

THE
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY
AND
PRINCETON REVIEW.

NEW SERIES, No. 16.—OCTOBER, 1875.

**Art. I.—PRESBYTERIAN ELEMENTS OF OUR
NATIONALITY.**

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THE vital and permanent elements which are assimilated in our nationality were derived from various sources. While, as a general rule, they had originally much in common, they were by no means homogeneous. There were marked diversities and peculiarities in New England Puritans, Dutch, Swedish, and Welsh colonists, Huguenot exiles, Scotch-Irish emigrants, and the Episcopalians of Virginia and the Carolinas. In what now constitute the Middle States, there was a preponderance of Presbyterians, and yet along with these were to be found many Quakers and Episcopalians. President Stiles, a few years before the Revolution, made an estimate of the relative strength of the Congregational Churches of New England and of the Presbyterian Churches outside of it, and, according to his calculation, the latter were but about one-fourth of the aggregate of both, or, in other words, the Congregationalists outnumbered the Presbyterians by three to one. If we concede to non-Presbyterians, who heartily co-operated in the region south of New England, a strength equal to that of the Presbyterians, we shall conclude that the latter were numerically one-fifth of the active Revolutionary force of the time.

But influence is not always proportioned to numbers. Positive and well-defined convictions will often give to a minority a preponderating force. That Presbyterians of the Revolutionary period were possessed of these, and that they acted upon them with consistency and energy, does not admit of question. Such convictions, moreover, are contagious, and peculiarly so under favorable circumstances. They mold the sentiments of the community. They communicate to others the enthusiasm with which they are entertained. A people, passing through a crisis like that which led to the establishment of our national independence, is peculiarly susceptible of impressions like those which would be exerted by the descendants of the Scottish covenanters and the brave defenders of Londonderry. The thoughts, words, and deeds of these men would naturally be a social leaven, and the principles which they held and avowed would readily acquire an undisputed ascendancy.

That this was, in fact, the case is evidenced by many incidents of our Revolutionary struggle. We need not cite any of the disputed issues of the Mecklenburg Declaration. Enough is freely conceded on both sides to substantiate our claim. The spirit of the convention that framed the supposed declaration determined the action of many more than it directly represented. Among the signers of the Declaration of Independence in Congress, there were men whose weight could not be measured by the units of their votes. Such men were Wilson and Witherspoon, and others who had been educated under Dr. Allison or at Princeton College. Their names inspired confidence, and their convictions, as well as their abilities, made them leaders of men.

How these men were formed—as well as the great body of American Presbyterians—and led to entertain and act upon the sentiments which they held, is more important as illustrating the Presbyterian elements of our national life than any census of numbers. It would not be uninteresting or unprofitable to trace the influence of such men as Witherspoon in council, or of Morgan or Stark in the field; and no history of our struggle for national existence would be complete which overlooked the influence and example of Presbyterian ministers, whether addressing volunteers from their own pulpits, or soldiers in the camp. But we are here more especially con-

cerned to trace the influences which made them what they were, and credit these as they should be credited, to Presbyterian sources.

The patriots and statesmen of the Revolution, notably such men as Otis, the Adamses, and delegates from Virginia, were not unfamiliar with the speculations of the political philosophers of England. They admired Sidney, and they borrowed the phraseology of John Locke; nor were they uninfluenced by the speculations of Cicero, Grotius, Montesquieu, and other writers on the law of nature and of nations. But the Presbyterians of the country had been imbued with kindred principles from an independent source. Rarely, perhaps, were they distinctly conscious of it. The mass of men are actually educated under influences which they are unable to analyze or historically to trace. Our Presbyterian fathers may even never have heard of some of the great writers in Presbyterian history, who had enunciated and vindicated those principles of civil and religious liberty in which from childhood they had been trained, in their sanctuaries and their homes. It is for us to do, what it was not in their power to do—trace the currents of traditional thought and conviction which had flowed down to them from the past, and created as well as beatified those fields of speculation in which their political and social, as well as religious, life was trained.

During all its earlier history, Presbyterianism had to struggle with persecution and intolerance. For more than a century it had to assert its right to be. In contending for its discipline and doctrine, it came frequently into collision with arbitrary power, but some were always found who refused to lower its standards. Contending for the truth, it became necessarily the champion of freedom and the assailant of despotism. In vindicating its principles and protesting against the invasion of the "crown rights" of the Head of the Church by pope, prince, or patron, it formulated its theories of natural law and inalienable rights in a series of works of remarkable force and ability, the merit of which later generations have never fitly recognized.

Before proceeding to notice these, it is proper to take note of the circumstances in which they were produced. While the seed of Reformation was germinating in Scotland, John Knox was at Geneva. That little republic, by the labors and counsels of Calvin, had become the model state of Europe. It had

flung off the yoke of civil and Episcopal tyranny, and shown the purity and vigor of the Reformed faith. Educated in this school, and in full sympathy with Calvin, Knox was prepared at the critical moment to become the leader, in some respects more than the king, of Presbyterian Scotland. He found the efforts of the Reformers withered, now insidiously, and now openly, by an unscrupulous queen, the pupil of the Guises and a tool of the Papacy. She attempted by her authority to arrest the preaching of the gospel. Submission to her command could only be treason to Christ. The "Lords of the congregation," admitting, with Calvin, that government was a divine ordinance, drew a distinction, recognized by later Scotch writers and by Knox himself, between the authority and the persons in whom it was invested. The "higher powers," commanding what they were authorized to command, must be obeyed, but when they commanded otherwise, they became tyrants and are to be resisted. Knox took the same view. Confronted with the queen, and asked if he thought that subjects having power might resist princes, he answered, "if princes do exceed their bounds and do against that wherefor they should be obeyed, there is no doubt they may be resisted, even by power," and Knox fortified his position by the conceded right of a child to disarm a frenzied parent. "It is even so," he said, "with princes that would murder the people of God that are subject to them; their blind zeal is nothing but a mad frenzy, and, therefore, to take the sword from them, to bind their hands and to cast them into prison till they be brought to a more sober mind, is no disobedience against princes, but just obedience, because it agreeth with the word of God." Such was the bold utterance in the presence of royalty of one "who knew not what it was to fear the face of any breathing."

