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THE TERMINOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

I

Considered as a monument of the Greek language at a particular stage of its development, the New Testament is a very interesting document; and not least so in the terminology which it employs to express the emotion of love. The end-terms of this development, so far as it is open to our observation, are found—we are speaking in broad categories—in the literature which we know as “classical” on the one side, and in the speech of the modern Greek world on the other. In passing from one of these end-terms to the other, a complete revolution has been wrought in the terminology of love; a revolution so radical that the ordinary verb for “to love” in classical Greek has lost that sense altogether in modern Greek, its place being taken by a verb in comparatively infrequent use in the classics; while the ordinary substantive for “love” in modern Greek, formed from this latter verb, does not occur even once in the whole range of classical Greek literature. Coming in somewhere between these two end-terms, the New Testament, flanked on the one side by the Septuagint version of the Old Testament and its accompanying Apocrypha, and on the other by the Apostolic Fathers, forms a compact body of literature in which alone we can observe the revolution in progress; or, we should better say, in which this revolution suddenly appears to sight already nearly completed. Without any heralding in the secular literature, all at once in this religious literature the change presents itself to our view as in principle already an accomplished fact.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF WAR

It is the doctrine of many that Christianity and war are mutually exclusive. This doctrine they base on three fallacies; that Christianity contemplates the speedy cessation of war; that such cessation is to be accomplished through her ethics; and that her ethics leaves no place for war. Let us take up these propositions one by one.

1. Christianity contemplates the speedy cessation of war. That she looks forward to its cessation may not be disputed. She could not but do so. Does she not conceive of God as "the God of all peace" (Rom. xv. 33)? Does she not delight to sing of him as "making wars to cease unto the end of the earth; as breaking the bow and cutting the spear in sunder; as burning the chariot in the fire" (Ps. xlvi. 9)? Was not her divine Founder foretold as the "Prince of Peace" (Isa. ix. 6)? Was not his birth announced by the angels as ushering in the era of peace? Did not the great Apostle describe the effect of Christ's reign as "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17)? Do not both Testaments glow with the vision of the day when he shall "judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many peoples: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa. ii. 4)?

Yet while all this is so, we must remember that our Lord himself did not expect the speedy cessation of war. On the contrary, he told his disciples that when they should hear of wars and rumors of wars, they should not be troubled; for such things (St. Mk. xiii. 7), said he, "must needs be, but the end shall not be yet." That is, wars and rumors of wars are not only no sign of the end of the world; they must in the nature of things occur. "The prince of the power of this world, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience," being who and what he is, it

could not be otherwise. Indeed, our Lord's programme for the development of the world before the certain triumph of peace and righteousness might well be understood as allowing for commotions and wars on a scale that would make even the terrific struggle of today appear insignificant. To think differently is to misunderstand both the devil's relation to war and the awfulness of his power.

Moreover, our Lord expressly says of himself, "I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. x. 34). Though himself the author and giver of peace, the Prince of Peace, a result of his mission would be contentions among individuals and wars between states. Not that he would cause these—that is impossible, he being the incarnation of love; but that he would necessarily become their occasion—that is what is meant. The devil hates nothing so much, and, being what he is, must resist nothing so strongly, as divine love: it is the opposite of his nature; it is the sure destroyer of his power.

Wars, therefore, in general, and such wars as the present one in particular, do not have the significance that we have seen to be commonly attached to them. Their existence and continuance do not in themselves prove anything against Christianity. Least of all do they indicate her failure, for she made no claim as to how soon she could do away with them, and she did intimate that they should be with us indefinitely and with increasing horror. The war, consequently, while it may disappoint the optimism of many, must at least vindicate the consistency of Christianity. It is just what her own teaching as to the devil and as to his power as prince of the world would lead us to expect.

