

THE LIFE WORK

OF

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Columbia, S. C.

COMPILED AND EDITED

BY

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CHAPTER VI

THE SEMINARY PROFESSOR

By W. T. HALL, D. D.

Columbia Seminary, known at the present time technically as "The Theological Seminary of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Florida," was founded in 1828 by the Synod of South Carolina and Georgia. For a year or two it was conducted at Livingston, Georgia, the Rev. Thomas Goulding, D. D., being the only professor. In 1830 it was transferred to Columbia, South Carolina, and in 1831 to its present eligible site on Blanding Street. In chronological order it was the eighth strictly theological seminary established in the United States. The first was established in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, in 1793, by the Associate Presbyterian Church of North America; the second, by the Associate Reformed Church, in New York, in 1804; the third was Andover, in 1806; the fourth New Brunswick, in 1810; the fifth Princeton, in 1811; the sixth Union Seminary in Virginia, in 1824; the seventh the Associate Reformed Seminary at Alleghany, Pennsylvania. It thus appears that our branch of the Reformed Church was not the first to begin the work in this country of erecting strictly theological schools for the regular training of ministers of religion, and that it was not content to combine its resources on a single great institution at some suitable locality. The idea underlying the policy adopted by our fathers was the importance of educating candidates for the ministry at home. It was thought that the number of

candidates would be increased by having seminaries of sacred learning distributed over the territory at suitable intervals; that the candidates would be better adapted to the work in the home field; and that different sections of the Church would have an equal chance to secure a supply of laborers. The records of the Synod of South Carolina and Georgia show that all these considerations operated on the minds of the founders of Columbia Seminary. And a survey of the work done by the Seminary in aiding to plant and develop our Church in the tier of States from South Carolina to Texas abundantly vindicates the wisdom of its founders. At the semi-centennial of the Seminary, celebrated in 1881, the Rev. George Howe, D. D., LL. D., who gave his whole life to the service of the institution, made the following statement, which illustrates the point: "More than three-fourths of the ministers and licentiates of the Synod of South Carolina, more than half of those of the Synod of Georgia, about one-third of those of the Synod of Alabama and Arkansas, nearly one-half of the Synods of Memphis and Mississippi were students of this Seminary." It should not, however, be inferred that the founders of the Seminary had in view only the benefit of these extreme Southern States. They recognized the fact that the field is the world, and planted the institution with reference to every department of Church work. More than seven hundred ministers have been trained for their work in her classrooms; and have gone forth to adorn the pulpit and the press, to preside over institutions of learning, to fill the chairs of theological seminaries, and to take a leading part in evangelizing the world. Particularly has the service of her sons been conspicuous in the great work of foreign missions

and in the efforts to evangelise the colored population in our Southern country. How could it be otherwise with John Leighton Wilson and John L. Girardeau among her alumni?

Dr. Girardeau was elected Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in 1875. He was the sixth in the line of eminent theologians who had been called successively to this responsible position—including Dr. Goulding at the beginning, and Dr. Palmer for a year or two during the War between the States. We may refer again to the historical discourse of Dr. Howe for a glimpse of several of these distinguished men. "And now the forms of my own associates of the faculty pass before me—of Dr. Goulding, my first colleague, who, as he sometimes humorously said to me, 'was the first native of Georgia that became a Presbyterian minister since the foundation of the world'; and who served the Church faithfully in this office for six years; of Dr. A. W. Leland, of commanding person and high native endowments, who served the Seminary as professor first of theology, and then of rhetoric and pastoral theology, for thirty-one years, till disabled by disease; of the matchless J. H. Thornwell, D. D., L.L. D., professor for six years of Didactic and Polemic Theology, called away, alas! too soon for us, to the skies; and to these brethren so dear to us, we have to add another, *nomen clarum et venerabile*, William S. Plumer, D. D., L.L. D., whom our Lord and Master has called home to himself from a life of great usefulness and unremitted toil."

During the war the Seminary, with the consent of the Synods then owning it, passed under the control of the General Assembly of the Southern Presbyterian Church, and so continued until after the date of Dr.

Girardeau's election. Thus it happened that he was called to service in the Seminary by the voice of the whole Church, expressed through the commissioners to the Assembly. The election was held by the Assembly during its sessions in the City of St. Louis in 1875. The nomination was made by the Rev. Dr. Palmer, of New Orleans, in a memorable speech. He had known Dr. Girardeau from a child. They were both born in or near the City of Charleston, and were both trained at Columbia Seminary. For many years they were associated as members of the Synod of South Carolina. Dr. Palmer also had full knowledge of the needs of the Seminary. He had known the institution through all its troubled history and had been twice a member of its faculty. Perhaps he never felt greater satisfaction in any event which he had a hand in shaping than in the call of his friend to the chair of theology. It did not require, however, much eloquent speech to move and guide the Assembly on the occasion. The attention of the friends of the Seminary had been directed to Dr. Girardeau for years as the proper successor to the lamented Dr. Thornwell. They recognized in him a man of deep piety, scholarly tastes, large attainments and national reputation as a preacher. No other man of his age in all the Church combined so many admirable qualities. He was known to be in full sympathy with all that distinguished the Southern Church from other Presbyterian bodies. He had become famous as a preacher to the negroes in Charleston, and spent his life in their service, notwithstanding his devotion to the principles for which the Confederate Government contended to the bitter end. It is hardly necessary to say that his election was hearty and unanimous; and that it gave great satisfaction to all the

friends and alumni of the Seminary. The right man had been found at last.

But what appeared so clear to the minds of all the other alumni and friends of the Seminary was a source of anxious thought and great embarrassment to Dr. Girardeau himself. At a meeting of the Board of Directors in September, 1875, the following resolution was adopted:

“That the Chairman of the Board write to Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., and state to him that this Board regrets that he has declined to accept the professorship tendered to him by the Assembly, and requests him to reconsider the matter; and, if he can see his way clear to do so, that he will yet accept the appointment.”

In reply to this communication from the Board, Dr. Girardeau made the following answer:

“Dear Brethren: The Synod of South Carolina, at the late meeting, the Synod of Georgia having subsequently concurred, urged me to withdraw the letter to the Moderator of the General Assembly, in which I had declined to take the chair of Theology in the Seminary at Columbia. In earnestly endeavoring to dissuade the Synod from adopting that action, I pressed one reason, although there were others which had been prominent and obtrusive against my assuming the responsibility of the professorship. I afterwards regretted that I did not give a fuller disclosure of my difficulties, but the proposition took me by surprise, and on the spur of the moment I presented the great reason which appeared to my mind sufficient of itself to oppose my acceptance of the chair. The action of the Synod over my protest, I am constrained to confess, deeply affected me. The fact that it was taken by a body which knew me well, and which I greatly loved and honored, and that a question already once decided against, imposing sanctions was again urged upon me with a persistency I could not account for, both humbled and impressed me. I felt that I was called

on to reconsider the decision which had been rendered. Having done so, I now beg to lay before you for your consideration the result which has been reached. I have been extremely reluctant to submit the case in such a form as supposes a meeting of the board, but I am shut up either to take that course or else absolutely to decline. And I am compelled to address this communication to the board and not to the Synod, because the latter body will not meet again until late in next year, and it is practicable for the former to convene at any time. The propriety of invoking the action of the board, moreover, is justified by the consideration that they represented different Synods, and that they are the immediate curators of the Seminary. This, I beg, may be accepted as my excuse for subjecting the members of the board to the inconvenience of a special meeting, should one be deemed necessary.