Such was the precedent which warranted the author of *Jus Populi Vindicatum*, of whom we have yet to speak more fully, to assert that, though "the office and ordinance (of government) may not be resisted, yet the person who is therewith invested may be resisted, not as he is invested, but as he abuseth the power, and so divesteth himself." When Lethington disputed with Knox, and asked him where the prophets did ever so use kings and rulers, he unhesitatingly replied by citing the language in which it was announced—"not whispered, but so

as the people understood well enough," that "dogs shall lick the blood of Ahab and eat the flesh of Jezebel." There was more truth than courtliness in his censure of the crimes of royalty and of a blind obedience. "Many, now-a-days, will have no other religion than the Queen; the Queen no other than the Cardinal; the Cardinal no other than the Pope; the Pope no other than the Devil. Let men therefore consider what danger they stand in if their salvation shall depend upon the Queen's faith." And again, "If (the King) be an idolater, I find no privilege granted unto kings more than unto people to offend God's majesty." "That the people, yea, or a part of the people, may not execute God's judgment against their king, being an offender, I am sure you have no other warrants, except your own imaginations and the opinions of such as more fear to offend their princes than God." Knox told the Queen to her face, "the sword of justice, madam, is God's, and is given to princes and rulers for one end, which, if they transgress, sparing the wicked and oppressing the innocent, they that, in the fear of God, execute judgment, when God hath commanded, offend not God." Mr. Craig, Knox's colleague, shared his spirit, and exulted to state, what he had heard (in 1554) at Bologna, maintained before the University, "that all rulers, be they supreme or inferior, may, and ought to be reformed, or bridled by them by whom they are chosen or admitted to their office, so oft as they break that promise made by oath to their subjects." "The Congregation" vindicated the doctrine of their preachers in declaring, in open audience, that while government was a divine ordinance, yet "if wicked persons abusing the authority established by God, move princes to command things manifestly wicked, that such as can and do bridle the inordinate appetites of misled princes cannot be accused as resisters of the authority which is God's good ordinance."

We can honor the sagacity at least of James I., whose early years brought him into contact with men who held these views, when he declared that Presbytery agreed with monarchy (his name for tyranny) as well as God and the devil. Mad with the pride of prerogative, he undertook to curb the spirits of men who understood only too well their pedant King. Thus he initiated a century's struggle, destined to terminate only when the last royal Stuart had become an exile.

Knox died, but his mantle fell on the shoulders of Andrew Melville, who proved himself the hero for the crisis. The King was bent on securing, through Episcopacy, more pliant tools than Presbyterian ministers. Scotland, it was resolved, should have bishops. The King named his man to be Archbishop of Glasgow. He was a Presbyterian. The Assembly forbade him to accept the office. The King requested them to desist from their course. They decreed that if the candidate accepted the post, he should be excommunicated, and enjoined upon his Presbytery to do their duty in the premises. They did it, although Lennox, at the head of an armed force, entered the house where they were sitting, and ordering them to desist, dragged the Moderator from his chair, insulted, beat, and imprisoned him. To the King and courtiers, furious as they were, the Assembly was not disposed to yield. To the King they sent a bold statement of their grievances. They complained that he, by ill advice, had assumed spiritual power and authority that belongs to Christ alone, and that in his person these evil counselors would erect a new popedom, confounding jurisdictions which God had divided.

The deputation appointed to present this statement had reason to apprehend the wrath of the court. Timid friends entreated them not to appear. But Andrew Melville was at their head. "I am not afraid," he said, "thank God, nor feeble-spirited in the cause and message of Christ; come what God pleases to send, our commission shall be executed." And it was. Melville presented the remonstrance. The Earl of Arran heard it read, and then, looking at the deputation with a threatening countenance, exclaimed, "Who dare subscribe these treasonable articles?" "WE DARE," replied Melville, and advancing to the table, took the pen and subscribed. The other commissioners followed his example. The unprincipled courtiers were over-awed, and before their plans of vengeance could be perfected, they were overtaken by popular retribution or fled the land.

Melville represented the attitude of Presbyterianism confronting despotism. It might have taken his words, "*We dare*," for its motto. It did dare, and it endured. From the time when James I. resolved, by his arbitrary power, to suppress Presbyterianism and set up Episcopacy in Scotland, down to

1638, when, under Charles I., the scheme was ignominiously defeated, and the National Covenant banded the people to resist tyranny, the issue remained doubtful. There was power on one side and unbending principle on the other. Between these there was no peace, scarcely even a temporary truce. It was inevitable that in these circumstances the relative duties of rulers and ruled should be carefully studied.

The first great Presbyterian writer, to formulate his views on this subject, was George Buchanan. Born in 1506, and dying in 1582, his life covered a period during which the map of Europe was changed and the prospects of the world transformed. As a scholar, worthy to wear the mantle of Erasmus, he was at the same time a historian, a poet, a jurist, and a statesman, and withal a patriot and a Protestant. At St. Andrews he was a pupil of John Major, who, sharing the views of Gerson and D'Ailly, taught that kings were servants of the people from whom they derived their authority, and to whom they were answerable; and if they acted the tyrant, they might be controlled by the popular voice or judicially dealt with and subjected even to capital punishment.

With a varied experience of continental despotisms, Buchanan returned in the maturity of his power and fame to Scotland, there to find that the liberties of the country and the freedom of worship were threatened by an alliance of civil with ecclesiastical power. Experience confirmed his early convictions, and when he was appointed tutor to the young King, James I., he was not sparing in honest utterance or bold reproof. He wrote his history of Scotland, a treasure-house of precedents, showing that the Scottish monarchy was limited, that the duties of ruler and subjects were mutual, and that the people, in controlling or punishing their kings, had repeatedly exercised the prerogative of self-defense assured to them by the law of nature.

As James I. advanced to manhood, the embryo despot was developed in him. He could not hear Buchanan's history spoken of with patience. But to this history there was appended, in an edition published (1584) after his death, a memorable treatise entitled, *Jus Regni apud Scotos*. Its sentiments were in advance of the age, and yet the work had been prepared several years before it was published. To appreciate its merit,

we should bear in mind that it appeared nine years before the "Judicious" Hooker put forth the masterly views of his first book of *Ecclesiastical Polity*; fourteen years before Albericus Gentilis gave the world his *De Jure Belli*; forty-one years before Grotius produced his great work, in which in dealing with tyrants he fell far short of the boldness of Buchanan, and a full century before Locke had elaborated and published his theory of the Social Contract, all the essential principles of which are distinctly embodied in Buchanan's *Jus Regni apud Scotos*.

In this work he contrasts the king and the tyrant. He expounds that law of nature which is the law of God, discerned by the soul as the eye of the mind distinguishes the base from the noble; of which all laws pertaining to morals are but explications. Of this law no orator or lawyer is the author, but God himself, the author of human society; and on this, not on utility, must organized States rest.

