

# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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No. 2—April, 1903.

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## I.

### THE ALLEGED LEGALISM IN PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

COMPARISONS between the teaching of Paul and the teaching of Jesus are the fashion of the day. A purely historical and a practical motive combine to lend interest to these comparisons. Prompted by whichever motive, the problem sought to be solved by them is the continuity or non-continuity of the religious impulse which shaped the origin of Christianity. The historian asks: Were two distinct forces introduced, the one by Jesus, the other by Paul? Or must we say that, on the whole, Paul's work lay in the line of the further carrying out of the principle introduced by Christ? If the former, can we determine the exact relation of difference or perhaps even heterogeneity in which the two stood to each other? Can we trace the interaction between them in their subsequent development, the degree in which each contributed toward the final result, and the mission which in virtue of this final result Christianity has since then accomplished in the world? If the latter, can we point out the unity of fundamental principle in the variety of doctrinal formulation? Can we draw the lines which run from the centre posited by Jesus to the several points of the wide circumference along which we observe the versatile and comprehensive religious genius of Paul moving? To the practical mind, on the other hand, this same problem of continuity, or lack of continuity, appears of decisive importance for the attitude to be assumed toward the modern attempt to supplant the theology of the Reformation, so largely based on Paul, by a less elaborate, less speculative, more congenial, be-

### III.

## THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF APOLOGETICS.

**A**POLOGETICS is the science of the rational proofs that Christianity is the supernatural and so the authoritative, the exclusive, the final, in a word, the absolute religion. By the practical importance of apologetics we understand its necessity or its usefulness in conversion and sanctification. Is it helpful in making men Christians and in rendering them better Christians? This is the question.

The inquiry is radically distinct from that as to the theoretic worth of apologetics. It is easy to see how it could be so. The "setting-up exercises" through which the soldier, especially in time of peace, is expected to go daily, are indispensable, if he is to become and continue an able fighter; but he never even thinks of them in battle. The naval officer must be master of the processes by which naval armor is tested, but this knowledge is of no use to him when he is leading his ships in the attack. Precisely so, there is much theological science which is essential as a discipline or necessary as a presupposition, but which cannot be employed in the actual work of bringing men to Christ and developing his life in them.

The difference between the question as to the theoretic worth of apologetics and that as to its practical importance will appear clearly when we contrast the denials to which each inquiry relates.

The question as to the theoretic worth of apologetics has to do with such denials as these: That there is no place for apologetics in the scheme of theological studies, because the reason, which is both its instrument and its court of appeal, is generally and essentially untrustworthy; or because the reason, while ordinarily to be depended on, is incompetent in the sphere of religion; or because the reason, though equal to considering the verities of natural religion, is quite out of relation to the objects and to the exercises of the regenerated consciousness.

On the other hand, the question as to the practical importance of apologetics concerns such denials as these: That Christianity needs no defense; that if it did, the simple proclamation of its

truth would be its best vindication; that apologetics does not resolve so many doubts or answer so many objections as it raises; and that, consequently, even if it be recognized in the theological encyclopædia, there is no place for it in the everyday work of the Christian.

While the practical question is thus a distinct and a very different one from the theoretic inquiry, and while it presupposes it to have been answered in the affirmative, it itself is scarcely less radical and vital. On the one hand, if apologetics bears on conversion and sanctification only indirectly; if, though essential as a discipline for and necessary as a presupposition of theological studies, it is quite out of relation to Christian work and life, then it would better be confined to the curriculum of the theological seminary and be studied afterward only by the professional theologian, or at most by the minister. On the other hand, however, if apologetics is important practically, if it has a place in Christian work and life and in its place is indispensable, then it ought to be recognized as a means of grace, it ought to be generally employed, and especially such a knowledge of it and skill in it ought to be secured among Christians as would issue in its effective use.

I. Such is the office of apologetics. It is important practically no less than theoretically. This follows:

1. From the nature of the case. Thus apologetics sustains a direct relation to conversion. For example, it is often needed to clear the way for the Gospel. It is in response to the truths of the Gospel that conversion takes place. Men turn from sin unto God when and because, and only when and because, they appreciate both the guilt and pollution of their sin and the readiness and sufficiency for salvation from these of God as He has revealed Himself in Christ. Now these truths of the Gospel, as all truths, will, and indeed can, impress us only in accordance with the laws of the mind; and it is a fundamental law of the mind that truth to be appreciated must at least be before the mind as its object. That is, what is never considered cannot be appreciated. This makes it clear how the way of the Gospel can be obstructed and so conversion be prevented by philosophy and "knowledge which is falsely so called." Where these hold possession the truth of Christ is denied a fair chance; if listened for, it could scarcely be heard: and as the apostle says (Rom. x. 17), "belief cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ."

That this is true of much of the philosophy and science of our own day, as, more or less, of every age, cannot be questioned. "The wisdom of this world" is, as it always has been and always

will be, "at enmity against God." The mind that is under its control cannot receive "the things of the Spirit of God." They are even "foolishness unto it."

This becomes peculiarly clear in the light of the ruling tendencies of modern thought. These are three.

There is, first, the tendency toward naturalism. This would explain the universe and all in it, the spiritual as well as the physical world, as the merely natural result of an indefinitely long and all-embracing process of materialistic evolution. The sole method of this school is the purely observational or scientific one. Darwin and Spencer may be named as its representatives. Any one, however, if familiar with their teaching, must, it would seem, see that it and the Gospel are contradictory and so mutually exclusive. For example, the fall becomes a blessing instead of an evil as soon as it is regarded as a necessary stage in the evolution of the race; it is a fall up: but the Gospel presupposes the evil of the fall; without it, it lacks its occasion. So, too, a supernatural intervention in the course of history is inconceivable, if purely natural evolution must be the law of all things; but the good news of the Gospel is precisely this, that God has supernaturally intervened to save fallen and so lost men. Nor is it otherwise, as regards method. The Bible claims belief on the authority of God, while the school that we are discussing would rule out all evidence save that of the senses. Thus naturalism necessarily excludes the Gospel. It can tolerate neither its controlling ideas nor its method. To consider the Gospel, a mind under the sway of naturalism must first deny itself.

Another tendency of modern thought is pantheism. This would view all things as modes or manifestations of the world-principle or God. It conceives, consequently, of the universe as essentially a spiritual organic development. Its only method is the purely speculative or philosophical one. Its representatives are Hegel and the Caird brothers. Now these, whatever they assert to the contrary, are as antagonistic to the Gospel as are the champions of naturalism. They must destroy the true reality and so the responsibility of the individual; but it is to the individual, and to him primarily as an individual, that the glad tidings of salvation are addressed: and this salvation the Gospel represents as characteristically free and gracious, whereas pantheism must regard it as necessary and natural. So, too, is it with respect to method: the pantheist depends on his own understanding only; the Christian rests absolutely on divine testimony. Thus this tendency also cannot but bar out the Gospel. The disciple of the Cairds may call himself a Christian; but he must

repudiate both the teaching and the method of his master, if he is to follow the Christ of the New Testament. The latter and pantheism, even though it be named and be "idealism," are mutually exclusive.

