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I. BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.

A splendid edition of Bishop Berkeley's works was issued, in 1871, by Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser, the incumbent of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh—the chair once illuminated by the genius of the illustrious Sir William Hamilton. The elaborate dissertations in which the accomplished Editor expounds the Bishop's idealistic system, and the fact that they have emanated from one who has succeeded the great exponent and defender of Natural Realism, have had the effect of calling attention afresh to the principles of Berkeley's philosophy. In proceeding to discuss them we deem it important to furnish a brief preliminary statement of the main features of Berkeley's system :

1. The Denial of Abstract Ideas.
2. The Denial of the Existence of Matter as Substance. There is no such thing as material substance.
3. The Denial of even the Phenomenal Existence of Matter, separate from and independent of spirit: denial of Natural Realism. Material things have no reality in themselves. Whatever reality or *casuality* material things possess, is dependent and relative.
4. *Esse est percipi*: the so-called material world depends for existence upon the perception of spirit. A thing exists only as it is sensibly perceived.

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conception analogous to that of Zeus has been rife even in New England within my memory, though now almost obsolete. In some of our churches it was currently said that the natural man hates God; and converted men and women, in their (so-called) experience meetings, were wont to say that they used to hate God. \* \* \* Theologians of this type maintained the damnation of the heathen, and sometimes, of infants; believed that God arbitrarily elected certain members of the human race for salvation, and decreed, from all eternity, the wickedness of the wicked as well as their horrible doom; ascribed to his direct command the slaughter of the Canaanites, with their women and children, and represented his wrath as unappeasable, except by an innocent being's bearing the full punishment due to the guilty. Men's natural sense of fitness and of its equivalent, the Right, recoiled from such a God; and a great deal of the infidelity which prevailed two or three generations ago sprang from the impossibility, on the part of ingenuous minds, of believing in such a Governor of the universe, while its better forms were really more nearly Christian than the type of Christianity which they replaced."

One knows not which the most to wonder at in this passage, the palpable denial of doctrines and facts affirmed in the Bible, or the misrepresentation of the Calvinistic theology, or the abuse heaped upon the Deity revealed in the Scriptures, or the arrogant claim that miserable sinners have the right, in conformity to their sense of fitness, to determine what sort of God they will have, if any God it all. The radical principle of the work being what it is, we are indisposed to criticise its details. We recommend our readers to examine the book for themselves, in order to ascertain what type of moral philosophy and theology is inculcated in Harvard University.

J. L. G.

#### MCCOSH'S REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY, *Defended in a Philosophic Series, by James McCosh, D. D., LL. D., Litt. D., (etc.), President of Princeton College. In two volumes; I. Expository; II. Historical and Critical.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons: 1887.

In a notice like this no more can be done than to make some general remarks concerning a work which deserves an extended review. The illustrious author evidently does not despair of a science of Philosophy. It is true that, like Theology, it has to deal with infinite elements, and that fact seems to render its reduction to scientific form impossible. But Dr. McCosh has the merit of showing that our knowledge transcends the facts of perception and the mediate conclusions of the logical faculty, and embraces what he felicitously terms faith-elements. If this latter kind of knowledge be valid, there is nothing to hinder its being imported from the believing into the thinking faculty,

and employed by the latter in its logical processes. Whether, on abstract grounds, this be affirmed to be impossible or not, the fact is that, in the concrete, it is constantly done, and must be done, unless we refuse to reason at all about the grandest and most significant of all our knowledges.

In connexion with this, the work affords a disproof of the common but unwarranted assertion, that Metaphysics is not a progressive science. A few considerations are suggested as illustrative of this remark.

First, For a long time the deductive method almost exclusively prevailed; but the inductive has come to be very generally employed, not as extruding the former, but furnishing the data upon which it competently proceeds. The interrogation of consciousness, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts upon which the fundamental principles of the science ought to be based, is certainly an indication of progress.