The State does not exist for rulers, but rulers for the State. The people have the right to confer the governing power upon whom they will. The magistrate is like the physician: he must know his art and observe its rules, and these rules are the laws. A man himself, he needs, like any artist, the help of experience. But he must also be called of the people, and then *Rex esset lex loquens, lex rex mutus*. Experience teaches that liberty is better trusted to laws than to kings, and these laws which prescribe the mode in which the governing power bestowed by the people should be exercised, should come from the people themselves. Nor should kings have the monopoly of interpreting laws. Interpretation belongs to those who cannot be made the instruments of tyranny. The king is to secure to each subject his rights. If he usurps power not given, he is a tyrant. A king rules willing, a tyrant unwilling, subjects. Scottish monarchs have not been always hereditary. They have come to the throne by popular suffrage. When inaugurated, they have promised to observe ancestral laws and institutions. The people from whom they have authority are more powerful than kings. They may demand back, for just cause, the powers they gave. Other magistrates, as well as kings, are ordained by God. Yet God ordains no bad man to rule. The king who breaks through the obligations of the laws is a public

enemy. Civil and ecclesiastical power are distinct. Bishops are subject to kings in their civil relations, and kings to bishops in spiritual. Thus the power of kings is limited by conditions, by the nature of their office, by their coronation oath, by the source from which their power is derived. The Synod of Basle deposed a pontiff; a thief by night may be killed, and the king who makes himself a tyrant is a public enemy. He may be prosecuted in just war, and be deposed. He has no just authority. He has violated the terms on which he is admitted to rule. "*Mutua igitur regi cum civibus est pactio*" is the elaborately reasoned conclusion to which Buchanan comes, and in this we have the complete germ of that theory of the "Social Contract" which Locke maintained, which was embodied by the Revolution Parliament in the English Constitution, but which at an earlier date Buchanan's successors in Scotland had distinctly advanced and variously amplified.

Well might James I., true to his Stuart nature, resent such teachings as these. They came athwart all his most cherished projects of despotism. They laid a solid basis for constitutional and legal freedom, and held a rod of terror over the rash and desperate counsels with which the house of Stuart for one full century were besotted. In spite of resistance and warning those counsels were adopted. In 1638, however, the royal project to force Episcopacy on Scotland was brought to a sudden pause. Presbyterians revolted at the imposition of a Romanized prayer-book. The people rose almost *en masse* to enter their protest, based on the old, accepted principles of Knox and Buchanan. The National Covenant was signed with enthusiasm, in some cases with the blood which the signers drew from their own veins. The time had come to make the theoretic practical. England groaned under bondage and asked help of Scotland. A common interest bound them together. They acted in concert, civil war was initiated, and the forces of the Parliament were arrayed against the forces of the King. Here was the very crisis contemplated by Buchanan's speculations. Could the nation resist the "Lord's Anointed?" How could forcible resistance be justified?

Milton answered for England; but with a learning and energy, if not a genius, almost equal to his, Samuel Rutherford answered for Scotland. We pause a moment, surprised at

the mention of such a name. We have been wont to associate Rutherford with those glowing *Letters* of his, the *Song of Songs* of our devotional literature. We have figured him to ourselves in his obscure parish of Anworth, almost as a saintly recluse, so wrapped in divine communion and sacred musings, that we almost involuntarily apply to him the lines of Cowper:

“When one that holds communion with the skies,
Has filled his urn where those pure waters rise,
And once more mingles with us meaner things,
'Tis e'en as if an angel shook his wings ;
Ambrosial fragrance fills the circuit wide,
That tells us whence his treasures are supplied.”

And yet the author of the *Letters* is the author also of one of the most elaborate political treatises of the time, the very title of which, *Lex Rex*,* indicates its scope and sympathies. Rutherford was one of the Scotch representatives at the Westminster Assembly (1643), but while in London his pen was ever busy, and *Lex Rex* is but one of several works which he produced in the decade that followed the opening of the civil war. This alone would have sufficed to vindicate his reputation as an earnest and able friend of truth and freedom. A thorough-going Presbyterian, he was a zealous adherent of the Parliament and a loyal son of Scotland.

In the preface we have the key-note of the book. “Truth to Christ,” he says, “cannot be treason to Cæsar.” He was urged to his task because “he considered that popery and defection had made a large step in Britain, and that arbitrary government had overswelled all banks of law, that it was now at its highest float.” As a minister of Christ he had a duty to discharge, for “pastors are to maintain the rights of people and a true church, no less than the rights of kings.”

* *Lex Rex : The Law and the Prince.* A Dispute for the just Prerogation of King and People, containing the Reasons and Causes of the most necessary Defensive Wars of the Kingdom of Scotland, and of their Expeditions for the Aid and Help of their dear Brethren of England, in which their Innocency is Asserted ; and a full Answer is given to a Seditious Pamphlet, entitled, *Sacro-Sancta Regum Majestas* ; or, The Sacred and Royal Prerogation of Christian Kings—under the name of *J. A.*, but penned by *Jo. Maxwell*, the Excommunicate P. Prelate. With a Scriptural Confutation of the Ruinous Grounds of W. Barclay, H. Grotius, H. Arnisæus, Ant. de Domi, P. Bishop of Spalato, etc. London, 1644.

With sound caution Rutherford lays the foundations of his argument. Government is from God, not from any inequalities of birth. "If all men be born equally free (as I hope to prove), there is no reason in nature why one man should be king and lord over another." But God never appointed an absolute king. Kings of his appointment were to be associated with judges, bound to judge according to his law, for "the judgment is neither the king's, nor any mortal man's, but the Lord's."* The true origin of government is stated to be in the law of nature. "It is not in men's free will whether they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey the acts of the Court of nature, which is God's Court; and this Court enacteth that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow if they appoint no government."

In establishing a government, it is a fundamental principle that "every living creature have radically in them a power of self-preservation," † "The power to create a man a king is from the people." "There is no title on earth now to tie crowns to families, to persons, but only the suffrage of the people." ‡ "The suffrages of the people of God is that just title and divine calling that kings have now to their crowns. I presuppose that they have gifts for ruling."

But the State Constitution hath below it the law of nature for its general foundation. Individual persons, in creating a magistrate, do not surrender what they hold by this law; they "do not properly surrender their right which can be called a right, for they do not surrender their power of doing violence to those of their fellows in the same community."