2. The second of the fallacies referred to above is that the cessation of war, or universal peace, is to be effected through the teaching of Christian ethics. That Christianity attaches great importance to her ethics; that in a true sense she exists in order to its realization; that her own power resides largely in her matchless moral sys-

tem,—all this cannot be asserted too positively or too frequently. "The force of truth" is the greatest of natural powers, and the moral principles and precepts of our religion are the very truth of God. The fallacy, however, in this position is that Christianity appeals to her ethics as the means by which the evils of war are to be mitigated and it itself at last prevented, and that, therefore, the alleged powerlessness of her ethics in these respects must be fatal to herself. The fact is that our religion does not make, and never has made, any such appeal. On the contrary, one of her fundamental doctrines is that all men are "by nature" "dead through trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. 1), and, consequently, incapable of responding to or even of appreciating "the force of truth." As Dr. Charles Hodge puts it, "the truth is compared to light, which is absolutely necessary to vision; but if the eye be closed or blind, it must be opened or restored before the light can produce its proper impression." The Psalmist, therefore, prays, "Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law" (Psalm cxix. 18); and our Lord himself says, "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him" (St. John vi. 44). Thus even truth incarnate is represented as in itself powerless to influence us. Though Christ in his character and life and teaching is "the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely," the carnal or natural heart "can see no beauty in him that it should desire him." Himself "the Truth," even he, simply as truth, has no power to attract, not to say to move us. Hence, it is that nowhere is Christian ethics as such appealed to. Its own truth and its own power are admitted, but the appeal is always to him who alone can open the blind eyes and recreate the dead heart and so make us able to discern and to understand and to love and to keep the law.

This is just what most men fail to grasp. They hold that a perfect system of ethics is all that is needed, and that because Christian ethics evidently is not all that is needed, it

cannot be perfect, that, consequently, it must have "failed." This is as unreasonable as though we were to claim that light is useless because it cannot help a blind man. In either case, our appeal must be to one who can make the blind to see and the dead to feel, that is, to a supernatural and so divine Saviour. Only in vital connection with such an one may Christian ethics be expected to do its work.

But it is precisely this condition which has not been fulfilled and which, as things are, cannot be fulfilled. It has from the first been characteristic of those who have put their hope only in the purity and sublimity of the moral teaching of Christ that they have denied his deity. If they have made him the greatest of teachers, they have insisted that he was simply a teacher. Widely though they have differed among themselves as to the explanation of the uniqueness of his teaching, they have agreed in repudiating him as "God manifest in the flesh." That distinguished scholar, professor, pastor and missionary, the Rev. Dr. S. H. Kellogg, in an article in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for 1890, pointed out that a tendency, indeed the tendency of the times, is to dethrone and undeify our Lord and Saviour. He shows how the various influences of our day—social, scientific, theological and even and specially political—all converge toward this one result; and he finds this movement not only so general, but so consummately organized, as to indicate a deliberate concentration of this form of evil, of the powers of Satan, on this one end. Now if Dr. Kellogg could write this a quarter of a century ago, what may we not say of today? As never before the tendency of the age is to desupernaturalize Jesus.

Yet there is a further difference. The former attack was at least honest. It denied our Lord's deity squarely: it made him only a man. The attack today is essentially dishonest. It regards Christ at best as only man at his highest. He was not supernaturally conceived. He did no supernatural work. What is left of his body still lies in a Syrian

grave. But then man at his highest, it claims, is really God. Could there be a more subtle, a more dangerous ruse? A divine Saviour is not in terms denied, but it is only because it has been found that man is God. The result is the same, but it is all the more dangerous since its meaning is concealed. The supernatural Saviour required, if the truth of Christian ethics is to exert its force, is rejected as before, and all the more effectually because he is in pretence retained. The Church is so hoodwinked that she joins her foes in denying her Head. Now is it not significant that this dishonest theology, which not only keeps men from trusting first of all in a supernatural Saviour, but prevents them from realizing that they have ceased to do so—that this dishonest theology, while widely held, is specially influential among some of the nations at war and, indeed, may be said to trace its origin to their philosophical lecture halls? Could any other result, then, have been expected? The one condition of the efficacy of Christian ethics being the attending “demonstration and power of the Spirit” of Christ, how could this condition have been met by those who denied his deity? If this condition were not realized, could anything else have been anticipated than “the failure of Christian ethics” which is alleged to have occurred? May it, however, be spoken of as a failure? The Church has never taught, Christ never intended, that even his ethics should realize itself apart from him. The fact is that, as regards preventing the war, Christian ethics has not failed: it has not been tried. The condition essential to its power has been necessarily disregarded. Ritschlianism and the New Theology in general do not and cannot realize the ethics of Christ, for they undermine his deity: and Christian ethics can be fairly tested solely by those who look beyond its truth to the Son of God, only whose omnipotent Spirit can cause its truth to be “quick and powerful.”

