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ART. I.—THE THREE IDEAS.

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EVER since the time of Plato, at least, the three so-called ideas of the True, the Beautiful, the Good, have found free expression in the literature of the civilized world. The language of common life, as well as that of the schools, has recognized them, and has stamped them with its richest, best, most significant characters. No terms in any language speak more expressively to the intelligence and the feelings of men than those which denote these ideas.

That these terms in universal language are not meaningless symbols, denoting mere zeros of thought or phantoms of fancy, that they are on the contrary signs of actual verities, not a doubt seems to have arisen. The recognition and acceptance of the ideas as such verities have been unhesitating as they have been universal.

That these ideas, further, stand in some vital relationship to one another has also been accepted with a kind of spontaneous, instinctive faith. Universally has it been believed that the perfectly good must be in beauty and according to truth; that pure beauty must be in like conformity to truth and goodness; and that the true must of its own native tendency go forth in beauty and also be a blessing. In some respects it has been supposed they must be one and the same, while yet in some other respects they must be diverse; although the precise character of this identity and diversity may have escaped recogni-

## ART. VIII.—TULLOCH'S RATIONAL THEOLOGY.

By Prof. E. H. GILLETT, D.D., New York.

RATIONAL THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College, in the University of St. Andrews. In two vols. 8vo. pp. 463, 500. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

In the study of what may be called the Broad Church element of English Christianity in the Seventeenth Century, Principal Tulloch has fallen upon a congenial subject for his investigations, and he has handled it with marked ability. He has brought forward into clearer light than that in which they have hitherto been seen, some of the most independent and noteworthy thinkers, preachers and scholars of their time. The names of some of these, like Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, Cudworth and Henry More, are familiar enough to theological scholars, and have long been so, but there are others, like Dr. Whichcote, John Smith, and other of the Cambridge Platonists, of whom the world has heard little, and whose merit has been buried in an obscurity which Dr. Tulloch has done his best to remove.

The position of these men can be understood only by a reference to the views and relations of the religious parties of the time. Dr. Tulloch represents them as repelled alike by the two extremes with which the age brought them into contact. He goes back to the Synod of Dort, and sets before us the theological conflict of which that Synod was the scene, and to which must be traced the rise of Arminianism in England. Here we meet with the famous Alexander Hales, of Eton, not a member of the Synod, but a spectator and reporter of its proceedings. He carries back with him to England an admiration for Episcopius, and a keen sense of the injustice with which the remonstrants were treated, and thenceforth, we presume, whether the expression in so many words fell from his lips, or not, he bids good night to John Calvin. His writings indicate remarkable largeness and liberality of thought for his age, and he evidently commands the highest admiration of Dr. Tulloch.

Of Lord Falkland, on whom Lord Clarendon has lavished his warmest eulogy, we have a glowing sketch. Although a layman, he was well read in theology, and in his hospitable mansion, men like Chillingworth found sympathy and a hearty welcome. His character commands our respect, and his early fate—a victim to what many will regard as a mistaken loyalty—excites commiseration. His position in relation to Church questions, was much the same with that of Chillingworth and

Taylor. He was no extremist, and only by the force of circumstances was he brought to espouse a party in the State. On Church questions he was an Episcopalian, but held moderate views. In Parliament he was indisposed to act with Laud and the High Church on the one side, or with the Puritans on the other.