“Circumstances render it proper and desirable that I should, at this stage of the matter, frankly expose to you, brethren of the board, the past and present posture of my mind in relation to it. This I will attempt to do with as much brevity as will consist with clearness. The reasons which have hitherto operated upon me have been of two sorts—one the matter of which was intellectual, and the other the matter of which was moral. In the first place, I was conscious of an inadequate furniture of scholarship and learning for the discharge of the duties of a chair which had been adorned by erudition as well as illustrated by genius. It was not so much a question of capacity, even though I could lay no claim to such a measure of it as the requirements of the chair demand. Upon that point my brethren had possessed the means of judging, and, if they thought me suited to be in some measure profitable to the Church in that respect, I was prepared to defer to their judgment. But it was a question of attainment which oppressed me and my own convictions as to that point sustained me in declining the position. Since the fresh and urgent pressure of the matter upon me by the Synod of South Carolina, with the concurrence of the Synod of Georgia, I have been led, somewhat to my own surprise, to take the view that the responsibility is lifted from me and assumed by the Church. I faithfully submitted the difficulty and it has been overruled. That reason, therefore, though still keenly felt, I now consent to waive.

“In the second place, among the moral reasons which have influenced me, unwilling to give up my present field of labor did not have a place. It would indeed be a great wrench to my feelings to be obliged to leave my beloved people, who have always treated me so generously and affectionately, but I admitted the power of the Assembly to make the transfer. Those reasons were the following: 1. There were certain private difficulties in the way of my acceptance which appeared to me to contribute to the justification of a declination. That reason, also, although not without great reluctance, I now relinquish. 2. I had received positive information that an impression existed, previously to my election by the Assembly, that I aspired to the Theological chair at Columbia, and also that in certain quarters a belief was entertained that there was a plan on the part of others which contemplated my being ultimately placed in it. In regard to the former I was innocent, and as to the latter I was ignorant. If any such plan existed I was unacquainted with it. It is plain that had I complied with the call of the Assembly those suppositions never could have been rebutted. Now, however, in consequence of my having declined, they must be exploded. That reason, therefore, is no longer operative. 3. I had made common cause with the brethren who have retired from the Seminary in contending for the principle of obedience to law on the part of theological students. In that contest we were defeated. Hence a two-fold difficulty arose. How could I consistently go into an institution in which the principle to which we had borne testimony had been prostrated? And how could I, by going in, appear to desert my friends who were out precisely on that issue? Fidelity alike to principle and to friendship seemed to rise up and dispute my passage to the Seminary. Nor could these things be easily separated, for the principle of obedience to constitutional law appeared to be incarnated in my friends as living representatives of it, and representatives in defeat. It is this difficulty which, since the solution of others, has emerged into prominence and occasioned my delay in responding to the request of the Synod. It is true the last Assembly in electing to a chair in the Seminary one who was known to have stood for the principle to which allusion has been made, seemed to give it a practical endorsement; but the concession was virtual, not explicit,

and nothing was said or done beyond an implicit approval which directly relieved the position of the brethren who retired from the Seminary. Fidelity to friendship, then, and obedience to the call of the church confronted each other. If they could in no way be reconciled, I felt that I must yield to the claims of the former and decline compliance with the call of the Church as incorrectly addressed to one under such circumstances. Since it is obvious that the Church cannot legitimately call an individual to violate fundamental obligations enforced alike by nature and the word of God. The question, then, was narrowed down to this: Would my going to the Seminary be fairly interpretable as an abandonment of the cause which was common to me with my friends, and to an abandonment of them? Now the cause was common to them and me in so far as the contest for the maintenance of the principle of obedience to law was concerned. If, then, my going into the Seminary would imply my relinquishment, or even compromise, of that principle, I could not go. Conscience and honor would bar its gates to me.

“If, therefore, I go into the Seminary, it can only be under this distinct understanding: that I regard the action of the Assembly of 1875 as an endorsement of the principle in question, and as consequently opening the way for one who maintained it to enter the institution, and also as virtually sustaining the retired professor in so far as their maintenance of that principle was concerned; that I still uphold that principle and would feel bound on any future occasion of its being challenged to give it my support; that I cannot consent to be construed as a sort of embodied compromise measure with neutral aspect toward opposite and conflicting principles; that it is my opinion that the utterance of the Church in her supreme court ought to have been definitely given in favor of the great principle of obedience to law and legitimate authority. Whatever view may have been expressed as to the expediency or inexpediency in the first instance of a particular measure which gave rise to the issue between that principle and the will of the students; that to the brethren who have retired from the Seminary ought to have been saved from that position of apparent humiliation in which they have been placed, but in which they must be consoled by the reflection that they are

vindicated by truth, and that the injustice which I conceive they have suffered ought to be removed by some explicit utterance of the General Assembly.

“At the same time I beg to say that should I go, it would not be in any belligerent or disputatious spirit, but with the purpose to refrain from agitating the facts or rekindling the passions of the past, and to endeavor, so far as in me lies, to act kindly, cautiously and fraternally toward all my colleagues, and with the hope that it may please the Lord Jesus to use me as an instrument for healing divisions, and so far contributing to the advancement of the Seminary and the interest of our beloved Zion.

“I lay before you, brethren of the board, this plain declaration of my views, and very respectfully crave your judgment in the case. If in the light of this statement you deem it inexpedient that I should go into the Seminary, an intimation from you to that effect will be all that is necessary. I will, in that event, allow my letter of declination to remain in the hands of the Moderator of the Assembly. If, on the other hand, with this statement before you, it still be your judgment, given unanimously, that I ought to go into the institution, I will withdraw that letter. In that case, as the Seminary has been in session for some time, I will submit to your will as to the question when I should enter upon the duties of the chair, whether during the present term or at the commencement of the next.

“I deem it required, by the allusions which have been made in this letter to Dr. Wilson and Dr. Adger, and by justice to them, to say that the former emphatically expressed his wish that I should go to the Seminary by the motion which he offered as to the form of the vote at my election, and that the latter has requested me to throw out of the account my personal relations to himself, and has expressed a strong desire that I should accept the professorship.

“I should be greatly pained if the impression should in the least degree be made upon your minds that I have written in any spirit of arrogance. Very far from it. I am too deeply sensible of the honor conferred upon me and the confidence reposed in me by my brethren, as well as my unworthiness and weakness; have been too profoundly exercised in regard to a

question at once so critical to me, and so closely related to the interests of the Church, to have been governed by any other feeling than one of humility.

"I come to you with the humble and earnest prayer that the Lord may reveal his will through the action which your wisdom may suggest.

"Permit me in conclusion to ask that you will do me the favor, when you shall have acted upon this communication, to give it publicity.

"I am, dear brethren, with high esteem,

"Very truly yours,

"JOHN L. GIRARDEAU."

On this communication the Board took the following action:

"1. That it sees nothing in the views expressed in the letter inconsistent with Dr. Girardeau's accepting the position in the Seminary to which he has been called.

"2. That this Board unanimously and most heartily repeats the call of the Assembly and the Synods of South Carolina and Georgia and the Board to Dr. Girardeau to accept the chair thus proffered to him."