The third tendency of modern thought is positivism. This would explain nothing. It would banish philosophy in the sense of metaphysics from theology, and it would deny to religion any interest in science. It would make the very ideas of reason but symbols of the unknown and necessarily indeterminable. It would, therefore, regard the earthly life of a merely human Christ as the sole source and standard of Christianity. Its exclusive method, consequently, is the critical or historical one. Its representatives are Ritschl and Harnack. The deliverances of these, however, are as contradictory of the Gospel as are both naturalism and pantheism. It is as essentially the Son of God and not as merely the man Jesus that the New Testament presents Christ; and it teaches that the worth of the facts, both of His life and of His death, is in the truth of the doctrine of redemption. And it is so, too, as regards method. Christianity demands of its recipients, not criticism, but faith; willingness to accept the explanation which its doctrines give of its facts, not the disposition to evacuate these of their divine meaning. Positivism, therefore, leaves no room for the Gospel. He who consistently embraces its principles or follows its method must see in the doctrines of the incarnation and of the cross and of the resurrection only "foolishness." Thus these three great tendencies of modern thought stand in the way of conversion. They contradict the Gospel which alone makes it rational. So long as any one of them holds sway in an intelligent mind the latter cannot seriously consider the Gospel.

And how widely they do hold sway! The appalling fact is that they are almost omnipresent and omnipotent. In these days of rapid communication the speculations of the philosopher become at once the creed of the people. The naturalism of Darwin dominates the masses. The idealism of the Cairds fascinates the thoughtful. The positivism of Ritschl is crowding the Gospel out of even our revival meetings. Hence, on all sides the cry that genuine conversions are becoming uncommon. There is little room in the minds of the twentieth century for the saving truths of Christianity. Foothold and breathing space must be cleared for them if the Gospel is to have its effect.

Now the inquiry is, How is this to be done? God could do it immediately and supernaturally. There is no question as to that. He who does regenerate can as supernaturally eject from

our minds whatever hinders the truths through which he ordinarily prepares the sinner for the new creation, and in response to which "the new man in Christ" "turns unto God with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience." He has done so. He may again do so. But the question is, Have we the right to expect him to do so? Are we justified in waiting for God to do for us what he has put it into our power to do? We must depend absolutely on the Holy Spirit to quicken the dead souls around us; but has enlightened and sanctified reason nothing to do in overcoming error and thus making way for the truth, in connection with which the Holy Spirit usually acts and only in the light and atmosphere of which can the revived soul live? In a word, as false philosophy is a great and very general hindrance to conversion, must it not be refuted? and are not Christian philosophy and apologetics appointed, because adapted, to do this? Not to use them thus is as presumptuous and wrong as for the sick man to discard medicine. Faith-healing and distrust of apologetics fall under the same condemnation.

Again, apologetics is frequently needed to get a hearing for the Gospel. This may be so even where thought is not under the control of the tendencies that we have been considering. There may be no disposition to listen to the saving truths of Christianity, though the way is open for them so far as false philosophy is concerned. Nor in such cases will the reason usually be an unwillingness to accept what, if received, must be received on divine authority. The reason will rather be a demand for evidence that what is presented has divine authority. Many who would never question the Bible as the Word of God insist that it be proved to them to be the Word of God. Just because they are ready to take it on his authority, they must know that it has his authority.

This is right as well as in accord with the spirit of the age. A State proclamation ought not to be accepted as such without careful examination. For the reason that it claims to be a State proclamation we are bound to discern on it the seal of the State. Not to do so would be to dishonor it. Thus, too, the unreasoning acceptance of the Gospel is unworthy of it. God's proclamation of grace, it demands that we should look for and insist on finding on it God's seal. This, indeed, is its own teaching. The Scriptures never require faith except on the ground of adequate evidence. "If I had not done among them," says our Lord, "the works which none other man did, they had not had sin" (John xv. 24). Could there be a clearer recognition of the principle that faith may not be demanded without proof? The pur-

pose of the miracles was that they should be the divine seal of the divine revelation. This clearly implies that the world has the right to ask, and so the preacher is bound to offer, more than "the witness of the Spirit" to the truth of the Gospel. Let there be no misunderstanding at this point. Undoubtedly, "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority of the Bible is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts" (Conf. of Faith, Chap. I, Sec. 5). Saving faith can result only from this testimony of the Spirit. This, however, is not all the evidence that the Scriptures, and so the Gospel which they contain, are from God and thus have his authority. "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God" (Conf. of Faith, Chap. I, Sec. 5). Now these arguments the world demands. Though only "the witness of the Spirit" by and with the Gospel in our hearts can make us feel its authority as God's proclamation of grace to lost men, more and more do they insist that it shall commend itself as such to their reason before they will even consider it. This demand the preacher of the Gospel, as has been remarked, ought to meet. In so far as he can rightly he should, like St. Paul, "become all things to all men, that he may by all means save some." And he can rightly make use of the rational proofs of Christianity. They are genuine proofs. Though a lower ground of certainty than "the witness of the Spirit," they are a real and, therefore, a legitimate ground. They are also a necessary one. Though we believe the Gospel on the authority of God, we could not feel that it had his authority if its facts could be shown to be unhistorical or its doctrines to be irrational. So long, therefore, as the facts of the Gospel are questioned and its doctrines are ridiculed, Christian evidences and fundamental apologetics, which they presuppose, must be appealed to. That is, "the witness of the Spirit" cannot take the place of the argument from reason any more than it can take the place of "the witness of the Spirit." As "the witness of the Spirit" is essential to true conversion in every case, so the argument from reason, is essential when the Gospel is assailed on grounds of reason. The relation between the two is not only that of a lower to a higher

court. The case is rather thus: If a remedy were offered for a common disease, it would be proper for those afflicted with it to try the remedy on the testimony of those who had taken it, and thus themselves experience its power. Only by such trial, indeed, could they assure themselves absolutely of its efficacy in their own case. If, however, the virtue of the remedy were questioned by many—if, for example, it were said that the cures attributed to it were due, not to it, but to some other cause—then it would be proper for those advocating it to show by chemical or other tests that it was adapted to do what was claimed for it. This would be a right procedure, as well as the only one to secure the impartial consideration and trial of the remedy. Precisely so, when as now and at Athens in St. Paul's day, the Gospel is assailed on grounds of reason, often the sole way as well as an always right way to get a hearing for it is by means of apologetics. In a word, as Prof. H. B. Smith said, "There are places where philosophy can be met only by philosophy."

