

The Kantian Epistemology  
and Theism.



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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF  
PRINCETON COLLEGE FOR THE DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY,

...BY...

C. WISTAR ✓ HODGE, JR.

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The Theism reprinted from "The Presbyterian and Reformed  
Review" of July, 1894.

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## The Kantian Epistemology and Theism.

**M**ETAPHYSICS is the most human of all departments of knowledge. This can be seen from the fact that the first question of unreflective thought is the same as that which holds the chief place in philosophic reflection. Man looks within and without himself, upon his own thoughts and passions which come and go, out upon the phenomena of nature, and the question which comes nearest to the mind and heart of all is, What is real? Where are we to find the ground of phenomena? Reality there surely is, or else all philosophy would be vain. This is the great intuition of which the consciousness of every age is heir; but where is ultimate Reality to be found, and what is its nature? Such questions, from their very nature, are the first to suggest themselves to man, and when once he has consciously reflected upon them he becomes aware that not only are they logically and temporally the first questions for humanity, but that from the standpoint of worth for the human spirit, Metaphysics is that which man as a rational being must have. While humanity exists and strives, hopes and despairs, rejoices and sorrows, its own soul with its hope of immortality and belief in its freedom and responsibility, the world about it, and the God above must always be the questions of the greatest worth, and these are the questions of Metaphysics.

But while we reflect upon Being or Reality, its idea has been a part of our conscious experience, and were this not so we could not have reflected upon it. By the idea of the Real then alone can we solve our problems. Now the idea or conscious experience of Reality is knowledge, so that the problem of knowledge is inseparable from that of Being. The first question, then, which reflective thought puts itself as it proceeds to the solution of its fundamental problem is this,—Is knowledge possible?—and of course, the next question is,—If possible, how? In seeking an answer to these two questions it is to be remembered that knowledge has been defined as the idea, that is, the mind's grasp of Reality, so that any answer which makes knowledge anything less than this must be rejected. The first question was as to whether or not knowledge is possible

Now we will find that Kant's answer to the second question, as to how knowledge is possible, shows that we can't give a demonstrative answer to this question; but if we assume that knowledge is possible, then the answer to the question how it is possible will lead to a result which will justify our assumption of its possibility.

Kant has shown that no uncritical demonstration of the possibility of knowledge is possible. He was born in an age when two solutions of the problem of knowledge had been given, and both had reduced the organic process of experience to a mechanical basis.

The Rational Movement, beginning with DesCartes and ending with Wolff, had, though in a somewhat different way in each of its representatives, postulated a parallelism between thought and Being; and in Wolff the whole of knowing had been reduced to the making explicit those ideas which were already implicit in our concepts, thus overlooking the real question of how the individual mind can go outside itself and lay hold on Reality. Such purely analytic judgments as are yielded by such a method, says Kant, are subjectively necessary but do not increase our knowledge, for the question is,—How can we obtain objectivity and synthesis? Kant then breaks away from the formalism of Wolff and turns his attention to the Empirical school of Locke and Hume. His, though, is too great a mind to rest long in such a philosophy, and he shows plainly its weaknesses.

Mechanism reigns supreme here. The mind is a blank, the objects of knowledge are totally unrelated to and different from mind. They come into contact with our organs of sense and set up nervous excitations which, by some mysterious transformation, become conscious impressions, or rather impressions of which we are conscious. But an impression is merely subjective. We cannot say that it has any objective reference, if our sole source of information be our senses. Here, then, is a purely subjective fact, but there seem to be certain necessary connections between these impressions, and Hume saw that this necessity was the point for which he must give an account on his own premises; but he explained it in such a manner as to explain it away altogether. Such relations as identity and causality he reduced to subjective habits resulting from association, so that, strange as it may seem, in turning to the senses for objectivity, we end in a world of illusion, impressions coming and going, related to we know not what, their connections with one another being merely the result of habitual association. It is easy to see that knowledge has been rendered absolutely impossible, that we can no more assert the existence of matter than of mind, and that the most thorough skepticism must be the outcome of a mechanical and sensational Empiricism.

We cannot, then, from the contact of the objects of knowledge with our sense organs, nor by the analysis of our concepts, demonstrate the possibility of knowledge, that is, we cannot thus prove that our knowledge is real and objective, so that we must approach the problem in a different way. We must first ask the Kantian question how knowledge is possible, and the result will justify our assumption of its reality, that is, its possibility. How, then, is synthesis possible? How are judgments possible which are necessary and *a priori*, and at the same time synthetic and not merely analytic?

Two presuppositions are necessary. The first has been the great constructive work of Kant. It is the activity of mind. Mathematical science seems certain, and yet must fall if Hume gives the last word for philosophy. For mathematical judgments are synthetic and *a priori*. Judgments of geometry, while *a priori*, rest not on the analysis of concepts, but on the construction of a *priori* intuition by the productive imagination. So also is the case where time is involved instead of space. If, then, mathematical science be possible, Kant says that space and time must not be things or qualities of things, but forms of the mind, pure *a priori* intuitions. But if we advance further we will find that space and time are only forms for the possibility of the cognition of objects, and that with these alone we cannot refer our impressions to one object, nor can we cognize one object out of its relations in the context of our organic experience. We know objects only as a part of what we understand as nature with its necessary connections. Everything, then, must be cognized as necessary in its connections with the other objects of our conscious experience, and thus, according to Kant, impressions are referred *a priori* to objects, and objects are cognized in necessary relations with each other. The categories accomplish this. In the deduction of these we come to the great lesson to be learned from Kant. His deduction of the categories\* is substantially this: The conjunction of the manifold in an intuition can never be given by the senses. Neither is it contained in the form of pure intuition. It is given by the understanding in an act called synthesis. But the conception of a conjunction of the manifold includes that of unity, for conjunction is the unity of the manifold of sense, so that this synthetic unity renders conjunction possible.

Now this is not the category of unity because all the categories presuppose this original act of synthesis. This is the original activity of mind which has been laid down as one of the presuppositions necessary to knowledge. The "I think" is the synthesis of all impressions into one self-consciousness. It is that which gives objec-

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, chap. ii, sec. 2.

tivity to our judgments. It is that which illumines all things with the clear light of self-consciousness. To this unity all representations and impressions are to be related, and the media are the categories, hence their deduction, that is their justification as necessary elements in knowledge, is the fact that they are links to self-consciousness. Things, then, if there be such, which are not related to this objectifying self-consciousness, can never be known. For a theory of knowledge the first and last word must be self-consciousness. As Leibnitz \* says, "there is a light born within us." There has been too much criticism of Kant which seeks to make him a Berkeleyan idealist because he taught philosophy the great truth that things exist only in relation to self-consciousness. Such criticism fails to recognize the difference between psychological and transcendental idealism. Psychological idealism reduces everything to a dream of the individual mind, while transcendental idealism shows those universal rational principles which bind the mind to reality. Moreover criticism such as this does not realize the fact that Kant's great mistakes do not follow from this his great truth, but because he failed to recognize the fact that a second postulate necessary to knowledge,—that the real is rational,—is deducible and follows necessarily from this first truth. This we shall endeavor to show, and it is here that criticism should meet Kantism. Because all things exist in relation to self-consciousness, Kant's individualistic and sensationalistic presuppositions by no means follow. Critics therefore should praise him for his great lesson to philosophy.

But there is a second presupposition without which knowledge as here defined is impossible. It is that the real is rational. This is not to be confused with the assertion that the rational is the real, which is very different. That the real is rational, however, is essential for knowledge. If we discover self-consciousness with its activity and its categories, and then say that they are individual and human merely, differing from that which is universal, then that which was to give us reality and objectivity shuts us off from it, and we come to suppose that the *réal* is beyond us; that the world is dead matter which in some way causes impressions, that is, that it is noumenon in the negative sense of the term as that which is not the object of our sensuous intuition, and that noumena in the positive sense as objects of non-sensuous intuition are separated from us and out of all relation, not knowable because not mechanically known. The real must be rational, and the true nature of self-consciousness and knowledge must be recognized. If Kant's great

\* Leibnitz, *On the Supersensuous Element in Knowledge and On the Immaterial in Nature*. A letter to Queen Charlotte of Prussia, 1702. Vol. of translations of the Philosophical works of Leibnitz by G. Duncan.

lesson, that things exist only in relation to self-consciousness, be true, and if self-consciousness be an activity and hence a real element in Being, then this second postulate follows necessarily from the first, so that if we follow logically Kant's own principle and the spirit of his system, we will reach a different conclusion than that which he did. The causes of his failure to take this farther step can be traced to the fact that he accepted the presuppositions of the very school he was endeavoring to refute and against which the whole spirit of his teaching points. After having shown that objects cannot exist out of relation to self-consciousness, Kant presupposes that knowledge is a mechanical process, the putting together of factors which are separate, hence he must choose which of his two factors is the real one, and he turns round in contradiction to his own teaching and says that the real is that which affects our senses, so that the next step is to say that self-consciousness as known is a mere phenomenon of the internal sense, and that the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is only a logical notion. Then of course the breach can never be healed, all the work of mind is individual and subjective, the impression of sense, which he has really shown cannot exist, is the only source from which the mental forms can have content, so that the real world lies as a sphere of dead "things in themselves" which are unrelated to thought, noumena in the negative sense as already explained, while noumena in the positive sense are beyond even the possibility of the assertion of their existence. Against this is the whole spirit of Kant's teaching as to the activity of mind, for if self-consciousness is a spiritual activity how can it be unreal? We are led by Kant's own teaching on this first point to accept the second presupposition essential for knowledge, that the real is rational.

Not only is the spirit of the whole Critique against the assumptions which hold Kant back, but also it is opposed to their bad fruits at every stage in the discussion. If the whole idea of the Critique is that things exist only in relation to self-consciousness then there is always an original synthesis previous to all analysis, so that knowledge may have a universal and a particular aspect, but in reality the two are one. Knowledge is an organic process and not a mechanical one, and the impression of sense which Kant got from Hume, so far from being the real element in knowledge, does not exist at all for consciousness, and things are only known as parts of an organic system. Hence in following the spirit of Kant's teaching we should do away with these false presuppositions. At every step moreover are the bad results of these assumptions contrary to the spirit of his teaching. Of course we cannot follow this out in detail, but will choose two points, which are of special im-

portance in relation to Theism, to show how the latter contradicts the spirit in Kant, and how if we admit the necessity for the mind's activity, we are lead into contradictions if we deny its universality and reality, that is that the real is rational. The first and most important point in a theory of knowledge is, as we have seen, self-consciousness. Now the real is rational here, knowing and being meet at this point. Self-consciousness is objective consciousness. We have seen how Kant's presuppositions lead him to overlook this. But if it is an activity how can it be a mere logical notion? Let us examine its true nature, and study a little more closely this, Kant's fundamental mistake.