As "kings cannot infuse any sparkle of a divine majesty upon inferior judges, the latter, as much as the former, must have it from God; and, therefore, it is unlawful for kings to take this divinity from judges, for they resist God who resist judges, no less than they who resist kings." "The parliament are as essentially judges as the king," and "I see not what privileges nobles have above commons in a court of parliament by God's law." § Arbitrary power, as claimed by despots, Rutherford will not allow. "Absolute power to tyrannize is not from God." "An

* *Lex Rex*, p. 8.† *Ib.* 10.‡ *Ib.* 14.§ *Ib.* 59.

absolute power is contrary to nature, and so unlawful." "A people putting a king above themselves retain the fountain-power, and so are superior to the king." "When he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, it is lawful to throw a sword out of a madman's hands, even though it be his own proper sword, and though he have a due right to it and a just power to use it for good." Indeed, "a people free, may not, and ought not, totally surrender their liberty to a prince, confiding on his goodness; because, liberty is a condition of nature that all men are born with, and they are not to give it away, no, not to a king, except in part and for the better, that they may have peace and justice for it." Absolute power on the part of kings on these principles is impossible, especially as men are not born kings, since "every man by nature is free-born," "free from all subjection except of that which is most kindly and natural—and that is fatherly or filial subjection, etc."

Neither are inferior magistrates absolute. "We allow no arbitrary power to parliaments;"* "nor is any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortal man." The law of nature is the law of the community, "and not their arbitrary lust." Nowhere is there "power to waste or destroy." If a people had it to give they would sin in doing so. "If for nature to defend itself be lawful, no community without sin hath power to alienate and give away this power." Moreover, the king himself is a man; and so, under law, if he becomes a tyrant he may be lawfully resisted. He has violated the compact by which he holds his crown.

Rutherford on this point adopts fully the views of Buchanan. There is an implied, if not expressed, covenant between king and people, and this covenant "giveth a co-active power to each other." The covenant is conditional, and the failure of one party to observe the conditions releases the other. Sometimes, as in repeated instances in the case of Scottish Kings, the condition is expressed in the coronation oath. But "when the people appointeth any to be their king, the voice of nature exposeth their deed, though there be no vocal or written covenant." The king's dominion, from its nature, as well as its ser-

* *Ib.* 60.

vice, is not masterly, but "fiduciary." It cannot rise above *salus populi*, which is, as asserted in the Twelve Tables, *suprema lex*.

But back of all this political speculation, and yet supporting it, there is in Rutherford's mind a profound respect for the dignity and the equal rights of humanity. "A man being created according to God's image, he is *res sacra*, a sacred thing, and can no more by nature's law be sold and bought than a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God." * With such convictions, Rutherford heartily co-operated with the friends of the English Parliament, and gave a specific application to doctrines of practical as well as theoretic importance. He justified resistance to the King, and vindicated the alliance established between England and Scotland by the solemn league and covenant. "The Parliaments of both kingdoms," he said, "ought to put to death cut-throat cavaliers raising war against the subject, *though the king command the contrary*." † In the actual circumstances of the case he did not hesitate to assert, "it is necessary and lawful for the States of Scotland to help their brethren in England." ‡

Rutherford's book produced a deep impression. It was carefully written, and its positions were supported by citations from a wide range of authors. The retired student of Anworth had the boldness and breadth of Milton, and his varied and extensive reading would have done credit to Richard Baxter. His book was studied as well as read. It was adapted to the age, but its principles were neither of merely temporary or local application. Attempts, but only attempts, were made to answer it, and it is reported, creditably to his sagacity, that Charles I., on reading the book, said he feared it should not have been answered. §

A new application of Rutherford's principles was to be made when, after the close of Cromwell's protectorate, Scottish Presbyterians, who had loyally clung to Charles II. as their covenanted king, received him back to curse where they had hoped he would bless. It was a dark day for Scotland when Argyle and Guthrie and Warristoun atoned by their deaths for the treason of their Christian patriotism. The King found sup-

* Ib. 91.

† Ib. 163.

‡ Ib. 378.

§ *Jus Populi*—p. 381.

plied to his hands, in abundance, the fit tools of his sinister designs. So far as Scotland is concerned, the reign of Charles II. is a reign of terror, ever cumulating with new horrors. The occasional ostentation of mercy was a new snare to entrap the unwary. An obsequious Parliament set the example of sycophancy to the King, by granting more than he demanded, and before he asked. It was, however, upon Presbyterianism and Presbyterians that the full venom of the King and courtiers was concentrated. The King could not be at peace while Presbyterianism, like another Mordecai, sat at the Scottish gate of his kingdoms. Bishops were more pliant; Episcopacy was more subservient. The purpose was fixed to root out Presbyterianism, and to plant in its stead its envious and hated rival.

To this end all the machinery of despotism, ecclesiastical and civil, was constructed. Argyle was got rid of, but not till his words, as he mounted the scaffold, "I could die as a Roman, but I choose rather to die as a Christian," had thrilled the heart of Scotland. Other kindred spirits followed. Rutherford's *Lex Rex* was burned by the order of the pliant Parliament, and he was summoned to appear before them at Edinburgh and answer to the charge of high treason. But, lying on his death-bed, he sent back word, "Tell them that I have received a summons already to appear before a superior judge and judicatory, and I behove to answer my first summons, and ere your day arrive, I will be where few kings and great folks come."

Episcopal candidates were found, and dignities were provided for them; the saintly Leighton among but not of them. Meetings of Synods, Presbyteries, and Sessions—the council proclaimed—were prohibited till ordered by the bishops. It was a paralyzing stroke. Few Presbyteries dared to meet and protest. The first act of the Parliament of 1662 was to restore and re-establish "the ancient government of the church by archbishops and bishops." Every kind and degree of church power which did not acknowledge dependence upon the royal supremacy was annulled. All leagues and covenants for reformation, notwithstanding the act and oath of Charles II., at his Scotch coronation, were pronounced treasonable, involving the guilt of unlawful oaths. All protestations and petitions were pronounced seditious. No questioning of the royal supremacy in

cases ecclesiastical was to be allowed, None might preach or teach in the schools or universities who did not own Episcopal government, and obtain a license from the prelates. All persons in public trust must condemn the National Covenant, although they might have subscribed it, and still believed it binding. Perjury was thus made a qualification for office.

Parliament adjourned, and the council was left to superintend the execution of its orders. The ministers were ordered to attend the Bishop's summons to diocesan meetings, and to recognize no others. Few obeyed the order. Then came the "Glasgow Act," formed by a set of men, as the Duke of Hamilton told Bishop Burnet, so drunk that day that they were incapable of considering anything that was laid before them. That act required that the ministers should procure presentations from patrons, and be admitted by the prelates to their charges, or be forthwith ejected. It closed more than two hundred churches, and left as many ministers homeless and dependent.