Once more, it is frequently through the apologetic treatment of the Gospel that "the witness of the Spirit" comes. Apologetics is practically important, not only to clear a way for the Gospel by refuting false science and vain philosophy and so dispelling the poisonous atmosphere which they engender; nor even, as we have just seen, to gain a hearing for the Gospel on the part of the many who feel the force of the rationalistic attacks on its authority and who, therefore, rightly demand the rational vindication of this if they are to attend to it: but also and specially to furnish the means that the Holy Spirit uses in developing our appreciation of its authority.

It is characteristic of the Holy Spirit that He operates in connection with the truth. He does so in sanctification. He is the sanctifier. Yet our Lord prays, "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth" (John xvii. 17). He does so in conversion. Without His help no one could turn from his sins unto God. Yet conversion begins with faith; and "belief cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ" (Rom. x. 17). Indeed, whenever the Holy Spirit uses an instrument in His action on rational beings that instrument is the truth. Even regeneration, moreover, in which His agency, because creative, must be immediate—even regeneration, save in the case of infants and idiots, takes place, if not as a direct result of the presentation of the truth, yet in association with it. Hence it is that God is said "of his own will to have brought us forth by the word of truth" (James i. 18). Though not the agent of regeneration, it is the atmosphere only in which can one capable of appreciating the

truth be regenerated. It is precisely as in the physical sphere. It was by His own almighty power, and by this only, that our Lord quickened the dead Lazarus; yet even He could not have quickened him as a man of like nature with ourselves save in the atmosphere. Indeed, the Holy Spirit would not be the Spirit of truth did He not thus, in the case of rational beings, invariably operate either by means of the truth or in connection with it. He would be untrue to the nature which He Himself has given to us did He act otherwise. He would contradict Himself. Now as truth is the conformity of what is thought to what is, so if truth is to affect us it must evince itself as truth: its power will depend ultimately on its evidence; the grandest idea will be but a vain imagination until we feel that it images reality. That is, truth, because truth, operates always by means of evidence. This evidence, of course, will vary according to the kind of truth. Scientific truth will reveal itself by the light of facts. Historical truth will reveal itself by the light of testimony. Philosophical truth will reveal itself by the light of pure reason. Intuitive truth will reveal itself by the light of its own nature. Each sort of truth, however, will make its impression by means of its evidence. We may not suppose the truth of the Gospel to be an exception. Of all truth the highest, it will be specially with reference to it that what has just been said will hold. Therefore, as the Holy Spirit always, in the case of rational beings, operates in connection with "the word of truth," so it will be by means of its evidence that He will use it. Otherwise, He would be untrue to the nature of truth. He would deny Himself.

It must be, therefore, that "the witness of the Spirit" "by and with the Word in our hearts," the witness through which and on the ground of which, in the last analysis, we believe savingly on Christ and turn truly to Him—it must be that this witness, as it is testimony to the truth of the Gospel, so it is this because it brings out and causes us to appreciate as well as to understand the evidences of the Gospel. It is not a revelation of new truth: if it were it could not afford evidence; at least, it could not until it had itself been established. It is rather the work of the Holy Spirit on us and in us, whereby He enlightens our minds and renews our hearts and so enables us both to perceive and to feel the evidence of the truth of "the things of Christ" that have been revealed to us in His Word. This, however, implies that some of the evidences—at any rate those inherent in the truth itself—are before the mind. Otherwise, there would be nothing for "the witness of the Spirit" to attest. And thus it is that as "the witness of the Spirit" is the ulti-

mate reason why we accept and obey the Gospel, so it is this by means of and because of "the testimony of the Church, the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, the entire perfection thereof," etc. In a word, it is only in connection with the evidences of the Gospel and so of Christianity that "the witness of the Spirit" is given or could be given. Just because he is "the Spirit of truth" will this be so.

Of course, this does not mean that all the evidences must be presented, if there is to be conviction of the truth of the Gospel. One class of evidences appeals to one kind of men; another, to another. Neither does it mean that any class of evidences must be presented avowedly and formally. In a true sense the Gospel is its own evidence. That is, much of its evidence grows out of its very nature, and so is involved in any correct statement of it. When it is merely preached, therefore, the Holy Spirit can and often does direct the minds of the hearers to much of its best evidence, and then, as only he can do, apply this evidence to their hearts. The question, however, arises, Have we the right to leave him to do the former when Christian apologetics is adapted and intended to do it? Because God often does what we can do, does it follow that we are excused from doing what he has qualified us to do? In such cases does not his action become our example? Surely he would not fit us to do what must be done, and what he often does himself, if he did not mean that we should be "fellow-workers" with him. Such, then, is the relation of apologetics to conversion. It should clear the way for the Gospel; it should get a hearing for it; it should fulfill the condition of "the witness of the Spirit" to it. In view of all this can we doubt its practical importance?

This appears as clearly when we consider the relation of apologetics to sanctification. Apologetics makes it possible to meet the first condition of sanctification. If sanctification be true, it must include the whole man. St. Paul beseeches us, "by the mercies of God, to present even our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is our reasonable service" (Rom. xii. 1). By as much more, then, as our reason is higher, more godlike, than our bodies, ought we to consecrate it. Indeed, St. Paul prays: "And the God of peace sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame, at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23).

So, too, the same apostle describes himself as "bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. x. 5). Our Lord also gives as the first and great commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy *mind*" (*διανοία*) (St. Matt. xxii. 37). It may not be doubted, therefore, that that only is true sanctification which embraces the intellect or reason. Indeed, the word rendered "mind" in the commandment just cited would seem to refer specially to the understanding or logical faculty.

We can see why this is. All that we are and have must be the lowest statement of our debt to God. Particularly will this be so in view of the fact that He has redeemed us with His own precious blood. "Love so amazing, so divine, demands our souls, our lives, our all." Consequently, whether we put a high or a low value on the reason, we ought to consecrate it to Him. Because and so long as it is a real element of our nature will this be the case.

Now the consecration of a faculty to God implies more than its subjection to the divine law. We do not truly consecrate our bodies, if we do no more than observe the laws of health which God has impressed on them. This is essential, but it is not sufficient. We must also regard our bodies as his instruments. We must use them for all the work of his kingdom that they are capable of performing. We cannot otherwise present them living sacrifices to him. Precisely so, the consecration of our reason may not be merely negative. It may not consist simply in thinking nothing that is displeasing to God. It must be also positive. It is preëminently for service that "every thought should be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ"; and, as in the case of the body, the service to be rendered is that for which the reason is by nature qualified.

What, then, is this?—To apprehend, to prove, and progressively, if partially, to comprehend "the things of Christ" and even "the deep things of God." That the reason can do this, the consideration of the theoretical questions concerning it should establish; and that this is the service appropriate to it, is self-evident. It would not be reason were it otherwise, any more than the body would be the body were not its functions physical. He, therefore, who does not develop the religion of the head as well as that of the heart fails in so far forth. To that degree his consecration is imperfect; his debt to his Redeemer is unpaid.

