

THE  
CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

FEBRUARY, 1831.

Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LIV.

The ninth commandment, which we are now to consider, is—"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." This commandment "requireth the maintaining and promoting of truth between man and man; and of our own and our neighbour's good name, especially in witness bearing." The requisitions of the precept before us, as here stated, will form the subject of the present lecture: and the first thing to be considered, because it is fundamental in the whole of the discussion, is the nature and obligation of truth.

The meaning of some words is so plain and obvious, that it cannot be made more so—It is, I think, scarcely practicable to give a definition of truth, that will impart a clearer idea of it than is conveyed by the word itself. "Truth, says Locke, is the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified agree or disagree." Johnson's definition is more plain and popular. He says it is "the contrary to falsehood; conformity of notions to things; conformity of words to thoughts."

Those who maintain that the foundation and sanction of all vir-

tue is to be found in *utility* alone, relax the obligation of truth, to a degree that to me appears highly exceptionable and dangerous. In many instances it is not easy, and in some utterly impracticable, even for a well informed and conscientious man, to say what *utility*, taken, as it must be here, in its large sense, as relating to the *general good*, does really dictate: and to leave every man to speak truth or falsehood, on every emergency, according to his own views of what will, on the whole, be for the general benefit, is to rest a virtue of the highest importance on a very uncertain and slippery foundation. I mention this, my young friends, because some writers on morals, who have fame and fashion on their side, have actually weakened the obligation of truth, as I apprehend, to a very dangerous extent, pleading *utility* as the justification of their doctrine.

It is *in the nature and will of God*, that we find the true foundation, obligation, and standard, of every thing that deserves, in a moral sense, the name of *virtue*. It is the highest honour, true happiness, and indispensable obligation, of every moral being in the universe, to be and act, in moral concerns, like his Maker—to the utmost extent of the faculties which have been bestowed upon him. "Be ye holy, for I am holy," is our Crea-

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museum annexed to the publick library, contains a number of curiosities brought from the South Seas by Weber, the painter, who accompanied Captain Cook round the world. Every body knows that the great Haller was a native of Berne—We purchased a well executed head of this good philosopher, at one of the print shops, as a memento of our visit, together with some curiously carved pieces of wood.

The most remarkable edifice in Berne is the cathedral. It stands on a terrace, elevated more than one hundred feet above the river Aar, and which is adorned with fine trees. On the low wall built along the edge of the precipice, there is an inscription in German, recording the wonderful escape of a man, whose horse being irritated by a parcel of rude boys, sprang over the wall. The horse was killed by the fall, but the rider escaped, with merely the fracture of a few bones. As we looked down the fearful deep from the parapet, our blood chilled, at the thought of this marvellous adventure. Entering the church, we saw the woman who keeps the door feeding, with crumbs of bread, a flock of little sparrows, whose nests we learned were in the old crevices of the walls, or on the monuments to departed worthies. There is nothing in our eyes very remarkable about this church—it has some richly stained glass in the windows, and the spire is certainly commanding.

Every American traveller must be surprised and displeased, at seeing in the streets of Berne a number of convicts in chains, who are kept constantly employed in some menial publick service. So torturing to the feelings of some of the criminals is this system of punishment, that a few years since, a woman condemned to this publick disgrace, while employed in sweeping the high terrace near the ca-

thedral, sprang over the wall, and dashed into eternity.

The traveller through Switzerland, when he arrives at Berne, usually makes an excursion for the most part on foot, over the mountainous districts in the neighbourhood, called the Oberland or Bernese Highlands. The environs of Unterseen and Interlaken, and the lakes, mountains, and cascades of the country of William Tell, almost tempted me to run the chance of losing my passage to America, in the ship which is to sail on the 15th of next month. I had received particular instructions from my friends in London, not to omit this interesting tour; but as fifteen days are necessary to perform it, I felt compelled to renounce the gratification.

(To be continued.)

FOR THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE,  
MENTAL SCIENCE.

### *Introductory Remarks.*

No branch of science is more interesting, than the philosophy of mind. It holds an important place in a course of liberal education, and has its use in theological investigations. Other sciences are not to be discredited or displaced by this; nor will any one, who properly estimates its real and relative value, be disposed to make an offensive use of it. By many, the science of mind is considered dry, useless, and only calculated to perplex, or obscure investigation. By others, it constitutes all that is worthy to be called knowledge. The truth lies between the two classes—but as a subject furnishing facts of high interest, no department of philosophy can rival its stores. We may admire the beauty and wisdom of creation, when we contemplate planets and systems of worlds in the light of astronomy—or we may limit our view to the globe which

we inhabit, and be absorbed with delight in examining its geological structure—or we may look more intensely upon the furniture of the earth, and be charmed with the treasures of natural science—or in moments of intense thought, we may linger with glowing pleasure in the abstract science of numbers and quantity—or we may be equally delighted with the examination of organized animated bodies: but there is a department of knowledge of more absorbing interest than all these—it is the *knowledge of mind*.

To know that which knows; to contemplate that which thinks, feels and acts; to examine that which examines, are higher exercises of mind, than all those which terminate on material things. Man is the noblest work of God which we have yet seen; and we have no reason to expect ever to see more than one order of created beings higher than man. The revelation of God informs us that man was made a little lower than the angels, and gives no intimation of an intermediate order. But all the amazing interest which we feel in contemplating man as the noblest part of this lower creation, arises from the nature, capacities, and operations of his immortal mind. When the body dies, we hide it from our sight as an object offensive and disgusting. There is not one pleasant thought connected with the rottenness of its decomposition and the filthiness of the tomb, except it be, the assurance which God has given of the body's resurrection. All else is disgusting in the extreme. But when we contemplate mind, its very deformities are interesting. Whatever contributes to the formation of character, in its present relations so important, and in its future results imperishable, may well engage our eager attention.

The characteristic of mind, and its influence over matter, furnish good reasons for all the importance

which we attach to the science. The mind knows, and is conscious of its knowledge—it feels, and is conscious of pleasure and pain—it acts, and is conscious of its actions. By these characteristics, the mind seems calculated for indefinite improvement in its capacities, acquisitions, and usefulness. By its influence over matter in the motions of the living body, indirectly in all the improvements of the arts, and in procuring the comforts of life, mind is the grand agent of using the creation of God, and possesses the only capacity for its enjoyment. There is, therefore, good reason why such an agent should be an interesting object of thought and self-examination.

But taking the revelation of God as our unerring guide, we do not wonder at the deep interest connected with this subject. The whole universe is made for the use of mind; and no inconsiderable portion of its immeasurable extent, is intended for the instruction, use, and enjoyment of human minds. The administration of God's government over this world, is regulated for the instruction and benefit of intelligent agents. The destiny of mind is immortal, and the scheme of gospel salvation tells its momentous value, in the estimation of its Maker and Redeemer. The whole revelation of God, the plan of mercy, the mission of Christ, the whole system of grace, and the mansions of glory in the heavens, provided at such vast expense, are for the minds of men.

It should not be forgotten that all the sufferings in the prison of everlasting despair, of which we are warned in the sacred pages, refer us to the miseries of immortal minds. Bodies reorganized, raised, and fitted to be immortal mediums of bliss or wo, will be in heaven and in hell, but the happiness and the misery will be chiefly mental. Surely these are sufficient reasons why minds should be deeply inter-

ested with the contemplations of themselves. There are no objects below angels, so elevated and sublime.

From these, and kindred suggestions, which will readily occur to those who carefully examine the subject, it might be obvious that mental science is important as well as interesting. All the high and holy communications of revelation are made to man, and respect his mind. The character of man's immortal spirit is there developed, its present obligations are defined, and its future prospects indicated. But in all these developments, it seems to be taken for granted, that men are acquainted with the operations of their own minds, or that they may know them, without difficulty, by self-examination.

One estimate of mental science, may therefore be made, without much labour. The investigation of mind must constitute an important part of useful knowledge, since to mind belong character, responsibility, and immortal prospects; since God communicates with it, and enjoins self-knowledge as an indispensable duty. An intelligent agent, to whom God has communicated the revelation of his will, whom he holds responsible to himself as the Almighty Sovereign, and whom he has bound to investigate the intellectual and moral character and relations of his mind, should regard it as a matter of high interest and importance to comply with this direction of his Maker. It is also easy to perceive that if a man mistakes or wrongly estimates the character of his own mind, he will be liable to misapply the directions of God's truth, and place a wrong estimate upon some doctrines of faith. Correct views of the principles and operations of the human mind, are important to the Christian in the estimation of his own character, and the application of God's revealed truth to his own relations and duty.

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To the minister of Christ, especially, correctness in mental philosophy must be vastly important. His grand official business is with minds, formed and planned in relations, and under obligations, like his own, to God.

One consideration, which shows the importance of this science to the ministry, is its influence in mental discipline. Much as an extensive knowledge of literature, philosophy and history may be valued, and justly valued, correct, thorough discipline of the mind, is worth more than all these stores. A habit of careful, accurate and thorough investigation of subjects, a ready and clear discrimination of thoughts, and a diligent and judicious application of a mind thus trained, to almost any subject of knowledge, will soon master all difficulties, and compass what is within its reach. Perhaps there is no study which so intensely fixes the mind's attention, compels it to so careful a discrimination of things and relations, as this. The exact sciences of numbers and quantity, though as accurate and discriminating, have not, for reasons which will appear in a subsequent part of this discussion, as direct and efficient an influence in disciplining the mind for the investigations of truth, as the science of mental philosophy. There is an alliance between this and theology readily discovered, which is not in the mathematics.

The only correct apprehensions of spiritual existence, which we can acquire, must be obtained from the examination of our own spirits. The better, therefore, the minister of Christ is acquainted with the nature and operations of his own mind, the more correct will be his apprehensions of other spirits. When he reads, in the revelation of God, the description of angels, those pure spirits which minister before their Maker's

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throne, he necessarily carries along and applies the apprehensions of spiritual existence, derived from the contemplation of his own living spirit. He knows no other kind of spirit. Such a spirit, without a material body, or any material organs, possessing a pure moral character, and powers enlarged so as to constitute a higher order of being, forms his conception of an angel. In like manner, the most definite and correct apprehensions of God, who is a spirit, are obtained. By adding the ideas of infinity, self-existence and independence, to the attributes of pure spirit, we form our conceptions of the glorious Jehovah. We do not in this process exclude the guidance of inspiration. Although the light of nature furnishes us with the means of knowing some of the attributes, as well as existence of the Eternal Spirit, yet we could not discover all his perfections, and gather all the associations which complete the conception of God, without his own guidance. Here it will readily be perceived that I refer to no speculative theory, but to a knowledge of the nature and attributes of mind, or spiritual existence.

Another consideration may here be suggested, to aid in this preliminary estimate of mental science. Theologians are not only employed in the investigation of truths which belong to minds, but as ambassadors for Christ, their main business is with the minds of men. They should know how minds are influenced, and how to estimate human character. It is not to be supposed that a knowledge of mental philosophy will give any one common sense, which most of all qualifies him for acquiring a knowledge of human nature, and forming a just estimate of human character; but it will greatly improve the judgment of manners, and enable him to accommodate his conduct and adapt his instruction to the great

diversity of mental habits. To know correctly and familiarly the laws of mental operations, must be of great advantage, in the official and private intercourse of the Christian ministry.

