

S. M. Casey
1871
Berkeley

THE
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 1.—JULY, 1887.

I. BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.

A splendid edition of Bishop Berkeley's works was issued, in 1871, by Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser, the incumbent of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh—the chair once illuminated by the genius of the illustrious Sir William Hamilton. The elaborate dissertations in which the accomplished Editor expounds the Bishop's idealistic system, and the fact that they have emanated from one who has succeeded the great exponent and defender of Natural Realism, have had the effect of calling attention afresh to the principles of Berkeley's philosophy. In proceeding to discuss them we deem it important to furnish a brief preliminary statement of the main features of Berkeley's system :

1. The Denial of Abstract Ideas.
2. The Denial of the Existence of Matter as Substance. There is no such thing as material substance.
3. The Denial of even the Phenomenal Existence of Matter, separate from and independent of spirit: denial of Natural Realism. Material things have no reality in themselves. Whatever reality or *casuality* material things possess, is dependent and relative.
4. *Esse est percipi*: the so-called material world depends for existence upon the perception of spirit. A thing exists only as it is sensibly perceived.

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communications. And so far as God's historical action is concerned, was Christ evolved by the progress of events? Even Schleiermacher, Semi-panteist as he was, admits that he was a new and separate beginning of humanity.

The author's doctrine of miracles is of a piece with this general view. They are denied to be contra-natural. Consequently their apologetic worth is reduced to naught. No extraordinary divine interposition could be proved by them; and indeed no such interposition would be deemed necessary by an evolutionist. We have no hesitation in saying, that according to this view, Christianity could not be proved at the bar of the human reason. It stands or falls with credentials which God alone could furnish.

From all this it does not surprise us, however it may pain us, to learn that the author's doctrine of redemption rises no higher than that of pure Arminianism as to its conception of grace, and no higher than that of Universalism as to its eschatology. He uses the phraseology of the evangelical school, but under its uniform he represents another. We should be happy to find that in this we are mistaken. But he who teaches that man is the determining factor in receiving the grace of salvation, and that God in redemption is simply evolving his purposes of love, appears to be half an Arminian, and half a universal Restorationist. If so, we know where Yale theology stands. It is not the theology of Dwight!

J. L. G.

PEABODY'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY. *A series of Lectures, by Andrew P. Peabody, D. D., L. L. D., Emeritus Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University.* Boston: Lee and Shepard, Publishers, No. 10 Milk street, 1 vol. 12 mo. pp. 337. 1887.

The author has not in this work pointed out with sufficient clearness what would seem to be an obvious distinction—between Moral Philosophy and Ethics. The former we conceive to be concerned about the analysis of our moral nature, and the treatment of the fundamental laws of morality or rectitude, which lie at the root of that nature, and are brought into consciousness by the actual cases of experience. Butler reduced these principles to Truth, Justice and Benevolence. To these perhaps Purity should be added. These principles becomes standards (when the facts of experience occur) by which we spontaneously perceive the right or wrong qualities of actions. In this way all men, who are not imbecile, acquire a spontaneously formed body of rules. Ethics, we take it, is the result of a reflective process by which these rules are examined in comparison with the laws of morality, corrected, and digested into scientific and formal shape. Dr. Peabody without indicating this distinction at the outset, proceeds at once to consider Human Freedom, one of the elements of moral agency.

When he comes to consider the nature of Virtue, he defines it to be "conduct in conformity with the right, or, more briefly, rightness or righteousness." Had he broadened this definition so as to make that to be virtue which is the element in our moral principles and states as well as our conduct, that is conformed to the right, he would have furnished a completer and more accurate one. But in considering rightness as the specific and distinguishing mark of virtue we believe him to be correct. What then is the Right? How is it grounded? These are questions of fundamental importance, and he breaks down in the answer he renders to them. Early in the work he has these words which carry us back to the theory of Samuel Clarke: "What characteristic is it that renders an act right or wrong? In other words, what is the ground, or the rule, of right? Were I to say, 'The right is what it is fitting to do; the wrong, what it is unfitting to do,' I might seem to be uttering a mere truism; yet in my belief I should be announcing the fundamental principle of Moral Philosophy—a principle, too, which has by no means the universal, or even the general, consent of ethical philosophers. I regard fitness as the ultimate and sole ground of right."