Of course, this does not mean that every one must be a skilled apologist: few are so endowed as to be able to be that. Neither does it mean that some have no need of apologetics: all, except

infants and idiots, can and so should appreciate and use certain of the rational proofs of Christianity. As every one ought to love God with all the emotion that he can stimulate, so every one is bound to love him with all the intelligence that he can develop. No more in the sphere of reason than elsewhere does God demand more than we can do with the powers that he has given to us aided by his grace, but in the sphere of reason as much as in every other he requires our utmost effort. Nothing less than this is implied in the consecration that is his due and for which he asks. Hence, Anselm was right when he wrote: "Negligentia mihi videtur si postquam confirmati sumus in fide non studemus quod credimus intelligere." Apologetics must, therefore, be of prime importance. One of its chief offices is to develop our understanding of what we believe; and at least the effort to understand this is implied from the first in true sanctification. Again, apologetics is necessary to the progressiveness of sanctification. Sanctification not only, as we have seen, exercises the intellect, it is very stimulating intellectually. In so far as it is genuine, it cannot fail to be. Nothing is so opposed to mental sanity and vigor as sin; and sanctification, at least in its negative aspect, is the process of overcoming sin. It is, however, with regard to its positive work that the enlarging and ennobling effect of sanctification on the mind becomes most evident. It develops a new and uniquely grand world. "All things are new" to him who by regeneration has been made "a new creature in Christ Jesus," and this new world is continually unfolded as the work of grace goes on. The development of "the kingdom of God" within us transmutes and glorifies all without us. It causes us to see all things in their relation to that kingdom which is from everlasting to everlasting, and which shall become universal. Can the reason grasp so magnificent a conception and not be enlarged and exalted? Beyond this, and more specifically, sanctification opens to us a new book. The man of the world has the Bible; in many cases he reads it; in some he studies it: but its real meaning is "foolishness" unto him; he has not the Spirit of God, and it is only spiritually that it can be discerned. When, however, the Holy Spirit, having regenerated him, proceeds to sanctify him, "the things of Christ" begin to stand out before him in their preciousness and beauty; the Spirit himself interprets to him the "hidden wisdom" of God as he becomes able to bear it. What education can so develop even the mind as instruction in such a book by such a teacher? And then, more specifically yet, sanctification gives us a new God. It brings us into daily and increasing sympathy with Christ; and so it enables us to under-

stand him who, as the eternal Word, is the reason of reason, "the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world." Who does not see that growth in the grace of such a Saviour must result in mental development? He would deny himself were it otherwise. It would be the greatest of all contradictions if we did not find, as we do, that those whom the Spirit of Christ sanctifies are, as never before, "in their right mind."

Now sanctification, inasmuch as it thus stimulates the reason, must yield itself to the reason or be repudiated by it. There is no other alternative. The teacher of logic must himself be logical, or his teaching will be discredited by his pupils just in proportion as they profit by it. Precisely so, the Christian life must approve itself to reason even when not comprehensible by it, or those who accept it will lose their intellectual interest in it. Just because, as nothing else, it has developed them intellectually will this be. Constituted as we are, it could not be otherwise.

To lose intellectual interest, however, in the Christian life means eventually to lose all interest in it. This, too, follows from our very constitution. Sanctification consists in our response to the action of the Holy Spirit on and in our hearts. It proceeds as we cooperate with him. Now we are moved, and, made as we are, we can be moved, to action of any kind only by our judgments or, and more usually, by our judgments and our dispositions. Thus religious activity and, consequently, the progressiveness of sanctification are rooted in reason. Either, and in any case, must be the result of a judgment as to Christ, as to his work for us, as to our relation to him. This judgment, moreover, must continually be growing clearer if we are to persist in following him, and so sanctification itself is to go on. Otherwise, though from force of habit one may strive for a while to live the life of Christ, he will at length lose heart. His reason for sustained activity will be gone; and, essentially rational, man cannot long act without a reason. Nor is it otherwise in the case of the many whose religious life is predominantly emotional, whose growth in grace is rooted in their dispositions, their desires and affections, rather than in their judgments. Every feeling must justify itself to an idea and exists only because of an idea. As Prof. Bowen said, "Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of an idea." One cannot love God unless the idea of God enters into his consciousness, and his love will be strong or weak according as this idea is clear or vague. As Prof. Henry B. Smith remarked, "He who thinks highly feels deeply": and it is only he who thinks highly who can continue to feel deeply; such is the dependence of feeling on thinking, that if one does not think as

highly as he can he will soon have no light for deep feeling. Consequently, as also Prof. James Orr has said, "No mere simplification of a belief has ever conquered, unless the half has burned more brightly than the whole": and nothing could be more significant in this connection than that the men of sustained faith and effort have been those whose faith was full and intelligent. What, then, could be so suicidal as the general tendency of our day to decry apologetics, to banish reason from religion, in the interest of feeling and practical activity? This is to neglect the roots in order to increase and perfect the fruit; and it is all the more suicidal because, as we have seen, sanctification cannot proceed and not stimulate the intellect. It is the kind of fruit which makes the most demand on the roots. In a word, the effect of sanctification is such, and we are so constituted, that its progressiveness is dependent on apologetics, that is, on the developing use of reason in religion.

Once more, such activity is of the very essence of sanctification. Faith is the necessary means of sanctification. We are sanctified by faith as truly as we are justified by faith. As it is through faith that we appropriate the merit of our Saviour's vicarious life and death, on the ground of which we are declared to be just and are treated as if we were righteous, so it is through faith that we receive the grace whereby the Holy Spirit develops within us the already implanted life of Christ. The first movement of the regenerated soul, faith is ever its vital breath. In the most profound sense, "the righteous shall live by faith" (Rom. i. 17). Now faith, both as an act and as a state, is rational. It includes the assent of the head as really as the consent of the heart. Let either be wanting and faith is wanting. But the assent of the head is conviction produced by evidence. Constituted as we are, there is, as we have seen, no other way by which the assent of the head can be secured than by evidence. This may be of various kinds, but whatever its kind, it must commend itself as rational. Otherwise, it would not be evidence. In the case of saving faith we assent to the truths of the Gospel, we receive Christ as our Saviour, on divine testimony. This is their evidence, and it is the highest of all evidence; but even "the witness of the Spirit" in our hearts, on the evidence of which we accept the facts and truths of the Gospel, would not be evidence if true history and sound philosophy and experience rightly interpreted, in a word, if reason, did not harmonize with it. "The Spirit of truth" would deny himself if his testimony did not agree with the truth of things; and it is only as we discern this, and in part through the appreciation of it, that we

can truly and so savingly believe. What is called blind faith, that is, unreasoning faith, is a misnomer; it is superstition, it is not faith. If we would really believe on Christ and so live in him, we must reason; there is no alternative, faith being the essentially rational act or state that it is: and so apologetics, which aims to develop the rational element in faith, must be of high practical importance with reference to sanctification as well as with reference to conversion. Though it can never of itself produce saving faith, such faith can neither exist nor grow unless, in one way or another, it has been active.