Mental philosophy has an influence in the interpretation of the holy scriptures, and in qualifying the mind for the correct interpretation of God's word. All men are governed in their interpretation of many things in the Bible, by some principles of mental science which they have adopted. This is matter of necessity, inasmuch as many directions refer them to their own consciousness of mental phenomena. Many exercises of Christian graces are so described, that men make the application according to their views of mental philosophy. Many doctrines of faith are necessarily explained on the same principles. A large portion of the errors in theology have originated in false philosophy, or have assumed some philosophical dogma as their defence. If therefore we correct the principles of mental science, we shall correct the errors, or deprive them of their support.

The importance of this branch of science is much increased, by the intellectual and speculative character of the present age. Never, perhaps, did speculative philosophy exert more influence over the opinions and conduct of men, than at the present time. This, however, may be considered by some as a strong objection, to the study and use of what is confessedly mischievous in its influence. But such an objection would be arguing from the abuse, against the use of the science. This is inadmissible. It may also be said that the simple, plain, grammatical interpretation of the scriptures, is the best antidote for theological errors; consequently, that all investigations of mental science are worse than useless.

To this objection it may be replied, that the premises may be correct, but the consequence does not follow. Correct philological interpretation of God's own word is certainly the most safe, and in our opinion the only safe method, of ascertaining the mind of the Spirit: and that which best ascertains the mind of the Spirit is the best antidote for all error. But unless it can be shown that correct philology and accurate investigations of mental science contradict each other, the consequence is not certain. To us it seems very plain, that philological and mental science are perfectly harmonious, and both necessary to the full and clear exposition of God's revelation. It should however be remembered and distinctly admitted, that much of what is called mental science is mere matter of speculation: and speculations not according to facts will always mislead, and prove more or less injurious. We deprecate the practice of interpretation by theory, and we also deprecate all methods of studying the mind, which are governed by theory, and not pursued according to facts.

It was not our design in this number to enter upon the investigation of the *method* to be pursued in studying mental science, nor to examine its *elements*; these will constitute the subjects of future discussion. A few suggestions preparatory to the investigation, which might have a tendency to promote a just valuation of the science, embraced our present object. The proper *method* of studying the science will be the subject of our next number. In the mean time, let every theologian be careful how he adopts theories of speculation. He who takes leave of facts can never anticipate the termination of his course—that it will not be in truth, is all that he can certainly know.

MEMOIR OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN  
WICKES.

(Continued from p. 20.)

Captain Wickes continues his narrative of the state of his mind, during the seventeen years that he remained in the melancholy darkness already noticed. We shall exhibit his statement, making but very little change in his language, and none at all in his ideas. Recurring to his gloomy and distressing situation he says—“Thus I went on during our revolutionary war. Whenever I was at home I hastened to get away, expecting that what I feared, about my dying in the midst of my friends, would take place. When I got away, I was more at ease; but never, for one waking hour, was I free from distress, in a greater or less degree. At the end of the war I was a prisoner on parol; and had lost my all of this world's goods, being left without a dollar for myself or my family. I however soon got employed, and was successful in business for several years. About the year 1790 I staid at home, to attend to the building of a new ship; and while she was building, I used to go constantly to publick worship, for I loved to hear the gospel preached in truth, though I had no interest in it, for it always condemned me; and I often came away with fears that the street might open and swallow me up.

“Here it should be observed, that there was not a creature who knew any thing about my soul exercise, for nearly twenty years: for I kept myself hidden from the people of God; until one day, as I was returning from a religious service in publick, I was overtaken by one with whom I had been very intimate twenty years before. He had seen me in the place of worship, and when the meeting was over, he followed me and spoke to me; although he seemed to be in doubt

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### LECTURE LV.

What is forbidden in the ninth commandment is to be the subject of the present lecture. "The ninth commandment, according to our Catechism, forbiddeth whatsoever is prejudicial to truth, or injurious to our own and our neighbour's good name."

Although in treating of the precept now before us, the arrangement adopted has been to consider separately, its requisitions and its prohibitions, yet in speaking of the former, the latter has been in a measure anticipated. This anticipation, which it was not easy to avoid, is attended with this advantage, that of the two parts into which the answer now to be discussed is divided; namely, the violations of truth, and the injury of our own and our neighbour's good name, the latter has received so much attention, that a separate consideration of it does not seem necessary. What farther notice it may require, will fall under some of the particulars embraced in the series which will be laid before you. In pursuing this series, I will speak:

1. Of whatsoever is prejudicial to truth in *courts of justice*. The awful sin of *perjury*, as it involves the crime of *profaneness* as well as

of *falsehood*, was treated of in our lecture on the third commandment; and it was also noticed, with a distinct reference to *witness bearing*, in the close of our last lecture. But in courts of justice, in our country, there are not only witnesses, but judges, jurors, and attorneys: And of these, the judges as well as the jurors, always act under the solemnity and responsibility of an official oath. The judge or magistrate, therefore, who pronounces a *sentence*, or gives instruction to a jury, contrary to what he knows to be law and justice, violates his official oath, and is really guilty of *perjury*, as well as of an act of gross injustice to the person, property, or good name of his neighbourhood. Nor is he scarcely less guilty, if he neglects to do all in his power to prevent, or detect, the suborning of false witnesses, or the false swearing of witnesses not suborned. In like manner, the juror who knowingly gives, or consents to a false verdict, breaks his oath, as well as incurs the guilt of doing injustice to his neighbour. The attorney, also, who labours to gain a cause which he knows to be altogether unjust, or to clear a culprit whom he knows to be guilty, is chargeable with a palpable and shameful disregard to truth. I do not say that an attorney may not lawfully appear as the friend and protector of a guilty party, to prevent his being punished beyond his desert. This

hill is quite a resort for Catholick pilgrims. Some distance up the mountain we passed through a curious natural arch, formed of immense blocks of breccia or pudding stone, and soon after stopped to rest at an inn near the Cold Baths. The breccia, or pudding stone, of the German naturalists, masses of which lie scattered around us, is a rock composed of fragments of various minerals, united together commonly by a calcareous cement. The Rigi, and the neighbouring mountains, appear to be composed of layers of this rock of different thicknesses, with thin intervening earthy strata. This curious formation must be highly interesting to the intelligent geologist.

Setting off in high glee from the Cold Baths, we soon passed the Staffel, an inn frequented by many travellers to these upper regions, and then arrived at the Culm, or summit of the Rigi, about an hour before sunset. We found here a large concourse of strangers from various parts of the world, all assembled to enjoy the sublimity of the surrounding scene, and now all anxiously watching the slow decline of the cloudless and glorious orb of day. I retired a short distance from the expecting and silent groups of spectators; and as I called home my thoughts, I felt, while gazing from this pinnacle of the earth on the majesty and sublimity of nature, more immediately in the presence of its great Author, than I had ever done before. My first glimpses of the vast expanse spread around me, had an intoxicating effect—but soon the objects before me lost their impression—the villages, the lakes, the rocks, the streams, and the mountains, faded away, and my thoughts hovered over mysteries deeper than the abysses at my feet, and soared to heights beyond the “vast cerulean” spread over my head.

(To be continued.)

FOR THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

MENTAL SCIENCE.

*Method of Investigation.*

In order to form a proper estimate of mental philosophy, it will be proper to consider the method by which it is to be investigated, before we examine its elements and uses. All correctness of our opinions, and the result of our investigations in this department of knowledge, depend on the method of studying the science. No reliance can be placed on speculations, pursued on assumed theories. Hypotheses may be multiplied to any extent, with which some occasional facts may accord, without ever leading us to examine the science in its proper elements. Preconceived theories and hypotheses are worth very little, in any branch of knowledge. They can have no use except to aid in illustration; and in mental philosophy they are generally mischievous. The whole materials of the science are simple facts, within the reach of every mind, and familiar to every man. It may not be in every man's power to name the facts, to arrange and classify them according to any principle of discrimination, but the facts themselves all must know, because they are subjects of their own consciousness.

The phenomena of mind need not be so abstruse as many have considered them. Mystery and absurdity have so often been associated with pretensions to metaphysical researches, that few think of investigating this department of knowledge. It would be more curious than profitable to trace the hypotheses of ancient and modern philosophy, which have involved the essence, nature, duration and phenomena of mind in mysticism, darkness and folly. It might amuse us to examine the Vedas of the Bramins—the Zendavista of the Parsees—the Stoicism and Pytha-

goreanism of the Greeks,—their emanations and immenations from the soul of the universe, and their resorption into the same,—their transmigrations, with nameless fabulous hypotheses. The systems of Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus, are scarcely more intelligible or rational. In more recent times Descartes, Berkeley and Hume, are fit to be classed with the schoolmen of Greece—and more recent still, we might find theories as foolish and useless as the Zendavista, or Pyrrhonism. But it would subserve no other good purpose, than to illustrate the futility of all hypotheses in the investigation of mind, to collect the number of absurdities which have been heaped upon this subject for ages. Here and there some fragments of truth might be found, among the rubbish that has been accumulating for centuries, and around the absurd speculations of modern Aristotles and Pyrrhos, but they are not worth the trouble of collection and separation.

The only profitable method of studying mental science is to apply rigidly the principle of Bacon, and examine the facts as we find them. The inductive method alone can lead us to accurate knowledge in any branch of philosophy, and it is more emphatically true in the investigations of mind. Lord Bacon said, "all our knowledge is derived from experience." This he established as a maxim, and used it with unprecedented effect. It guided him, and others after him, into unexplored regions of philosophy, and produced a revolution in science. Locke attempted the application of the maxim to mental philosophy, in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding," which formed a new era in mental science. His application of the principle was not completely successful—he did not adhere throughout to the maxim; but had he excluded other subjects, not necessarily connected

with that which he proposed to investigate, and preserved throughout his essay the same precision in the use of terms, which he employed in some of his definitions, his work might have been imperishable, and his fame uneclipsed. As it now is, the world is greatly indebted to Locke, for leading the way and attempting the proper method of investigating mental phenomena. Dr. Reid stated the same principle, although he sometimes departed from it in his investigations. "Wise men now agree, or ought to agree in this, that there is but one way to the knowledge of nature's works, the way of observation and experiment—and it is the only one by which any real discovery in philosophy can be made." This sentiment, which is claimed by all writers on mental philosophy, of any value since the days of Bacon, is not to be confounded with the uses which have been made of it by those who have attempted to employ it; nor will it sanction all the opinions of those who profess to estimate its value. There are few men, perhaps none, who have been completely successful, in its application to the investigation of mental phenomena. Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Payne, and some others have attempted it; and to some extent have been successful. Payne has pursued the application further than either of the others mentioned; but he has seemed to grow weary of the labour, and to substitute hypotheses in solving some mental phenomena. All writers on this subject have done the same, to a greater or less extent, and many, without seeming to know that they did it. Perhaps we may do the same; for in claiming to have detected the fault in others and an intention to be governed by the inductive method, we do no more than others have done; and yet they have fallen into the error which they disclaim. It seems to us, that after having ex-

amined a few facts inductively, they have found it convenient to frame them into a theory, by which they could explain other phenomena; thus they have insensibly departed from their maxim, until at length, they use hypotheses in the place of facts. Probably the task upon their time, patience, and intensity of thought, was too great to be continued, as long as was necessary to complete their system. But some have written with a view to refute a certain error, which has been so constantly associated in their thoughts while writing, that every illustration seems carefully adapted to that specific object; without regarding the sources whence the arguments have been derived. Our countryman, Edwards, has given to the world a specimen of patient research and intense thought, in his "Treatise on the Will." But he has not rigidly applied the principle under consideration to the method of his investigations. Having his mind intensely fixed on his object, the refutation of a certain error, he has used arguments drawn from facts and from hypotheses, without discrimination of their source; only taking care that they should answer his purpose, in prostrating the system which he opposed. This could be plausibly and forcibly done, in many instances, by hypotheses, because the error which he opposed was a mere hypothesis. The same may be said of almost all the writers on the phenomena of mind. With the exception of a few facts industriously arranged and classified, which will stand the test of all examination, the systems of mental science may be properly considered a collection of hypotheses, one giving place to another, as successive writers have employed them—sometimes with little, but often with no improvement in the stock of knowledge. Frequently they have been mischievous in their application to the

subject by perverting facts; and they have always hindered the progress of mental science. Almost all metaphysicians have too much attachment to some favourite associations and classifications of thoughts, with which their minds become familiar. Those few associations embrace the first principles of their scheme, which they find useful in solving other phenomena. Their minds soon become charmed with the principles, and their application in solving difficulties; they save much laborious thinking; a fine theory is adopted, and their system is completed under its influence. Such have hitherto been the course and results of mental research; and such will ever be the state and character of mental science, discordant and unfixed, until there shall arise some man who will examine the subject inductively throughout, and furnish the world with the results, expressed in terms of precision, and a style of clearness in illustration, not yet attained—Hypotheses and theories must be laid aside, and facts alone must guide.