Here, then, we discern the grounds upon which the "Rational Theology" which Dr. Tulloch delineates planted itself. It was a theology developed under peculiar conditions. It was a combination of reactions from two opposite extremes. It could neither acquiesce in the dogmatical puritanism of the Westminster Assembly on the one hand, nor the intolerant assumptions and bigoted exclusiveness of High Church on the other. It was repelled in almost equal measure by Presbyterian rigidity and Prelatic tything of "mint, anise and cumin." This is seen alike in Chillingworth's "Religion of Protestants" and in Jeremy Taylor's "Liberty of Prophesying." Chillingworth indeed had passed through a peculiar experience. Loyal to his convictions of truth, and by the logical necessities of his mental constitution compelled to search out the solid foundations of belief, his inability to satisfy himself with the results of his own thinking left him a prey to Jesuit arts. Entrapped in the meshes of their sophistry, he sought the guidance of infallibility in the Roman Catholic Church, and for a short time became a resident at the seminary of Douay. Rome probably never had a more sincere convert, but a very short experience satisfied him of his mistake. Re-entering, so far as his calm and impassive nature could resent, the imposition that had been practiced on his reason, and making himself a thorough master of the relative position of both parties in the conflict, he set himself to the task of producing that memorable work, which, considered as an argument, is one of the most exhaustive and complete in the whole range of literature. He was under the necessity of asserting the just claims of reason. The claims of an infallible Church had been urged on the grounds of reason and could be judged on earth only at the bar of reason. So that in the entire course of his argument, Chillingworth was really the advocate of a Rational Christianity.

It is obvious, however, that he speaks not in the interest of a party, and although the freedom of his thinking was resented by some of the narrower minds of the Puritan class, we can scarce make him the representative of any theological school. He stands as it were by himself, and is by no means in his mental development a product to characterize the century. It is an unnatural and forced association when Laud, a though his patron, is brought into any sort of theological juxtaposition with him.

Of Jeremy Taylor the same can be said only with grave qualifications. His "Liberty of Prophesying" was a genuine product of the age, and if we recognize in him the eloquent advocate of liberty of thinking and worship, as well as of latitude of dogmatic belief, we find the explanation of it in the theological collisions which ensued when the Long Parliament wrested from the prelates' hands the keys of that cave of *Æolus* in which they had so long held imprisoned the controversial elements of English religious thought. "Sects" multiplied to an alarming extent. Should they be violently repressed? Should a Presbyterian despotism, now that Prelacy had fallen, assume the task for which this was no longer competent? Taylor answered, while himself stinging under what he regarded as oppression, with an emphatic No! His negative was not calmly reasoned out in the still air and under clear skies. The answer he gave was forced from him, and it was given not in the interests of a "Rational Christianity," but under the pressure of circumstances peculiar to the time.

That this is the case, and that Taylor's "Rationalism" belongs to a crisis of English history rather than to the century as a feature peculiar to it, is obvious from some facts to which Dr. Tulloch only hastily adverts. When the day of hardship had passed by, and the needy Welsh schoolmaster had become Bishop of Down and Conner, he changed his tone. Dr. Tulloch does not say, but he might have said, Taylor flatly contradicts himself. We are not insensible to the charm which the author's genius has thrown over the pages of the only product of the age which for beauty and eloquence can vie with Milton's "Plea for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." The wealth of a mind stored with all the treasures of quaint and curious reading, and of an imagination that laid all nature under tribute and seemed to revel at will in every sphere of thought and fancy, has so enriched Taylor's memorable treatise, that in the splendor of its diction, and the fascination of its rhetoric, his later utterances are cast in shadow. And it is scarce too much to say, that neither Heylin nor Sheldon could have found anything fitter to express the severity of their intolerant feelings toward dissenters, than what Irish Presbyterians might have heard with indignation from the lips of the author of "Liberty of Prophesying," when his time of hardship had passed and his time of triumph had come.

With very material abatement, indeed, we may yet bring an analogous charge against Stillingfleet, whose portrait is number four in Dr. Tulloch's gallery of Rational Christianity. It is very significant that when the King returned, Stillingfleet also felt it expedient to palliate the early indiscretion of his "Irenicum." He too was a rationalist—so far as he was one—from the force of circumstances. Under Cromwell's

Protectorate, when the prospects of Episcopacy were dark enough, he was ready to accept a modified ecclesiastical system of Usher's stamp. He was a moderate then, and to his credit, be it said, he never became afterward so extreme as some of his associates. But his moderate views were developed in the hot-bed of the Commonwealth administration, and quite wilted away when the heat of royalty beat down again on Prelatic heads and hearts.