If knowledge is to be ontological there must be some point where knowing and being meet. This point is objective self-consciousness. But Kant argues that as knowledge is a process in which the content of the categories must be given by sense intuition, hence the only reality for knowledge is that which impresses the inner or outer sense, so that Being is out of relation to our faculties, and hence all our knowledge is phenomenal. But he saw that the categories must belong to some subject other than the empirical self of the inner sense which they determine, but the metempirical self is an empty idea. Thus he argues,\* with reference to the "possibility of a conjunction of the manifold representations given in sense" that the presupposition of all is "the original synthetic unity of apperception." This is an admission of the "*cogito ergo sum*" of DesCartes, only that Kant makes it an empty idea because it can't be presented to the inner sense. Thus under the "Paralogism of Pure Reason" † we find him saying, "If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition, we must have at the basis of the cognition a permanent intuition as the indispensable condition of its objective reality." In other words, the only substance is that which is object only, and that too to sense, so that as the inner sense only gives my phenomenal self, that is, my flowing states of consciousness, of course the Ego is a mere necessity of conception. If he had realized that the real is rational, that the Ego is real because it acts and thinks, he would have been saved his mistake. There is no contradiction between Idealism and Realism when the terms are properly used. Prof. Morris says ‡ that we must accept Kant's conclusion as to the Ego if we accept his presupposition that an object of knowledge can be given only by sense. If the mechanical relation

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Deduction of the Categories."

† Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, p. 244.

‡ Morris, *A Critique of Kant*, chap. on "The Paralogism of Pure Reason."

between subject and object be maintained, then subject and object can only be conceived as opposites; whatever is purely and absolutely objective can never be subjective and *vice versa*. Therefore, *ex hypothesi*, the absolute subject can never become object. But if we realize the truth that the I is conscious of itself only as existing, then there is seen to be a vital connection between thought and being. Being is in closest relation with my conscious life, and we need not presuppose a thing in itself out of all relation to my faculties. But as this is so vital a point in a theory of knowledge, the exact relation of the "*cogito*" and the "*sum*" should be determined. What then is the relation between the thought and the I? In the first place, those who have criticised the "*cogito ergo sum*" as a piece of syllogistic reasoning have missed the point. Then the major, to use the language of Prof. Veitch,\* would be the abstract proposition, "thinking is existing," and this, Prof. Veitch says, is erroneously to suppose a purely abstract beginning for thought, for "if I am able to say, I am conscious that all thinking is existing, the guarantee even of this major or universal is the particular affirmation of my being conscious of its truth in a given time; if I am not able to say this, then I cannot assert that all thinking is existing, or indeed assert anything at all." But, as Prof. Veitch shows, it is an immediate inference, or, more correctly, I think, it is an act of direct consciousness, so that Huxley's objection that the "I am" is assumed in the "I think" will not hold. Let me quote Prof. Veitch † again: "That something called I exists, is not known to me before I am conscious, but only as I am conscious. It is not a distinct proposition. 'Something called thought exists' is not any more a distinct proposition, for the thought which exists is inseparably my thought, and my thought is more than the mere abstraction 'thought.' 'The thought is the result of the action of the I' is not a fair statement of the relation between the 'I' and the 'thought,' for there is no 'I' known first and distinct from thought, to whose action I can ascribe thought. The thought is me thinking. And the existence of the thought would never be absolutely indubitable to me unless it were my thought, for if it be but thought, this is an abstraction with which I have and can have no relation. 'How do you know that thought is not self-existent?' that is divorced from a me or thinker, for this reason, simply that such a thought could never be mine, or ought to me or my knowledge. Thought divorced from a thinker would be not so much an absurdity as a nullity." The significance of this

\* Veitch, "Introduction to DesCartes," published in Veitch's translation of DesCartes' *Discourse on Method and Meditations*.

† Veitch, "Introduction to DesCartes."

for Philosophy is very plain. It is this: In the very first act of knowledge there is a necessary and vital connection between knowing and being within our consciousness. They imply each other. Hence Reality is spiritual, and there is no ground for the positing of lifeless "things in themselves" which can never be known, and no more ground is there for regarding as unreal that which we do know. Thought and being are thus together from the very first, and Kant's doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception is wrong. But there is another lesson quite as important for Philosophy taught us here. We learn that all consciousness is personal consciousness. The two are inseparable, and there is no such thing as consciousness in the abstract. Existence is personal conscious existence. It is to the greatest degree concrete. There is no such thing as pure, unconscious, qualityless being, coming by a necessary evolution to be clothed upon with concreteness. Philosophy must start with Being as known in our self-consciousness, otherwise we cannot know the nature of Being, and we cannot evolve it by any extra conscious way. We do not wish to be misunderstood here. For while the very point of our criticism of Kant is that he never transcends individual human consciousness, we still believe that Dr. Caird\* is mistaken when he says that if we take our stand in individual consciousness we can never transcend it. On the contrary, the truth is this, that if we do not start with our self-consciousness we can never know the nature of Reality. If, however, we do thus start, we find principles which have a necessity which must come from a source above our individual consciousness, showing that it is in harmony with Universal Consciousness.

We must give only a very brief space in showing the contradictions involved in denying that the real is rational in the case of space and time, that is knowledge in the sphere of perception, and pass on to Kant's doctrine of causality as being of special importance in relation to Theism, and furnishing a general example of the categories.

As to space and time. The difficulties at this part of Kant's discussion spring from the same source. The critical position in the "Analytic" is that objects exist only in relation to self-consciousness and in relation to each other. In the "Aesthetic," however, Kant seems to hold it possible that objects be given and the intelligible or intellectual relations added afterwards. Hence that which is *a priori* must be merely subjective, and if anything is objective it must be a "thing" or a "quality of a thing" given by the senses. Now space and time must be *a priori* in order that we may have synthetic judgments *a priori* in Mathematics, and consequently they

\* Caird, *The Philosophy of Kant*.

cannot be "things" or "qualities of things," and must therefore be merely subjective. Now it seems almost needless to repeat that all this comes from the mere assumption that the real is that which is given by the senses, and that when this assumption is done away with, the separation of *a priori* and *a posteriori* in knowledge vanishes, and with it the belief that that which is *a priori* must be subjective. We may hold to the *a priori* character of space and time, and at the same time on Kantian principles show their objectivity by recognizing the truth that objects must be in space and time or they could not exist, much less be known, and that without sensationalistic presuppositions there is no reason for postulating any other reality in this sphere. In criticising Kant's doctrine of space and time, Trendelenburg\* has shown the entire compatibility of *a prioriness* and objectivity, though he destroys the original element in them by trying to derive both from motion which, of course, really presupposes both. In order to illustrate what has been said and to show the contradiction involved in denying that reality is rational in reference to the world in space and time, we cannot do better than quote Dr. Ueberweg:† "The subjective element in sense perception cannot be separated from the objective in this way, namely that space and time can be referred to the subject only, or its material to external things affecting our senses. For on this presupposition, although it would be necessary to apprehend the matter of sense perception in any form of space and time, each particular matter would not be referred back to each particular form, and consequently might be perceived in another form from that in which it actually appears, without having undergone any real change. But in perception we feel ourselves actually confined to the union of definite forms with definite matters." Similar also is the position of Herbart.‡ Here, then, is a confirmation of the necessity of recognizing the second presupposition as stated, and a clear view of the difficulties involved in its denial.

The categories come next. They are a part of the mind's synthetic activity, the first presupposition necessary for knowledge, so ably expounded by Kant. Their function in knowledge, as he sets it forth, has been stated. But we have now to look at the contradictions involved in denying that the real is rational, that Reason is Ontologic. Kant's only ground for asserting the individual and subjective character of the categories is a contradiction. Impressions of sense are unreal. The forms of sensibility are only potentialities, so that the categories are necessary to give reality to knowledge.

\* Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, § 6.

† Ueberweg, *Logic*, p. 80.

‡ Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. ii, p. 271.

Such is the first position taken by Kant, and the next is that knowledge is phenomenal just because the categories are necessary, whence a human element is introduced producing subjectivity. On such a contradiction rests the doctrine of their subjective and phenomenal character. But it should be observed that only the necessity for the categories is shown, not their individual and subjective character. In order to see how untenable is the doctrine of the subjectivity of the categories, it will be best to take as an example of them that of causality, as this is most intimately connected with Theism, and it will be necessary in examining Kant's Theistic discussion, to know his exact view of causality. In his discussion of causality Kant is endeavoring to answer Hume. It is necessary to notice that Kant's method of dealing with the problem is to first write as though he admitted the precritical position that we have through perception experience of a series of events while the understanding then adds the elements of universality and necessity, then later to advance to his own position that the work of the understanding itself is necessary to perception. Hume had seen that the nerve of causality lay in the necessity therein involved. This he had entirely explained away by reducing it to a mere subjective habit of association. Kant saw that even granting that we could have experience of objects through perception alone, this could give knowledge only of matters of fact, but no necessity of connection. Granting that we could perceive that one event follows another, we could never say that it must always do so. If, then, this cannot be given by perception, and yet is a fact, as Hume admitted when he sought an explanation for it, we must seek it in the synthetic activity of thought, in a concept of the understanding. But from a concept we can never advance our knowledge by an analysis of its implicit content. We must have a proof that this category can be applied to real objective sequences. This is given in the proof of the "Second Analogy."\* Kant is to prove that "all changes take place according to the law of connection of cause and effect." His proof in substance is as follows: Mere experience of succession is dependent on the *a priori* judgment of causality. For in all empirical cognition there is a synthesis of the manifold by the productive imagination, but this synthesis may have the events in any order, either progressively or retrogressively. But in order that it may have objective validity the events must be represented as they occur in time. Now they occur in time in a necessarily determined order; therefore in order that reality may be given to the sequence, this necessary order must be given by the category of causality determined in time *a priori* as invariable sequence. The proof, then, consists in

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, p. 141.

simply this. In the first place we admittedly have subjective sequences of our perceptions, as in the case of the perception of a house where the sensations must be successive because our consciousness is subject to time, but where the order is arbitrary. We do admittedly experience objective sequences where the order is not arbitrary but invariable, and just this is their distinguishing mark. Kant now asks how this latter kind are possible. Not, he says, by mere perception, since this gives nothing objective without the understanding. Not from the pure concept which can only make explicit by analysis that which a previous synthesis has given it, and which can never prove that causality can be in objects. Experience of this objective sequence, then, is possible only from the fact that we determine the category of causality in time as invariable sequence.

Such seems the meaning of this passage which has aroused so much discussion and about which opinions so various have been held. Adamson\* says that Kant cannot be trying to show how invariable sequence is possible, because he is endeavoring to prove that all experience of change is possible only by means of the causal category. "In order that any change be determined "as existing in time" it must be determined according to the law of cause and effect. So Adamson concludes that the problem is to show how experience of any change at all is possible. But Kant is trying to show that all experience of real or objective changes, as distinct from those due to the arbitrary play of our imagination and therefore subjective, is subject to the causal law; and it is just this irreversibility which is their distinguishing mark, hence this distinction is just Kant's point, so far from leading to a confusion, as Adamson claims. Certainly Kant is trying to prove that all changes in an ordered objective experience are subject to this law, and, as Adamson says, it would be contrary to his whole position to hold otherwise; but of course the question is limited to that coördinated and related experience which is the sphere of knowledge. Dr. Stirling † takes a different view, but Prof. Watson ‡ criticises Stirling and takes a position very similar to the one just stated. Dr. Stirling says that Kant holds that through perception we have a knowledge of events in sequences and then by means of the causal category determine some as necessary and invariable, and then Stirling objects that if there were not some necessary order or connection in the events themselves we could not know when to

\* Adamson, *The Philosophy of Kant*, Lecture ii.