Secondly, There has been a decided advance in the enunciation and development of the original Laws of Thought and Belief in relation to the processes of the understanding, and of the original Laws of Morality in relation to the processes of the moral nature—relations indicated by psychological investigation.

Thirdly, For ages philosophers adopted the hypothesis of Representative Perception. Since the rise of the Scottish school, the tendency of philosophical thought has been marked in the direction of adopting the contrary theory of the Immediate Knowledge of the external world.

Fourthly, There has been notable progress in the evolution of the doctrine of Presentative and Representative Knowledge.

Fifthly, There has been, in some degree, progress in fixing the certainty of principles and doctrines, arising from the conflict of opinions, somewhat analogous to that which, in theology, has resulted from controversies in the Church. The Absolutist controversy, for example, has tended to settle the limitations of the mental powers and the boundaries of thought, at the same time that it has enhanced confidence in the existence of native principles in the mind, which while they ground the possibility of experience, depend upon it in turn for their development. It has contributed to make more distinct the divisions between the domains of Faith and Conception, and so has classified the obscure inquiries of Ontology by assigning the restrictions under which Thought proceeds, and determining the proper office of Faith and the sweep of the peculiar judgments which it necessitates, in contradistinction to those which are the appropriate results of the Comparative Faculty.

Sixthly, There has been progress in the matters of the Duality of Consciousness as affirming matter and spirit—to use the exquisite language of Hamilton—in the synthesis of knowledge and the antithesis of existence, and of its testimony to the certainty of Objective Reality.

If to these and like considerations, it be objected that the progress of physical science is more certain and its results more trustworthy, the question arises as to the ground of certainty in the respective spheres.

To us it seems clear that, in the last analysis, that ground is one and the same—that is to say, the veracity of consciousness. Physical science proceeds through the medium of the senses as its instruments of observation. But reliance is placed upon the testimony of the senses by virtue of consciousness. In perceiving an external object we are either conscious of the perceiving act, or immediately of the object perceived. On either supposition, we trust in the veracity of consciousness. Now as the relation of consciousness to mental phenomena is far more direct—there being no sensible medium intervening—it is fair to infer that its deliverances as to them cannot be less trustworthy.

In the respects which have been mentioned, and others, Dr. McCosh is justly entitled to the praise, and it is no mean praise, of furnishing by his labors a refutation of the charge that philosophy is unprogressive. He is safe in placing himself in the ranks of those who maintain the Common Sense philosophy, which in the hands of his distinguished countrymen has been developed with conspicuous ability, and we think, has by his own inquiries been pushed forward on the path of further development. In this he has rendered important service, not only to speculation, but to religion. For religion, considered comprehensively, embraces natural as well as supernatural truth. Christianity itself, as a peculiar because redemptive scheme, assumes the great pre-suppositions of nature, and incorporates them into itself.

These remarks are made, not especially with reference to the work before us, but to the drift and genius of all his productions. The point at which he seems to us to have advanced the Scottish philosophy—and in this it is likely he will not agree with us—is not so much his persistent and laudable assertion of Natural Realism, for he has himself acknowledged that of that doctrine his great compeer, Sir William Hamilton, was a pronounced and exceptionally able advocate, but in his explicit vindication of our faith-judgments as real and valid knowledges. In this he has gone farther than Hamilton, who, while he held distinctly the transcendent power of faith as contradistinguished to conception, and maintained the necessity of our believing much that we are utterably unable to think, unhappily restricted, at least too severely restricted, the appellation of knowledge to the results of perception and positive thought. In this he erred, and the error in his nomenclature has exposed him to grievous misconstruction of his real positions. From this defect, Dr. McCosh is free. The transcendent facts of God's existence, of the infinity of space and duration, and of immortality, which the thinking faculty cannot grasp, he characterizes not only as beliefs, but knowledges. We own ourselves indebted to him for profound suggestions in connection with this vitally important subject. Nor do we know of another writer who has contributed as much as he to a careful analysis and pains-taking classification of those original principles of both the intellectual and moral nature, which he prefers to call intuitions, but which, on account of the ambiguity of