A few months later (1663) there was a new hardship imposed. Some Presbyterians, robbed of their pastors, were indisposed to hear the curates thrust into their places. A fine of twenty shillings was imposed if they failed to attend the parish church. The ejected ministers were still ready to teach and preach as they found opportunity. Beloved and honored, they brought together congregations that no house could hold. This was the origin of field meetings, against which the dragoons were soon to be let loose. To meet the case of those who frequented them, an act was passed, imposing enormous fines on absentees from ministers "publicly authorized." This act was called "the Bishop's drag-net," and those who were caught in it were subjected by a licentious soldiery, who acted the part of judges, to most oppressive exactions. Persons who would not sign the declaration against the National Convention were not allowed to engage in trade. It seemed to be the purpose of those in authority to make it impossible for a Presbyterian to breathe in Scotland. But harsher measures were yet to come. The Privy Council, of which the two Archbishops were members, was to outdo the Parliament, which was yet in session. It met and ordered all ministers included under the Glasgow act to remove themselves and their families, within twenty days, from their parishes, and not to reside within twenty miles of the

same, nor within six miles of Edinburgh, or any cathedral church, nor within three miles of any royal burgh, under penalties of laws against movers of sedition. Such as had fled to Ireland could not return and preach in Scotland under the same penalties, and "officers of the standing forces," as well as magistrates, were authorized to enforce the laws against absentees from the parish church, while the curates were encouraged to act as spies and informers against their parishioners. For this last provision the scanty attendance upon the curates' services was the apology. Their audiences were sometimes reduced to half a dozen persons, or even less. Presbyterians revolted against their spiritual guidance, and would submit to it, even in form, only at the point of the bayonet.

In 1663, Sir James Turner, with a body of troops, proceeded to the south and west to levy the fines that had been incurred by contempt for the curates. A military adventurer, unscrupulous and merciless, he was the right arm of a militant Episcopacy. He pillaged the country, and let his horde, as mercenary as himself, loose to waste and destroy. He took free quarters with those on whom the fines were levied, reveling in riot and drunkenness, sparing neither age nor sex, and seizing on what could be carried off and sold.

Meanwhile, preparations were made to establish a court of High Commission. It was not a whit behind that iniquitous institution of the same name, which a quarter of a century before had roused Englishmen to frenzy, and hurried forward that drama which closed with laying the monarch's head on the block. It was authorized to arrest and punish all offenders against the King's ecclesiastical supremacy and the iniquitous statutes of the time. It could censure, suspend, fine, imprison, employ military force, and do and execute what was necessary for his majesty's service. It was aided by the organized espionage of the curates, and introduced the terrors of a Spanish inquisition into every parish and every household. Some were impoverished with fines; some thrust into prison and left to rot there; some banished to remote parts; and some actually sold as slaves. It was made a criminal offense to take up charitable collections for the ejected and famished pastors. Sir James Turner was authorized to search the houses of people for arms, and carry them forcibly away. Conventicles, as the

field-meetings were called, were forbidden by proclamation, and private soldiers, without rebuke, were allowed to seize, fine, and punish those who failed to respect it.

In 1666 Sir James Turner renewed his visitation to the south and west. He proposed to execute the law, that, under penalty of exorbitant fines, held landlords responsible for the ecclesiastical orthodoxy of their tenants, masters for servants, and parents for children. He left behind him a track of desolation. None dared even to complain, well assured that complaint would be regarded as a new offense.

An act of horrid cruelty upon a poor and helpless old man provoked his neighbors to interfere for his rescue. The soldiers turned upon them with their swords, and were in turn resisted, and at length disarmed. There had been no project of insurrection, but all knew that their humane interposition would be accounted a crime, and punished without mercy. As a measure of self-defense, they determined to seize Sir James Turner himself, and they effected their purpose. But now they did not dare to disband. Others joined them, but in numbers too few to be formidable. Still, the alarm of their rising spread. All the forces that could be collected against them were called into service. There was fright at Edinburgh and Glasgow, and those places assumed the appearance of being in a state of siege. But the insurgents were too feeble to make a successful resistance. They marched to Lanark, renewed the covenant, published a declaration in their own vindication, and made ready for battle. Few, feeble, and exhausted, they offered for a time a spirited resistance, but at length gave way. Fifty were slain in battle, and as many more captured. Such was the issue of the "Rising of Pentland."

A travesty of legal forms completed the work which the sword had left undone. Eleven were condemned to be hanged, and some were subjected to the torture of the boot. But they triumphed in their death, and their last words were a living power in the hearts of those who witnessed their execution. Men could not but ask why they suffered, and why they exhibited such heroism on the scaffold. Prelacy might, indeed, be feared the more, but it was loved the less. Presbyterians could not be converted to the faith of the curates by the apostleship of Sir James Turner, or the High Commission.

It was while the enraged friends of royal despotism and prelacy were exultantly engaged in crushing out every symptom of insurrection—and even petitioning was accounted a crime—that voices were raised in behalf of the cause for which the martyrs of the covenant had suffered. They rang out in bold and fearless tones, as unequivocal and emphatic as the words of Buchanan and Rutherford. This is the more significant, as the freedom of the press was crushed, like other rights, under the heel of despotism. The press, it was said a few years later, and it was equally true then, “is blocked up against all such books that may offer a manifestation of the innocency of that (covenanting) people, and the injustice and inhumanity of their enemies, which is their only hope of preventing the world’s knowledge and condemnation of their actings.”* The books that appeared in behalf of the persecuted at this juncture were probably printed in Holland. They have no name of author or of publisher.

Of these publications, one was *The Apologetical Relation*,† written, it is said, by Brown, of Wamphray. It defended the right of the persecuted to assemble at the field-preachings, and to bear arms in self-defense against those who would violently assail them in the midst of their worship. It vindicated the position taken in *Lex Rex*, that the late war carried on by the Parliament of Scotland against the King “was lawful, both in point of law and conscience,” and that if that was lawful, “a war raised by subjects, in their own sinless self-defense, without the

* *Hind Let Loose*.—Preface.