Dr. Girardeau's notes show the spirit with which he entered his work, and the methods used by him.

"I entered upon the discharge of my duties here January 18th, 1876. I was, previously to my first lecture, anxious almost to sickness. I could not endure the thought of undertaking an office for which my furniture was consciously so inadequate. But the Lord helped me. I was enabled to speak with freedom in my first attempt, with the senior class, on the Dispositions proper to the study of Theology. And I have been helped since. I commit myself and this work to which I did *not* call myself, to the Almighty, faithful

hands of the Lord Jesus. Glorious Saviour! I adore, I admire, I love Thee! Use me to show forth Thy matchless beauty, loveliness and glory! Enrich me with all knowledge and utterance, for Thy name's sake, Amen.

J. L. G."

"FIRST MEETING WITH SENIOR CLASS.

"I. The Text Book to be used.

"Choice lies between Calvin and Hodge.

"Reasons for electing the latter.

"II. Get Calvin, and get him as well in the original as in the translation.

"Read him daily, in the original—if only a brief passage.

"On the topic for study the translation may be used, parallel with Hodge.

"Get Hill also. Lectures in Divinity. Comparative Theology.

"Read Thornwell's Second Volume. Masterly discussion. Turretin.

"III. Methods.

"1. Recitation upon text-book.

"2. Interrogation.

"3. Lectures—unwritten and written.

"4. Written analyses of each day's exercise."

"PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

"1. Relation between the instructor and the students.

"2. Free interrogation by the class. Free discussion under limitations. (1) Must not be captious. (2) Must not be to cover want of preparation, or to consume time. (3) Must be respectful.

"3. My advice to you is, that, ordinarily, you do not pursue the plan of taking notes of the remarks made by the professor; except in the case of definitions, leading divisions, and statements written on the blackboard.

"1. The practice will prove injurious to your training as extemporaneous preachers. The opposite practice beneficial.

"2. Injurious, also to your training as debaters and speakers.

"3. Hurtful to the memory. The bearing upon attention.

"4. Less stimulating to the teacher, especially when lecturing.

"5. You are not training to be expert reporters.

"6. Illustration derived from my listening to Thornwell and Palmer.

"7. This counsel is given only in regard to my own chair. Each professor must determine for himself concerning this matter. So, likewise, must, to some extent, each student.

"8. After each *recitation* write out scheme as far as possible. The difficulties may be great, but success will be all the greater.

"9. Analyses in writing, after every recitation, in alphabetical order."

"THE DISPOSITIONS PROPER TO THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

"I. In the general, those which spring from conversion.

"II. The love of Truth.

"This will induce zeal and industry in its pursuit.

"III. Neutrality of mind.

"What?

"1. Indifference as to what shall prove to be the truth as between conflicting views.

"Not indifference to the truth itself.

"2. Great law: Evidence is the measure of assent.

"3. The holding of previous judgments, however derived, except from thorough-going, independent investigation, as tentative. The weight to be attached to early instructions. Venerable presumptions, which are to be held until rebutted by competent evidence.

"IV. Humble dependence upon the Holy Spirit.

"V. Implicit submission to the dogmatic authority of God's Word."

"THE METHODS OF STUDY.

"I. Analysis and synthesis.

"II. Regard for the drift of a particular context.

"III. Regard for the analogy of the whole—'the proportion of faith.'"

History teaches that several conditions must meet in order to the production of a great theologian. Chief among these are extraordinary endowments, both nat-

ural and gracious; prolonged occupation as a professional instructor, and the stimulus of some absorbing religious crisis. This statement might be illustrated by referring to Calvin and Chalmers, or to Hodge, Dabney and Thornwell in our own country. The first and third of these conditions met in the case of Dr. Girardeau, but the second was, in a measure, absent. He entered the Seminary, as a teacher, in January, 1876, and retired voluntarily, as he began to feel the burden of years, in May, 1895. Time enough was allowed to form an acquaintance with the broad field of theology and its kindred sciences, but not for formulating the result in a systematic treatise. His pen was not idle, as we shall see further on, but his published works are critical rather than constructive. In adopting this policy he was wise. Dr. Charles Hodge began to teach in Princeton Seminary in the year 1822, but his "Systematic Theology" was not written until about 1870. Dr. Dabney and Dr. Thornwell both began their labors as instructors a few years after they were ordained as ministers. Dr. Dabney lived to a good old age and preserved his vigor to the last. Consequently we have a sense of completeness when we read his works. Dr. Thornwell was cut off in his fiftieth year, when his work was but half finished. There is perhaps some advantage in having in the chair of Theology a man who has had considerable experience in the pastoral office, but it is a question worth considering whether the gain would not be greater if the incumbent was allowed to give his whole life to the work of teaching. But, to return to the subject of this sketch, nor are we left in doubt as to the type of theology he taught, by the absence of a systematic treatise on the subject. The text-books he

used, his "Discussions of Theological Questions," and the statements of those who studied under him furnish ample evidence that he emphasized the Federal theology. By this we mean the Reformed Theology cast in the mould of the covenants. This will indicate with sufficient distinctness his devotion to the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms, as they contain the only Creed that teaches the doctrines of the Covenants. But the question remains as to the extent of the influence the federal principle is to be allowed to exercise in the interpretation of these standards. Fortunately for us, he has spoken his mind on this question deliberately and freely. At the semi-centennial of Columbia Seminary he delivered a carefully prepared address on "The Federal Theology: Its Import and Its Regulative Influence." He had been teaching theology in the Seminary about six years, and he probably made use of the occasion to indicate his position as a theologian. As our purpose in this sketch is to allow Dr. Girardeau to state his own views, we will quote freely from this address. It opens with the following brief history of the origin of the federal theology: "It has become almost an adage, that the Church has developed her theology mainly through conflict with error. This must be so from the nature of the case. Attention is not apt to be specially directed to what is undisputed, and our clearest judgments are delivered from comparison. The contrast of truth and error, induced by the assertion of the latter, enhances our comprehension of both. The doctrine of the covenants constitutes no exception to this law. It was not brought distinctly under investigation and formally developed until the period succeeding the Reformation. Luther grandly elucidated the cardinal doctrine of

justification by faith alone. Justification he saw clearly. Imputation he perceived less distinctly: and he stopped short of the controlling principle of federal representation. Even Calvin, magnificently endowed as he was by his abilities and learning for a systematic treatment of revealed truth, although he produced a theological work distinguished for its comprehensive grasp of the doctrines of religion in their relation to each other, did not seem to have had his mind definitely tuned to the federal scheme.

“It was when Placæus broached his theory of the mediate imputation of Adam’s sin that the attention of the Reformed Church was thoroughly aroused to the importance and scope of the federal theology. The theologians of the Dutch School, in their massive works, subjected it to a full, if not exhaustive, consideration; and their example was followed by some of the most illustrious divines of England and Scotland.”