3. The third of the three fallacies mentioned at the be-

ginning is that Christian ethics leaves no place for war. It is clear at once that Christianity leaves comparatively little place for war. This is so even of the Old Testament. This, it is true, regarded war as a "religious activity." It was to be entered into at Jehovah's word. He was to be inquired of with regard to its continuance, and he answered through the Urim and Thummim or by the prophets. He endowed the warrior with special qualifications for battle, and it was he who gave to him the victory. It was David, "the man after God's own heart," who sang: "God is my strength and power: and he maketh my way perfect. He maketh my feet like hind's feet: and setteth me upon my high places. He teacheth my hands to war; so that a bow of steel is broken by my arm. Thou hast also given me the shield of thy salvation: and thy gentleness hath made me great. Thou hast enlarged my steps under me; so that my feet did not slip. I have pursued my enemies, and destroyed them; and turned not again until I had consumed them. And I have consumed them and wounded them that they could not arise: yea, they are fallen under my feet. For thou has girded me with strength to battle: them that rose up against me hast thou subdued under me" (II Sam. xxii. 33-39).

But there is another side, and it is the significant one. It is one in respect to which the Old Testament differs radically from the scriptures of all contemporary religions. While it does regard war as a religious activity, it greatly restricts it. This is so even of war considered as the divinely appointed means for the conquest of Canaan. With regard to it the Israelites were not left to their own discretion or caprice in interpreting their commission. They were to do what God commanded and just what he commanded and because he commanded it, and this under the severest penalties. Thus were they kept from carrying on even these "wars of extermination," as they are called, for the gratification of personal feeling. Again, the Israelites

were never permitted to regard these wars as precedents. Together with the command to drive out and to exterminate the Canaanites, they were given for their permanent rule: "If a stranger sojourn with you in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God" (Lev. xix. 33-34). Thus were they taught the extraordinary nature of their commission. They were not to expect that even God would call on them again for this work of judgment. Once more, in the performance of it they were limited. Aggressive war was permitted only at certain specified points and for certain specified objects. Otherwise, war was to be merely defensive. Under no circumstance was war for war's sake encouraged. Because David had been a man of war he was denied the honor of building the temple. In these and in other ways was war restricted under the Old Testament and the people guarded against the indulgence of a fierce spirit and even against the development of a warlike disposition. It was kept impressed on them that always and in all respects, even in war and specially in war, they were to be the executors of the will of the Lord. Just because war was "an activity of religion" must its sphere have been thus limited by the absolute righteousness of Jehovah.

As might have been expected, the position of the New Testament with regard to war is not essentially different. As Canon J. B. Mozley says in his great sermon on "War," "we may observe in the New Testament an absence of all disparagement of the military life." For example, there is presented no precept against war which is "mandatory in term, and in range universal." This is so, though the cases of the centurians at Capernaum and Caesarea, both of whom are spoken of with approbation, would have afforded occasion for such, if such had laid in the intent of our Lord

or of his ministers. Of the same significance is the fact that the frequent references made by the Apostles to the armor, weapons, and discipline of soldiers are unaccompanied by any denunciation of the military service in its own nature. As Dr. Storrs remarks in this connection, "The saying of our Lord to Pilate, 'if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight,' may imply that the forcible defence of secular rights was not regarded by him as otherwise than appropriate, as it certainly was usual." Indeed, most of the earlier, as many of the later, expositors of Christianity agree with Augustine in the main, that to fight is not necessarily a sin, though the object of war should always be the recovery of peace! That is, the New Testament adopts the Old Testament's position with regard to war. It does not say, as in the case of loose divorce, that war was permitted to the Hebrews because of "the hardness of their hearts," but that under the Gospel a new law was to prevail. On the contrary, it leaves the Old Testament position still in force. As Dr. Charles Hodge observes, "the lawfulness of war in itself it quietly assumes. Nay, it affirms it, at least by implication. "If magistrates," as we learn from the thirteenth of Romans, are armed with a power of life and death over their own citizens, they certainly have the right to declare war in self-defense." Hence, in order further to illustrate the position of the New Testament on this question, Dr. Hodge remarks: "No historical Christian church has pronounced all war to be unlawful. The Augsburg Confession expressly says that it is proper for Christians to act as magistrates, and among other things *bellare, militare*, etc. And Presbyterians especially have shown that it is not against their conscience to contend to the death for their rights and liberties (Sys. Theol. Vol. III. p. 367).