† The *Apologetical Relation* I have been unable to procure. In a letter from Rev. Dr. Harper, of Newburgh, in reply to some inquiries, he states, “In regard to this work, there is a reference to it in the *Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans*, by John Brown, of Wamphray. This Brown was cast into prison, and afterward (having been permitted the alternative) banished to Holland, in 1662, for censuring those who sided with the so-called ‘diocesan assemblies.’ While in Holland he wrote the *Apologetical Relation*, which was afterward ordered by the Court of High Commission to be burnt in the streets of Edinburgh by the hangman.”

“He adds, that in the preface to Brown’s *Exposition*, the editor speaks of his singular judiciousness and honesty in being a faithful witness and wrestler for the purity of reformation, which appear in his *Apologetical Relation*, wherein he holds forth the dreadful and heinous nature of national perjury and covenant breaking, and convincingly discourses that it is not in the power of the nations to shake themselves loose of the sacred obligations, either as to the matter or manner of them.”

“Brown died in Holland, in 1679.”

conduct of their representatives, cannot in every case be condemned."

A more famous book than the *Apologetical Relation* appeared in 1667. It was entitled *Naphtali; or, The Wrestlings of the Church of Scotland for the Kingdom of Christ*. "The book," says Wodrow, "was compiled by two very great men; the reasoning part of it was done by one of the best lawyers of his time, Mr. (afterward Sir) James Stuart, of Goodtrees, whom we shall meet with frequently in the following periods; and the historical part by a very worthy minister, the Rev. Mr. James Stirling, minister of the gospel at Paisley." In this work a sketch was given of the struggles of the Scottish Church during the preceding century, and inwoven with it was a vindication of the cause of the persecuted Presbyterians. "Many thousands of innocent Protestants," it was asserted, "who never burnt either house or city, for no other alleged crime but their peaceable forbearance to bow to the idol which the King hath set up, are thrown into a furnace of fiery trial, seven times more heated than was ever known in the Christian world, for such a cause." In this book were reprinted the National Covenants, in which the right of the subjects to be governed by the common laws of the realm was distinctly maintained. It followed Buchanan and Rutherford in asserting that "all constitutions of societies and governments do virtually suppose and imply" mutual covenants, and "are founded thereon." It protested against the intrusion of the King into the ecclesiastical sphere, since "where a church is regularly constituted, and so acting, and by him sworn to be maintained, no king or prince ought so far to intrude himself into her power and privileges, unto which he is neither called nor gifted, as to assume to himself a sovereign and immediate power of judging and discerning upon doctrine, and her most spiritual rights and censures." This, Charles II. had done. Nay, more than this; he had violated his solemn oath and covenant, upon the faith of which he had received the Scottish crown. While "ecclesiastical power is not subject to the civil, so in matters ecclesiastical there should be no appellation from the church to the civil magistrates." Yet, had the King been placed on Christ's throne, and by "the absolute complement of all wickedness, and the heights of usurpation," all the acts of the church, Parliament, and council, inconsis-

ent with his supremacy, had been annulled. Patronage, that curse of the church, and violation of the people's rights had been revived, and any reluctance or refusal to submit to the new order of things was visited by fines, imprisonment, and the severest impositions. The successive steps of tyrannic usurpation are detailed, the expulsion of the ministers, the High Commission Court, the enormous fines, the cruelties of the dragoons, the suppression of the worship and field-preaching, until this accumulation of horrors—the oppression that might make a wise man mad—had become “a most just cause and provocation, to all ingenuous spirits and true patriots, to undertake the asserting of their own liberty upon the greatest hazard.” “*Naphthali*” maintains, that where the proper ends of government are “intolerably perverted, the common tie of both society, government, and law, is in so far dissolved.” Subjects “relapse into their pristine liberty and privilege,” and may defend themselves, their lives, and liberties from unjust violence. But infinitely more important duties and concerns are involved, when “the glory of God and of our Lord Jesus Christ, the defense and maintenance of the blessed Gospel and its precious ministry and ordinances,” are at stake. On these grounds the late rising is to be justified, and no oath of allegiance can be so unlimited as to imply absolute submission. “Our allegiance was, and standeth perpetually and expressly, thus qualified, viz.: *a defense of religion and liberty*, according to our first and second covenants,” while, moreover, “all allegiance and obedience to created power whatsoever, of its own nature, is indispensably thus restricted.”

This anonymous book, with no clue on its title-page* to the place of publication, was like a bomb-shell in the camp of the persecutors. There were two ways of answering it—one by fire, and the other by the pen—and both were adopted. On December 12, 1667, a proclamation of the council ordered that it should be burned, that all copies of it should be handed in to the magistrates before February 1, ensuing, and any who after that should keep copies were to be fined £10,000 Scots.

An answer to the book, entitled *The Surveyor*, was prepared and published in a pamphlet of about 120 pages.

* I presume this is true of the first edition. It is of the second, 1680, from which I quote.

Although anonymous, it was known to be by Bishop Honeyman, who, as Wodrow says, "evidently weakened the cause he undertook to defend," and for the very good reason, that his cause had no logical strength. He did, however, most important service to the cause he assailed, by provoking a rejoinder. Sir James Stuart replied to him, "with great strength and reason," in a work more elaborate and argumentative than *Naphtali*, in which the principles of natural law and the rights of subjects, as well as the limitations of authority, are discussed with a force and eloquence which place the author among the foremost writers of his own or of any age. The book contains paragraphs of thrilling eloquence and of keen satire. It betrays no timidity of counsel or wavering of convictions.

The author was evidently quite familiar with all the great writers on law and government, from Cicero down to Dr. Ferne and *The Surveyor*. He starts with the admission by Barclay, Grotius, and the royalists themselves, of a natural right of self-defense. Self-preservation belongs to the law of nature, and "the laws of nature" are irrevocable. They are God's laws, and "it is better to obey God than man; and men's commands and laws, to which obedience cannot be yielded without contempt of and treason against the highest of all, who is King of kings, are as no commands before God, and disobedience unto these is no disobedience to the lawful authority, but faithful allegiance to the most supreme."

The *Surveyor* had spoken of the "liberties" of the people. "What that liberty is," rejoins the author, "which the people of Scotland are now come to, who can see it, for the perfect slavery and bondage they are sold unto? A freedom he talks of when all our liberties are sold, and we are given up as bondmen and bondwomen unto the lust of a man, and are denied the very liberty which is the privilege of all free subjects, yea, and that which is the birthright and native privilege of all men, viz., to supplicate, petition, or to pray. What liberty, then, can he mean, unless the liberty to forsake God and our covenant, to turn apostates from his truth and our profession, to swear, forswear, drink, debauch, etc., without curb and control." The *Surveyor* would have the memory of the late resistance buried; one author says, "we are persuaded the memory of their memorable ways will never be buried, but shall stand as an

exemplary monument to succeeding generations, when God shall think it meet to animate them with the spirit of courage, to free the land of tyranny and of domineering, abjured prelates, with all their tail and train."