A work on this subject, such as we need, would require a mind of strong intellectual power, well disciplined to accurate thought, to patient and persevering investigation; and then its possessor must devote years of labour and revision to the system. Hitherto, this department of science has not been made the main object of any man's study during a whole life, as natural philosophy and the mathematics have been of many men. In these latter branches of science, the facts are classed, the terms are fixed, and every man who reads and thinks, can compare the facts and examine the system. If any new discovery be made, it is carefully disposed and arranged in its place, and real advancement is made in the science. Every improvement becomes common property, and when it is announced, every lover of the sci-

ence can make himself master of the whole process by which the discovery was made: because he is led by the hand every step. But it is otherwise in mental philosophy; few things are fixed, and classifications are various and multiplied, producing confusion and doubt. If one hypothesis be swept away, and a real improvement be made by any individual, another cannot receive it without a process of thought as intense, and almost as original, as that by which the discovery was made. All other branches of science can now be studied under the guidance of books, without perplexing hypotheses, and the result is satisfactory, because it is obvious truth; but in this, original thought and independent examination are necessary, to arrive at any satisfactory and valuable result. Perhaps there will always, from its nature, be less precision and more discordant opinions in this, than in almost any other department of knowledge. We can enter at once into the possession of Newton's discoveries, because the whole process is placed before us; but in mental science only the result is seen, without the process. The object cannot be attained without fixed attention to unembodied thoughts, and evanescent feelings of one's own mind. If we had, therefore, a correct and thorough system of metaphysics, it is doubtful whether the majority of students would compare the classifications with the facts, and examine thoroughly the phenomena of mind; and unless this be done, hypotheses are likely to be preferred to truth, and much confusion to remain in the minds of those who adopt them.

It may be observed here, that almost all the writers on mental philosophy have attempted, not only to classify the phenomena of mind, but also the materials of knowledge, with their relations, associations, and similarity. This has led them into so wide a field of investigation

that their discussions become too complex and indefinite. It is true that the names of mental exercises are, many of them, derived from the external objects to which they relate: and there is undoubtedly an intimate connexion between mental science and logical discussions. But it seems to us important that they should be examined distinctly, for the sake of truth and accuracy. We would not undervalue dialectics, but let every branch of science be in its place, and its elements be carefully examined by themselves. When once the elements of the two branches are thoroughly examined and well settled, then let their relation and connexion be illustrated, for the improvement and use of both.

After all that has been said of the inductive method, there is an important question to be settled, viz. by what standard shall we estimate the phenomena of mind; or how shall we pursue the inductive method of investigation? To this inquiry we answer, by our own *consciousness* and the *revelation* of God.

*By our own consciousness.* Every man must of necessity employ and trust his own consciousness in this investigation. If this should deceive him when properly employed, there is no remedy; because this is the last resort and the highest tribunal of truth, in the cases appropriately within its sphere. Here every man will and must trust his consciousness, rather than all other testimony, and it may be in opposition to all other evidence. But when the body and mind are in a healthful state, consciousness will not deceive us. There may, indeed, be some mental illusions and wrong associations, which may become habitual, and serve to mislead in some mental investigations; but even here, rigidly inductive appeals to consciousness, afford the only prospect of expelling the illusion, and correcting the habit.

We do not now enter on the examination and discussion of consciousness, to decide the question, whether it be a distinct faculty of mind, a mere feeling, a mere intellectual exercise, or a combination of both feeling and apprehension. This question will be considered in its place, when we examine the phenomena of mind, or elements of the science. It seems necessary to advert to the fact, in this place, that the mind does take cognizance of its own acts. Whatever this may be called, and however the knowledge may be attained, the fact is most certain and needs no proof. Indeed if it should be alleged that it is necessary to prove to a man that he is conscious of his own mental acts, we should not know what arguments to employ. We might describe his mental exercises, and state their results in external conduct, but this would only be evidence of his consciousness to others, not to himself. The most it could do would be to recal to his mind the facts in their connexion. The proof is in his own mind—it must be intuitive, the fact itself. Intuitive truths and simple ideas do not admit of being made more certain, or more plain, by argument or illustration. We may describe them, and illustrate their use, but beyond this we cannot go.

These things being premised, we say that all mental phenomena, in order to be understood and classed, must come under the cognizance which the mind takes of its own acts. Every illustration and every definition, must accord with consciousness. Now it would seem from the nature of the case, that there might be more certainty in the knowledge of mind than of matter. All our knowledge of matter is through the medium of the senses, the cognizance which they take of the properties belonging to material substances. We do not suspect our senses of deceiving us, and yet illusions are sometimes so com-

plete, that for a time we are deceived. In such cases, a second experiment sometimes dispels the illusion, and sometimes it is dispelled by analogical reasoning, or by opposing and audible testimony. After all we must be guided by our senses, properly employed, in all matters which come appropriately under their cognizance. In this illustration, and throughout this article, we use terms in their popular import, and according to common usage, without attempting their analysis. So we say consciousness must be our guide, in acquiring knowledge of all those things which appropriately come under its cognizance. There may be some difficulty in certain cases, to determine what belongs to its sphere, but in such cases the question respects more particularly the relations, not the elements—the connexion and influence of mental acts, and not the acts themselves.

*The revelation of God*, is also our guide in this investigation. In the moral estimate of our mental relations, this furnishes our standard, and may not be contravened. In the *elements* of mental science this standard corresponds with consciousness. He, who formed the mind and governs it, has given a revelation of his will, adapted to man's mental state and character. This all will admit, who accredit his revelation. That He, who knows what is in man, not only knows how to adapt his instructions to his case, but has done so, is secured by his goodness. And what is thus secured, appears in fact upon the face of the document which he has sent us. Let us be understood on this part of the subject.

The fair grammatical interpretation of the revelation will be found to correspond with the result of induction, pursued according to consciousness, so far as both relate to the same things. But here it should be remembered, that mental philosophy, founded on hypotheses, is a

very dangerous guide in the interpretation of the holy scriptures. The interpreter of scripture should ascertain the mind of the Holy Spirit, according to correct philological principles: then, if the true meaning be ascertained, and it correspond not with the views he has taken of mental phenomena, he should suspect the correctness of his mental investigation, and rigidly scrutinize every step in the analysis. We may be sure that the descriptions which God has given, of the human mind and its exercises, correspond with the facts; and if we are guided by consciousness in our mental analysis, the result will be the same.

It is true that God's revelation was not given for the purpose of teaching men a system of mental science. It was not necessary that he should reveal directly the facts which we know, or which we *may* know, from our own consciousness. But it is also true that, in the development of man's moral character, relations and responsibilities, the whole mental phenomena are directly or indirectly involved. Not that we believe every thing properly belonging to mental science, will be found in the Bible; but all the elements are there, and should be regarded as fixed principles. They should be well understood, correctly defined, and never invaded by theories of any kind. We do believe that correct philology, and an appropriate application of grammatical principles to the interpretation of the scriptures, will furnish data sufficient to correct our speculations in mental philosophy. This will be done by settling correct principles, and compelling us to adopt the inductive method of investigation. The sum of the matter is this: revelation does not teach directly, nor was it needed so to teach, mental science; but it recognises the principal facts of mental phenomena, in such a manner as to furnish sufficient principles to

guard us against hypothetical theories, and guide us in the pursuit of truth.

We have but one remark more at present, on the method of studying the science; and that is, a caution against analogical reasoning in the investigations. The human mind loves analogy, and whenever its use is appropriate, it is certainly a forcible, as well as an agreeable method of illustration. Whenever analogies are judiciously selected and properly applied, they give life, vigour and permanence to impressions, which are otherwise rarely attained. But they are inadmissible in the investigations of the exact sciences, and of mental philosophy. Who would think of teaching the mathematicks by analogies taken from political discussions, or from any source whatever? It would be equally absurd to attempt analogical deductions, in classing mental phenomena, or in examining the facts under inspection and analysis. We must therefore be cautious how we apply the same mode of reasoning to mind, which is applicable to the body and its senses. We cannot prove by analogy, that the mind consists of parts or numbers; nor because the body has several senses, some of which may be destroyed and the rest remain perfect, may we infer that the same is true of the mind. The mind must be examined by itself, in all its phenomena: and no proof, argument, or classification can be analogically established. Nothing except facts, and those belonging to the department itself, can be trusted. In the abstract science of mental phenomena, we must be very cautious how we admit analogies. The inductive method, under the guidance of consciousness and the word of God, affords the only prospect of safety and truth. All other methods will perplex and may grossly deceive us.

We have been the more prolix in this article, because we think many

have been misled by their method of investigation; and others have been disgusted by the bewildering hypotheses and perplexing analogies, so often and so improperly employed in the discussion of this subject. We feel confident that a successful application of those principles which we have attempted to describe, to the method of investigation, will be both useful and safe.

F.

## FOR THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

The article on the *doctrine of imputation* in the July number of the *Biblical Repertory*, I read with great satisfaction. It presents a luminous and correct exhibition of that important truth. It ought to be widely circulated. I feel, however, apprehensive that from the brief notice taken of President Edwards, in that article, the reader may receive a wrong impression of what has been taught by that great man, on this important doctrine. It has led me to examine with some care his work on *original sin*; and if you will grant me a few pages in your useful miscellany, I will endeavour to present a fair and fuller exhibition of his sentiments.

I. *Original sin*, in Edward's view, comprehended not only *innate depravity*, but the *imputation of Adam's first sin*.

In the very first sentences of his treatise, he says—"By *original sin*, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the *innate sinful depravity of the heart*. But yet, when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include not only the *depravity of nature*, but the *imputation of Adam's first sin*; or, in other words, the liability or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the *divine judgment*, to partake of the *punishment* of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who hold one of these have maintained the

other; and most of those who have opposed one have opposed the other. And it may perhaps appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected, and that the arguments which prove the one, establish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one, than the other."

"I shall, in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard to the *corruption of nature*; and as we treat of this, the other will naturally come into consideration, in the prosecution of the discourse as connected with it."—I quote from Dwight's edition.

II. President Edwards proves *innate depravity of heart to be universal*. No quotations are needed to support this particular. Every one, having the slightest acquaintance with his work on original sin, will allow at least the fact, that he attempts to establish this important truth.