In passing on to the Platonists of Cambridge, we come upon a school of thought springing up under the Commonwealth, and continuing on after the Restoration, in which we find the elements of a "Rational Theology" attaining a legitimate development, and possessing something more than the merely temporary significance which we allow to those—Hales' excepted—whose names have been already mentioned. As to Whichcote's "Rationalism," we are willing to concede all that Dr. Tulloch claims. Indeed, his representations fall far short of the assertion of Toland, who, in his *Nazarenus*, states that "it was a saying of Dr. Whichcote that natural religion was eleven parts out of twelve of all religion;" and we are tempted to believe that Tuckney had even more reason than the language here quoted from Whichcote would warrant, in finding fault with the extent to which he indulged in rationalistic speculation.

The tone of Whichcote's thought may be inferred from a few sentences in one of his letters addressed in self-vindication to Tuckney: "I thank God," he says, "my conscience tells me that I have not herein (preaching) affected worldly show, but the real service of truth. And I have always found in myself that such preaching of others hath most commanded my heart which hath most illuminated my head. The time I have spent on philosophers I have no cause to repent, and the use I have made of them I dare not disown. I heartily thank God for what I have found in them; neither have I upon this occasion one jot less loved the old Scriptures. I have found the philosophers that I have read good so far as they go; and it makes me secretly blush before God when I find either my head, heart or life challenged by theirs, which I must confess I have often found. I think St. Augustine saith of St. Paul, *Non destruit verum quod invenit in latere Paganorum*; and our Saviour reproves the Jews by Tyre and Sidon."

He will not admit that he dwells too much and too often on "the rationality of Christian doctrine." "The scriptures," he exclaims, "full of such truths, and I handle them too much and too often! Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational." In keeping with this, he vindicates his own charity: "I dare not blaspheme free and noble

spirits in religion who search after truth with indifference and ingenuity ; lest in so doing, I should degenerate into a spirit of *persecution*, in the reality of the thing, though in another guise. . . . And truly I think that the members of the Church, if not the leaders, on this point have very much yet to learn. For I am persuaded that Christian love and affection is a point of such importance that it is not to be prejudiced by *supposals* of difference in points of religion in any ways disputable, though thought weighty as determined by the parties on either side."\* Again he says: "To speak of natural light, of the use of reason in religion, is to do no disservice at all to *grace* ; for God is acknowledged in both—in the former as laying the groundwork of his creation, in the latter as reviving and restoring it."†

On this point he repeats himself, and with increased emphasis. "To go against reason is to go against God. Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life ; it is the very voice of God."‡ "Can a man, ought a man to believe otherwise than he sees cause? Is it in a man's power to believe as he would, or only as the reason of the thing appears to him?"§ "Reason is not a shallow thing, it is the first participation from God ; therefore, he who observes reason observes God."|| It is likewise indicative of the philosophical tastes as well as peculiar theological sympathies of Whichcote that "he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, Plato and Tully and Plotinus."

One of these "young students" was John Smith, who died at the age of thirty-four, but whose brief remains attest that he was a worthy pupil of his master. A man of genius, and an eloquent preacher, his few sermons which serve as his memorial, define his theological position. At nearly the time when the Westminster Assembly was drawing up its creed, he took occasion to say that "the Great Master would not, while here on earth, draw up into any system or body, nor would his disciples after him" the truth they taught ; "He would not lay it out to us in any articles or canons of belief . . . His main scope was to promote a holy life as the best and most compendious way to a right belief."¶ And again, "We should not, like rigid censors, arraign and condemn the creeds of other men which we comply not with, before a full and mature understanding of them, ripened not only by the natural sagacity of our own reason, but by the benign influence of holy and mortified affection ; so neither should we ever hastily subscribe to the symbols and articles of other men. They are not always the best men who blot most paper . . . Whilst we plead so much our right to the patrimony of our fathers, we may take too fast a possession of their errors as well as of their sober opinions."\*\*

\* Vol. II. 77, 9. †Ib. p. 99. ‡ Ib. 100. § Ib. 102. || Ib. 110. ¶ Ib. 146. \*\* Ib. 146-7.