† Stirling, articles entitled "Kant Has Not Answered Hume," published in *Mind*, Vols. ix and x.

‡ Watson, *Kant and His English Critics*, chap. vii.

apply the category. Watson says that Stirling has not understood Kant, who holds that no experience of the objective sequence of objects or events can be had at all without the aid of the understanding, and that so far from trying to show when we are to determine sequences as objective, Kant is really asserting that we can have no experience of objective sequence at all without the category. Prof. Watson seems to us to be right and the criticism of Dr. Stirling wide of the mark. But nevertheless the Kantian proof is open to criticism. The question at once suggests itself as to whether this invariable sequence is causality. While it is invariable sequence in one sense, it is not the invariable sequence of causality. To illustrate this, take an example of subjective sequence such as that mentioned by Kant with reference to the perception of the parts of a house where the sequence is arbitrary in order. Now, in comparison with this, Kant's sequence is truly invariable; for example, in one single instance the events happen in a certain order which is invariable in that one case, but not necessarily so when the same events happen again; so that they are invariable only in a sense very different from that in which a true causal sequence may be said to be invariable. Either Kant must mean invariable sequence in one instance only as distinct from the play of fancy, and then he has not proved causality; or if he has proven causality, then he has done away with the possibility of the experience of non-causal sequences which we undoubtedly have. There must be, then, some mark by which to distinguish the causal sequence from the invariable sequence of Kant. It is found in the dynamic notion of efficiency and force. The omission of this idea is the fundamental defect in the Kantian doctrine on this subject. He holds, in the case where the "leaden ball" produces a hole in the "cushion," that it is the definite order in time which brings it about that the hole in the cushion would not produce the leaden ball, thus making a very minute distinction of an order in time where there is not necessarily a lapse of time. But these two things, the ball and cushion in contact, exist absolutely simultaneously. Hence it is not the order, but the want of energy or force in one instance, and the presence of it in the other, which makes the real difference between them. This shows that there is some objectivity in causation other than that shown by Kant. There is an objective efficiency in one thing independently of the finite mind which is not in another. The dynamic idea is all important for science, so we see that Kant's doctrine of causation is unsatisfactory for science. We must bear this in mind when we come to his Theism, for if a doctrine of causation is inadequate for science, it must be wrong *a fortiori* to use it in the Metaphysical sphere.

Taking this, then, as an example of all the categories, we conclude, first, that there is a unity of organic experience, and, secondly, an objectivity of the categories, both different from that held by Kant. As to the first of these points, Caird\* shows that the unity given in Kant's doctrine of the understanding is not a necessary but only an accidental one. If the consciousness of self is consciousness of synthesis, and if this is judgment, then the Ego and its categories cannot be separated; and if thought itself is synthetic, and must go out of itself, then the understanding cannot be separated from sense. The unity of conscious experience is not the mechanical putting together of separate parts, but the differentiating consciousness of that which is already united; the recognition of the distinctions in that which is a unity in diversity. And secondly, although nature depends on Mind and is the revelation of an idea, yet it is independent of the finite mind. The cosmic order is one where forces are playing independently of our mind; forces which will crush us if we come in their path. The reaction from the eighteenth century, where this view was so exaggerated, and where the spontaneity of the individual was annihilated, where in cognition things must impress our blank minds, and where in morality we are in the chains of physical necessity, the reaction from all this so grandly expressed by Kant is carried too far. There is a necessity in the categories which bespeaks an origin other than our finite minds. Nor is this a return to the old position that things exist and are perceived apart from the understanding and the spontaneity of thought which then adds on, as it were, necessity. On the contrary, it is the assertion that the work of thought cannot be separated from perception, and also that the Cosmos is not a dead thing as in the philosophy which Kant was criticising; it is the assertion of its intelligibility, that it is built on the framework of reason, the product of mind, immanent with rationality, so that the finite mind finds its forms in it, thus reaching truth which is objective and at the same time making possible "synthetic judgments *a priori*." To say that the Cosmos is independent of our finite minds is not to say that it is independent of the Universal Mind. The alternative is before us; we must presuppose that reality is rational or we must go back to Hume. Kant's position is not tenable. His objectivity consists in being a distinction from feeling and sensation, it cannot logically be independent of the human consciousness. Dr. Harris† has given forcible expression to the train of thought which we have been following. He says: "It is only because the constitution of the universe is accordant with these principles and its on-going regulated by them,

\* Caird, *The Philosophy of Kant*, p. 381.

† Harris, *The Philosophical Basis of Theism*, p. 121.

that the universe is a Cosmos and not a chaos. They are the 'flammania moenia mundi,'\* the flaming bulwarks of the universe, which no power, not even though almighty, can break through or destroy, and within which the Cosmos lies in the light of rational truth, and moves in the harmony and order of rational law to the realization of rational ideals and ends. Thus the principles of Reason, together with the truths inferred from them, and the ideals and ends determined by them, are the archetypes of Nature."

In view of all the preceding we are forced to conclude that if Hume is to be answered and refuted, it is not by one of the two postulates of knowledge laid down, but by both together. Thus the Kantian limit of knowledge with reference to noumena in the negative sense, that is, with reference to the mysterious unknowable "things" which cause in some way our sensations, has been removed, and it has been removed by showing that on Kant's own principles no such "things" can exist and that the world of our knowledge is the real world. This is the teaching of the Neo-Kantians.

But there next arises the question as to noumena in the positive sense, that is, as to objects of "non-sensuous intuition." Kant saw that man has a faculty of Reason above the understanding, the supreme category of this reason being unity. Man in seeking unity is not satisfied with the system of nature whose unity is a concatenation of law. So that the activity of mind once shown, the natural course of mental necessity leads us to demand the unconditioned. Here is the point where the critic of Kant who is familiar with post-Kantian Philosophy must praise him and show that, although his system was the forerunner of British Kantism, such was not the spirit of his system. Hamilton † praises Kant for his Agnostic position, but criticises him for maintaining that the idea of the unconditioned is natural to the human mind and something positive, instead of showing that it is merely a negation of the conditioned. Kant is greater than his followers. He recognizes the force of Reason, and seeks to leave his ideas in a position that can be vindicated by the Practical Reason. But the grave defects in his system must bear their fruit here also, and a brief survey of them will prepare the way for a consideration of his discussion on Theism or Rational Theology. Reason demands the unconditioned unity in a series of conditions, Kant tells us.‡ It seeks this by syllogisms \* which proceed through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned. Thus

\* Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, i, 73.

† Hamilton, *Essay on the Unconditioned*.

‡ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," § 3.

it reaches the subject which can never be predicate, the unconditioned unity of all phenomena, and unconditioned unity of all things. Thus we get Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology. But reason must regard these as merely empty ideas for producing a higher unity than that of the understanding. Reason cannot assert the reality of these ideas, because she has no grounds for so doing.

Now, in the first place, Kant is to be criticised for making the ideas of Reason mere logical universals, thus making them as abstract instead of as concrete as possible. He is wrong in seeking them through syllogisms, and this leads him into his difficulty. Cousin's \* book makes this the main point of the whole discussion. We find Kant thus separating the understanding and Reason, as he had the understanding and sense. But it is not through syllogisms that we reach these ideas. They are immanent, involved in the scientific cognition of the understanding. We cannot recognize the categories without also recognizing the spiritual Ego whose activity they are, nor without recognizing the Cosmos which they constitute, while the knowledge of all this as relative involves the recognition of the demand of Reason for Absolute and Unitary Being. And right here we meet another confusion of Kant's. He gets the idea of the Cosmos from the unity of phenomena, and the idea of God from the unity of "things in themselves." This is not the true distinction. The way which seems more accurate is to recognize the function of Reason in the sphere of the Relative, demanding a relative noumenon or ground, and its function in the Rational stage proper demanding the Absolute as the ground of all Relativity both in its phenomenal and noumenal aspects.

In the second place we have to consider Kant's doctrine of the limit of knowledge as not extending to these ideas, and of their purely subjective character. One source of this doctrine has been removed in showing their concreteness and that they are not merely logical universals. But Kant's chief reason for denying knowledge of these is the same which has held him back from the full truth all along. It is his failure to recognize that reality is rational, and the false presupposition that reality is given by sense. Then the conclusion is inevitable that these ideas of Reason are empty because they cannot have a content of sense intuitions. But if we recognize the spiritual nature of reality this presupposition is done away with, and all ground for denying a knowledge of rational ideas goes with it. Then there is no reason for saying that sensation is necessary for all knowledge because it is necessary for a certain kind, the only ground for such a statement being this very presupposi-

\* Cousin, *The Philosophy of Kant.*

tion. If, then, we deny the possibility of knowledge in the sphere of Reason we deny that the real is rational, and if we deny this we can have no knowledge in the sphere of science, so that we must conclude that the postulates necessary to render knowledge possible in scientific cognition make it possible in all spheres. Again we must say either Hume or a knowledge of the ideas of Reason, Kant's half-way position is untenable.

We leave the Rational stage within the sphere of the Relative which demands the recognition of the relative noumena, and turn to the sphere of Reason proper which demands the Absolute as the ground of all Relativity. Reason's category unity cannot be satisfied with two relative noumena, and moreover the consciousness of ourselves as dependent and finite, involves the knowledge that Absolute Being must exist. This is the first great truth of Philosophy, that back of the Relative exists Absolute Being. But immediately questions of the greatest importance press upon us. What is the nature of Absolute Being? Can it be known? The importance of these questions cannot well be exaggerated. The importance of the former for the problem of knowledge, which we have been considering, is fundamental. The complete justification of the assumption that the real is rational will depend upon the determination of the Absolute as self-conscious, personal Spirit. We may define the Absolute as existing out of all relation to the Relative and as including all possible modes of Being, or as the One Substance, or Unconscious Idea, the result of which will be to give the Absolute a nature which has no warrant for its truth in experience, a nature such that all knowledge of it is impossible under those categories in which we must have knowledge of it if we can know it at all. The conclusion must be that if the Absolute is out of all relation to us we can never attain any knowledge of it, and that if Being is identical with Non-being or Nothing, the whole process of knowledge has its formal basis in logic taken away, and the Absolute of this Philosophy becomes the Unknowable of the Agnostics who have been led to their position from the Metaphysical standpoint by just this definition of the Absolute as the negation of all that we can know. But, on the other hand, if Absolute Being is God, a self-conscious personal Spirit, then the postulates of knowledge are fully justified. Knowledge we saw was impossible on the supposition that there was any reality other than the content of our objective ideas, that in reality is that which is the direct object of our consciousness and there is no thing in itself which makes this unreal or phenomenal. But in order that we may show that this is knowledge in the true sense, we must show that the world is the product of Intelligence; for if an intelligent idea is not immanent

in it, it cannot be in direct relation to consciousness as the object of its knowledge, and our knowledge is subjective after all. Also if the Absolute be not more completely determined its unknowability must follow. Religion and Morality are also at stake. Everything depends on holding right ideas as to the relation of man, the world, and God. If they are not kept distinct, Religion and Morality, which have to do with the relation of the individual to God and Duty, suffer. If on the other hand, these three ideas are isolated and out of mutual relations our knowledge of all that is unphenomenal becomes impossible. Now it is only God and not an abstraction such as Absolute Being which can stand in proper relation to man and the world. As Coleridge, the poet-philosopher puts it:

“ ’Tis the sublime of man,  
Our noontide majesty, to know ourselves  
Parts and proportions of one wondrous whole !  
This fraternizes man, this constitutes  
Our charities and bearings. But ’tis God  
Diffused through all, that doth make all one whole.”