III. He endeavours to show, that the *imputation of Adam's first sin is taught* WITH GREAT PLAINNESS in *holy scripture*.

"As this place" (referring to Rom. v. 12—21) "in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature derived from Adam, and also the *imputation of his first sin*, are both clearly taught in it. The *imputation of Adam's one transgression*, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that by *ONE MAN'S SIN*, *death passed upon all*; all being adjudged to this punishment, as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one man's sin. And it is repeated over and over, that *all are condemned, many are dead, many made sinners, &c.*, by *ONE MAN'S offence, by the disobedience of ONE*, and by *ONE offence*. And the doctrine of original *depravity* is also here taught, when the apostle says, *by one man sin entered into the world*; having a plain respect (as hath been shown) to that

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

APRIL, 1831.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LV.

(Continued from p. 115.)

3. *Forgery*, or setting a false name to a writing, or fabricating the whole of a writing, with a view to deceive and defraud—is one of the grossest violations of truth that can be perpetrated; and at the same time it is a most nefarious deed, in relation to the property of another—It breaks two commandments, the eighth and ninth, in one act; being equally a theft and a deliberate lie. Its frequency is a lamentable indication of the prevalence of licentious principles and practice. In the country from which we derive our origin, it was, till lately, invariably followed, when detected, by the punishment of death; because in a commercial community, scarcely any other violation of law could be so injurious. Believing, as I do, that no crime but murder, or that which involves it, should be punished with death, I have marked with pleasure the efforts recently made—I am not sure that they have as yet been successful—to exempt forgery from the list of capital offences in Britain. Yet I wish by no means to diminish in your minds its moral turpitude. It is certainly one of the basest and blackest transgressions of the moral law of God, that can

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be committed; and the injury that it does to society is also of the most flagrant and inexcusable kind.

4. *Hypocrisy* is forbidden by the spirit and scope of the ninth commandment. *Self-deceivers* in regard to their spiritual state, are sometimes, both in scripture and in common discourse, called *hypocrites*. But of such we do not now speak—We here refer to those who, knowingly, make a false and deceitful profession and show of religion; who assume the appearance of piety, and perhaps pretend to great zeal, on purpose to deceive the world, and promote their own temporal emolument; while, in their hearts, they are opposed to religion, perhaps disbelieve and despise it utterly; and it may be, indulge secretly in gross vice. Of such persons it may be said with truth, that their whole life is one series of practical falsehood—one continued lie. Their guilt is beyond description; for the sin they commit is a direct affront to the heart-searching God; being a constant practical denial of his omniscience. It is as much as to say, that if they can deceive man, and escape his censure, they are regardless of the knowledge and displeasure of the Most High. It is worthy of remark, that they who are loudest in the condemnation of hypocrisy, and are apt to charge it on all who are strictly and eminently pious, are often gross hypocrites themselves. While they hate all

Y

ped, late in the evening, at a convenient inn, just beyond the walls of an old town. I must not forget to mention, that we passed, on the road, the Archduchess Michael, and all her train—and truly the Russians made quite a formidable appearance. She rode in a fine barouche, and we saw her distinctly. Her female attendants had full and fair features, though we did not think them handsome.

“Methought she looked at us—  
So every one believes that sees a Duchess.”

(To be continued.)

FOR THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

MENTAL SCIENCE.

### *Elements of the Science.*

The first principles of every science are few and simple; but their relations, combinations and uses, are very numerous. This is emphatically true of mental philosophy.

By *elements* we mean the first principles of the science. If we speak of language, letters are its first principles or elements; of the science of numbers, the ten digits are its elements. So of mental science, the *faculties* of the mind, and the *rule* or *principle* of classification in examining the phenomena, are the elements. Strictly speaking, the faculties, capabilities, or properties, are the elements; but inasmuch as we cannot proceed a single step without observing some general law of mental operations, which discovers the primary relations of those phenomena to the character of their respective faculties, we consider it right to incorporate the principle of classification with the elements of the science. But if any object to this, we have no very strong objection to its being considered a secondary principle.

*Mind* is the subject, its proper-

ties or *faculties* are the elements; and the whole mental phenomena, developing their character, relations and uses, are to be classified and described, to form a complete system of mental science.

Our first inquiry respects the *mind* itself, as that to which all the elements belong.

Of mind itself, we are not conscious, but only of its exercises. We are, however, as certain of the existence of mind as of any fact whatever. There are several ways in which we arrive at certainty; the most important which concern the present philosophy are *intuition*, *consciousness*, and *inference*.

The first two are simple and difficult of explanation; the latter is complex and admits of extended illustration, but it belongs more properly to dialectics. We omit, for the present, any extended illustration of either; but it may be proper to say, that what we know by *consciousness* and *intuition* is certainty. The difference between these two mental acts is perhaps not very wide, yet they are easily distinguished one from the other. By one we take cognizance of exercises and properties,—and by the other, of their simple and necessary relations. We know by *consciousness* the exercises, *thought*, *feeling*, and *volition*; and we know by *intuition*, that *something* thinks, feels and wills. We know by *consciousness*, the difference between perception and feeling; and by *intuition* that there is a difference between the capacity, or adaptedness, to perceive and to feel.

The famous enthymeme of Des Cartes, “*cogito, ergo sum*,” does not describe the mental process, because the knowledge of our thought and existence are simultaneous, without reasoning on the subject, and with complete certainty. The process is too simple for explanation, and the fact is intuitive: no argument can ascertain it with more certainty.

Of the *essence* of mind, we are profoundly ignorant, and so we must remain, while our spirits are so intimately connected with their material habitations. How it may be when our minds are disembodied, must remain hidden from our view, while we dwell on earth. We can speculate concerning it, but knowledge we have none. There are, however, some things concerning the mind which we can *certainly* know,—others, *satisfactorily*: and there are some others of which we may have *probable* knowledge. Take the following specimen for illustration. The mind's *existence* is certainly, because intuitively known,—its *operations*, because of them we are conscious,—its *immateriality*, because the nature of all its known properties differs from those of matter,—its *immortality*, because its moral relations, and revealed destiny require it, according to that gospel which brings life and immortality to light.

The mind's moral character may be *satisfactorily* known, because its feelings may be compared with a perfect moral rule, capable of being examined. The expansion of its capacities, when it shall be separated from the body, is *probable*, because this is according to its known history in its present frail tabernacle, and in harmony with some intimations of God's revelation.

We are aware that it has been said, mind is only *exercise*; and because we are conscious of nothing antecedent, therefore nothing else of mental character exists. This sentiment has been variously modified. By some it has been made the ground of materialism; and great efforts have been made to prove that matter, peculiarly organized, is capable of thought, feeling and volition. By others it has been contended, that all those exercises commonly styled mental, are produced *immediately* by the author of our being. The conclusion

from this doctrine, as it seems to us, must be, that there is only one intelligent agent in the universe. Others say that action is the essence of mind, and that those evanescent, ever varying phenomena, called thoughts, feelings and volitions, constitute the mind.

It is worthy of remark, that the latter speculation has been applied in all its principles to matter. Thus one class of philosophers has attempted to deprive us of mind, another has attempted the same with matter, and both have been equally successful and rational. As we might a man undertake to prove that he has no existence, as that he has no permanent subject of the constantly diversified intellectual phenomena; that is, has no mind distinct from exercises. We know not how to guide any man's mental process to convince himself that he exists, or that he has a mind, if he denies or doubts the facts. A man who will not trust his consciousness and his intuition, should rather seek relief from medicine than philosophy.

We think it sound pneumatology, and unassailable truth, to assert that we have intuitive knowledge of both existence and mind. We should think it quite as philosophical to talk of motion without any thing being moved, as of mental exercises without a mind—antecedent to, and distinct from, the exercises themselves.

What is mind? We cannot answer essentially, but we can answer the question relatively: and that with rational satisfaction. It is a spiritual substance, which thinks, feels and wills. It is the permanent subject of those numerous and diversified phenomena, of which we are conscious, and which differ in their nature and laws from all that pertains to matter. This is mind—simple, uncompounded, not consisting of parts or organs, but indivisible and unique. Its capacities we shall attempt to describe,

but not its essence. It is proper here to state, there is a mental process, in the form of an argument, approximating certainty, for the immateriality of mind. The process is similar to that by which we prove the existence of matter. By our senses we take cognizance of certain properties, which must belong to something beyond human cognizance. This something, we call matter—not because we know its essence, but can judge of its properties. The material substance, in all its masses, atoms and forms, is unintelligent. We take this upon the authority of our senses; and their testimony is corroborated by the history of its creation and government, in the word of God's revelation to man. Those properties of matter—each, and all together, unintelligent—must belong to something in its nature unintelligent. Now by consciousness we know certain properties and phenomena, entirely different in their nature from all the phenomena and properties of matter. This character is intelligence; hence, the substance to which they belong must be entirely different from matter: we call it mind, intelligent spirit. If there be any truth in philosophy, the results of this process are truths. But after all, this is not the process by which the mind originally arrives at these results. Every intelligent man takes the knowledge of his own existence, and the nature of mind, as far as he knows any thing of its nature, upon the authority of his own *intuition*; his knowledge of the phenomena of mind, upon the authority of his *consciousness*; and his knowledge of external objects, upon the authority of his *senses*. We must take these things upon such authority, supported by the intimations of revelation, without philosophical proof; but if any man cannot do this, we should think his best remedy would be a mad-house. When facts are known, we may

class them, use them as arguments, point out their relations, and show their dependence one upon another. But a man, who has so employed his philosophy as to produce a doubt or denial of his own intuition, consciousness, senses and experience, must be left to the enjoyment of his blank scepticism.

Our next inquiry is the *principle of classification*, by which we distribute and arrange the phenomena of mind. We introduce this inquiry in this connexion, for reasons which will be obvious from its use; and because many different classifications have been made by metaphysicians. The latter reason seems to render it important that we should carefully examine and settle this principle, before we examine the capacities and their phenomena.

Classification is the disposition or distribution of our mental exercises, according to some principle, or character, cognizable by consciousness. Some have made two classes, some three, some six, some nine, twelve, and some many more. In some systems, a preconceived theory of faculties forms the basis of classification, which saves much time and accurate painful investigation of facts, but lacks truth and utility. Others have adopted the relations of mental phenomena to internal and external objects of thought, and thus have multiplied the faculties of mind to a great number. We shall not stop to examine those theories and principles; although they have had, and it is likely they will yet have, their advocates. It will be sufficient for our purpose, to define what we consider the true principle of classification.

The *resemblance, or difference, in the nature of exercises*, is the principle. To state it more fully—All mental exercises which are of the same nature, however they may be modified and combined, we put together, and distribute them into as many classes as we find pheno-

mena essentially different. For example, we *know*, let all the exercises whose nature is knowledge, form one class—we *feel*, let all the phenomena of feeling constitute another class—and we *will*, let all those exercises whose nature is choosing or refusing, that is *willing*, be disposed in another distinct class. This is the general, and we think only correct, principle of classification; except there may be sub-classes, disposed according to the relations, combinations, or circumstance of phenomena, having the same nature. But in this sub-classification, the whole nomenclature might be exhausted to name the classes. We trust it will be evident, that the general principle of classification is sufficient for our guidance in mental analysis; although we may sometimes have occasion to make a secondary class, the principle and reason of which will hereafter be explained.