On other points the views advocated by Smith indicate those rationalistic tendencies in which he was in conflict with the prevalent theology. Dr. Tulloch speaks of them as characterized by "enlightenment and breadth of criticism." He says, "The idea of verbal inspiration appears to him wholly unnecessary to guarantee the accuracy of the prophetic representations." Of rigid definition of dogma he was impatient, and while adopting a semi-apologetic tone he advances sentiments which remind us of the late Rev. F. D. Robertson, of England. He says, "Far be it from me to disparage in the least the merit of Christ's blood, his becoming obedient unto death, whereby we are justified. But I doubt sometimes some of our dogmata and notions about justification may puff us up in far higher and goodlier conceits of ourselves than God hath of us; and that we profanely make the unspotted righteousness of Christ to serve only as a covering wherein to wrap up our foul deformities and filthy vices, and when we have done, think ourselves in as good credit and repute with God as we are with ourselves, and that we are become heaven's darlings as much as we are our own."

Of More and Cudworth, the most noted members of this Cambridge "Platonic School," we know more than of any of the others. They were men of note in their own day, and their learning and speculations have commanded the respect and attention of later scholars. Cudworth was a marvel of erudition. "His Intellectual System" is a monument of unwearied application, and omnivorous reading in the sphere of ancient philosophy. In him, more distinctly than in any of his compeers, we recognize the reactionary influence of contemporary speculation. Long before he undertook his great work, and in fact years before Hobbes had issued his English edition of the *Leviathan*, the destructive and materialistic theories of the "Philosopher of Malmsbury" had engaged Cudworth's attention, and had been vigorously although concisely discussed. The popularity and wide diffusion of these theories excited alarm in many quarters, and provoked antagonists in the spheres alike of religion and politics. From the light pamphlet to the more imposing quarto, publications in great numbers, designed to refute them, issued from the Press; but although no less a person than Lord Clarendon appeared in the lists, the most conspicuous and elaborate refutations of Hobbes were Cumberland's work, "*De Legibus Naturæ*," and Cudworth's "*Intellectual System*."

As Hobbes had struck at the very foundations of morals and of religion, as well as of constitutional government, Cudworth directed his efforts to a vindication of the existence of a Providence and an immutable morality. "These three things," he said "are the fundamentals or essentials of true religion and morality that all things do not float

without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent understanding Being presiding over all—that God hath an essential goodness and justice; and that the differences of good and evil, moral, honest and dishonest, are not by mere will and law only, but by nature; and consequently that the Deity cannot act, influence and necessitate men to such things as are in their own nature evil; and lastly that necessity is not intrinsic to the nature of everything, but that men have such a liberty or power over their own actions as may render them accountable for the same, and blameworthy when they do amiss, and consequently that there is a justice, distribution of rewards and punishments running through the world.”

To defend these positions, in direct antagonism to Hobbes, Cudworth was necessitated to appeal to reason, and the testimonies of reason as scattered through the pages of the ancient philosophers. In vindicating principles fundamental to all religion, natural and revealed, he was under the necessity of tracing them to their source, and revealing the solid basis upon which they rested in the very nature of things. His “Rationalism,” therefore,—though we are scarcely surprised at the prejudice which it excited among those who were too indolent to peruse or too incompetent to judge his ponderous book,—was constructive and not destructive. His method of proceeding, as well as arguments, reflect his familiarity with the Platonic philosophy. His “Plastic nature” is the scarcely disguised reproduction of what meets us familiarly in the Platonic dialogues, in Cicero’s “*De Natura Deorum*,” and the speculations of the Stoics. The destructive materialism of Hobbes, by the very repugnance which it excited, threw him back upon the idealism of Plato, while a thorough mastery of that idealism necessitated an extended acquaintance with the broad range of ancient philosophical speculation.