that term and its consequent liability to misapprehension, we would rather, with Dugald Stewart, designate as fundamental laws of thought, belief and morality. Mausel, for instance, uses the term *intuition* in its primary sense, as indicating an act of presentative knowledge in which we directly gaze upon an object now and here present to the perceptive faculty, external or internal. In this sense it cannot, without a concession of the outrageous position of the Absolutists—Schelling's Intellectual Intuition for example—be held that we have an intuition of God and of substance. But as to that, *de gustibus*, etc. Dr. McCosh has done signal service in ranking the judgments of faith, elicited by the conditions of experience into formal expression, and overpassing the scope of the perceptive and discursive faculties, as the grandest and most salutary knowledges of the human soul.

While, however, we accord this tribute to Dr. McCosh, we think that he has needlessly confused the subject by making, as he does in his *Intuitions of the Mind*, some experimental knowledge always precede faith. The true statement, enforced by his own principles, is that the fundamental laws of belief antecede all the processes of experience and exercise a regulative influence upon them, but that the thought-knowledge acquired by those processes goes before and conditions the articulate judgments of faith.

We are disposed to think also that he has not with sufficient accuracy noted the *criteria* of these original principles. He has in this, his latest work, given them as Self-evidence, Necessity and Universality. One fails to see why he omitted Simplicity, or—if we might venture to employ so unusual a word—Ultimacy. These principles are to psychological investigation what ultimate facts or primordial elements are to physical; when discovered by analysis, they ground all logical synthesis. Consciousness reveals them as incapable of resolution by analysis into any simpler elements, and they are therefore entitled to be accepted as fundamental. Universality can hardly be assigned the place of a separate and co-ordinate test. It is rather the proof of Necessity. What all men everywhere and always believe must be so believed because it is necessary. It may, indeed, be doubted whether all tests may not be reduced to unity upon that of Necessity. But enough upon this point.

In the work before us, which appears to be to some extent a recapitulatory statement of the results of his previous investigations, the author, in the first volume, didactically expounds his own philosophical system, and in the second, states and criticises the prominent systems of the past and the present. By the way, it is somewhat curious that, in commenting upon that of the Scottish School, he does not signalize the position of Hamilton, who holds the seat of the Tachmonite among the mighty three, the others of whom were Reid and Stewart. Was it because of his determinate opposition to Hamilton's doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge? This leads us to say a few words about that matter.

The capital feature of the present work is, as its title indicates, a defence of Realism. By this must not be understood that Scholastic Realism which affirmed the existence of substantive entities represented by general notions or common terms. It is mainly, if we understand it, what is now known as Natural Realism, but with certain, specific elements different from those of the doctrine designated by that name. Dr. McCosh maintains the leading characteristic of the Natural Realism of the Scottish School—namely its affirmation that we immediately know the external world in an act of sense-perception. He criticises Hamilton for attempting to incorporate with this doctrine the principles of Kant. Now it is evident that whereas the German regarded the subjective forms of the mind as furnishing no certain guarantee for the independent existence of objective reality, the Scotchman held precisely the contrary. In what then does Dr. McCosh condemn Hamilton's concurrence with Kant? In this—that they both affirm that we cannot know things absolutely, we know them only relatively: we cannot know them “in themselves.” Let it be borne in mind that the question now is in regard to the perceptive knowledge of external things. Hamilton contends that we know phenomenal qualities immediately, when they are related to our faculty of perception. There is no apparent difference here between Dr. McCosh and Hamilton. They both hold to the immediate knowledge of phenomenal reality, for Hamilton did not deny that a phenomenal quality is a real, existing thing. But he denied that we know, *by an act of perception*, the thing so perceived in itself. What does he mean? Why, that perceptive knowledge does not and cannot give the occult substance of the thing, the phenomenal qualities of which we perceive. The thing in itself is the thing considered as a substance, grounding the phenomenal qualities, manifested by them and constituting their hidden bond of unity. But Hamilton also affirmed that this defect in the immediate knowledge furnished by perception is supplemented by an inferential judgment enforced by belief. We necessarily believe in the substance—that is, the thing in itself—in consequence of our perceiving its phenomenal qualities. But this inference to the substance from its qualities, is made with so magical a swiftness that only reflection can detect a distinction between the two spontaneous acts. They seem to be one and the same, but are really distinct. The one involves immediate, the other, mediate knowledge. This mediate knowledge of the thing, substantially considered, is a relative knowledge because it could never be given by the thing, phenomenally considered, but only through the relation between phenomena and substance. These two acts of apprehension appear to synchronize, but one is in order to the other: that of immediate knowledge, by perception of the phenomenal qualities, in the order of production antecedes and conditions that of mediate knowledge, by faith, of the substance supporting the qualities and phenomenally manifested by them. This is the doctrine of the Scottish School, foreshadowed by