Yet while all this is so, one cannot read the New Testament and not feel that, even more than is true of the Old Testament, its spirit is against war. It presents Christ, its

great subject, as the "Prince of Peace": and if he does say of himself, "I came not to send peace but a sword," this as we have seen, does not mean that he is the cause of war or even that he approves it; it means only that the proclamation of the doctrine of peace must become the occasion for renewed antagonism on the part of that great spirit of evil from whom all wars ultimately proceed. It is an antagonism and consequent warfare for which the "Prince of peace" is no more responsible than medicine is to blame for the pain which often results on its application. The medicine is the occasion of the pain: it does not produce it; it is the disease that does that. So, too, the New Testament, no more really than the Old Testament, but more strikingly, emphasizes God's love for men. It tells us that he "is love" (1 Ep. John iv. 8). It presents him to us in Christ as love incarnate. It points to the cross as both the proof and the illustration of God's love for us. All this it does as the basis of a command that we men should love each other as he has loved us. What, then, must be the New Testament's attitude toward war, which many tell us has its only root in hate, the opposite of love?

Nay, the New Testament takes its stand against war yet more explicitly and emphatically. As Mozley says, "Christianity does not admit, indeed, but utterly denounces and condemns the motives which lead to war—selfish ambition, rapacity, tyranny and vanity." The hate whence they spring and which they further develop is always and entirely contradictory of the Christian spirit. How, then, in view of all this, it is asked, can the New Testament or Christianity leave any place for war? Surely we must conclude with James (iv. 1), that wars, whether between persons or between nations, come of our lusts that war in our members" and ultimately of the devil himself; and, consequently that war exists, only by God's permission, never with his approval. This, however, is not saying that Christianity and war are mutually exclusive. May it not be necessary to go

to war, if, as the context in James commands, we are "to resist the devil"? In a word, may not defensive war be a Christian obligation?

The negative of this position is seriously taken by the Society of Friends; and it is taken so seriously by them and is appropriated by so many individuals not claiming fellowship with them, as, for example, Count Leo Tolstoi, that we must pause briefly to consider it. What, then, is the issue between those who admit the obligation of defensive war and those who deny its lawfulness? The question is not as to the right and duty of resistance to evil. As to this there is no question. The weapons of truth, "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," the Friend would use as vigorously as the Presbyterian. Both agree that the truth should assail error and must prevail over it. Nor does the question concern the powerlessness of the sword in the sphere of the truth. The kingdom of God cannot be established by the weapons of carnal warfare. As Lactantius said, "Religion cannot be forced, and it should be defended, not by killing, but by dying" (Inst.). As to this, too, there is no difference between the Friend and the rest of Christendom. All agree that truth is the only power appropriate to the realm of the spirit. In it the use of physical force is always wrong, for it is always useless. It can decide which of two men or of two nations is the stronger; it can decide nothing as to which is right. The question, however, is, whether in the kingdom of this world, even as taken up and embraced by the Kingdom of Christ, physical force may not and should not be employed against physical force, whether the man whose life is threatened by the knife of the assassin or the nation whose rights and liberties are assailed by the armies of her neighbor may not and ought not to put up a defense of the same kind?

