



THE WORLD PERIL

AMERICA'S INTEREST
IN THE WAR

BY
MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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INTRODUCTION

The Department of History and Politics of Princeton University offers the articles of this volume as an especial contribution to the more accurate understanding of the reasons for the entry of the United States into the European War, and to the more vivid appreciation of all that is involved in the outcome of this conflict. There is an imperative need today that every American citizen should clearly discern the full significance of a Teutonic victory. This volume will greatly aid in illuminating the understanding of any who may still be unable or unwilling to appreciate the bearing of the issues of this war upon their own country and the world. It is well from time to time as occasion offers to refresh our memory and fortify our resolution by a frank rehearsal from a new point of view of the proved facts of German political policy and ambition.

To establish a Germanic world empire, to realize her arrogant pretensions that the Germans are a superior race and destined by divine decree to subdue all peoples to an unquestioning obedience to her autocratic sway, with an insolent insistence that all means are justified

by the sacred end of the German will to rule—broken treaties, the ingenuity of scientific savagery, campaigns of frightfulness, wanton cruelty, mocking the restraints of moral law, the dictates of mercy, the demands of decency and the promptings of chivalry—this is the Teutonic program. Americans should not allow themselves to forget this or to minimize its import.

A nation that has been inhuman in war will be merciless in victory. Within the last few days Count Zu Reventlow has been quoted in the press as saying that the moral law is binding as between Germans, but not as between Germans and other nations. If this is an ethical creed obtaining in war, it will not be set aside by a nation flushed with victory and glutted with the spoils and indemnities of war. Our pacifist friends whose well meaning utterances in this present crisis are nothing more or less than treason should consider the inevitable tendency of their peace propaganda. It means either a direct and immediate surrender to German demands and the consummation of a German victory, or an inconclusive outcome of the present war, affording to Germany the opportunity and the means to reconstruct her war machine and precipitate within the next generation another world conflict and agony.

We dare not pay the price of a premature peace. Rather let us be willing to undergo any sacrifice, to suffer, to endure to the end all the miserable woe and sorrow of a protracted war.

If Germany has been misrepresented and is fighting a fair war in a fair way with the legitimate purpose solely to defend her own land and her own people, then this war should end at once and an equitable compromise be sought and secured. If, however, one is constrained to believe that the success of Germany will prove the scourge of the world, then there is no escape from the grim conclusion that this war must be fought to a finish, whatever may be the accumulated misery for us and our children.

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Princeton, N. J.,
August 27, 1917.

CHAPTER I

AMERICAN RIGHTS IMPERILLED

Conscientious Objectors of the Fourth of July Type¹

HON. HENRY VAN DYKE, D.C.L. (Oxon.)

The Fourth of July is a good day for setting forth the case and maintaining the cause of true Conscientious Objectors, like the men who signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776. This is what I propose to do.

The name "conscientious objector" has suffered much from its modern appropriation by people whose conscience centres in the idea of non-resistance. They think it always wrong to fight, even for the protection of justice and humanity. They object to the use of force even to defend the right against the force which is used to inflict wrong. Persons who have had that particular kind of conscience long enough to make sure that it is not a cloak for cowardice or sedition, should be allowed to obey it. If a man cannot fight for his country, let him work. If he will not work, neither let him eat.

But let him not dare to claim that he is the real or the only "conscientious objector." He

¹ Address at Madison Barracks, July 4, 1917.

belongs to a small and narrow class. There are millions of men who have a larger and more heroic conscience. They object to the tyranny of unrighteousness even more than they object to fighting. And they have not been afraid to risk everything in the defense of justice, liberty, and human rights.

The English men who met at Runnymede in 1215 to force the Magna Carta of English liberties from their base King John were conscientious objectors to a rotten regal autocracy.

William the Silent, who raised the banner of freedom in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, was a conscientious objector to the brutal tyranny of Philip II of Spain. He wrote in 1568: "We are unable, by reason of our loyal service due to his Majesty, and of our true compassion for the faithful lieges, to look with tranquillity any longer at such murders, robberies, outrages and agony. We take up arms therefore to oppose the violent tyranny of the Spaniards, by the help of the merciful God, who is the enemy of all bloodthirstiness."

Hampden, Pym, and Cromwell were conscientious objectors in the seventeenth century when they resisted the claim of King Charles I to the divine right of a monarch to impose a people's wrong. They fought him and they beat him.

The signers of the American Declaration of Independence were conscientious objectors in 1776, when they drew up their famous protest against the attempt of the German King of England George III, and his fat-witted minis-

ter Lord North, to enslave and oppress the American colonists by military force. Read the history of the American Revolution carefully, and you will see that it was not a Rebellion: it was a Resistance against an illegal assertion of power by an autocrat. It was a repetition of the lessons which Great Britain herself had taught us in her great objection to the Stuart tyranny. It was a prophecy of the causes which have brought us to her side today. The reasons which forced us to fight against George III in 1776 are precisely the same as those which bring us to take part with Great Britain, and with our old and true friend France, in resistance to this last unjust and violent assertion by a German monarchy, that it has a right to rule the world by military might.

Abraham Lincoln was a conscientious objector when he wrote to the men who were trying to destroy the United States in 1861, "In every event, to the extent of my ability, I shall repel force by force".

Woodrow Wilson was a conscientious objector when he sent his great message to the United States Congress on April 2, 1917, declaring that the present, avowed, ruthless "German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind". He continued: "I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States, that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus

been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the German Government to terms, and end the war”.

That is a magnificent, measured, sane statement of the position of true conscientious objectors today. It sets forth the aim which they have at heart: “to end the war”. It states the only way by which that end can be achieved, by a victory which shall “bring the German Government to terms”. Let me sum up briefly the nature of our objections to Germany’s war.

I. *We object to the existence of this war.* It is a needless, wasteful, horrible conflict which should never have been begun. The offense of choosing, forcing and beginning it lies on Germany’s head.

By the head of Germany I mean whatever power has actually controlled that country in her recent policy and action.

Some say it is the Kaiser, and many of his own remarks seem to indicate that he himself is under that impression.

Others say that he is little more than an imposing figure-head, and that the real power lies with a group of men who surround him, his counsellors, the great manufacturers, shipping-merchants, heads of corporations and Junker land-owners.

Others say that the ruling class in Germany is the military and naval clique which had built up an enormous instrument of war, fitted with all modern devices for destroying life and property, and which could not be content until they had a chance to use their new machine. That sounds childish, but it is none the less likely to be true.

However that may be, the power, or the combination of powers in Germany and Austria, which sent the armies into the field and keeps them there, is the criminal guilty of the existence of the bloody and unnecessary world war of the twentieth century.

Understand I do not now profess to speak of the causes, of the conflicting national interests, which lie behind this great conflict. They reach back to the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, and perhaps even farther. It is not to be supposed that in those multitudinous international disputes, differences and strifes, the right was all on the side of one nation, or of any one group of nations. Indeed the groups have formed and reformed themselves so frequently, and with so many changes, that it is almost impossible to trace the heredity of great alliances today.

But our point is this: Whatever may have been the condition of the international questions of Europe and of the so-called balance of power in 1914, there was absolutely no reason and no justification for choosing and forcing war as a method of attempting to settle those difficulties.

Take the Austro-Servian quarrel, which was made the nominal root and origin of all the evil that has been brought upon us. An Austrian Archduke and his wife were assassinated on June 28, 1914, on a visit to the capital of the province of Bosnia. The assassins were Austrian subjects, of doubtful character. The Austrian Government despatched an ultimatum on July 23 accusing the Servian Government of complicity in this crime, and demanding by way of punishment conditions which would practically destroy the independence of Servia as a nation. Forty-eight hours were given as the period in which this ultimatum must be absolutely accepted in all its terms. The Servian Government replied by practically accepting all of the terms but one, and by stating that it did not understand that term, and that it would be willing to refer the matter for peaceable solution to the decision of the International Court at The Hague, or to the decision of the Great Powers who signed the Declaration of 1909. Now it is impossible to imagine either that Germany did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum before it was sent to Servia, or that she was ignorant of the tenor of Servia's submissive and peaceful answer, or that she was unaware of the grave danger which would arise on the side of Russia if the independence of the Servian nation should be overridden by Austria.

During this time the British Government made earnest efforts to avert the storm of war which Germany determined to let loose. It was

proposed by the British Foreign Minister that the French, Italian and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately, to discover an issue which would preserve peace. He also suggested that these four Powers,—two from the Triple Alliance and two from the Entente, Germany and Italy, and Great Britain and France,—should mediate between Austria, Servia and Russia either at Vienna or at St. Petersburg. France and Italy on July 27 accepted Great Britain's proposal for this conference. On the same day the German Secretary of State refused it. Direct conversations were begun between Vienna and St. Petersburg. That afternoon the Kaiser, who had been yachting at Kiel, returned to Potsdam!

On the next day, July 28, Austria declared war on Servia, and on the following day Russia began to mobilize her armies in the districts bordering upon Servia and Austria. On this same day the late Czar of Russia telegraphed to the Emperor William as follows: "Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented today by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship". On July 30 the Austrians began to bombard Belgrade. On the 31st, in answer to a question from Great Britain, France promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium;—Ger-

many refused to answer the question, and presented an ultimatum to Russia and to France. On August 1 Germany declared war on Russia. On August 2 she violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, entered the territory of France, and presented an ultimatum to Belgium demanding that she should betray her own neutrality. On August 3 Germany declared war on France. On August 4 Germany invaded Belgium, and Great Britain presented an ultimatum to Germany; on the 5th the British Ambassador left Berlin, and on the 6th the Prime Minister announced a state of war.

There we have in outline the whole shameful story of Germany's betrayal of the peace of Europe. She refused every proposition of arbitration. She declined to have anything to do with a conference of the four Powers, in which a peaceful solution of the question between Austria and Servia might have been obtained. She played fast and loose with her own promises, and made disgraceful propositions to Great Britain to betray her obligations to France, and to Belgium to allow herself to be shamefully used in an attack upon the flank of France. She drew the bloody sword apparently without hesitation and without remorse. She professed to be forced into a war of self-defence; *but she has never to this day been willing to state what it was that she was defending, or what was the cause for which she was determined to fight, but which she was not willing to submit to an impartial court of arbitration, or even to a con-*

ference of her sister nations. She wanted war, and she got it!

Doubtless she had no dream of the full flood of blood and horror and grief which she was letting loose upon Europe. Doubtless she thought the war would be a short and comparatively easy one. But even if in her pride she thought that, it was no excuse. If the war had only lasted three months, it would still have been a terrible crime. Now that it has lasted nearly three years it has become a gigantic sin against humanity, of which Germany must bear the guilt. We conscientious objectors make our first objection to the very existence of this war, and we propose to help our allies in pursuing the only way which now remains to end it, namely, to bring the German Government "to terms".

II. *We object also in the name of conscience to the manner in which Germany has conducted this war.* It has been an astounding exhibition not only of disregard for solemn treaties, but also of contempt for the accepted rules of international law and the plain instincts of humanity. Begin where you like in the record. You will find that everywhere Germany has led the way. I do not say that she has been altogether alone in practices which are abhorrent, and from which we hoped that the common principles of civilization had delivered every belligerent nation. But I do say, and I say it

without hesitation, after careful study, that in every case Germany has been the first to violate the rule of law and the instinct of humanity. Take the unannounced dropping of aerial bombs on the sleeping city of Antwerp on August 24, 1914. It is true that Antwerp was a fortified city. But that fact did not cancel the rule of international law, that the bombardment of even a fortified city must be announced, in order that the lives of non-combatants may be spared. This shocking Zeppelin raid, however, which, from the course taken by the airship, was evidently carefully designed to destroy the palace in which the King and Queen of Belgium were sleeping with their children, and the hotels in which the members of the Belgian Cabinet were lodged, as a matter of fact succeeded only in destroying some sixty peaceful houses and injuring hundreds of others, and in killing by way of playful experiment scores of helpless women and children. It was the keynote of the horrors which were committed by the Germans after that in Belgium and elsewhere. Louvain and Dinant were burned, and hundreds of their people were massacred. Scores of old cities in Flanders and northern France were ruined without any military excuse. The cathedral of Rheims has been slowly and systematically reduced to a ghastly ruin, for no reason other than the pure lust of destruction. The abominable use of poison gas in warfare, with all the cruelty that it involves, was begun by the Germans in the trenches before Ypres on April 22,

1915. Summer resorts, peaceful villages and coast towns of England, whether fortified or not, were raided from the air. The laboring populations of invaded Belgium and northern France were deported with circumstances of incredible brutality and taken to Germany, where they were made to work at tasks which were unquestionably hostile to their own countries. And the German submarines began their career of destruction against peaceful ships of all nations, including the nations with whom they were in friendship, as well as those with whom they were at war.

Try to understand the submarine. Germany claimed that it was such a wonderful, delicate and scientific instrument of destruction, that the old-accepted rule of international law, which obliged a naval commander before sinking a merchant ship to give warning and to make provision for the safety of the passengers and the crew, could not any longer be regarded as binding. The exquisite and triumphant submarine, fragile as it was, could not afford to take any such humane precautions. It must be allowed to sink any vessel that it chose to sink, and leave the people on board of it, men, women and children, to perish in the waves. This argument, if once admitted, would justify any assassin in killing anybody, provided the instrument with which he committed his crime was sufficiently delicate to be in danger of being broken in case of a conflict.

The German idea of *Kultur* in war has culmi-

nated in the practice of torpedoing hospital ships with wounded men and Red Cross nurses on board, many of whom are necessarily lost. This is certainly the extreme limit of scientific barbarism. Taken in connection with the long list of preceding cruelties and atrocities it fully justifies the conscientious objectors in saying that they object with amazement and horror to Germany's conduct of this war, and that they propose, with the help of God, to put an end to it by whatever means are needful and possible.

III. *In the third place we conscientious objectors in America object to the way in which the German Government has forced this war upon our peace-loving country.* The record is a long list of shameless injuries and provocations to the United States, borne with an extreme patience and forbearance,—yea, to the utmost limit of more than seventy times seven.

While we were still at peace with the Germanic Powers they established a base system of espionage and an impudent propaganda in our country. These enjoyed the aid and comfort of diplomatic representatives, whose very office bound them to honorable conduct. We sent the Austrian Ambassador home for promoting sedition and privy conspiracy here. The German Embassy continued his shameless work. Officials of that Embassy less clever than their chief, Count Bernstorff, were caught black-handed and sent home. Still German agents

conspired against our neutrality and honor. They used our land to plot outrages in Canada. They set flame to our factories and our wharves. They made the German ships to which we had given asylum in our harbors an assassins' cave, for the manufacture of bombs to be hidden in our own ships and in those of friendly nations. Filled with the madness of destruction, they cared not whom they maimed or slew. At last the German Government sent a secret message to Mexico, proposing an alliance in case of war, offering to give her two or three of our states as a reward, and even urging her to persuade Japan into that unholy league. Such is the record of the German Government and its agents on land,—a record of contempt, injustice and treachery toward our country.

Now turn to the record on the sea. The story of the attack of the German submarines upon American interests, rights and lives, is one of the most shocking pages of human history. The *Lusitania* was torpedoed without warning on May 7, 1915. There were 114 American men, women and children on board who were thus murdered,—drowned without an effort of the submarine to help them,—“Butchered to make a German holiday”. The holiday was celebrated; and I have one of the infamous medals which were struck in Germany to commemorate it.

Within the next three months three indignant notes of protest and warning against this outrage of law and humanity were sent to Germany. Her answer was to sink the *Arabic*, on

August 19, and murder three more Americans. After this the correspondence dragged along until the attack on the Sussex, March, 1916. Then a practical ultimatum was sent by the President, warning Germany that diplomatic relations would be broken off, unless she abandoned her illegal and inhuman submarine policy. She promised to abandon it. On January 31, 1917, she withdrew that promise and announced that she would carry on an unrestricted submarine war, sinking merchant and passenger ships at sight. The President kept his word, and broke off relations. Promptly thereafter the Germans torpedoed eight American merchant vessels in succession, and murdered forty more Americans.

The die was cast. Our country could no longer restrain her conscientious objections to the existence, the conduct and the animus of this war against freedom, justice and democracy. Germany compelled us either to take up arms to end it, or to submit to its threat against the world's liberties and our own life.

We are in the war now,—in it with our conscience and our honor. Let us make ourselves count in it for all we are worth,—heart and head and hand, purse and property and prowess. We pledge our best aid to our brave Allies in order to get the war over as soon as possible. We will unite every counsel, every will, every effort to serve the good cause. We are resolved not to cease until the menace of an all-powerful, ruthless, military autocracy shall perish from the face of the earth.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY IMPERILLED

THOMAS JEFFERSON WERTENBAKER

How ignorant of history is the world! When, in the summer of 1914, the German Emperor violated the neutrality of Belgium, the world was surprised. When the German Chancellor defended his master by declaring that it was unreasonable to expect him to forgo his plans for an attack upon France because of a mere scrap of paper, the world was again surprised. It was with amazement and alarm that the world awoke to the dread realization that the Kaiser was making a deliberate assault upon the liberties of Europe, and that he had organized his empire for that purpose into a vast military machine.

There was no reason for surprise at these things. In doing them William II was only being true to the traditions of his house. In the breach of Belgian neutrality he had before him the example of ancestors whom he had always revered and imitated. In organizing his people into a great army for aggression upon his neighbors, he could find his precedent in almost every Hohenzollern from the Great Elector to his own grandfather, the Prince Cartridge of the Berlin Revolution of 1848.

In fact, the house which now rules in Germany has had a history of singular uniformity, of unflagging adherence to certain fixed principles. William II is not different from William I, William I followed the policy of Frederick the Great, Frederick the Great was the reflection of the Great Elector. There are five cardinal points in the Hohenzollern policy: the raising and equipping of the largest military establishment that their subjects can possibly support, a diplomacy characterized by Machiavellian duplicity and faithlessness, unswerving opposition to liberal government in any form, an appetite for territorial aggrandizement that can never be appeased, machinelike centralization and efficiency in civil affairs.

If we may single out from these policies the one which has been the most consistently, the most religiously adhered to, it will be, perhaps, Hohenzollern treachery. Prince after prince, whether of his own initiative or from the advice of his ministers, has made and broken treaties with equal facility, has deceived friend and foe alike. In this respect there has been no truer representative of the house than Frederick William the Great Elector. Wakeman, in his "Europe 1598-1715," written many years before the outbreak of the present war, thus describes him: "Not one spark of generosity illuminated his policy, not one grain of idealism colored his ambition, no sentiment of moral right ever interfered with his judgment, no fear of future retribution arrested his action. Mean

minded, false and unscrupulous, he was the first sovereign to display the principles of seventeenth century Machiavellianism, stripped of their cloak of Italian refinement, in all the hideous brutality of German coarseness.”

Of a similar stripe was Frederick the Great. This monarch's wonderful genius and his plucky fight against tremendous odds have blinded many to the real meaning of his career. He was, as Macaulay has said, “a tyrant without fear, faith or mercy.” His international policy was shaped solely by what he thought would benefit Prussia. He never hesitated to betray his allies in their hour of need and he held his own word as a matter of no moment, a thing serviceable only to deceive his friends and enemies alike, a thing to be broken without hesitation or compunction. Weaker nations, he declared, must give way before the stronger. They had no rights which need be respected because they had not the power to defend themselves.

Frederick's treatment of Saxony in the Seven Years War affords so striking a parallel to the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 that it will be well to give a brief description of it. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1756, Frederick set his armies in motion ostensibly for the invasion of Bohemia. Just as Belgium was the easiest route into France for the hosts of William II, so Saxony, which lay directly between Brandenburg and Bohemia, afforded Frederick the shortest path to Prague. The King demanded of the Saxon Elector, Augustus III, permission for his

troops to pass through his domains, promising that they would observe exact order and discipline upon their march. Augustus, who was not built in the heroic mould of King Albert, gave a prompt assent. Whereupon Frederick moved into Saxony and took possession of it.

The terrified Elector now learned that the Prussians intended not to pass through Saxony, but to seize it with the purpose of forcing him to become their ally in the war with Austria. "Saxony must share the same fortune and the same dangers as my own states," declared Frederick. "If I am fortunate, the Elector shall be amply compensated. I shall take charge of his interests as well as my own. As for what people will say, . . . his best excuse is that he is unable to do anything else." Augustus was told that he must either assist Frederick as an open ally or see his troops incorporated in the Prussian army, his revenues appropriated by the Prussian Government. "Good God," cried the Saxon envoy, "such a thing is without example in ancient or modern history." "Do you think so?" was Frederick's sneering reply. "It seems to me there is a precedent, but if not, perhaps you know I flatter myself on being original."

The Saxon army retreated to a strong camp at Pirna, and there was besieged by the Prussians. Despite the heroic efforts of the Austrians to rescue them, they were captured, and the private soldiers were compelled to enlist in Frederick's army. Saxony throughout the war was treated as a conquered province, and a

crushing burden of taxation placed upon her helpless people. Leipsig alone was compelled to pay no less than 10,726,429 thalers.

The invasion of Belgium shows that William II is no better and no worse than his great ancestor, that he has in this the twentieth century learned to be nothing more than a Hohenzollern. Belgium stood in the way of his ambitions so he trampled her under his feet in just the same way that Frederick had trampled Saxony a century and a half before. And had Albert submitted to the violation of his soil as Augustus had submitted, who can doubt that his fate would have been the same as that of the Elector?

This treacherous foreign policy has ever been accompanied by blatant militarism. The victims of Hohenzollern duplicity have only too often been powerless to secure redress because they could not match the overgrown Prussian army. The sharp command of the drill sergeant and the tramp of many regiments have resounded throughout Prussia since the days of the Great Elector. William II, with his huge fighting machine which is today challenging the liberties of the world, is no greater advocate of militarism than was William I, or Frederick the Great, or Frederick William I. In fact Frederick William I, known in history as the Drill Sergeant, was the greatest military enthusiast of all time. This man had the same love for his regiments that the child has for his toy soldiers. He loved the fine uniforms of his grenadiers and their glistening muskets; he loved to watch their perfect

discipline as they wheeled and countermarched upon the parade ground. At his death he handed down to his son the great Frederick an army of 89,000 men, the most perfect in Europe. Can we wonder that the present Emperor, with such traditions in his family, should adhere to the military fetish? "I thank my army for all that it has accomplished for my House," said William II in an address to the soldiers, "for its devotion and spirit of self-sacrifice, for its bravery and loyalty. . . . The new century sees our army—in other words, our people in arms—gathered around their standards, kneeling before the Lord of Hosts. . . . And verily, if anyone has especial reason for bowing down before God, it is our army. A glance at our standards suffices for an explanation, for they are the embodiment of our history." "It is the soldier and the army," said he upon another occasion, "not Parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests upon the army."

The Crown Prince, even more than his father, glories in militarism. "For him who has once ridden in a charge in peace," he writes, "there is nothing better except another ride ending in a clash with the foe. How often in the midst of a charge have I caught the yearning cry of a comrade, 'Donnerwetter, if it were only in earnest.' That is the cavalry spirit. Every true soldier must feel and know it." "We live today in a time which . . . indulges in foolish dreams of the possibility of a perpetual world

peace," he says again. "This view of life is un-German and does not become us. A German who loves his nation . . . must not close his eyes to such reveries. . . . Just as lightning equalizes the tension in two differently charged strata of the air, so will the sword always be and remain till the end of the world the finally decisive factor."

"It behooves us to have a sharp eye for, and to guard against half-heartedness in our military effort," writes Baron von der Goltz, "against any adulteration or dilution of the warlike spirit and warlike passion, against diplomatic generals. . . . Let us be spared the false humanitarianism which would shrink from a desperate fight. . . . The warlike spirit must not be allowed to die out among the people, neither must the love of peace get the upper hand."

But what makes the German army especially dangerous to the liberties of the world is that it controls, rather than is controlled by, the people. The power rests in the hands of a bureaucracy of officials, who are not responsible to the Reichstag, but to the Kaiser alone. This bureaucracy is filled with Prussian nobles, popularly known as Junkers, who are passionately attached to the stern old repressive military spirit, and fanatically loyal to their monarch and war lord. "Prussia attained her greatness," says Prince Bülow, "as a country of soldiers and officials, and as such she was able to accomplish the work of German union; to

this day she is still, in all essentials, a state of soldiers and officials." "Any one who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals," says another German writer, "knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the army by the German Parliament."

The *Cologne Gazette*, in a recent issue, entered a vigorous protest against a proposal made by the Constitutional Committee of the Reichstag, that the unlimited control of the Kaiser over the army and navy be in some way curbed. After publishing a defence of Prussian military traditions together with the history of the relations between the Crown and the army, it says: "What is positively perilous is the effort . . . to interfere with the position of the Supreme War Lord toward army and navy. The proposal to make the Imperial Chancellor or the Minister of War responsible for the nomination of officers is an invasion of the rights of the Crown which we must characterize at once as unfounded, inappropriate and harmful, and which must be repudiated with the greatest determination in the interest of the corps of officers, which is the backbone of our defence on sea and land. . . . Are we now, as if we had Jena and Auerstadt immediately behind us, suddenly to cut the ties which unite the King of Prussia and German Kaiser with the corps of officers? Why should we do so? Only because doctrinaire theorists wish so."

Hand and hand with militarism has gone despotism. The Hohenzollern house has always had an invincible antipathy to any form of popular government. They have been patriotic in the sense that they have governed always efficiently, but they have fought fiercely against the growth of parliamentary power. From the days of the Great Elector, when the liberties of Brandenburg and East Prussia were ruthlessly crushed, to those of the present Kaiser, Prussia has been essentially a despotism. In 1813 and 1814, when the Prussian people rose against the hosts of Napoleon and threw them across the Rhine, there was momentary hope that the old system would be overthrown. Frederick William III, in his hour of need, promised a constitution to his country. But when fear of Napoleon had passed, yielding to the pleading of the nobles and of the reactionary Metternich, he broke his word, and refused to make any concessions whatever.

It is true that later, in 1850, Frederick William IV consented to the mockery of a constitution, but it in no way changed the character of the state. Prussia remains today what it has always been—aristocratic and despotic. Although there is a parliament, the electoral system is so arranged that there is no chance for the poor to exert their proportionate influence, even in the lower or popular house. In 1900 the Social Democrats, although they polled a majority of the votes, secured only seven seats out of four hundred. The House of Lords is made up of

hereditary members who represent rights of blood, life members who represent landed properties and great institutions, and officials who represent the bureaucracy. This body, the very centre of reaction, is the King's creature, for he may appoint new members without limit.

The German Empire, while it enjoys a more liberal constitution than Prussia, is also essentially autocratic. The Kaiser declares war with the consent of the Bundesrath, or Upper House of Parliament; he is the head of the army and navy; he appoints the Imperial Chancellor to whom the heads of the executive departments are responsible; he names the Prussian delegates to the Bundesrath. The Lower House or Reichstag plays but a subordinate part in the government. It neither makes nor unmakes ministries, it does not control the army, and while, in conjunction with the Upper House, it votes the appropriations, many of these are granted for long periods of years. The Bundesrath is an assemblage of princes, for it represents not the people of Germany, but the rulers of the states of which the Empire is composed.

To Americans it seems incredible that a vast empire, an empire noted for its leadership in many intellectual fields, should at the beginning of the twentieth century cling to this illiberal system. When Germans display reverence and awe for their Kaiser, when they unsheathe their swords and vow to defend his throne and to extend his power, there comes to us the picture of a Louis XIV or a Henry VIII, and we wonder

why the Teutonic mind is still enslaved to principles long since cast off by other modern nations. We are apt to view the German with something like contempt and speak lightly of the time when he shall enjoy the freedom which is ours, when he shall cast aside the imperial trumpery and like a man take the government of his country into his own hands.

Unfortunately it is no easy matter to effect reforms in Germany. Any change in the constitution of the Empire can be blocked by fourteen votes in the Bundesrath, or, as the Kaiser appoints the seventeen Prussian delegates to that body, by what amounts to an imperial veto. That William II will never willingly permit the liberalization of the Empire his whole career bears witness. If the German liberals are to secure the boon of liberty, it must be done by revolution or by the aid of foreign arms. And revolution is most difficult because sentiment is by no means universally in favor of radical changes. There are millions of Germans who are convinced that their government is the best in the world, who would give their lives to defend the powers and privileges of their Kaiser. So far are they from repudiating the German system that they long to spread it to other lands. It is best that we should conquer, they say, that we may give to less fortunate neighbors the benefit of *Kultur*.

“Germany, thanks to its genius for organization, has reached a stage of civilization higher than that of other peoples,” says Professor

Ostwald, a German of great prominence. "War will make them share our higher civilization some day, under the form of this organization. Of our enemies . . . the French and the English have attained the degree of cultural development that we passed more than fifty years ago. This is the stage of individualism. But above this stage is the stage of organization. It is this stage that Germany has reached."

"A man who is not a German can know nothing of Germany," said Professor Lasson, in a letter published in the *Amsterdammer* of October 11, 1914. "We are morally and intellectually superior to all; beyond comparison. The same is true of our organization and our institutions."

"Germany ought and desires to remain isolated," wrote Professor von Leyden in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. "The Germans are the most elevated people on earth. They will accomplish their destiny which is to govern the world and to control other nations for the welfare of humanity."

These are not the words of isolated fanatics, but of leaders of German thought, and they represent the opinions of millions of the sober temperate people of Germany. To Englishmen and to Americans it seems incredible that any save a madman could hold such monstrous views, and they wonder how it was possible for them to become current among an intelligent people. The explanation is found in the control exerted over the educational system by the Gov-

ernment. For decades the Prussian bureaucracy has made use of the institutions of learning for the unceasing preaching of despotism, militarism and aggressive nationalism. It is not too much to say that a large number of the universities have become instruments for propagating ideals of government which accord with the wishes of the official caste. The nomination of professors for the universities lies practically in the hands of the Minister of Education, and this minister can and does exert pressure upon them to compel orthodoxy. With typical German docility a large part of the people have accepted their teaching, have learned to glory in despotism, have learned to regard all save Germans with contempt.

In the task of retaining its hold upon the people the Government has one argument which has been hard for the liberals to answer—success. It constantly harps upon the benefits that have come to Prussia and to Germany from the Hohenzollern House; military glory, prosperity, national unity. Against the pleas of the Social Democrats the Kaiser can point to the fruits of despotism. William II would have the German people revere William I as a demi-god. His references to the founder of the present Empire in an address in 1896 are so instructive that we quote at some length: “Had this exalted sovereign lived in the Middle Ages he would have been canonized and pilgrimages from all lands would have come to offer up prayers at his relics. God be thanked, it is

even so today. The door of his mausoleum stands open; daily his faithful subjects fare thither, taking their children with them, and strangers come to rejoice at the sight of this glorious old hero and of his statues.

“But we may be especially proud of this mighty man, since he was a son of the Mark. . . . The House of Hohenzollern and the Mark of Brandenburg are connected as though they were one. . . . So long as the farmer of the Mark stands by us, so long as we can count upon the support and help of the Mark in our work, no Hohenzollern will despair of his task. . . . To this task the memory of Emperor William the Great calls me, and in fulfilling it we will rally around him, around his memory, as the Spaniards of old rallied around the Cid. This task, which is laid on the shoulders of all of us, and which by our fealty to Emperor William I we are bound to undertake, is the battle against revolution—a combat to be waged with every means at our command. That party which ventures to attack the foundations of the State, which revolts against religion, which does not even stop at the person of the most exalted sovereign of whom I have spoken—that party must be vanquished. I shall rejoice to know that the hand of any man is clasped in mine—be he workman, sovereign or gentleman—if only he helps me to this combat.”

Nor is this plea entirely unreasonable. Although the Hohenzollerns have given Germany little real liberty, they have given it a marvel-

lous organization. They have always coupled their despotism with centralized efficiency which has been largely responsible for the rapid development and growth of their country. They have ruled always despotically, but well.