He next considers the import of the Federal Theology. In this inquiry he begins with the Covenant of Grace, “for the reason that its existence and the operation of the representative principle in connexion with it are more clearly and explicitly set forth in the Scriptures than are the fact of the Covenant of Works and the way in which its results are entailed.” Much of the discussion must be omitted, but the following extracts will show the drift:

“In this covenant the principle of representation was involved as an essential element. Christ, by the appointment of the Father, and by His own spontaneous election, became the legal representative of the elect seed who were given to Him to be redeemed. He undertook all their legal responsibilities, as well as those which related them to the preceptive require-

ments of the moral law, as those which barred them as transgressors to endure the penalty. Whatever the law exacted of them, in order to their justification, he as their representative obliged himself to render. The life of obedience due from them He engaged to live; the death demanded of them He bound Himself to die.

“There is a distinction which is now strangely neglected, but to which the Calvinistic theology ought to be recalled, as vital to its consistency and completeness. . . . The import of it is that, on the one hand, the elect were, *in mass*, justified *in foro Dei*, in the justification of Christ as their federal head and representative; and, on the other hand, they are severally justified *in foro conscientiae*, when, in the period of their earthly history they actually exercise faith in Christ. In the first instance, they are conceived as justified constructively, federally, representatively; in the second, subjectively and consciously. In the first, they were justified independently of their voluntary conscience; in the second, they are justified through their conscious exercise of faith.

“If the doctrine of the Covenants be scriptural, it is too plain to need proof that there is a federal oneness of Christ and His seed. When, as their representative, He yielded obedience to the law in order to justification, they yielded that obedience in Him. His representative acts and experiences, in relation to that end, were theirs. Otherwise the principle of representation is a figment and the term *representative* a sham. . . . What hinders, then, that we should hold that when He was justified, they were justified with Him? The consequence must follow if He was justified as their head and representative. Not subjectively

and consciously, but federally and representatively, they obeyed, died, and rose again, and were, in God's heavenly court, justified, in Christ.

"Now, inasmuch as no justification at God's ban is conceivable except upon the ground of a perfect righteousness, it is obvious that the elect seed of Christ must have been, in some sense, adjudged to be righteous in order to their virtual justification. That sense is, that they were righteous by imputation. . . . Christ's righteous was, in God's court, imputed to them in order to their justification in Him. Here, then, it deserved to be noticed, we have a case of 'antecedent and immediate imputation' of righteousness—antecedent, since the imputation preceded the spiritual birth of the elect; immediate, since it was not conditioned by or mediated through inherent and conscious holiness.

"The elect seed of Christ having been thus, in the court of heaven, virtually justified in Him, their representative, were invested with a right and title to eternal life. Then, when their earthly history emerges, their righteous Advocate and priestly Intercessor, at God's appointed time, sent out for them the gift of the Holy Spirit, who, imparted to them by the Mediatorial King, enters into them, convinces them of their sin and misery, illuminates them in a knowledge of Christ as a Saviour, regenerates them, and enables them to exercise that which conditions their conscious and actual union with Jesus. Not now are they, for the first time, federally and representatively, but subjectively and consciously justified. This is their actual, in contradistinction from their virtual, justification. In the order of production it succeeds regeneration, as, in that order, virtual precedes it."

The author now turns to the parallel case of the operation of the great principle of federal representation in the covenant of works.

“Now had Adam fulfilled the condition of the covenant, that is, perfect obedience to the law, during the specified time of his trial, his posterity would have fulfilled the condition, would have rendered the obedience in him. So was it, we have seen, in the case of Christ and his seed. The obedience of the representative is the obedience of the represented—yielded not subjectively and consciously, but federally, legally, representatively. Nor does this destroy the reality of the constituent’s obedience. A representative’s obedience is as real as a conscious. They are differently conditioned, but they are both real.

“It follows, also, that had Adam been justified his posterity would in him have been justified in *foro Dei*. They would have had previously to their conscious existence, a virtual justification in him as their head and representative. The analogy holds between the virtual justification of Christ’s seed in his justification and the virtual justification of Adam’s descendants in him, on the supposition that he had fulfilled his probation. As no justification can take place except upon the ground of a perfect righteousness, the race, according to the supposition sharing his justification, would have been, in the court of heaven, justified on the ground of Adam’s righteousness imputed to them. These would, then, it is clear, have been an ‘antecedent and immediate imputation’ to them of the righteousness of their federal representative—antecedent, as anticipating their personal existence and inherent holiness; immediate, as directly terminating on them without being mediated through their conscious virtue.

And when they emerged into individual existence, they would—I am bold enough, pursuing the analogy, to think—have been actually justified upon their conscious acceptance of God's appointed method of justification; they would, in a word, have been both virtually and actually justified on the ground of imputed righteousness. It would have been nature's plan, as it is that of recovering grace.

“But Adam fell. Following the lead of the representative principle, we cannot err in affirming that his act of disobedience was the race's act of disobedience. ‘They sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression.’ They sinned in him, they performed his fatal act, not subjectively and consciously, but federally, legally, representatively. It is equally evident that his condemnation was theirs. He was condemned not merely on his own account, but as their legal representative; consequently, they were condemned in him. The sentence, passed in God's heavenly court, terminated at the same time upon him and upon his federal constituents. It was pronounced not in *foro conscientiae*, but in *foro Dei*. But as no sentence of condemnation can be justly pronounced except upon the ground of guilt, and as Adam's posterity was not in conscious existence when they were thus condemned, his guilt—the guilt of his first sin as representatively their sin—was imputed to them as the ground of their condemnation. It was not their guilt as contracted subjectively and consciously, but as incurred federally, legally, representatively. In the former sense the guilt was that which attached to another's sin—*peccatum alimun*; in the later, it was a guilt which resulted from their own sin. The distinction is scriptural and obvious, and it is the only one which even approximately

relieves the difficulties which the speculative reason encounters in its attempt to construe the facts of the case. But whether the thinking faculty is satisfied or not, faith accepts the exposition which it recognizes as furnished by inspiration itself.

“Here, then, we have again an ‘antecedent and immediate imputation’—the imputation of Adam’s guilt to his posterity, which was antecedent to their personal existence and subjective depravity, and which was immediate, as not conditioned by or mediated through their conscious corruption. The paralellism between the two Adams and their respective seeds is in the points indicated, without a joining element, condemnation being substituted for justification in the instance of the first Adam and his race.”

Having thus explained the import of the federal theology the author passes to consider its regulative influence—first upon the doctrines of natural religion, the religion of law; secondly, upon those of supernatural religion, the religion of redeeming grace.

In the realm of natural religion, it leaves no room for Pelagianism with its monstrous dream that men are born destitute of any character; for Arminianism with its theory of a family covenant and parental representative; for the various metaphysical theories that seek to explain the responsibility of the race for the sin of Adam on other grounds than those of legal representation; or for the theory that federal guilt and subjective depravity so concur in the same concrete and inseparable experience that neither is in order to the other.