2. This conclusion is confirmed by history. Her pages show us that what we have inferred must be the case has been and is the case. Whenever reason has not been given her place in religion, the issue has been evil. For example, preaching at the time of the Reformation was rarely apologetic. The Church was so engrossed in the enunciation of true doctrine as to overlook the need for its rational vindication. Is it not significant that the century following was preëminently the age of Deism and of Pantheism? Again, no spiritual movement promised more than did Pietism. So vigorous was it at first that, as Hurst has said, "Rationalism in Germany without Pietism as its forerunner would have been fatal for centuries." Yet Pietism lacked "a homogeneous race of teachers." Its founder, Spener, had blended reason and faith harmoniously. His successors cast off the former and blindly followed the latter. Hence, as might have been expected, Pietism fell. The good which it had done continued; it itself disappeared.

The historical argument is also positive. Whenever reason has been rightly honored in religion, benefit has resulted. The Roman Empire would scarcely have become a Christian State without the apologies of Justin, of Origen and of Tertullian. To the age of faith which succeeded the time of Augustine no single man contributed so much as did this great Bishop of Hippo, and his grand work was that magnificent effort of reason, *The City of God*. If the divorce of reason and culture was one of the causes of the Deism of the eighteenth century, the defense of Christianity by Butler and Paley and their associates had more to do with the revival of faith with which the next century began; and their defense was altogether on grounds of reason. If but lately the School of Tübingen threatened to banish the supernatural from history and even from the Gospels, the overthrow of its influence was followed by new spiritual life in Germany; and that overthrow was effected by German scholarship.

This historical connection between apologetics and faith be-

comes most significant when we consider the missionary work of the Church. The greatest advance in this is to be observed in those periods in which reason was duly employed in religion. As has been well said, "The age which has been called by eminence the age of the Apologists was also the greatest missionary age of the ancient Church"; and it is the apologist Justin who asserts of the rapid movement of Christianity during the period in which he lived: "There is no people, Greek or barbarian, or of any other race, by whatsoever appellations or manners they may be distinguished, however ignorant of arts or agriculture—whether they dwell in tents or wander around in covered wagons—among whom prayers are not offered in the name of the crucified Jesus to the Father and Creator of all things." The great apologetic work in England during the eighteenth century was accompanied, certainly immediately followed, by the great missionary movement, which from that day to this has been gathering strength and is at this time the most characteristic work of the Church. Just in proportion as the absoluteness of Christianity as the religion of the world has been systematically demonstrated would seem to have been the vigor of the endeavor to propagate it. We have only to turn to history to read the confirmation of Bacon's remark, "A little philosophy leads a man to atheism, but a good deal to religion."

Beyond this we should mark well the importance of apologetics on the mission fields themselves at the present time. The missionary is obliged constantly to draw on it in his conflict with heathendom. Those who are successful in the foreign work acknowledge, almost invariably, their great indebtedness to our science. Not a few of them affirm it to be that one in the theological curriculum to which those who intend to be foreign missionaries should give most attention. In a word, if the practical importance of apologetics is, as we have seen, a direct consequence of the nature of things, so this importance is illustrated and confirmed by history and, perhaps even more, by the experience of our own day.

3. The argument is clinched by the Word of God. This shows infallibly the correctness, both of our inference as to the practical importance of apologetics from the nature of things, and of our interpretation to the same effect of the testimony of history and of our own experience.

Thus the Bible, inasmuch as it is predominantly practical in aim, teaches by its implications and examples the practical importance of apologetics. As Prof. De Witt has said, "It is true that no book in the New Testament can be regarded as formally a

vindication to the human reason of Christianity as the one divinely revealed religion; but that the New Testament both justifies and contains appeals to the reason in defense of Christianity, that it presents the record of the proofs of the divine mission of Jesus urged by Christ and his apostles, no one will deny who has given the subject any reflection. Our Lord himself honored the intelligence of man by the miracles which he wrought in attestation of his claims. He would not have men believe on him without evidence; and that the evidence of miracles exerted, in some cases at least, its appropriate influence appears in the language of the ruler: 'Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher sent from God, for no man can do the miracles which thou doest except God be with him.'"

Moreover, our Saviour, though usually reticent in what related to himself, was copious in express apology in reference to the nature of his mission, and of the kingdom whose advent he proclaimed. Objected to because of their spirituality and universality, it was these aspects of them that he formally defended. He justified them to the reason on the grounds, that Christianity aims at curing moral rather than physical evil; that it believes in the redeemableness of human beings, however sunk in sin and misery; that it thinks the meanest of mankind worth saving; and that it assumes God's attitude toward mankind to be the same as that of Christ. One of the most pointed and weighty questions addressed by him to the men of his day was, "And why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" (St. Luke xii. 57). Thus for the truth of his claims he who was himself "the truth" appealed directly to the reason of man.

The apostles, likewise, in the first publication of Christianity, were at pains to furnish the evidence of the resurrection of our Lord. It was held to be an indispensable condition of apostleship that one should have seen the risen Jesus and so be able to testify from personal observation as to the fact of the resurrection. The reason was that the apostles recognized that adequate proof ought to be given of the Gospel which they preached. This apologetic spirit characterized the ministry of all of them. The first Christian sermon, that by Peter on the day of Pentecost, was not more a declaration of the Gospel than an apology for Christianity based on the fulfillment of prophecy. When Paul came to Thessalonica he went into the synagogue, and for three Sabbath days reasoned (*διελέγετο*) with them from the Scriptures (Acts xvii. 2). While at Athens he reasoned (*διελέγετο*) in the synagogue with the Jews and the devout persons, and in the market-place every day with them that met him (Acts xvii. 16).

His sermon on Mars' Hill found in the truths of natural religion a basis and introduction for the doctrines of the cross. Thus to the men of Athens the great apostle to the Gentiles preached the Gospel from the point of view of an apologist, showing that Christianity alone answered their longing for the revelation of the Deity, who to them had been an "unknown God." When at Ephesus "he entered into the synagogue and spake boldly for the space of three months, reasoning (arguing, *διαλεγόμενος*) and persuading as to the things concerning the kingdom of God. But when some were hardened and disobedient, speaking evil of the Way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, reasoning (*διαλεγόμενος*) daily in the school of Tyrannus" (Acts xix. 8, 9). Of Paul's Epistle to the Romans it has been well said that it is "encyclopædic in its structure, round and full like the circle of Giotto, and containing all the elements of natural as well as of revealed religion." "The apostle John has told us that the main design of the fourth Gospel is not biographical or expository, but distinctly apologetic. He tells us that Jesus did many other signs in the presence of His disciples which are not written in this book: and he then adds a statement of the principle that controlled his selection of those whose record he has preserved: 'But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name.'"