Germany today resembles a well oiled piece of machinery, perfectly adjusted in all its parts. In the government there is little corruption, little misdirected energy, little bungling. There is no Pork Barrel, no waste of money, no municipal scandals. As the Kaiser is the head of the administration there is the lack of the periodic change of national policy which is an inherent weakness in more democratic countries. The Government guides and controls the national energies, turns them from unproductive channels, points out the way to prosperity.

It is this marvellous efficiency which has made possible Germany's rapid growth in population and in wealth since the foundation of the Empire in 1871. At the outbreak of the present war her people were numbered at 66,715,000; her imports valued at \$2,500,000,000; her exports \$2,131,000,000; her wealth \$80,000,000,000. German manufactured goods were competing vigorously and successfully for the world's markets. It was but a few days ago that the British Empire Productions Association, at a luncheon in London, discovered that they were eating from German made plates, and vented their vexation by hurling them to the floor.

And it is this very efficiency which makes Germany so great a menace to the world. This

machine, this mechanism of industry and wealth and men, wonderfully organized and centrally controlled, constitutes the most powerful creation of all time. The successes of the Germans in the present war, their march through Serbia, their conquest of Poland, the superiority they have shown over more numerous enemies are due not entirely, in fact not chiefly, to the perfection of their armies, but to the organization of the nation behind them. The army is but the weapon with which blows are struck, the nation is the man who wields the weapon. In other words, we have the alarming spectacle of a vast empire organized in its every detail for aggression upon its neighbors.

The power which has come to the Hohenzollerns through the perfection of their armies and the organization of their resources has been used ruthlessly for territorial aggrandizement. When Bismarck was trying to persuade William I to annex to Prussia the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, he succeeded by reminding him "that each of his immediate predecessors had won an addition to the Monarchy."

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Hohenzollerns were petty princes, ruling over Brandenburg in the north of Germany; today they are the Kings of Prussia, which has engulfed more than half the Teutonic territory and extends in one vast sweep from the Memel to the Rhine; they are German Emperors, and as such rule from Denmark to the Alps; by conquest in the present war they control territory from Lille to Kovel.

The growth of Hohenzollern territory has been steady and rapid. In 1600 the House ruled over dominions aggregating about 40,000 square kilometres. Before the middle of the seventeenth century this had been nearly tripled, and amounted, at the death of the Great Elector, to 110,840 kilometres. Frederick the Great received from his father 118,000 kilometres and handed down to his successors 195,000 kilometres. Frederick William II, thanks to his participation in the partition of Poland, increased the Prussian territory to 300,000 kilometres. There was some loss of territory under the adjustments of the Napoleonic period and the Congress of Vienna, but they were more than compensated for by the acquisitions of 1866, when Prussia expanded until it embraced an area of 348,000 square kilometres. The North German Confederation which was formed in the same year and placed under the Prussian Kings brought the total Hohenzollern territory to 415,000 kilometres. Finally, in 1871, the formation of the German Empire and the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine made the Kaiser the ruler over no less than 540,496 square kilometres. In three hundred years the Hohenzollern domains have increased more than thirteen fold.

As we reflect upon this story of constant expansion at the expense of weaker neighbors, we ask ourselves in alarm where the thing is to end. What is the ambition of the present Hohenzollerns and the men who surround them? Until the outbreak of the present war this expansion

had been carried on chiefly at the expense of other German states. It has hitherto been excused by the plea that it was necessary in order to cement German union. But now that the Empire is a *fait accompli*, can it be that the Hohenzollerns desire territorial growth at the expense of non-Teutonic peoples? Is it possible that they wish to restore the Holy Roman Empire and plant their heels upon the neck of vanquished nations?

Germany's hostile intention against the world can no longer be doubted, for it is evidenced by the writings of a host of her most prominent citizens; officials, professors, generals, and so forth. "We must not forget the civilizing duty which devolves upon us by the decrees of providence," writes General von Clausewitz. "As Prussia has been made by fate the nucleus of Germany, so Germany will be the regenerating nucleus of the future empire of the West. . . . And in order that no one shall be ignorant of it, we proclaim now, that our continental nation has a right to the sea, not only the North Sea, but also the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. We will absorb then, one after another, all the provinces which border upon Prussia; we will annex successively Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Franche-Comté, North Switzerland, Livonia, then Trieste and Venice; finally the northern region of France, from the Somme to the Loire."

Referring to this scheme of aggrandizement as outlined by General von Clausewitz, General

von Schellendorf, a former Prussian Minister of War, says: "This program which we now give out without fear is the work of no fool; this empire which we wish to establish will be no dream; we have now in our hands the means for its realization."

In June, 1917, the principal speaker at a reactionary meeting in Germany advocated the seizure of all the vast region of Lithuania and Courland, the expulsion of many of the inhabitants and its settlement by 2,000,000 German speaking Russians from the interior of the Slavic dominions. This he felt would weaken Russia permanently, would establish a complete bulwark of dependent states east of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and would widen German influence and civilization.

At the moment of writing comes the report that the reactionists are circulating among the troops a pamphlet entitled "Germany's Position under Good and Bad Peace." Among other features of this publication are maps showing Germany covering or controlling nearly three-fourths of all Europe. It is actually suggested that France be annexed to the German Empire as a dependent state. An alternative proposition is the acquisition of a strip of territory to connect Germany with the Mediterranean. The pamphlet also pleads for the formation of a German customs union to include the Scandinavian countries, for the expulsion of Great Britain from the Mediterranean, the acquisition by Germany of Cape Verde, the Azores and

other islands, the reduction of Poland, Courland, Finland, the Baltic provinces and large stretches of Russia proper to the status of subject states.

“You ask what Germany desires?” says Professor Ostwald. “Well, Germany wishes to organize Europe, for Europe so far is unorganized. Germany wishes to enter upon a new path in order to realize the idea of collective work. How does Germany propose to realize her project of organizing the West? She will demand that both Germans and French be made welcome into each of those countries, that they be permitted to work and to acquire property upon the same conditions as the citizens of each country; in the East Germany will create a confederation of states, a kind of Baltic League, which will embrace the Scandinavian countries, Finland and the Baltic provinces. Finally, Poland is to be torn from Russia and be made into an independent state. I believe the moment has come for the revising of the map of Europe.”

General von Bernhardi, in his famous book, “Germany and the Next War,” says, “We must arouse in our people the unanimous wish for power together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interest of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a world Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. . . . In one way or another we

must square our account with France, if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. . . . France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path."

To what extent the German nation has subscribed to these extreme schemes of conquest it is not possible to say. It is improbable that either the average citizen or the Imperial Government entered the present war with the definite program of a confederated Europe under German leadership. That many hundred thousands believe that this is the eventual "manifest destiny" of the Teuton race, none can gainsay.

It every day becomes more evident, however, that the Kaiser and his advisers did have as their chief purpose in precipitating war the establishment of the long dreamed of *Mittel-europa*. More than two decades ago there was established a society known as the Pan-Germanic Union, whose avowed purpose it was to bring into the Empire all German speaking peoples. "The German Empire is incomplete," they said; "beyond the imperial frontiers are twenty-one million Teutons, two million in Switzerland, ten million in Austria-Hungary, one million in Russia, and eight million Netherlanders in Belgium and Holland. The problem consists in establishing complete identity between the linguistic territory and the political territory; then only will Germany attain her natural frontiers."

This society, which numbers among its members many of the most prominent men of the Empire, has been laboring unceasingly to con-

vert the people of Germany to their views. Agents have been scattered far and near to preach the doctrine of Pan-Germanism, money has been spent freely, professors have taught it in the universities, newspapers have consecrated themselves to it. That this propaganda, if accepted as their own by the German nation, would lead inevitably to a great European upheaval did not deter them. "It is then necessary before all to convince ourselves," declared General von der Goltz, "and to convince the generation whose education we must shape, that the moment for repose has not come, that the prediction of a supreme struggle, having as its stake the existence and grandeur of Germany, is by no means a vain dream, the creation of the imagination of a few ambitious fools, that this supreme struggle will break forth some day inevitable, terrible."

With time the Pan-Germanist program grew. Out of the movement for a union of German speaking peoples developed a vast scheme of unprecedented expansion. It was proposed that Germany should annex or control all of central Europe, including Belgium, Holland, northern France, Poland and the Baltic provinces; the whole of the Turkish Empire; and a connecting strip of territory through the Balkans. The new Germany was to stretch in one mighty sweep from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. Europe was to be split with an iron wedge, and a direct path opened for German organization and for German armies into the heart of Asia.

The entire plan was set forth in 1911 by Otto Richard Tannenberg in his work, "*Grossdeutschland, die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts.*"

Although the Kaiser and the group of men who surround him have not accepted openly this scheme of aggression, William has encouraged the Pan-Germanist movement in every way, allowing their agents to work freely among the people, receiving their leaders into royal favor. More significant is the fact, now for the first time dawning upon the consciousness of the world, that the imperial policies have for years shaped themselves in conformity with the greater part of the Pan-Germanist scheme. What other interpretation could be placed upon the Kaiser's activities in the Orient, his visit to the Sultan, the Bagdad Railway concession, the Germanizing of the Turkish army? The Kaiser's famous utterance at Damascus in 1898, when he assured "the Sultan as well as the three hundred millions of Musselmans who venerate him as their Khalifa" that the German Emperor was their friend forever, takes on a new meaning in the light of recent events. Nor can there be any doubt that the immediate occasion of the present great war was the blocking of the way to the East by the Treaty of Bucharest which followed the Balkan wars. With this treaty the crushing of Serbia became a necessity to Germany, because Serbia was a link in the great chain which was being forged to connect Hamburg and Koweit.

More convincing still is the fact that the war has made the Pan-Germanist scheme a *fait accompli*. The thing is done. "Let us make no mistake," says M. Chéradame, "Austria-Hungary is actually as much under the domination of William II as is Belgium. The European conflict has enabled Germany artfully to occupy the Empire of the Hapsburgs under the pretence of defending it. Since the beginning of 1915 all the troops of Francis Joseph have been entirely under the orders of the Berlin General Staff. Even if Austria-Hungary wished to make a separate peace she could not do so, for all her motive power, diplomatic and military, is exclusively controlled by the Kaiser's agents."

The conquest of Serbia, Montenegro and parts of Albania, and Rumania, together with the domination of Bulgaria have made real the second step of the vast scheme; the Germanizing of Turkey has accomplished the third. Germany's control over the Sultan's domains is almost as great as over Austria-Hungary. Not only has the economic life of Turkey fallen under the influence of German industrial organizers and its army under the control of German officers, but a large delegation of German professors has been sent to Constantinople as apostles of German Kultur.

The American citizen with his love of peace is inclined to ask why the Germans wished to enter upon this vast scheme of aggression and conquest; why they were not content to enjoy in quiet the prosperity which their industry had

won, how they could justify themselves in plunging the world into the most frightful struggle of all time. General von Bernhardt gives a partial explanation. "Germany supports today 65,000,000 inhabitants on an area about equal the size of France," he writes, "while only 40,000,000 live in France. Germany's enormous population increases annually by about 1,000,000. There is no question, agriculture and industry of the home country cannot give permanently sufficient employment to such a steadily increasing mass of human beings. . . . Partitioned as the surface of the globe is among nations at the present time, territorial acquisitions we can only realize at the cost of other states . . . and such results are possible only if we succeed in securing our power in the centre of Europe better than hitherto." Again he says, "It is impossible to change the partition of the earth as it now exists in our favor by diplomatic artifices. If we wish to gain the position in the world that is due to us, we must rely on our sword, renounce all weakly visions of fear, and eye the dangers surrounding us with resolute and unflinching courage."

This gospel is a simple one. Since Germany has not all that she desires or that she considers necessary for her development, and since she can get it only by robbing her neighbors, she is quite justified in launching an attack upon them. That other nations have need for their own territory does not matter. "I am hungry," she says, "surely you cannot blame me if I knock

you over the head and eat you." Her crude appeal to force she justifies by the law of the survival of the fittest. She laughs at international law, and brushes it aside as the foible of petty minds. "A state cannot commit crime," says Professor Lasson; "to observe treaties is not a question of law, it is a question of interest. . . . He who has power can create new conditions which will be as much law as those which precede it. In spite of all treaties the feeble are the prey of the stronger. . . . Between neighboring states . . . the case can be settled only by material force. . . . The feeble flatter themselves that the treaties which assure their miserable existence are inviolable. But war shows them that a treaty can be untrustworthy, that conditions have changed. There is only one guarantee: a sufficient military force." "Only cranks trust in international conventions," said Professor Busch at a recent Pan-German meeting, "and, as for disarmament treaties, they are not worth the paper they are written on."

What shall the answer be? The Kaiser and his people have presented their case to the world in an unmistakable manner—with the points of millions of bayonets, with the roar of thousands of guns. If the world reproaches them for their ruthless aggression, they reply with steel; if Belgium bemoans her hard fate, their reply is steel; if France points to her bleeding breast, their reply is steel; if America holds them responsible for her murdered women and children,

they reply still with steel. It is a difficult argument to answer; in fact it can be answered in but one way—with steel.

The world is slow to awaken to its peril. It was so content to go peaceably on its way, devoting its energies to things that make for happiness and plenty. It looked back with pity upon the struggles of other ages and congratulated itself that the enlightenment of the twentieth century would protect it from the horrors of war. It cannot even today realize that it is terribly necessary to bestir itself, to throw aside all hesitancy, to arm to the teeth in order to preserve all that it holds dearest, that it is necessary for her to use the argument of steel.

But there are millions of Americans who are wondering how all this concerns us. They cannot understand why we should be dragged into what they term a European squabble. Why should we care if the Kaiser does secure his Mitteleuropa and extend his power to the Persian Gulf? Why should we send our youth to slaughter in order to help the English and French conquer their enemies? They think that the submarine warfare alone has forced us into war and wonder whether the President might not have found some way to preserve longer our strained neutrality.

In fact our stake in the war is the same as that of our European allies; the preservation of our democracy, the defence of our liberties and our homes. Should the Germans be successful in this war the balance of power in

Europe will be overthrown. There would be no nation, no group of nations that could withstand the terrible might of the Kaiser. It would be a new European Empire, it would be Charlemagne returned to earth.

It requires no great insight to perceive that the safety of the American continents depends upon a division of power in Europe. Were all the millions of men, all the vast wealth, all the resources of Europe controlled by one government, we would be almost helpless before it. The day would not long be delayed when it would stretch forth its mighty hand across the Atlantic for a share in the riches of the West. Already the Kaiser has cast longing eyes at the Americas, and has sent to them hundreds of thousands of Teutonic settlers, as the vanguard of what may some day be a conquering host.

It is well for us to recall the dangers which threatened our country from the overgrown power of Napoleon Bonaparte. When Napoleon became First Consul of France the vast Louisiana territory bordered upon our western frontier, with the Mississippi the dividing line. When our independence was acknowledged this territory was in the hands of the decadent and unprogressive monarchy of Spain, from whom we had nothing to fear. Except for the extreme southern section, Louisiana was unsettled and it was unlikely that it would be settled for many decades. The possibility of the building up of a strong rival nation and the blocking forever of our westward expansion seemed remote.

But when Napoleon, in 1799, took Louisiana from the helpless Spaniards with the design of founding a new French empire in America, we were filled with the greatest alarm. "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans," declared President Jefferson, ". . . seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." The renewal of the European war forced Napoleon to sell Louisiana to the United States, but there can be little doubt that he would have turned his attention once more to America after his conquest of western Europe, had not the way been barred to him by the ever victorious British fleet.

It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the people of the United States that their safety would be seriously jeopardized were Germany to emerge from the war undefeated. Were hostilities to end today upon the *status quo*, or even upon the basis of no indemnities and no annexations, the Kaiser's domination of Europe would be almost undisputed. If France, England, Russia, Italy have been incapable of curbing the military might of Germany in the present war, what conceivable combination of Powers can accomplish the task in the next? A truce of a few years is all that Germany would require to organize herself and her allies into an invincible fighting machine. General von Bernhardi was quite correct when he wrote,

“Our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expect continuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to their interests.”

The United States has as much at stake in maintaining a divided Europe as France formerly had in preventing the uniting of Germany. For centuries the French rulers had little to fear from their neighbors across the Rhine, because they were disunited, weak and bitterly hostile to each other. In 1866, Napoleon III held his armies inert while Bismarck defeated the Austro-Hungarians and their allies, and brought about the union of all north Germany. His folly resulted not only in the crushing of France four years later by the German military machine and the collapse of his own imperial government, but in creating such a permanent menace to the very existence of France that she has lived ever since in the shadow of impending disaster. France today is paying for the folly of her Emperor with the lives of hundreds of thousands of her sons, with billions of francs, with untold bitterness and suffering. The people of the United States would be equally foolish were they not to strike with all their might at the Teutonic military power which threatens now to overwhelm Europe. If we fail in the present war, if Germany emerges with her military machine in working order, our sons will pay dearly for our failure.

But, many are asking, is not the danger as great from England as from Germany? Will we not, by striking down the Teutonic peril, help create an irresistible Britain? Is the menace of the Kaiser's army greater than that of England's navy? Such fears are without foundation. There is no reason to suppose that Great Britain will emerge from this struggle stronger than when she entered it. It is possible that she may retain some of the conquered German colonies, but these can add little to her power. Upon the continent of Europe she will secure not one foot of territory, and her might will still be balanced by that of Germany, France, Russia, Italy.

Moreover, Great Britain, like ourselves, is a democratic nation, a nation whose rulers are the representatives and servants of the people. She is the very antithesis of the military despotism of Germany. There is no fear that the British people will ever arm themselves to the teeth as the rulers of Germany have armed the German people, for an assault upon the liberties of the world. Can there be dread of a country the peace strength of whose army is only 138,497 men, and who was forced to create its effective fighting force of the present war after hostilities had begun? It is true that Great Britain has for centuries maintained the greatest navy of the world, but this has been necessary in order to assure the integrity of her empire and her own existence. It must be remembered that a navy is primarily a defensive weapon in that

it cannot be used for purposes of extensive conquest unless accompanied by an effective army. The British navy has been for us far more of a protection than a menace. It was the control of the seas by the British that made possible the independence of the Latin American states, for our Monroe Doctrine would have been of little avail against the reactionary continental powers which wished to aid Spain in subduing her rebellious colonies, had not Canning refused them passage for their armies. Nor would we have been allowed to acquire Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines in 1898, had not the British navy been ready to oppose any hostile league of European Powers.

No, the menace is from Germany, not from Great Britain. It is Germany that "stands in shining armor in the midst of Europe" and defies the power and derides the laws of the world. It is against Germany that the outraged peoples have been compelled to arm to protect all that they hold best and dearest. The struggle has become a world crusade, a crusade against a nation infidel to justice, to international law, to treaties, to all save its own selfish ends.

There can be but one of two outcomes to the world's quarrel with Germany: either the world must crush the German system, or succumb before it. Just as it was impossible for the United States before our Civil War to remain permanently divided against itself, as it inevitably had to become all slave or all free, so the world to-

day cannot remain divided against itself, it must become all Prussian or all democratic. There can be no compromise in the present struggle, no half victory. If we do not crush to the ground the hosts of despotism they will eventually overwhelm us. We will not, we cannot relinquish the struggle until the goal has been reached, until militarism has been rebuked, until international law has been vindicated.

When once this end has been accomplished, when the sword has been struck from the Kaiser's hand, steps must be taken to make impossible the recurrence of the present frightful calamity. "The world must be made safe for democracy." But how, it may be asked, is this to be accomplished? Is Germany to be disintegrated? Is Prussia to be reduced to her ancient bounds? Are the south German states to be made independent? Is France to secure all territory as far as the Rhine? Such radical steps would be unwise and unnecessary. Our President has declared that we have no quarrel with the German people; we would not be justified in destroying the German nation. Our foe, the foe of the world, is Prussian military autocracy, and this alone must be destroyed. But this must be destroyed utterly, for if it be merely curbed, it will arise again and again to menace the liberty of the world. The world must be made safe for democracy *by* democracy.

At the Congress of Vienna, when the victorious allies were quarrelling over the spoils of Europe, which they had just torn from Napo-

leon Bonaparte, the delegates of the little Republic of Genoa came to plead for recognition for their state. "Republics are no longer fashionable," they were told by the Czar, and their territory was handed over to the King of Sardinia. Things have changed since that day. A glance at the map of the world of 1815 shows that there was then but one real republic in existence—the United States. Now all save one-thirtieth of the territory of the world is occupied by democratic nations or their dependencies. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, some of the Balkan states are almost the sole survivors of the autocratic spirit of past ages. Since the Revolution in Russia and the entrance of the United States into the war, the struggle has assumed openly a character which it bore in spirit from the first, a battle of democracy with despotism. And when the war is over, when the conference is held for the reconstruction of the world, Alexander's words will be turned against the Kaiser and he will be told that it is despotism which is now not fashionable.

CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPERILLED

BY EDWARD S. CORWIN

The greatest of German jurists defines rights as interests which society undertakes to protect, not merely for the benefit of the bearers of such rights, but—and primarily—for its own benefit. It follows that the individual who asserts his rights to the extent of his ability performs thereby a social service; and so in fact Von Ihering argues. "Every man," he declares, "is the champion of the law in the interest of society."

What then is the duty of a state whose rights under international law have been trampled upon by another state? Clearly, to seek reparation from the transgressor. For as it is the object of municipal law to "secure the conditions requisite for social life," so it is the object of international law to secure the conditions which are requisite for the life of the civilized states of the world in community with one another. Where therefore international law assures certain rights to the individual members of the family of nations, its doing so may be taken as representing the verdict of mankind that the rights in question comprise essential

conditions of the life of nations in association with one another, and that the relation of the individual members of the family of nations to such rights is to be regarded as one of obligation as well as of privilege. Furthermore, the majority of men will hardly deny that the meeting of this obligation must in certain circumstances involve a resort to force. Accustomed to evaluate force as legitimate or illegitimate according to its employment, they will scarcely challenge the self-evident fact that a society in which force was always more readily enlisted against the law than in its behalf must eventually disintegrate.

There is just one circumstance which may validly operate toward relieving a state from the duty otherwise incumbent upon it to vindicate its affronted rights under international law, and that is the likelihood of incurring overwhelming calamity if it undertook the discharge of this duty. It is for this reason that in the present war those who are banded together in the effort to bring Germany to bar have overlooked the laches of the small states neighboring on Germany whose rights the latter has so systematically violated, since it is appreciated that for Switzerland, Holland or the Scandinavian states to assert themselves against Germany in defence of their rights would be to invite the fate that has already overwhelmed Belgium, Serbia and Rumania. But to risk ruin is one thing, to incur grave inconvenience quite another; and the state which would forgo its

rights merely in order to avoid the immediate annoyance and expense of asserting them would only expose itself to fresh aggressions which must in the end become unbearable.

The entrance of the United States into the war against Germany was a duty which it owed itself both in its character of custodian of the rights of its people and in that of a member of the family of nations. Under the rules of international law the people of the United States, so long as they remained neutral, had the right to venture their lives and their goods upon the high seas subject to certain risks. By her methods of submarine warfare Germany has enhanced these risks intolerably, and with resultant loss of American lives. In the first place, for the belligerent right of capture at sea she has invariably substituted the practice of outright destruction. In the second place, from the procedure of capture she has eliminated the essential steps of visit and search, with the result that destruction is carried out with little or no warning to the victims. In the third place, for the duty of the captor to put those on board the captured vessel into a safe place before destroying it, she has substituted "the poor measure of safety" of entrusting them to the mercy of wind and wave in small boats many miles from land—when, indeed, her commanders have not murderously assailed them with shot and shell. Then to these gross infractions of the law of nations Germany has added, in the case of the United States, an

equally gross violation of a specific pledge. At the time of the controversy over the sinking of the *Sussex*, the German Government, after having forwarded our Government an explanation of this occurrence which for sheer hardihood of prevarication is unsurpassed in the annals of diplomacy, gave its word that thenceforth merchantmen carrying American citizens would be sunk by its vessels only after warning. This undertaking, which indeed contained an intimation of its temporary character, was probably instigated by the fact that up to this time submarine warfare had not proved a success and that most of the submarines of the original pattern had been destroyed by the British navy. By the beginning of the current year, however, Germany had a new stock of subsea vessels on hand of a much larger type. So, confident of being able to end the war by the use of the improved weapon before the United States could become an effective enemy, the German Imperial Government, on January 31, 1917, bluntly informed our Government that it proposed to renew unrestricted submarine warfare on the following day. This time at any rate it was as good as its word, and on February 1 began the course of events which compelled our Government to determine definitely whether to submit to injury capped by insult or to join the league against the Ishmael among nations.

At this point it will be advantageous to anticipate an objection, the consideration of which will bring us to the threshold of the principal

topic of this chapter. I refer to the argument which has appeared in certain quarters that, while Germany undoubtedly infringed upon our rights as neutrals, Great Britain by her embargo upon neutral trade with Germany did the same thing, and that, accordingly, it was not the vindication of our rights at international law which really determined our entrance into the war. The argument conveniently ignores a material fact, namely, that Germany's violations of our rights were of a vastly more serious nature than Great Britain's and so required from our Government a corresponding urgency in meeting them. This may be ascertained by putting the following question: What was the menace held out respectively by the British embargo and by German submarine warfare to American rights *in case they were asserted* in defiance of these measures? The answer is obvious. The menace held out by the British embargo was, at worst, the seizure of American property on the high seas and its indefinite detention in British waters—therefore, property loss. The menace held out by German submarine warfare, especially after it entered upon its final stage on February 1, 1917, was the outright destruction, without an instant's warning, of American lives *as well as* of American property on the high seas. But it may be argued, along the line taken by the recent Austrian note to our Government, that the destruction wrought by German submarines is not an unwarned destruction, that indeed the warning is given

even before American property or American lives leave their home ports. In other words, we are warned not to try to exercise our rights on the high seas thenceforth. Naturally, our Government has not given any heed to such warnings. It has proceeded on the assumption that American citizens would continue to assert their rights on the seas, the common highway of mankind.

So the question turns upon the difference between the right to life itself, when one is where he is entitled to be, and the right to property, which is but a means to life; on the difference between a right which may be assessed in terms of dollars and cents and paid for, and a right which cannot be assessed and paid for. It is a difference which the law has recognized from antiquity. Sir Edward Coke stated it in *Mouse's Case*,¹ where he held blameless a ferryman for jettisoning his cargo in an effort to preserve those on board. On the same basis rests the right of municipal authorities to destroy property in order to prevent the spread of a conflagration. Indeed, even that otherwise so little sapient organization calling itself "The Emergency Peace Commission" recognized that we could not arbitrate matters with Germany unless the latter first discontinued ruthless submarine warfare.

There is, moreover, a larger aspect of the subject. The duty of our Government to come to the protection of the lives of our citizens in

¹ 12 Coke 63.

the exercise of their rights of trade and travel was a very immediate one, but it was overshadowed in this instance by an even more imperative duty, and that was to the future security of our communications with western Europe. Germany has made a shambles of the Atlantic highway, she has dyed with the blood of our citizens those very waters which make the roadway of the vast part of both our commercial and intellectual exchanges. Is she to be permitted to succeed in her purposes by such methods? And if she, why not others? Are the transcendently important part of our foreign trade and the vital thread of intercourse with the sources of our civilization to be held henceforth in fee to any international marauder which may consider itself entitled to a bigger "place in the sun"? The submarine is a new instrument of warfare, and whether it is to prove a blessing or a curse to mankind is now to be determined once for all. Used within the limits set by the rules of international law, it may well prove a valuable addition to the arsenal of defensive warfare, and so a force making for international peace. Used in the way that Germany is using it, it must remain a terror to civilization unless inventive genius contrives some way of cancelling it. And there is no nation whose concern at the outcome can surpass that of our own country.

When, therefore, the German Imperial Government issued its challenge on January 31, 1917, our Government was bound to take it up

or else to abdicate its trusteeship of essential rights and interests of the American people. For in the face of the downright declaration that every vessel encountered thenceforward by German submarines in the waters which wash the shores of Great Britain, France and Italy "would be sunk," that is, would be sunk without warning and regardless of nationality, no single loophole was left for ever so dexterous a diplomacy. Yet it is not this fact, nor even German brutality of word and threatened act—to which indeed something of gratitude was due for clearing the issue of much obscuration—it is not these which offer the most conclusive demonstration of what the cause of international law and order demands of us now that we are in the war. Germany has violated our rights, and so has given us a *casus belli*. But the vastly more important circumstance is that, pursuant of the principles avowed by her statesmen, her jurists and men of learning, it was inevitable that sooner or later she should do just this thing. To put the matter somewhat differently: While it is Germany's violations of international law that have *brought us into the war*, it is what these violations imply that must *keep us there until Germany is defeated*, since they spring from ideas which make any rational hope of good order in the world of nations a *permanent impossibility*.

Suppose we extend our comparison of the derelictions of Great Britain and Germany to the apologetic efforts of their statesmen. The

British Government originally sought to justify its embargo upon neutral trade with Germany as a measure of retaliation for Germany's infractions of the rules of civilized warfare. But however available against the other belligerent, the argument in question was no sufficient answer to neutral protests, since, as our State Department put it in answer to the German Government when the latter offered the same argument in extenuation of the Lusitania crime, acts of retaliation "are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights." And so the British Government has, in effect at least, subsequently admitted. Thus in his elaborate notes to our Government of July, 1915, and April, 1916, Viscount Grey endeavored to present the British embargo as an allowable application, in view of the conditions of modern warfare, of the belligerent right of blockade. His argument, though exceedingly adroit, is unconvincing, since the effect of it is to wipe out the distinction between contraband goods and innocent goods and to deny the United States the benefits of the Declaration of Paris. Nevertheless, it has in candor to be admitted that the concept upon which the British Government today rests its case for the embargo, the doctrine of continuous voyage, also underwent a very radical extension at the hands of our own Government during the Civil War, when Great Britain was the disadvantaged neutral. Moreover, the question of the convincingness of the British argument is a matter somewhat be-

side the point. For whether it is a sound argument or a fallacious one, it is at any rate *an appeal to law* and constitutes therefore an admission that the issue which the embargo has raised between the United States and Great Britain is one *to be determined under the law, whose ultimate vindication is thus assured*. Nor is this all: from the outset the British Government has stated its willingness, in harmony with the existing treaty between the two countries, to refer the dispute at the close of hostilities to an international tribunal.

With this attitude of humane reasonableness, addressing itself to like reasonableness with like rights and avowing its readiness to abide the verdict of the tribunal of the civilized world, compare the outgivings of the German Imperial Government when it revoked the pledge it had given after the sinking of the *Sussex*. In the note which accompanied its brusque announcement the German Imperial Government used these words:

“Every day by which the terrible struggle is prolonged brings new devastations, new distress, new death. Every day by which the war is shortened preserves on both sides the lives of thousands of brave fighters, and is a blessing to tortured mankind. The Imperial Government would not be able to answer before its own conscience, before the German people and before history, if it left any means whatever untried to hasten the end of the war. . . . The Imperial Government, if it desires in a higher

sense to serve humanity and not to do a wrong against its own countrymen, must continue the battle forced on it anew for existence with all its weapons.”

“Conscience,” “history,” “service to humanity,” “battle for existence”—by such phrases does the German Imperial Government seek to appease the moral sensibilities of those whose intelligence it affronts. In the presence of its own people it is not so hampered. On the same day that the document just quoted from was handed to Mr. Gerard, the Imperial Chancellor addressed the Ways and Means Committee of the Reichstag on the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare as follows:

“We have been challenged to fight to the end. We accept the challenge, we stake everything, and we shall be victorious. . . . I have always proceeded from the standpoint of whether U-boat war would bring us nearer victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that was calculated to shorten the war constitute [sic] the most humane policy to follow.² When the most ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and swift victory, I said, they must be employed.