But, in the first place, fitness implies a standard. What is that standard? In the second place, a thing may be fit which is not right. In the third place, the standard of fitness would be as mutable as the perceptions of moral agents. In the fourth place, virtue would be reduced to moral taste. The author is greatly opposed to making the will of God the ground of moral obligation, but the reasons he urges for this opposition would all be met by signaling a distinction upon which his eye did not seem to rest, but which is of vital import, namely, that between the ground of moral obligation, and the ground of moral distinctions. The will of God obliges me to be and to do right. This furnishes the ground of obligation. But the ground of moral distinctions is in the eternal nature of God as right. That is to say—to be more specific—the requirements of God's will constitute a formal rule of right, because they represent the whole moral nature of God, including his will itself. We know that God's will requires only what is morally right, because it is his will, and must be conformed to the unchangeable norm of right in his nature. In regard to this, Dr. Peabody employs most extraordinary language for a Christian teacher in high places: "In maintaining that his (God's) acts are right because they are his, we virtually ascribe to them no moral attributes, but merely apply to the Majesty of Heaven the maxim outgrown on earth, unless at the court of Ashantee or Dahomey, 'The King can do no wrong.'" It follows, then, that man's perception of fitness is the ultimate standard by which God's acts are to be judged. And this Dr. Peabody explicitly maintains! In connection with this impious moral philosophy he cannot resist the temptation to give us a specimen of an equally impious theology. After emphasizing the "atrocious tyranny and cruelty" of Zeus in his fabled treatment of Prometheus, he proceeds to say: "A

conception analogous to that of Zeus has been rife even in New England within my memory, though now almost obsolete. In some of our churches it was currently said that the natural man hates God; and converted men and women, in their (so-called) experience meetings, were wont to say that they used to hate God. * * * Theologians of this type maintained the damnation of the heathen, and sometimes, of infants; believed that God arbitrarily elected certain members of the human race for salvation, and decreed, from all eternity, the wickedness of the wicked as well as their horrible doom; ascribed to his direct command the slaughter of the Canaanites, with their women and children, and represented his wrath as unappeasable, except by an innocent being's bearing the full punishment due to the guilty. Men's natural sense of fitness and of its equivalent, the Right, recoiled from such a God; and a great deal of the infidelity which prevailed two or three generations ago sprang from the impossibility, on the part of ingenuous minds, of believing in such a Governor of the universe, while its better forms were really more nearly Christian than the type of Christianity which they replaced."

One knows not which the most to wonder at in this passage, the palpable denial of doctrines and facts affirmed in the Bible, or the misrepresentation of the Calvinistic theology, or the abuse heaped upon the Deity revealed in the Scriptures, or the arrogant claim that miserable sinners have the right, in conformity to their sense of fitness, to determine what sort of God they will have, if any God it all. The radical principle of the work being what it is, we are indisposed to criticise its details. We recommend our readers to examine the book for themselves, in order to ascertain what type of moral philosophy and theology is inculcated in Harvard University.

J. L. G.

MCCOSH'S REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY, *Defended in a Philosophic Series, by James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., Litt. D., (etc.), President of Princeton College. In two volumes; I. Expository; II. Historical and Critical.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons: 1887.

In a notice like this no more can be done than to make some general remarks concerning a work which deserves an extended review. The illustrious author evidently does not despair of a science of Philosophy. It is true that, like Theology, it has to deal with infinite elements, and that fact seems to render its reduction to scientific form impossible. But Dr. McCosh has the merit of showing that our knowledge transcends the facts of perception and the mediate conclusions of the logical faculty, and embraces what he felicitously terms faith-elements. If this latter kind of knowledge be valid, there is nothing to hinder its being imported from the believing into the thinking faculty,