Nor is the New Testament apologetic only in spirit and aim, and never in form. As Prof. A. B. Bruce has observed, "That remarkable writing, the Epistle to the Hebrews, is an elaborate apology for the cross in a twofold aspect: first and chiefly, for the cross which Jesus bore, and, second and subordinately, for the cross that came to Christians in connection with their faith in the Crucified One." Thus at least this epistle is a systematic apology.

It is not only, however, by implication and example that the Bible teaches the practical importance of apologetics. It does this also by explicit statement. For instance, Peter (1 Epis. iii. 15) charges us to "sanctify in our hearts Christ as Lord: being ready always to give answer (*πρὸς ἀπολογία*) to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you, yet with meekness and fear." These words are not a little significant. Literally translated they are, "being ready always for an apology to every one that asketh a reason," etc. The connection between the clauses indicates that if we do sanctify Christ in our hearts as Lord, that is, if we do practically regard him as such in view of all our adversaries, we shall show it by preparing ourselves to

vindicate rationally his truth and our faith and hope against all who gainsay them. It is to be noticed, moreover, that this charge is not given to ministers only or specially. It is addressed to Christians generally. In the apostle's view no man can be the believer that he ought to be save as he is qualified to be an apologist of his faith. Even more striking is Paul's prayer for all who are in Christ (*Vid.* Eph. iii. 14-19). His petition for them is that, "being rooted and grounded in love, they may be strong to apprehend (*καταλαβέσθαι*) with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know (*γινώσκειν*) the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that they may be filled unto all the fullness of God." The former of these two verbs, especially in view of its employment in the middle voice, refers distinctively to the mental powers, to the comprehension and reasoned knowledge through them of essentials. The latter further specifies the practical knowledge arising from religious experience. What the apostle really prays for is that we may come measurably to understand the love of Christ for us and so may have a deeper and richer experience of it. Need more be said to vindicate the practical importance of Apologetics? It is rooted in the nature of the Christian life. It is illustrated in and confirmed by history. It is asserted as well as implied in the Word of God. If not indispensable to Christian experience, apologetic activity is represented by the Holy Spirit, the author of all Christian experience, as in order to the intimacy of such experience.

II. What, then, are the true functions of apologetics? What should it do, if it is to realize its practical importance?

1. It should qualify the believer to vindicate Christianity against all assaults. This does not mean that it should place in his hands the weapons with which to repel each one of the attacks of unbelief. Such is the conception that many, perhaps most, have of apologetics. They regard it as if it were a great armory. In their view, the Christian has only to go to it to find at once the particular answer that he needs whenever in any way the hope that is in him is denied. No mistake could be greater.

The attacks on our faith are too numerous and especially are too various. "It is true," as Prof. H. B. Smith has said, "that the questions under debate are ever essentially the same: for God and man and the universe remain essentially the same from age to age; and the questions are ultimately about them and their relations. But it is not true that the form of the conflict or its weapons remain or can remain the same; these change with the changes of age and nations and philosophies just as much and as

surely as do the armaments of war." Hence, the weapons of yesterday are out of date to-day. The *Analogy* of Butler, well-nigh perfect though it is for its specific end, does not meet the most pressing issues now. The battle is no longer with deism, as when the great Bishop of Durham wrote. The objections that we must answer are, as we have seen, those raised by Darwin and Spencer, by Hegel and Bauer, by Ritschl and Harnack; and these are new, at least in form. Indeed, these questions themselves differ from day to day. No two Ritschlians present the same front. The idealism of Edward Caird calls for a keener blade than did Hegel's, if its pantheism is to be laid bare. It is vain any longer to combat naturalism on the ground of the inadequacy of natural selection, for Mr. Spencer himself is conceding that. The function of apologetics, therefore, cannot be to furnish the believer with ready-made weapons. It is to enable him to make for himself those which he may require. Our science is to be regarded as a school in the construction of arms rather than as an armory. Its procedure is not determined by casual attacks on Christianity at particular times: but it infers from the inmost nature of Christianity what classes of attacks on itself are in general possible; what false principles are at the basis of these; and what answers to them may be derived from the essential constitution of our religion. Thus, though it may not give even one specific answer, it should qualify the believer himself to prepare *the* answer to every challenge of his hope.

This, however, does not mean that the answer will be in any case an absolute one. Christianity is a religion based on facts. In a profound sense "the fact of Christ" is Christianity. It is and is what it is because he is and is what he is. Paul emphasized this when he wrote: "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, your faith also is vain" (1 Cor. xv. 14). But a fact cannot be demonstrated. It may be certainly true; it cannot be shown to be necessarily so. Doubt concerning it may be most unreasonable, but it will always be metaphysically possible. You are sure of your own individuality; you cannot divest yourself of the consciousness of it: nevertheless, you cannot prove it; and the millions of India to-day affirm it to be an illusion. One cannot think and not admit that, if there be a triangle, its angles must equal two right angles; but even if one sees and touches a triangle, there is room for the objection that the senses are untrustworthy. Hence, apologetics may not be expected to vindicate Christianity absolutely. You can show that one who sets aside the testimony to the resurrection must rule out all testimony as to anything, but you cannot prove even such

procedure to be metaphysically impossible. This peculiarity needs to be emphasized. Diverse kinds of truth have different criteria, and we have no right to expect in the domain of facts the demonstration that we properly demand in the sphere of necessary truth.

Indeed, it would in this case be most unfortunate were we to obtain it. If apologetics could so answer the objections to Christianity as to render the possibility of further objections inconceivable, this would only make the Christian life impossible. That is essentially a life of faith, and faith is ruled out by demonstration. It can no more breathe the atmosphere of this than it can take root save in the soil of evidence.

What, however, is meant by the vindication of our religion against all assaults is that the positions whence these proceed be shown to involve more serious difficulties than does Christianity. It is supernatural and so cannot be absolutely vindicated. It must ever be metaphysically possible that the supernatural, because *supernatural*, might be contranatural and irrational. But, on the other hand, the objections to Christianity are based on the contranatural, and so the contradictory and impossible. This, of course, though not an absolute vindication, is a sufficient answer. For example, the theistic view of the world with its doctrine of creation must be admitted to have its difficulties. We cannot explain creation *de nihilo*. The material cause is wanting. On the other side, however, all the objections to theism must fall back ultimately on the assumptions, that the material of the world was nothing; that its method was chance; and that in it all there was no purpose. The efficient cause and the final cause are lacking as well as the material cause. That is, chance working upon nothing made the universe. "This," however, as Mr. Ballard has well remarked (*Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 55), "is such a stupendous and absolute violation of all we know to be natural and rational that all the difficulties of theism and all the miracles of Christianity together are literally as nothing compared with it." In this way and to this extent should apologetics meet the objections of unbelief. It should counteract the so common tendency to evade or ignore them. It should prompt to their immediate and fearless examination. It should show that at the bar of reason and with the weapons of reason Christianity can put all her adversaries to confusion.