“This moment has now arrived. Last autumn the time was not yet ripe, but today the moment has come when with the greatest prospect of success we can undertake the enterprise. We must not therefore wait any longer. . . . As regards all that human strength can do to enforce

² The Sussex pledge was given two months later!

success for the Fatherland, be assured, gentlemen, that nothing has been neglected. Everything in this respect will be done.”

Henry James in one of his critical essays classifies the pleasures of literature into the pleasures of surprise and of recognition. The pleasure to be got from reading the foregoing passage must today unquestionably be set down as of the latter order, though three years ago its classification would have been a matter of more difficulty. For who can read the words just quoted and fail to recall the same speaker's apology for the invasion of Belgium?

“Gentlemen, we are at present in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg: perhaps they have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is contrary to the rules of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that it would respect Belgium's neutrality as long as the adversary would respect it. However, we know that France was ready for an invasion.³ France could afford to wait, but we could not! A French invasion on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. Thus we were forced to disregard the justified protests of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong which we thereby commit we shall try

³ Even German apologists seem today disposed to abandon this pitiable fiction. See excerpts from an article by Lieut. Gen. Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Chief of the Supplementary General Staff, quoted in *The New York Times* of August 12, 1917.

to make good as soon as our military aim is attained. Whoever is threatened as we are is not allowed to have any other consideration beyond how he will hack his way through.”

Read in the light of later events, how terrible appears the relentless candor of these words! Yet here are words of compunction, a confession of wrong, a pledge of reparation, none of which mitigates the speech of last January. Prussian ruthlessness did not spring into existence full grown!

We come therefore to the third dimension of our subject, so to speak. I have advanced the thesis that Germany's attitude toward the law of nations and international obligations constitutes a perpetual menace to international good order and neighborliness, makes them, in truth, an impossibility so long as it shall continue. Official Germany's attitude in this respect we have just passed in survey, and at any rate the war must have made it evident to the dullest apprehension. What I aim now to show is that the views of which Von Bethmann-Hollweg is mouthpiece in the passages given above are by no means a product of the war alone, but also of a way of thinking which, as it preceded the war, will be likely to survive it, certainly if Germany is victorious. Such views may at present wear the mask of exigency, but in reality they are compound of the sinews and substance of a considered philosophy. Their menace for the peace of the world is therefore no merely transient one.

The founder of Prussian political thought was Hegel, who presents the State as the complete development of morality on earth and as entrusted with the mission of spreading its own peculiar culture (*Kultur*); and especially was this so of the Prussian state, the last word of Deity in the field of statecraft. By what methods, however, is the *Kultur-Staat*—Prussia in particular—to fulfill its missionary rôle? Hegel does not say; but his influential disciple, Professor Adolf Lasson, is more explicit, as the following extracts from his essay “*Das Kultur-Ideal und der Krieg*” will show:⁴

“Between states war alone can hold the sceptre. Conflict is the essence and rule of international relations; friendship the accident and exception. . . .

“A small state has a right to existence only in proportion to its power of resistance.—Between states there is only one right in force and that is the right of the strongest. . . .

“A state is incapable of committing crime. . . . Whether a treaty should be observed or not is a question not of right but of interest. . . . Not all the treaties in the world can alter the fact that the weak is always the prey of the strong so soon as the latter finds it worth while to act on this principle. . . .

“The state which is organized only for peace is not a true state. . . . War is the fundamental phenomenon in the life of the state and the

⁴ See also his *Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts* (Berlin, 1871).

preparation for it occupies the place of preponderant importance in the national life. . . .

“It is not only the state’s own possessions which are at stake in war, but also those which it has not acquired and must conquer. It is absurd to pretend indignation at the idea of conquest. The only essential point is the purpose of conquest. . . .

“Civilization is the general improvement of civilization upon barbarism. Culture [*Kultur*] is the distinctive form which civilization takes with this or that people. The diverse forms of Culture are mutually opposed to one another. Each menaces the other, for each believes itself the true and perfect form of civilization, and so desires to extend its influence. . . . Every rational war is a war between competing cultures. . . .

“The National State, representing the highest expression of the Culture of its race, can come into being only through the destruction of other states, and this destruction can be effected only by means of violence. . . . To demand a peaceable development of the different forms of Culture is to demand the impossible, it is to reverse the order of nature, it is to set up a false image in the place of the true morality.”

When in 1868 Lasson first published the brochure from which the above passages are borrowed, his views stirred liberal Germany to vehement protest, but the brilliant successes of Bismarck’s policy of “blood and iron,” interpreted by the eloquence of Von Treitschke in

terms of Prussian history, have long since done their work, as the pages of Bernhardt and the pamphlets of the Pan-Germanists attest. The key to Lasson's position, which is today the position of a most influential section of German society, is furnished by his exaltation of the claims of culture.⁵ Americans and Englishmen, unblest by an overweening consciousness of superiority or divinely appointed mission to the rest of Christendom, are apt to regard culture, in the sense in which Germans use the term, as considerably less important than civilization, and this they look upon as primarily the work of gifted individuals and as only indirectly served by the state through its service of the individual. Furthermore, they hold that there is normally no greater service which the state can render its citizens than to maintain friendly contacts with other states as the essential condition of cooperation in the common tasks of civilization.

The Prussian point of view impinges upon international law in two ways. Lasson's idea that the State can do no wrong of course makes international law impossible from the outset. The more representative German view, however, though it ultimately arrives at the same

⁵ On the general subject of Pan-Germanism see the familiar volumes of Usher and Chéradame; also Nippold's *Der deutsche Chauvinismus*. The *Berliner Tageblatt* of April 21, 1913, makes this interesting statement: "It has lately been clearly demonstrated that numerous threads connect the clamorous leaders of Pan-Germanism with the official world." Certainly one finds it impossible to avoid the conclusion that if Germany were to win the war, the Pan-German influence would determine the use she would make of her victory.

result, does so by a more roundabout method. In the phraseology of an exponent, it plants in the timbers of the legal edifice "the secret worm" which ultimately consumes the whole fabric. What this "secret worm" is we shall now see.

One of the most remarkable products of a German pen since the outbreak of the war is a brochure by Josef Kohler, written to defend the invasion of Belgium and bearing the caption "*Not Kennt Kein Gebot.*"⁶ Kohler, who is professor of jurisprudence at the University of Berlin and a Prussian Privy Councillor, is the most eminent of living German jurists and the most prolific of all jurists, "a veritable twentieth century Leibnitz," with over five hundred titles of books and articles to his credit. Though, like Lasson, a disciple of Hegel, he was until recent days a preacher of international peace and cooperation. Thus in his "*Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie,*" which appeared in 1907, he had written: "Passionate devotion to one nationality . . . will long struggle against the idea of bowing to a supernational law. Nevertheless, the idea must gradually penetrate, and when it has become fully developed the chief step toward the peace of the nations will have been taken." And to Lasson's notion of the inevitable antagonism of national cultures he had opposed the ideal of their mutual tolerance, thus: "The individual state should not be the only centre of culture, but the attitude of all states to one another

⁶ The full title is *Not Kennt Kein Gebot, die Theorie des Notrechtes und die Ereignisse unserer Zeit* (Berlin, 1915).

should so conform to the cultural order that one does not clash with or operate against the cultural development of another." But the iron of the war has entered into Kohler's soul, and his recent writings prove only too conclusively that he has joined forces with that section of German jurists one of whom has recently proposed that the German Branch of the International Law Association had better cut loose from its foreign affiliations, the reason given being that "Germany has such different interests from those of other countries that its tendencies in this field are not those of other nations."⁷

With characteristic candor Kohler distinguishes at the outset of his essay the two entirely different but frequently confounded notions of *self-preservation* and *self-defence*. He then proceeds to rake over the whole field of casuistry for the stock situations in which the individual is confronted with the choice of violating the rights of others or himself coming to grief. The crux of his position is disclosed in his treatment of that situation which is labelled the "*Aut Ego aut Tu.*" In this case two

⁷ The author of these words was Prof. Th. Niemeyer of the University of Kiel, also a Prussian Privy Councillor, and himself the President of the German Branch. For further evidence of the disturbance which Kohler's thinking has undergone in consequence of the war, see an article of his on "The New Law of Nations," translated for the June, 1917, number of the *Michigan Law Review* by Prof. Jesse S. Reeves. For proof, however, that not all German publicists have gone off their heads since August, 1914, see a letter by Dr. Hans Wehberg of Düsseldorf in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of September 24, 1915. Prof. Reeves refers to this letter and a translation of it appears in the *American Journal of International Law* for October, 1915, pp. 925-7.

men who have been shipwrecked find themselves grasping a plank which is insufficient to bear them both; the stronger man pushes the weaker away and is eventually saved, while the other is drowned. Commenting on this class of cases, Kohler writes: "When two persons act in a condition of necessity [*Notrecht*] and the legal order can discover no ground for giving the preference to either, then must the legal order give way to the natural order *and crown the victor. Das ist die Realdialektik der Welt.*"

But if the justification of self-preservation may be claimed by the individual, Kohler continues, how much more may it be by the State, "a human institution of the highest rank and of deep spiritual significance, as well as the economic foundation of our being." Hence, "the relations of one state to another are governed in the highest degree by the law of necessity [*Notstandsrecht*]. The state which is forced to fight for its existence acts rightly if in the course of its struggle it encroaches upon the rights of other states, even upon the rights of neutrals, for its existence comes first; to this may everything or anything be sacrificed." And so it was with Germany's invasion of Belgium: "Even if we entirely ignore the justification of self-defence and Belgium's earlier forfeiture of her right of neutrality, still Germany was entirely within her rights; what she did was *not* an excusable *wrong*, but she acted in exercise of the law of necessity, and at one and the same time fulfilled a holy duty to herself and to the world

of culture [*Kultur*]. She preserved her existence; and Belgium thereby incurred a heavy fate, for which she has but herself to thank.”—Thus Von Bethmann-Hollweg, despite his seeming candor, spoke falsely after all! Germany did no wrong in entering Belgium. True, she violated both her own promises and international law, but she fulfilled a Higher Law, the law of her necessity—as judged by herself; and *Realdialektik* (which apparently is Hegelian for “*Unser alte Gott*” of the Kaiser’s incantations) had its way once more. The thought occurs, Why, if *Realdialektik* is such a beneficent agency, should its interventions be confined to cases of *necessity*?

But the subject has also its technical side, and so I wish once more to confront the German point of view with the English-American, or such evidences of the latter as seem best authenticated; and to begin at the beginning, I will match Professor Kohler’s hypothetical case of “*Aut Ego aut Tu*” with one which actually got into court. I refer to the case of Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, the facts in which were found by the jury as follows: “That on July 5, 1884, the prisoners, with one Brooks, all able bodied English seamen, and the deceased [Parker], an English boy between seventeen and eighteen, the crew of an English yacht [the *Mignonette*], were cast away in a storm on the high seas, sixteen hundred miles from the Cape of Good Hope, and were compelled to put into an open boat; . . . that on the eighteenth day,

when they had been seven days without food and five without water, the prisoners spoke to Brooks as to what should be done if no succor came, and suggested some one should be sacrificed to save the rest, but Brooks dissented, and the boy, to whom they were understood to refer, was not consulted; that on the day before the act in question . . . the prisoners spoke of their having families, and suggested that it would be better to kill the boy that their lives be saved . . . ; that next day, no vessel appearing, Dudley . . . made signs to Stephens and Brooks that the boy had better be killed; . . . that Stephens agreed to the act, but Brooks dissented from it . . . ; that Dudley with the assent of Stephens went to the boy and telling him his time had come, put a knife to his throat and killed him; that the three men fed upon the boy for four days; that on the fourth day after the act the boat was picked up by a passing vessel, and the prisoners were rescued. . . .”

The jury put the question to the court whether the accused were guilty of murder. The court answered “Yes,” and proceeded to reduce defence’s argument to an absurdity: “It was not contended,” said they, “that the person killed under circumstances of so-called necessity would not be justified in resisting. Now, if resistance is justifiable at all it is justifiable even to the infliction of death when one’s own life is at stake. Therefore, we should have a state of things in which A is not punishable for killing B, nor yet B for killing A if he cannot prevent

A from killing him. But to say that A may kill B if he can, and also that B may kill A if he can, is to deny the existence of any law at all." In other words, Professor Kohler's region of the Higher Law of Necessity in which *Realdialektik* holds sway is dismissed as a region devoid of law! Justice Grove also added this interesting note: "If the two accused men were justified in killing Parker, then, if not rescued in time, two of the three survivors would be justified in killing the third, and of the two who remained the stronger would be justified in killing the weaker, so that three men might be justifiably killed to give the fourth a chance of surviving."⁸ Again, a shocking lack of confidence in *Realdialektik*!

All the objections which exist to admitting the justification of supposed necessity for breaches of the ordinary law are reenforced when it comes to breaches of international law. For one thing, when it is brought into the ordinary courts the plea signifies the grim issue of life and death, while as between states the so-called "right of self-preservation" is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the merest figure of speech. Again, there is no tribunal above states which is capable of passing upon such a plea with impartiality and precision as there is over individuals, so that each state is left ordinarily to assess the sufficiency of the plea advanced by itself. Finally, while international

⁸ L. R., 14 Q. B. D. 273; *Law Quarterly Review*, I, 282. See also *ib.* 51.

law does not—and perhaps never can—form a closed circle, and each state is consequently left free to make war for reasons which seem good to it, yet the advantage which accrues to a state from having the sanction of law on its side is an important one and should not be available on a plea which frankly overrides international law.

Though English and American writers on international law, in a misplaced zeal to become apologists for certain pet derelictions of their own governments, have seemed at times to give the so-called “right of self-preservation” an undue extension, yet the better considered utterances of such writers will generally be found to confine the idea to its proper field.⁹ A typical case, which is discussed by all the authorities, is furnished by the action of the British Government in connection with the Caroline affair of 1837. This vessel, which was controlled by Canadian rebels, was attacked by a British expedition while lying in American waters. The British Government defended the act as a necessary act of *self-protection* against an impending *injury* for which, if it had occurred, the Government of the United States would have been *responsible*. Eventually, our Government accepted this explanation of the affair as satis-

⁹ See the discussion by Prof. C. de Visscher of the University of Ghent in his article entitled “*Les Lois de Guerre et la Theorie de la Nécessité*” in the *Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public* for January-February, 1917; also Prof. John Westlake’s *International Law: Part I, “Peace,”* Ch. XIII.

factory. In the words of Mr. Webster, it was admitted that, assuming there was “*a necessity of self-defence, instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation,*” and assuming the action of the British Government to have been “*limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it,*” such action was proper. In other words, the British Government exercised its right of *self-help* against an impending *wrong*. It may be added that our controversy with Spain over the Virginius affair in 1873 was adjusted along similar lines.

But the capital product of German thought of recent years, touching the relation of the state to international law, has still to be considered. I refer of course to the doctrine of *Kriegs-raison*.¹⁰ The source of this doctrine is to be found in certain passages of the Prussian Von Clausewitz’s work “*Vom Kriege,*” of which the following are representative: “War is an act of violence designed to force the adversary to perform our will. . . . In the employment of such violence there are no limits. . . . War knows only one method: force, . . . and this employment of brute force is the absolute rule.” Certain German publicists however have sought a more reputable parentage for their darling

¹⁰ On this subject, see the article cited in note 9, *supra*, with the writers there given; Westlake’s *Chapters on the Principles of International Law*, 238 ff.; Prof. Amos S. Hershey’s *The Essentials of International Public Law*, pp. 353 and 389, with accompanying notes; also articles by Profs. Reeves and Niemeyer in the *Michigan Law Review*, XIII, 175 ff.

theory in a phrase from Grotius' great work: "*Omnia licere quae necessaria sunt ad finem belli,*" which may be rendered in the words of the Great General Staff as follows: "What is permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained." Thus the founder of international law, who tells us that he wrote principally to protest against the barbarities of warfare, is made sponsor for Prussian frightfulness!

The fact of the matter is that Grotius' words may be interpreted in either of two ways: they may mean that all methods of warfare are legitimate which are thought to be necessary; or they may imply that necessary methods of warfare must first be legitimate; that is, within the law. The English-American view of military necessity accords with the latter of these interpretations. By it a military commander, *even when acting within the rules of civilized warfare*, is entitled to use no more violence at a given time than is necessary under the circumstances. The doctrine of *Kriegs-raison*, on the other hand, subjects the rules of civilized warfare at all times to what a commander—and *a fortiori*, a government—may deem essential to achieve success. The doctrine of "Necessity" is thus divested of all disguises and pretences: that which is necessary and which therefore must be obtained at all hazards is German victory! The practical conclusions which the German official mind has drawn from these premises have been made known to a still amazed world in

terms of blood, ruin and defilement: the invasion of Belgium, the atrocities of Louvain, Dinant and a score of other towns, the execution of innocent hostages, the shelling of Rheims Cathedral, the sinking of the Lusitania, the use of poisonous gases, the bombardment of undefended towns, the indiscriminate slaughter of women and children by explosives hurled from aircraft, the enslavement of Belgian workmen, the deportation of the young women of Lille, the devastation of northern France, ruthless submarine warfare, the sinking of hospital ships, and so on and so on. To be sure, the German Imperial Government has sometimes sought to alleviate the odium of universal indignation by special explanations of some of these acts, but even where such explanations have not dealt in downright falsehoods, their unallowable assumptions have always revealed the lineaments of the real explanation.

There are those who contend, however, that it is futile to attempt to govern war by law, who seem indeed rather disposed to applaud Germany for making war as hideous as possible, saying that the thing to do is to abolish war! Is *Kriegs-raison* entitled even to this somewhat ambiguous approval? No; for the maintenance of the law of war so long as we have wars and the abolition of war as soon as possible are causes which, far from being opposed to one another, have everything in common. For one thing, the restraints which international law seeks to impose upon the business of war, and

which Germany has so ruthlessly and systematically swept aside, rest upon the belief that there are certain fixed values of Christian civilization which no necessity, even of a state, is warranted in offending, and the abolition of war must appeal to the same belief. Again, those who advance this view seem not to perceive that the German doctrine which they so heedlessly ratify constitutes a part of Germany's preparation for war, and to that extent an incitation to war. For not being hampered by the scruples which trouble other governments, the German Imperial Government has just that additional reason to hope for the success of its aggressions. Finally, the view in question ignores the fact that the difference between Anglo-American and German methods of warfare connotes a difference between two theories of the *purpose* of war which is of immense significance from the point of view of the movement for a permanent peace.

The German theory of the purpose of war is stated by Bernhardt as follows: "War is an instrument of progress, a regulator in the life of humanity, an indispensable factor of civilization, a creative power." This is but Lasson's idea over again, that "War is the fundamental phenomenon in the life of states"; or, as Von Treitschke has put it, "War is the forceful extension of policy." The English-American theory is very different and points to very different results. It is that war is primarily remedial, a redress of grievances, a method of self-

help. And being procedural, with the vindication of the law its object, the rules governing it must be followed as a matter of course. More than that, however, since war takes place chiefly for the lack of a better method of obtaining one's rights, the essential step in its abolition must be to supply the procedural deficiencies of international law. In short, where the Prussian idea of war presents it as a positive good, the Anglo-American idea presents it as a necessary evil, and offers the hope that it will not always be even necessary.

The quarrel between our country and Germany comes, therefore, ultimately to be a very deep seated one. Back of the conflicting theories of legal obligation which it involves stand conflicting theories of the purpose of war and of the nature of civilization itself. Nor is this remarkable when one considers the contrasted histories of the two nations. The history of Germany is simply the history of Prussia's conquest of the rest of Germany, of the triumph of the Prussian military autocracy over the rights of weaker populations and communities. More unfortunately still, the pietistic German mind has brought to the interpretation of this history the dangerous notions of religious and philosophic obscurantism, tricked out for modern use with the terminology of biological science. Since the history of German unification has been a history of violence, this interpretation runs in effect, then violence must be the way of God. The Anglo-American mind is at

once more mundane and more reverent. Mistrustful of "Dark Forces," it finds it especially hard to believe that Providence is wont to employ the devices of Satan. Its political achievement, wrought out mainly by methods of compromise, is constitutional democracy and imperial federation; its political ideal a reconciliation of the equality of men with the rule of law. It regards law as normally the triumph of opinion and so of reason, as so much snatched from primitive chaos, the way which civilization must in the long run always take against barbarism. True, in an imperfect world the law must frequently rely on the support of force, but it is the law which validates force and not force which validates the law.

Hence, though we entered the war in behalf of our own offended rights, we fight in it in behalf of the law and the order of the world. A nation which applauds such crimes as the sinking of the *Lusitania* has lost all sense of responsibility as a member of the family of nations; a nation which thinks and acts by the madcap logic of "world dominion or downfall" is a perpetual menace to the peace of the world. Such logic can be refuted in only one way; for if nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like failure. Germany will see eye to eye with her neighbors when she has been chastened by the bitter disappointment of defeat. For her past merits the world owes her this boon.

CHAPTER IV

THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER IMPERILLED

MASON W. TYLER

When the United States went to war with Germany last April the causes of this action seemed clear to most of us: it was Germany's continual violation of international law and of the dictates of humanity in her use of the submarine and her breach of her promises to us to refrain from such illegality and inhumanity in the future. To almost all of us these were the sole causes for our action and probably still remain its chief justification. But there is coming to us, exactly as there came to Great Britain after she had gone to war to avenge the violation of treaty right in Belgium, the realization that together with this cause for action there was another—less ostensibly international and humanitarian, but none the less vital—the danger from the enormous power of Germany; the need of the restoration of the balance of power in Europe. At first this phase of the problem was little discussed in England, but more and more it came to the front. Finally in an editorial published March 8, 1915, the

London *Times* came out with the frank statement that England had not gone to war for Belgian neutrality but to restore the balance of power threatened by Germany. That this is an overemphasis is very probable, but it does show that, in the minds of at least some of the leaders of English political thought, this cause for action had assumed first place. Nor has this feeling lessened as time goes on until now probably the main motive in the fighting is the desire, on the part of the Allies, to put an end to the overweening pretensions of Germany to world domination and to restore the balance of power. Have we, in America, any interest in this motive? Would we be willing to accept a settlement which, while restoring Belgium and Serbia with suitable indemnities, would still leave Germany and her allies—to use a euphemistic term—the masters of Europe? Or do we feel that such a settlement would be dangerous for us and ought not to be allowed? And if so how is such an ending of the war to be prevented? These are questions it seems to me America ought to face as soon as possible, for her answer to them will modify to no small extent our policy both during the war and in the settlement which follows it.

Have we a vital interest in the maintenance of a world balance of power?¹ It would seem

¹ The phrase “balance of power” used here and elsewhere in this chapter refers to the world balance of power and not to the European balance, unless the latter is specifically stated. Its use gives rise to some confusion because there are several local “balances of power” as well as the world balance. In-

that those who would answer this question in the negative would bring forward one or both of two lines of argument to support themselves. The first is that the balance of power solution is intrinsically bad, that it has always made for strife and always will and that the United States should stand for an international policy which would unite all nations regardless of their power or influence. The second is that our best policy is found in abstention from European affairs and an interest only in the two Americas. On this policy, they say, we have thriven and there is no advantage in giving it up at this time. Let Europe settle its own affairs, we will settle those of the American continents. These two arguments I will treat in turn.

deed whenever any issue arises the Powers most interested—and they are not necessarily those of the first magnitude—are apt to group (around) two parties to preserve the balance of power in the locality affected by the issue. Thus Venizelos, in forming the Serbo-Greek Alliance of 1913, stated that its object was “to preserve the balance of power in the Balkans”—that is in the regions directly affected by the Balkan wars. The most important of these local balances of power is the European balance, which, from the magnitude of the interests involved, has often been spoken of as *the* balance of power. But with the advent of world policy there has arisen a world balance of power, which may be termed a synthesis of all the local balances of power, but which, owing to the fact that the greatest amount of material force at present existing in the world lies in Europe, rests more or less on the European local balance for a foundation and is merely modified in its superstructure by non-European nations. This world balance is by no means a result of our entry into the war, although this event has made more clear a situation which has existed for some years. The United States would seem, ever since the war with Spain, to have been considered by European statesmen as a possible make-weight for or against their designs and to have been courted accordingly. Our entry into the war appears to signify our conscious acceptance of the situation and its attendant responsibilities.

We ought to work for internationalism and not perpetuate the outworn theory of the balance of power: so say the first class of objectors. And in substantial agreement with them is Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the former German Chancellor, who declared in one of his peace speeches that "the English balance of power must disappear, because it is, as the English poet Shaw recently said, 'a hatching of other wars.'" But it is in the striking unanimity of opinion between the former German Chancellor and our class of objectors that the danger in the theories presented by the latter seems to lie. Of course Von Bethmann-Hollweg wished the balance of power to be abandoned because it stood in the way of German mastery of Europe and beyond that of the world, or, as he preferred to put it, such a theory stood in the way of "the inviolable and strong position of Germany." On the other hand the friends of internationalism wish to abandon the theory because it, in their opinion, prevents the realization of their hopes. Which of the two is right?

It seems fairly clear that the first result of such an abandonment will be the mastery of Germany in Europe and probably throughout the world. But will such a situation produce, in turn, internationalism? Will the Power which commenced the war by proclaiming that "necessity knows no law," which has since broken nearly all the rules of international law which stood in the way of the attainment of its desires, be a fit guardian of the new internationalism

which is to bring relief to a war worn world? And even had Germany shown the greatest respect for the law it is doubtful if an internationalism imposed by one nation according to its own interpretation on the other Powers will be either a lasting or a good one. For the international mind is not the property of any one nation; it draws its inspirations from every corner of the earth, and even the most catholic of Powers—and Germany can hardly claim this distinction—is too narrow to be its true interpreter. Finally it is very doubtful if this modern reincarnation of the Roman Empire will prevent war in the future; the Roman Empire had plenty of wars, but they were termed rebellions and civil tumults.

The real internationalism for which we all must strive is a free grouping of free Powers, each contributing its best to the common good, and this can never be brought about by the hegemony of any one Power, it can only be built up when something like a balance of power is restored to Europe. And so it would appear that all internationalists who wish a real adoption of their plans must work, first of all, for the establishment of a world balance of power. But that balance is now endangered by the pretensions of the Teutonic Powers and can only be restored when those Powers are defeated in the field. Internationalism, then, is not like that "something wonderful, grand and good" of Kipling's "Rhyme of the Banderlog" that is "won by merely wishing we could." Under the pres-

ent circumstances it must be fought for and won by the sword.

Finally: it was just that policy of abstention from the conflict, that taking of position above the claims of either side, that desire to impress on each the dictates of internationalism that marked the policy of the United States from the summer of 1914 until the spring of 1917. And how did it succeed? Our plea for international right was listened to by Germany just so long as she felt that the danger from our entry into the war outweighed the advantage to be secured from acting contrary to our desires. In other words we were reckoned by Germany, not as an international force but as a factor in the world balance of power. And when she felt that our weight as such a factor was not to be considered against the gain to be derived from the unrestricted use of the submarine she broke with us and with internationalism and went her own way. We have learned that we cannot—at least in dealing with such a Power as Germany—act as a force for internationalism unless we, at the same time, hold the balance of power which will make our views respected. And this balance of power must be fought for.²

The second class of objectors claim that we have no concern in the European balance of power and that our best policy lies in abstention from European affairs and a careful cultivation

² For a discussion of the broader phases of internationalism and the war see the chapter "The World Paril and World Peace," *infra*.

of the relations with our South American neighbors—of Pan-Americanism.³ This is the traditional American policy, hallowed by its association with Washington's Farewell Address and with the second part of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover it was, during the greater part of the nineteenth century, the only possible policy for us. For we had before us a continent three thousand miles broad to be cultivated and to be brought into the sphere of American influence. In the face of such a task it was absolutely impossible for us to give any attention to European affairs, even had we had the strength to make our influence felt, which was obviously not the case. Add to that the fact that we had, during the first half of the century, to deal with the question of slavery and then to wage a gigantic war to settle the problem. It is clear that any lessening of attention from the task in hand could be little less than fatal. Nor were the dangers from such a policy of abstention sufficient to cause any uneasiness. The Atlantic barrier was a strong protection for it was almost impossible for any European Power, with the possible exception of England with her strong navy and her Canadian base, to wage war with us across it. And England, in the years following the Treaty of Ghent, was sufficiently occupied elsewhere and had no desire to wage war with us. Moreover nations lived more unto themselves in those simpler days, and

³ This topic is treated in its broader aspects in the chapter "The World Peril and the Two Americas," *infra*.

the present network of international trade and credit was in a far more rudimentary stage. Even the great Napoleonic wars, involving all Europe, do not seem to have greatly influenced more than one phase of our economic activity, our seaboard commerce. We lived a nation apart, occupied with our task of developing the North American continent, and Europe paid little attention to us and we to Europe.

But today the situation is utterly different. In the first place the task of developing and Americanizing—to use a popular term—the North American continent is finished and our activities have begun to overflow into other fields. Not that it has more than begun, for our exports of manufactured goods are still small in relation to our home consumption, and yet these exports are constantly increasing. Then too the international network of trade and credit is now so well developed that we can no longer, in these spheres of life, live to ourselves. In comparison to the Napoleonic wars the effects of the present world war on our economic life seem almost as a mountain to a mole hill. Finally, to our no small disturbance of mind, we are realizing that the Atlantic is no longer the barrier against invasion that it was even a quarter century ago, that improvements in military technique and in transportation have made it possible to make at least a most destructive raid on our coast cities, that submarines may soon, if not now, be able to cross the ocean and raid our commerce. Just as Great

Britain has learned that her real frontier is not the Channel but the valley of the Meuse—to quote Lord Kitchener's expression—so we are learning that our first line of defence is not the Atlantic coast but a proper maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Otherwise the battle will be fought on our own territory and we will pay heavily, no matter what the outcome be. The European balance of power is the first line of trenches in American defence.

And what would be the effect of a German supremacy in Europe? Can we be sure that such a Power would leave us in peace to pursue our Pan-American policy? Has Germany no interests in South America to be defended and enlarged? It would be perfectly possible to cite any number of Pan-German writers who advocate the extension of the German colonial empire to South America. Of these perhaps the most notable is Tannenberg, who frankly earmarks southern Brazil and the Argentine for Germany in his "*Deutschland um 1950.*" But it may be admitted that too much attention must not be paid to irresponsible vaporings such as this. That they have been widely read in Germany is certain, but that they have had or will have any effect on German official action is far from sure. But, on the other hand, it is extremely doubtful if it is advisable to put too much confidence in the statement of Count von Bernstorff that Germany had no intention of gaining territorial acquisitions in South America, for such a statement was, under the circumstances, the

only one that the German representative to this country could have made. One is reminded of the answer Bismarck is said to have made to an inconvenient question: "No, but I would have told you that anyway."

Probably the best guide to the extent of the danger Germany may be in the future to Pan-Americanism is found in the actual situation in South America. That there are many Germans settled there, that these immigrants are fairly well concentrated in southern Brazil, that Germans have acquired no small interests there and have built up a large trade, the largest foreign trade in some states and a very respectable competitor in almost all the others, may be taken as almost undoubted facts. That any attempt by American interests to push their own trade at the expense of these German interests will lead to friction between the two countries is at least possible. And the extent of this friction as well as the lengths to which Germany will go in defence of her interests will, in all probability, depend on the condition in which she emerges from the present war. A triumphant Germany, drunk with power, will probably listen much more attentively to the appeal of the Pan-German and of the South American vested interests than a Germany that has tried to control Europe and failed. And if the other countries of Europe are beaten and discouraged they, our potential allies, will be the less willing to help us when this possible day of reckoning comes.

But Germany will not probably try the game

alone: and in this lies perhaps the greatest element of danger. The Zimmermann note ought to prove to us that Germany is willing to utilize all the discordant elements in Pan-America to further its designs if necessary. And if we allow Germany to become the master of Europe and the strongest single Power in the world, we must expect that there will be plenty of *real-politikers* in South America who will think they see advantages in alliance with such a state. Our only defence against such a possibility is to prevent Germany from gaining such a position. Remember that Germany has never recognized the Monroe Doctrine, and that her only official pronouncement on it, apart from the statement of Von Bernstorff referred to above, is Bismarck's declaration that it was an "international impertinence." This phase of the question ought not perhaps to be stressed too much, but it ought not to be forgotten.