The Absolute Being must be of such a nature as to reveal Himself to us in all the relations involved in Knowledge, Morality, and Religion. We must choose between the doctrine “*Omnis determinatio est negatio*,” and that of Leibnitz, who says:\* “The perfections of God are those of our own souls, but He possesses them without bounds. He is an ocean from whom we have received but a few drops. There is some power, some knowledge, some goodness in us, but they are whole and entire in God. Order, proportions and harmony enchant us; painting and music are samples of them. God is all order. He always keeps an exquisite justness of proportions. He creates the universal harmony. All beauty is an expansion of His rays.” From what has been said it will be seen that it is necessary that the Absolute be Spirit. But this notion involves first intelligence, and secondly energizing activity in accordance with a moral nature. Now these two notions involve those of self-consciousness and personality, and thus the highest metaphysic accords with experience for, while we know unconscious states of self-conscious spirit, we do not know unconscious spirit, and that which we do know by direct introspection is conscious and personal. Lotze teaches us that experience justifies the position we have stated. He says,† “We cannot, however, for a moment admit that this conception of an unconscious Spirit has in this sense any real meaning whatever. We cannot, indeed, deny that there are within our spiritual life unconscious states and processes, but it does not follow

\* Leibnitz, *Essais de Theodicée*, quoted by Saisset, *Modern Pantheism*.

† Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 55.

that these, as unconscious, and as at the same time states of a Spirit, ever occur except in those beings which are by nature conscious spirits. We must only look upon them as cases in which a conscious, spiritual life is arrested or limited." We have learned, then, that for the sake of the gravest interests of humanity, the Absolute must be recognized as a self-conscious and personal spirit, and from Lotze we have learned that this accords with experience. Moreover the solution of all subsequent questions of Metaphysics will have a character determined by the way in which this first question is settled. It is not enough to say that the Ultimate Reality is spirit. The whole Hegelian movement was anti-materialistic, but because it failed to attribute self-consciousness and personality to Absolute Being, it could not grasp the fact of Creation in any other way than that of the necessary evolution of the Absolute, thus losing all the Reality of the Relative, the consequences of which in the sphere of Religion and Morality being too obvious to require stating. Thus the doctrine of creation and with it that of the human psyche and the Cosmos, depend on the question at issue. Furthermore Being which is nothing, is an abstraction which can never become clothed upon with concreteness unless it have in it a necessary principle of movement, but if it is Non-being or Nothing how can we say that there is a living dialectic in it, and why is not Agnosticism a more logical development from such a doctrine than Hegelianism? If Metaphysic is to be at all possible in any true sense, we must have God as the starting point and not the culmination only. Thus the question to be discussed and in which we are to seek the cure for Agnosticism, should at the same time be a corrective for the Pantheism of Hegel. That Agnosticism and Pantheism are to have the same remedy does not seem strange when we reflect that it was the defect of Kantism which led on to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This same point should be one of correction for the school of thinkers who think that the problem of knowledge is to be solved by breaking away from the individualistic tendencies of Kant, but who are not careful to avoid his abstraction. It is not by avoiding any one cause of the Kantian limitations that we can hope to find a satisfactory solution of the problem of knowledge. It can be done only by a careful consideration of the merits and failures revealed by the history of thought. Kant has shown that the categories and synthetic unity of apperception are necessary for knowledge. But this self-consciousness was human and moreover only an empty notion. Now, says the school in question, the rational is the real, so for the individual thought without a thinker substitute a Universal Idea or spiritual principle without transcendent personality, and the problem is solved. But when we

have a principle which is merely the unity of subject and object, and when we have substituted the universal thought for the individual we are no farther away from abstractions. At the very outset we said that for Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception" was to be substituted the concrete, individual, self-conscious, personal "I," so now it is this "I" which should be raised to universality, and not the abstraction of Kant. The problem is to be solved in such a way that we can say that our thoughts are the correct ideas of reality, and not by the identification of the rational and the real, for, while we have claimed that a necessary postulate of knowledge is that the real is rational, it by no means follows that the rational is the real in the sense that the two spheres are identical and co-extensive, for reality as spirit is far wider than mere thought. Moreover, when we have said that Kant's acknowledgment of the spiritual activity of the ego leads us to link our organic experience or knowledge to a real noumenal subject which is concrete, instead of to the acceptance of Kant's own doctrine which was the result of presuppositions contrary to the spirit of his system, we have, I think, shown that Neo Kantism,\* as represented by such men as Cohen, Lange, and Vaihinger, is not a true development of the spirit of Kantism. These men say, and rightly too, we think, that on Kantian principles there can be no thing in itself in the Kantian sense, this is a mere category to complete experience; but then they accept Kant's doctrine of the merely logical and subjective character of the ego, and so hypostatize experience, resting it on nothing. Here is abstraction again. If the spirit of Kant has taught us anything, it has taught us that the noumenal reality of the ego is necessary to experience so that we have an anchorage at once immanent and transcendent. But now having done away with the abstract Kantian thing in itself, the complete justification of our belief that the Cosmos or world of our knowledge is the real world, depends on whether or not the Absolute is a Personal Spirit who can be at once immanent and transcendent, and create the Cosmos according to principles with which He has endowed His creatures. Having a belief in ourselves and God we have no difficulty in accepting the fact that it is by Reason and not by sense that we get the reality of the Cosmos, and are content to let Psychologists debate as long as they will.

Furthermore it was the abstract and *a priori* definition of the Absolute in a way which has no justification in experience which led Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel to Agnosticism. Abstraction is the bane of all true Philosophy. We have just

\* See Stählin, *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl*; also Seth, article entitled "The Epistemology of Neo Kantism," *Philosophical Review* for May, 1893.

mentioned Agnosticism. Its cure lies just at this point. Kant's question was that of knowledge, and so we are especially concerned with this relation of Theism to Epistemology. The immediate cause of Agnosticism is Epistemological, that is the subjectivity of the human Reason, but the cause of this is the identification of the Absolute with Non-being or pure abstraction. Are the categories, which render possible synthetic judgments *a priori*, those of God who created the Universe rational and placed in our mind the frame work of reality, or are they merely individual forms, and we thus forever shut up to Kantism? The answer to this depends on our determination of the Absolute as a self-conscious and personal Spirit, for only such a Being can be self-revealing, and, as has been said, if men are left with a reason which differs essentially from reason Universal, to grope after God, they must end in despair, and everywhere will be found altars "to the unknown God." But if He be a self-conscious, personal Spirit then is He near to each one of us and every way to Him is one which He Himself has made and which humanity has but to traverse. Reason, the great emotions common to all humanity, Science, Morality and Religion, every road will lead us to Him, humanity will be filled with His presence, and Philosophy's main problem will be solved.

There is another thought which will help us in examining Kant's Theism, and which is suggested by the two movements resulting from his system, and which have been mentioned. Both transcendental Idealism and Agnosticism stand alike open to criticism for making Being Nothing, but there is another point of view in which they differ totally, and from which a lesson of vital importance in examining Kant will be gained. The difference between the two systems mentioned may be expressed by the word immanence. The Agnosticism of Spencer, besides coming from his abstract definition of the Absolute, results also from the fact that he thinks that he can explain the world by matter and a Relative Force, so that the Absolute stands apart and is unknowable. But in Hegelianism the case is entirely different. The Absolute is everything to this system. Immanence is the profound truth to be learned from this system, and which, if rightly apprehended, will do away with Agnosticism. Kant's God is only transcendent, and his doctrine must be transcended in a system which will recognize the truth of immanence, and the great question now is how can we have an immanent and at the same time a transcendent God, and a world and creatures distinct from Him and finite. If we ascribe self-consciousness and personality to God, and realize that this involves a consciousness of self as distinct from both nature and

other personalities, then God can be conceived as separate from, as well as revealed in, nature and the human psyche. Transcendence is not to be lost sight of in emphasizing immanence; we must have a God above as well as in man and nature or we must give up Ethics, yes, and Christianity too, for there is not one Bible doctrine that can stand if only immanence be true. But immanence is only half the truth. There is no opposition between immanence and transcendence. But only a self-conscious and personal God can be at the same time immanent and transcendent.

Now the true nature of Theism which holds fast both immanence and transcendence, and can show that they are not mutually exclusive ideas because God is self-conscious and personal, needs emphasis. No less a thinker than Schopenhauer has not grasped it, and he speaks of the far-away Unknowable of Agnosticism and the mechanically conceived God of the eighteenth-century Deism as though they were the God of Theism, saying that before Kant there was a dilemma between Materialism and Theism, but that Kant has given us a starting point for a third alternative which will free us from the dilemma. He says:\* "Before Kant there was a real dilemma between Materialism and Theism, that is, between the supposition that either a blind fate, or an Intelligence directing things from the outside according to ends and concepts, had brought the world into being, nor was there any third alternative. . . . But now Kant, by his profound distinction between phenomenon and the thing in itself, has taken the foundation from Theism, and has opened the way on the other hand to an entirely different and more profound interpretation of Being." Here we see that Schopenhauer has misunderstood Theism. It is true that Kant has "taken away the foundation" from the theory that an Intelligence directing in a mechanical way from without is at the ground of things, but this is Deism and not Theism. Now between Materialism and Theism rightly understood as including both immanence and transcendence, our choice has still, and always will have to be made, for, as Schopenhauer says, Kant has driven us from Deism, and we cannot accept any theory which recognizes only immanence because personality and self-consciousness are ultimates. The answer of Schopenhauer to the great question is no better than that of Hegel, for we cannot say that the *Ding an sich* is blind will striving to be, because will separated from Intelligence is as much of an abstraction and impossibility as Being which is Nothing and has to "become" before it can really and self-consciously be. If it could be so, despair would be the last word of Philosophy. Amid the deep sorrows of life and its daily cares which sometimes seem

\* Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, p 608.

so heavy, instead of hope to sustain men, the best that they could do would be to cease to will to live. Between Theism, then, and the "blinder Zufall" our choice must be made. Blind chance or Intelligence, and not Intelligence merely but personal self-conscious Intelligence, for here alone immanence and transcendence can unite.

It is clear, then, that the interests nearest the heart of humanity depend on whether or not the Absolute Being is God, that is a self-conscious and personal Spirit.

The question, then, is whether the Absolute of Philosophy is God, that is, a self-conscious, personal Spirit.