Of that acquaintance Cudworth availed himself, and forgetting that “time is short and art is long,” proceeded to construct that pyramid of learning which the world did not encourage him to complete. But as to the grounds of morality and Natural Religion, he anticipated the speculations of Dr. Samuel Clarke in that remarkable fragment of his great work, published long after his death, in which he endeavored to show that moral distinctions are immutably established in the nature of things, and not by human statute or the Divine will. Here is the key to Cudworth’s Rationalism. It simply went back of revelation to those eternal principles which human reason is constrained to recognize, and which were recognized perhaps as fully by Bishop Wilkins, Parker, Tillotson, Cumberland, and many others, as by Dr. Clarke or Cudworth himself.

In this connection Cudworth's language in a passage of his sermons before the House of Commons, not quoted by Dr. Tulloch, although quite as characteristic as other paragraphs that are quoted, assists to define his position. "There is," he says, "a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul, in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of divine truths that is printed upon paper, which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with, such as never did anything else but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them. But there is a soul and spirit of Divine truths that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which by a secret traduction and conveyance, passeth from one soul into another, being able to dwell or lodge nowhere, but in a spiritual being, a living thing, because itself is nothing but life and spirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, express itself sufficiently in words and sounds, but it will best declare and speak itself in actions." Evidently it was impossible for a mind given to such thoughts as these, to idolize forms, systems, or elaborately constructed confessions, and yet it would be unjust to class such a mind as simply rationalistic in tendency or speculation. Its pre-eminent and unswerving loyalty to an eternal truth lying back of all human creeds and records, exposed it to the reproach of comparatively undervaluing the vase in which the truth was enshrined, but it would be grossly unjust to suggest any genial association between it and the rationalizing spirit which has been so remarkably developed in later centuries.

But in Henry More we recognize a mind pre-disposed far more than Cudworth's to imbibe the Platonic philosophy, and surrender to its influence. What in the latter was rather an intellectual or logical necessity, was in the former a spiritual craving. What one grasped by study and application, was by the other almost intuitively apprehended. More's visions as well as his phraseology show how thoroughly his mind was steeped in Platonism. The story of the hermit, which Parnell has borrowed from him and versified, illustrates his Platonic tone of thought. When he tells us that, "by a just Nemesis, the souls of men that are not very heroically virtuous, will find themselves restrained within the compass of this caliginous air, as both reason itself will suggest, and the Platonists have unanimously determined,"—we seem to be listening to a distinct echo that comes down to us fresh from some Socratic discussion like that with which Plato concludes his "Republic." More was indeed beyond any other modern, a creature of that philosophy to which, down to the present day, minds as diverse as Cicero and Bishop Berkeley have confessed themselves indebted. He seems almost like an exotic in the

age in which he lived—transplanted from Athenian soil, and striking root in the culture of Cambridge, as though only a single generation, instead of 2000 years, had intervened between the Greek master and his English pupil. Notwithstanding More's association with his great contemporaries at the University, he seems to us to stand almost alone, with a marked individuality and an isolation, which all the stirring events and great characters of the time fail to disturb. He has no lance to break with Hobbes. He has no prize of earthly ambition to reach. He will not accept a bishopric or even a benefice, except long enough to transfer it to another. He is the quiet dreamer, the recluse scholar, happy in his own meditations, living in his own ideal world, indifferent to fame, glancing forth from his hermit-like seclusion, only to see with what new dream of beauty, or by what spiritual appeal, he can reach the hearts of men absorbed in the sensual and material, and oblivious of the lofty possibility of attainment which is theirs by birthright, and which they are pawning for a paltry mess of pottage.