Let us suppose, however, for the moment, that all the foregoing is pure moonshine, that Germany has not and never will have any designs on South America other than the exploitation of economic opportunities: even then can we feel that the danger from a German mastery of Europe is not worth consideration? Let us also put the danger of a military attack by Germany on the United States out of our minds and simply consider Germany as confining her active intervention to continents other than the Americas. How then would we stand? Remember that we are becoming more and more a country

of foreign export and that Germany is, with the possible exceptions of England and Japan, our only great competitor. But this economic rivalry is no longer merely a question of cheap manufacture and able salesmanship: governments are more and more coming to the aid of their exporters, and the political factor will also have to be reckoned with. To take one illustration: In the midst of the Russo-Japanese war Germany took advantage of Russia's weakness to negotiate, as a price of her benevolent neutrality, a commercial treaty which placed German goods at an enormous advantage in the Russian market. A Germany, mistress of Europe and enormously strong in the outside world, will be in a position by bribes or threats to enhance greatly her intrinsically strong economic position with the other nations of the world. If we build up a market in a given country we may find that Germany, through political means, has been able to force in her own goods at an advantage. The doctrines of the Manchester school have been a little out of date since governments have come into the arena behind their traders.

Nor is it merely in the economic sphere that we will suffer. Whenever we wish to adopt any given line of world policy, whenever we wish to push any idea from the Open Door to the League to Maintain Peace, we will find that we will have to reckon with a Germany far more able than we are to impose her wishes on the world. For, in the last resort, the value of an idea or a policy

in world politics depends on the amount of force that can be brought behind it, and if Germany be left mistress of Europe we can easily see that the European nations at least will look far more for their direction to the Power that is able to enforce its wishes than to the United States, however convincingly, as arguments, its wishes may be set forth. I do not claim that this represents an ideal situation, let us hope that a better one may come; but such seems to be the world as it is at present.

And so for these reasons it would appear that the United States must be vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Not only for our defence but in order that we may count for something in the world, economically and politically, it is necessary for us to defeat any German attempt to win the mastery of Europe. The old days of isolation are past, we are a world Power with interests in every part of the earth, and as a world Power must we think and act.

But, you may say, the days of extreme German danger are past: peace votes in the Reichstag, statements by public men disclaiming imperialistic views show that Germany has no intention of becoming a danger to Europe. Moreover, the military outlook at present is favorable for the Allies with the Germans almost everywhere on the defensive, save for counter attacks, and that ought to prove that the chance of a Germany triumphant over united Europe is slim today and growing slimmer. As

to the first objection I would merely call attention to the fact that it is only because of a weakening of German strength, a disappointment of German hopes, that these voices for peace have been raised. In December, 1915, when the German tide was high, the Reichstag voted for a program of annexations. If in July, 1917, they vote for peace it does not necessarily mean that they have become converts to internationalism, it might merely mean that they feel that a peace negotiated at this time will be more favorable than one negotiated later and under the somewhat vague formula "no annexations and no indemnities"—an independent Poland under a Hapsburg prince, or Belgium forced into economic dependence on Germany would not be "annexations"—they hope to gain their ends. Nor are the annexationists by any means dead in Germany: they will revive at the first German success. Indeed the lamentable military collapse of the Russian Republic at the time of present writing may probably be counted on to revive the hopes and influence of this gentry and correspondingly depress those of the peace party in Germany. Nor is the present military situation one to give rise to any great hopes of a speedy victory. For a non-military man to attempt a diagnosis of that side of the question would undoubtedly be unwise, but a glance at the military map as it is at present would seem to show that Germany is far from a beaten nation. It would seem to be obvious that only by the strongest, most united effort in the military

line can the balance of power be brought back to Europe or Germany be brought to reason.

But there is one plan which has seemingly captured all German minds: those of the peace party as well as the annexationists. It is a plan so plausibly, so ostensibly reasonable that it has seemed to many Americans a perfectly possible settlement for the European difficulty. And yet within it, as it is brought forward by the German leaders, lurks no small danger to the peace of Europe and to the balance of power. This is the celebrated scheme for the constitution of "Mitteleuropa," a federation of states extending from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf and including the present Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, most if not all of the Balkan states and undoubtedly, in the present scheme, a reconstituted kingdom of Poland. These states are not to form one government but are to act as a unit in questions of economic, military and foreign policy. One tariff, one federated and unified army, one policy toward outside states seem to be the characteristics of this new world group as sketched by its ablest advocate, Herr Naumann in his "Mitteleuropa," published about a year ago. Now against such a federation as this we can have no objection unless it in any way harms interests vital to us. In other words, we can feel no resentment if one state or group of states allies with another state or group unless thereby policies inimical to ours be strengthened or the balance of power disturbed to our disadvantage. On these lines alone, then, we can

criticize this new German scheme of *Mittleuropa*.

Does it strengthen policies inimical to us? This will depend a great deal on the policy and position of the Central European Powers after the war. If Germany wins, the present policy will, doubtless, be continued and that this policy is inimical to the United States can hardly be denied. Remember the statement of Prince von Bülow, not primarily a Pan-German, that "the anger which is so widely felt in Germany against the American people with whom they had such friendly feelings is only too natural and comprehensible." The Germans feel that our policy of neutrality has been hypocritical, that up to the outbreak of war we were really aiding the cause of the Allies, and for this alleged hypocrisy and opposition they will desire, if possible, to secure revenge. If Germany is defeated her policy may change due to the necessities of a new position; and even if this policy of hostility continues defeat will greatly lessen the harm her revengeful spirit can do us. But if *Mittleuropa* means a strengthening of the German strength and the present policies continue then, for us, *Mittleuropa* cannot help but be a vital problem.

Will it destroy the balance of power? In the first place it must be noted that in all questions dealing with foreign relations as well as in all military matters this new *Mittleuropa* is to act as a unit; indeed in dealing with its aspects as an international force it may be practically

treated as one Power. And how strong will this new Power be? If we add to it the population of the new kingdom of Poland—and the announcements made from German sources as to the new state leave no doubt but that it is to be considered as part of the new group formation—it will possess about one hundred and sixty millions of population. What else in Europe can compare with it? France with forty millions, Italy with several millions less, Russia with about one hundred and seventy-five millions, the British Empire with between two and three times as many. Outside of Europe the only Powers that can compare with it are the United States with one hundred million, Japan with fifty million and China with between three and four hundred million. But of the Powers which are strong enough to meet Mitteleuropa, Russia and the British Empire, the first is and probably will be for some years to come a prey to civil dissensions and the second is too widespread for the rapid concentration necessary in the early part of a war. The United States is too far away to render effective help until some time has passed, and of the two Asiatic countries, one is interested merely in the affairs of the Far East; and the other, China, is too weak as an organized Power to count for much, for some time to come, among the nations of the world. It would appear that, for a term of years at least, Mitteleuropa would be the strongest single force in world politics.

But, it may be argued, this would not be a

great danger because Mitteleuropa would be, from the very nature of its composition, an international and not a national force. For it would consist of Turks, Slavs, Italians, as well as Germans; indeed the latter would represent a minority among the population. Far from being a cause of war it would be a mediating force between Slav and Teuton which would make for peace. Such is the argument as Naumann presents it. But is it absolutely true? It is not always the majority which rules in a state; indeed as a general rule a minority, well organized, well educated and knowing clearly what it wants, can impose its will on a majority, ill organized and lacking education and a plan of action. And such is the situation in the countries which would make up Mitteleuropa. In only one, Bulgaria, would the Slav element be in a position to force concessions from the ruling German caste, and the Bulgarian Slav is hardly a good spokesman for his racial brothers in Austria and Germany. For with the south Slav he is a rival, and as yet he feels little interest in the fate of the Pole or the Czech. A few compensations in the economic sphere would probably win his support to a policy of Germanization in Poland or Austria. Mitteleuropa would pass under the rule of Berlin because there has been situated the directing force that has carried on the war which had created it; a victory of Germany in this war would almost certainly mean the supremacy of Prussianism among the entire group. Indeed Naumann,

although in guarded terms—for his book was not written for German consumption alone—practically takes this view. “Mitteleuropa,” he declares, “will in its kernel be German; it will of course use the German language as a medium of communication.” And the very mixed feelings with which this book was received in the Austro-Hungarian Empire show that the thinkers of the Dual Monarchy seem to have their doubts as to where the leadership of the new group formation would be situated.

We may take it as reasonably certain, then, that *Mitteleuropa* would be, in its external relations, merely a projection of Germany from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. That such a group formation would be a danger to the balance of power and, therefore—if my preceding argument be accepted—to us, can hardly be doubted. How then is it to be defeated? If we consider that one of the greatest dangers in the whole scheme lies in its direction by Germany, then obviously our first task must be a defeat of Germany such as will teach to all the unwisdom of following the lessons and guidance of the forces now ruling in Berlin. A defeat of Germany will probably mean the revival of federalism in Austria and the gain of the non-German nationalities throughout Central Europe; the victory of Germany will probably mean the victory of Teutonism and the defeat of these hopes.

But once Germany is defeated; what then? The usual method advocated is the division of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire, parts going to Italy, Rumania, Serbia and Russia; the possible formation of an independent kingdom of Bohemia, and the allowance of Hungary and Austria proper to go their own way, the former probably as an independent kingdom, the latter probably as part of the German Empire. But it is my personal conviction that such a plan would, in the end, prove unwise. Hungary would, as in the days of Andrassy, probably find that its sole dependence against Russia would be in alliance with Germany. Rumania would, very probably, follow the same course. Bulgaria, overshadowed by the new Serbia, would gravitate toward this Central European group, and Serbia, surrounded, would find herself in much the same position as in 1914. Such a project would restore the balance of power in Europe, but it is by no means certain that it would make for peace.

The supposition on which the majority of the advocates of the foregoing scheme base their assumptions is that Austria is irretrievably bound to Germany. But is this true? Has the present Austrian policy been consistently followed in the Dual Monarchy? If we examine closely we will, I think, find that the present policy has by no means been consistently followed since 1871, but that, on the contrary, there seem to have been two policies: one the policy, originated by Andrassy and especially associated with Hungarian statesmen, looking to Germany for support and regarding Russia and Slavdom

generally with hostility; the other, associated with various Polish and Czech statesmen, endeavoring to steer a middle course between Russia and Germany, and not particularly friendly or hostile to either. Moreover we will discover that this latter policy has never been without advocates in the Dual Monarchy, and finally that it seems to be the policy pursued by the present Emperor, Charles, since his accession. And it is to be further noted that this more international foreign policy will also bring with it a more reasonable method of treating the non-German elements within the Empire; indeed the new Austrian policy seems to be directed toward greater cooperation with these elements in internal matters. If these Slav elements can be strengthened so as to present a firm front against the German ones, then Mitteleuropa will, very likely, present much less of a danger. A regenerated federalized Austria-Hungary might be a safe focus around which a safe Mitteleuropa might form, but Germany, at present, can hardly be considered as such a one.

It will thus be seen that there is here a problem for the diplomatist as well as for the soldier. Just to what extent it will be found necessary to take away portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the interests of nationality and of international right is difficult at this juncture to say and probably useless to discuss. But is it not possible to adopt the method advocated toward Germany by Lloyd-George and state that with such a regenerated and federalized

Austria-Hungary it will be possible to deal far more generously than with an Austria-Hungary under Teuton control, as at present? For, in our case at least, the main objective of our attack is Germany: we are not even at war with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and this ought to enable us to give to the latter more consideration when the time of settlement comes.

There is another feature of the plan of *Mittel-europa*, as at present brought forward, which presents serious danger. This is the question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. A *Mittel-europa* extending from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf would be in a position to close, at will, every economic outlet of the Russian Empire in Europe except the port of Archangel, frozen during half the year. Again the inclusion of the new kingdom of Poland in the German group would take from Russia the greater part of its industrial area, situated in Russian Poland. There is a rapidly developing manufacturing district in southern Russia, but this does not, as yet, seem equal in importance to that of Russian Poland. Nor is a period of internal settlement, with all the unrest which attends it, a favorable time for industrial development, and it would appear that Russia is likely to pass through such a period of internal reorganization in the years following the war. If this German plan is carried out and Russia loses the control of her economic outlets as well as her largest industrial districts the result will almost certainly be to bring the new Russian Republic into a more or

less complete economic dependence on the Central Powers. Germany, which before the war had such a strong economic hold on Russia, would easily build it up again after the conclusion of peace and this hold would be extremely difficult to shake off. Moreover if she seeks, as she will have to, other economic outlets, through Persia to the Persian Gulf or in the Far East, she will almost certainly collide with the interests of Great Britain and would thereby be brought, as in the years before 1908, into political as well as economic subjection to Mitteleuropa. Such an outcome would, almost certainly, upset the balance of power.

We must insist then that this new Polish kingdom, if formed, shall have its closest bond with the Russian Republic which has an economic need of it and not with the German Empire, to which it would be merely a useless competitor. Also we must make sure that at least one of Russia's economic outlets, that through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, remains free to her. Two methods have been suggested in dealing with the latter problem: one that the Straits be handed over to Russia, the other that they be internationalized. The former solution is open to several grave difficulties. In the first place it has been renounced by the Russian Republic itself in an official statement. Again it would undoubtedly stir up a large amount of hostile feeling in the Balkan states, notably in Bulgaria and Rumania. Finally the Germans claim that Russia would use her possession of

Constantinople to close the Hamburg-Persian Gulf route to the East in favor of the more eastward routes across Russia. But none of these objections can be brought against internationalization as a solution. True, such a method has been a little discredited by later events, but, unless the world goes to war again in the next half century, which is doubtful, such an international government at Constantinople would have some years in which to become firmly established.

But it must be again stated that all these solutions are secondary at present. Against all of them Teutondom will fight, and until Teutondom is defeated there is no chance of their being carried out. Our first duty is to defeat Germany and then we can solve such problems in a way, it is to be hoped, to give satisfaction to all.

Thus we have seen that every world plan, even the most moderate, thus far brought forward by official Germany contains danger to the balance of power in Europe and in the world. And if it be advocated that, to us, the problem of the balance of power is a vital one, then the war against Germany will have an added reason, the phrase "a world safe for democracy" will have an added meaning. For if we are a world Power, as a world Power we must think and act; and these problems demand our serious consideration.

CHAPTER V

THE WORLD PERIL AND THE TWO AMERICAS

CLIFTON R. HALL

For nobody in the world is the progress of civilization more discouraging than for the unneighborly man. If it is still too early in history to contend that the hermit in his wilderness retreat and the castaway on his lonely island are conceivable to us today only as romantic figures of a past of somewhat doubtful authenticity, certainly there are few, and increasingly fewer, spots on earth capable of ministering to the comforts of man or of stimulating his ambition or avarice, where the hermit can be guaranteed his solitude or the castaway his oblivion. Relentlessly humanity fulfills its divine commission to multiply and possess the earth, and so inevitable is the process that one is fain to recognize a Providence that has made neighborliness a human instinct with direct purpose to safeguard the future.

As with men, so with nations. The age of peoples living apart and undisturbed, or wandering over unoccupied regions where boundaries were superfluous and sustenance provided

by nature was to be had for the taking, are more remote in our thought but hardly less compatible with our standards of living than the times when winds and sails and flintlocks and horses were the reliance of peoples who now tremble for their safety despite the resources of steam and electricity, the submarine, the motor and high explosives. The children of men are all thrust, will they, nill they, into a single crib, where they may nestle together in harmony or scratch out one another's eyes, their freedom of choice being conditioned only by the necessity of recognizing that others are inevitably in the same crib, and at rather uncomfortably close quarters.

For few nations in the world's history has the romantic, relatively untroubled period of isolation been so delightfully prolonged as for the United States. Our forefathers were introduced by fortune to a vast and rich domain, where boundless lands, huge forests and mighty rivers challenged the imagination and tenacity of generations to come and where only the savage, few and poorly equipped Indians—who, except as allies of white men, rarely showed formidable offensive strength—disputed their rule. Until well toward the end of the last century, Americans, battling with and subduing to their profit and comfort this great empire of nature, found neither strength nor leisure to turn their attention elsewhere, and their geographical isolation became a sort of ideal provincialism, exalted by dreams of their infant

country's transcendent maturity and by satisfaction in the importance of their own labors as a constructive means to so noble an end.

In this isolation they were confirmed, moreover, after their successful revolution from England, by an appreciation of their present feebleness. The young nation, exhausted by the struggle, unskilled in government, empty in pocket, insignificant in population, needed time and experience to order its course, solve its problems and develop its enormous potentialities; and it is no wonder that its leaders, contemplating the fierce strife of the European monarchies for each other's possessions and the ruthless gobbling up of the little states by their great neighbors, looked upon the hundreds of leagues of ocean tossing between their continent and Europe as the "aegis of democracy" and presented the principle of isolation to their countrymen as a lamp divinely lighted to guide their footsteps along the highway of history.

In this spirit Washington addressed to his fellow citizens his classic message of farewell:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest or caprice?"

Jefferson, chief apostle of American democracy, harped constantly on the same string:

“Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue.”

And again:

“We have a perfect horror at everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe.”

Similar sentiments were reiterated by most of the fathers whose foresight best deserved the nation’s heed, and the principle of isolation became ingrained in the American character.

Regarding the possessions of European Powers that remained in America at the close of the Revolution, the same policy commended itself. Aside from the British possessions in Canada and the West Indies, regarded, on the whole, as safe and economically profitable neighbors, the great bulk of the western hemisphere was in the hands of Spain, whose immense colonial empire stretched over both continents from the Mississippi to the Pacific and from the Great Lakes to Cape Horn, including Florida, the entire coastline of the Gulf of Mexico, and the principal islands of the West Indies, and excluding nothing of great importance except Brazil, which belonged to Portugal.

Toward this enormous institution—the Spanish Empire of the Indies—the people of the United States were complacent. Ardent democrats, they could not, of course, sympathize with a system of government which saddled upon its

colonists a bureaucracy—a graded organization of Spanish-born officials—far less representative, less efficient and more oppressive than that of England, which had driven them to revolt; nor could they, who had writhed and protested under the British trade regulations, condone a commercial system that exploited and wrung its subjects in America for the profit of the king's exchequer and of favored mercantile interests in distant Spain; but, as shrewdly practical countrymen of Yankee Doodle, they saw readily enough the advantage to themselves of having as their neighbor decrepit old Spain rather than some vigorous Power with an aggressive imperial policy. The infant Hercules could well afford to let Spain sleep on next door, while he toughened his sinews and took on wisdom; then, if his destiny pointed to the Pacific or the Gulf of Mexico, as he was beginning to fancy it might, the matter could be attended to. With regard to Central America, Panama and far away South America he had little knowledge and no ambitions whatever.

But Spain was not permitted to slumber while the young giant grew to man's estate. The terrific explosion of the French Revolution shook all Europe wide awake, and, as its last phase, came the parvenu conqueror Napoleon, irreverently erasing the boundaries of old monarchies and shaping them to his designs of world dominion. No imperial scheme could possibly overlook Spain, rich and ripe for the plucking, and in 1807 Napoleon's veterans

marched across the Pyrenees and a new and pregnant chapter in American history began; for the subversion of Spain meant the disintegration of her empire in America.

The Spanish colonies rose in revolt, a revolt with more than the usual complexity of causes attending popular upheavals—patriotic Spaniards against the French rulers arbitrarily imposed upon them, disgruntled American-born creoles against the overbearing Spanish-born official class, champions of free trade and open markets against the old, deadening commercial monopoly—but in its final stages it became quite definitely a revolution against the sovereignty of Spain herself. The reason for this is to be found in Europe.

Napoleon's grandiose schemes of universal empire had brought about his ruin. Driven by the instinct of self-preservation, the European monarchs sank their differences with one another, combined against the common enemy, crushed him at last and, with thanksgiving in their hearts for their deliverance, set about restoring and safeguarding their tottering thrones that had so nearly crashed down in ruin. Thus originated the "Holy Alliance,"¹ a league of the rulers of Russia, Prussia, Austria and France, united to "put an end to the system of representative governments in whatever country it

¹ The term "Holy Alliance" is here used loosely to designate the permanent (Quadruple) alliance which England repudiated, rather than the original fantastic Holy Alliance of Czar Alexander I, with whose principles England declared herself in sympathy.

may exist," to "prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known" and to uphold the "legitimate" sovereignty of those royal families ordained of God and divinely appointed to the governance of men. Under its auspices popular movements in Italy and Spain were snuffed out without mercy and, encouraged by its support, King Ferdinand VII of Spain, contemptible in character and in intellect, entered upon a policy of reactionary absolutism for the kingdom and colonies under his rule. His unenlightened action was the *coup de grâce* to loyalty to the Spanish monarchy in America, where the revolution promptly gained an *élan* it had not had before. Ferdinand's cause came to depend more and more upon the inadequate force of soldiers sent from Spain, and by 1822 his colonial empire had practically ceased to exist and the infatuated monarch could only turn weakly and expectantly to the *deus ex machina* in the person of the Holy Alliance and pitifully beg his lost possessions at its hands.

What might have been the fate of the newborn democracies, had they stood alone or with only the United States at their back, to defy the conquerors of Napoleon, may be conjectured. But, fortunately for America, England derived no comfort from the prospect of a crusade against representative government or of burly European autocrats elbowing her overseas colonies and closing South American ports to her trade; and, to the delight of our anxious ad-

ministration, the British foreign office took the initiative in suggesting the identity of England's interests with our own and inviting us to a joint declaration against interference by the Holy Alliance in American affairs. President James Monroe might have been pardoned had he embraced the tempting proposal without qualification, but his astute Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, perceiving that England's self-interest absolutely assured us of her support, urged the advantages of a separate pronouncement by the United States alone, which, instead of presenting us to the world as a mere "cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war," would preserve our traditional policy of "no alliances," leave our hands free for the future and win us international prestige with no attendant risk. Accordingly, on December 2, 1823, the President's message announced that the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," that we should regard any attempt on their part "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing" the new republics "or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

This was the famous Monroe Doctrine. It is doubtless true that, if its announcement seemed

to dissipate successfully the menace of the Holy Alliance against America, the true explanation of that happy result is to be found rather in British ships and guns than in an American paper pronunciamento. It may also be admitted that the doctrine originated primarily in selfishness rather than in altruism, that our statesmen were thinking more of the security of the United States than of the liberty of the struggling colonists. Still, the fact remains that, thus early in her national existence, the United States appeared before the world as the avowed champion of American democracy and of the right of the peoples of the western hemisphere to work out their own institutions in their own way.

In Latin America these evidences of the support and good will of the democrats of the north fell on no sterile ground. Enthusiasm for the United States was universal, the names of her Revolutionary heroes were on all lips, the constitutions of the new states, to be imposed on an incongruous citizenry of Latins, Indians and blacks, copied with flattering if regrettable fidelity the fundamental laws of a people schooled for generations in the intricacies of "checks and balances," and in 1824, when the "liberator," Simon Bolivar, pursuing his dream of a league of free American republics, proposed the first Pan-American congress of history, to be held at Panama for the purpose of formulating a common policy with regard to American affairs, an urgent invitation was sent to Washington.

Unhappily, the faith of Bolivar and his compatriots in the readiness of the United States to preside over and to protect, as an elder sister, a happy family of American democracies was doomed to disappointment. In truth, the United States was not worthy at that time to pose as sponsor for a league of freedom, for she herself, despite the lofty sentiments of her Declaration of Independence, was polluted by slavery. The half century of struggle between the North and South had already begun, and the nation's counsels were conducted and her policies determined with that issue always in mind. Its baleful influence on American democratic solidarity appeared at once in the protests of Southern Congressmen against sending delegates to the Panama Congress, upon the ground that that body was to include negroes in its membership and that among its projects was the recognition of black Haiti as a free state and the emancipation of Cuba and Porto Rico from the tyranny of Spain. Could their own negroes be kept reconciled to bondage, they asked, when they connived at investing black skinned islanders with the rights of man? So long did they succeed in delaying the departure of our delegates that when they finally reached Panama the congress had adjourned and the name of the United States had ceased to be one to conjure with in the cause of democratic Pan-Americanism.

This deplorable episode was but the beginning of a long period of estrangement, ranging from

indifference to open hostility, between the United States and her southern neighbors. The full vigor and genius of our people were turned to the occupation and development of the great West and pace for pace with the movement of settlers into the new land went the eternal controversy over slavery. The Southern champions in Congress, foreseeing and dreading the overwhelming of their cherished institution by the preponderance of free labor in the West, fought the battle for slavery over again whenever the admission of a new State to the Union was proposed, and, when their defeat appeared unavoidable in the territory then possessed by the nation, raised the cry, "more land for slavery!" The South became avowedly imperialistic. Slave holders poured across the southern border into the Mexican territory of Texas, defied the Mexican laws against slavery, and finally, in 1836, threw off the rule of Mexico and knocked at the door of the Union. In 1846 pro-slavery interests forced on Mexico, exhausted by internal strife and helpless to protect herself, as unjust a war as ever a great nation waged against a smaller, and ravished from her California, New Mexico and Arizona. Cuba also, the richest jewel remaining to Spain in America, kindled their covetous eyes. Filibusters, equipped in our Gulf States, regardless of international obligations and municipal law, harassed her coasts and towns, official offers of purchase to Spain were couched in almost dictatorial terms, and the climax was reached when,

in 1854, the American ministers to England, France and Spain—two of them slaveholders and the third devoted to Southern interests—met at Ostend in Belgium and united in a manifesto advising the United States, in case Spain proved indisposed to part with Cuba, to “wrest it from her if we possess the power.”

Our Civil War, by abolishing slavery, destroyed the damning inconsistency in our democracy, but neither then nor afterward was anything accomplished toward cementing the broken links of Pan-Americanism. The redeemed Union, after the necessary reconstruction, entered upon a marvellous era of material development—the age of big business, trusts, railroad extension, wars between capital and labor, controversies over the tariff and the currency. Hence it emerged, toward the end of the nineteenth century, full of strength, resource and optimism, conscious that its internal problems were well on the way to a solution and its natural wealth in process of exploitation, with a keen sense of its destiny, the eye of an *entrepreneur* alert for new avenues to usefulness, progress and profit, and a complacent appreciation of its significance as the home of freedom and opportunity for all the world and as the eldest and most successful expositor of the success of democracy in a great nation, and with a sincere benevolence, not without some tincture of superiority, toward oppressed and unfortunate peoples on whom the blessings of freedom had been bestowed in less measure.

This splendid period of growth and coordination of national resources had one inevitable result—it tore away whatever remained of our chrysalis of isolation and precipitated us into the mid-current of world affairs. Already we were the world's greatest producers of raw materials, with a surplus beyond our own needs seeking a market; and when we coned the lessons of our census and the reports of our immigration bureau it required no effort of the imagination to prefigure the time when the yield of our fields and mountains would be inadequate to supply our teeming population and when our manufactures, multiplied enormously in response to increased demands, might be exchanged abroad for the foods and minerals of other lands. The economic law of interdependence among nations made us a world Power and constrained us to dig the Panama Canal.

While still a weak and provincial nation, the United States had been glad to subscribe to any arrangement with European states that would save the face of the Monroe Doctrine and secure us equal rights with others to use the projected waterway. Now, however, that we were indisputably the paramount Power in America, with long coastlines on both oceans, containing harbors for our vessels of war and trade, any trans-isthmian canal must become the strategic centre for our commerce and our naval strategy—in the words of President Hayes, “part of the coastline of the United States”—as necessary for us to control as the capital of our Govern-

ment or the funds of our treasury. And, needless to say, the control of the canal implied control also of the principal routes by which it could be reached—the great sea lanes between the islands of the Caribbean and important positions commanding its termini in both oceans.

Thus consideration for our future as a world Power urged us southward, into closer and closer contact with our one time admirers, the Latin Americans, whose sentiments toward us, however, had undergone, not without reason, a process of refrigeration and who now regarded us with distrust as conscienceless interlopers, intent on securing plenty of room for ourselves by a resolute elbowing policy.

Our initial plunge into the unfamiliar waters of the Caribbean did not allay their apprehensions. Our war with Spain in 1898 was fought from a variety of motives, but of the dominant one—sympathy for the outraged Cubans (and that it was so nobody who remembers the sentiments or has read the newspapers of that year can doubt)—our people had no reason to be ashamed. Still, other less unselfish impulses appearing in the background appealed to our startled neighbors, and to Europe as well, as more in accord with our reputed national shrewdness and materialism, and the terms of peace served but too well to bear out their suspicions, for we proceeded not only to pocket Porto Rico and the Philippines but to force upon Cuba, for whose liberties we professed to have been wielding the righteous sword, a

tutelage which conditioned her nominally declared sovereignty by our own conception of her needs, and to exact a substantial recompense for our services in the form of naval bases on her soil.

The end of the war brought the American people, somewhat to their surprise and almost against their will, face to face with the fact that their old practice of aloofness from others' concerns had been relegated forever to the nation's collection of outgrown antiquities. Henceforth our policies were to be cast in an international mould.

Our first step was impossible to mistake. We must build and own the canal. England, with whom we had an embarrassing treaty on the subject, was told that, controlling as she did the Suez waterway, she could not in propriety insist upon rights in "a canal and a half." Convinced, less perhaps by the force of our logic than by her desire for our friendship, in view of the menacing rise of German maritime power, she obligingly withdrew, and "the Hay-Pauncefote treaty [1901] was a turning point in the history of the West Indies, in that it was a formal recognition of the transference of naval supremacy in the Caribbean from Great Britain to the United States." The Panama route was decided upon, and although Colombia, sovereign over that territory, interposed obstacles to our impatient will, our Presidential chair was occupied by a "man of action," and Mr. Roosevelt "took Panama while Congress debated."

Americans whose faith in the unswerving justice of the United States to weaker nations has been fortified by the Roosevelt and John Hay versions of what occurred in Panama in 1903 will do well to consult an unbiased historian's account of those events. Here it needs only to be observed in passing that the Panama revolution was projected in this country and anticipated with equanimity by our Government several weeks before it actually broke out; that under a more than doubtful construction of an old treaty dating from 1846—a construction repudiated by Colombia and by Latin Americans generally—we resorted to forcible means to obstruct the operations of the Colombian troops attempting to suppress the rebels; that in recognizing the Republic of Panama only three days after its declaration of independence we violated principles regarding recognition which we ourselves had announced with unction in the case of the revolt of the Spanish colonies and for a far less heinous disregard of which, with reference to the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederacy in our Civil War, we had bitterly denounced England; and that the principal justification alleged for our action—that the canal was a world necessity, the enjoyment of which by humanity self-seeking officials of a single turbulent nation could not be permitted to prevent—must be thrown out of court as irrelevant, since the question at issue with Colombia was not the granting or denial of the desired concessions, but rather the amount of money

we were to pay for them. It is at least a profitable reflection whether a nation that spent over half a billion dollars, composed in considerable part of pensions and "pork," in the year 1903, might not well have afforded to add an additional item of a few millions for the sake of avoiding all appearance of injustice and conserving the good will of the people of a whole continent.

Whether Mr. Roosevelt or the Colombians had the right of it, the Panama episode did more than any other event in our history to arouse against us the resentment, distrust and fear of Latin Americans. To them we seemed to stand revealed in our true character—the "Colossus of the North," bestriding both the Americas and appropriating them to our designs. Their alarm increased when, in 1906, we intervened in Cuba to repair the creaking machinery of government. They whispered sardonically that Uncle Sam was removing his disguise as "general benefactor" and preparing soullessly to gobble the next morsel that invited his perennial appetite, and surprise and mystification followed our prompt withdrawal after order was restored.