The question now comes up as to whether there is any *a priori* reason for believing that this is so. Reason gives an affirmative answer. Her supreme category is Unity. A complete and absolute Unity must be attained. Now there are the spheres of nature and of freedom. But nature is independent of our finite wills. If therefore all we can say is that Absolute Being exists, the dualism between nature and freedom cannot be done away with. The only possible unity is one where the ends of freedom are realized in nature, and this can be only if nature is controlled by a Unitary Being which is active for ends, directing nature for the realization of these ends of freedom. Mechanism is not chance but law, and the idea of law includes in it that of an end. Thus mechanism leads by necessity to Teleology, and the only unity is a teleological one where self-conscious intelligence and will is subjecting Mechanism to its own ends. The supreme unity is found when Mechanism and Teleology harmonize in the nature of a Being who is the source of both moral and natural law. Reason is satisfied only where the heart is satisfied, in the belief and knowledge that above all is one personal, self-conscious Spirit, the Absolute God who has predetermined all things for the realization of His own glory and the well-being of humanity. Kant recognizes this *a priori* necessity. He argues\* that the Absolute must be conceived as one and individual because it is the primal source of all things; and in another place,† he tells us that the highest unity is a teleological one so that Intelligence must be predicated of the Absolute. In fact the connecting link of Kant's whole system is Teleology. He sets forth Nature and her categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and after leaving noumena beyond the reach of knowledge so that we cannot even say that they exist, he shows us that they exist and opens up the world of freedom in the *Critique of Practical Reason*; but he connects the two spheres in his *Critique of Judgment* by means of the Teleologi-

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," Bk. ii, chap. iii, § 2.

† *Critique of Pure Reason*, Appendix to the "Transcendental Dialectic."

cal judgment which reflects on nature as though she were subject to a Supreme Intelligence and realizing the ends of freedom. But with Kant an *a priori* necessity is only a subjective one. To say that anything is a *priori* with him is equivalent to saying that it is subjective only, and he seeks to show that all arguments a *posteriori* with reference to this question are fallacious. He grants what has been given a *priori*, but only as a subjective necessity, and then shows the dialectical procedure of Reason in the Theistic argument.

But it is clear from the introductory remarks on knowledge that this identification of a *prioriness* and subjectivity is groundless. The fact that a truth is a *priori* necessary by no means proves that it has no objectivity, nor does it even leave us powerless to claim for it objectivity. The fact that it is a *priori* is strong evidence of its objective truth. And it is also true, as has been shown, that Kant's separation between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* in knowledge is false. They are two aspects of truth which is a unity. Therefore the *a posteriori* must not conflict with the *a priori*, and if we find that it does we may be sure that one or the other is not genuine. If it be true, then, that a *priori* we must say that the Absolute is self-conscious and personal Intelligence, then it is of the very greatest importance that this be justified a *posteriori*, that is, in experience; for if this be not possible we may well question our supposed *a priori* necessity. Now the *a posteriori* justification of our belief in the existence of the Absolute and of our determination of it as personal self-conscious Intelligence, is the Theistic argument. The arguments of which this is composed are a *posteriori* with the exception of one aspect of the Ontological argument. The question before us, then, is as to whether or not the Kantian criticism has overthrown the historic Theistic arguments.

There is one point, however, which should be carefully noted before estimating the weight of Kant's criticism. It is that the idea of God which he uses as the object of these arguments is very different from the God of Theism when rightly understood; and also very different from the God which we might infer from what Kant himself has admitted as an *a priori* though subjective necessity. The God of Theism is a self-conscious and personal Spirit and this realizes both the ideas of immanence and transcendence. Now as we are seeking the *a posteriori* justification of that which we have determined a *priori*, of course this same idea of God which has been reached a *priori* should be the subject of the Theistic argument. Moreover since Kant has admitted the *a priori* necessity of determining the Absolute as intelligent and personal, such a God could be immanent as well as transcendent, and such a Being should have been made the subject of his criticism. But such is not the case. The God which is the subject of

his remarks on the Theistic arguments is the God of eighteenth-century Deism, and of course they avail against this. His theory of knowledge was marred by its mechanistic character, and so the objects of knowledge come to have a mechanism about them and exist apart from consciousness. God stands apart and in a purely external and mechanical relation to the world and man. The idea of God which he gives\* has three elements. First the sum total of the possibility of all experience. Second the conception of an *ens realissimum*. And in the third place the attributes which we get by what he calls "hypostatizing" the idea; that is, he argues that from it all things derive their reality and so it is regarded as primal. A primal Being must be one and simple. Then we regard it as the ground of all things, and cogitate the whole sum of our experience as an individual whole, giving the idea of individuality, and so reach the idea of God. Now nothing could be more mechanical than this. God is not the sum total of all existence regarded as a whole and individual. He is not a sort of mine or fund of reality from which we draw. He is not a sum total of all reality as though reality were, as a house, made of different mechanically constructed parts. God is a spirit existing in spiritual relations to His finite creatures. It was just such a mechanical and pantheistic definition as this which lead Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel into so many difficulties. Dr. Runze † speaks to the point on this mechanical conception. He says that the mechanical conception of a sum total which limits God to a mere aggregate, is not interchangeable with the idea of the Highest Being. "Much rather," he says, "does the highest reality lie at the foundation of the possibility of all things as a cause and not as a sum total."

We must carefully bear in mind that it is God, a living Spirit who exists in spiritual relations to us, whom we are seeking; and not a God who is afar off, and in merely mechanical relations to us, or else out of all relation.

The Theistic arguments, Kant's treatment of which we are now to examine, are four in number. There is the Ontological argument which tells us *a priori* that if the Absolute or Necessary Being exist we must predicate infinity of all its attributes, and identify it with the All Perfect Being; and *a posteriori* this argument expresses the truth that God through this perfect idea has spoken in and to the consciousness of humanity, so that His existence may be inferred as the cause of this idea. Next there is the Cosmological argument which proceeds from the contingent to the necessary, and thus from

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transc. Dialect," chap. iii, §2.

† Runze, *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis*, p. 81.

this we infer the existence of a necessary Being which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side tells us is the Most Perfect, the Infinite Being. Then there is the Teleological argument, which argues from the adaptations of means to ends in nature to design, and thence infers that Intelligence is to be predicated of the Absolute. Lastly we have the Moral argument, which from our moral nature and the supreme categories of Morality infers the moral nature of the Absolute.

The most notable and important fact with reference to these arguments is their vital connection with, and mutual assistance of, each other; while at the same time each preserves its own identity in the performance of its special function. They are parts of one whole, which cannot stand hostile criticism if separately required to perform the whole task. Thus the Cosmological argument gives us the existence of the Necessary Being, but nothing more. The Teleological and Moral arguments give us attributes of this Being, while we leave experience and say *a priori* that these attributes are infinite and so identify the Absolute with God. Therefore these arguments can neither be separated nor identified. They have been most happily likened to a bundle of twigs, which when bound together the strongest arm cannot break, but when separated may be broken by the weakest. They are the *a posteriori* ground of that firm conviction that the Absolute of Philosophy is the God of the Bible, and together with the *a priori* ground of this same belief they change it into a reflective knowledge by which man's reason bids his heart take courage as it faces the assaults of skepticism.

Kant first criticises the Ontological argument.\* He discusses it in its *a priori* form. Anselm† is the author of this, so we must look to him for a statement of it. He gives it thus: "And we believe that Thou art a Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived. . . . And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the intellect alone. For if it be in the mind only there can be thought a Being existing in reality also, which is greater. If therefore that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the mind only, it follows that that, than which a greater cannot be conceived is that, a greater than which can be conceived: but certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, beyond a doubt a Being than whom there can be no greater, both in thought and in reality." Anselm's reasoning is simply that if we could conceive the non-existence of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, then a greater could be conceived, which is a contradiction. But, of

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 4.

† Anselm, *Proslogion*, Caput ii.

course, this is after all merely a necessity of conception founded on the impossibility of conceiving the opposite. It asserts a contradiction in the removal of existence as a predicate, asserting that it is contained necessarily in the concept. Now Kant's first criticism is that the arguments which have been drawn to show the correspondence between thought and things have been taken from judgments, not from things. This criticism attacks the argument as though Anselm's position were that what exists *in intellectu* exists also *in re*. But this is not his argument, as Dr. Patton\* shows. His argument is, as has been stated, that existence is necessarily in the concept of the Perfect Being. Kant realized this, and proceeded to criticise the argument in this form by showing the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, and that being is not a real predicate. He argues as follows: If there is a contradiction involved in the denial of this predicate, it must be contained in the concept; and must therefore be a merely logical predicate and so say nothing as to reality: therefore though the annihilation of this predicate involves a contradiction, both subject and predicate may be together suppressed without contradiction. But if the judgment is to express existence, that is if being is a real predicate, it must add something to the concept and so its removal will not involve a contradiction. Moreover existence is not a real predicate, or there never could be a correspondence between the concept and object, the object always being greater.

Now in order to estimate the force of this we will state three positions which may be held with reference to the Ontological argument.

1. There are those like Anselm, who hold that it is an *a priori* demonstration of existence.

2. There is the view of Leibnitz,† who believes that Anselm's argument needs to show first that the idea of a Most Perfect Being is possible, that then the conclusion follows, and that this is done when it is shown that there are no contradictions involved in this Idea conceived as existing.

3. There is the position which we have indicated, that the *a priori* side of the argument is not designed to prove existence, but to show that the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument is the Infinite and Perfect Being of our idea. And *a posteriori* this argument is to express God's witness to humanity of His existence, through this perfect idea.

Now the first of these positions Kant has successfully overthrown. His arguments against any *a priori* demonstration of God's existence merely from the idea are unanswerable. There are *a priori* rea-

\* Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism*.

† Leibnitz, *Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas*.

sons, but from the mere concept a demonstrative proof in the Anselmian way is not possible. He has also been successful against the position of Leibnitz; for if the possibility of the idea is to be shown by the mere absence of all contradiction, Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments will rise against us, and the Leibnitzian view will not differ from the Anselmian. But against the third position Kant's arguments can have no force. He has made two errors in his criticism. He has taken the *a priori* side of this argument, which is only designed to identify a certain idea with the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument, and has required that existence be shown *a priori*. But that which is the far greater mistake is the fact that he has neglected the *a posteriori* side of the argument altogether. DesCartes is the author of this aspect of the Ontological argument. He gives the Anselmian proof, but also argues that the idea of God is Perfect and Infinite, and that therefore God must be its cause. He says,\* "And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that the work should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my Creator, it is highly probable that He in some way fashioned me after His own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself; in other words, when I make myself the object of reflection, I not only find that I am an incomplete, imperfect and dependent being, and one who unceasingly aspires after something better and greater than he is; but, at the same time, I am assured likewise that He upon whom I am dependent possesses in Himself all the goods after which I aspire, and that not merely indefinitely and potentially, but infinitely and actually, and that He is thus God." Kant has done away with an *a priori* demonstration of the far-away God of the eighteenth-century Deism. But he has left untouched the Ontological argument as the grand expression of the truth of Mysticism, the truth that God is near, and that the consciousness of humanity is a God-breathed consciousness with a God-given idea. Negatively, He speaks to our spirits in the feeling of weakness and dependence which grows into the reflective knowledge of our finitude. In the dissatisfaction with the world and ourselves we see that we are not of earthly origin, that there is in us that which comes from a source above Nature, and that we can have been produced by no natural process. And all this would not be

\* DesCartes, *Discourse on Method and the Meditations*, Meditat. 3, also *The Principles of Philosophy*, Part I, § 18.

possible if God had not inspired our consciousness with the positive idea of Himself as the Father of our spirits. In ourselves we feel His presence, and then know it; in the world we see an Ideal that is not of the world. God as a self-conscious and personal Spirit can be thus near to us. The strongest and most spiritual minds in all ages have felt His presence, and have testified to the truth of Mysticism. God is truly present to the consciousness of humanity both in its idea of Him and in its aspirations after Him. He has spoken to men, and Rationalism can never dissuade them from belief in this truth.