Reid, further developed by Stewart, and more explicitly expounded by Hamilton.

How does Dr. McCosh's doctrine differ from it? If we do not misunderstand his position, it is that "in one primitive concrete act"—such is his language<sup>(\*)</sup>—we know things in their reality: we know them at once in their integrity. If by knowledge Dr. McCosh meant both immediate and mediate knowledge as contemporaneously experienced, we would have nothing to object to his position, as it would have to be identified with that of the Scottish School. But this cannot be his meaning. It is that we immediately know by perception things as wholes—in their integrity. We know in one concrete act of immediate knowledge both substances and qualities. We know immediately the *substances as qualified*. This holds both in regard to matter and mind. We immediately know "a stone" as a certain material substance so and so qualified; and we immediately know self as thinking, feeling, willing, and passing moral judgments. Perception gives us the former, self-consciousness the latter. Touching this theory, we remark:

First, It is indeed a protest against the Catholic doctrine of the Scottish School: it involves a departure from its whole genius and spirit, and we cannot resist the conclusion that it is out of harmony with Dr. McCosh's teaching with reference to the knowledge which springs from faith in contradistinction to perception and thought.

Secondly, So far as it differs from the position of the Scottish School, it is in the main indefensible. If we have by perception an immediate knowledge of things, as substances, they are presented to us in the same way as are qualities. We would consequently be able to describe the former, just as we are able to describe the latter. This it is impossible to do, and the conclusion is necessitated that we do not in that manner know things considered as substances. We immediately know a stone as an aggregate of phenomenal qualities, but we do not immediately know the subtle material substance which is manifested by these qualities. If we do, we can tell how it looks and feels. In like manner, we must distinguish between our immediate knowledge, by consciousness, of the phenomena of the soul, and our knowledge of the soul itself as an immaterial substance. If we had immediate knowledge of it, as a substance presented to us, we could describe it as we describe its phenomenal manifestations. Who ever did this? If Dr. McCosh will do it, he will convince us of the truth of his doctrine. A direct consciousness of self, such as Dr. Mansel and Dr. McCosh affirm, could only be maintained by denying consciousness to be equivalent to immediate knowledge of presented objects. If that be denied, the question is degraded into one of words. We are conscious of the substance neither of matter, nor of our souls, nor of God. We are conscious of their phenomenal manifestations, and through them—that is, relatively—know them by immediate inferences enforced by fundamental laws

(\*) Scottish Philosophy, p. 289.

of belief: immediate inferences so swiftly derived from the data conscious as to seem identical with those data themselves.

Thirdly, Dr. McCosh incorrectly charges Hamilton with considering phenomena as mere appearances. He as much holds them to be realities as does Dugald Stewart. What is the objection to calling qualities phenomena? Are they not the circumstances through which the substances appear as well as those by which they are modified?