That they should is the position of the Christian Church as a whole; and that this position is true to Christianity herself is established, at least so it seems to us, by the following considerations:

First: The untenableness of the contrary position. This appears in its presuppositions. These are well presented in a paper on "Christian Non-Resistance" published, together with other essays, in 1912, in Edinburgh, by Hector Waylen. The first of these presuppositions is that our Lord himself never resorted to physical force, and, therefore, that his disciples never should do so. The premise in this reasoning need not detain us, though we must ask in passing, if Jesus did not use physical force when he made a whip of small cords and drove the traders from the temple, what did he use? and were not his miracles called "mighty works" because of the physical force which they exhibited? It is our author's conclusion which specially challenges attention. If Christ did not stand up against the evil man, does it follow that we should not? As we may not affirm that we should do or even may do all that he did, so neither may we infer from all he did not what we ought not to do. He is our infallible example, but he is not our example so far as his powers and situation and mission transcended or even differed from ours. As the divine Redeemer of the world, or even as the perfect Man, he could not be an example in all respects for sinners. Nor is it to the point that the New Testament nowhere explicitly affirms the right and the duty even of defensive war. It was with reference to Church order and ceremonial that Hooker said that Scripture by leaving out did not condemn, but only sent us back to the ground of reason and natural law; but this applies to the ethics of the Bible as well. By the absence of precepts requiring war we are debarred from claiming for it the absolute authority of Scripture, but we certainly are not justified in inferring that it is forbidden by it. The Scriptures recognize every truth of reason, every requirement of natural law. Our question, then, continues unanswered, and it can be answered only by an appeal to reason and natural law.

A second presupposition of the view that we are criticiz-

ing is that the early Church condemned military service; and that the early Church, because so near to the Apostolic age, reflects its spirit as the Church of no later day could do. Neither of these claims may be admitted unreservedly. A distant view is often juster as well as more comprehensive than a narrower view. We are only beginning to understand the Napoleonic wars. No one who is not a fool presumes to understand the causes of the present struggle. The authority of the early Church has been considerably overworked. Moreover, in this case there is a conflict of testimony. In the early church there would appear to have been two parties with regard to the lawfulness of military service. One affirmed its compatibility with the Christian calling; the other, probably at first the more influential, denied this. Thus, on the one hand, we have a powerful party which counted among its leaders Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Lactantius and Basil, who maintained that all warfare was unlawful for one who had been converted; and this opinion had its martyr in Maximilianus, who suffered death under Diocletian solely because, having been enrolled as a soldier, he declared that he was a Christian, and that, therefore, he could not fight.

On the other hand, there can be no question that many Christians from a very early date did enlist in the army, and that they were not cut off from the Church. The legend of the "Thundering Legion" attests the fact, and it is no other than Tertullian who asserts it. Indeed, he says expressly with reference to the Christian soldiers in the army under Marcus Aurelius, "We sail with you, we fight with you, we till the ground with you"; though he gives it as a reason why the Christians, though not fearing the sword, did not assail the persecuting empire, that in their religion it was counted better to be slain than to slay (Apol. I, 42, 37). So, too, Augustine, perhaps the most prominent representative of this second position, writes as follows: "Do not think it impossible for any one to please God when en-

gaged in active military service." Then he brings up as examples David, the two centurions, and the soldiers who came to John for baptism, adding that John did not prohibit them to serve as soldiers when he commanded them to be content with their wages. Having said this, he proceeds, "Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity, and preserve them in peace. Therefore, we in waging war should cherish the spirit of a peace-maker, that by conquering those whom you attack you may lead them back to the advantages of peace" (Ep. 189, 4, 6). That is, according to the greatest theologian of the early Church, defensive war is not wrong in itself.

This may have been, and we are inclined to believe was the real view of the opposite party. At all events, there is great weight in the remark of Dr. Charles Hodge that the reason of the early opposition of Christians to entering the army was that they thereby gave themselves up to the service of a power which persecuted their religion; and that idolatrous usages were inseparably connected with military duties. When the Roman empire became Christian, and the cross was substituted for the eagle on the standards of the army, this opposition died away (Sys. Theol. III, p. 367).

A further presupposition of the champion of non-resistance is that the resort to physical force destroys reliance on God. But why should this be true of physical force any more than of moral force or of intellectual force? Does not the power of the former depend on God as much as that of the latter? As a matter of fact, have not those who were most careful to keep their powder dry often been, as Cromwell's "Ironsides", those who based all their confidence on the Lord of Hosts? Again, we are told that the use of force means the exaltation of the physical above the spiritual. But need it mean this? Does the employment of a servant imply that he is set over his employer?

Once more, it is assumed that man is spirit only and therefore, that, as physical force cannot enter the realm of the spirit, there is no sufficient reason why it should be resisted. It cannot touch the man himself. But this is to take a view as unscriptural as it is unnatural. The Bible and nature both teach that a man is a created spirit in vital union with a physical organized body.