But it has in natural religion more than a negative value. As to this positive influence we quote the author, instead of giving the substance in condensed form. “The regulative influence of the federal the-

ology is in nothing more signally manifested than in the fact that it affords the only tolerable solution of the profound and awful mysteries which hang over the moral history of the race. We are born in sin; we begin our earthly career in spiritual death, disabled for the performance of any holy act, and bound apart from God's redeeming grace by a fatal necessity of sinning; I say not of committing this or that particular sin, but of sinning. We are required to render a perfect obedience to the divine law which we have no ability to yield; failing that, we are commanded to exercise faith in Christ which we have in ourselves no power to put forth; we cannot deliver ourselves from this mournful captivity to the law of sin and death, we are bound in affliction and iron: and still we are justly held responsible for this condition, are righteously condemnable for its existence and are liable, on account of it, to the eternal pains of hell. Is it any wonder that reason reels and staggers under the apparent contradictions of the case? that she fumbles like the blind and feels after some guiding hand? Now if this were our original state, if thus we were at first created, if our history had no other beginning than one thus conditioned, the blackness of darkness would settle down upon the problem. But reason cannot be satisfied by such a supposition. She craves and demands another. Kant's hypothesis of an extra-temporal condition, and Julius Müller's and Edward Beecher's, of an ante-mundane existence, in which each individual determined his destiny by a free self-decision, attest at once her anxiety and her inability to escape from the gigantic difficulty. Scripture, philosophy and consciousness being her guides, she is estopped from taking that road for deliverance. Here

the Word of God comes to our help, and darts a morning beam into the deep midnight of the case. It informs us that our history began not at our birth but at the creation of Adam, not in the place of our nativity, but in Paradise. In our first parent appointed of God our head and representative, we had our legal probation under a covenant, which conditioned upon obedience for a limited time the attainment of justification and adoption—of indefectible holiness and bliss. In him we had freedom of will to elect the path of rectitude and to stand in integrity, in him we were endowed with amply sufficient grace to meet all the requirements of the trial. But he sinned and we sinned in him. He fell and we fell with him. We wilfully threw away our ability to render obedience to God, and, passing under the curse of a broken law, sunk into our present condition of helpless inability as the punishment of our foul and inexcusable revolt. This is the solution which the federal theology affords of the mysteries which enshrouded our moral state. Our inability is not original, it is penal. Discard this solution furnished by the Oracles of God, and we shall find that every other oracle is as dumb as the Theban Sphinx.”

In regard to the regulative influence of the federal theology upon the doctrines of supernatural religion attention is called to the fact that no Calvinist can state the successive steps in the application of the benefits of redemption apart from the federal scheme without plunging into inextricable perplexity; that this scheme is the bulwark of unconditional election, partial atonement, effectual calling, and the final perseverance of the saints.

Here we bring to a close what we consider should be said in a single chapter about the theology taught by Dr. Girardeau in the class room. As intimated in the beginning, it was thought advisable to state, as far as possible in his own language, the distinctive feature of his work in this department; and not to attempt to cull from his many discussions of special topics in theology a summary of his views. We will add to this judgment the further consideration that under Dr. Girardeau's distribution, or division, of theology the federal principle becomes pervasive. He divides theology into but two parts—the theology of natural religion and the theology of evangelical religion. The first division is concerned with all that is popularly called natural theology and also includes the covenants of works. The second division is concerned more particularly with what is embraced in the covenant of grace. Under such a distribution the scope of the federal principle is almost without limit. And we will add, also, as a further reason for such extensive quotations from the address on "The Federal Theology", that the volume in which it was published is accessible to very few readers of the present day.

The connection between certain branches of philosophy and theology is very intimate. It must be so, for the reason that they occupy common ground. Both assume to teach what is true concerning God and man. Philosophy seeks to attain truth on these vast subjects by speculation, while theology relies upon the testimony of God in His Word. Both methods are legitimate, but different conclusions are liable to be reached unless, on the one hand, the student is possessed of a sound philosophy, and, on the other, of a proper view of the office of review in regard to revela-

tion. Church history is full of instances where philosophy has been substituted for theology, and also of the baleful influence false principles in philosophy have exerted in the building of systems of theology. It has become common in our theological seminaries to meet this difficulty by requiring a course of lectures to be given in the junior year on the subject of philosophy, mental and moral. Dr. Girardeau's book, "Discussions of Philosophical Questions," grew out of this requirement. It grew out of the lectures on these subjects he delivered to his classes. And we must follow him into this branch of his work.

In the introduction we have the following explicit statement of the author's purpose: "Should the question be asked, What ends are sought to be accomplished by these discussions? the answer is, in the general, that the writer desired clearly to explicate and enounce the views derived from his own reflections, and that this desire was enhanced by the duty, bound upon him professionally, to deliver a brief course of lectures, during each session, in the institution to which he is attached. More particularly—and the answer is given in all modesty—the end contemplated by the writer has been to contribute something, so far as his abilities would allow, toward a fuller development of the destructive principles of the Scottish philosophy."

The characteristics of this school of philosophy are concisely given by Dr. James McCosh as follows: "It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really. In this respect it differs from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us. The method pur-

sued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly. . . . To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation. As the masters of the school were the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them, are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it. II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation. It may thus be distinguished from some other schools with which it has been confounded. . . . III. By the observation of consciousness, principles are reached which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other hand, from the dogmatism and a prior speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by observation, and out of the facts of experience; but, then, it separates from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have these the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutchison calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original and necessary.

Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as *a priori* forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them."

Allow another quotation from McCosh's "The Scottish Philosophy." "It has been the main aim of the Scottish school, as modified and developed by Reid, to throw back the scepticism of Hume. Reid tells us that he once believed the received doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system along with it, till, on discovering the consequences to which it had been driven by Hume, he was led to review the whole theory and abandon it. Kant declares that he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by the assaults of the Scottish sceptic, and was thus impelled to the task of repelling the attack. . . . It is interesting to observe the respective ways in which the Scottish and the German metaphysicians sought to meet the great skeptic. It is evident that the assaults might be repelled at one or other of two places; either when the foe has entered, or after he has made certain advances. That the mind begins with impressions and goes on to ideas, which are mere reproductions of impressions—this is the fundamental principle of Hume. . . . It is interesting to observe that

Reid met him at both these points. . . . Kant exercised his best power in meeting Hume at the other (second) point; that is, in showing that there is an *a priori* furniture in the mind, independent of all experience. But what he built with one hand he took down with the other. For these *a priori* forms could not, in his theory, guarantee any objective reality. . . . Sir W. Hamilton sought to unite Reid and Kant, but was never able to weld thoroughly together the principles which he took from two such different sources. His doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, and of causation as a mere importency of the mind, has prepared the way for a doctrine of mere experience now largely espoused."

These extracts from McCosh enable us the more fully to appreciate the end and aim of Dr. Girardeau in his "Discussions." Of the distinctive principles of the Scottish philosophy and the errors of Hamilton he says: "Those principles constrained his adherence by their agreements, in his judgment, with the data of consciousness and their necessary consequences, with the common convictions of mankind, and with the doctrines of divine revelation. But although considered for the most part sound and superior to any other system, the Scottish philosophy did not appear to be free from certain grave defects, or to have reached the point of consummate development. This seemed to be true, notwithstanding the fact that the extraordinary learning and acumen of Sir William Hamilton were employed in the effort to bring it to maturity. Indeed, it must be confessed that the attempt of the great philosopher to expand, systematise and perfect it was attended with certain inconsistencies of statement and questionable doctrinal utterances, together with some

ambiguity in his positions, which resulted unhappily. They exposed him to the unfriendly criticism of his associationalist opponent, John Stuart Mill, gave some plausibility to the claim of Herbert Spencer that his agnosticism is justified by Hamilton's doctrine touching the knowledge of the Infinite, and —'most unkindest cut of all'—induced some of the supporters of the Scottish philosophy to impute to him the maintenance of the utter incognoscibility of God, and the atheistic tendencies of that view." Taking this view of the situation, it was the noble aim of the author to "bring the system into harmony with itself"—and to assist in advancing the Scottish philosophy towards a completer and more definite development." It is probable that these discussions ranged above the average capacity of the students who heard them. There can be no question, however, as to the ability with which they are conducted or of their value to maturer minds among the ministers and intelligent laymen of the Church. All that can be attempted here is a glance at a few of the points in which the author differs from Hamilton. And this not so much for the psychological value of the changes, as for their influence on theology.