Not only in the Americas did the stretching of Uncle Sam's limbs occasion discomfort. The great commercial nations looked askance at our growing ambitions and extended activities. Particularly so did Germany. Coming too late into the family of nations to share in the partition of North America and Africa into colonial do-

mains, no nation was more conscious of its imperial destiny or more alive to the necessity of providing homes for its population and markets for its products. If Germany was to take the forward place in world affairs to which her national character and ambitions assigned her, some resource must be found to offset the handicap of restricted territory. All the world knows that it was supplied by perfection of organization, by the application of the uncanny German genius for taking pains, sentimentalized by an unwearying propaganda devoted to the glorification of German efficiency, and rhapsodized into a crusader's vision of the diffusion of Teutonic "*Kultur*." Thus equipped, she entered the battle for the world's wealth and the world's power, her producing, selling and fiscal organizations combined with intricate perfection, her young subjects trained as specialized agents for the conquest of new markets for her commodities, her capital ventured in large amounts and often at dangerously speculative rates in investments calculated to win her credit and consequently business abroad, and behind all the purse and the strong arm of her centralized Government. Coincidentally with the expansion of her trade proceeded the augmentation of her navy, regarded as the necessary guarantee of her success. In the early years of the twentieth century the mushroom growth of both brought consternation to her rivals; all of them save England were speedily distanced, and she, despite extraordinary exertions, had ample reason for concern.

No field of expansion afforded more attractive possibilities than the American; and German money, German goods and German immigrants were already pouring into the most promising localities. In every respect, the policy of the United States seemed a bogey to German ambitions, and most intolerable of all was the Monroe Doctrine, denying her forever a single square foot of territory in the hemisphere.

No one familiar with German habits of thought and "practical" methods could entertain a doubt as to how the empire would deal with such a situation. It was resolved, as a matter of course, to defer to the United States and to the Monroe Doctrine only so far as expediency might dictate; and expediency, to the German mind, has usually been measured in terms of battleships and ordnance. In 1898 the sentiments of the Kaiser appeared in his efforts to effect a coalition of European Powers to compel us to relax our pressure on Spain and in his reported observation: "If I had had a larger fleet, I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck." When Dewey, victorious over the Spaniards, occupied Manila Bay, a German squadron, present ostensibly to protect German interests against the insurgents, thrust itself between our ships and the town and rendered itself so obnoxious as to draw from Dewey the outburst: "Tell Admiral Diederichs that if he wants a fight he can have it right now!" The first German-American armed conflict might well have materialized forthwith, had not the

behavior of the British commander, also on the scene, conveyed to the Germans a distinct impression of Anglo-American amity.

Some day a historian will tell the interesting story of the *rapprochement* between England and the United States which has now produced such gratifying results, and he may well be able to show a relationship between increasing British amenities to us and the rise of the German menace. An outstanding affection for us has not always been a British peculiarity. However that may be, the advantages to England of America's friendship during those disturbing years were obvious, and, in the light of what we already know of Germany's intentions toward us and our own blind helplessness to protect ourselves, we may confess with gratitude that we have by no means least benefited by the Anglo-Saxon family reunion.

The Manila episode was only the first rustle of the rising hurricane. Judicious German loans to impecunious Latin American countries, which the latter proved providentially unable to pay, were recurrent pretexts for the employment of Teuton strong arm methods, and most disquieting ones for Uncle Sam. On one occasion, in 1902, the Kaiser's grip upon the collar of recalcitrant Venezuela was broken only by President Roosevelt's threat to dispatch Admiral Dewey to the scene of action. Again, in 1907, the claims of Germany and other European states upon the bankrupt treasury of Santo Domingo forced the President to one of the

most significant extensions of the Monroe Doctrine that has ever been made. By agreement with the debtor state, officials from the United States were appointed to administer the Dominican customs in the interest of foreign creditors, upon the principle that "we must make it evident that we do not intend to permit the Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this continent as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations," and, in cases of wrong doing or impotence of American states, causing just grievances to their creditors, the United States may be forced "to the exercise of an international police power."

Such disconcerting experiences as these at length convinced our people of the necessity of formulating a practical American program. Of recent years, Latin American cartoonists have been fond of depicting the long, striding legs, longer arms and clutching, bony fingers of imperialistic Uncle Sam; but, with the evidence all in, the worst that can fairly be said against our policy is that it has concerned itself (1) with the reassertion of a somewhat amplified Monroe Doctrine—amplified to meet new exigencies as they have arisen; (2) with the assumption of an amount of control over small, irresponsible Latin American countries sufficient to anticipate the designs of ambitious European Powers on their integrity; and (3) with the creation of a scientific system of defences for the canal, including the command of

the principal sea routes into the Caribbean and the occupation by ourselves, or the exclusion of rival nations from, the important naval bases near its Atlantic and Pacific termini.

These three elements in our policy are, indeed, closely interrelated and may be thought of as parts of one big plan—the perfection of the defences and the insurance of the security of the United States, regarding our West India islands and the Canal Zone as integral factors in a single problem. There have been, since the Roosevelt pronouncement regarding Santo Domingo, two significant extensions of the Monroe Doctrine. The first, in 1912, occasioned by the rumor that Japanese commercial interests, closely allied with the Japanese Government, were negotiating with Mexico for concessions of territory on Magdalena Bay in Lower California, was the “Lodge resolution” to the effect that “when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for naval or military purposes.”

The second is still more interesting. For years the immense oil fields of Mexico and

northern South America have been, like other deposits of raw materials in Latin America, the basis of heavy investments of foreign capital. A new international significance has recently attached to oil, from the fact that it is being substituted for coal as fuel for battleships, and, at no very distant date, oiling stations and the control of oil supplies must figure largely in the estimates of naval experts. Thus the question of the control of American oil properties becomes a matter of concern in our plans of national defence, and when in 1913 it was learned that the great British firm of Pearson and Son, already heavily interested in Mexican oil, was concluding negotiations with the Colombian Government which gave it a monopoly of valuable deposits in that country, with the right to construct pipe lines, railroads and docks, our Government was aroused and expressed its displeasure so strongly that the Pearson projects were abandoned. The Monroe Doctrine was deftly fitted to the situation by President Wilson in his speech at Mobile, in which he declared: "States that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs. . . . What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise. . . . The United States . . . must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter

are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity.”

In the turbulent little republics of Central America and the West Indies we have, of late years, constantly interfered and taken upon ourselves new burdens, with slight advantage to ourselves, for the simple reason that we were compelled to do so or to hand over regions strategically vital to us to our most formidable rivals, especially Germany. The world is just beginning to comprehend and to shiver as it should at the story of German machinations; and of all the reckless sleepers saved by grace rather than by prescience, Uncle Sam has as good reason as any for self-gratulation.

An excellent illustration is Haiti. That negro island republic, endowed by nature with a profusion of riches, and endowed by man with ignorance, improvidence and chronic revolution, has been for a century a pathetic instance of neglected possibilities. Once a colony of France and still French in speech, its finances were controlled, until seven years ago, by a French banking corporation. German interests, however, were active there, as everywhere else, and in 1910 were powerful enough to secure a re-organization of the bank which would give them a share in the country's fiscal affairs. The French Government, as nervous at the prospect of embarking in such a venture with Germans as their sole associates as Red Riding Hood had reason to be in her woodland walk with the wolf, insisted on having a third party along,

and the final adjustment, on its face, gave Frenchmen fifty per cent. of the stock, Americans forty per cent., and Germans only ten per cent.; but there was, perhaps, some significance in the fact that the principal American holders bore unmistakable German names. Be that as it may, the bank was not the last word in the story. In 1914 and 1915, Haiti was convulsed by two of her habitual revolutions and when the smoke had cleared away it appeared that the revolutionary leaders had contracted loans with German banks bearing such picturesque rates of interest as 35 and 45 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. per annum, with the Government revenues pledged for their repayment. More important than this was the intimation that came to the United States that the German minister had negotiated with the Haitian Government an arrangement whereby one of the considerations for German financial assistance was to be the grant to Germans of the right to construct a commercial coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas, at the northwestern extremity of the island, an important strategic site commanding the Windward Passage, the highroad to Panama. The alarm felt in our Government circles at this swoop of the German eagle toward an eyrie in America, where one of the roads to the canal would be directly under his eye and claws, may be imagined, and it was doubtless due to energetic protests from Washington that nothing came of the plot.

But the end was not yet. The bank and the

loans gave the Germans an ideal lever for their Haitian diplomacy, and when, in 1914, President Theodore's skyrocket financiering had involved his country in economic chaos and the gold in the Haitian bank had been spirited to New York in a United States gunboat for safe keeping, the French and German Governments approached Washington with the proposition that Haiti's finances required regulating and that their interests there entitled them to participate in the work. The French communication was polite, but the sinister scowl and the clenched fist appeared unmistakably in the German representation, the language of which set forth the unconcern of German public opinion with any American tenderness for a traditional doctrine and concluded with the assertion that Germany "would not understand" any arrangement that excluded her from a settlement of Haitian affairs.

The United States, at last thoroughly aroused, replied to both France and Germany that she admitted no exceptions to her general policy that independent American nations were not to be interfered with by European governments. At this juncture came the great war, and Germany's energies were fully occupied elsewhere. Just what sort of reply our defiance of the Imperial Government would have brought us under different circumstances is a shiver inducing speculation for those of us whose faith is not pinned to the threadbare aphorism that "America has never lost a war."

Meanwhile Haiti had become a welter of revolution and murder, one president after another fitting disconcertingly across the stage and each picking up, in his course, whatever cash happened to be in sight. When missions from the United States had failed to effect any arrangement concerning the finances, utter anarchy reigned, French marines had been landed at Cape Haitien to protect French interests, and a mob had invaded the French legation at Port-au-Prince to drag out and assassinate President Guillaume-Sam, the United States took forcible control of the situation. She had no alternative. Haiti must be shaken out and made fit for respectable society by somebody, and unless we were willing to assume the unpleasant duty ourselves we could not, in common sense, go on denying to other interested parties the right to use the rod. Our marines accomplished the corrective process with a minimum of pain to all concerned and, by a treaty negotiated in September, 1915, Haiti was placed in probationary leading strings, the collection of her customs and the disbursement of her revenues assumed by the United States, and her so-called police system replaced by a native constabulary recruited, drilled and officered by Americans, the arrangement to remain in force for ten years "and further for another term of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either of the high contracting parties, the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished."

The story of Haiti is the most melodramatic

chapter, but a thoroughly characteristic one, in the history of our relations with the Caribbean countries. Santo Domingo, Haiti's neighbor, has been continuously under our wing since 1907, when alarm at the attitude of her foreign creditors first drove us to assume the post of nursemaid; and, in consequence of recent lapses from the path of order and virtue, is now being reclaimed by military government, backed by the rifles of United States marines.

Of the little republics of Central America, Nicaragua has enlisted our peculiar interest, because her territory contains the logical route for the second isthmian canal which some day will be built. Here also the foreign bogey has appeared, and here, from 1893 to 1910, its designs were facilitated by the rule of the infamous tyrant-dictator Zelaya, a sort of prince of desperadoes, who for seventeen years terrorized, exploited, robbed, blackmailed and murdered his countrymen, executed citizens of the United States, kept neighboring governments in a turmoil of apprehension and ruined the country by concessions to foreigners, pledging her resources for loans which he and his henchmen squandered until, when the blight of his presence was at length removed, Nicaragua lay helpless to meet the claims of the European Powers which were at her throat demanding immediate compliance. Only our intervention and our promise that she would meet her obligations saved her and, at the instance of her own rulers, experts from the United States undertook the

rehabilitation of her government and finances. A new revolutionary outbreak led to the landing of marines to keep the peace. Our financiers, with justifiable caution, declined to risk considerable sums in the country without positive assurance that no more financial orgies of the Zelaya brand would be staged there; and, to furnish them the necessary guarantees and for the good of all concerned, the United States and Nicaragua concluded a treaty in 1915, by which we placed \$3,000,000 to her credit in safe banks, and received in return a perpetual right to build and maintain an interoceanic canal by the Nicaragua route and a ninety-nine year, renewable lease of the Corn Islands, guarding the Atlantic terminus, and the Bay of Fonseca, the Pacific gateway of the proposed new "ditch."

Prospects of similar salutary tutelage over Honduras and Salvador have so far miscarried, but the future may well hold further responsibilities for us in Central America.

It must be clear that the key to our "imperial" policy, including our salvage of shipwrecked American states and our brandishing of the Monroe Doctrine in the faces of foreign nations, is our concern to safeguard, for the sake of our interests, territorial, commercial and strategic, in the canal and its neighborhood, the principal avenues of approach to Panama and to the Gulf of Mexico. This is a perfectly justifiable purpose, at which no fair minded individual or nation can cavil, and which, indeed, we would be absurdly shortsighted to

neglect. The same motives lie behind our latest Caribbean venture, the purchase of the Danish Islands, of which St. Thomas and St. John, with the roadstead between them, constitute potentially what one expert has termed an "American Gibraltar," the most formidable stronghold and naval base in the entire Caribbean. The eternal presence of the German cloven hoof appears in the facts that German influence defeated our attempts to purchase these islands sixteen years ago, and that at the outbreak of the world war the Hamburg-American (German) steamship corporation had established at St. Thomas a system of docks, coal depots and other properties which quite exceeded the requirements of a mere commercial headquarters.

Indeed, an explanation of our recent activities in Haiti cannot neglect the circumstances that, when the war began, that republic was, to employ the phrase of an authority, "practically a German commercial sphere," and that German designs on Mole St. Nicholas, a position dominating the important Windward Passage and blanketing our naval station at Guantanamo, Cuba, were well understood. Nor, in our interest in Santo Domingo, could we have ignored the existence of Samaná Bay, on its northeast coast, an inland sea twenty-five miles long and ten miles wide, flanked by high ridges, its mouth protected by a coral reef broken by channels from twelve to twenty fathoms deep leading to a great deep water roadstead twelve by eight miles in extent, capable of holding all the navies

of the world with room to spare, flanking the Mona Passage, and second only to the Danish Islands in strategic importance.

We cannot regard as least among the advantages which the great European war has brought to us our escape from the normal consequences of our improvidence and ineptitude in the past and our success, through taking advantage of Germany's distractions elsewhere, in breaking her tightening clutch upon the doorways of our trade and the natural defences of our coast. Never were the ministrations of that Providence which is said to protect babies and the United States more charitably in evidence; and, by its salutary interposition, backed by the sobering and impelling lessons of the war itself, we are in a fair way to repair our old fences, build new ones and secure the necessary preemptions to safeguard our national preserves against designing squatters from overseas, whose utter lack of scruples is offset by an abnormal penchant for acquisitiveness.

Our belated awakening to the importance of Latin America to our national future appears not only in the spheres of politics and strategy, but in that of commerce as well. Since the war began we have devoted a really remarkable amount of energy and intelligence to the promotion of our business relations with her. For years her markets had been in bitter dispute principally between England and Germany, with

the United States a comparatively weak contender, except in the Caribbean region, where we have had distinct interests and advantages, and, to a less extent, in Brazil, the bulk of whose coffee crop has come to us.

The "Open Sesame" for Europe's business with Latin America has been her heavy investment in Latin American projects—in national securities to some extent, but particularly in public utilities and private construction works—railroads, lighting and power plants, irrigation and mining projects, and the like. England has long been the world's chief lender. When the war broke out, her interests in Latin America were reckoned at \$4,000,000,000, Germany and France following with about \$1,000,000,000 each, and the United States figuring insignificantly.

"Trade follows the loan" has become a commercial axiom. The pouring of immense quantities of England's surplus wealth into South America created huge credits in her favor, credits which South America, poorly supplied with ready capital, discharged by shipping raw products to England—an arrangement which pleased and profited both parties. English money invested in construction projects went in on an understanding that the material used in the work should come from English factories, and so an ever increasing demand for English goods was created. Moreover, English subsidized utilities advanced civilization and pros-

perity, prosperity created additional wealth, and additional wealth meant more purchasing power for the absorption of English exports. The readiness of English capitalists to lend to South America established ties of mutual interest, confidence and good will, which someone has called the "immovable foundation of a commercial edifice," and which have stood England in good stead on more than one occasion. It has been said that one of her strongest assets in maintaining herself so well against the fierce competition of Germany has been the feeling of regard and gratitude current among South Americans to the country whose sympathy and aid contributed most toward placing their feet upon the ladder of progress.

The commercial nations of Europe, thoroughly organized financially, with a surplus of money for investment (for which few attractive opportunities appeared in their own highly developed countries), manufacturing in excess of their needs and requiring raw products for their factories and food for their people from foreign sources, were ideally prepared for exactly the opportunities offered by South America. In the United States, on the other hand, the demand for capital to develop our seemingly inexhaustible resources has been, until recently, far in excess of the supply available for use. Furthermore, most of the products we have had for export, such as grains, meat and the like, have been exactly those which the South Americans

themselves produce; in a word, there has been no great natural incentive to exchange between nations both with a surplus of raw materials and both with a market for manufactured goods. And, in the years just before the war, when certain of our manufactures had reached a volume that made exporting profitable and desirable, we found the European exporters firmly established among peoples naturally conservative in trade relations and inclined to continue the old, satisfactory business connections, and fortified by a financial organization so elaborate and formidable as to discourage attack.

The most baffling element in the situation for the United States has been that even those South American commodities in demand in this country (such as Brazil's coffee) have not paid for our goods consumed in South America, but, ironically enough, for the goods of our foreign rivals. In her financial relations with Europe, South America has regularly found herself on the debit side of the ledger, her obligations depending partly on imports of European goods, but considerably, also, on interest due on Europe's immense investments in her securities. On the other hand, her trade balance with the United States has been as regularly favorable to her, with no counter claims to offset it. In other words, she has constantly owed money to England, for example, and has had money due her from the United States. Obviously, she has used her credits to pay her debts, and instead of spending the money we have owed her

in this country for United States goods, she has handed it over to England in discharge of obligations to her. This triangle of trade, as one writer has called it, "operates effectively to siphon gold from this country, and by this method the more we buy the more we add to the selling power of our competitors."

The greatest asset which European exporters have had in their battle for America's trade has been their banking system, and its effectiveness appears the more by comparison with the primitive methods which have obtained until recently in this country. Of this system, the keystone is the bill of exchange on London. This bill, drawn, of course, in pounds sterling, has become the currency of the world. The ready demand for it everywhere, based on England's supremacy as the centre of the world's wealth and as the greatest buyer and seller, as well as the greatest lender of surplus capital, has made it the medium of international exchange, the cheapest and most marketable commercial paper in existence, "preferred to gold because transferable with greater rapidity, less risk and loss." Thus a merchant in the United States, owing an Argentine exporting house for a shipment of goods, has liquidated his indebtedness by a bill on London and has been under the necessity of paying tribute to English banks in the form of commissions and exchange. "Millions of bags of coffee imported into the United States annually pay a toll of five to six cents a bag in commissions on drafts."

A constant difficulty in selling to South American merchants has been their demand for long term credits. They have an excellent reputation for conscientiousness and reliability, but they do business under conditions which make it impossible for them to discharge their obligations with the promptness to which merchants in the United States have been accustomed. Capital is not as plentiful in South as in North America. Many of the customers are poor natives whose purchasing power is slight and who depend on the merchants to carry accounts for them in anticipation of their crops, which must be harvested before they can pay. The high duties and freight charges on shipments to South America often compel importers to buy goods in larger quantities than they can dispose of promptly and to carry them for long periods, thus tying up their money in stock on hand.

European business has met these conditions in two ways. In the first place, branches of the big British and German banks located in the principal South American cities, with the revenues of the parent banks behind them, have been able to grant the desired credits at lucrative rates of interest to local firms purchasing of British and German merchants, whose standing they have investigated and found satisfactory. Until the passage of the Federal Reserve act in 1913, our banks were not permitted to establish foreign branches, and our exporters were compelled to take the entire burden of credit on their own shoulders.

Another handicap enjoyed by Europeans has been the use of acceptances. By this device, a British exporter who had sold goods in South America might draw upon his South American customer at any number of days sight, forwarding his draft with the shipping documents (bill of lading, etc.) to a British branch bank in the consignee's locality. Upon acceptance (*i.e.*, endorsement) of the draft by the latter, who thus bound himself to honor it at maturity, the bill of lading was delivered to him, enabling him to secure the goods. The draft was sold in the market and, when it matured, was paid by the consignee. Meanwhile, the exporter had received his money at once from the central bank, and everybody was happy. The enormous advantage possessed by a manufacturer who could command such resources in dealing with countries where credit is king measures the difference between a British or German merchant and an American before the Federal Reserve act legalized the discounting of acceptances by American banks.

In fact, until the great war brought the nations of the world to our doors, gold bags in hand, competing with one another for the privilege of purchasing our wares at our own prices, it could hardly be said that we had more than a superficial acquaintance with the science of foreign trade. Let business be poor at home and our manufacturers unable to dispose of their products to our own citizens, and a temporary and somewhat bewildered plunge into

the foreign market might be made to tide over the situation, but, with the return of better times, the extended hand has usually been withdrawn, old connections resumed and the disappointed new customer left to exercise his vocabulary at the expense of American business methods and to form emphatic resolutions for the future with "never again!" as their major theme. True, our shipments abroad have been far from contemptible, but hitherto a large proportion of them has consisted of natural products that practically sold themselves and of articles manufactured by great corporations having the resources to create new markets.

While our money was finding profitable employment at home, Europeans were building up gigantic, intricately organized agencies for buying, selling and carrying the commodities in which they were dealing, calculated to discourage the enterprising American *entrepreneur*, not only by preoccupation of the territory and by their very vastness, but also because, under their laws, they were able to combine with one another for increased efficiency and power and to rely upon the active support of great systems of banks equipped with foreign branches and of their governments as well to provide them with every possible resource in the struggle for trade supremacy.

England, perennial reservoir of surplus capital and pioneer among manufacturing nations, has long been the giant in the foreign field, but, in the years preceding the war, it was the phe-

nomenal rise of Germany that astonished the world. Everybody knows the story of the cartels, those vast unions of manufacturing interests which have determined the character of German industrial life, forcing down the prices of raw products which they require by playing off rival producers against each other, raising the cost of their goods at home at their own sweet will, and crushing competition abroad by selling at a lower price in Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro than the buyer in Berlin pays for the same article, protected from assault from without by high tariff walls and preferential rates on railroads, and rendering emulation more hopeless by agreements with steamship lines regarding freight rates, routes and space for cargoes.

It is not only that these monsters of coordinated efficiency have squatted defiantly before the golden fleece of American commerce, but Jason, in the person of the ambitious competitor from the United States, has had no suitable weapon with which to dislodge them. It was torn from his hand before he had sought to use it when, in 1890, our Congress, responding to the public hostility to the great trusts—similar monsters native to our own soil, which were believed to be crushing freedom of competition in American business— forbade, by the Sherman act, combinations in restraint of trade not only among the several States but with foreign nations as well. Perhaps, as has been sometimes asserted, the legislators who framed this im-

portant measure did not intend it to operate to render American exporters, who refrained from illegal combinations at home, powerless to meet their foreign rivals abroad with their own weapons; but probable intent is hardly a dependable argument before a court of law, the plain wording of the act has remained to stare our exporters in the face and the potentialities of the cartels have gone far toward reducing them to a philosophical resignation.

An American business man, experienced in the foreign field, has given convincing testimony to the cartels' efficiency. There are in Germany, he estimates, thirty thousand associations of one sort or another, dealing with foreign trade alone. These are frequently "subsidiary creations of great financial institutions which dictate their general policies and cause them closely to conform to those of the Government. In turn the community of interest of these institutions greatly strengthens the position of the industrial system of the German Empire and makes their constituent members most effective factors in securing business abroad. Two powerful banking groups dominate and direct the operations of practically all large corporations, such as steamship lines, shipbuilding plants, mines and steel works, arms and ammunition works, electrical manufactories, electro-chemical establishments, etc. This network of connections between German financial interests and German industries has ramifications which extend throughout the world. So,

for example, we find in the chief cities of the Argentine and Chile railway, lighting and power enterprises, financed by German banks, large shareholders in the corporations which have supplied all the materials of construction.”

Not only have we lacked the banking facilities and cooperative organization on which our rivals in trade have relied; we have lacked also American bottoms in which to transport our goods. Our merchant marine was, from various economic reasons, practically driven from the seas in the 1850s. Since then our supply of shipping for foreign trade has been relatively nil and we have been compelled to rely largely on the service that European carriers have been willing to allow us for our Latin American trade. While it appears that this service has been, on the whole, adequate to the trade, and that American shippers have not been systematically mulcted in freight rates, as has sometimes been alleged, the explanation may lie in the fact that, until recently, American competition has been too insignificant to disturb European serenity. Now that it has become a potent factor in the field, it is a bit disquieting to reflect that, when peace is concluded, it may be at the mercy of the great government subsidized European lines which in the past have controlled the foreign carrying business by means of categorical agreements known as “conferences” in which English, German and other companies have joined, dividing the territory among themselves, fixing rates of transportation, pooling their earnings and ad-

ministering a system of rebates to crush interlopers. Under the rebate arrangement, a South American exporter who signs and observes an annual contract to send all his goods by the conference line is entitled, at the end of the year, to a rebate of ten per cent. on his shipments. What makes the conference most formidable to American competition is the fact that the South American shipper must depend upon it for his shipments to Europe as well as to the United States and realizes that a single cargo forwarded to New York in an American freighter will deprive him of both his European and American rebates for the year and may permanently lose him the use of conference bottoms. Consequently, to have any chance of success in a battle with the conference for the South American carrying trade, projected American lines would be under the necessity of maintaining European as well as American connections and routes, in the face of rivals already firmly established, assured of the support of their governments in the form of subsidies and other perquisites, and of carrying into the contest impedimenta in the form of higher cost of ships built in this country, unintelligent restrictions placed on shipping by Congress and an attitude toward our merchant marine on the part of the American people which, for charity's sake, may be described as indifference.

One could go on indefinitely multiplying more or less familiar explanations of our failure in the contest for the South American field: lack

of cooperation between the Government and business; the disinclination of our merchants, whose experience and success have been gained at home, to take the trouble to understand and adapt themselves to the business methods, needs and etiquette of a people whose conditions of life and point of view differ markedly from their own; American ignorance of the geography, history and institutions of the southern continent; a fatal disposition to patronize and urge rather than to fraternize and persuade; a dearth of high grade salesmen possessing the social adaptability, culture and *savoir faire* so important to the Latin, and conversant with the languages of the countries to which they are sent; and, finally, the absence of any considerable number of immigrants from the United States to create a demand for our goods. It will, however, be more profitable and stimulating to inquire what Uncle Sam has done to atone for his past sins of omission and to measure up to the superb opportunities for new friendships, new markets, increased helpfulness and enhanced profits which the great war has created for him.

On the whole, the record is one to make us proud of the breadth of view, efficiency and adaptability of our people. In estimating it, we must remember that economically the war has been the greatest disturbance in history and that, excepting the belligerents who have been actually overwhelmed by the military forces of their enemies, no nations were more immediately hurt by it than those of South America.

Here were partially developed and dependent countries suddenly deprived not only of a large part of the manufactured commodities, necessities as well as luxuries, on which they had been accustomed to rely (Germany alone had furnished them with about twenty per cent. of their imports, and figures do not begin to tell the whole story, because in many cheap and important articles of daily use, especially by the poorer classes, German goods commanded practically the entire market), while at the same time the European demand for their natural products decreased so greatly as to diminish their purchasing power to the point where fundamental readjustments in habits of life were demanded; the ships on which they had depended for carrying their exports and imports ceased to visit their harbors; the vast sums which had come almost unsought from Europe for investment in their public and private enterprises were now absorbed at home, necessitating the suspension or abandonment of wealth producing development projects; and the resources of credit which had been an un-failing antidote for their lack of capital were cut off almost without warning. The whole continent passed through a crisis which varied in intensity in the several countries in accordance with the closeness of their reliance on Europe and with the soundness of their financial institutions; and while the allied nations, notably England, showed an admirable fidelity to their South American connections and an extraordi-

nary ability, under the circumstances, to continue their trade relations at something like their normal level, it was the United States that saved the situation.

The record appears in a nutshell in the accompanying table, the export figures affording striking evidence of South America's slump in purchasing capacity in the early period of the war and her subsequent recovery as she adjusted herself to the new conditions.

TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES.

| Country | <i>Imports.</i> | | | |
|----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 1913 | 1914 | 1915 | 1916 |
| Argentina. \$ | 25,576,000 | \$ 56,274,000 | \$ 94,678,000 | \$116,293,000 |
| Bolivia. . . . | 398 | 172 | 33,000 | 209,000 |
| Brazil. . . . | 100,948,000 | 95,001,000 | 120,099,000 | 132,067,000 |
| Chile. . . . | 29,554,000 | 24,239,000 | 37,284,000 | 82,124,000 |
| Colombia. . . | 15,714,000 | 17,548,000 | 19,820,000 | 25,645,000 |
| Ecuador. . . | 3,453,000 | 3,356,000 | 5,417,000 | 7,976,000 |
| Guiana, B. | 98,000 | 223,000 | 266,000 | 1,065,000 |
| Guiana, D. | 813,000 | 1,035,000 | 624,000 | 1,075,000 |
| Guiana, F. | 32,000 | | 47,000 | 34,000 |
| Paraguay. | 67,000 | 61,000 | 29,000 | 51,000 |
| Peru. . . . | 10,825,000 | 11,270,000 | 15,804,000 | 31,083,000 |
| Uruguay. . . | 1,861,000 | 9,597,000 | 13,889,000 | 16,277,000 |
| Venezuela. | 9,309,000 | 10,917,000 | 14,292,000 | 13,711,000 |
| Total. . . | \$198,259,000 | \$229,520,000 | \$322,282,000 | \$427,610,000 |
| | <i>Exports.</i> | | | |
| | 1913 | 1914 | 1915 | 1916 |
| Argentina. \$ | 54,980,000 | \$27,128,000 | \$ 52,841,000 | \$ 76,874,000 |
| Bolivia. . . . | 960,000 | 806,000 | 964,000 | 1,888,000 |
| Brazil. . . . | 39,901,000 | 23,276,000 | 33,953,000 | 47,679,000 |
| Chile. . . . | 16,617,000 | 13,628,000 | 17,816,000 | 33,383,000 |
| Colombia. . . | 7,647,000 | 5,784,000 | 9,004,000 | 14,287,000 |
| Ecuador. . . | 2,882,000 | 2,504,000 | 3,368,000 | 5,005,000 |
| Guiana, B. | 1,630,000 | 1,813,000 | 1,908,000 | 2,544,000 |
| Guiana, D. | 732,000 | 655,000 | 587,000 | 861,000 |
| Guiana, F. | 319,000 | 282,000 | 535,000 | 493,000 |
| Paraguay. | 215,000 | 83,000 | 53,000 | 86,000 |
| Peru. . . . | 7,609,000 | 5,876,000 | 7,917,000 | 13,986,000 |
| Uruguay. . . | 7,617,000 | 4,153,000 | 7,889,000 | 11,851,000 |
| Venezuela. | 5,462,000 | 5,024,000 | 7,295,000 | 11,337,000 |
| Total. . . | \$146,515,000 | \$91,013,000 | \$144,129,000 | \$220,288,000 |

Figures are usually dry reading, but these are not without romance, and when one considers the chaos produced in South America by the war, they take on an added glamor. Complete statistics for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, are not yet available, but those for the first nine months are inspiring testimony that our campaign gains in momentum as Latin America recovers her equilibrium. Between July 1, 1916, and March 31, 1917, we exchanged with her \$1,070,000,000 in commodities (U. S. exports, \$420,000,000; imports, \$650,000,000), as compared with \$798,000,000 (exports, \$294,000,000; imports, \$504,000,000) for the same period in 1916 and \$554,000,000 in 1914, the last year of peace. An expert estimates that, if the last three months of the recent fiscal year hold their normal relation to the others, our Latin American trade will aggregate \$1,500,000,000, or nearly three times what it was in the year before the war. Most of this increase means new business with South America, to which we supplied thirty-three per cent. of her imports in 1916 as compared with fifteen per cent. before the war. Percentages are far more significant than aggregates in dollars, for, of course, soaring war prices account for a good part of the increase in the latter.