According to the general principle of classification, we denominate the *faculties* of the mind. Let us be understood in our use of the term *faculty*. We mean what is sometimes called capacity, property, preparedness, or adaptedness; something antecedent to the exercise which develops its character. The faculties of the mind are the simple elements of mental science, and somewhat difficult logically to define. We may use other terms to express the same simple ideas; but that will not furnish logical definitions. We may also guard our meaning, by dissociating such things as others might be liable to suppose belonged to our intention. The latter may be important. We do not mean by *faculty*, a distinct agent, as if the mind were a habitation of different agents; nor do we mean parts of the mind, as if it were divisible like matter. The mind is one indivisible agent, capable of knowing, feeling and willing. This capability is what we

mean by *faculty*; and the distinction to which we have already alluded is obvious, that the capability of knowing is not identically the capability of feeling, or of willing. They all belong to one agent, but differ as much as the essential character of the phenomena which they exhibit. Without supposing any analogy in the things themselves, the illustration is appropriate which we take from the process of thought, in associating and dissociating the properties of matter. The process is similar. Take the following example. Gold has colour, weight, malleability, &c.; but we ascribe not the phenomena belonging to one property, to any other, yet we ascribe them all to the one mass, and to its every particle. So we ascribe to that one indivisible essence, which we call mind, all mental phenomena, but to each faculty its appropriate character and exercise, and not the same to another faculty, or to all indiscriminately.

*Faculty* is an inherent and inseparable property of the human mind, which has its own peculiar character, and all the faculties belong to the mind. We ascertain the character of each faculty by its appropriate phenomena. The faculties are the real basis of classification in all mental phenomena, because each faculty exhibits its own peculiar character, in its own exercises. But we must pursue the inductive method,—learn first the character of the phenomena, then by them the character of the faculty to which they belong. When, therefore, all the phenomena are classed, and the character of each faculty ascertained, their whole estimate indicates the character of the mind. Thus it will be perceived there are three stages in the process of this examination—the *first* is the character and classification of the phenomena—*second*, the character of each faculty, —*third*, the character of mind.

Now if we were conscious of that spiritual essence itself, and could take cognizance directly of its character and properties, this process would be unnecessary. We should then know, with certainty, all the mind's properties and principles of action, and precisely how it would act in all supposable circumstances. This would be knowing the mind in some measure as God knows it. Possibly this may be one thing included in the apostle's assurance of knowledge, when that which is in part shall be done away—"then shall I know even as I am known." But such knowledge, and such method of acquiring knowledge, are denied to us in our present state. We must now examine facts as they come under our cognizance, and by slow degrees learn their character and relations, to acquire a useful and practical knowledge, even of ourselves.

It has been said that faculties and exercises of mind are only different states, in which the mind exists. This may be true or it may be false, just as it is understood. The term *state* is so indefinite as to furnish a cover for almost any conceivable associations of thought; and yet the acute metaphysician, Payne, who uses the phraseology, may have had an entirely correct view of the facts. The term may mean condition, modification, relation, quality, or character. It is true that *qualities* belong to substances, and have not a separate existence; so actions are evanescent, and cannot exist without an agent; but the agent and action are not the same thing. Connected with mind, action has existence, quality, mode, relation and character, not independently, but as expressive of mind. As objects of consciousness, therefore, mental actions, thoughts and emotions, have real existence, and are not mind, nor its condition, but indices of its character. We may as well speak of the *state* of mental affec-

tions, thoughts and volitions, or of the faculties, as to speak of the *state* of mind: in all we might speak truth. If the phraseology be intended merely as a caution against considering mental phenomena material, it is very well, nothing is lost by the word *state*; but if it mean any thing more, it may not be so harmless. It adds nothing to the definiteness of thought or expression. The *mind* in action, is just as definite as mind in a *state* of action—the *mind* feeling, as in a *state* of feeling—the *mind* willing, as in a *state* of volition. Still we admit that the *state* of the mind is ascertained by the phenomena, but they are not the same; and we have an objection to use a term differently from its proper significance, and without gaining any thing in the definiteness sought, especially when the term is intended to denote any important distinction.

In order to be the better understood, we state here the result of our general classification, so far as the names of the faculties are concerned, before we give the process and application of the principle in detail. The general faculties are three, *understanding*, or faculty of knowing; *heart*, or faculty of feeling; *will*, or faculty of volition.

Having disposed of three inquiries, namely, concerning the mind itself, the meaning of faculty, and the principle of classing mental phenomena, it will be convenient to close this article with some general remarks, on the application of our principle in distinguishing mental operations. We call it *our* principle, not because we claim to have discovered it, but because we adopt and use it. Indeed we affect no originality in these discussions; and our main object is to simplify the application and use of known principles.

In applying the principle of classification, it is obviously the first step to examine carefully the cha-

acter of the phenomena. To do this successfully, we must examine each exercise distinctly, and compare it with others, that we may avoid mistaking the character, and shun confusion in the arrangement. After all, it must be confessed, there is a difficulty in the process. It is difficult to apply the principle to thoughts which are evanescent, feelings which are transient, and volitions which are momentary. We cannot lay them by in some repository, and examine them at our leisure, as we analyze material substances in the laboratory of the chemist. We must take cognizance of them as they pass in instantaneous succession, and if we continue the examination, recollection must furnish the subject.

But there is less difficulty in applying this principle of classification, than any other which we have seen, or of which we can form any conception. If relations and circumstances are to form the rule of classification, we cannot reduce them to form, or complete the work of distribution. If we take the objects of thought, feeling, and volition, as the basis of classing mental phenomena, there will be as little prospect of relief and success. On this principle, our classification must be confused, and our labour interminable. It is not at all wonderful that philosophers, who have attempted classification on the principle of relations, or of objects, have uniformly failed of success, both in distinctness and completion. All variety in circumstance, complexity, or objects, would, in such a case, indicate a different state of mind. What, therefore, becomes of the principle of distribution? It becomes a mere arbitrary name of resemblance, or else there will be no limit to the number of classes. But if resemblance, or difference, in the nature of exercises, be the principle of classification, we have some prospect of cognizable distinction, and the completion of our labour. Re-

lations and circumstances may furnish reasons for sub-classifications, or the distribution of genera into species, but never can be a rule by which to discover generic differences, or to form general classes of mental phenomena. It may sometimes be convenient, as has already been intimated, to employ these secondary, or specifick classifications, in our mental investigations, but it will make great confusion to dispense with generic classes.

We do not expect in these essays, to examine all the phenomena of mind, or all of any one class of exercises, but to furnish sufficient specimens to illustrate and settle both the principle and the process of classification. In our next, we propose to apply the principle to several phenomena, and examine their connexion with the mind's capabilities. F.

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#### PRACTICAL METHODISM.

(Continued from p. 25.)

To the Editor of the Christian Advocate.  
Rev. and dear Sir,

In the present paper, I shall confine myself to some general remarks on the effects of Methodism on the church, and on the world.

By way of preliminary, I would state, that I am very far from depreciating the good the Methodists are accomplishing all around us. I do, yea, and will rejoice, that through their zeal and activity, the lamp of the gospel is carried to many sitting in the regions of darkness. In the wild wastes, and new settlements of our country, as well as in foreign lands, they are accomplishing much, which without them, would probably remain undone. But yet, in several respects, I think the effects of their influence are very much to be deplored. And

1. *As it regards the church.*  
Here the first obvious effect of their influence, is in lowering the stand-

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MAY, 1831.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LVI.

We now proceed to the consideration of the tenth commandment, which is thus expressed—“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour’s.” This commandment requires “full contentment with our own condition, with a right and charitable frame of spirit toward our neighbour and all that is his;” and it forbids “all discontentment with our own estate, envying or grieving at the good of our neighbour, and all inordinate motions or affections toward any thing that is his.”

You are aware, I suppose, that as the Papists dispense with the second commandment, because it manifestly prohibits their use of images; so, to keep up the number ten, they divide the one now before us,—taking the first clause, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife,” for the ninth commandment, and the remaining clauses for the tenth. To justify this, they say that the first clause of this precept relates to *property*, or *interest*; and the rest to *pleasure* or *gratification*.

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But besides the absurdity of such a distinction, in regard to one and the same sinful emotion—that of coveting—the thing asserted is not true in fact; for the ox and the ass of our neighbour, to say nothing of his servants, are as much parts of his property as his house. Besides, it is evident, beyond reasonable controversy, that the inspired lawgiver did not intend that this precept should be thus divided, because the two first clauses, which furnish the whole ground of the distinction contended for, are used interchangeably by himself, in two places, in which this precept is recorded. In Exodus, xx. 21, the commandment begins with the words, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house;” but when Moses recites the decalogue to the children of his people, on the borders of the promised land, [Deut. v. 21,] he introduces the tenth precept thus—“Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbour’s wife,” and then goes on with the other parts, which chiefly relate to property. In truth, this Popish distinction is so absurd, that it is scarcely worthy of serious confutation.

A point far more worthy of attention is, to ascertain why this commandment was given at all; since the whole of the decalogue relates, not merely to outward actions, but in every precept, is spiritual in its nature and extent, reaching to “the thoughts and in-

or country seat, are unrelished, if not unknown, in France. The peasant, like the citizen in Paris, must have the bustle and the amusements of society.

We stopped a short time at Chalons, situated on the dull banks of the river Marne. This is a miserable looking town, and is so old, that nobody can tell when it was founded. "In the time of the Emperor Aurelian it was considered one of the principal towns of Belgick Gaul. Two remarkable battles were fought near it—that in which Tetricus was defeated by Aurelian, his competitor for the empire, and that in which Attila and his allies were vanquished and dispersed by the Romans, Burgundians, and Goths, in 451." Here, if it had not been for the horrors of the Diligence, one might have been excited to some enthusiasm by reflecting on "by-gone" days; though scenes of battle and blood, either in ancient or modern times, are no agreeable topicks of contemplation.

Between Chalons and Paris, we passed through a portion of the district of Champagne; and the Diligence stopped at an inn, where we obtained some of the *exquisite* and famous wine, for which this country is celebrated. The champagne wine does not seem to be produced from any species of grape peculiar to this part of France, but it derives its superiority from the manner in which the vineyards are cultivated, and the skill exercised in expressing and refining the juice. The nature of the soil, no doubt, contributes much to the perfect growth of the grapes. The conductor of the Diligence we noticed purchasing a number of bottles of capital champagne, which he stowed away in some of the inscrutable holes of his moving castle; and he succeeded in eluding the custom house officers stationed at the barriers of Paris, and who searched us before we entered the

metropolis. Thus, after three days of hard labour, by sun and stars, we arrived safely from Strasburg; and I am now once more comfortably lodged in my old apartments, in the Hotel de l'Interieur, Rue Mont Martre.

(To be continued.)

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

##### *Intellectual Phenomena.*

In applying the principle of classification to mental phenomena, it will be our aim to describe the process of examination, pursue some examples of analysis, and state a few important results.

*Understanding*, has been long used as the name of a mental faculty, and should not be discontinued without good reasons. It means the mind's aptitude to know or apprehend. To avoid circumlocution, we shall use this term as the name of a faculty to which one class of mental operations belongs, although we are aware it is sometimes used as the name of a mental operation itself.