Finally, we are told, as by Prof. Bertrand Russell of Trinity College, Cambridge, that non-resistance is really the most effective resistance; that, for example, if the Allies had not resisted Germany, the latter would have withdrawn her demands and recalled her armies. This, however, is to attribute far too much, I do not say to depraved German nature, but to depraved human nature. It is, moreover, contrary to experience. The spirit of aggression has been stimulated, it has not been subdued, by submission. If you tell a robber he may take half your property, he will try to take the whole. We conclude, then, that the doctrine of non-resistance is untenable in its presuppositions.

It is, however, even more untenable in its consequences. Only two may be mentioned. One is that force should have no place in human affairs except when its use would be good for those on whom it would be brought to bear. Logically, this condemns all punishment, divine as well as human.

The other is that the doctrine of non-resistance must issue logically in submission to and even in co-operation with evil. To let the robber strip you of the property of which God has appointed you his trustee, to let the murderer destroy the life for which God holds you yourself responsible, to let him kill your brother whose keeper God has made you, to let other nations crush the nation of which God has constituted you a citizen, all of which the doctrine of non-resistance under consideration requires whenever, to prevent any of them, an appeal to force becomes necessary—what is this but to assist at the triumph of evil? It is not to suffer wrong patiently; it is to acquiesce in wrong, and so

to do wrong basely. Surely "resist not evil" cannot mean this, unless no other honest interpretation is in sight.

But one is in sight, even at hand. Our Lord in St. Matt. v. 39, *et seq.*, is referring, as the context indicates, to a common perversion of the *lex talionis*. What he would forbid in these verses is not the forcible punishment of the offender by the state, but the taking of the law by the individual into his own hands; not public justice but private revenge. Wrong under both dispensations, this is specially forbidden under the law of love which Christ is emphasizing and illustrating. From the standpoint of his own interest, therefore, the Christian is not to resist the evil man. So far as he himself is concerned, in his individual capacity, he is to love his enemy so much as to be ready to turn to him his left cheek when his right one has been smitten, to give to him his coat when he has taken his cloak, to go with him two miles when he has compelled him to go with him one. This, however, does not imply that he will always or often do this. It usually means that he will act quite otherwise. True love for his enemy will prevent his suffering that enemy to wrong himself, as he would do, were he to let him assault or rob or domineer over one who, like him, had done him no injury. But, in addition, no one can act solely in his individual capacity. He sustains also divinely established relations. He is a member of the state or institute of rights for the administration of justice. That is, he ought to resist and even to arrest the wrong-doer whom he himself as an individual has forgiven, and he ought to uphold his nation against the aggressions of other nations for whose soldiers as individuals he will strive to cherish love.

Here, then, in this twofold order, the order of grace and the order of nature, we have both the refutation of the doctrine of non-resistance and the explanation of that doctrine of war which the Christian Church has always held and which we would vindicate. Let us as we close refer to this twofold order, and specially to its implications.

1. There is an order of nature. That is, before all supernatural revelation, as that in Christianity, and independent of it, there is the universe. It owes its existence to God's creative act, and its constitution and laws "declare his glory and show his handiwork." Instead of being repudiated by subsequent revelation on God's part, it must condition it. He may manifest himself in ways quite beyond it, but he can neither set it aside nor contradict it. To do either would be to dishonor the work of his own hands and so to deny himself; and just because he is God, "he cannot deny himself" (2 Tim. 2. 13).

2. The order of nature in the sphere of human society includes certain great forms of existence—the family, the nation, the church. We call them institutes to indicate that they are not conceived by us, but are found by us already instituted in the divine purpose and in the constitution of society. They are not developed out of it, but they determine its development. Thus we are born into the family and into the nation and into the church. We do not make them, but they make us. Each one of them is necessary to the perfection of one of the essential elements of our nature. The family nourishes affection; the nation maintains justice; the church fosters religion. All three together make human society possible. Without all three together, its continuance would become impossible.