2. The function of apologetics is also positive. It cannot realize its practical importance, if it confines itself simply to answering the objections to our religion. It is not enough to prove that these are contranatural and so must be irrational, whereas

Christianity is supernatural and so may be rational. The most useful function of apologetics is to rationalize, so to speak, the supernatural. It should show that the Supernatural, though above reason, is congruous with it. Supernatural revelation and reason do not proceed along different lines, but along one and the same line. The difference between them is that supernatural revelation goes much farther. The difficulty, therefore, is not that reason cannot apprehend supernatural revelation: it does do so; it reads it in its own language just so far as it can read it at all. The difficulty is that reason cannot comprehend supernatural revelation; though of the same kind with it, the latter is too large to be grasped by it; supernatural revelation is written in the language of reason, but there is far more of it than reason can read and much even of what it does read it cannot appreciate. In a word, our embarrassment in the case arises from the finiteness of our reason and not from the irrationality of the supernatural. To show this is truly to vindicate our religion, and it should be done in three respects.

First, with reference to the historical facts of Christianity. Take, for example, the resurrection of our Saviour. This, according to apostolic teaching, is the foundation of our faith and hope. It is, however, clearly supernatural and incomprehensible. No man can understand "the working of the strength of God's might which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead." As to its power and method, the resurrection is a mystery; it is above reason. But it does not follow from this that it is out of all relation to reason. On the contrary, reason can prove the fact of it. Reason can show, that no event in history rests on testimony so good as that for the resurrection of our Saviour; that if the reality of this event be denied, all the records of the past must, logically, be discredited; that if Christ did not rise from the dead, then the fact of the Christian Church and the power of Christianity for moral regeneration, than which no facts are more certain and conspicuous, become, not mysteries, but manifest contradictions and thus impossibilities. That is, apologetics can show that the fact of the resurrection is demanded by other unquestioned facts, if they are not to become utterly unreasonable. But note the bearing of this on the nature of the power and method of the resurrection. The reasonableness of these, though not evinced, is at once proved. That, the reality of which reason herself requires, must be essentially rational even if above reason. Otherwise reason would stultify herself, which is impossible. This does not mean that the evil and so the irrational cannot exist or cannot be proved to exist. It does mean that that

must be reasonable whose existence is proved by reason's own demand for it.

Secondly, with reference to the eternal truths of Christianity. These truths or doctrines are the divine interpretations of her facts. Though too deep for reason to fathom, they are not of a nature such that reason cannot investigate them. On the contrary, apologetics can and should bring out their congruity with reason in various ways. For example, this appears in that the doctrines of our faith really do interpret its facts. Often they go far in explaining them. Thus in the light of them the facts are seen to be at least possible. Take the fact of the creation. Do what we will, we must, the universe being self-evidently dependent, assume that it was created and that it was created out of nothing. This, however, is a conception that reason refuses. That something should of itself come out of nothing is a contradiction; and unbelieving science would herself recognize this, did she not decline to think whenever the question of origin arises. But in theism we have the suggestion of the solution. The mind can admit the conception of creation out of nothing in view of the absoluteness of the Creator. We can endure the absence of a material cause inasmuch as there is an efficient cause, and this is the self-existent absolute One. Why should he not "call the things that are not, as though they were?" How any being can do this, we cannot explain; but that the Absolute Being can do it, no one can rationally deny. Does not this indicate the reasonableness of the doctrine of God? At least such a doctrine is presupposed by the certain fact of the creation.

But apologetics can and should do much more than this. It can often show the truth of the facts of Christianity to be, to a considerable degree, comprehensible. Take the nature of God as revelation portrays it. He is a social being. He must be, for we are made in his image. God, however, has existed eternally, whereas rational creatures and, indeed, the universe were created in time. For ages upon ages, therefore, God existed alone. But how could this be and he be blessed, if he is essentially a social being? This is the question which Unitarianism is bound to answer and cannot answer. The mystery of the Trinity, however, removes this particular difficulty. In the persons of the Godhead we see how God could exist alone and yet not be lonely. Does not this evince, at least so far forth, the congruity of the doctrine of the Trinity with reason? Only that which is itself reasonable can thus meet a demand of reason. And this is not all. The "philosophical aspect" which, as Prof. H. B. Smith says, can be discerned in the case of every doctrine of Christianity, proves that

the doctrine, even in those aspects of it that are above reason, is still rational. This is so because the philosophical aspect of every Christian doctrine belongs to its very significance. It is not a foreign element, in the doctrine but not of it. It arises out of the essential nature or meaning of the doctrine. Thus it is that God exists as three real persons—it is precisely this that explains how he can be the social being that he is. Now what is rational in its essential nature, so far as we can understand it, must be rational throughout; for that nature cannot but be the same throughout. If a child can appreciate some of the aspects of the declaration of our national independence, he is bound to believe that he could appreciate them all if he knew enough: because they are all aspects of the same fact they cannot differ in kind, but in degree only; if the lower are essentially appreciable, so also must be the higher.

Thirdly, apologetics can and should show that it is precisely because Christianity is incomprehensible that it is reasonable. Could it be comprehended throughout it would, in view of its claims, be irrational and, indeed, impossible. By its own statement it is supernatural because from heaven and of God. How, then, could it be understood by human reason? The supernatural would be no longer supernatural if it could be expressed in terms of the natural. Thus the incomprehensibility of Christianity is the sign of its truth; and so in bringing out this incomprehensibility, as apologetics must do in every attempt to rationalize Christianity, apologetics does but present the final and, in view of all that has gone before, the convincing proof of its essential reasonableness. To be reasonable, "the way and the life and the truth" of him who is "God manifest in the flesh," as in some of its aspects, as we have just seen, it must be open to human reason, so in others it must be above it. This is the necessity of the case. Hence, apologetics should rationalize our faith. It should counteract the very general tendency to regard it as out of all relation to reason and so to be held blindly. It should dispose us to its constant and diligent study. It should show that even when we cannot understand it itself, we can always understand why it should be held; and that not the least reason why it should be held is that it is above our reason. Such, then, are the functions of apologetics. If it is to realize its practical importance, it must vindicate Christianity both negatively and positively. It must refute the false principles that underlie the prevalent objections to it by showing that these involve far greater difficulties than even those that may appear to embarrass our religion. As one has well said, "In removing the Christian

mole-hill, there is of necessity created an agnostic mountain." Then, positively, apologetics must rationalize Christianity, by showing that its facts, while mysterious, are so bound up with the system of admitted facts that the latter cannot be real and the former not be; by bringing out "the philosophical aspect" of every one of the doctrines of our faith; and by pointing out that the mystery in which both the facts and the doctrines of our religion terminate is the cloud of glory which by veiling indicates both the presence and the nature of him who is the Reason of reason.