It is now convenient to begin our examination with *simple apprehension*. We mention this as indicating the essential character, or *nature*, of all those exercises which form one class, and belong to one faculty. This term is preferred for reasons which will be obvious, in our analysis of intellectual phenomena. Several other terms are used to designate the same operation; as *knowing*, *understanding*, *cognizance*, and some others less appropriate. We are certainly conscious of a mental operation called *apprehension*. It is a simple, uncompounded and indivisible exercise, which admits of no analysis. We can give no philological definition of the term, because it suggests a simple idea; all that can be done towards a description of the operation intended, is to use its appropriate name, point out its re-

lations, and refer men to their own consciousness for the true knowledge of its meaning. If we use a technical description, it is the *taking hold* of any thing, or thought, without comparing, judging or reasoning—one simple mental act. By whatever name it may be called, we use it to indicate the character of a whole class. All the mental exercises of this class are distinguished by this character, whatever may be their relations, objects, modes, or combinations. Operations of this character may vary in all these respects, and be so connected as to form a process of thought, to which a distinct name is given. We give different names to mental exercises of the same nature—from the objects to which they are directed, the relations involved, and the results obtained. But they are all capable of analysis, and reducible to simple apprehension. All this will be evident from the illustrations hereafter to be given.

Some of the operations of the understanding, are *consciousness, conception, perception, memory, judgment, reason, and imagination*. All these belong to one class, because they possess a common character, although in different relations: they belong to one faculty, because they develop but one capability, or aptitude of the mind. These different operations vary in their objects, strength, clearness, and other circumstances, but not in their nature.

What is *consciousness*? Its technical, or philological import, is the mind's knowledge of its own operations—the mind knowing *in, of, with, or by* itself. It is a single simple operation; knowing, or apprehending, is its character. It admits of no analysis or more appropriate definition, and the best description is simple apprehension, having for its object the internal mental phenomena. Some have told us that consciousness is a faculty, power, or susceptibility of

the mind; but its meaning indicates no more than a mental act with its peculiar relation; for if it were a distinct faculty, then the principle, by which it is so denominated, would make every modification of thought or intellection, to denote a distinct faculty. Such a principle of classification, would introduce confusion into the science, and contradict the testimony of common sense. All attempts at classification on such a principle would be useless.

Others have told us that consciousness is a general term, expressing the whole variety of our feelings. But this is more indefinite still, and farther from the truth. Consciousness is neither a variety of feelings, a mode of feeling, nor any feeling at all. It has no such character, but is a knowledge of feelings, as well as other mental acts. If it were merely feeling, or if it consisted of multiplied feelings combined, it could not be our guide in the investigation of mental exercises. And those philosophers, who give it this description, resort to a supposed faculty of discovering resemblances, by which the mind is able to class its own operations. What is this but an inappropriate description of consciousness? It is the apprehending faculty, or understanding, employed with mental acts as its objects. Why suppose a distinct faculty to account for a mental phenomenon, so obviously the same exercise properly denominated consciousness? The truth on this subject recognises an agent or mind, a capacity, and a description of its appropriate exercises relating to different objects. A different mode, and different objects of the same kind of exercises, do not indicate different faculties; but difference in the nature of the exercises necessarily implies a different capacity. We have already intimated that correct philology corresponds with correct mental philosophy. In

this case, the philological meaning of consciousness, expresses correctly the distinct mental operation to which it is applied. It should be applied no otherwise, than to denote the exercises of the mind taking cognizance of its own acts.

What is *conception*? Like all other mental acts, it has been the subject of many puzzling speculations, and given rise to many absurd theories. By some it has been considered a faculty of making things absent, objects of thought. By others it has been considered a modification of memory; by some others a modification of imagination; and by another class of philosophers, it is considered as belonging to a supposed faculty of suggestion. We cannot here enumerate all the hypotheses on this subject, much less attempt to describe and expose their fallacy in order.

Conception is applied either to one or more mental acts, and never properly to denote a faculty of mind. It is sometimes used to denote a single idea, which the mind forms of an absent object; but it more properly denotes the mental process of combinations and abstractions of thought, in which the mind forms ideas of things not present, or things never seen. We hear or read the description of an animal, plan, or thing which we have not seen; conception denotes the process of thought in combining or abstracting qualities and circumstances to form an idea of the animal, plan, or thing which may, or may not, correspond with the fact; and therefore it differs from perception, and from recollection of the facts. Such is our meaning when we say we conceive of things, events, or relations; for it matters not as to the nature of the exercise, what the objects or relations may be. All the descriptions of past, absent, and future things and events, are materials from which the mind forms its conceptions, or with which they are connected.

The technical meaning, (*con* and *cipio*,) as applied to mental acts, is to *take* or *apprehend with, in, or by* the mind itself. But it has an acquired import from the *usus loquendi*, and so indicates the invention, arrangement, combination, or abstraction of thoughts; it is therefore a process of simple apprehensions. When the whole process is carefully examined and analysed, it will be found to consist exclusively of simple apprehensions connected together, and so related to their appropriate objects, as to form the result. This result is often called the conception, but more properly it denotes the process of mind by which the result is attained.

What is *perception*? In answer to this question we are constrained again to differ from many respectable pneumatologists, who describe perception as a distinct faculty. We consider it a very important operation of the understanding, perhaps, next to consciousness, the most important. Some have considered it the characteristic operation of the faculty; and such it would be, from its prominence and use, but for the fact that it is not a simple operation, or its description does not suggest a simple idea. It includes necessarily, or by its use, a fixed and indissoluble relation to the senses. Its technical import is its true and appropriate meaning; (*per capio*) always denotes to *take through* the senses. But abstract its expressed relation to the medium and external objects, and what is there left, except simple apprehension? Apprehending or knowing is its character. It differs not in its nature from the exercises already described, but relates to external objects of thought, apprehended through the senses of *sight, hearing, touch, taste, or smell*. Thus we perceive light, sound, hardness, sweetness, scent. Terms are often used, which are derived from the senses, to denote the mind's cognizance through their medium; but

there is no need of confusion from that source. The mind's apprehension through the senses is what we call perception. This completes the analysis.

We enter not into a discussion of the question whether sensation is in the organ, in some intermediate link between it and the mind, or in the mind itself. This question would involve physiological principles which we have not room to discuss; and it is not necessary to our purpose. We only express our full and deliberate conviction, that a careful and thorough inductive inquiry will establish incontrovertibly the facts, that all sensation is in the mind and not in the organ, and that there is no intermediate link between them. Our purpose will be accomplished by describing the operation itself.

What is *memory*? It is a process more complex than perception, but it as certainly belongs to the intellectual class, consequently to the understanding. The term can never be properly used as the name of a distinct faculty, because it denotes a complex process of thought. The analysis is simple and easy. To make the matter plain we may use a tautological explanation. It is the apprehension of an object, or thought, together with the apprehension of having apprehended it before. This may be either with or without the precise time or place associated. Take any process of memory, and this is its whole analysis; and nothing else belongs to the mental operations. If, however, we use the term in a sense a little more extended, as may be entirely proper, to include recollection, there will often be a longer process of analysis. The circumstances of time, place, similar things, relations and connexions of facts, may be so associated as to awaken all the apprehensions, and furnish the process of memory and recollection. The latter differs from the

former only by including a voluntary exertion, to recal former apprehensions: but beside this, there is nothing in the whole mental process except a combination of simple apprehensions; to this every mental act in memory is reducible. Beyond this, they cannot be separated.

We are well apprized that memory has been called a distinct faculty of the mind; also that some have attempted to resolve the phenomena into a law of suggestion; others have called it a power of association; and it has been described as a particular mode of operation belonging to a supposed faculty of suggestion. But all these are mere hypotheses, and not the result of inductive examination and analysis. The stubborn fact, which no thinking man can avoid, is, that the whole process of memory has no other generic character than simple apprehension. Every man, who adopts the only principle of classification which can be defended, will refer it to the same generic class with perception and apprehension; consequently it cannot be a distinct faculty.

With respect to the faculty of suggestion, which some very respectable philosophers have supposed to exist in the mind, and to which belong, as appropriate exercises, conception, memory, imagination and habit, we have room only to state that it is a fanciful theory, tending more to perplex than to simplify the subject. The terms are indefinite, and seem to us, calculated to cover ignorance under general names, without any proper attempt to analyze the mental process. The doctrines of relations, resemblances, contrast, and contiguity, which are made so conspicuous in the scheme, and associated with mental operations, seem to have misled the advocates of the system. They seem to have forgotten that the relations of ob-

jects and the mental recognitions of them, are distinct things to be examined. States of the mind, and suggestions of the mind to itself, or of relations founded on resemblance, contrast and contiguity, as their laws, suggesting the succession of one mental state after another, all seem to us much like talking very wisely without any definite meaning; or more properly, it is confusion confounded. The truth, as it seems to us, is altogether in opposition to this theory. A careful inductive analysis would have set it aside, and shown its authors and advocates that they were contemplating different combinations of simple apprehension—operations of the understanding.

What is *judgment*? It is an operation of the understanding, recognizing some relation between two or more objects. It respects relations only, and is an apprehension of their character. It is perfect or imperfect, clear or indistinct, according to the character of the apprehensions in the case. A man recognises the difference between a stone and bread, between a circle and a triangle, and between a plain matter of fact and an obvious falsehood. But in each of these cases the process is an exercise called judgment, easily reduced to simple apprehensions of the things and their relations. The correctness of the judgment, involves the distinctness and certainty of the apprehensions in the process.

What is *reason*? In this question we refer not to any syllogism, or form of words in which reasoning is expressed—this consists in a series of related and connected propositions. We mean that process of intellection by which the mind reaches its conclusions. It corresponds with the description of judgment in having relations for its objects; and it differs only in the number and combination of the apprehensions. In judgment the

relations are obvious and the process short; but in reasoning they are not immediately obvious, some other connecting things, having relations to both, are interposed and compared to discover the relations sought. This is reasoning. Now the whole intellectual process, be it long or short, is nothing more than a concatenation of simple apprehensions. The whole complexity arises from the number and arrangement of simple operations, having the same nature. What is that intellectual operation in which the mind discovers one relation or quality? It is apprehension. The same, by which two, three, or more are known, when the exercises are arranged in a certain order, constitutes reason. It is not, therefore, a distinct faculty of the mind, but only a process of thought, of the same character with judgment, whose nature is simple apprehension. We need not lumber this discussion with examples to illustrate a process so familiar to every mind. All appropriate arguments, short or long, and on any subject to which argumentation can apply, will furnish examples for analysis. And every analysis inductively made, will but investigate the same process of apprehension.

What is *imagination*? The phenomena of imagination are modified conceptions. We combine and abstract our apprehensions of facts, qualities, and relations, not only as things exist, but in forms and connexions never actually found. This is a process of imagination. We also arrange and combine apprehensions of resemblances, and relations for the illustration and embellishment of subjects, which is also called imagination. Perhaps the only difference between conception and imagination, consists in a more extended combination of apprehensions, or giving, as a whole, liveliness and strength to the latter, which do not necessarily belong to the former.

Any process of imagination may be resolved into conceptions, and these again into simple apprehensions. The same process of analysis directly reduces both, and brings us to the same result. No distinct faculty is developed, no new generic class of phenomena is furnished; it is only a development of the understanding, in some of its most rapid and variously combined operations. A good imagination, therefore, means a readiness of apprehending appropriate relations: and a lively imagination, intends a ready combination of resemblances or contrasts, abstracting and associating, without any regard to existing connexions.

In the same manner attention, abstraction, comparison, habit, and every intellectual process, may be analyzed. Let the combination and arrangement be distinguished, the nature of each exercise be examined by itself, and the class to which it belongs will be easily determined. Such a process of examination conducted throughout, on inductive principles, will be satisfactory and profitable.

There are some phenomena, or combinations of mental exercises, having appropriate names, which belong partly to the intellectual class, and partly to others, because they combine operations differing in their nature. But when they are analyzed, each part of the combination can easily be assigned to its class and appropriate faculty. We shall have occasion to examine some exercises of this description, after we have considered the phenomena of different natures, according to the radical principle of classification. Such are conscience, faith, hope, and several graces of Christianity.