3. The nation involves as one of its essential rights the right of defensive war. But for this right, the nation could not exist. It cannot be the institute of rights, unless it can and may assert and maintain rights; and as, in the last analysis, right will be and can be set aside only by physical force or by deception, and as such force can not be met except by such force, the nation must have the right to appeal to physical force in defence of rights or it must go out of commission. As Elisha Mulford has said in one of the greatest books of our political literature, "The nation is the investiture on the earth of right with might; it is constituted

as a power in the moral order of the world and for the maintenance of that order. The right to declare and make war belongs only to the nation, and to that only as the minister of righteousness, the power which in its normal being is to assert justice against violence, and law against anarchy; and freedom against oppression" ("The Nation," p. 161).

4. This position is only strengthened by the attempts to set it aside. Thus it is urged that if individuals can settle their disputes peaceably before the courts, surely nations should be able to do so. But why is it that the settlement in the case of the individual can be and must be peaceable? It is just because, as Mozley remarks in his sermon on "War", "every judgment of a court is backed by the whole force of the nation as against the force of the individual who dissents." The defeated suitor, I may add, submits ordinarily, not because he approves the verdict, but because he prefers submission to going to prison. In a word, individuals are enabled to settle their disputes peaceably by the fact of being under a government that has physical power and that stands ready to use its physical power. The case under consideration does but illustrate and confirm the truth that in the end physical force can be met only by physical force. Be this as it may, we are asked, Why can not international disputes be adjudicated in the same peaceable manner? Why may there not be "a parliament of nations, a federation of the world"? Why can not the nations now at war be forced to submit their differences to the Hague Tribunal? Because that tribunal has not the physical power or the authority to compel submission on the part of the nations to its judgment. Why, however, does it not have the power and authority? Because the supreme universal government, which alone could have this power and authority, is not a part of the order of nature. This needs only to be studied for us to see that God has, in the political sphere, distributed men in separate nations, as, in the domestic sphere he has distributed them in different families;

and that any scheme of things that ignores the essential separateness and autonomy of the nation is as unnatural and ultimately as impossible as would be the attempt to merge all the families of the nation in one great national family. Plato did have such a plan, but he could not work it. In a word, it is not more clearly involved in the order of nature that individual nations should have the right and should be under the obligation to self defense than it is that such a union of all nations as would do away with the right and the obligation is against nature.

5. As might be supposed, the Bible, which reveals the order of grace, recognizes the order of nature. The Bible is supernatural; it is not preternatural. It nowhere takes exception to the world as God made it, and as it was when he pronounced it "very good" (Gen. i. 31). On the contrary, it builds on its constitution and it reenacts its laws. It recognizes its institutes. No book ever put such emphasis and honor on the family as does the Bible. No book ever taught so clearly the divine appointment and office of the individual nation as does the Bible. God, it tells us, "made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons and the bounds of their habitation (Acts xvii. 26). "Ordained of God", it declares, are "the powers that be", and it affirms the magistrate to be "God's minister" and to "bear not the sword in vain" (Rom. xiii. 1, 4). The Bible, then, adopts the order of nature, with all that in any case it necessarily involves, even the right of appeal to the sword itself. Is not this virtually a divine assertion of the right and obligation to defensive war?

6. Christianity, as might be expected, takes over the order of nature. She establishes the order of grace on it. No one of her characteristics is more striking than this. Her charge to her first disciples was that they should abide in the same calling wherein they were called. She commanded, for Christ's sake, obedience to rulers that were wicked men

and officers in a heathen and persecuting government. Nowhere does she set herself against nature or against what is necessarily involved in it. On the contrary, she teaches that "every creature of God is good and nothing is to be rejected if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer (1 Tim. iv. 4). We conclude, therefore, because the nation is a part of the order of nature, and because the right and duty of defensive war is involved in the very conception of the nation as the institute of rights, and because the Bible in general and Christianity in particular adopts the order of nature with all that it truly implies—because of these considerations, we conclude that, while our religion utterly repudiates all wars of aggression, and while it condemns as strongly the spirit of hate in which even defensive war may be waged, it does not forbid defensive war itself, but may even be said to enjoin and sanctify it. It cannot be, consequently, that all participation in war is unchristian.