Sir James Stuart knew full well the bitter hostility with which the principles he avowed were regarded. Buchanan had been denounced. *Lex Rex* and *Naphtali* had been doomed to the flames, and the *Commentary on the Romans*, by Paræus, as the author notes, had been burned by the order of James I. But, fearless of the results, he lays down his principles: the natural equality of all in matter of rights; the supremacy of the law of nature, from the binding authority of which no human power can loose; the organization of government as a reasonable measure not designed to leave society worse than it found it; the right of the people to choose their *form* of government; their right to reserve power to alter it, or define the terms on which they will accept rulers; the fact that they are the source of power, and that from them comes the right to govern; the presumption that no people, in erecting a government, designed to give up "their birth-privilege and power of self defense;" the justice of resistance to violent oppressors; the fact that rulers cannot have from the people a power the latter do not possess, viz., "such a power whereby to make themselves slaves—slavery being against nature, and a bondage;" that "a king going beyond his bounds is no magistrate," and may therein be resisted; that neither the ruler's authority or the subject's obedience can be absolute; that allegiance must be qualified by its nature: that obedience to tyrants is not required; and that parliaments are fallible as well as princes, and for just cause may be resisted.

These last positions are maintained on the ground of the Social Contract, which the author expounds more fully than most of his predecessors, and which, as the book was printed in Holland, we surmise that Locke must have seen and studied. But Sir James Stuart sees distinctly—what his predecessors do not seem to have noted—that right and duty do not originate in the Social Contract, although the contract virtually defines them, and shows how they pertain to ruler and people. "This mutual obligation" (of ruler and people), he says, "may arise *both* from the law of God and from the covenant, without any

repugnancy," the covenant giving "form" to the antecedent obligation. Here the author goes beyond Locke, in defining the relation of the Social Contract to the Law of Nature.

"Some acts of tyranny," said Sir James Stuart, in the name of his fellow-sufferers, "we are willing to endure," but not "such as tend to the destruction of the true liberties of the subject," and "open a gap to all the ingrained and bloody Neros to waste and destroy at pleasure." As to Charles II., he might, if he had ground to complain that the people rather than himself had violated the covenant, have taken the benefit of this concession, "and never owned us more," and "if he had done so, and have gone to some other part of the world to spend his days, as some would not have been grieved," lawyers and divines would have counted him loosed from his obligation.

We have not space for the author's caustic address to the champions of prelacy and prerogative, but courtly ears never heard plainer language. His summary charge against them and their allies in behalf of the people is in a lofty and eloquent strain. Referring to his opponent, he says, "He asked the question, if any people of the land be spoiled of their lawful civil liberties—as if a man should inquire if the sun were risen at twelve hours of the day. Our religion, reformed in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, which was one of our main civil and most lawful liberties, is taken from us. The liberty of supplicating, which the law of God, the law of nature, and the law of nations allow, is taken from us. The liberty of our election of members of Parliament was taken away. Liberty of protesting in Parliament was taken away. The King's prerogative is screwed up to such a height that it overturns the true native liberties of the subject. Many honest subjects are cast into prison, no transgression being once alleged, much less proved, against them. The due exercise of their religion, as was covenanted, is taken away. Judicatories are set up without the consent of the people, or their representatives. Liberties and privileges of burghs and such incorporations are taken away, unless they will renounce and abjure a lawful, religious, and necessary covenant. The free exercise of justice, especially against nobles, is stopped. The lieges are not ruled by the laws of the land, but by the arbitrary will and lust of a

few prelates and the Privy Council. Will he ask now if our liberties be taken from us, or will he call them unlawful?"

In a similar strain he replies to the question, what the King had done that could be counted a grievance. Adverting to the High Commission and a pliant Parliament fawning upon royalty, he declares, "No power under heaven could enact what they have enacted. No power under heaven could condemn, annul, and rescind lawful covenants made with the most high God. . . . All the laws made by King and Parliament to the prejudice of the covenanted work of reformation are intolerable grievances." Such is the tone of a work the very title of which, *The Right of the People Vindicated*, designates it as a text-book of natural and constitutional law for the age and the country in which it appeared.

But protests of this kind, while they might keep alive the spirit of resistance, or even here and there force it to a flame, could not arrest the progress of despotism. There were temporary lulls of the tempest of persecution, as rival favorites or parasites gained the royal ear. There were artful methods for dividing the Presbyterians, especially when James II. offered them the freedom, which he wished to extend also to his Papist co-religionists. But there was no retrogression, no disavowal of obnoxious principles. Some of the most infamous tools of prelacy and prerogative were put aside, but from shame rather than conscience. Fines, prison, and torture, or even exile and death, were the fates of those who adhered to the covenant.

The day of deliverance was, indeed, at hand, for William III. was soon to land on the English coast and give success to the revolution of 1688. But before this memorable event, another voice was to be lifted in behalf of the persecuted and the martyrs of the covenant. The volume that gave it utterance bore the quaint title, *A Hind Let Loose; or, An Historical Representation of the Testimonies of the Church of Scotland for the Interest of Christ*. Its author was Alexander Shields, a zealous covenanting minister, who must often have listened to field sermons,

"By Cameron thundered, or by Renwick poured,
In sweetest strain;"

participating himself in the trials and the triumphs of their daring enterprise, in which they boldly defied the tyranny of the

time ; separated widely from his more moderate brethren, he yet joined with them after the revolution of 1688, and became minister of St. Andrews and chaplain of the Cameronian regiment. In 1699 he was "missioned" by the Assembly to the short-lived and unfortunate Scots' colony of Darien, called New Caledonia, where he acted with praiseworthy zeal, but sank under the hardships endured by the colonists, dying the next year at Port Royal, Jamaica.