Kant next criticises the Cosmological argument. This is the argument from the contingent to the necessary. Aristotle is its author. He argues\* for the existence of a First Mover, thus regarding the world under the category of motion, as contingent. Kant gives the argument so as to include the finite ego under the category of contingency. He gives the argument as follows:† "If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Therefore there exists an absolutely necessary being." The argument, he says, proceeds thus. "A necessary being can be determined only in one way, that is by only one of all the opposed predicates; therefore, it is completely determined by its concept, and there is only one concept which can completely determine a thing *a priori*, that is the concept of an *ens realissimum*; therefore, as this is the only concept by and in which we can cogitate a necessary being, therefore a supreme being necessarily exists."

Now, in order to meet the Kantian criticism of the Cosmological argument, we must have a clear idea of its function and relation to the Ontological argument; that is, to the *a priori* side of that argument, which it is to be remembered Kant always means, and which for convenience we will refer to as the Ontological argument in discussing Kant's criticism of the Cosmological. The Cosmological argument gives us the existence of a necessary Being, but cannot determine the nature of that Being. The Ontological argument *a priori* shows us that if such a Being exists its nature must be of a certain character; but it cannot give *a priori* demonstration of the existence of this Being. Now Kant makes an error similar to that which he made in criticising the Ontological argument. He criticised that argument as though it were designed to demonstrate *a priori* the existence of a Being corresponding to its concept. Now we see that he states the Cosmological argument as though it

\* Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. ii, chap. vii.

† Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, § 5, *sq.*

were meant to perform not only its own work, but that also of the Ontological argument in the determination of the nature of the necessary Being. That which he terms the first part of the argument shows that an absolutely necessary Being exists. Now, instead of seeing that this is all that is required of this argument, he proceeds to add the Ontological argument as a second step in the Cosmological; and then states as his first point of criticism, that experience, that is the Cosmological argument, merely aids Reason to make the first step to the existence of the necessary Being; and that we must turn away from experience to the conception of an *ens realissimum* to determine the properties of this Being, so that the Cosmological argument becomes the Ontological. Now it is perfectly true that the Cosmological argument is insufficient by itself; but Kant should have realized that the inference to the existence of a necessary Being is all that this argument can be legitimately required to do. Moreover, when, after adding the Ontological argument in its *a priori* aspect as a second step in the Cosmological, he says that reason believes that we may infer the existence of a necessary Being from the concept of an *ens realissimum*, he seems to have forgotten that he has admitted on the very same page that "experience is held to aid reason" in showing the existence of a necessary Being, and that he himself added this second part "to determine the properties," and not to demonstrate the existence of this Being. We see, then, that Kant's first criticism of this argument consists in putting the Ontological and Cosmological arguments together, and criticising each because it cannot perform separately their joint task. He tries also to bring out this same criticism by logic. He says that the *nervus probandi* of the Cosmological argument is the proposition that every absolutely necessary being is an *ens realissimum*; and if this be true, since all *entia realissima* are alike, it follows that this proposition may be converted simply, and we have the proposition that every *ens realissimum* is a necessary being; and this proposition being determined *a priori* by concepts, we have the Ontological argument. In short, he says that in the identification of the *ens realissimum* with the necessary Being, we assume that we can infer the latter from the former. But this is not true. It is difficult to see why the Cosmological argument, in turning to the Ontological to determine the nature of the Necessary Being as Infinite in its attributes, after having shown its existence, must proceed on the assumption that the Ontological argument must show *a priori* the fact of existence.

Kant also makes the following objections to the Cosmological argument:\* First, that the transcendental principle of causality is

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Dialectic," chap. iii, §5, p. 374.

only valid in the sensuous world, because the purely intelligible or intellectual conception would never produce a synthetic, that is, an objective proposition. The answer to this objection is the rejection of his doctrine of the limit of knowledge. Thought is synthetic of itself, and it is not the object of sense which makes it so. And it is obviously false reasoning to argue that, because in scientific cognition the content of the category is given in the sphere of experience, therefore, this is the only kind of causality admissible. Of course, if we define causality as invariable sequence, and then say that this includes all causality, we rule out the Cosmological argument by definition. But his doctrine of causality as merely invariable sequence is inadequate for science; how much more so, then, must it be for metaphysics, and how unfair its application in this sphere. We cannot use a purely mechanical and physical category when we have reached the sphere of spirit. The contingent involves the necessary, but a caused cause is still contingent. Our idea of causation is not fully satisfied with a cause that is itself caused, as is the case with every cause in the relative sphere; and the mind must find its type of causation in the causality of will determined by motive and character, but free from physical necessity. If this be not admitted, the alternative is physical necessity, and this leads to, or rather involves, materialism. The categories of science may be used with no materialistic implications at all; they have their legitimate sphere. It is only when the metaphysician tries to use them that materialism ensues. Thus Mr. Spencer, in trying to explain the universe by relative and material forces, *ex hypothesi* shuts himself off from any valid inference to the Absolute and his postulate of the Unknowable has nothing on which to rest. If it is manifested in the material and relative force which explains the universe, the implication is materialistic as to the nature of ultimate reality; or if this Unknowable is entirely apart from the relative force which explains things, then why postulate it? This is merely to show the danger of making physical categories do metaphysical work. However, in making the inference of the Cosmological argument, we go beyond the sphere of natural causation in the very idea of the argument, which expresses the necessity of the existence of Absolute Being.

Kant's last objection to this argument is that the impossibility of an infinite series of causes is assumed, and that this is a principle which cannot be justified. This is simply a statement, in a slightly different form, of the principle of which we have just been speaking, or, more accurately, may be inferred from this principle,—that everything contingent must have a cause. The highest category of causation is not satisfied with anything but

a non-contingent and uncaused cause. The stage of scientific cognition is not denied when we assert this; but that which we recognize as real in one stage of reflection, is seen at a later stage to be not the ultimate reality; and while we admit the reality of the one, we may reflect upon it as only a partial view of reality and go on to higher categories. If, then, we are to admit the validity of our highest spiritual categories,—and we must if any knowledge at all is to be possible,—we must admit that an infinite series is impossible. Kant goes on in this same chapter to explain the dialectical illusion substantially as follows. On the supposition that something exists we cannot avoid the inference that something necessary exists. But let us form any conception whatever of a thing, nothing prevents me from cogitating its non-existence. We may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while at the same time we cannot cogitate any individual thing as absolutely necessary; and the conclusion is that neither necessity nor contingency are properties of things, but merely subjective principles. In other words, we may be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, and yet because we cannot find this among any of these contingent things, we conclude that these principles are only subjective, or else we break down in contradiction. Obviously, the conclusion does not follow. If we try to find the Absolute as one of the series of contingent things, we find that we can cogitate none of these as necessary. But it is just for these very contingent things that we are seeking a basis that shall not be one of them. If we try to cogitate the Absolute Spirit after the analogy of the world-series we can reach no result; but when it is shown that it is a false supposition that all objectivity for knowledge is given by sense, then we need not conclude that principles which transcend the sensuous sphere are merely subjective. We are groping for Being where everything is Becoming; and trying to find a changeless resting place where decay is a principle as well as beginning to be. If we search in the right place, we shall find that Absolute Being is not far from every one of us. Only we should be careful to let the brightest, truest light within us, show us where to look.

The Teleological argument next meets the Kantian criticism. This argument, which Kant calls the Physico-Teleological, from the adaptations which are observable in Nature infers design, and thence attributes Intelligence to the Absolute Being. This argument Kant says deserves to be mentioned with respect. He says,\* “The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we

\* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, “Transcendental Dialectic,” chap. iii, § 6.

pursue our observations with the infinity of space, in one direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations, even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language, in the presence of wonders so inconceivable, has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression, all the more eloquent that it is dumb." Kant's criticisms of the Teleological argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are two in number, and arise, as before, from the fact that he requires this argument to do the work of three. He says, in the chapter from which we have just quoted, "We cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to a demonstrative certainty and to a reception on its own merits, apart from favor or support from other arguments." Now we do not make this claim for it. We neither claim for it "demonstrative certainty," nor that it can be considered apart from other arguments. Let us see exactly what can be expected from it in its organic connection with the other arguments.

The Cosmological argument shows us that a Necessary Being must exist, and now by the Teleological argument we infer that it must be possessed of Intelligence wonderfully great, which the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side shows to be infinite. The Teleological argument, then, is to show that the cause of the world is an Intelligent Cause, and this is all that can be legitimately required of it. In order to indicate how it does this we cannot do better than quote from this same chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "The chief momenta in the physico-teleological argument are as follows: First, we observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. Second, this arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world, it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for those purposes by a rational and disposing principle in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. Third, there exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause, or several, which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. Fourth, the unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of a reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as

portions of an artistic edifice, an inference which all our observation favors, and all principles of analogy support."

In this chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant makes two criticisms of this argument. The first he expresses thus—"According to the physicotheological argument the connection and harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world. . . . This proof can at the most therefore demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject." Now in the first place this objection involves the asking too much of this argument: all that is sought from this argument is to show that the Absolute Being, of whose existence as the cause of all relativity we are assured on other grounds, is possessed of intelligence. This would be a sufficient answer to Kant's criticism, but we may go even farther. Dr. Flint\* says that this objection can be urged, only if order were not of the very essence of matter itself, and not merely something superimposed in the arrangement of it. "Science," he says, "shows that the order in the heavens and in the most complicated organisms is not more wonderful than the order in the ultimate atoms themselves. The balance of evidence is that order penetrates as deep as matter itself."

Kant's second criticism is that from the order in the world we can infer only a cause proportionate thereto. We can conclude therefore from this argument, only that the Intelligence and Power of the world-cause is very great; but not that the Intelligence is infinite and the Power absolute; and they must be so determined, as such a predicate as "very great" gives no determinate conception of this Being, nor does it inform us what it may be. Empirical considerations failing to give this determination to the concept, we accomplish this by falling back upon the Cosmological argument, which is the Ontological in disguise. "After elevating ourselves to admiration" of the power and wisdom of the world's author, and finding that we can advance no farther by this method, we proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order in it, and then argue from its contingency to the existence of a Necessary Being, and thence to the concept of the *ens realissimum*. This objection obviously arises from the demand that the Teleological shall alone do the work of all three arguments, and it only gives an illustration of their unity and organic connection. When Intelligence has been predicated of the Absolute, this argument has performed its function. When once this is done all materialistic

\* Flint, *Theism*, Lect. vi.

explanations of ultimate reality become impossible, and we are then obliged *a priori* to say that this Intelligence is infinite. Thus it refers directly to the *a priori* argument and not indirectly through the Cosmological as Kant says. It does not, then, depend on this argument, much less is it identical with it. It needs only the Ontological argument on its *a priori* side for its completion, while the Cosmological argument needs both the other two.