This conclusion is confirmed by the moral effect of war when carried on as the necessary means of obtaining or of maintaining justice. As Mozley well says, "One side, indeed, of the moral character of war is in special harmony with the Christian type—I refer to the spirit of sacrifice which is inherent in the very idea of the individual encountering death for the sake of the body to which he belongs . . . it is this serious and sacred function which consecrates war. Without it, indeed, what would war be but carnage? with it war displays, in spite of its terrible features, a solemn morality. The devotion of the individual to the community stands before us in a form which, while it overwhelms and appalls, strikes us with admiration. That the nation may rise, the individual sinks into the abyss; he vanishes as a drop that waters the earth, yet he does not murmur; it is his function, it is his appointment, it is an end to which he is ordained, the member is bound to the body, the unit exists for the good of the whole." Is there

not something Christlike in such a spirit as this? How, then, may we say of what is fitted to produce, and does produce, such a spirit as this, that it and Christianity are mutually exclusive?

Again, as does almost nothing else, defensive war emphasizes the unique worth of the spiritual. It teaches and trains us to sacrifice wealth, health, comfort, family, even life, everything, for what we conceive to be the right. It develops us to prefer war with all its miseries to peace with dishonor. Is not such a discipline salutary? May it not be called for at a time like this when nothing is more significant and alarming than the fact that the opposition to war is being based largely on economic grounds, on the waste and misery that it involves rather than on the sin whence it proceeds and which it causes? Instead of being exclusive of Christianity, may not war be one chief way in which Christ would command attention to the things of the spirit? "Nothing," says James Martineau, "can well be further from the sentiment of Scripture than the extreme horror of force as a penal and disciplinary instrument which is inculcated in modern times. The reverence for human life is carried to an immoral idolatry when it is held more sacred than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumph of hypocrisies" (*Studies of Christianity*, pp. 345, 354).

Finally, in the case of Christians, do not the extreme horrors of war, if defensive and therefore right, foster the manifestation of the grace of Christ? They do not simply become the occasion for this, as any evil may; their inherent tendency is themselves to secure it, as no evil can. In a word, the spirit which prompts to such war and which it more and more develops is not merely one which Christ can overrule with good; it is one which in itself is congruous with his grace. There has been nothing finer in religious history than the famous letter of Cardinal Mer-

cier, Archbishop of Malines, to the Belgian people. Hear but a sentence or two: "Is it not true, my brethren, that God has the supreme art of mingling his mercy with his wisdom and his justice? And shall we not acknowledge that if war is a scourge for the earthly life of ours, a scourge whereof we can not easily estimate the destructive force and extent, it is also for multitudes of souls an expiation, a purification, a force to lift them to the pure love of their country and to perfect Christian unselfishness?" Can that which itself tends to promote so gracious a spirit as this be exclusive of Christianity? Nor is there force in the objections which some make much of, the objection that both sides appeal to God and claim that he is on their side. This demonstrates that both sides are Christian, but it proves nothing as to which side is right. It shows that both sides are Christian; for neither is willing to go into battle unless they can believe that Christ goes with them: but it signifies nothing as to whether their cause is just; for the best of Christians are imperfect, and only if they had fully "the mind of Christ," could they be sure that they either knew or appreciated his will. When Abraham Lincoln was reminded by a friend that God was on his side and that he ought not to worry as to the success of the armies of the Union, he replied in substance: "That is not the point; the point is whether I am on the Lord's side." If the governments of Europe had had more of our great President's humility, the war would never have been declared; its issues would now, doubtless, be in process of arbitration. This, however, is all that the facts warrant us in even conjecturing. As Mozley says, "Christians fight each other in full spiritual communion." In the order of grace they are all one church; in the order of nature they are of many nations: and the order of grace adopts the order of nature; so far from setting aside the rights and obligations of nature and so of nations, it is to them that it applies its ethics, and it is in relation to them and largely through them that it develops its life.

This concludes our argument. Many contend that the continuance of war proves "the failure of Christian ethics" and so of Christianity, because Christianity and war are mutually exclusive: and we have tried to show that, on the contrary, Christianity makes no claim as to the cessation of war; that the powerlessness of her ethics has not been established by the war, for she affirms no power of her ethics apart from the divine Christ from whom it has been divorced; and that they misconceive the attitude of Christian ethics toward war, who teach that it is never right to go to war.

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