III. In closing, let us consider very briefly how the so important functions of apologetics may best be performed.

1. Its negative office would seem to call for such a change in our Church services as would allow of frequent public meetings for the free discussion, by means of question and answer, of the objections to Christianity. This requirement is ably presented by Mr. Ballard in his chapter on "The Attitude of the Christian Church" in his *Miracles of Unbelief*, probably the strongest as well as the most striking of recent works on the evidences of our religion. According to Mr. Ballard, a chief reason, perhaps the chief reason, for the slow progress of the Gospel is that public opportunity is rarely, if ever, given for the expression and the answering of the intellectual difficulties concerning Christianity that exist antecedently in the minds of many, and that the preaching of the Gospel, however faithful and often just because faithful, is almost sure to suggest to more. These difficulties, it is true, are generally dealt with in books. But then most persons need to be directed to the works adapted to their particular cases; to not a few these are inaccessible; many, if they had them, would still require a personal teacher. Besides this, the desire for light is seldom so strong as the sense of difficulty. Therefore, if light be not afforded at once, the difficulty prevails; he who might have been a sincere inquirer becomes a sullen objector. His difficulties increase and propagate. What is worse, they engender the feeling that the Church either cannot resolve them or does not care to do so. To this way of thinking Mr. Ballard believes to be due the facts that in modern "Christian" England there are four men absent for every one present at Sunday services; and that in London, certainly one of the most church-going cities of the world, we have four millions of human beings unassociated with any Christian Church. The masses despise what they call "pulpit logic" and often stigmatize the pulpit, sometimes not untruly if unkindly, as a "Edward's castle."

The remedy for this deplorable condition is, of course, the

removal of the offense. The decency and order of public worship would prevent the permission of challenges and even of questions while it was in progress. But might not a meeting be held invariably immediately after the service for all such as had perplexities to present or objections to raise? These would commonly be similar, so that the answer to one would be the answer to many. The easier and the more general could be disposed of first. The obstinate objector could then be dealt with at length and when few persons remained. The details of the plan may not now be set forth, and they would vary in every case. The plan, however, would seem to be practical; and in view of the demand for it, ought it not to be adopted? It has always been in operation on the foreign field, and it is not a little significant that there the growth of the Church has been many times more rapid than at home. Nor would the benefits of such a method be confined to the resolution of intellectual difficulties. It is essentially the method of Spener. So good a movement as Pietism was when at its best was made possible by just such meetings as we are advocating.

2. The positive office of apologetics would seem to call for preaching that itself appeals to the reason. It should do this by its method. By this it is not meant that human reason should be presented as the source or the ground or the measure of religious truth. To regard it as all or as any one of these is rationalism. The Gospel is from God: we receive it on His authority, and we accept it in so far as he has revealed it, whether we do or do not comprehend it. Nevertheless, because God is the Reason of reason, his message must have its rational aspect, and we shall both bring out its divinity and consequent truth and commend it to ourselves by evincing its reasonableness. Hence, the facts of Christianity should be set forth, not only in their supernatural isolation because uniqueness, but also in their historical relations; the crucifixion, for example, as the centre of human history no less than the consummation of God's plan of redemption. So, too, the doctrines of our religion, while they should be preached as divine and, therefore, true declarations, should also be proclaimed as evincing their divinity and truth through their harmony with reason; the incarnation, for instance, as a mystery of God and yet as manifesting its origin specially in being the rational answer to the deepest need of man. That is, as there should be more doctrinal preaching, so doctrinal apologetics should enter more largely into doctrinal preaching.

Preaching should appeal to reason also by its subject-matter. The proofs of our religion should be frequently and fully set forth.

This should be done positively, not as refuting objections, but as confirming what the preacher assumes to be believed. Indeed, nothing is more foolish than for the preacher to raise objections. It is quite enough for him to afford the opportunity for their presentation in the after-meeting already referred to and to discuss and answer them then. The truth of Christianity may, however, be established without even suggesting objections and in such a way that, were they existing, they would be ruled out. Thus the argument from prophecy, the argument from the self-consistency of Christianity, the argument from its early diffusion, the argument from its historic effects, the argument from its power of recuperation and of self-development and of assimilation, the argument from the comparison of it with all other religions, the argument from its unique excellence as a system of truth or a philosophy, the argument from the character and from the resurrection of Christ—any one of these arguments, not to mention others, may be presented without apparent apologetic purpose and in a spirit the opposite of what the apologetic spirit is popularly conceived to be, but with such true because positive apologetic effect as often to render negative apologetics unnecessary.

Of course, the objection arises that the plan proposed would require an abler ministry than we have. Yes, it would. To conduct "in meekness and fear" such meetings as have been described would require grace that not many possess, but not what "the God of all grace" does not have and is not ready to give. It would call also for intellectual preparation such as few of our students or ministers aspire to. It would not be consistent with a college course devoted, as so often under our elective system, to almost all studies except those of high disciplinary value; nor with the so common comparative indifference to the more fundamental and, therefore, apparently less practical subjects of the seminary curriculum; nor with the so frequent neglect on the part of our more active pastors of severe and independent theological study. It might demand the addition of another year of required preparation. It might necessitate the liberal endowment of fellowships for theological research. It might call for the exercise of much more wisdom and firmness on the part of Presbyteries in rejecting candidates who seem to be lacking in any of the three indispensable qualifications of the ministry—godliness, common sense and aptness to teach.

Yet all these difficulties do not constitute even one real objection to the plan that this paper has proposed and that it has described, though most imperfectly. It is worked successfully on

the foreign field. It is urgently demanded here at home. Who, then, may say that God would not have us put it into operation or could not give us the power and wisdom to make it succeed? If it be the fact, as the latest census would seem to prove, that at last the Church of our country is failing to keep pace with the increase of our population, does not this emphasize the need of a different kind of evangelism, of a more general recognition of the practical importance of apologetics, and of a return to what we have seen was so often and so characteristically the method of our Lord and of his apostles? So long as man is the rational animal and religion is the most rational of all his concerns, it cannot be that Christianity can be established by bare assertions, however strong; by mere appeals, however fervid; by confused teaching, however earnest: it must be that the noble science which aims to set forth the rational side and so the proof of our religion will ever be of exceedingly practical because of fundamental importance. Just because living Christianity is the result of the work of "the Spirit of truth," and ultimately of this alone, Christianity must be made manifest as truth to the correlate of truth; and the correlate of truth is the reason.

PRINCETON.

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