Kant's criticism, then, amounts to showing the connection of these arguments, since his objections may be all classed under two heads: First, those criticisms which do not rest on the separation of the arguments, but which we have seen only to avail against the mechanically conceived God of Deism, but not against a God who is a Spirit at once immanent and transcendent; and secondly, those criticisms which rest on the separation of the arguments, and the requirement of one to do the work of all; and these we have shown to be unfair. We may learn from this that every road, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, will lead us to some aspect of Absolute Being. In God are all things, and every line of reasoning must culminate in Him; while no one way can lead us to the whole truth, which is so vast that the human mind can never hope to comprehend it. The inspired writer was only expressing the sense in which we must all be Agnostics, when he said: "Canst thou by searching find out God?" And yet it is because "He is not far from every one of us" that we apprehend Him in everything.

We have yet, however, to consider Kant's most subtle criticism of the Teleological argument. This is given in the *Critique of Judgment* where it is discussed much more elaborately than in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This criticism is that finality is merely a subjective principle of reflective judgment.

In order to make clear his somewhat confused discussion it will be necessary to state a little more precisely the steps in the Teleological argument. Lotze\* has hit the nerve of the design argument, though his criticism of it does not seem just. He says that the argument is involved in a piece of circular reasoning, because it rests on the assertion of the improbability of certain results happening if they were not designed; but that this improbability holds only if we presuppose design, for then things which resulted without being designed would seem exceptions to the general rule; but if we do not presuppose design, then all this improbability vanishes; for the argument, says Lotze, rests on the belief that "what is without purpose, perverse and irrational, has a better title itself to existence, or is more likely, as such, to be real, than what is not so." This is not true. The design argument makes no presuppositions as to what

\* Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, chap. i, §§ 10, 11.

is or is not likely to exist in such and such a case; nor does it presuppose design; but without any preconceived ideas at all, upon observation of the wonderful adaptations in nature, it argues that it is highly improbable that this could have happened if it had not been designed. Of course this is not demonstration, and it is open to critics to deny this improbability on which the argument rests; though we do not believe that they can show adequate grounds for this denial. However the nerve of the argument is this improbability just mentioned; and the argument is primarily, as has been remarked, "to design" and not "from it."

Three distinct steps may be traced in the argument. First, observation shows order, harmony, adaptation, and law in Nature. This rests on observation, and is not denied by those who will not admit finality. But, in the second place, is this order and adaptation finality? Are there ends in Nature? Can this order be explained by mechanical causes alone? The order and system is too vast and complex to have been produced by chance, but will not mechanical law and efficient causation explain it? Now we see phenomena where the results seem to have required such an extraordinary and complex combination of circumstances and mechanical causes, and where there is such an agreement of the present with the future, as Janet\* puts it, that we are compelled to believe that this wonderful combination could not have been brought about if the idea of the end did not exist in the cause and determine the means. Now we have a direct knowledge only of the nature of our own acts, but here we find a direction of means to ends. But the actions of other men resemble our own in every particular, and it seems as if they were directed to ends. Then the acts of animals while differing from those of men in that we do not ascribe any intentionality to them, which is not the question here as should be carefully noted, yet resemble them in being apparently directed to ends. Next, the relation between organ and function, organism and environment, is a witness of adaptation. In view of all this we conclude that finality is a law of nature. But, in the third place, does finality involve intentionality? Can we infer intentional finality and hence a conscious and intelligent cause of it? Here we argue that intentional finality is the only rational view. For since it is nature which forces us to admit finality, it cannot be merely subjective. We have left, then, as a cause of finality, either Nature itself or conscious Intelligence. We know by our own consciousness that intelligence is a sufficient cause for it, and we know that it is characteristic of our intelligence to act for ends; but of unconscious finality we know nothing; so we conclude that it is more logical to infer

\* Janet, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. i.

conscious Intelligence than that of which we know nothing, not even its possibility. Either the First Cause is absolutely unknowable or else this much anthropomorphism is necessary. It is the fact that we are created in God's image that enables us to know Him. So that anthropomorphism is the assertion that His nature is in us to an imperfect degree, and not an imputation of our nature to Him; and it is difficult to see why Zoomorphism should be preferred to this. We are now concerned, however, not with the Philosophy of the Unconscious, but with Kant's doctrine of subjective finality; but because of the difficult nature of his discussion of this, we have outlined these steps in the argument in order that we may use them as guides in our examination of the Kantian doctrine, to which we now proceed.

As to the first step in the argument, the order and adaptation observable in nature. This he recognizes and presupposes in the *Critique of Judgment*, directing his whole discussion to the last two steps as stated. He asks whether this adaptation is "purposive," and whether we can infer an Intelligent Cause of the world. But he mingles these two points in the discussion, sometimes considering both at once and sometimes going from one to the other, so that we will endeavor, for the sake of clearness, to separate these points, and to present a brief statement of his views on each of these points, as given by him in the *Critique of Judgment*.

But before examining his theory of finality, we must see what the assumption of order and harmony involves. Dr. Flint\* takes the position that it is merely a kind of finality; but Janct† and Diman‡ make order the basis of a separate argument for intelligence, so that even though we cannot infer finality from order, we may use the latter in our Theistic argument. Kant takes this order for granted, and then says that mechanical causes explain it, except in some cases where mechanism breaks down and where we must conceive an Intelligent Cause. Janet has made this mistake also, and Dr. Patton§ has criticised him for it. The relation of intelligent causation to mechanism is not that the former comes in when the latter breaks down. There is a deeper relation than this. We ask, even where things are explained by mechanical causes, what is the cause of these causes? The Cosmos is a vast system of mathematical relations and dynamic sequences apart from any question of finality. Now we cannot propose mechanical law as the explanation, because it is precisely this law which we are seeking to account for, so that this would be begging the question. Law itself is the thing

\* Flint, *Theism*, Lect. ii.

† Janct, *Final Causes*, Bk. i, chap. v.

‡ Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, chap. iv.

§ Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism*.

to be explained, and our alternatives are chance and intelligence, so that if we abandon the former we are driven to the latter. There is no other alternative, since we have seen it to be a *petitio principii* to hypostatize law, making a metaphysical entity out of it for its own explanation. And no more can we hypostatize chance. So that it seems that intelligence is the only possible conclusion. The world, considered as a *Cosmos*, is nearly as wonderful as when considered under the category of finality. It seems, then, that Kant's admission of the reign of law makes the concession which the Theist wishes, even though finality could not be proved. The argument from finality, however, is a still stronger evidence of intelligent causation, so that it is of the greatest importance to the Theist in giving the *a posteriori* side of Theism. We proceed, therefore, to a critical examination of the Kantian doctrine of finality.

In considering the question which has been given as the second step of the argument, whether we can infer finality from order and adaptation observed, Kant seeks to show that finality is merely a subjective principle of the reflective judgment. Its origin he explains substantially as follows:\* The Understanding legislates *a priori* for knowledge of Nature as an object of sense. The Reason legislates *a priori* for the causality of freedom in the supersensible sphere. But the supersensible must be able to determine the sensible in regard to the causality of freedom, because the effects must take place in the sensible world, and although the possibility of this cannot be comprehended, it must be presupposed. The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final cause which ought to result in the natural world, hence the conditions of its resulting are presupposed in Nature. The Teleological judgment does this, and thus bridges the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres. Therefore, it is a necessary judgment. But what is its nature? Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained in the universal. Now, if this universal be a necessary concept which renders experience possible, as do the categories of the Understanding, then the judgment is called a determinant one. But if we have only a particular empirical law, and try to find the concept for it, then the judgment which makes the subsumption is called a reflective judgment. Such a judgment cannot borrow its principle from experience, for it is seeking a necessary principle; nor can it get it from the Understanding, for then it would be a determinant judgment; therefore the faculty of judgment must itself supply this principle *a priori*. The principle is this. For reflection on Nature, if this is to be possible,

\* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translation by Bernard, Introduction and Division 2.

the same *a priori* certainty must be conceived to be in the particular laws of nature as in the universal ones. They must be considered as if they proceeded from an Understanding, though not our own, so as to render possible a system of experience embracing the whole of nature; in short, nature must be conceived as purposive. Here are Kant's own words:\* "As universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding which prescribes them to nature, although only according to the universal concept of it as nature; so particular empirical laws, in respect of what is in them left undetermined by these universal laws, must be considered in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an Understanding, though not our Understanding, had furnished them to our cognitive faculties so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature. Not as if in this way, such an Understanding must be assumed as actual, for it is only our reflective judgment to which this Idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining; but this faculty thus gives a law only to itself and not to nature." This concept, then, is only necessary for our understanding; and whether or not it is true objectively we cannot say, because it arises from the peculiarity of our understanding. It is the peculiarity of the human Understanding, says Kant, that it is discursive, that it proceeds from universals to particulars. But as these are undetermined by the universal concept, in order that they may be subsumed under it Reason demands that they be conceived as purposive. But Kant goes on to say that we must recognize the possibility of an Understanding which is intuitive and not discursive. Such an Understanding would intuit the whole and its parts in one act, so that there would be no necessity for any distinction between final and efficient causes, but the whole could contain the possibility of the parts, and itself be merely the result of them as causes; but in accordance with the peculiarity of our Understanding the whole must be considered the result of the parts, and it is impossible that it should contain the ground of the possibility of the parts, so that the idea of the whole must contain the possibility of the form and adjustment of the parts, and this idea of the whole is a purpose. So Kant concludes that finality is merely a concept necessary for our minds. This constitutes the nerve of his objection to the Teleological argument; for when we come to consider the two criticisms which he makes on the third step of the argument, that of the inference to an Intelligent Cause of finality, we will find that this same doctrine of subjective finality is repeated, and that it is the only one of the two criticisms which could have any weight. So that this second point being established, the Theist would have

\* Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by Bernard, Introduction, † 4.

gained his point as far as Kant is concerned. Of course, in a treatise on Theism the doctrines of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann would also have to be considered.

Kant's doctrine of finality is open to the following objections :

In the first place the deduction of the principle of finality in nature from a necessity of connecting nature and freedom is a mistake. This is taking finality in its *a priori* and spiritual significance as referring to ultimate moral ends, and trying to introduce, or rather force, it into the sphere of observation and natural phenomena. This highest category of Reason has its proper place as we have seen, but not in the *a posteriori* argument from final causes. The concept of finality in nature, that is the finality inferred from the adaptations of means to ends in nature, cannot be deduced *a priori* from the concepts of morality. Any attempt to derive one of these teleological concepts from the other must lead to confusion, and it has led Kant into an unfair criticism of the *a posteriori* argument in question, because, having deduced the principle *a priori*, the argument would have to presuppose a knowledge of ultimate ends in the spiritual sphere. But this argument does not presuppose any knowledge of these, and is grounded entirely on observation, inference, and probability ; so that Kant's criticism of it because of our ignorance of ultimate ends is groundless and arises from the confusion pointed out. In the second place, his doctrine of the subjective origin of finality is open to criticism. We have seen how he sought a more specific origin of this principle than the one just mentioned. The principle is a rational tendency due to the peculiar nature of our understanding, which is discursive and not being able to intuit the whole and its parts must use this principle in the subsumption of particulars under universals. Now, of course, if the principle of finality in nature were *a priori* in the same sense as is that of causality, that of conditioning experience, then it would be objective ; but this we concede to Kant is not the case. But we deny his statement that experience cannot prove it, and believe that he is wrong in making it merely a rational tendency. If by experience he mean direct observation, then this does not give the principle ; but it is an inference from this with all the weight of probability upon probability until it almost reaches necessity and certainty. Finality is forced upon us by our observation of nature. It is a demand of Reason upon occasion of experience and therefore objective. Says Dr. Patton,\* "If we were under the necessity of seeing finality in everything, then subjective finality would be the best guarantee of objective finality. It would be an *a priori* truth. But there is no

\* Patton, *Syllabus of Lectures on Theism*.

such subjective necessity. And since we see finality in some things and not in others there must be some objective ground for this distinction." Trendelenburg also shows a contradiction at this point of Kant's argument. Here is his view, as summarized by Janet:\* "If finality were a necessary form of our knowledge, as space and time are necessary forms of our sense intuition, all things would appear to us in the relation of means to ends. But no, according to Kant, the help of finality is called in when the explanation by efficient causes no longer suffices; it is the object itself which forces the mind to quit the road it was following. It is then the object which determines when we must apply the purely subjective principle of finality." The demand for this principle is occasioned by observation of nature. It is true, as Kant says, that our minds being constituted as they are we must conceive nature thus. But this is not a sufficient guarantee of its subjectivity. The assertion that it is, is merely his assertion of the relativity of knowledge, which postulates without grounds the existence of a reality which is not the object of consciousness. Knowledge implies a knowing mind, it is the mind's grasp of objective truth. We cannot say then, that because it requires a mind to know, knowledge is subjective. The knot of the question is whether or not there is any connection between our minds and their principles of knowledge, and Universal Reason which is the ground of all things. If we deny this connection, absolute skepticism must be the result. This objection of Kant to finality on the ground of its subjectivity finds its strongest answer in a criticism of his theory of knowledge. We conclude, then, that finality is an objective fact which demands our acceptance and calls for explanation.