We close this article with some general remarks on the use of the understanding. This faculty constitutes man an intelligent being; it is important to man in all the relations of his nature. The use of

the understanding, expressed in a simple abstract term, is *to know*. Its first development is in the acquisition of knowledge. The same process is repeated again and again, new combinations are formed as the faculty develops, and through man's life on earth, its appropriate employment is to acquire knowledge. From these facts we might infer, that the design of this important faculty is to be forever employed in learning the perfections, works, and government of God. It is an expanding capacity, ever increasing in strength by exercise, and improving in its present brief lodgment, until the organs, which connect it with this world, decay. The intimate and mysterious connexion between the mind and its mortal habitation, must remain to us an inexplicable fact; and how mind can act or know without the intervention of material organs, we cannot explain. But the fact rests not on inference, or our desire of its truth. God, who formed both the spirit and the body, has assured us of the mind's immortality, and its capacity to know and improve, after its release from the mortal habitation. The objects of knowledge are infinitely multiplied, and sufficient to employ this expanding capacity for ever. At present, we know only in part, but how wide, even here, the different degrees of knowledge in infancy and ripened age! But such differences vanish, when we think of the cloudless intelligence of unembodied spirit. The progress of knowledge, when men task their intellectual power to its utmost effort, under comparatively favourable circumstances, seems to us rapid. But, in another view, this is slow improvement, and no investigation is completed. What must be the march of intellect, when no clog shall hang on this continually expanding capacity? In looking abroad through a little portion of the vast expanse, and thinking how little we know, and

how unbounded and sublime the materials of knowledge, we would like to become philosophers with angelick wings, that we might explore the worlds and wonders of creation. Could we thus soar for ages amid the systems of worlds, with the mightiest intellect of man's possession in this life, we should have learned little of the works and ways of God. We might find everlasting employment for all our intellectual efforts in this survey. We must have indefinitely enlarged capacity, even to scan the material worlds. But there are subjects of higher interest to be investigated in the development of redemption. This scheme of grace will doubtless furnish angelick and redeemed minds with objects of intense and ceaseless investigation. These thoughts, which we think are authorized by intimations of revelation, suggest the important use of this intellectual faculty in the present and future life.

F.

(To be continued.)

## PRACTICAL METHODISM.

(Concluded from p. 192.)

But what is, perhaps, the greatest evil of Methodism, is yet to be named. I mean its effect in *begetting improper notions in regard to divine truth*. The influence which our views of divine truth exert on the heart and conscience, is extensive and powerful. In regard to the production of proper religious feeling, our views of truth are every thing. When they are obscure and undefined, there will be a corresponding confusion in our feelings; when rational and luminous, they impart warmth, vigour, and propriety to every holy affection. In this view of the subject, how deplorable the extension which is given to views and notions based on clouds, and borne up by vapours, which vanish into thin air

before the light of reason and Scripture.

Were it not that I resolved, at the commencement, to exclude all doctrinal discussion from these papers, I could easily elucidate what I mean, by a slight glance at some peculiarly erroneous sentiments. I would refer to them, however, merely as to their practical tendency. Among the Methodists there is very much religious irreverence,—arising, no doubt, from their improper views of the character of God. It is impossible to support their creed without derogating from some of the essential attributes of his nature. His sovereignty, omniscience, foreknowledge and unchangeableness, are by implication, set aside; and having lost a just view of his majesty, he can be approached with the less reverence. Hence their boisterous and unmeaning prayers, the great familiarity with which they treat the Most High,—their crude notions on the subject of “getting religion,” and of sinless perfection. They suppose that religion can be obtained and lost at any time—that it consists in a boisterous agitation of the passions—that other means than prayer and the avoidance of temptation, are to be used in overcoming the devil,\*—and that reverence and order in religious worship are the characteristics of coldness and formality. So incorrect are their notions in regard to some truths, and so lax and gross as it regards others, that where Methodism has been to any extent prevalent, it is almost impossible to make a proper impression upon the mind. You can do but little else than look upon, and

\* A man of my acquaintance, a few years since, cried out, in an evening meeting among the Methodists, “brethren, I have got the devil, and will not let him go till I kill him.” He continued fisthing his Satanic Majesty against the wall, for half an hour, whilst the cries of “Amen,” and “Glory to God,” were rising all around him.

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**Religious Communications.**

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LIX.

The next position of our catechism which we are called to consider is this—"Some sins in themselves and by reason of several aggravations, are more heinous in the sight of God than others."

This proposition, you perceive, consists of two parts. It affirms—

I. That some sins in themselves; that is, in their very nature, are more heinous in the sight of God than others.

II. That the guilt or malignity of sin, may be increased by reason of several aggravations.

I do not think that either of these propositions requires any formal proof. Both of them are sanctioned, not only by very numerous and plain declarations of holy scripture, but by the common sense and feeling of mankind. Illustration, then, is all that is necessary in treating on this answer of the catechism—thus

I. In regard to the assertion that some sins in themselves, that is, in their very nature, are more heinous in the sight of God than others, we have only to say—that unqualified blasphemy is a more heinous sin than a minced oath; or that deliberate murder is a greater crime than

a momentary feeling of unjustifiable anger; and every human being, who understands our language, and whose conscience is not perfectly stupified, will immediately assent to the truth of what we affirm. All perceive that blasphemy implies a depth of depravity, a force and strength of horrible impiety, in the blasphemer, that is not indicated by a degree of profaneness which the very act demonstrates, that he who is guilty of it is still afraid of the extreme of the sin which he commits. In like manner, we cannot think without shuddering of that destitution of all moral sensibility, and that infernal vindictiveness, which there must be in the soul of the deliberate murderer; while we regard a flash of unseasonable angry feeling, rather as an infirmity than a crime. Transgressions, therefore, both of the first table of the moral law and of the second—sins against God, and sins against man—are, by the feelings of every person who has any moral sensibility, immediately adjudged to be, in their very nature, of exceedingly different degrees of malignity. Accordingly, this truth is recognised throughout the Bible. To give but a single example: our Saviour represents the sin of Capernaum and Bethsaida, as unquestionably greater than that of Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah.

quarters of a mile through the woods, to the road that I ought to go in. I told them they must put me in the road, or let me and my horse tarry with them. I saw a boy there, not so large as I was, and I told him I would give him what pence I had, which I think were seven, if he would go and put me in the road. About this time, also, the moon arose; and though it rained, yet it was so light that we could see to travel. The boy consented to go, and after being put in the road, I had no more difficulty in finding the way, and I got safe to my mother's house a little after the middle of the night.

I tarried about ten days with my friends and acquaintances at Killingly. I often thought of my solemn promise in the woods, and did not directly seek an opportunity to commit the sin. But every day I was less and less affected with a sense of my being lost in the woods, and the promise I had made: and the day before I was to set out on my journey to Malden, I was led into temptation. A number of circumstances concurred to bring me to the trial, and I endeavoured not at all to keep out of the way of temptation: and when an opportunity offered, I made a free and voluntary attempt to commit the sin, but was unexpectedly prevented and disappointed. After some hours I repeatedly endeavoured it again, but was still prevented, as to the outward action; but in me it was the same as if I had done it: for I did what I could; my will was certainly in the thing; and in the very time of my endeavouring it, my conscience put me in mind of my promise, and checked me: but I hearkened not, stifled conscience, and resolutely complied with temptation, so far as I could: so that in the sight of God I was guilty, and that against light and conscience. The next day I set out on my journey, and returned home to Malden—careless, stupid, and insensible of

my guilt. After my return home, I recollected my promise in the woods, and that one part of it was "that within a week after I returned, I would begin to pray in secret;" but I thought with myself that I had broke one part of the promise, by endeavouring to commit the sin, and the promise being broken, it would be much the same if I neglected to pray; and so concluded that I would not observe that part which respected praying. The truth was, I had no inclination or heart to pray, but felt amazingly stupid and careless. This was my condition till the last night of the week after I returned; that is, the night before the morning, when, according to my promise, I was to begin to pray—On which night I had a remarkable dream.

(To be continued.)

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *Phenomena of Feeling.*

In examining our mental exercises, we find a class which we denominate feelings, or emotions. Much speculation has been excited among philosophers concerning these exercises; some refusing them the distinctive appellation of a class, and denying a generic difference between them and intellectual operations. But apprehensions are so manifestly different from emotions, that we think it unnecessary to state and refute those speculations which assume their identity, or similarity. It is quite sufficient to refer every thinking man to the evidence of his own consciousness. The difference is generic, and therefore properly denotes a distinct class, in which are to be included all mental exercises, which are of the nature of emotion or feeling. However numerous their combinations, and various their modifications, a proper analysis will discover their character and relation.

The truth is, they are not as variously modified as the operations of intellect.

*Mental feeling* is the generic indication; *pleasure and pain* are the two modes of this class. Every mental affection, desire, or passion, will be found to possess the generic distinction, and one or the other of the modal characters; or, as is sometimes the fact, a combination of both. We shall not attempt to follow, establish, or refute the theories of Reid, Stewart, Brown, or Payne, but simply mention a few of the most important phenomena of this class, and give some brief specimens of illustration, as we apprehend the facts. We have mentioned affection, desire, and passion, as names of operations belonging to this class. But these are general terms, which denote the degrees of feeling, and not the kind, mode, or relation of the exercise. The same is true of emotions. In their general, or abstract meaning, we cannot define them, because they are only other names for feelings, and they need no other description than to call them degrees of feeling; and refer every thinking man to his own consciousness for the recognition. *Affection*, without any qualifying term, may indicate any kind, mode, or degree of feeling, in relation to any object. *Desire* is used to express any feeling of anxiety, more or less strong: it follows the simple emotion of pleasure or pain, and may be considered generally as exciting volition. *Passion* denotes a stronger degree of feeling, and in common usage means a sudden, highly excited emotion. The most important distinction to be observed in the use of these general terms, is that between *affection* and *passion*. Those emotions or feelings, which gradually increase and abide, are called *affections*; and those which are suddenly excited, are strong and vivid, and which soon subside, are called *passions*. But in all this

the difference is circumstantial only; the principal difference is in degree.

*Love* is an affection which includes pleasure and desire. It presupposes several things: an object corresponding in its nature and tendency with some propensity, or character of the faculty which feels; and an apprehension of the object, and the quality or character suited to awaken the emotion, are necessarily presupposed. Except what is included in this statement, no reason can be given why we love any object. The pleasure excited may be greater or less in degree; and in proportion to its strength will be the desire to enjoy the object, or promote its good, if it be capable of enjoyment. The specific character of this affection is distinguished by the object, or by its intensity. When the object denominates its character it is easily understood, as self-love, benevolence, friendship, patriotism, complacency, paternal, filial and conjugal love. So, where it is distinguished by the degrees of its intensity, we use various terms, as respect, esteem, attachment and veneration. There is no other method of analysing this affection. It has no ingredients except pleasure and desire; and all its modifications are by its objects, degrees, or some circumstantial relation. Its moral estimate is another matter, hereafter to be considered.

*Hatred* is an emotion directly opposite to that of love. It consists of pain, and desire to avoid or remove the object which awakens the feeling. The analysis is conducted in the same manner as with love, its opposite affection; and is modified by the object, its degree, or circumstantial relation. It is self-abhorrence, and misanthropy, or it is disregard, disesteem and contempt.