His book marks the culmination of covenanter zeal. We cannot accept, however, Lord Macaulay's judgment, that "in his zeal for the covenant he had forgotten the gospel," and that "it is not easy to conceive that fanaticism can be heated to a higher temperature than that which is indicated by the writings of Shields." He had provocations for his bold and defiant language which it is difficult to appreciate. He had lived in daily intercourse with many of that great "cloud of witnesses" that testified from the prison and the scaffold to the cause of Christ and the covenant. He had witnessed outrages cruel and harsh enough to curdle all the milk of human kindness. The enemies of the covenant had exulted in riotous demonstrations of triumph over the victims of their persecuting malice. They had sought to stifle every whisper of protest or remonstrance. Mad in their loyalty, they had put forth, under the name of law and religion, the most monstrous paradoxes of tyranny. In 1683 the University of Oxford had signaled its blind subserviency to despotism, by condemning twenty-seven propositions, most of them such as would now be regarded as the political axioms of a free commonwealth. The books containing these propositions were doomed to the flames, and among them, along with Baxter's *Holy Commonwealth*, and the writings of Milton, Goodwin, Owen, Hunton, and even Hobbes, were specified the works of John Knox and Buchanan, the *Lex Rex* of Rutherford, and the *Apologetical Relation* of Brown, of Wamphray.

Nor was this all. In 1684 Sir George Mackenzie, His Majesty's Advocate in Scotland—the "Bloody Mackenzie" of Scotland's persecution—put forth his *Jus Regium ; or, the Just and Solid Foundations of Monarchy in General, and more especially of the Monarchy of Scotland, maintained against Buchanan, Naphtali, Dolman, Milton, etc.* The book was an

outspoken plea for unlimited monarchy and arbitrary power. Buchanan's *De Jure* having been "recently translated, and many copies dispersed," he thinks it worth while to note that it was condemned as slanderous by the first Parliament that sat after its original publication. He classes with Buchanan the authors of *Lex Rex*, *Naphtali*, and *Jus Populi Vindicatum*, as "ring-leaders, who have endeavored extremely to poison this nation, by persuading the people that our monarchs derive their rights from them, are accountable to them," etc. In opposition to this, Mackenzie holds that "our" monarchs are absolute, holding their crowns from God Almighty alone. He brands as false, Jesuitical, and fanatical, the assertion that every man is born free, or can choose his form of government. He denies that parliaments are co-ordinate with kings in legislation; rejects the assumption that kings can do nothing in matters of government—as restraining the license of the press, and requiring his subjects to engage to secure the peace—without an act of parliament; insists that kings are wholly irresponsible, except to God, for what they do, and that upon no pretext soever, "no, not to defend their liberty and religion," may subjects rise in arms against their king. In his view, Charles I. and Charles II. "were the best and most reasonable of kings."

A more abject surrender of all civil and religious rights, a more thorough-going plea for arbitrary power, even Philip II., of Spain, could not have desired. Logically, it made a king an absolute despot, and left all the laws of the State and all the property of the citizen to his caprice, without check or control. It threw the shield of its justification over all the violence and outrage against law and justice which had characterized the ignominious reign of Charles II. for a quarter of a century. It was enough to exasperate a cooler man than the ideal covenanter, the "wanderer," who had no home, save heath, glen, or forest, where the outlawed truths of Christ's crown and covenant, presented to exasperated crowds, armed for self-defense, inspired them with a courage that dragoons and scaffolds could not appal.

Shield's book was written in an emergency like this. It is fervid, often eloquent, and not without logical force. It traces the struggles of the reformers; presents the views of Knox, Craig, and Melville; describes the insidious attacks of James I.

and Charles I. upon the integrity and rights of the Scottish Church; deals out caustic censure upon Charles II., "the Achan, the cause of our overthrow;" denounces "Cromwell's* vast toleration and liberty of conscience;" and details the successive outrages that had characterized the persecuting administration of Scotch affairs; makes it manifest that resistance to tyranny had become imperative, not only allowable, but a duty; argues that lawful government no longer existed; depicts the horrors of the Scotch "Inquisition," through which tyranny, oppressing conscience, had become "the throne of the devil;" vindicates the Social Contract theory, and traces its logical application in the right of a people to defend themselves against those who usurp God's power, and who, if ordained in any sense, are ordained "as the Devil is;" and presents at large the grounds upon which Buchanan, Rutherford, and Stuart had based the same conclusions.

Shields' book marks (1687) the period of transition at which the Presbyterian struggle against tyranny and intolerance was transferred to this country. We learn from him that, shortly before he wrote, the "prisons being filled, they were emptied to make room for others, in ships, to be taken away to be sold for slaves, in one of which were sent to Virginia above sixty men, some ministers, who, through the kindness and sympathy of some good English people, were relieved at London;" that two or three hundred were "murdered in a ship bound for America, being shut up under the hatches, when it split upon a rock in the north of Scotland," some fifty on board making their escape; that some were sold "as slaves in Carolina and other places in America, to empty the filled prisons, and make room for more;" that within the two preceding years, several shipfuls of honest and conscientious sufferers had been sent to Jamaica (of whom, before they were sent, some had their "ears

* In 1655, after Cromwell had become established in the Protectorate, Michael Hawks wrote and dedicated to him his *Right of Dominion and Property of Liberty*. The principles he advocated, so far as the connection of Church and State was concerned, differed little from those of the covenanters, or the leading minds of New England at that time, except that he would give a larger liberty to all classes of Christians, retaining for the magistrate, however, a supervisory power of the church generally. While "it is irreligion and tyranny to force the consciences of men," yet kings and emperors may be "as well priests as kings," and obstinate heretics do not seem to have conceded them any large share of toleration.

cut), New Jersey, and Barbadoes, in such crowds and numbers that many have died in transportation," and that a company of Scotchmen, arrested at a private meeting in London, were banished and transported to New Jersey, sixty of them dying upon the passage.

But the fortunes of these exiles, or the spirit and sympathies of those who, during the next generation, followed them to this country, we have not here space to trace; nor can we present the relations of Irish Presbyterianism to the despotism that sought to crush it. These matters must be deferred till another time. But we have seen very distinctly the attitude, the principles, and the claims of Presbyterianism in Scotland. While the Prelatists of England and Scotland were rivaling each other in serf-like adulation of royalty; while they were striving to break down all the safeguards of popular rights and civil and religious liberty; the Presbyterians of Scotland, unawed by power, unappalled by a persecution scarcely paralleled in horror in any age of the world, were bearing aloft the banner of Christ's crown and covenant, and making that banner, at the same time, the banner of human rights and the banner of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688.

Art. II.—CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN TURKEY.

By Rev. E. D. G. PRIME, D.D., New York.

RARELY in the history of Empires do we find movements in the direction of personal freedom and security working downward, from the sovereign to the people; and there is probably no instance in modern times in which the usual order of things has been more notably inverted than in the history of the Ottoman Porte. Here, in the West, we are accustomed to think and to speak of the Turkish as the worst government in existence; as founded in despotism, and administered without regard to human rights. But, notwithstanding its despotic character and the venality of its officials of every grade, a