We are certainly more impressed by the dissimilarity than the likeness of those men who composed the Platonic School at Cambridge. The impression is by no means lessened when we add the other names of Culverwell, Rust, Fowler and Patrick, which Dr. Tulloch passes in review. If they all exhibit what it may perhaps be allowable to call a rationalizing tendency it is by no means to be traced to the same sources of influence, except to a limited extent. The same is true also of Chillingworth, and in a less measure of Taylor and Stillingfleet. Take all together and they do not suggest the idea of any appreciable *current* of Rational Theology. They are rather a group of bayous, sometimes parallel or contemporaneous, and sometimes successive, that communicate, perhaps by narrow mouths, with the grand stream of thought in England that characterizes the age. A better showing might be made by going outside of Falkland's Symposia and Cambridge circles, and bringing forward not a few others, who in theological or philosophical or even political collisions, struck out principles or speculations perhaps as broad and as pregnant in the direction of rationalistic inferences as those advocated by the Cambridge Platonists.

But it would be impossible to do justice to the subject, or even to these writers individually, without bringing first into view the general current of religious, and we must add skeptical thought in England, during the whole period of the Stuarts. We cannot understand the success or influence of Hobbes' speculations without some reference to those views of Grotius, at which he scarcely covertly sneered. We need to note that rising spirit of Deism which in Lord Herbert's *De Veritate*, published in 1624, was so cautious and reverent as to entitle

itself to a certain measure of sympathy, and was silently leavening a very important element of English thought. We need also to pass in review the Socinian development that excited so much alarm in the Commonwealth period, and which provoked such powerful and elaborate rejoinders from some of the great Puritan divines like Dr. Owen. Even America is not to be overlooked, sending back to England Pynchon's "Meritorious Price of Man's Redemption," and challenging a refutation not only from the American Norton but from one of the foremost of the English Divines.

Nor is this all. At a period when State and Church were intertwined, and statesmen like Pym and Hampden and Rudyard and Falkland and Digby felt called upon to discuss in Parliament some of the most difficult ecclesiastical, we might almost say theological, questions of the time, no survey would be complete which did not enable us to apprehend the mutual relation and interaction of politics and religion. We shall then understand the significance of that strange and sudden development of all various beliefs which enabled Pagit to render so piquant the pages of his Heresiography, and we shall be better enabled to judge how the tone of religious thought and speculation was modified by this development, unprecedented before, even at the time of the Reformation, in English History.

We cannot but consider all this as a necessary part of a suitable introduction to the history of "Rational Theology" in England in the seventeenth century. We miss it in Dr. Tulloch's volumes. We miss too, many names, perhaps less famous, but scarcely less noteworthy than those which he has brought before us. We are left too without any proper clue to the subsequent historical connection of the "Rational Theology" passed under review, and which, if it is to be considered simply by itself, loses more than half its interest and importance.

It is true indeed that the Cambridge "Platonic School" declined with the disappearance or death of its leaders, and the view of it which Dr. Tulloch presents leaves it in that isolation in which it appears perhaps to the best advantage. But though it may be portrayed apart from its historical connections and subsequent development, it was by no means so isolated in itself as Dr. Tulloch's perhaps discreet silence might lead the reader to infer. We can plainly track the progress of the movement which it originated, up to the close of the seventeenth, and into the first half of the succeeding century, and we can do this, not only within the bounds of the Established Church, but among several of the leading Non-conformists. If Dr. Tulloch had gone on to define the position and set forth the views, not only of Parker and Cumberland, but of Baxter, Howe, Wilkins and Tillotson, who either were Non-conformists or had been

closely connected with them, he would have exhibited to us the working of the Cambridge leaven, after the "School" itself had been virtually dissolved.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the rational element that abounds in Baxter's writings. In his "Holy Commonwealth" written in reply to Harrington, and in his "Christian Directory," which rivals in more respects than one Jeremy Taylor's "Ductor Dubitantium," as well as in several other of those numerous publications which made him the most voluminous author of his time, we meet with frequent appeals to the law of nature, or the law of right reason, and even a superficial acquaintance with his theology reveals the rational element with which it was pervaded, and which gives its significance to the reproachful epithet of "Baxterianism" which came into frequent use. It is true that Baxter was not a Cambridge man, or, for that matter, a university man at all, but his omnivorous appetite for books, we may be confident, would lead him to master all that Chillingworth or More produced, while his constant controversial collision with the skepticisms or errors of his age, necessarily forced him upon the study of the law of nature and principles fundamental to all religion.