With reference to the third step of the Telological argument as stated, Kant's criticism is twofold.

The first one is this: † After criticising the doctrines of Epicurus, Spinoza, and of Hylzoism, he says of Theism that, while it is the best of all systems because it ascribes the purposes of nature to Intelligence, it nevertheless does not establish its claims, because it rests its inference on the basis of finality, which has been shown to be only a subjective principle. The second criticism, given in the section entitled "Physico-Theology," is this: ‡ However far Physico-Theology be pushed, it can never disclose the ultimate purpose of creation, because it does not extend its inquiries beyond experience. It is based on inquiries into the purpose for which nature exists, and on this the concept of a Supreme Intelligence rests. Our

\* Janet, *Final Causes*.

† Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Bernard's translation, § 73.

‡ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, § 85.

ignorance of this ultimate purpose prevents us from inferring an Intelligent Cause of finality.

The first objection, that finality is merely a subjective principle, has been already dealt with; and we have seen that finality is a real truth to be explained, and, as Kant says, granting this, Theism seems a more reasonable theory than those of Epicurus and Spinoza and, we may add, than that of Hegel.

The second criticism was that the argument presupposed a knowledge of the ultimate end for which nature was created; and that our ignorance of this vitiates the argument, since from the knowledge of contingent ends in nature we cannot infer an Infinite Intelligence. With reference to this, it may be said that this *a posteriori* argument does not seek to infer Infinite Intelligence, but only to show that the First Cause is possessed of intelligence. It therefore does not presuppose any knowledge of ultimate ends; but from the wonderful adaptation of means to ends in nature, the mind concludes that the cause of all this must have been an intelligent cause. When this is done this argument has performed its special function. This last criticism is irrelevant, because it requires the argument to prove too much.

As long as men continue to seek adequate reasons for the phenomena about them this argument will continue to have weight, in spite of the subtle criticisms of philosophers. Men never can be made to believe that this vast and wonderful cosmos resulted from chance or that mechanical law is self-explanatory. Neither will they believe that it resulted from the evolution of an immanent principle which reaches self-consciousness only in man, and so cannot be "external to anything;" no more will they believe that their firm conviction is a mere vagary resulting from the peculiarity of their mind. The belief will always exist that Conscious Intelligence is at the beginning of things as well as that it is their ground, immanent in nature and man, yet external to both. The supernatural can never be reduced merely to the spiritual.

The conclusion from all this would seem to be that the position reached *a priori* is confirmed by *a posteriori* considerations. That we get a true view of reality, no matter which of the two standpoints we take. That they thus agree is strong evidence of the truth of each.

To leave the consideration of any aspect of Kantism without including the results of the *Metaphysics of Ethics* and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* would be unjust and would give no adequate conception of his system. In an age when the commands of duty had been reduced to maxims of prudence or of inclination, he raised his voice more powerfully than any other to show the sacred-

ness of duty ; for in spite of the Utilitarian way in which his categorical imperative voices itself, this is given as a test rather than a ground of Rightness, the ground being found in man's noumenal nature, which connects him through freedom to Reason Universal. The autonomy of the will is the basis of his Ethics, and is open to severe criticism ; but he certainly did uphold duty as against a calculating morality. And furthermore he showed the necessity of a Metaphysical basis for Ethics. We will have to consider, then, very briefly, his Ethical teaching, and here of course only so far as it bears directly on Theism.

The relation of Theism and Ethics he conceived, we believe, inadequately. The true relation between them, or the moral argument for Theism is, briefly, this. The three fundamental categories of Ethics are Moral obligation, the Right, and the Good. Our consciousness tells us that we are under an unconditional obligation to conform our conduct to a certain standard of Rightness and to realize a certain end or *summum bonum*. This is all that our moral consciousness tells us, but there must be some ultimate metaphysical explanation of these categories. Beginning with the fact of moral obligation, we see that to give this any empirical deduction would result in reducing it to a hypothetical imperative ; and to make the will absolutely and unconditionally legislative for itself must result either in a philosophy of caprice which would explain away the categorical imperative, or else in the Ethical Pantheism of Fichte. The only adequate explanation of the categorical imperative, therefore, is one which distinctly separates the Absolute and Relative wills ; regarding moral obligation as the Will of God binding His creatures to Right, which must consequently be explained as His nature, and to realize the good, which must embrace human well-being or perfection and happiness, and God's glory. That the Absolute must be possessed of moral attributes is thus the testimony of moral phenomena. Let us now examine Kant's doctrine of the relation of Theism and Ethics. He lays down what he believes to be the two great foundations of Ethics in his *Metaphysics of Ethics*. He tells us\* that from experience we can never tell of an action whether it is objectively right only, or whether it is also subjectively right, that is, done merely out of respect for the moral law ; but that we conclude that whether or not there are actions of this latter kind cannot be the question, and that Reason itself, independent of all experience, tells us what ought to take place, and that this imperative is categorical. This imperative, being a fact of consciousness, must have some explanation which will render it possible. He lays down the principle of the autonomy of the will as

\* Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Abbot's translation, Preface, § 2.

the ground and explanation of the moral law. The will must legislate for itself by an *a priori* maxim, because all heteronomous theories are inadequate, empirical principles being unable to give a categorical imperative, and the rational principle of perfection being too indefinite, while the theological view of connecting the moral law with God would necessitate an "intuition of the Divine Perfection" which we cannot have. So he concludes that the moral law in our consciousness is the "*ratio cognoscendi*" of freedom, while freedom is the "*ratio essendi*" of the moral law. This being the case, we expect some superficial conception of the connection of God and Morality. It is found in the consideration of the *summum bonum*. This is the material category of Ethics, and Kant shows\* that it must include happiness as well as virtue,—“worthiness to be happy.” It is here that the existence of God can be shown. Kant gives this in substance as follows: † Man ought not to seek happiness, but he ought to realize it. But happiness is the harmony of all physical nature with one's end. Now the acting, rational being is not the cause of nature, and there is no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. Therefore the supposition of a supreme Moral Cause of nature, a Holy Will, is necessary in order to connect necessarily the two elements of the *summum bonum*. We must therefore predicate moral attributes of God. Thus the moral law leads through the conception of the *summum bonum* to religion. The moral laws are recognized as Divine commands, not in the sense that they are right because God wills them, but because He is holy, and His will is in accordance with them.

Now in the first place, God stands in such a doctrine in too external and superficial a relation to Ethics. He is brought in merely in order to get over a difficulty in harmonizing the elements of the *summum bonum*. The categories of Moral obligation and Rightness can be explained without Him. This leaves us with a theory of freedom which is caprice, and instead of explaining moral obligation explains it away. On the contrary we know that the imperative speaks to us with all the constraint of an Absolute Will commanding our own, and cannot be explained as our noumenal self determining our phenomenal self. God, with Kant, becomes the moral governor because He has a holy will which perfectly obeys this principle of Rightness which is external to and above Him. All this difficulty arises because Kant thinks that if we explained the moral law by God's will it would make it arbitrary. He does not seem to see another alternative, that God's will and nature cannot be in opposition. God must will these laws because

\* Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Bk. ii, chap. ii.

† Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Abbot's translation, Bk. ii, chap. ii, § 5.

they are the expression of His nature. It is the fact of the determinism of the divine will which makes a necessity of the Christian Mystery in the Incarnation and Atonement. Surely as far as arbitrariness is concerned nothing could be more so than Kant's theory. It is just because God is the *ratio essendi* of all the ethical categories that we ascribe to Him a moral nature. The objection that we can have no "intuition of the divine perfection" could be urged only if God were entirely different from us and out of all relation to us. But it has been seen that the Self-revealing Spirit which a true Metaphysics gives us, can be like us because we have been formed in His image. It is this truth that makes all knowledge possible, and Agnosticism must be the result of denying it. In order to know nature, we must determine our series of states of consciousness in time in relation to a relating and unifying self-consciousness which cannot be part of the series; and this in turn must be a true copy of that self-consciousness which makes nature possible. If then our noumenal self carry with it a moral ideal so must God also be conceived as possessed of moral attributes.

But even passing any defects in Kant's theory, we may ask, Upon what does it all rest? What is his ground for asserting that the Practical Reason opens up the noumenal sphere? Kant says\* that it is not opened to knowledge. Freedom, God and Immortality are not matters of knowledge but only deducible from the Moral law, which is the one point where the noumenal world enters our consciousness. But we may well ask what special right it has to this unique position. Examination of consciousness will show us that the necessity accompanying our theoretical principles is just as strong and true, just as universal. It would seem, then, that we must admit the validity of our theoretical principles in the noumenal sphere, or else become agnostic in Ethics also. Kant's position is not logical. He is not logically constructive. Yet through all, this was his aim, this was the spirit of his whole system.

The ruling categories of eighteenth-century thought were those of individualism, mechanism, and sensationalism. These had such a hold on the human mind that it seemed as if Philosophy was to be forever impossible. Knowledge must be explained mechanically and sensationally, or its possibility denied. Morality must be reduced to physical necessity, or at best to a calculus of prudence. Religion was an empty name. Kant lived and thought just at this time. He gives noble expression to the power and worth of the human spirit. He illumines everything with the light of self-consciousness. He brings out the *a priori* elements in knowledge. He places morality above prudence. He causes the great movement

\* Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Preface.

of German Idealism. In short he makes possible the whole intellectual life of the nineteenth century. He rises, an intellectual giant, tearing himself from the fetters of the preceding thought; and though he is held back half chained, as it were, by the very bonds whose power he fought so nobly to break, and did break, yet the first step was the hardest to take, and he must be classed with the world's great thinkers whose influence has been positive and constructive. He will always be, as Dr. Stirling says, "der ehrliche Kant."

PRINCETON.

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