What, now, of the time when the war shall be over? Shall we be able to retain the enviable position into which the embarrassments of Europe have thrust us, shall we hold and improve our advantages as growing Latin Amer-

ica's business associate, customer and backer and establish permanently the foundations of Pan-American economic solidarity and self-sufficiency, or will our rivals, entering the field of their former victories with greater determination than ever, succeed in ignominiously expelling us?

Certainly there is no lack of indications that we are not to maintain our ground without a struggle. Experts have pointed out that, since the war began, England has made greater strides in industrial efficiency than in fifteen or twenty-five years previously; that, as regards her South American trade, despite the tremendous demands on her wealth and her productive agencies, the diversion of her ships from their accustomed uses and the menace of the submarines, she has now been able to bring her exports close to ante-bellum figures; and that, when peace is declared, far from abdicating her sovereignty over the world's trade, she will appear in the lists rearmed, rejuvenated and more formidable than ever.

Germany's attitude finds characteristic expression in a recent pamphlet by Dr. Paul Gast of Aix-la-Chapelle, which is of peculiar interest as indicating how slowly Teutonic obsessions yield to the logic of events:

"It is in our interest to further this anti-Yankee spirit [in South America], for under no circumstances can we tolerate a political predominance of the United States in this virgin economic soil. . . . Even this war, and our justi-

fied hatred of the Entente Powers, must not blind us to the fact that Germany's greatest danger in South America, so indispensable for our economic future, is not symbolized by the Union Jack, but by the Stars and Stripes. . . . Happily, the commercial beverage offered to the South Americans by the Yankee does not agree with their stomachs. It is not only the bitter Panama and Mexico after-taste which spoiled the digestion. The Yankee's prices are high, he insists on cash on delivery, and, what is of still more importance, he cannot adapt himself, as we Germans do, to the idiosyncrasies of the foreign customer. If Uncle Sam really wants to dislodge us from our solid positions there, he will have to use persistent trench warfare instead of old time cavalry attacks; not weeks and months, but decades are necessary to smash to pieces our cemented industrial dugouts. . . . We wish to impress upon the world at large, and the United States in particular, that Germany, this world Power, with its dense population, its eagerness for work, its financial strength, carries on this bloody war unflinchingly, because it is borne on by the inspiring knowledge that it is its duty to create for its future generations a free field for a world embracing activity, and that, consequently, it cannot suffer it that the countries of Latin America, one-seventh of the earth's surface, with their natural treasures and progressive population, be closed to the influence of the German spirit, of German labor. We insist upon fair play in

the South American field, not for nebulous purposes, but for the sake of our own well understood future."

A French writer tells of such recent developments as the formation of a "Hispano-Germanic Society" to facilitate relations between German and Spanish speaking peoples, of an "Economic Committee" and of various other societies to resume and develop German-American social and business connections, and the energetic use of the press in German interests. Moreover, the disconcerting activity of Japan in developing new ship lines and in greatly increasing her emigration to South America introduces an added complication into an already perplexing problem.

But, whatever the final outcome, it is safe to predict that the United States will never again be relegated to the position in South American trade which she occupied three years ago, for the simple reason that our business men and our Government have not been content merely to picnic upon the new ground, but have proceeded to fortify themselves so effectively that much of it, at least, is bound to remain permanently in their possession. In fact, it is not fair to them to intimate that they waited until the upheaval in Europe did their foundation work for them, for, before that event, an intelligent beginning had been made. Still, one needs only mention that the American Manufacturers' Export Association and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, our nationwide

conferences of business interests, devoted to the study of problems of trade and the education of Congress and the country to its needs, are but some six years old; that the Department of Commerce at Washington, our governmental auxiliary to private enterprise, first appeared as a separate executive bureau in 1913; and that the National Foreign Trade Council, a committee of our ablest business men pledged to the promotion of "greater national prosperity through greater foreign trade," and particularly of the welfare of the small manufacturer, antedates the war by only three months, to suggest how lately American business has sufficiently appreciated the importance of cooperative effort to take the trouble to practice it. Local enterprise has gone hand in hand with the larger organizations, and the early months of the war were characterized by the formation or rejuvenation of merchants' and manufacturers' organizations and of "get together" measures of every description, with Latin America for their field of operation. One of our big express companies, sending representatives to South America to study opportunities for its own business, offered the services of these experts to investigate openings for its patrons, and promptly received seven hundred letters bespeaking the proffered aid.

Of all the harbingers of happier days for inter-American trade, none has brought more satisfaction to our exporters than two sections in the Federal Reserve act, the first authorizing

national banking institutions with a capital of \$1,000,000 or more to establish branch banks abroad, the other permitting branch banks, under certain restrictions, to discount acceptances based on the importation or exportation of goods. In signing this bill, the President swept away with a stroke of his pen some of the most formidable obstructions that have seemed completely to block the path of our commerce. It is enough to distinguish the act that it destroys, once for all, the absolute sway in international trade of the bill on London, and with it the tribute exacted from us by English financiers. Henceforth, branches of powerful United States banks located in Latin America can sell drafts on their head institutions in dollars instead of in pounds sterling, and since these will save the extra interest and commissions charged on foreign bills, they will be cheapest for American business. The bill on London is firmly intrenched in the world's markets and there is no expectation of ousting it, but there is every indication that, with the appearance of our banks in foreign fields and the expansion of our trading relations, dollar exchange will supplant sterling exchange in inter-American transactions. Moreover, in times of stress like the present, when sterling exchange is disorganized, the dollar may well provide the ballast to keep the ship of world finance on an even keel.

That the promotion of dollar exchange will be but one of the many advantages we may ex-

pect from our branch banks in Latin America is manifest from an interesting statement by Mr. James H. Perkins, Vice-President of the National City Bank of New York (the first American bank to take advantage of the new opportunities for profit and patriotic service created by the Federal Reserve act, and now maintaining branches in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Santos, Sao Paulo, Valparaiso and Havana), in an article in the *World's Work*. He speaks thus of the activities of his institution:

“The bank will furnish the facilities which are generally supplied by branch banks everywhere; that is, they will accept deposits, issue letters of credit, handle collections and deal in exchange. The operations of the branches will create a market for the American dollar with the result that gradually direct exchange will become a fact between South America and the United States. Under the Federal Reserve Act, national banks may make acceptance of long time bills growing out of foreign commercial transactions. This provision creates an opportunity for an American bill to be developed similar to the best known financial instrument, the London bill, which is now the chief medium in the world's commerce. The ‘bill’ is now a ‘sterling’ instrument. It will be possible under the new order to draw an increasing number of such bills in dollars instead of pounds, and the world market for the dollar should be enlarged to a point where it will take a prominent place

in international exchange. Direct transfers by cable of funds from the branch to the parent bank, or from the parent bank to any bank in the United States and vice versa, will become possible with the minimum of expense. Gradually a broad discount market for American bills will be developed and will undoubtedly go a long way toward encouraging the use of the draft on New York instead of on London in settlement of international transactions.

“The gathering of credit information will be one of the most important functions of the bank. As rapidly as possible the branches will collect reliable credit information concerning South American business and will at the same time be in a position to give the South American business people correct credit information about the people with whom they have transactions in the United States. . . .

“There will be attached to each branch one or more commercial representatives, who in a broad sense may be said to be the personal representatives of American business interests. These men will study trade conditions in the country to which they are assigned and will form cooperative relations with the foreign business men who are interested in the commerce of this country. They will thus be in a position to act as intermediaries and will be able to assist the representatives of American business interests who visit South America. They will look for trade opportunities and when such opportunities arise will communicate with

the foreign trade department of the bank, which will be in a position to indicate these opportunities to the interested business organizations here. They will, furthermore, be in a position to make investigation of the possibilities for particular articles in the market, and, when an exhaustive investigation along some technical line is required, to employ a technical representative who will be competent and reliable. Many firms have already asked that preliminary investigations of this kind be made, and in numerous instances requests have been made that the representatives purchase various articles in the original package to be sent to the American manufacturer so that he may not only ascertain the character and quality of the article but the way the article is prepared for market, packed, labelled, etc. The commercial representative will also be able to give information regarding refused shipments, custom house delays, etc., and in other ways will be of assistance in smoothing out difficulties that are encountered by the exporter."

The National City Bank also maintains a valuable library of trade statistics, government reports and general literature useful to exporters, issues frequent summaries of the latest news from the South American field, publishes and distributes gratis an excellent monthly magazine, *The Americas*, and, in cooperation with leading educational institutions, is preparing selected young men by a thorough and systematic business education for positions in its foreign departments.

Entirely aside from mere considerations of dollars and cents, one would search far to find a business organization administered with loftier imagination, greater constructive ability and a more profound conception of public service than this. Other American banking and mercantile houses have followed the shining example, and with encouraging success, although it was well understood at the start that big returns from South America could not be expected immediately and that establishments there were in the nature of bread cast upon the waters. They are a new generation of American pioneers, opening new regions for fresh achievements of American genius. Business follows them into the channels they have explored, and its triumphs will constitute their reward and their monument.

Among the most important services to be rendered by our banks and business establishments in South America will be that of opening the door for the investment of our capital in those countries. Here, again, the war has provided the stimulus. Not only has the usual supply of European money been cut off from them, not only have the governmental and private projects necessary to their progress been brought to a halt, not only have they turned to us for help in their distress, but the warring nations themselves, straining their resources to finance their monster war establishments and to discharge the heavy trade balance constantly mounting up against them through their purchases of our

manufactures and foodstuffs, first dumped their holdings of our own stock and bonds back upon us and, after we absorbed these, have followed them with South American securities. Thus Europe herself is thrusting us into her place as guarantor of South America's prosperity, and it has only remained for us to adapt ourselves to our new rôle.

That we have not been entirely averse to doing so is suggested by a recent estimate that, by the end of July, 1916, our investments in South America alone had risen from the very few millions ventured before the war to between \$750,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000, compared with British interests totalling something less than \$4,000,000,000. This sum, a surprising showing for a newcomer in the field, is made up partly of stocks and bonds turned over to us by Europe, partly of our own direct loans to governments and new purchases of securities and partly of actual property holdings by American interests, many of them acquired since the beginning of the war, such, for example, as the \$3,500,000 packing plant opened by Armour and Company at La Plata, Argentina, in 1915.

An outstanding milestone of progress is the American International Corporation of New York, a 1915 creation, capitalized at \$50,000,000, numbering among its stockholders many of our foremost manufacturers and dedicated to the promotion of our Latin American commercial relations. This remarkable organization not only labors for the development of inter-Amer-

ican trade, but locates and investigates opportunities for new investments and new business and construction enterprises in the southern countries. In connection with this latter phase of its activity, it maintains an expert engineering department to look into promising building and development projects and to advise interested American companies regarding them. While its primary object is to assist American business in Latin America rather than to seek advantages for itself, it is prepared, on occasion, to act directly and to seize opportunities that might otherwise redound to the advantage of our rivals. For example, it purchased the fleet of the Pacific Mail Company to save our west coast carrying trade from complete absorption by Japan. Recently it was reported to have taken the important contract for the extension of the port of Buenos Aires.

Our Government, responding, doubtless, to the inspiring activity of private enterprises, has ranged itself by their side in the battle. Without attempting to detail the official agencies now at the disposal of American business, one may mention the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce, with its special Latin American division; the *Daily Consular and Trade Reports*, providing exporters with the latest intelligences from abroad; and an efficient system, developed by Secretary Redfield, of regular commercial attachés to collect data and furnish advice, special agents to travel wherever needed to study local condi-

tions, and offices in our principal cities, manned by trained experts, to disseminate information to interested parties—all this in addition to our increasingly capable consular service. Indeed, it may be said that the executive branch of our Government is employing every means in its power, under our present laws, to give American business the sort of support which it has always had to do without and which its European competitors have counted on as a matter of course.

The men who have shown themselves so apt to seize the chances which the great war afforded our country have been no less fertile in constructive suggestions for meeting the assault upon our newly established positions which Europe is sure to make when she is again free to do so. If, for example, our commercial resources are not coordinated to match the collective efficiency of the great European business combinations such as the German cartels, the fault is not with them, for the Webb bill, designed to facilitate that very result by legalizing associations “entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade” and agreements made by them, provided neither the association nor the agreement operates “in restraint of trade within the United States” or “in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor,” is before Congress, projected and indorsed by commercial conventions and organizations throughout the country. Some

opposition to it has developed, principally from the fear that powerful cooperative instrumentalities, fostered under its cloak, will find a way to attack and stifle competitors at home and bring back, in a new guise, all the old evils of the trusts from which the Sherman act was designed to emancipate us; but its sponsors point to the powers of our Federal Trade Commission as entirely adequate to detect such tendencies and invoke the law against them.

The Webb bill does not, of course, invest our trade with the whole arsenal of weapons possessed by the cartels, but it does at least go as far toward giving American enterprise a fighting chance as our democratic instincts will tolerate, while at the same time safeguarding the welfare of the home consumer, which the German system has conspicuously failed to do.

For an American merchant marine, also, much has been done. The enforced withdrawal of European bottoms from the world's trade turned our shipyards into hives of industry. The menace of Germany's submarine campaign to our own security and the future of democracy brought us into the war and focussed our energies, governmental and private, upon the building of ships. Congress passed laws removing some of the most obvious impediments to the registry of ships under our flag and created our already rather painfully notorious Shipping Board, which, now that it has been pared and patted into harmony, may be expected to give us a great fleet of steel or wooden vessels or both,

which will be available, so far as they survive the war, to support our prestige on the seas. By an ironical perversion of German dreams, her vast overseas commerce has ceased to be and many of her mightiest "sea leviathans" have gone to swell the resources of her enemies. *Sic transit gloria maris.*

Experts say that the time honored belief that American ships cannot be built to compete with Europe on account of the excessive cost of construction in this country has become a mere bugaboo. Already we are able to produce the necessary materials, such as ship plates and shapes, more cheaply than Europe, and the high wages paid to American labor, though a severe handicap, may be offset, it is contended, by the same system of standardization (*i.e.*, specialization by each shipyard in particular sizes and types of ships) which our manufacturers have applied with such success to making automobiles. A more serious problem is the cost of operation, embarrassed as it is by existing laws, notably those secured by "friends of labor" which prevent the employment of cheap alien seamen on our ships. If Congress and—what is more important—the people can be induced to turn their attention to a thorough study of the value and needs of our merchant marine, there is hope for the future.

With such encouragements may we not believe that our commerce with Latin America, despite the competition of Europe, will not suffer too severely from the coming of peace?

What economic conditions will then appertain it is impossible to predict with certainty. Europe's immediate demands for our help in her upbuilding will, of course, prove irresistibly tempting to our capital. But the war has already accustomed us to enormous extension of credits and enormous production, and we should now be in a position to satisfy Europe's requirements without sacrificing our promising relations with our new business friends to the southward. True, our transactions with them now appear insignificant by comparison with our sales and loans to the warring nations, but, in normal times, Europe will not need our manufactured goods or our money, while Latin America will continue increasingly to demand both. Europe is destined to be our rival economically, Latin America our auxiliary. Our great surplus of natural products, which has constituted the bulk of our exports, will constantly diminish as our population increases, until our multiplying factories will take up our supply of raw materials and our workers will consume our foods; while South America, unsuited, generally speaking, to the development of manufactures, is the world's unexploited treasure trove of natural resources. Both as sellers of finished commodities and as buyers of raw products, Europe and the United States will be competitors and Latin America will be a principal battlefield. Is it rash to postulate that, in laying now the foundations of American economic interdependence, the United States is creating the surest guarantees for her future?

It is not, however, to mere considerations of politics and trade that we must look for light upon the future of inter-American relations. However strained and artificial may have been the motives that have determined the alliances of monarchs in the past, nations in the new world movement of democracy will come more and more to base their friendships upon common impulses, common sympathies, common beliefs and common ideals, upon mutual trust and confidence and esteem. Whether or not we move toward "that far off, divine event," "the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world," no student of the progress of humanity can escape the conclusion that it is to the peoples that the coming ages are to belong. It is upon what the peoples of the two Americas think of each other, not upon doctrines and made to order projects of amity, that their history will depend.

That the sentiments of the people of the United States toward our southern neighbors are those of hearty good will admits of no argument. If when in the early years of their independence they turned to us with naïve enthusiasm as their guide and mentor we lost our unique opportunity to win permanently their confidence and affection, our failure was due rather to faulty understanding than to defects of the heart. Failing to comprehend how dangerous to them was the compliment they had paid us in copying our intricate system of government, which nothing in their previous experience qualified them to administer, and ignorant,

or at least unappreciative, of the geographical, racial, social and economic obstacles which hindered their progress, our highly developed Anglo-Saxon sense of order and efficiency was outraged from the beginning by their apparent instability and hopeless futility in their political life; and, our own domestic problems claiming our whole attention, we turned from them with a pitying and helpless shake of our heads and, for some generations, seemed willing to return to them only when our selfish interests impelled us and, while continuing to wish them well and to pray for their salvation, were far too disposed to assume a rasping superiority that interpreted their interests in the light of our own.

Our Monroe Doctrine, while in practice it proved to be a protection to the weak Latin republics, was enunciated principally in our own selfish interest, its capricious application has been sufficient evidence that it has continued to be so interpreted, and its intangibility and elastic adaptability to every exigency has earned it the suspicion which must naturally attach to any force at once so great and so mysterious. Devoting our energies and our wealth to our own advancement, withholding from the Latin Americans the sympathy and encouragement, moral and material, which as sister democracies they felt they had some reason to expect, we occasionally showed our consciousness of their existence by growling over them when Europe seemed to cast an envious eye in their direction, or by administering a correcting slap

or a sharp word when they trod ever so lightly upon our toes. Worst of all, when many of them had successfully emerged from their period of trial, had set their feet on the road to national stability and had developed a just pride in their achievements and prospects, we persisted provincially in lumping them all together in our thought as a sort of simmering stew inseparably compounded of brawls and bankruptcy. Reading the absurd and amazing references to them in the public prints and in the debates in Congress, one wonders whether there may not have been some worthy citizens to whose mind they belonged in the category to which Justice Taney relegated Dred Scott, possessed of "no rights which a white man is bound to respect."

The last twenty years—called with some outward show of reason, but with little real appreciation of their spirit, the imperialistic era of the United States—have been remarkable for the change they have wrought in our knowledge of and interest in world affairs. With this new knowledge and interest has come understanding of Latin America, her spirit and aspirations, and a conception of Pan-American sympathy and service.

Unfortunately for us, our past sins of commission and omission now arise to plague us. We find too often that Latin Americans neither like nor trust us, and that we are under the painful necessity of proving to their satisfaction that our innocent appearing exterior is not a false covering hiding the wolf beneath. "Span-

ish America shows neither a surpassing inclination of friendship, nor an unlimited confidence" in the United States, says Professor Oliveira Lima of Brazil. "The Cuban war was started with an injustice to Spain; it led to the annexation of Porto Rico. The negotiations with Panama, which Senhor Roosevelt can explain much better than I, have only served to increase our apprehensions, which are that the results of American imperialism may be just as impartially destructive as those of European imperialism. . . . Pan-Americanism to us seems a mockery and impossible of realization. There is no racial, linguistic, traditional or religious community between 'Anglo-Saxon America' (or shall we say, with Bryce, 'Teutonic America'?) and Latin America. . . . True, we have sometimes interests and sentiments in common, which, properly agitated and played upon, may bring excellent results. 'Pan-Americanism' continues to represent the ideal of a single union, and as most of the various 'isms' is continually exhibited for the 'grand effect' on the people—its actual influence being somewhat less than that of a substantial, solid, silver dollar." Even more outspoken is Senor F. Garcia-Calderon of Peru. "To save themselves from Yankee imperialism," he declares, "the American democracies would almost accept a German alliance, or the aid of Japanese arms; everywhere the Americans of the North are feared. In the Antilles and in Central America hostility against the Anglo-Saxon invaders assumes the

character of a Latin crusade." "The opening of the Panama Canal," remarks a Colombian journalist, "will mark the date which our grandchildren will remember—perhaps with sorrow—when they shall see each of the states of Latin America represented by a little twinkle on the Stars and Stripes." A Mexican sociologist suggests that a conquest of the American tropics by the United States would supply her with the cereals which she needs in increasing quantities.

"Anti-Yanqui" clubs abound in Latin America. The press pays reiterated homage to North American "pigs" and "dollar diplomacy," and its notices of North American happenings too often consist of harrowing catalogues of lynchings, murders, divorces, graft, pork barrel politics and other public and private obliquities, conveying the impression that of such is Anglo-Saxon democracy. Cartoonists exhaust their ingenuity in maligning and deriding the United States, a favorite device being some variation of the theme of the Yankee fisherman, his line labelled "intervention," angling with gratifying success in the troubled sea of revolution.

Latin Americans never tire of quoting, with comments, Secretary Olney's famous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela affair of 1895: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." "Away, then, with this benevolent Monroe Doctrine!" exclaims one. "It is very far from a doctrine by which all

interests may be protected, or may be held equally sacred in all the countries it concerns. Instead of that, it is a doctrine of absorption, and annihilates the interests of the parties affected. . . . The Doctrine of Monroe is the shield and buckler of United States aggression; it is a sword suspended by a hair over the Latin continent." Instances in our history of callousness, of unscrupulous ambition and of disregard of the rights of weaker states are paraded unwearyingly, and too many Latin American republics harbor memories of indignities sustained at our hands. What, it is inquired, has the sentimental, spontaneous, generous Latin in common with the shrewd, calculating, cold blooded, dollar worshipping Yankee?

Fortunately there is a brighter side to the picture; fortunately there have been, north and south of the canal, philanthropists of sympathy and vision, believers in the essential brotherliness and benevolence of humanity, who, instead of scouring the past and the present for incentives to inter-American distrust and ill will, have devoted themselves to introducing the Americas to each other, on Charles Lamb's principle that one will not hate a man he knows well, and to preaching the gospel of confidence and cooperation.

Of late years these efforts have become general and more efficiently coordinated. Many of them are familiar to every citizen at all conversant with current happenings. The Pan-American Union, expressing its object in its

name, maintained by the twenty-one American republics in its palace in Washington, labors constantly for better acquaintance and comity between the Americas. Visits of distinguished citizens—statesmen, scientists and financiers—are exchanged. The year 1915 was signalized by the assembling of a Pan-American Financial Congress at Washington, presided over by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, to study financial questions of inter-American significance; and this body created a permanent "International High Commission," with a sub-committee in each American country, to canvass such subjects as uniformity of maritime laws, arbitration of commercial disputes, wireless communications and a postal congress. Since 1908, Pan-American scientific congresses of increasingly distinguished membership have assembled from time to time to listen to papers and to formulate policies on such widely divergent topics as anthropology, astronomy, conservation of natural resources, agriculture, irrigation, forestry, education, engineering, international law, public law, jurisprudence, mining and metallurgy, economic geology, applied chemistry, public health and medical science, transportation, commerce, finance and taxation. Eminent scholars have passed from continent to continent, giving courses on the history and economics of their countries in leading universities. Free scholarships have brought about the interchange of students. Periodicals are devoted to acquainting the American peoples

with each other's point of view. The daily press is awaking to its responsibilities in the campaign of education, witness the establishment of a reciprocal news service between our United Press and *La Nacion* of Argentina in 1916.

It is not, however, from sporadic protestations of amity by individuals or states that the Pan-American *rapprochement*, of which we are beginning to appreciate the value and the need, can come. Unions of the hearts of peoples, as distinct from the time serving, self seeking leagues of governments, predicate confidence, and confidence is born of deeds, not of words, and of deeds reflecting an inward spirit of charity, so consistent in its operation as not to degenerate into hypocrisy when self-interest is concerned. Latin Americans cannot be too much blamed if they have regarded incidents like the Mexican War and the acquisition of the Canal Zone as more solid evidences of the true meaning of the Monroe Doctrine than the platitudes of our public men at Pan-American banquets. If our physical proportions were those of the sparrow and Latin America's those of the hawk, and if in the past we had seen the sharpness of the big bird's talons demonstrated at the expense of other sparrows no larger than ourselves, we should have some difficulty in watching his flight in our direction with unruffled equanimity.

Happily for us, not all the weight in the scales is against us. The compelling motive behind our war with Spain was sympathy for suffering

peoples; our unexpected withdrawal from Cuba gained credit for our plighted word; our refusal to traffic in the recent misfortunes of Mexico has won us friends (for whatever mistakes our Administration may have made there, it has shown a conception of the moral obligation to forbearance resting on a strong Power in its relations with a weak one, and an appreciation of the relative importance of a letter of the law insistence on the personal and property rights of our citizen adventurers in Mexico on the one hand and an interminably exploited nation's struggles for more endurable conditions of life on the other); and our prompt acceptance of the proffered mediation of the A B C Powers in our Mexican imbroglio and our invitation to six Latin American states, including one from Central America, to join us in determining which of the contending factions in Mexico was worthy of recognition have accomplished more than rivers of rhetoric to make Pan-Americanism a reality. High minded men have found in this novel disposition of the United States to admit her neighbors to her counsels on American questions the key to a real and permanent *entente cordiale*.

One fact stands clearly forward for the guidance of those who are working toward that end. Pan-Americanism must be based on cooperation, not on tutelage. Many of the Latin American states have outgrown all need of leading strings and are ready to meet us, if at all, as equal sovereignties. If any one sentiment peculiarly

characterizes Latin Americans it is a lofty pride in their racial and national traditions, a keen sense of the meaning of democracy and of the dignity of independence. This is as true of the backward and turbulent little republics of Central America as of Argentina or Chile or Brazil. Someone has said with truth that they all prefer governing themselves, no matter how badly, to being governed by us, no matter how well. Our intercourse with them abounds in evidences that this is so. Only the other day the legislature of Porto Rico, in thanking us for the gift of citizenship in the United States, concluded its address with the pertinent suggestion that we logically complete the good work by conferring on them the boon of independence. A nation that has been brought up from infancy on the principle that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed" should not find as much difficulty as we have sometimes done in comprehending this state of mind. One senses a disquieting analogy between the air of condescending superiority with which we have too often offended our Latin friends and the Teutonic conception of a world civilizing "*Kultur.*"

The new watchword of cooperation finds expression in the recent utterances of many eminent North and South Americans, and in its name those of our neighbors who have given us their confidence are interpreting our principles to their countrymen.

Particularly interesting is the Latin discus-

sion of the Monroe Doctrine, for, as conducted in the new spirit of constructive rather than destructive criticism, it has helped us to clarify our own somewhat befogged conception of this ancient instrument, to recognize the accretions which have impaired its usefulness and to re-shape it as a vehicle for progressive Pan-Americanism.

Briefly, the Latin American formula for a purified, rejuvenated Monroe Doctrine may be summarized in the phrase, integrity and independence, both political and economic, for all the American states. It embodies, asserts Senor Alejandro Alvarez of Chile, "the aspirations, not merely of the United States, but of America as a whole, and has nothing in common with that policy of imperialism and hegemony . . . confined to the United States alone. . . . In truth, the Americans of the North apparently desire to assume, in certain quarters of the American continent, a patronage, a directorship, nay, a positive control, analogous to that recognized in Europe, especially regarding Oriental affairs, as appertaining to the Concert of the Powers. . . . Though it was framed by a President of the North American Republic, the Monroe Doctrine none the less corresponded to a principle and a necessity which were common to both Americas. . . . The Latin States regard every attack upon the freedom of a sister republic as an attempt upon their own." The Monroe Doctrine "is in fact a formula of independence," says Senor Luis M. Drago. "It

creates no obligations and no responsibilities between the nations of America, but simply calls upon all of them, with their own means and without foreign aid, to exclude from within their respective frontiers the jurisdiction of European Powers. Proclaimed by the United States in the interest of their own peace and security, the other republics of the continent have in their turn proceeded to adopt it with an eye alone to their own individual welfare and internal tranquillity. This moral consort of intentions and tendencies constitutes in itself alone a great force without need of treaties or formal alliances or definite obligations. Thus understood, the Monroe Doctrine, which in the end is nothing more than the expression of the will of the people to maintain their liberty, assures the independence of the states of that continent in respect to one another as well as in relation to the Powers of Europe." "In principle, the Monroe Doctrine is an essential article in the public code of the new world," is the opinion of Dr. Garcia-Calderon. "It is only the brutal expression of the doctrine, the cynical imperialism which is deduced from it, which becomes dangerous to the moral unity of the continent. The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing this doctrine from the future history of America, even when they criticize its excesses most severely." While the imperialistic ambitions of the United States have sacrificed the integrity of the Caribbean countries "toward South America its intervention deserves only

respect. The purely selfish interest of the United States evidently lay in the acceptance of war and anarchy, in accordance with the classical formula 'Divide and rule'; yet the United States has kept the peace. From Panama to the La Plata it is working for the union of the peoples and for civilization. Here, then, is an aspect of the Monroe Doctrine of perpetual usefulness: the struggle against the wars which threaten to ruin the New World, still poor and thinly populated—intervention with the olive branch. In stimulating the union of South American republics, the United States is at the same time protecting its own commercial interests, menaced by this perpetual turmoil. If its action were to halt there, if it renounced all territorial acquisition and set its face against all interference with the internal affairs of every state, the doctrine so often condemned would seem born anew and no one would dare to criticize its efficacy."

No point in the Latin American conception of the Monroe Doctrine finds more emphatic expression than that of its utter incompatibility with any spirit of imperialism or further extension of its territories by the United States. The discomfort of the sparrow in the presence of the hawk constantly appears. The imperialistic disposition on our part has been the chief ground of friction in the past, and, unless we abandon it, will continue to be so. As Senor A. de Manos-Albas puts it: "The means to accomplish unity of sentiment and to dispel the mis-

givings between the United States and the Latin American republics is not far to seek. It is only required to amplify the Monroe declaration to the full extent of its logical development. . . . If the United States should declare that the era of conquest on the American continent has been closed to all and forever, beginning with themselves, the brooding storm of distrust will disappear from the Latin American mind, and an international cordiality of incalculable possibilities will ensue, not only for the welfare of the American nations, but universally for the cause of freedom and democracy."

In so far as the utterances of our public men best qualified to voice the nation's will can reassure our friends to the southward, they have little cause for complaint, for the official pronouncements of this country's policy conform almost verbatim to the formula of the Latin writers. As long ago as 1906 Elihu Root declared to a South American audience: "We do not wish to win victories, we desire no territory but our own, nor a sovereignty more extensive than that which we desire to retain over ourselves. We consider that the independence and the equal rights of the smallest and weakest members of the family of nations deserve as much respect as those of the great empires. We pretend to no right, privilege or power that we do not freely concede to each one of the American republics." In the same spirit, ex-President Roosevelt said at Montevideo: "The Monroe Doctrine is in no sense a doctrine of one

sided advantage. . . . It should be invoked by our nations in a spirit of mutual respect, and on a footing of complete equality of both right and obligation. Therefore, as soon as any country of the New World stands on a sufficiently high footing of orderly liberty and achieved success, of self-respecting strength, it becomes a guarantor of the doctrine on a footing of complete equality, . . . so that," as regards such countries, "all that the United States has to do is to stand ready, as one of the great brotherhood of American nations, to join with them in upholding the doctrine, should they at any time desire, in the interest of the Western Hemisphere, that we should do so."

A notable address by Secretary of State Lansing before the Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington in 1915 contained these words: "I speak only for the Government of the United States, but in doing so I am sure that I express sentiments which will find an echo in every republic represented here when I say that the might of this country will never be exercised in a spirit of greed to wrest from a neighboring state its territory or possessions. The ambitions of this republic do not lie in the path of conquest, but in the paths of peace and justice. Whenever and wherever we can we will stretch forth a hand to those who need help. If the sovereignty of a sister republic is menaced from overseas, the power of the United States and, I hope and believe, the united power of the American republics will constitute a bulwark

which will protect the independence and integrity of their neighbors from unjust invasion or aggression. The American family of nations might well take for its motto that of Dumas's famous musketeers, 'One for all; all for one.' If I have correctly interpreted Pan-Americanism from the standpoint of the relation of our Government with those beyond the seas, it is in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy of the United States; Pan-Americanism is an international policy of the Americas."