First, the author differs in some important particulars from Hamilton's classification of the cognitive powers. We wish to notice briefly one of these variations. Under the head of "Faculties of Mediate Knowledge" he puts down three—Representative Faculty; Thinking Faculty; Believing Faculty. These give, respectively, Representative Knowledge; Thought-Knowledge; Faith-Knowledge. In other words, the Representative Faculty yields knowledge, and so do the Thinking and the Believing Faculties. Faith is

as truly a source of knowledge as reason. There is a valid distinction between mediate and immediate knowledge, but none whatever between faith and knowledge. Knowledge is the genuine result of all the cognitive faculties. The contrast to faith is not knowledge, but cognition. We know, it is true, only what stands in relation to the mind, but there are several ways in which this relation may be established. Sense-perception or memory or reflection may bring an object before the mind; but so also may the report or testimony of other persons. The old distinction that we know what is present while we believe the unseen may mislead us. The Bible makes faith a source of knowledge. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews says: "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." Our Saviour says: "This is eternal life to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."

Faith being a source of knowledge, our author proceeds to discuss the question, "Have we a valid knowledge of the Infinite Being?" This he tests both in the sphere of natural and supernatural revelation. The conclusion reached is that in neither sphere is a knowledge of God as Infinite attained by the cognitive reason. Must we, therefore, abandon hope of reaching such knowledge? By no means. In all our knowledge there are two elements, one of which addresses itself to the cognitive powers, the other to the believing faculty. It is the joint operation of these two classes of faculties that gives the full result. We know substance; only, however, as it is manifested through its properties. When the phenomena are apprehended by the faculties of cognition, the existence of the sub-

stance becomes known by an immediate and necessary act of faith. In like manner, when the world is apprehended as contingent, the believing faculty, under the law of the causal judgment, infers a self-existent Creator. And the process is the same in the sphere of Supernatural Revelation, the necessary conditions being furnished by the life-giving energy of the Holy Ghost. Man was made to know God. There is in every soul of man a fundamental faith which adapts it to the knowledge of the Infinite Being. This proposition will bear the test of all the criteria by which fundamental beliefs are discriminated. And when this native faith is developed by a cognitive experience, it gives valid knowledge of the Infinite God.

Still another question in this connection is raised by the author. Granting that we have a valid knowledge of the Infinite God, he goes on to inquire, "Is it possible for the reason to employ it as an element in the processes of science?" The significance of this question will be recognized at once by all who have reflected upon the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition of theology, or of allowing to it, in strictness of speech, the character of a science. In grappling with this problem, the author notices first that we may define without limiting. For instance, unless we are Pantheists, we must distinguish the divine substance from all created substance. And yet we do not limit it. Again, we distinguish one divine attribute from another, but do not limit any of them. Again it is admitted that, while we know the fact of God's existence, we do not know *how* he exists. It is the fact that God is Infinite that we know. It is revealed to faith. "It is susceptible to affirmation and negation—may be made a term of human judgments. In like manner, a

divine attribute cannot be perfectly comprehended by us, but it may be known as an infinite perfection by faith; and as known may be made the subject or the predicate of a proposition. Cognition may furnish one term and faith the other, and the proposition be valid. For example, we are entitled to make the affirmation: the justice of God is infinite. Cognition gives justice a particular kind of perfection, as the subject, and faith gives the term *infinite* as predicable of justice. Here, then, we have an infinite element as a valid constituent of a premise, and as other premises may be construed in the same way, legitimate conclusions may be drawn. But if we may reason about the Infinite and from the infinite, it is manifest that it may constitute a valid element in human science under the limitations, however, which have been pointed out."

We pass now to notice his criticism of Hamilton's doctrine of Causation. The importance of correct views on the nature of cause and of the origin of the causal judgment cannot be exaggerated. The mind is constructed with reference to knowledge as distinctly as the eye is to sight. Take away such notions as those of unity, of plurality, of differences, of identity, of cause, and you make it impossible to compare our impressions or to attain the conception of general laws. Knowledge is just the application of primitive concepts of the understanding to the material furnished by sense or consciousness. In this way we know the sensible realities. But in order to rise above the sensible the mind must be furnished with primitive beliefs, as well as original concepts. It is generally recognized that without the native belief that every effect must have an adequate cause there could be no speculative knowledge of God. But the play of this principle in

the sphere of revealed religion should not be overlooked. What is the Bible but an effect of a supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost exerted on certain men who were of God to be his organs in communicating his mind and will to men? And what is redemption but a work which manifests the deity of its author? Hume recognized the importance of the doctrine of causation. He seized upon the prevalent philosophy of his time to eliminate from the idea of cause the element of efficiency. All that the senses can perceive is antecedence and sequence, and that is all we can know. That the antecedent produces what follows is no part of the idea of cause. Our knowledge in the case goes no further than our experience. The causal judgment is a fancy. Kant came to the rescue, but unfortunately, while he vindicated the intuition of the mind, he made the particular law of causation entirely subjective. It regulates the order of our thoughts, but does not certify that things exist as we think them. Hamilton applied his doctrine of the conditional to the case and reached the conclusion that the causal judgment is not the result of a positive but of a negative necessity of thought—that it is not the native product of a faculty of the soul, but springs from a native impotency. We wish we had space to introduce to the readers Dr. Girardeau's criticism of Hamilton's errors both as to the nature of the idea of cause and as to the origin of the causal judgment. It is both unfair and unsatisfactory to cite a single paragraph from a long and labored discussion. But to this we are compelled for want of space. Hamilton's position is that the causal judgment lies between the two inconceivable and contradictory extremes of an absolute commencement or an infinite series of relative commencements.

Neither is conceivable, and hence mental impotency. But as contradictory, one or the other must be true. Consciousness decides through its testimony to free acts of the will that an absolute commencement is the true extreme. A negative judgment of the mind cannot counterbalance the express affirmative of consciousness. We know that we are the responsible authors of our actions. The following quotation will intimate the course of the argument in refuting Hamilton's doctrine: "If these things be so, Hamilton's argument against the view that the law of causality is original and underived breaks down. The argument is that nothing is to be assumed as an original, special principle of the mind, operating by a positive necessity, which can be shown to result from a mere mental powerlessness. The causal judgment, he contends, is in this category: it is enforced by a negative necessity occasioned by an inability of the mind to conceive the contrary. Hence there is no original, fundamental law, no special positive principle of causality in the mind. His minor—namely, that the causal judgment is derived from a mental impotence—has been shown to be inconclusive. . . . The other argument of Hamilton against such a positive, fundamental law of belief also gives way—to wit, that, as consciousness affirms the fact of an absolute commencement, it contradicts the hypothesis of an original law which demands a cause for everything which begins to be; and that our nature would be self-contradictory and mendacious on the supposition of the existence of such a law and of the testimony of consciousness in opposition to it; but we have seen that consciousness makes no such affirmation."