Dr. Tulloch finds nothing to commend in the Puritan theology. No such good thing as a Rational theology is to be looked for as springing from the Puritan Nazareth. Yet John Howe is a Puritan of the Puritans, and in his writings are to be found passages which Dr. Tulloch would have accounted gems if found in the pages of Whichcote or Cudworth. With a liberality equal to that of Chillingworth, Taylor or More, John Howe says, "We shall only be in happy circumstances when we have learned to distinguish between the essentials of Christianity and accidental appendages, between accidents of Christ's appointing and our devising; much more, when every truth and duty contained in the Bible cannot be counted essential or necessary; when we shall have learned not only not to add inventions of our own to that sacred frame, but much more not to presume to insert them into the order of essentials or necessities, and treat men as no Christians for wanting them."\* Surely this is not the tone of dogmatic bigotry which Dr. Tulloch's reader would infer from his pages to be characteristic of the Puritan theology. It is moreover significant that Howe was of Christ's College, Cambridge, and must have come in close contact with More.

The character of Wilkins has been drawn by Burnet: "At Cambridge he joined with those who studied to propagate better thoughts; to take

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\* Howe's Works, p. 931.

men off from being in parties or from narrow notions." His "Natural Religion" might have afforded illustrations of his broad views, and shown his theological sympathy with more than one member of the "Platonic School." Although educated at Oxford, he was in more ways than one connected or associated with Cambridge, and for the year preceding the restoration (1659) he was master of Trinity College in the latter university. Tillotson, in prefacing his "Natural Religion," (1674) paid a tribute to his merit as "establishing the principles and duties of religion upon their true and natural foundation."

As to Tillotson himself, one need not read far in his works before he traces the sentiments of one who held that "it is a great mistake to think that the obligation of moral duties doth solely depend upon the revelation of God's will made us in the Holy Scriptures." Tillotson's theology came in the next century under Whitefield's reprehension, whether justly or not is not the question here, but it was obnoxious probably on the same grounds upon which Dr. Tulloch would commend it. Yet Tillotson was educated at Cambridge, and his biographer assures us that it was Chillingworth's book that "gave his mind the ply, that it held ever after, and put it upon a true scent." Nor is his connection with the Platonists overlooked.

There are other names associated with Cambridge and its Platonic School, which, at a subsequent date, gave evidence of the abiding impression that had there been made. We can here only refer to Dr. Thomas Burnet, a pupil of Tillotson, and educated under Cudworth at Clare-hall and Christ's College, Cambridge. In 1661 he was senior proctor of the University, and we have good evidence that to the "rational" element of the Platonists, he was far from being indifferent or unsusceptible. In 1692 he published his *Archæologiæ Philosophicæ*, which he dedicated to the King. But its Rationalism was too pronounced for even such a dedication, or his own reputation as a profound and accomplished scholar, to save it. It was in vain that in a new edition he directed the printer to omit the imaginary dialogue between Eve and the Serpent. No emendation could save the work from damning criticism. Rather, it dragged its author down, and if Oldmixon can be relied on, lost him, on the death of Tillotson, the succession to the See of Canterbury.

It was in the next year after Burnet's book was published that Blount's "Oracles of Reason" appeared. A large part of the latter is simply a translation from the former. The Theist borrows and is proud to borrow from the Rationalist. Burnet's latitudinarianism thus became doubly offensive. He had put arms into the hands of the skeptic. But Blount was not indebted to Burnet alone. His commendation of Hales, and quota-

tions from his writings, indicate his connection with Dr. Tulloch's Rational Theologians. He illustrated the pertinence of his own simile, "that human reason, like a pitcher with two ears, may be taken on either side." The Platonists laid hold upon one, but he of the other.