As to the practical shape which this ideal of Pan-American cooperation is to take, there are difficulties. The dream of a tribunal, in which all the nations of the two continents, varying extremely in size, civilization and responsibility, shall be equally represented, invested with full power to hear and determine inter-American controversies, is now quite generally recognized to be chimerical. The United States, with a population greater than that of all Latin America together and excelling even more in wealth than in mere numbers, would hardly care to submit its vital interests, in a controversy with a Latin state, to the arbitrament of a body completely Latin in its make up, which, however disposed it might be to do justice, could not possibly free itself entirely from racial and traditional prejudices; nor would an organization based on population or wealth be any more acceptable to Latin America. Questions of the weight to be given each state in determining a

policy or in imposing an assessment would raise the same difficulties. Professor Albert Bushnell Hart suggests the analogy of the "New England Confederation" of our colonial days, which went to pieces because Massachusetts surpassed all her associates combined in population and resources.

A more natural and workable plan seems to be a general acceptance of the principle that, in complications of inter-American significance, no single state shall act impulsively on its own judgment and interest alone, but shall welcome the counsel and, if feasible, the cooperation of such of its neighbors as may be best fitted to render such service. There need be no obligation to accept the advice given; but the very bringing together of eminent men with differing points of view, the interchange of opinion and argument, and the moral necessity of squaring a contemplated policy with enlightened principles of Pan-Americanism are bound to raise the issue above the realms of mere partisanship, to free it from ignorance and provincialism, and to eliminate misunderstandings.

The possibilities of an arrangement of this sort were demonstrated by the A B C mediation conference at Niagara Falls in 1914, where diplomats from Argentina, Brazil and Chile met with representatives of Mexico and the United States in an effort to compose their difficulties, and in the joint deliberations of the next year which resulted in the recognition of Carranza. The actual accomplishments of these confer-

ences were inconsiderable by comparison with the contribution they made to the cause of inter-American comity. If, as one writer holds, what was done by them cannot be undone, if a precedent has been created for the right of the Latin republics to be heard on American questions, the United States, face to face with the future necessity of dealing with nations of constantly augmenting self-consciousness and strength and of recognizing eventually a "balance of power" in America, may well be congratulated for adapting itself so readily to an inevitable situation. The same writer goes on to say: "The Western Hemisphere has, at last, been swept into the realm where *interests* dominate in the government of states, and this pitiable but Draconian principle of collective human development, when human nature is organized nationally in societies, is now about to operate as a disturbing and corrosive element on that purer American idealism which the people and most of the political leaders in both of the American continents had blindly supposed would always distinguish their happier world from the old one of the wicked kings." To which it may be replied that if actualities rather than "Draconian principles" had occupied the minds of Americans since the days when the Monroe Doctrine saw the light, we should perhaps be farther than we are at present on the road to an understanding of one another's national ambitions and to an adjustment of them to some practical live and let live arrangement. The sooner we

recognize the inevitability of the "principle of nationalities" and base our international relations upon it, the better for all concerned.

Another step in the right direction was Mr. Bryan's treaties insuring at least a year of investigation and inquiry into the merits of disputes before resort to force by the signatory Powers. "The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission . . . and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and report." The parties to the dispute are in no sense bound by the commission's findings, but the cooling of hot blood, a full knowledge of the facts in the case and the moral force of a just decision will be sufficient to save many an international friendship.

Practical Pan-Americanism, then, should mean not the formation of a formal league, binding together in unnatural union peoples widely divergent in race, culture and feeling, but rather a spontaneous and candid association of American states which, while recognizing the inevitable and salutary principle of nationalities, shall bring their combined intelligence and resources to the solution of American problems.

From the point of view of the United States, the cause of practical Pan-Americanism would be greatly subserved by a process of amalgamation in Latin America which would substitute

for large numbers of restless and all but helpless small states a few large ones, possessing sufficient population, territory and wealth to afford some assurance of eventually becoming strong and self-reliant Powers. A union of the Central American republics, for example, would be an unmixed blessing to us, relieving us of responsibilities which bring us little compensation, cause us no end of worry and lay us open to persistent offensive imputations; and some of the smaller states of South America would derive obvious advantages from merging themselves with their larger neighbors. But the Latin seems to cherish a sentimental affection for old boundaries which North American democrats must respect, if they cannot approve.

Most Latin Americans are ready to acquit us of any sinister designs south of the countries bordering on the Caribbean. It is the development of our system of defence of the Panama Canal, with its necessary ramifications in the form of naval stations and protectorates, that has aroused their fears. Our fault, in their eyes, lies not in taking precaution for our safety nor in anticipating the designs of European nations in American waters—for in these respects their interests are identical with our own—but in acting in an unneighborly and often mysterious isolation which too often has left them in the dark as to our intentions, and which has involved infringements upon the liberties of peoples whose needs we have incompletely understood.

Here, as elsewhere, it is the principle of co-operation that can meet the difficulty. Certainly, after the precedent of the Niagara Falls conference, we can have no notion of interfering in South American affairs without consulting and acting with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and probably with other Latin American Powers, and even in the Caribbean, where our supremacy is now well established, it is inconceivable that a people committed to the principles of democracy will go on forever ruling hundreds of thousands of Dominicans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Cubans or even Porto Ricans against their will. We cannot arrogate exclusively to ourselves a sovereignty whose sole sanction is our own belief in the infallibility of our judgment in ordering the lives of others, and it is a fair question whether a divine commission to regulate the Americas is possessed by a state which can regard a trust, like that we assumed in stricken Santo Domingo, as an opportunity to create sinecures for "deserving Democrats." Problems which concern all America must be dealt with by the common action of at least the strong American states.

To the ideal of American solidarity the war in Europe has contributed fresh impulses. The original appeal of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin Americans lay in its championship of democracy in the New World, and this feature alone has seemed to them to justify its existence and to constitute its value. Viewing the European cataclysm, the soulless designs of monarchs, the

contempt for treaties, the worship and triumph of force, the crushing of the weak, and, as the one bright ray in the gloom, the spectacle of peoples emancipated by blood from agelong tyrannies, they have felt, in the words of one of their statesmen, that "the world's salvation is here in America, through the influence of a democracy that means peace and justice, and one that we must stand by and defend."

It is not entirely from selfish motives that sympathy for the cause of the Allies has spread throughout Latin America and that state after state has quarrelled with Germany and voiced its protest against her crass disregard of others' rights. A clearer understanding of the sacredness of the rights of men and of nations has come to all Americans alike. It has, may we not say, drawn the world's democracies closer together, not only in economic interdependence, but in sympathy and pride? To the Latin Americans must have occurred the question: How would their cherished independence have fared, had not Monroe's warning to autocrats fortified them in the days of their weakness against the fate of Serbia and Belgium, or had the heartless and cynical Prussian been substituted in their history for the rough and blundering, but withal not unkindly, democratic Yankee uncle, who, possessing the power to coerce and exploit them, has, on the whole, been content to let them live their own lives in their own way, provided they kept the peace and left Europe no excuse for meddling uncomfortably close to his

own door? Whether or not such feelings have played their part, the war must serve to draw closer the spiritual as well as the material bonds uniting the American states, for a conception of responsibility to the cause of democracy, whose spirit is human equality, must inspire the ideal of comradeship which has come increasingly to distinguish inter-American relations.²

² Among the many aids in the preparation of this chapter, special mention should be made of Jones's "Caribbean Interests of the United States," Filsinger's "Exporting to Latin America," the proceedings of the National Foreign Trade Conventions, the articles in the "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science," and those by Mr. George Marvin in the *World's Work*. The author is grateful for statistical and other data kindly furnished by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, the Pan-American Union, and Mr. O. P. Austin, statistician of the National City Bank of New York.

CHAPTER VI

THE WORLD PERIL AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST

MASON W. TYLER

The present conflict has been rightly called a world war. Into it have been drawn Europe, Africa, Asia, the islands of the Pacific, and the Americas. And the causes and results, as well as the war itself, will probably be found world-wide in their scope. But the United States is not at least equally interested in every phase of this struggle. The majority of Americans would probably agree that our interest in the solution of the African problem—to take one instance—is decidedly secondary to that of other Powers such as England and France. Provided that justice is done, that the balance of power is not endangered, that any trade we may have is not unduly interfered with, we may leave this problem for others to settle. But there are regions in which the United States has long been interested, and of these perhaps the most important, outside of South America, is the problem of the Far East. It was our fleet, under Commodore Perry, which opened Japan to the world; we took a leading share in the opening of China. The Open Door in China is an American policy, formulated by an Amer-

ican Secretary of State and sustained by American diplomacy. If the war is likely to affect this part of the world such effects cannot fail to be of interest and of vital importance to the United States and deserving of our most careful study.

To write a history of the problem of the Far East would require a volume in itself. But it would appear that there are three questions whose answers would, probably, go far to clear up the situation as it exists and to bring out such changes as may occur. First of all: what is the origin of the present situation and how far is it the result of the present war? Secondly: what are the aims of the United States in the Far East and how far are they threatened by the present situation? Thirdly: is there any possible solution to be found for such difficulties as have arisen or are apt to arise in the future? Such a treatment can only cover certain phases of the problem; it is by no means a complete study, but it is to be hoped that it may help Americans to see our part in the problem more clearly.

To explain the present situation one must go back to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1906. Before that date the greatest danger in the Far East lay in the policy and aggressions of the Russian Empire. Backed by Germany, who seems to have felt that this policy kept Russia involved in the Far East and therefore unable to influence the European balance, Russia had pushed down through Manchuria and was

laying plans which seemed to aim at an ultimate protectorate over north China. Against this policy the other Powers vitally interested, England, Japan and the United States, had been acting in concert. The two former had formed a defensive alliance, and the United States, seemingly unwilling to take any definite steps, confined herself to diplomatic representations. But the defeat of Russia changed absolutely the situation. The war left Japan the predominant Power in Corea and Manchuria and besides this in the moral position of being the Power to whom, because of her strength and achievements, the whole Far East looked for guidance. The result of later events on this moral position will be noted afterward.

The history of the next eight years, 1906 to 1914, illustrates how hopeless it is to attempt to isolate the Far East from European events. Russia's Far Eastern policy had left her almost without influence in Europe, and Germany and Austria had been able to pursue their Balkan plans in comparative peace. But after 1906 and more clearly after 1908 Russian policy, under the leadership of the Pan-Slavs, began to pivot back to Europe and to take a constantly increasing interest in the affairs of the Balkans and the Near East. But just as her Far Eastern policy had forced a sacrifice of her European policy, so this new European policy forced her to moderate and sacrifice her interests in the Far East. As a result, in 1908, she liquidated—to use the phrase of her then Foreign

Minister M. Isvolski—her interests in the Far East and two years later signed an alliance with Japan out of which the latter drew most of the practical advantages and which left her to follow her own plans in the Far East secure against Russian hostility and with even the possibility of Russian aid. In the same way as European affairs withdrew from the Far East one of the great moderating influences against Japan, Russia; so it followed the same course with another, England. In 1906 England was still vitally interested in the Far East, but as the German danger progressed it was necessary more and more to orientate her policy from European considerations and to leave the western Pacific more and more to itself. The defence against a possible German attack forced England to concentrate her strength in the North Sea and to leave the defence of her Asiatic interests to her ally, Japan, and to pay for that defence by allowing that ally a more or less free hand to carry out her policy. As a result Japan in 1914 had secured an almost free hand for her dealings in eastern Asia.

And she had made good use of her opportunities. Between 1906 and 1910 Japan had annexed Korea, a process which was marked by repeated breaches of faith on the part of the Japanese Government. During the same period and in the next four years she had pushed her control in southern Manchuria to the detriment of treaty rights and in defiance of the principle of the Open Door. And yet it ought to be

brought out in defence of Japanese policy during this period that Japan is almost vitally dependent on Corea and Manchuria for her food supplies and raw products. To allow these districts to fall into the hands of another Power would be almost suicidal, and the Japanese efforts to chain them so thoroughly that they cannot so escape have at least this justification. But the breaches of treaty right, the broken promises, the attempt to monopolize all trade in Japanese hands leave an unpleasant impression on almost all outsiders who study the Japanese policy of those years.

The outbreak of the European war in 1914 was of no small aid to Japan in her aims. In the first place it completed the withdrawal of England and Russia referred to above; and, in addition, it forced these Powers to call on Japan to defend their interests in eastern Asia, for which defence Japan could be enabled to demand payment in the shape of a free hand in China. Again the Japanese Government prepared to make every use of its favorable position. Soon after the outbreak of the European war it decided to use the opportunity to expel from the Far East one of the European Powers, Germany. Germany had been one of the sharers in European imperialism in China, where she had possessed since 1898 the port of Kiao-Chow and extensive mining rights in the Shantung peninsula behind it. As an imperialistic Power her policy in China had been much like that of the others, not much either better

or worse. But, to her, the Far East had always been a secondary interest, inferior to her interests in the Balkans and Turkey; useful as a pawn in the game of world policy more than as a field for direct German influence. In the Far East she seems to have, in the main, followed the policy of Bismarck who always strove to lure presumably hostile Powers into colonial expansion either in order that they might quarrel over the spoils or in order that they might dissipate their energies in distant adventures and leave other spheres of interest, more vital to Germany, free for the aims of the latter to be attained. Kiao-Chow was an outpost of empire, a germ of future empire perhaps, but for the time being merely an outpost, which Germany would probably have sacrificed to attain her more immediate and more vital aims. But when Japan demanded the withdrawal of the garrison and the surrender of the colony, German honor demanded that the post should be held to the end. The German garrison made a gallant defence of its lonely little stronghold and only capitulated to overwhelming force.

The capture of Kiao-Chow marks the beginning of the present stage of Japan's march to empire. It was of the greatest value to Japan in that it gave her a claim on the gratitude of the Allies who might moderate her future policy and at the same time a claim on the gratitude of China, in whose interests she claimed—in somewhat equivocal language—the expedition had taken place. And it was to China that she

turned for payment for the service, real or pretended, that she had done, and in this claim for payment threw off the mask with which her imperialism had, thus far, been covered. For her actions in Corea and Manchuria Japan seems to have had at least the shadow of an excuse, but her demands, now made on China, were nothing more nor less than the bullying of a weak Power by a stronger. They may be divided into two classes, first the class of demands which aimed at economic control and economic exploitation of China by Japan, second a class of demands—the so-called Group V—which would have given to Japan a political control in China as well. If China had accepted the entire series of demands made on her she would have been placed, to a certain extent, under the tutelage and protection of Japan. But China resisted. And during the delay which this resistance brought about it was shown that Japan's position of predominance, relative though it might be, was not absolute. For not only the United States, but also, after some delay, England interfered to urge the Japanese Government to modify and soften the claims it was making. Probably Japan saw it had gone too far, at least for the present. And so the political part of her demands was quietly allowed to drop, while the economic part was pressed with a flourish of an ultimatum. To this China yielded and the question was, for the time being, closed.

Japan, however, made no small gains in ex-

tending its power and influence in the Chinese Republic. She had forced China to recognize her predominant position in Manchuria, secured an extension of the lease of Port Arthur and the Manchurian Railways to 99 years, and full rights to establish in that region any Japanese enterprise. In Shantung she not only secured all the economic rights hitherto held by Germany, but also greatly extended them, including the right to build, under Japanese control, the new railway opening up the northern part of the peninsula. She secured the right to control and almost monopolize the great coal and iron fields in the Yangtze valley. Finally she secured at least a prior right to the development of Fu-Kien province in southern China. Taken all together, these concessions constitute the commencement, at least, of an economic monopoly for Japan in China. Shantung and the coal and iron fields of the Yangtze valley are, together, the great mineral fields of China as at present developed, and both of these have now passed under the control of Japan. The effect of such a state of affairs on the economic position of the other nations in China is reasonably obvious.

Such, then, is the present situation. The war in Europe has forced the attention of England and Russia away from the Far East and has left their partner, Japan, predominant there. The latter has used this predominance, as all imperialistic Powers are apt to do, with no little ruthlessness to attain their ends. But it has not

been all pure gain. Her ally, England, has been forced by the latest events to take a position opposed to her, and the probabilities are that the old alliance and friendship of the years before the war will not be renewed. Moreover in 1906 Japan was in a strong position of moral leadership in eastern Asia: the other nations looked to her for training and guidance in their development. It would now appear that much of this has been lost. The treatment of Corea, the policy pursued in Manchuria, the demands on China have cost Japan in moral prestige. In the years immediately following 1906 many young Chinese students went to Japan for their training. But the stream soon turned to other quarters, notably to America, and many of those who had gone to Japanese training schools came home in disgust. Every indication from China seems to show that Japan is now regarded there, not as the helpful guide, but as a danger—a Power to be feared. Indeed it would appear that much of the dread and dislike with which Russian policy was regarded in the years before the Russo-Japanese war has now turned toward Japan. Will Japan see this, and modify her course accordingly, or will she continue her imperialistic projects? That question the future alone can answer.

Thus far I have treated the problem of the Far East in its Asiatic aspects merely, and without any consideration of the American interests involved and the effect it may have on us. But the United States, as was said at the

beginning of this article, has a very vital interest in this problem and cannot be left unmoved by any changes that occur in it. What then are our interests in the Far East? In the first place we have a very strong interest in the maintenance of the integrity of China. For the last dozen years, and particularly since the establishment of the Chinese Republic, that Power has looked to us for support and guidance in its attempt to become a living and up-to-date member of the world group of Powers. From America they have chosen many of their advisers, and to America they have sent many of their future leaders to gain the benefit of American training. To abandon China under such circumstances would be almost the betrayal of a trust. Thus we must oppose the attempts of Japan or any other Power to secure such position or influence in China as will retard or warp the development of the Chinese Republic into a first class independent Power. In the second place we have an old and well established trade with China which ought to be defended by every means consonant with justice. To this end, and in order to prevent the constant trade bickerings so dangerous to the peace of the Far East, we have originated and urged the policy known as the "Open Door."

The history of this policy, at least in its later developments, is rather sad reading for Americans. For it can hardly be denied that of late it has lost and is steadily losing much of its power. For this loss circumstances, such as the

withdrawal from the Far East of our co-defender of this policy, Great Britain, are certainly partly responsible. But at least a share of the blame for its relative failure must fall on us for lack of firmness in its enforcement against those Powers whose policy was opposed to it. It is probably true that a majority of American citizens would not have approved of going to war for its maintenance, but that fact does not entirely excuse the seeming diplomatic supineness with which we have allowed its infraction or the blindness with which we, at least on one occasion, "cried out peace where there was no peace." If we are to make this policy felt in the Far East we must be prepared to exercise more strength, at least diplomatically, in securing its enforcement.

The policy of the "Open Door" as originally laid down by Secretary Hay in 1899 seems to have comprised merely the establishment of equal opportunity for the nationals of all Powers within the already established "spheres of influence"—areas which certain Powers had staked out for economic exploitation by members of their own nation. But it would appear that the fundamental idea of the Hay note went yet further, that it marked the desire of the United States not only to limit the use of these "spheres of influence," but also to prevent their erection in the future. This extension of the original policy seems more clearly brought out in the note of Secretary Hay to the Russian Government dated February 1, 1902,

in which he protests against the erection of an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in Manchuria and styles it a violation of the principle of the "Open Door." But it is somewhat doubtful if the United States can balk the granting of concessions to various national groups, or if it would be wise to do so if she could. China is in great need of development, and absolutely lacking in the capital required for it. And yet it is doubtful if, under present circumstances, capital would care to venture into Chinese development unless associated in national groups more or less under the supervision of their governments who would protect them in local disturbances or in difficulties with the Chinese Government. But we have, in this, at least the germ of a "sphere of influence." As things now stand, we are face to face with a dilemma: either to retard the development of China, or else to allow the erection of what may easily become "spheres of influence" and break up the Chinese Republic. But might not a way be devised which will avoid both difficulties?

The root of the difficulty appears to be in the nature of the power that protects the capitalist in his work of development. It seems to be in the fact that this protection is left to the individual governments, some of whom are imperialistic and anxious to extend in every possible way the interests of their nationals; and is not in the hands of an international group in which the more moderate Powers can restrain the more imperialistic. But of late years a new

principle appears to have been introduced, that of concerted action. It took the form of an international—or nearly international—loan. Originally loans were made by individual Powers, but between 1911 and 1913 a proposition was brought forward for concerted action in this field: the so-called Six Power Loan. In this financial groups from the six Powers most interested in China—England, Germany, France, Russia, Japan and the United States—joined to furnish money to the Chinese Republic in return for a certain amount of supervision over China's economic development. This supervision, probably, went too far and constituted, in a measure, a weakening of China's sovereignty, and for that reason, as well as because of a fear that it would involve us in Oriental complications, the support of the United States was withdrawn by President Wilson soon after his inauguration in 1913.

But, while the Six Power Loan, as a specific measure, may have been open to grave objections, it would appear that the principle of concerted action in the field of the economic development of China has distinct advantages. For it would insure to China a steady supply of foreign capital for its development, and at the same time would vest the control and protection of this capital in an international body, in which the more moderate Powers could restrain the others. Some sort of control over China seems necessary, at least until the new government is able to gain a firmer grip on the

situation. And the temporary nature of such control could be secured in the agreements, and the ultimate return of the concessions to Chinese control could be made certain—as seems to have been already done—by agreement for their repurchase at the end of a term of years. And at any rate such an international tutelage would seem to be an advance over the present anarchy and scramble for concessions.

The present situation in the Far East, if the analysis given here be correct, is the result of the withdrawal of the moderating Powers in order to concentrate their attention on the European war, leaving Japan practically mistress of the scene. To this must be added the disinclination of the United States to take a strong policy in eastern Asia, nor is there any probability that this policy, whether right or wrong in the past, will be changed now that we have entered the European struggle. Japan can expect, in all probability, to be able to enjoy her supremacy until the day when peace returns and the Powers are able to turn their attention again to these regions. We may then be able, in all probability, to count on England and, if we play our cards well, on the Russian Republic in our attempts to maintain the integrity of China and equal trade opportunities for all. To refuse to join with them or to refuse to take such steps as may be necessary to make this entente a strong factor in the Far East would appear to be the height of unwisdom. Alone we can do but little, with the aid of other Powers

of like mind with ourselves much may be accomplished.

And what is to be our policy toward Japan? There would appear to be three courses open to us: to oppose her, to come to terms with her, or to withdraw from the affairs of the Far East. Japan is such a factor in the situation that for us to attempt any policy in eastern Asia without dealing with her appears little short of impossible. But we can withdraw, leave China to her fate, accept such a share in trade as the others will leave to us and confine our attention to South America or other quarters of the world. Such a policy would undoubtedly be one of inglorious safety, for Japan is not likely to attack us on account of the immigration question alone. But do the people of the United States wish to follow this inglorious policy? Are we prepared to give up the position we have gained in the Far East? Are we ready to abandon China to its fate? It is very doubtful if a majority of American citizens would agree to this proposition, and until they do it is idle to waste time in its discussion. As a nation we intend to have a Far Eastern policy, and, by the very nature of the case, our policy must deal with that of Japan.

Shall we oppose the Japanese policy? Certainly the policy of that Power is in many ways opposed to ours in China. But to answer fully the question, we must ask ourselves another: how far do we intend to carry this opposition? If Japan refuses to yield to our wishes are we

prepared to go to war in order to secure their recognition? To employ half measures, to threaten and oppose and then to yield when it comes to the fundamental point would gain us no advantage and would prove to the whole world our weakness as a world Power. But are the American people willing to go to war with Japan over the Far East? Only, it would appear, if the question was a vital one, and if every method of conciliation had been tried and failed. And what is the advantage of adopting a policy of uncompromising hostility to Japan if the American people are to repudiate it in the end? That they would back up a firmer policy is probable, that they would accept war if Japan obstinately opposed us on a vital point is reasonably sure, but they will ask for assurance that everything within reason and honor has been done to conciliate a proud and sensitive nation.

Then there is another reason which should urge Americans to go slow in their hostility to Japan. At present Japan is in the position of reconsidering her alliances. Her old leagues with Russia and England are losing their value to her, that with Russia on account of the weakness of the present Government and its probable concentration of attention, in the years immediately following the war, on internal questions; that with England seems to have outlived its usefulness to both Powers, and ominous rents are appearing in its fabric. Whither shall Japan turn? Why not to Germany? For her such

an alliance would have many advantages. The Far East seems to be a secondary interest for Germany, in so far as colonial expansion is concerned, and she would gladly make concessions to Japan in this region in return for her support there and elsewhere against Great Britain and the United States. In addition she might ask for the Philippines—remember the events of 1898—but Japan might be willing to allow Germany a foothold there. Her interests are predominantly on the mainland in China, and the Philippines in German hands might prove a useful counter weight, in Japan's eyes, to the English colonies in Australia and New Zealand. So long as she is left undisturbed in China, it is not to Japan's disadvantage that others should quarrel in the other parts of the Pacific and leave her free to pursue her own plans or to mediate between them.

The Zimmermann note is a sufficient indication that this alliance would be welcomed by Germany. But for further illustration of this note and of the policy which underlies it the words of Von Reventlow—written before the outbreak of the European war and therefore free from any of the prejudices of the present situation—would seem worthy of quotation and of careful pondering by Americans: “Japan and the German Empire are from their geographical position, from their relations and interests peculiarly fitted to work together in close alliance. Should firm and well regulated connections be formed between the two Powers, it would result,

sooner or later, in a decided relief to Germany in the North Sea, and a strengthening of its position toward Europe, toward East Asia and, last but not least, toward the United States. Japan would make yet greater gains in its freedom from the present English patronage, further in its differences with the United States." That a victorious Germany would plan such an alliance is only too probable, and connects, in a way, the work of our soldiers in Europe with the defence of our interests in the distant Far East.

Should such an alliance take form the only course for the United States would appear to be an immediate alliance with the British Empire—equally threatened in the Far East—and an immediate strengthening of our Pacific fleet to such a force as would enable it to cope easily with the Japanese navy unaided. Bare considerations of safety would demand such a course. But it is not at all sure that Japan, despite certain obvious advantages, would wish to pursue such a policy. It would involve a complete change in her system of foreign policy, and, unless the advantages are certain, such a complete diplomatic change of front is seldom wise. Moreover it is not at all sure that the present disinterestedness of Germany in the Far East will continue. He who sups with the Devil must use a long spoon, and it is doubtful if Japan would gain by the supplanting of two moderate Powers such as Great Britain and the United States by a Power like Germany in

whom the appetite for imperialism is still unwhetted. And especially is it unlikely if the United States can find a course on which it can agree with Japan and conciliate their somewhat contending interests. Can such an agreement be found?

The sources of difference with Japan seem to be two, one the question of immigration, the other the question of the Far East. With regard to the first difference the difficulty of adjustment does not seem to be insuperable. In the first place it would appear, if the "Memoirs" of Hyashi are to be trusted, that the question of Japanese immigration constituted for Japan merely a pawn which she could use in her differences with the United States in the Far East. But it seems to have been magnified by the methods taken in this country to restrict such immigration, or to prevent those already here from gaining any foothold in the country. If you have a difference with a nation, said a sage diplomat, you should be careful to be scrupulously courteous in small things. This advice we appear to have neglected. Some of our State legislation cannot but have been insulting to a nation as proud and sensitive as are the Japanese. And even if, to official Japan, this question is not of vital importance compared with others, with popular Japan—and popular Japan is not without power—this question is a real stumbling block to reconciliation. Let us hope that our western legislatures will take all due care in handling this difference, especially while Japan

is loyally observing her gentleman's agreement to restrain immigration. And at present this seems to be the case. Furthermore, in future discussion of the question, for it is sure to come up again sooner or later, let us endeavor, so far as possible, to avoid anything wounding to Japan's pride. That Americans and Japanese do not get along well together on the Pacific coast does not mean that they are in any way inferior to us, but merely that they are different. Moreover the problem seems, at bottom, mainly an economic one which time may settle. But at the present moment, when Japan needs her sons elsewhere and is willing to discourage immigration, it will do us no good to raise the question unnecessarily. Let sleeping dogs lie.

The second difference demands more immediate attention and is, in itself, probably more difficult in solution. Is there any way in which the interests of Japan and the United States may be reconciled in the Far East? Perhaps a possible solution might lie along this line: The expansionist movement in Japan follows two directions, one to Corea, Manchuria and inner Mongolia, the other toward China proper. With the first we have much less objection than to the second. Japan has a real economic need for Corea and Manchuria, they furnish a large amount of her foodstuffs and in return take a goodly share of Japan's manufactures. For their possession Japan has fought two wars and spent countless blood and treasure. Moreover Manchuria is only in the widest sense of the

term part of China, an outlying district, almost a protectorate, not an integral part of the Republic, nor has Japan ever refused to recognize Chinese sovereignty there. Korea was once an independent kingdom and is now an integral part of the Japanese Empire. However much we may dislike the methods by which it was annexed it is doubtful if anything can be done now to change its status short of war with Japan. England and Russia, our potential allies in our Far Eastern policy, have bowed to accomplished facts and recognized Japan's predominant interest in Manchuria and her annexation of Korea. Our course has been a rather ambiguous one, marked by the ill fated attempt of Secretary Knox to neutralize the Manchurian railways in 1910.

If we should recognize Japan's position in Korea and Manchuria, agree to put no obstacles in her path there, what would we lose? We still possess some trade in these regions, part—which would probably remain—in goods in which Japanese competition is either non-existent or weak; the remaining interests might be granted a term of years to move elsewhere. Then we would, in a way, have compromised our position toward the Open Door and toward the integrity of China. But is it wise to try to remedy our mistakes of yesterday by vigorous and continued protests against actions committed long since? Nor is the real integrity of China threatened. If the Chinese Republic becomes, as we hope, a strong Power, Japan can

no more hold Manchuria against her than England could hold Belgium against the German Empire, if Belgium wished to join Germany. Japan's only salvation in that day will be her friendship for England, Russia and the United States and the support of the people of Manchuria, won by years of good government. And if she follows this policy we ought to be content.

And what can we gain in return for these concessions? We can ask of Japan to join with England, Russia and ourselves in maintaining the integrity of China and equal trade opportunity for all. We might ask them to join with us to form at least the nucleus of an international organization to supervise the economic development of China. Such a union of effort would preserve the fundamental principles in the policy of both Japan and the United States. For Japan it would mean undisturbed opportunity to develop Manchuria and Corea, and the opportunity to win, in China, all the trade that fair competitive measures would allow. It might mean a defeat for the more imperialistic sections of the Japanese people, but it is doubtful if their policy, carrying with it the alienation of Russia, England, the United States and China, is, in the long run, the wise one for the Japanese Empire. For us it would mean the preservation of the integrity of China proper and of the "Open Door." Indirectly we would gain by the development of Corea and Manchuria, for Japan has a large trade with us and we could gain by her prosperity.

Such in its general outline is a possible plan by which Japan and the United States may be reconciled. It is only put forward as a possible plan and without any attempt to give more than the most general outline, for to do otherwise, in this changing world situation, would be not only useless but probably unwise. But may not the hope be expressed that, in some way or other, this favorable opportunity can be grasped and the present alliance between Japan and the United States against the German danger be extended into an agreement to the advantage of eastern Asia and to the United States and Japan themselves?

It may seem a far field from the present world danger of German arms to the Far East with its seemingly separate problems, its peculiar animosities and alliances. And yet, in an indirect way, it would seem that this situation is a result of the German attempt at world rule. The German danger has withdrawn first Russia, then England and lastly the United States from the Far East and forced them to concentrate their attention in Europe. And Japan has been left predominant and unchecked in eastern Asia. The German peril is as great in these displacements it effects in the world situation as in its more direct results in Europe and the Near East. And these effects, with their vital importance to us, deserve the serious consideration of all American citizens.