The last contribution to philosophy made by Dr. Girardeau, which we will notice, is his treatise on "The Will in Its Theological Relation." As his views on this subject have been exposed to not a little criticism, attention should be called to the fact that they were not hastily adopted by him. He tells us in the preface to the volume something of its history. In the year 1849, while a licensed probationer for the gospel ministry, a sentence in a sermon in pamphlet form, by Dr. Thornwell, suggested to his mind some serious questions. Not feeling satisfied with the solution given by Dr. Thornwell in a subsequent interview, he worked out his own answers, but did not obtrude them upon the minds of others. During the war Jonathan Edwards' "On the Will" was one of his companions in the army and was carefully studied. In 1871 the first two volumes of "Dr. Thornwell's Collected Writings" were issued, and about the same time the "Systematic Theology" of Dr. Charles Hodge. His surprise was great to find himself relieved from the necessity of being cautious in the expression of his views as they seemed after all to be taught substantially by both of these masters in Israel. "In 1877, a controversy involving the theological relations of the will occurred between two distinguished combatants, conducted on the one side in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* and on the other in *The Southern Presbyterian Review*. In the progress and results, so far as reached, of this debate I became intensely interested, and published two articles in *The Southern Presbyterian Review* on the subject of the Freedom of the Will in Its Theological Relations. These articles were challenged and criticised by an able writer in the pages of the same *Review*. This led to the addition of four articles,

making six in all, which were published in *The Review*. The remaining part of the work was subsequently written."

The work treats of the will in man's four different estates of innocency, hereditary sin, grace and glory. It is not necessary, however, to follow him over this broad field. What our purpose requires is simply to collect from the volume what is peculiar to Dr. Girardeau's teaching. And the task is still further shortened by the fact that the whole treatise grew out of a painful conviction of the author that the doctrine of the will taught by Jonathan Edwards fails either to ground the sense of human guilt or to acquit God of the charge of being the author of sin. For this reason he regarded it as an insufficient account of the freedom of the will. The case, as Dr. Girardeau saw it, is set forth in the following extracts: "We pass on to show that the theory of Edwards, either as held by himself or as modified by those who essentially agree with it, fails to ground the sense of guilt and to acquit God of the charge of being the author of sin, and is therefore an insufficient account of the freedom of the will. The point in which they all concur is the denial to the will of any self-determining power, that is, of any power to originate its determination—of any real, causal efficiency in itself, and the affirmation that its volitions are efficiently caused by the sum of motives existing in the soul. . . . They agree in affirming moral necessity of all the acts of the will, that is, they hold that the acts of the will, whatever they may be, are unavoidable. They could not be otherwise than they are in any given case. The man wills freely, but he cannot will otherwise than he does. He acts in accordance with a force operating invincibly and inevitably through the

will itself. The force is the spontaneity and *habitus* of the man himself. He always acts in accordance with, never against it. The law which the adherents of the principle of determinism coincide in announcing is: As is the moral spontaneity of the man, so must be his volitions—the spontaneity determines the will; the will never determines the spontaneity. This is Edwards' moral necessity, a necessity not imposed in the way of physical constraint, but springing from the dispositions of the man himself. Now, every Calvinist must admit the possible co-existence of such a necessity with the highest form of freedom. They concur in God, in the elect angels, and in glorified men. The only question is—and it is of the utmost consequence—Does this concurrence take place in every supposable case? Did it obtain in the instance of the non-elect angels and of Adam in innocence? We do not object to the possible concurrence of this necessity and freedom of will. We admit it as a fact in some actual instances. We deny that it must always exist—that it is the result of a universal and invariable law. . . . Let us settle our view of this concurrence theory. Its essence is that the will, morally considered, has, under no conceivable circumstances or relations, any power to act otherwise than in conformity to the moral spontaneity of the soul. Its freedom consists in its following the law of the spontaneity. It must be what the spontaneity is. Now, the question starts up: What determines the moral spontaneity which thus determines the will? What is its origin? What is the cause which produces it? For we are agreed in demanding a cause for every effect. It will not do to say, it is sufficient to know that the spontaneity belongs to the man himself, and in acting in accordance with

it, he is only expressing himself. That may be true, but that accounts only for self-expression, as Dr. Thornwell well remarks, and not for self-determination. How comes the man to be conditioned thus and so? Did he have any voluntary agency in inducing that moral type of being which now characterises him beyond his power to change it, or did he not? If he did not, he only develops his natural constitution when he sins. Not to sin would be to violate the original laws of his being. It can not be conceived that he would be more to blame than is a poisonous plant in producing poisonous fruits in accordance with the law of its nature. If he did, then he must have done so by a self-determination of the will, that is, a determination uncaused by a preceding moral spontaneity; for, upon the supposition, he determined the spontaneity and was not determined by it. . . . And the question resolves itself into this: Did Adam, by a free self-decision which might have been avoided, determine himself in the direction of sin? Here the issue is to be joined. This is the real place at which the discussion of the self-determining power of the will must be had. It is idle to transfer the question to the will in its present sinful condition. It is the case of Adam which is critical, typical, controlling. . . . The question before us, then, is did Adam, in the commission of the first sin, act from necessity—that is, was his first sin unavoidable? or did he commit it by an un-necessitated and avoidable decision of his will? Now, either he was in some sense necessitated to the commission of the sin, or he was not. If he was, then God must have been the author of the necessity.”

In a word, Dr. Girardeau demands for the will, in the case of an innocent creature on probation, the

power of contrary choice. He thinks the angels that kept not their first estate must have possessed it; and that Adam, when he was on trial for himself and his natural posterity, must have been endowed with such a power. He would not say that the sin of Adam and his fall were uncertain events, but he would say that they might have been avoided. Still further Dr. Girardeau holds that we are bound to conform our view of the constitution and working of Adam's soul in innocence to the requirements of the revealed facts of imputed guilt and the impossibility of God's causal agency in the fall. A psychology built on the testimony of the consciousness of fallen man cannot be transferred to him while undergoing probation. "The undoubted principles of a correct theology must be held to be regulative of the conclusions which flow from a merely philosophical process, so far as common ground has been occupied."

It is not to be supposed that a strong and earnest mind, thoroughly imbued with the principles of the Federal theology, would have reached conclusions so different from those of contemporary Calvinistic writers if there had been entire agreement as to the question under discussion and in the use of terms. Justice requires that Dr. Girardeau be allowed to make his own statement of the question, and to define his use of terms. We refer the reader to his treatise for the larger portion of the statement, having room only for two of the more important particulars covered by it.

In stating the question at issue Dr. Girardeau uses the following words: "An illegitimate distinction is made between the man and the will. What is the will, but a power of the man? If, therefore, the man is

free, his will is free; else the unity of the soul is destroyed. And this becomes the more glaringly inadmissible when, in consequence of this unnatural schism, freedom is denied to the faculty which is by eminence that of action, and restricted to those which are only active in a limited degree. . . . The question which it is proposed now to consider is not, whether the soul may be free, while the will is not, but whether the soul is free in willing—that is, whether the will is free.” Let us now introduce the statement of another author, and we will see how wide apart they are at the beginning of the discussion. He says: “Another ambiguity still more mischievous is found in the current phrase, ‘the freedom of the will.’ Locke has very clearly raised the question of the propriety of the phrase, by asking whether freedom or liberty is not always thought as the attribute of a personal agent, and not of a faculty or power. This question discloses the confusion of the statement. It is the human spirit which is free in all its responsible volitions, and not the faculty of the will. Were freedom ascribed to any other faculty or power of the spirit, the absurdity would be at once apparent.”

