

S. M. Casey
1871
Berkeley

THE
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

NO. 1.—JULY, 1887.

I. BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.

A splendid edition of Bishop Berkeley's works was issued, in 1871, by Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser, the incumbent of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh—the chair once illuminated by the genius of the illustrious Sir William Hamilton. The elaborate dissertations in which the accomplished Editor expounds the Bishop's idealistic system, and the fact that they have emanated from one who has succeeded the great exponent and defender of Natural Realism, have had the effect of calling attention afresh to the principles of Berkeley's philosophy. In proceeding to discuss them we deem it important to furnish a brief preliminary statement of the main features of Berkeley's system :

1. The Denial of Abstract Ideas.
2. The Denial of the Existence of Matter as Substance. There is no such thing as material substance.
3. The Denial of even the Phenomenal Existence of Matter, separate from and independent of spirit: denial of Natural Realism. Material things have no reality in themselves. Whatever reality or *casuality* material things possess, is dependent and relative.
4. *Esse est percipi*: the so-called material world depends for existence upon the perception of spirit. A thing exists only as it is sensibly perceived.

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VII. CRITICISMS AND REVIEWS.

HARRIS'S SELF-REVELATION OF GOD.

THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD, *By Samuel Harris, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887. 8vo.

In this elaborate work of 552 pages, we have a discussion of the profoundest and most interesting questions with which the human mind can come in contact. It was to be expected from the author's reputation, and his distinguished position in the Oxford of New England, that the treatment of these themes would be marked by great ability, and this expectation is fully met. The book is divided into four parts: I. God revealed in experience or consciousness as the Object of religious faith and service; II. God revealed in the Universe as the Absolute Being; III. God revealed in the Universe as Personal Spirit through the constitution and course of nature, and the constitution and history of Man; IV. God revealed in Christ as the Redeemer of man from sin.

The chief value of the work, in the judgment of orthodox Christians, will be found in its polemical discussion of Anti-theistic theories. In this sphere the author evinces signal ability. We must say, however, that like many other Christian writers, he concedes far too little influence to the Scriptures as regulative of doctrine in the department of Natural Theology. It is impossible to construct a natural theology without reference to the supernatural revelation of himself which God has furnished in the Bible. Nor can the speculative conclusions of reason be regarded as co-ordinate authority with the deliverances of such a revelation. The former must submit to be verified or condemned, expanded or corrected by the latter. One of the great points, for example, which the author establishes, is the personality of God as a Spirit. But if reason should rest in the doctrine that God is unipersonal, it would maintain a false doctrine. The Bible reveals him as Three Persons. If it be said, that reason never could have discovered the Trinity, the answer is that it was originally revealed to reason, and, therefore, reason has no right to speculate about God's personality, independently of that revelation when it is accessible. If it does, it revolts against God's authoritative guidance, and must needs plunge into error. Now, this primal revelation the Bible confirms. Reason, we believe, can of itself reach the doctrine of God's personality, but it ought to expand that doctrine into that of his trinal personality under the regulative teaching of the Scriptures. The onliness of God as contradistinguished to many pretended divinities, and to the universe, is the onliness of a Triune God. Any other doctrine as to the divine personality is really as misleading as those which altogether deny that God is a person. We speak here of the authority of the Bible in the sphere

of natural religion and not of supernatural or redemptive. The great assumptions of the former are justified and corroborated by the Scriptures which, like magnifying glasses, reveal them afresh. To say that the authority of the Bible upon these questions cannot be pleaded with the sceptic amounts to this: that historical evidence is of less value than speculative. He who fails to be convinced by the clear evidence upon which the Bible grounds its claims will be apt to remain unsatisfied by all the reasoning, however valid, which is founded upon ontological premises. The two sorts of proof are complementary, but it is not reason which must confirm the Bible; it is the Bible which confirms the deductions of reason. A verbal revelation must be more definite and authoritative than one which depends upon the influences either of thought or of faith.

While we thoroughly agree with Dr. Harris in his doctrine that the knowledge of God is intuitive, and springs necessarily from the constitution of man and the spontaneous processes of the human soul in connexion with the facts of experience, we are compelled to dissent from his view that God is directly known in consciousness. If by consciousness he simply meant its data, together with the immediate and necessary influences which attend them, we would have nothing to object. But he distinctly defines consciousness—and in this he is correct—to be the equivalent of immediate knowledge—that is, the knowledge of presented objects. That God is the object of such a knowledge would appear to be impossible by a single consideration. The infinite as an object cannot be presented to a finite subject. What we immediately know in presentation we can describe. If God be thus known we can describe his infinite essence. The consequence refutes the theory. We immediately know his finite manifestations, and from them we necessarily infer the attributes manifested, and by another step necessarily infer the substance to which these attributes belong. But even then we are conducted to a Being not necessarily infinite. The universe itself is finite, and the contents of the conclusion cannot *logically* transcend those of the premises. What then? The original aptitude for the knowledge of the infinite—and Dr. Harris, we are glad to notice, acknowledges it—elicited from latency and developed into concrete form by empirical conditions, takes the shape of a definite faith-judgment, and positively affirms that the Being to whom thought has, by its valid processes, conducted us is the Infinite Being. Now this "belief" in the Infinite Being is a knowledge, a real, genuine and regulative knowledge. We know his finite manifestations by consciousness, sense-perception and the inferential processes of thought; we know him as infinite by faith. Reason is the generic source from which flow the specific functions of thought and faith, for thought is reason thinking and faith is reason believing; and knowledge is the generic result of thought and faith. Thought has its knowledge, faith has its knowledge, and as he who thinks and he who believes is the same indivisible unit,