CHAPTER VII

THE WORLD PERIL AND WORLD PEACE

The War For International Freedom

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN

INTRODUCTION

The United States from August, 1914, till April, 1917, experimented with every possible brand of neutrality to find itself in the end reluctantly, though inexorably, drawn into the great conflict. First we tried the anaemic variety of neutrality, the paralysis of moral and intellectual powers. Then we more or less unconsciously assumed the impossible rôle of the benevolent neutral, hoping for the success of the Entente Allies. And finally we resorted to the dubious expedient of armed, malevolent neutrality.

We were afforded all possible opportunities and leisure to study the whole situation in order to ascertain our precise obligations toward the struggle. We did not enter the war blindly under any illusions. We have voted vast credits. We have our naval and military forces actually in Europe. Breaking with all our traditions and prejudices, we have resorted to conscription to raise an enormous army to send

across the seas. We believe ourselves prepared to make the frightful sacrifices demanded as the price of victory.

In spite of all this, the American people, with no implied disloyalty but with a spirit of honest inquiry, are asking the reason for all this sacrifice. They are insistently demanding that we should define clearly the final goal, the exact aims of the war. On every side is heard the question: "What are we fighting for?"

President Wilson as the official spokesman and the rightful leader of the nation in foreign affairs has repeatedly tried to state the aims of the United States in entering the war. In his memorable message to Congress on April 2 he said:

"The present German warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. . . . The challenge is to all mankind. . . .

"Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

"Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

“Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.

“We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German people included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the trusted foundations of political liberty.

“It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.”

No argument is needed to demonstrate that we are grappling with an international outlaw who “is running amuck.” President Wilson spoke for the whole country when, in reply to the insolent command of Germany to remain

cravenly at home, he answered: "There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are not common wrongs; they reach out to the very roots of human life." (Message of April 2.)

There can be no equivocation, no uncertainty, no doubt concerning this immediate reason for entering the war, nor any failure to concentrate every energy on its successful prosecution. The world must be rid of this assassin of the sea, this red handed apostle of *Schrecklichkeit*, this international outlaw, this government that "knows no law" except the law of its own brutal necessity. There can be no argument on this point. We know full well what we are *fighting against!* But are we clear what we are *fighting for?* This is the legitimate question. After the outlaw is defeated, after he is rendered harmless, what then? What are the larger aims of this war? Are we fighting for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, for the freedom of Poland and Bohemia, or are we fighting for something that is equally vital to ourselves as well as to Europe?

To this demand for a definition of the objects of this war President Wilson has replied: "The world must be made safe for democracy." This conception of our rôle as a responsible member of the great family of nations is lofty and vast.

One may recognize its profound truth but feel incapable of defining with any precision its practical application. We are bound therefore to make certain that this battle cry, this inspiring announcement of our great purpose in entering the war should not remain a vain and magniloquent phrase. To be of value it must mean something simple and vital for every American. We must reduce it to intelligible and practical terms. This may be best done, it seems to me, first by defining our goal, and secondly by defining the methods by which we may attain it.

What then do we mean by this fight "to make the world safe for democracy"? What is the vital significance of this struggle for international freedom? First of all we need to recall certain larger aspects of the eternal fight for freedom for which mankind has shed rivers of blood.

There is an inspiring significance in the fact that on the walls of Washington's old home at Mount Vernon hangs the rusty key of the Bastille, that bloody citadel of "the divine rights of kings to rule badly." It was splendidly fitting that Lafayette should have brought this eloquent trophy of the battle for freedom in France to his old comrade in the battle for freedom in America.

We must remind ourselves that Washington and Lafayette did not fight merely against a crazy king or on account of an ancient enmity between France and England. Their fight was

essentially a fight in behalf of the rights of democracy in England and France, as well as in America. Trevelyan, the British historian, reminds us that many of his countrymen "could not forget that their opponents were Englishmen, with a deeper grievance even than their own against the same set of perverse and unwise rulers, speaking the very same mother tongue, professing the same religion and owning the same great history and the same glorious literature as themselves. The Americans justified their political action by precedents derived from the Long Parliament and the Revolution of 1688." ("George the Third and Charles Fox," Vol. II, p. 199.)

Louis XVI, in aiding the American Revolution against the hereditary enemy of France, was permitted by the irony of fate to make his own contribution to the cause of freedom which later was to involve his own throne and life. The French Revolution, like the American Revolution, was not merely an uprising against a "perverse" and "unwise" ruler. With all its demoralization and excesses, as with its modern counterpart in Russia, it was the expression of a universal force, the dynamic, explosive, destructive and constructive power of democracy throughout the world. It bore terrible testimony to the truth that it is never safe to oppose the divine right of democracy to rule, whether wisely or badly.

Another epochal event in the great struggle for freedom was the promulgation of the Mon-

roe Doctrine to the effect that Europe should never be permitted to interfere with the development of the free democratic nations of this western hemisphere. It was a bold direct answer to the threat of the Holy Alliance to fight democracy wherever it might show its head. It is of striking and peculiar interest at this time to recall the avowed purpose of the Alliance as revealed in the first article of the secret Treaty of Verona signed November 22, 1822:

“The high contracting Powers being convinced that the system of *representative* government is equally as *incompatible* with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to *put an end* to the system of *representative* governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.”

It is difficult fully to appreciate the magnificent service rendered to the cause of freedom by the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. We should remind ourselves that the nations of this hemisphere were left free to determine their own destinies, and that they have been spared the unhappy struggles and the criminal operations of the policy of balance of power which has wrought such disaster in Europe. This is why President Wilson has proposed “that the nations should with one accord adopt

the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and the powerful." (Message, January 22, 1917.)

This is the answer of America to the unholy alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, whose purpose to crush the rights of other nations and control their destinies has been clearly revealed.

It is well to recall the great revolutionary struggle in behalf of democracy that swept Europe in 1848. We must not forget how Hungary, with the enthusiastic sympathy of the American people, fought in vain for liberty; how she was finally crushed by the combined forces of Austria and Russia, and how today, alas, this very Hungary tyrannizes over her own subject nationalities, the Croats and the Rumanians. We should recall the disdain with which Frederick William IV of Prussia declined a crown at the hands of the people in 1849. We should not forget how popular demands for the right of democracy to rule were cynically met by the Prussian Constitution of 1850 which still constitutes today the bulwark of the Hohenzollerns. While other countries in Europe were steadily winning their constitutional freedom, Germany and Austria, with their present ally Turkey, were able to stand firm in the de-

fence of autocracy and reaction. The war of 1870, though it brought humiliation and disaster to France, also brought about the firm establishment of the Republic which Bismarck had cynically encouraged because he believed it would mean a weaker neighbor. Germany, on the other hand, because of its material triumphs became more submissive than before to the arrogant domination of Prussian militarism.

The failure of the fight for freedom in Germany needs no demonstration. The present archaic, feudalistic government stands out as an ugly crude fact. The system which permits Prussia to dominate Germany, which permits a militaristic minority to control Prussia, which leaves to the King-Emperor the right to veto any initiative even in respect to changes in the constitution has been amply condemned by Germans themselves. Rohrbach, in "German World Policies," which the translator, Von Mach, asserts to have "probably inspired more Germans than any other book published since 1871," alluding to the recommendation of a Chinese commission that China should adopt the Prussian form of government, remarks:

"Theoretically many things may be said in favor of such a system for a community like China; actually, however, a reform which was intended to advance freedom could not have been proclaimed more inauspiciously even in China than by basing it on a system which everywhere else in the world was regarded as reactionary. . . .

“If the leading classes in Germany show that they wish to continue conditions which are not conservative in a moderate sense of the word, but reactionary and politically immoral, it is they and not the press of the opposition which are responsible for the damaged reputation and influence of our national idea abroad. (p. 218)

“Since even Bismarck in his masterful way adopted at home the principle of freedom for the sake of the respect which it would win for the Empire abroad, we might well learn how wise and useful it would be if we permitted a new spirit to transform our national life today in a way which would strengthen us at home and be unfailingly effective abroad.” (p. 219)

The movement now going on in Germany in behalf of political reform, if favored at all by the Government, would undoubtedly be favored principally for the cynical purpose of “the respect which it would win for the Empire abroad”! We must be on our guard against a revolution made to order in Germany!

There are those who argue that it is nobody's concern what kind of government the Germans may live under, if they are contented. This would be true in the main were it not for the unhappy fact that the autocratic rule of the Hohenzollerns enables Prussian militarism to threaten the freedom of other peoples than the Germans themselves. As long as this system prevails, the peace and happiness of Europe, and—as we now see—the peace and happiness of the whole world are constantly in danger.

The proofs of this fact are to be found, first of all, in the public utterances of the Kaiser and of the leading representative men of Germany. The sacred mission of German *Kultur* to civilize and dominate the rest of the world has been repeatedly proclaimed in no uncertain terms. Rohrbach has fervently expressed this creed as follows:

“We start very consciously with the conviction that we have been placed in the arena of the world in order to work out moral perfection, not only for ourselves, but for all mankind. (“German World Policies,” p. 4.)

“. . . Rome had to be the mistress of the world before she could determine the political and legal thoughts of future generations.

“It is not necessary to claim for the German idea that it will exist like the Roman either as the mistress of the world or not at all, but it is right to say that it will exist only as the co-mistress of the culture of the world, or it will not exist at all. (p. 5)

“. . . Germany’s fate is England. . . . The man who has studied the progress of the world during the last hundred years, and who knows something of the world today from his own observation, knows that there is only one important national-political question: ‘Is the Anglo-Saxon type destined to gain the sole dominion in those parts of the world where things are still in the process of development, or will there be sufficient scope also for the German idea to take part in the shaping of the culture of the world on both sides of the ocean?’ ” (p. 8)

The naive significance of this argument is surely extraordinary. No word whatever concerning the rôle of Slavic, Latin, Dutch and other national "cultures" in the development of civilization! Not at all! We have here the proposition and the challenge that England and the United States must share with Germany the domination of the world! This western hemisphere "where things are still in the process of development" must be opened up to German *Kultur*! The Monroe Doctrine, in other words, must definitely be abandoned!

These ideas are not the ideas of irresponsible, isolated individuals. They are the ideas of the statesmen, publicists, teachers and leaders of opinion in Germany. They are merely the echo of the extraordinary utterances of the Kaiser whose fundamental creed is that he is responsible only to God. He is credibly reported to have said:

"It is to the empire of the world that the German genius aspires.

"God has called us to civilize the world: we are the missionaries of human progress.

"The German people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to elevate and achieve the civilization of the world." (Quoted by Gibbons in "The New Map of Europe," p. 31.)

But the proofs of the German menace to the world rest not merely on bombastic words, on chauvinistic schemes. The diplomacy of Germany for the last seventeen years has repeat-

edly revealed the crude reality of her ambitions. It is sufficient to recall the famous telegram of encouragement from the Kaiser to President Kruger, the blusterings of Germany at Tangiers in 1905, again at Agadir in 1911, the loud rattling of the sabre during the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis of 1908-1909 that ended in the humiliation of both Russia and Serbia, the ardent support of Austria against Serbia in 1914 and the insolent ultimatum to Russia which provoked war when Austria had already agreed to a peaceful discussion of the whole Serbian question.

The foreign policy of Germany during this period was marked by two characteristics: the attempt to achieve her ends by a parade of force; and to embarrass her rivals by sowing dissensions or encouraging disaffection. Militarism could well afford to be content for a while, if it could achieve its ends without actual war. This was an indirect Prussian method of controlling the destinies of other nations.

Fishing in troubled waters which they themselves have helped to trouble is an art long cultivated by Prussian diplomacy. The Irish disaffection was welcomed and abetted with great joy. A demoralized autocratic Russia in the hands of a disreputable German clique was far more to be desired than a free democratic state affording the Russians the chance to develop a strong spirit of nationalism. We in America would do well to remember the embarrassment caused Admiral Dewey by the

menacing presence of a German fleet in Manila Bay in 1898. We should never forget German intrigues against the very sovereignty of the United States within our borders, and in particular the sardonic attempt to embroil Mexico and Japan against us. German ambitions and machinations, as this war is rapidly unfolding, have known no limit. The history of their devilish plots is long and hideous. There can be no reasonable doubt of their insensate ambition to dominate the world.

In sum, it was not the international bad manners—the *Schneidigkeit*—of Germany which isolated her and drew her neighbors into a defensive *entente*. It was the “shining armor” that rendered friendly relations impossible. It was the *furor Teutonicus*, the revealed purpose to impose German *Kultur* on the rest of the world, that warned Europe to prepare for the war long determined in principle in Berlin and Vienna. It was not the assassination of the Archduke that caused the Great War. We now know through the revelations of Giolitti to the Italian Chamber of Deputies that the war was planned for 1913.

In view of all these well established facts, it cannot be the undertaking of the Entente Allies merely to frustrate these Prussian ambitions. Neither is it the object of the United States to fight merely to avenge certain injured rights. It is possible that a “peace without victory” resulting in an effort to restore as far as possible the *status quo ante* would serve our im-

mediate ends. It would not, however, make the world safe for democracy. The sacrifices of the gigantic struggle for freedom would have been largely in vain. The right of free peoples to determine their own destinies without dictation from without can only be achieved by the triumph of democracy within Germany itself. The world cannot be free, there can be no true system of international law, so long as Germans remain enslaved and permit themselves to be the powerful agents of Prussian despotism. There can be no real international freedom where so powerful a nation places itself above restraint, whether from within or without.

Since the moment Germany pleaded its own military necessity as the excuse for the violation of Belgium, she has constituted herself a self-confessed outlaw. We were slow to realize our duty against this *hostis humani generis*. We long tolerated inhuman violations of our rights on the high seas, and even endured ugly intrigues and crimes in our very midst. The truth was hard to believe. Such villainous acts and projects were entirely foreign to our way of thinking, to our understanding of the obligations of one state toward another. But at last we saw the German menace in all its terror. We saw not merely our own interests imperilled: we saw the enemy of freedom reaching out to throttle the world. We shook ourselves from our drugged state of callous indifference and crude provincialism. We saw the splendid vision of our duty as a member

of the great family of nations. We came to realize that international peace and order were at the mercy of the greatest outlaw the world has ever seen. Though tragically late, we are now trying to do our duty as good international citizens. We are ready to pay a fearful price for the preservation of freedom, the freedom of nations to determine their own destinies, the supreme stage in the ancient struggle, the most heroic, the most horrible of all the conflicts for the sacred cause.

It ought to be sufficient, perhaps, merely to realize the simple fact that we are fighting against an outlaw. The immediate task is obviously stupendous. It demands all our powers, all our loyal devotion. We cannot prudently ignore, however, the question which is heard on all sides: "How can the world be made safe for democracy?" What are the guarantees of freedom? This is not mere speculation: it is a very practical problem. It is our solemn duty to make certain that all this horror and heroism shall not have been in vain.

I

First of all, it should be obvious that the outlaw must be defeated. He must not merely be checked: he must be overwhelmingly beaten. The immediate problem is purely of a military character. What shall be done with the outlaw after he is beaten or captured is of secondary importance. We have been all-too-slow to

realize the immense menace from Germany on land and sea. While we have leisurely made plans and indulged in futile discussions, the Entente Allies have suffered terrific losses that have greatly weakened their powers of resistance. Our help may arrive too late. The questionings, the obstacles placed by pacifists and others have had a criminal result in withholding urgently needed aid from those engaged in a life and death struggle with a marvellously prepared and extremely powerful outlaw. The fight for freedom cannot be won by words or by academic discussions concerning terms of peace. It is essentially a military problem.

II

We must next remember that we are wrestling, not with flesh and blood, with guns, Zeppelins and submarines, but with a false ideal. We are wrestling with a grossly materialistic conception of human relations; with a pagan idea of legal rights and obligations that recognizes no other necessities than those of Germany. We are fighting against a feudalistic theory of the state that threatens the freedom of all other peoples. We are battling to arouse the German people from their degradation as Prussian vassals. We are fighting their own battle for freedom as did the men of '76 in their fight for British freedom. As President Wilson has said: ". . . we act without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them,

but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government." (Message, April 2, 1917.)

All that is admirable, inspiring and endeared to the rest of the world in Teutonic civilization is in no way threatened. On the contrary, we are fighting for the best traditions of Germany against the Prussian foe that has dragged them in the mire. We are fighting to restore to Germany the bulwark of democracy—the town meeting, which originally came out of her free forests centuries ago.

This is a holy cause for which German-Americans and all true friends of Germany may loyally, though with natural feelings of sadness, shed their blood. The battles of the North and the South over the freedom of the slaves arrayed brothers against each other. Defeated and victorious alike can now truthfully say that the end attained was worth the sacrifice. May we not hope that the influence and aid of German-Americans in this supreme struggle for freedom will prove of inestimable value in arousing all Germans to the sense of the need of overthrowing Prussian despotism?

This truth must be constantly emphasized: that the world will not be made safe for democracy merely by the defeat of the outlaw. International law and order may not be preserved in any other way than by his complete subjection. This can only be accomplished by a sweeping political revolution in Germany which shall have for its fundamental principle the right of free peoples to govern themselves.

III

With the outlaw banished and Prussian absolutism overthrown there still remains the problem of protecting international society from future violence. The spirit animating the soldiers of all the contending armies should be: "Never again!" The horrors of this war have made men solemnly resolve to take whatever steps may be necessary to render other great wars impossible. This has well been termed "a war against war."

The difficulties in the way of world organization for the preservation of order are obviously immense and, possibly, insuperable, at this stage of civilization. First of all, as we have seen, Germany must be defeated, and a revolution in German thought must be brought about. Before nations can unite in any common undertaking, they must learn to think fundamentally alike. They must share similar conceptions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice. They must agree on basic rights. They must agree on the laws that shall protect such rights. They must agree on the proper agency for the interpretation of these laws. They must agree on the nature of the penalties for their infraction. They must agree on the nature and the powers of the executive charged with the maintenance of international rights and order, as well as for the punishment of wrongdoers.

To state these difficulties should serve to remind us that the evolution of society does not permit great sweeping reforms in a day. Im-

mense patience as well as wisdom is demanded. We are bound to acknowledge the existence of vital differences among nations concerning fundamental conceptions of rights and obligations. We are compelled to confess that international law has hardly begun to define national interests and rights with any precision or authority. In some instances—Poland, Serbia, Bohemia, for example—the basic right of existence, even, has not yet been determined.

We must admit that a court presupposes law: that the proper function of a court is to interpret, not to legislate. We must recognize that it is inherently unjust and abhorrent to attempt to coerce before you have defined one's rights, and have prescribed the proper way of protecting rights. Moreover, the freedom of independent democracies throughout the world demands that they shall participate voluntarily in the formulation and in the protection of international rights. The spectre of absolute sovereignty in any form, whether within the state or between states, must be forever banished. There must be no attempt, whether by councils, leagues, international police or any other instrumentalities, to coerce free democracies through any "Great Leviathan." We should keep ever in mind the vast distinction between the town meeting and the international community: between municipal law and international law. Kant was right when he observed in his essay on "Perpetual Peace" that: "This juristic state must arise from some sort of com-

pact. This compact must not be based, however, on compulsory laws like that lying at the basis of the state: it must rather be that of a permanent free association."

Bearing in mind these great obstacles in the way of world organization, we cannot fail to recognize that the problem is deserving of the most earnest consideration. President Wilson has repeatedly spoken of a "league for peace," of "a covenant of cooperative peace," of "a concert of free peoples," of "a partnership of democratic nations," of "a league of honor," of "a partnership of opinion," phrases which suggest something of the vagueness, the intricate nature of the proposition.

This proposition of international cooperation for the preservation of world peace has taken practical form in the definite recommendations of "The League to Enforce Peace" organized under the presidency of ex-President Taft, and guardedly approved in principle by some of the leading statesmen of England, France, Germany and other countries, as well as by President Wilson himself.

These recommendations, in brief, are as follows: (1) All justiciable questions not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment. (2) Non-justiciable questions "shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation." (3) Economic and military pressure shall be employed against any member of the League "that goes to war, or

commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.”

(4) Conferences shall be held from time to time “to formulate and codify rules of international law, which . . . shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal.”

Of these recommendations the last, which constitutes a recognition of the lack of international legislation to formulate the rights of nations, I believe to be far the most important. It is a confession that the whole structure of international organization cannot be erected until the solid foundations have been laid.

Another significant feature of this proposed league is its frank recognition of the fact stated by President Wilson that: “Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples. . . .” (Message of April 2.) Furthermore, this league is a candid recognition of the necessity of force for the preservation of international rights. It affords a common platform for extreme militarists and pacifists. The name of the league permits the militarist to stress the word “enforce,” the pacifist the word “peace,” while it also allows others to stress the word “league.”

Serious objections may be made against these proposals as involving perilous liabilities for the United States and an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. It is not to be expected that these recommendations will be adopted *in toto*

by the great nations. They afford, however, an excellent basis for discussion, a *point de depart*, when the question of future guarantees for world peace shall be formally taken up.

Whether or no the nations are ready as yet to enter into any formal "league," any "partnership" or "covenant of cooperative peace," immense encouragement is to be found in the fact that the present combination of fifteen nations against the Teutonic *bloc* is virtually a league of peace. Its object is the preservation of international order. This union of international *good* citizens against an outlaw is a most hopeful sign that the majority of the nations are in substantial agreement concerning the rights of free democratic peoples. It is an encouraging indication that with the overthrow of Prussian absolutism it would not be impossible to secure a consensus of international opinion regarding the fundamental rights and obligations of nations. If this fiery furnace of affliction should fuse the warring nations into a real "partnership of opinion," into one democratic union of sympathies and ideals, it should augur well for the future peace of the world. When men understand each other there may be little need of coercion or of the formal organization of councils, or leagues to enforce peace.

IV

The insistent demand that the respective belligerents should state their definite terms of

peace is hardly reasonable. It would seem very much like cynical indifference to ask either the outlaw or his victims to define clearly what they are fighting for. Moreover, in any war whose fortunes may fluctuate from day to day, where deeds are done that cannot be made right, where situations are created that render a return to the *status quo ante* impossible, neither of the contending parties can afford to lay all its cards on the table. There must always be something in reserve with which to bargain, especially in the interests of the weaker party. Unless the belligerents have both become sincere converts to the ideal, the principle of *uti possidetis* cannot be eliminated from peace discussions. To be definite, the question of the disposition of Germany's conquered colonies depends very largely on the question of the disposition of the territories conquered by Germany in Europe. The creation of a Teutonic Mitteleuropa during this war is a new and portentous fact that must necessarily render difficult the statement of war aims by either of the belligerents during the actual conduct of the war.

All that may fairly be demanded is that the belligerents should formulate their general aims. This has been done with considerable precision by the Entente Allies and the United States. They have demanded "restitution," "reparation" and "guarantees." They have insisted that the outlaw should restore his plunder, should make all-too-inadequate amends to

his victims, and should be rendered impotent to break again the peace of the world.

The German Government, on the other hand, has spoken of a "German" peace. It has failed to subscribe whole-heartedly to the Russian formula, which has been mildly accepted by the feeble Reichstag, to the effect that there shall be no "annexations by conquest" or indemnities. The Kaiser and his Prussian autocrats, the Austrian Emperor, the Government of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey,—none of them could honestly subscribe to the condition emphasized by President Wilson "that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." To subscribe to that principle would mean the end of their power, their complete downfall. In some instances it would mean the dissolution of their nations, notably, Austria and Hungary. There can be no reconciliation of the war aims of the opposing parties in this struggle. The failure to perceive this fundamental fact is a failure to see the difference between right and wrong, between virtue and crime, between freedom and slavery. There can be no honorable surrender by the friends of international freedom. It is an insult to ask them repeatedly what they are fighting for.

But when it concerns a question of frontiers, of the disposition of the fates of whole peoples, though the United States may very properly

decline to assume direct responsibility for all future adjustments of this character, we are bound to insist on the application of certain sound principles. In our fight for the overthrow of an outlaw and for the safety of democracy throughout the world, we are bound to make certain that no more such criminal denials of the rights of free peoples shall be permitted as in the Congress of Berlin. Our concern is primarily not about European problems but about problems which involve the peace and good order of the whole world. We must therefore demand that this war should result in a just recognition of all rights in accordance with just principles. The archaic principle of the balance of power which heretofore has brought such misery and cruel wrongs to Europe must be forever repudiated. The United States has not come into this struggle to redress the European "balance of power." We have come into the struggle primarily for the protection of our own rights. But we cannot shirk our responsibility to mediate between ancient enmities and bring to the councils of Europe fresh inspiration and counsels of justice. We cannot become party to any adjustments based on desire for revenge, aggrandizement and power. We must be prepared to insist on the application of sound principles which shall ensure an enduring peace. Our own interests demand this, as well as the interests of the nations most vitally concerned. The sacrifices of this hideous struggle must not have been in vain.

First of all, we may properly insist on the rights of nationalities, on the recognition of the principle "that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." The long fight of nationality and democracy must end in the fullest recognition of the right of men to group together in accordance with their political, social, religious and economic preferences and prejudices. Any substantial denial of these rights can only lead to future wars. There can be no just "enforcement of peace" where the legitimate claims of nationalism are not recognized. In further territorial readjustments, the wishes of the people immediately concerned should be ascertained as far as possible by plebiscites. But a small minority should never be permitted, in a spirit of selfish provincialism, to have the final decision where the larger interests of two or more nations are vitally involved.

If it should prove impossible in every instance to satisfy fully the aspirations and claims of a whole people or of a relatively small district, their rights should be protected by the establishment of complete local self-government. The principle of autonomy is the logical corollary of the principle of nationality. It may not be possible or desirable to guarantee complete independence to all aspirants for a separate national state. Take Poland or Bohemia for example. Owing to their peculiar situation, and

their relations to their neighbors, it would be excessively difficult for them to enjoy absolute independence. But the guarantee of the fullest degree of autonomy in affairs of a domestic, internal character would be the most essential right of democratic free peoples. They may not properly claim—any more than individuals—absolute freedom of action in their external relations. For the sake of compensating advantages in protection and general welfare, they may well be content to sacrifice a certain amount of freedom. Any other pretensions might lead to anarchy in international affairs as they would within the state.

A further principle which would seem to demand increasing recognition is that of international freedom of intercourse. The nations of the world are growing more and more dependent on each other, not alone for physical necessities, but for intellectual, artistic and moral satisfaction as well. The age of Chinese isolation is past. But so also should it be with economic warfare. Tariff frontiers and the exclusive exploitation of colonial markets do not conduce to world peace.

It is true, unfortunately, that state aid to industries in various guises, or low standards of living, may enable the manufacturers of a given country to flood foreign markets with cheaper goods. This in turn naturally compels other nations to raise protective dykes. This leads inevitably to friction, distrust, hatred and war itself. The end of economic warfare is disaster.

The logical alternative of this lamentable state of affairs is a frank, generous, mutual understanding between nations concerning the basic questions of production and distribution. Whether one speaks of it as reciprocity, freedom of trade, freedom of exchange, or—to employ Mr. Weyl's phrase—"the economic integration of the world," it would seem clear that the future peace of the world will depend in very large measure on the extent to which nations are able to reach generous agreements for regulated freedom of intercourse in all that makes life itself, as well as mere existence, worth while. The whole question strikes at the very roots of human welfare and happiness.

These three basic principles of nationalism, autonomy and freedom of intercourse amply complement each other. They afford a happy solution for many trying European problems such as Bohemia, Poland, Ireland, and Trieste. In the case of Trieste, for example, where the nationalistic claims of Italy conflict with the economic interests of the Austrian hinterland, the creation of a "free port" with complete autonomy under Italian sovereignty, and with absolute freedom of intercourse with Austria would doubtless prove an equitable arrangement.

These principles would seem to be the sound and just principles on which the maintenance of peace mainly depends. The statesmen of Europe, for honest or vicious motives, have heretofore been unwilling to grant the just

claims of nationalism and democracy. They have been dazzled by the *ignis fatuus* of the cynical principle of the "balance of power." If this principle should dominate or even exert a minor influence on the negotiations for peace which shall end this war, it would surely sow the seeds for future wars. The United States is bound to see that Europe shall free itself from this baleful influence which is a constant menace to the peace of the world. We have always stood for the principles of nationalism and democracy. We abandoned our neutrality because "neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples. . . ." We are bound to insist on sound guarantees for the future peace and freedom of the world. Such guarantees would seem to lie mainly in respect for the principles of nationalism, autonomy and regulated freedom of international intercourse. We may not care to assume direct responsibility for their application in the Balkans and elsewhere, but it would seem to be our duty to insist on their recognition wherever the peace of the world may be directly or indirectly involved. We must make certain that all the horror and the heroism of this "war against war" shall not have been in vain.

To summarize briefly, our consideration of the objects of this war from the American point of view has led to the following conclusions:

1—The United States is protecting its own

vital interests. We were attacked by an outlaw and could do nothing else with self-respect than defend ourselves. Not content with inhuman attacks on our citizens and ships on the high seas, he conceived dastardly plots in our very midst. With cynical effrontery he dared attempt to incite Japan and Mexico against us with promises of American territory. Negotiation with such a scoundrel was as shameful as it was futile.

2—Once in the fight, we find our task to be something more than the satisfaction of a private grievance and the temporary protection of American interests. Our duty is to make certain that it never can happen again. We are seeking permanent guarantees of peace. We see that the Prussian regime is a perpetual menace to peace. Its control of the German people, its partnership with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey in a formidable Mitteleuropa, because of its lust for world power is a portentous menace to the free democracies of the world. It will not be sufficient merely to thwart Prussia. A free democracy in Germany will be the only genuine guarantee of peace. In this sense, therefore, our war against Germany, though primarily for the defence of our vital interests, becomes a war in behalf of international freedom. We have resolved that "the world must be made safe for democracy."

3—The war must not be permitted to end in a compromise with an outlaw. On the other hand, it must not degenerate into a war for re-

venge, aggrandizement and power. The United States is bound to insist on reasonable guarantees for enduring peace. This is indeed "a war against war." We must insist on the application of sound principles even though we may have no immediate concern in the local problems at issue. These principles would seem to be the rights of nationalities, of autonomy, and of regulated freedom of intercourse. If the belligerents are willing to negotiate with each other in a spirit of equity, this world catastrophe will have proved a blessing.

4—There remains the further problem of international cooperation for the enforcement of rights, and the preservation of order and peace. The difficulties in the way of any formal organization at this stage of development in the community of nations are many and great. If the law abiding, peace loving nations, however, are able to crush this outlaw, and then lay the foundations of peace in accordance with sound principles, they may have but little reason to concern themselves about the formation of "councils," "leagues," police, or even of courts. The application of the Golden Rule as the rule of enlightened self-interest among nations will need hardly any other sanctions than its own sanction. The horrors of war must not be permitted to drive nations to adopt doubtful expedients for the maintenance of peace. There must be no menace of unjust coercion, and no denial of that freedom which is even more essential to nations than to individuals.

5—The ultimate problem of all must always remain that of seeking to bring about better understandings among nations. They must learn to understand each other first of all in order to sympathize with their respective aims. They must then learn to think alike concerning the basic interests, the rights and obligations of nations.

This is a long process of education requiring the labor of generations. Yet we may confidently hope that this struggle will have proved a most powerful agency in making nations understand each other. A common task, a common sacrifice and suffering should bring them to a clear vision of international justice. The union of the United States with sixteen other nations in the performance of the obligations of good international citizenship cannot fail to bring about a mutual understanding and respect that will firmly guarantee world peace.

The revolution in German thought that must inevitably come about in the near future should by the workings of Providence bring them also to a just appreciation of the rights of other nations. They, too, through sacrifice and suffering will be brought to a realization of their duties as good international citizens. The great fight for international freedom will have attained its supreme triumph. The United States may then thank God that we were privileged to have our great share in so sublime a cause.

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