Dr. Girardeau raises the question, “What is the relation which the Will sustains to the other powers?” To this perhaps most followers of the general theory of Edwards would say: The human spirit is subject to laws of action regulative of its faculties in their freest processes. In order to the rise of a volition there must be an object presented to the intelligence of the spirit which chooses. The object must be seen by the mind not only as attainable but also as good. And whether the object will appear desirable or good will depend upon the disposition of the man. Dr. Girar-

deau would answer as follows: "We would express it (the relation) as that of elective obedience. It furnishes no laws or regulative standards of action. These are given by the other faculties, and it is its province, by its choice, to comply with them. . . . It is its peculiar office—and it has a mysterious power to perform it—to choose the suggestions of the other faculties, to assimilate them into its own nature and to make them the proximate inducements to personal action. . . . In discharging this office, the will establishes a spontaneous *habitus* of its own, an inclination, appetency, *nisus* toward the doing of those things, the attainment of those ends, to which it had received direction from the other faculties."

We have now said all that seems to us necessary in order to enable the reader to fix Dr. Girardeau's relative position as a teacher of theology and of philosophy. The work was undertaken at the earnest request of the family, and it has been to me a labor of love. I greatly preferred that it should be entrusted to some one of Dr. Girardeau's own students, who would be better qualified to do it creditably. But I am not sorry to have an opportunity to give some slight manifestation of regard for one who was so kind and so helpful to me at the beginning of my work as his successor in office.

Two estimates of Dr. Girardeau as a teacher and as a member of the Thursday Afternoon Conferences, furnished at my request, will close this sketch. The first is by Rev. Thomas P. Hay, D. D.:

"I entered the junior class in the Seminary about a month before Dr. Girardeau entered the institution as Professor of Theology. And it was my privilege

to be his scholar during the period of his transition from the eloquent pulpit orator to the professor and teacher. He impressed and greatly helped me by his gift of analysis and of clarifying things by making distinctions, and of logical development of thought; and by the happy faculty of fixing thought and truth, thus elucidated by the illustrations of his imagination and the charms of his eloquence.

“Dr. Girardeau required his students to write out from memory an analysis of his lectures, or a recapitulation of the portion of a text-book gone over in a recitation, embodying any criticism he made on the author’s statements. One of these analyses would be read and criticized by the professor at the beginning of the next class-hour. By this exercise I learned to preach without any notes in six months’ time; and the professor’s system of theology took full hold on my understanding and memory. I could recall his arguments and reasonings on all theological questions raised, and even his personal opinions on matters on which Calvinists differed. I have often said that, next to my revered father, I owed more to Dr. Girardeau than any other man; and this was due to the above characteristics. He certainly *taught* me theology, established my convictions in the truth of the Calvinistic system and trained my mind.

“Let me add to this my impression of his kindness to his students and his sympathy and readiness to come down to the student’s ground and point of view. He reasoned and argued as an equal; so that a young man was not afraid to raise his questions and difficulties, and felt free to differ with him and argue out his own contention.

“He impressed me in the Conferences very much, as doubtless he did the congregations whom he served as pastor. He was spiritual, edifying, earnest, eloquent and loving.”

The second is from Rev. B. P. Reid:

“Students under Dr. Girardeau got a great deal more from him than a mere knowledge of the truths he taught. This is useful enough as far as it goes, and is about all that is to be gathered from many teachers reputed to be great. But there ought to be more in every teacher than his mere mental machinery. Wonderful as was Dr. Girardeau’s mental power, there was something in him far beyond this, because, under him, we got an impression of a man which lingers with us as an inspiration in life.

“Who could fail to be impressed with his devotion to truth which amounted to an absorbing passion with his soul? The very intensity of his love of it made him so quick and positive in the expressions of his conviction of it, as to cause some to suspect him of a lack of charity to those opposed to his view, which was far from being true. When he discussed the great doctrines of theology who could fail to be touched by his evident feeling of awe in the presence of these great facts about God, and who could escape the conviction that his soul saw reaches not perceived by the ordinary mind?

“Eloquence and wit, both natural to him, enlivened all his class-room lectures and talk. Never have we heard anywhere his equal in the power of apt and original illustration drawn from Scripture incident, and of clothing great thoughts easily and rapidly in their appropriate garments of words.

“We admired, necessarily, Dr. Girardeau’s great power as class-room lecturer and preacher, and we loved him for his sympathy. This was so deep and so pure as to lead him to be absolutely forgetful of himself in the use of all that he had. His evident joy in the opportunity to help, whether with instruction, advice, or money, is something long to be remembered by those under him. The way in which he followed us out into life with a kindly interest which grew with the years, showed that his sympathy was no passing emotion, but belonged to the very composition of his being. To this hour I can not recall, without emotion, the last time I remember seeing him when he called me to him across the crowded street of the city with all the joy of youth in his voice over the sight of a friend. He oftentimes refreshed and encouraged us with his sympathy in life, and this made it especially hard when we had to be told that the hour of his departure was at hand.”

Upon his resignation the following paper was unanimously adopted:

“In accepting the resignation of Dr. John L. Girardeau, L.L. D., as Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology, the Board of Directors of Columbia Theological Seminary would note the fact that this action on our part has been taken most reluctantly, and not until we had used every effort to induce him to continue his connection with us, and had been assured by him that this action on his part was final, and that his connection with the faculty must close with the present term.

“The Board takes this occasion to express its grateful appreciation of the valuable services he has, through these many years, rendered to this institution. He has given to us the best of his life, and has favored our students with his splendid abilities. As an active worker he goes out from our halls, but

his memory, a precious legacy, shall remain in our minds, and our affection for him shall never go out of our hearts.

"As for his work, it has been wrought out of and upon material that is immortal, and will forever abide a splendid monument to the honor and glory of Him he so faithfully followed and so devotedly served."

The following resolutions were adopted by the faculty of the Seminary:

"In view of the retirement of Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., LL. D., the faculty wish to place on record their sincere regret at the dissolution of his relation to the Seminary, in which he has so long been an honored professor.

"1. *Resolved*, That we hereby express our appreciation of his talents, scholarship, eloquence, piety and loyalty to the truth, which have made him the peer of the great theologians and preachers of the country and century.

"2. *Resolved*, That as a member of the faculty, he was wise in counsel, courtly in his bearing, kind and considerate towards his co-professors, while firm and decided in his convictions.

"3. *Resolved, further*, That the prayers of the faculty shall follow him while we indulge the hope that he may yet be spared for many years of usefulness in the Church.

"4. *Resolved*, That these resolutions be published in the papers of our Church and in those of the city, and that the clerk is directed to furnish Dr. Girardeau a copy of the same."

NOTE.

The editor has added Dr. Girardeau's inaugural address to Dr. Hall's article as an appendix. It should have appeared in the "Discussion of Theological Questions," but was omitted by a mistake. The editor is especially anxious to preserve it, as Dr. Girardeau was accustomed to say of it, "This is about the length of my tether."