Blount lays the stepping stone from the platform of the Rational Theologians to that of the later Deists. With Hales he held expressly that "heresy and schism as now commonly used, are two theological scare-crows," and with Minucius Felix, "He is the best Christian who makes the honestest man." Among the most noticeable of his positions are these: "Morality in religion is above the mystery in it," hereby anticipating Toland and Tindal. There is no need of a mediator. Things are good or evil "antecedent to human compacts," hereby harmonizing with Cudworth and Clarke—"All vice and wickedness is but a denial and disowning of God to be the supreme infinite good"—in this retaining the better elements which Lord Herbert had commended before him.

With such antecedents fairly apprehended, we are prepared to follow out the sequel of the great Deistic controversy, which reaches down to about the middle of the last century. The Platonic school at Cambridge stood in a direct relation to this development of "Free Thought," and its history cannot be adequately written without going over an extensive field, the outline of which we have merely indicated. The subject is one that has peculiar claims upon the student of the historical development of Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy. It has never yet been properly investigated. Dr. Tulloch has given us several valuable, but fragmentary, chapters of it, and he pauses at just the point where our interest is greatest to have him proceed. We trace with him the course of a stream, which we know cannot be absorbed and vanish like a river in an African desert, and we actually discover far beyond the point at which he leaves us, glimpses of the silver thread, which assures us of a progress more important still, that yet remains to be traced.

But while saying this, we are not insensible to the value of the service which Dr. Tulloch has rendered. His aim is obvious enough. His criticisms render it transparent. His eulogy of a "national" Church as the only one in which there can be safe elbow room for thought, thrusts it rather unpleasantly upon our notice. He evidently delights, too, to make the seventeenth century teach the nineteenth to articulate and spell. He would familiarize us with the boldness of "modern thought," by teaching us to bear the "Rational Theology" of Taylor, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet and the Cambridge Platonists. For all this we confess that we feel under no special obligation. But he has done more. He has lovingly uncovered features that have been long obscured, on which it is a privilege to gaze. He has recovered important facts and presented them in

new connections. He has helped us to a more familiar acquaintance with men and writings that deserve to be remembered, and he has given us his biographical and critical sketches in a perspicuous and elegant style. Sometimes, either he or the printer has erred, and sometimes we think he has misjudged either from lack of proper examination or from "moderate" sympathies, as in the case of Jeremy Taylor. But even though we are to be kept in ignorance of the contradictions of the great poet preacher, or are to be told that the queen of Charles I. was "the *sister* of Henry IV.," we are not disposed to deny the merits of a work which as a series of kindred and almost contemporary portraits has beguiled the fleeting hours, and carried us back to the most productive age of our theological literature, and the tragical yet heroic period of English history.

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#### ART. IX.—HAMILTON'S AUTOLOGY.

AUTOLOGY; An Inductive System of Mental Science; whose Centre is the Will, and whose Completion is Personality. A Vindication of the Manhood of Man, the Godhood of God, and the Divine Authorship of Nature. By Rev. D. H. Hamilton, D. D. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham.

Dr. Hamilton's antecedents in authorship are unknown to us. He has now suddenly emerged from comparative privacy with one of the most massive and exhaustive volumes on philosophy which has lately been produced in the English tongue. Although of a very different type, yet it more nearly approaches Porter's *Human Intellect* in exhaustiveness than any work we have met with for a long time. This is none the less so, although it is in many ways obnoxious to criticism. Nevertheless, it has solid and enduring worth, and must command a place in the libraries, as it will certainly repay the study, of all votaries of high philosophy. The author is bold and original in his doctrine and method, and quite unceremonious at times, if he were a weaker man we should say almost flippant, in his treatment of acknowledged masters and established methods in psychology and metaphysics. He deals with Kant, Edwards and Hamilton as if he were a giant tossing pigmies. He is not much afraid of the *argumentum ad verecundiam*. Indeed we think he would be all the better if he felt it more; and his book too, even on rhetorical grounds if no higher, were it blemished by fewer passages like the following, however trenchant and slashing:

"The great questions of human liberty which Edwards suffocated in the 'slough of despond,' and of human capability which Kant beheaded