the knowledge of the Infinite Being is blended into unity as the joint product of the thinking and believing powers of the one human person. It is therefore, we conceive, a great mistake to contradicting faith to reason on the one hand, and to knowledge on the other. It is a special function of reason and results in knowledge. To say that our apprehensions of God, of the substance of our own souls, of the substance of matter, and of our immortality are mere beliefs which are not knowledges, is to sink the grandest and most operative cognitions of our minds beneath the level of those which spring from our sense relations to the phenomena around us. Strictly speaking, there is no "God-consciousness." In consciousness we immediately know the finite things which reveal him; by faith we mediately but validly know him as infinite.

We have not room to discuss other positions taken in this work from which, if we correctly apprehend them, we must dissent. We only advert to some of them. The author's conception of supernatural revelation we confess that we cannot understand, except upon the hypothesis of Rationalism. Not to pause upon the loose definition of the supernatural, as that which is over and beyond the mere physical, we construe him as implying that God reveals himself alone in action. He furnishes an historical manifestation of himself progressively in nature, providence, the constitution of man, and redemption. It is the province of rational thought to apprehend and state in verbal propositions this historical revelation. But, God himself has done this for us in his Word. That Word is a verbal and authoritative Rule of Faith and Practice. Theology gets its facts from that external Standard, and systematizes them. To take any other ground is to depart from the primary canon of Protestantism.

The author's account of God's revelation of himself in nature, providence and redemption, has one signal defect which must exercise a controlling and disastrous effect upon the scientific theology which it is the office of rational thought to construct. It is that the fundamental attribute of Justice is left out. The revelation is of power, wisdom and love. Of course, from these premises the theologian, Reason, will get the ultimate restoration of the race to God's favor. A future probation is the logical result. But every form of God's self-revelation, non-biblical and biblical alike, asserts justice as well as love. This changes the premises and therefore the conclusion.

The author appears to have embraced the hypothesis of Evolution as a whole. Besides the consideration that a Christian theologian should refrain from affirming what science itself has not yet established, he cannot forget the fact that the scheme of redemption was to some extent revealed, externally and verbally revealed, just after the Fall, and that it has not been evolved by the natural action of the human faculties, interpreting God's historical manifestation of himself, nor by any inherent power in the early revelation to expand itself, but developed by supernatural additions in the form of new, verbal and authoritative

communications. And so far as God's historical action is concerned, was Christ evolved by the progress of events? Even Schleiermacher, Semi-panteist as he was, admits that he was a new and separate beginning of humanity.

The author's doctrine of miracles is of a piece with this general view. They are denied to be contra-natural. Consequently their apologetic worth is reduced to naught. No extraordinary divine interposition could be proved by them; and indeed no such interposition would be deemed necessary by an evolutionist. We have no hesitation in saying, that according to this view, Christianity could not be proved at the bar of the human reason. It stands or falls with credentials which God alone could furnish.

From all this it does not surprise us, however it may pain us, to learn that the author's doctrine of redemption rises no higher than that of pure Arminianism as to its conception of grace, and no higher than that of Universalism as to its eschatology. He uses the phraseology of the evangelical school, but under its uniform he represents another. We should be happy to find that in this we are mistaken. But he who teaches that man is the determining factor in receiving the grace of salvation, and that God in redemption is simply evolving his purposes of love, appears to be half an Arminian, and half a universal Restorationist. If so, we know where Yale theology stands. It is not the theology of Dwight!

J. L. G.

PEABODY'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY. *A series of Lectures, by Andrew P. Peabody, D. D., L. L. D., Emeritus Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University.* Boston: Lee and Shepard, Publishers, No. 10 Milk street, 1 vol. 12 mo. pp. 337. 1887.

The author has not in this work pointed out with sufficient clearness what would seem to be an obvious distinction—between Moral Philosophy and Ethics. The former we conceive to be concerned about the analysis of our moral nature, and the treatment of the fundamental laws of morality or rectitude, which lie at the root of that nature, and are brought into consciousness by the actual cases of experience. Butler reduced these principles to Truth, Justice and Benevolence. To these perhaps Purity should be added. These principles becomes standards (when the facts of experience occur) by which we spontaneously perceive the right or wrong qualities of actions. In this way all men, who are not imbecile, acquire a spontaneously formed body of rules. Ethics, we take it, is the result of a reflective process by which these rules are examined in comparison with the laws of morality, corrected, and digested into scientific and formal shape. Dr. Peabody without indicating this distinction at the outset, proceeds at once to consider Human Freedom, one of the elements of moral agency.