Fourthly, We utterly dissent from Dr. McCosh's judgment that Hamilton's doctrine of relativity logically conduced to the Agnosticism of Spencer, and "ended in nihilism or at least in nescience." This is a serious indictment, and if correct a fatal one. To our mind, it has no foundation. What was Hamilton's real doctrine? He virtually represented knowledge as generic, having under it two species—immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge. Immediate is that which we have when an object is now and here present to us. We gaze upon it as an act of genuine intuition. Mediate is acquired either by mediate or immediate inference. The conclusion from a syllogistic argument is a specimen of the former, the judgment that as we immediately know phenomenal qualities there is a substance which they manifest, is an instance of the latter. When also we are conscious in an act of reminiscence of a mental image, re-presenting a past event, we immediately know the vicarious image, but mediately know the event. We immediately know the finite manifestations of God's existence, and through them, by an immediate inference, necessitated by a fundamental law of belief, mediately know God in an act of faith. Now, although Hamilton usually applied the term *knowledge* to that which is immediate, he did not absolutely restrict it. He admitted mediate knowledge—and as that is the sort of knowledge by which alone we can apprehend the infinite, God, the substance of matter and of the soul, he was logically bound to admit that our grandest knowledges are mediate. In fine, Hamilton's belief in God, in substance and in immortality was his mediate knowledge of those realities. They could not be immediately known, but *they must be known by faith* in consequence of the operation of fundamental laws empirically developed. To say then that his principles logically led to the unknowableness of God, of substance, of immortality, is either to confess ignorance of them, or abusively to employ them. The Atheistic Materialists who go by the name of Agnostics, aware that Hamilton denied, and justly denied, the possibility of apprehending God, as infinite, in an act of *immediate* knowledge, perverted his doctrine to mean that we cannot know him at all. But their doctrine was not born of Hamilton. It had another father, and claimed respectability by falsely pretending to be his child. This is not strange as coming from them, but we wonder when we hear an advocate of the Scottish philosophy sanctioning the groundless pretention. Hamilton no more denies the knowledge of

God by faith, than does Dr. McCosh affirm the knowledge of Him by perception.

There is, however, one respect in which it strikes us that Dr. McCosh has passed a just stricture upon Hamilton's position, if that position has been rightly construed. The latter says that to the object of sense-perception—that is, the external thing perceived, elements are respectively contributed by the distant object, by the intervening medium, by the organ of sense, and by the mind perceiving. The perceived object is modified by the mind itself. If this means that the object is compounded jointly of material and mental elements, we cannot see how Hamilton can be saved from the criticism that he compromises the great principle of his school, of an immediate, presentative knowledge of external objects, and that he imperils his own doctrine of Natural Realism, that in the same act we are conscious of the duality of self and the external world, of an antithesis, as to existence, of mind and matter.

We must arrest this notice before we would desire. Dr. McCosh's critical reviews of philosophical systems are learned and acute; his discussion of the doctrine of Causation is very able and has our hearty concurrence. To the Aristotelic causes, the material, the efficient, the formal and the final, which he has finely expounded, he might with propriety have added the instrumental of the Schoolmen. With his rejection of Hamilton's account of the genesis of the Causal Judgment we cordially agree. We regret his gingerly handling of Evolution. There is no reason why that hypothesis should be entitled to philosophic consideration, while there lie across its path Harvey's great and undisproved law: *Omne vivum ex ovo*, and the law of Hybridism which, if not removed, Huxley has confessed will shatter the Darwinian doctrine. It is the Transmutability of Species, not generative propagation *intra speciem*, that is the essence of Evolution, and until science has established that fact, philosophic concession to its claims is as unwise as it is premature.

J. L. G.

#### ALEXANDER'S PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. *By Archibald Alexander, Professor Philosophy in Columbia College.* New York: Charles Scribners' Sons: 1886.

This is a small volume of only 170 pages, but it condenses into a brief compass the results of extensive philosophical learning. Professor Alexander displays a profound insight into the problems which for ages have tasked the speculative intellect. It seems to have been his purpose to state them rather than to solve them, to array in their most formidable shape the doubts which attend them, so as to stimulate the effort to encounter and settle them. But he does in some instances allow himself to indulge in positive argumentation and the defence of