The modifications of *pleasure* are numerous; sometimes with strong, and oftentimes with very

slight shades of difference. Take for an example of the former, gladness, joy, delight, and compare them with cheerfulness, contentment, satisfaction, and the difference is readily perceived. But compare satisfaction with contentment, or gladness with joy, the shade of difference is very slight. They are all modifications of the simple emotion of pleasure, connected with less or more strength of desire.

The same method will show the modifications of *pain* to be various in different degrees. The terms grief, regret and melancholy, indicate emotions of pain differently modified in slight shades; while anger, remorse, disgust and revenge, differ widely, in their modifications and relations, from the preceding and from each other. Take any affection or passion, and analyze it by observing its objects, relations, and degree of intensity, then all that will be left will be an emotion of pleasure or pain, and its attendant desire. Let pride and remorse be the examples for illustration.

*Pride* is considered essentially an inordinate self-esteem; it is a high degree of pleasure in one's real or supposed superior excellence, with a desire to make it manifest. Now these ingredients suppose some other exercises of mind beside feeling, but they belong not to its proper description. Intellectual exercises are always presupposed in pride: there is always a high estimate by the mind of its state, qualifications, attainments, or of whatever excites the emotion. This estimate may be just, and yet awaken the emotion properly called pride. But it does not follow that every man who highly estimates his own qualities, attainments or possessions is necessarily, or in fact, influenced by pride. We make these remarks to show that the intellectual process does not belong to pride. Now separate, in the analysis, what belongs to the man-

ner and circumstances of its manifestation, and what belongs to the kindred feelings of haughtiness and overbearing contempt of inferiors, and the definition above will be applicable to all cases.

*Remorse* is a painful feeling which arises from self-accusation, on a retrospection of one's own guilt. It presupposes a perception of the standard by which the character is estimated, and a consciousness of criminality; but the consequent painful feeling is the remorse. There is one emotion presupposed in all cases of remorse: it is an approbation of the rule or standard by which the estimate is made. The desire which belongs to remorse varies with the nature, relations and circumstances of the crime and the criminal. Sometimes it may be for restitution, sometimes self-destruction, sometimes to drown sensibility, and sometimes to seek forgiveness.

The foregoing brief analysis of some phenomena belonging to the class of feeling, is sufficient for the purpose of furnishing a specimen of ascertaining both the nature and the modification of this class. Recurring, now, to a principle already established, that all mental exercises, of the same nature, belong to the same faculty, we propose to make some remarks on the name given to this faculty in the scriptures; and on its uses. This will render the present article both scriptural and practical.

The term which is used in the holy scriptures to designate the faculty of feeling is *heart*. The meaning of this term is an important subject of inquiry. It is used in connexions where it is very necessary to be understood, because great importance is attached to the heart and its operations. Although the term is used in different senses in different passages of the Bible, sometimes figuratively, more or less extended or limited, yet it has an appropriate distinctive meaning,

when applied to the source of moral exercises. We intend not to examine all the different senses in which the term heart is used in the Bible, or in common language; a few only will be sufficient. Its literal and common meaning is, to denote the muscular organ which gives circulation to the blood; one of the primary organs of animal life. It is scarcely necessary to say that we have no reference to this vital organ in our present discussion: as physiologists we might have something to say of the material organ, but as mental philosophers nothing. The term is also used to denote the vital part, and sometimes the inner or hidden part of any thing: with these meanings we have at present no concern. Our only object now is, to remark on some of the meanings of this term as applied to mind. It is here proper to say, that by far the greatest number of the terms applied to mind are borrowed from material things, or have their original and literal application to the properties of matter. But while in this view words are taken from their original and literal meaning, and may be said to be figuratively employed, common usage has so familiarized them to the ear and thoughts, that we scarcely think of any other than the figurative import.

*Heart* is one of the terms, though figurative in the above sense, as applied to mind, which has, from its use, a proper meaning; and when it is applied to the seat or source of affections it is used properly. Thus we read of a good heart, an evil heart, of sorrowful, joyous, hard, proud, tender, faint, and pure hearts. By these and many like uses of the term heart, are meant plainly, the seat of mental feeling; but it would be manifestly improper to substitute the name of any other faculty in the places where heart is thus properly used. We never speak of a sorrowful, or joyous understanding, nor of a hard

or tender will. By a metonymy, heart is used for an affection or passion in many instances, which will readily occur to the reflecting reader as he peruses his Bible. By a different form of the figure, heart is sometimes used for the soul, or mind, with all its faculties, which instances are easily distinguished by the careful reader. These suggestions will be sufficient to show what we think is the true meaning of the term *heart* in the scriptures, and in mental philosophy. We repeat it, that it may not be misunderstood or forgotten—*heart is the faculty of feeling, or seat of affections and passions*, in distinction from the faculties of knowledge and volition.

The heart is a moral faculty, as is evident from the scriptures, and from the nature of the case. Jesus Christ, who proved his divinity by that perfection of the true God, *searching the heart*, declared that from the heart proceeds every evil. (Matt. xv. 18, 19.) The question, what belongs to man of a moral nature, and why is it moral? deserves more full and particular consideration than we shall attempt to give it in this place. In some future article we intend to give the result of a careful examination of this important question. For the present it is enough to say, that the heart is a moral faculty, because it is the seat of praise or blame, good or evil, sin or holiness in man. We shall not deny the depravity or perversion of the other faculties, or their sanctification in the saint, but we mean to say, that the scriptures do represent the heart as the seat of that which is morally good or evil in man. (Matt. xii. 34, 35.) The affections are, therefore, more directly expressive of all moral qualities than perception or volition.

The *heart* is the governing faculty of the mind, and its character determines the character of the man. Men perceive objects of a

physical and moral character, but the mere perception does not produce any action, nor discover character, except the mere fact that they are intellectual beings. Good men and bad men may perceive the same objects—they may see the same evidences of God's power, wisdom and goodness, in his works and providence, but they feel very differently affected in view of the same truths. We can have no doubt that holy angels and fallen spirits feel very differently in view of the same developments of God's plan. The temper of the heart, therefore, gives character to men and angels. It is the *feeling* that governs the conduct. Holy angels act very differently from wicked angels; and wicked men act differently from good men, in their moral relations, and that because they feel differently from each other. The reason is entirely obvious, therefore, why the revelation of God contains such special injunctions to keep the heart, and to direct its exercises towards God and holiness. Its governing influence, and being the source of character, account for the fervent appeals made to men's hearts, in the scriptures of truth.

The *uses* of this faculty have been already, in part, intimated; but we are desirous to add a few thoughts on this suggestion, in the close of this article.

In addition to the intimations already made, we say that one important use of the faculty is to render men *responsible agents*. It is the heart alone, which feels a sense of responsibility; and without a faculty to feel a sense of obligation, no obligation could bind man: he could not be a subject of praise or blame. Here it may, perhaps, be said by some, that men perceive their relations to law, and to God the Lawgiver, that without understanding, man could not be morally bound, and that understanding is, therefore, the faculty connecting

with obligation. But to make this matter plain, let it be observed that all the faculties of *understanding, heart and will*, are necessary to constitute man a moral, accountable agent. No man can be a responsible subject of moral government unless he has a *faculty of knowing* his relations, a *faculty of feeling* the influence of inducement, and a *faculty of action*—that is, he must be a *perceptive, sensitive, voluntary agent*. But after all, some one of these faculties must be more immediately connected with the idea of obligation than the other, and this we think must be the heart. Take another view of the facts in the case. It is moral agency alone that can fit a man for obligation. There must be an internal principle of action, which is itself a moral principle. Man has such a principle of action, and that is the heart, which alone can feel. Without this capability of feeling in man, there could be no action. No motive would influence him, nothing could induce him to seek one object or avoid another. The heart is the spring of action, consequently that on which obligation ultimately rests. Take one more view of the subject. That, which distinguishes good beings from bad, must be of a moral character, belong to the moral faculty, and correspond with, or violate responsibility. That faculty which renders man virtuous or vicious, renders him capable of moral obligation; and the exercise of that principle might be under moral responsibility.

There is another *use* of this faculty which will show that man's moral obligation connects primarily with the heart—it is to render him capable of happiness or misery, susceptible of reward or punishment. A responsible man must be liable to punishment if he violate his obligation, otherwise to reward. But no reward or punishment can be appreciated in prospect, or felt when present, without

a faculty of feeling; this brings us to the same result as before, the heart is the grand qualification for sustaining obligation.

It is evident that the great design of this capacity is that minds may enjoy happiness, and that they should feel obligation to seek their own and promote the happiness of others. There can be no doubt that this heart is capable of *increasing* degrees of happiness or misery. We believe it will be eternally expanding its capacity for enjoyment, if in this life it shall be prepared to enjoy the development of eternal scenes; or if not prepared to delight in those scenes, its capacity for misery will be for ever increasing. The everlasting increase of knowledge will bring along with it an everlasting increase of pleasure or pain. It is not at all wonderful, therefore, that so much importance should be attached to the heart in the scriptures of truth; that God should look upon the heart to ascertain the character; should demand the heart as the primary faculty of obedience, and predicate obligation and ultimate responsibility principally of its character and operations. How elevated, with this capacity fitted for the enjoyment of God, may man become? Bound to the throne of God for ever, by a heart fitted for deriving enjoyment immediately from the perfections, glory and government of the only true God—to know whom is eternal life! But how debased and forlorn in wretchedness, with this capacity unfitted for the enjoyment of God, may man become? Bound to existence by the hand of God, and to his dominion who made him, by an obligation which he perpetually violates, who can estimate the misery of his eternal curse! These thoughts arise from the capability of man's heart to feel, without entering into an estimate of his moral character and relations, any further than the principles of his being necessarily imply them.

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We close this article with a single remark, obviously suggested by the foregoing examination. It is this, a correct knowledge of the *heart*, as a faculty of the mind, is of vast importance in understanding and applying the holy scriptures. Every man who errs in his view of this faculty, will be at fault in the interpretation of many parts of the Bible. If the heart mean a distinct, permanent faculty, consisting of different propensities or aptitudes, then we shall understand and apply the Bible descriptions of its change and influence agreeably to their philological import; but if we understand it to mean exercises only, we must have a new rule of interpretation of many passages, and shall often find difficulty in their application. Illustrations of several principles and facts now suggested, will be given hereafter.

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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

No. II.

Agreeably to an intimation in our last number, we are now to endeavour to show how the majority in the last Assembly came to be what it was. On this point, we have no hesitation in saying, generally, that it was the result of pre-concerted plan and effort. This has been freely admitted by some who helped to form the majority. It was, indeed, openly avowed by a member, on the floor of the house, that he had come to the Assembly for the express purpose of using his influence, with others, for effecting, if possible, two things.—One was, to vindicate Mr. Barnes; and the other, to change the Board of Missions, and put out of office the Corresponding Secretary and General Agent of that Board. His errand, without doubt, was the same with that of many others; and we think, that without any constrained

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

SEPTEMBER, 1831.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LIX.

It is a solemn and alarming truth which is expressed in the proposition of our Catechism, to which your attention is now invited; namely, that "Every sin, deserveth God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come."

Perhaps you are ready, my young friends, to object to the doctrine which is here propounded, as inconsistent with equity, and irreconcilable of course with the divine attribute of justice. A careful attention to the subject, however, will, I am persuaded, satisfy you that no other proper answer could be made to the question "What doth every sin deserve?" than that which is given in the catechism. A principal design of the answer doubtless was, to oppose the absurd and dangerous distinction which is made in the Romish church, between some sins which, in that church, are represented as *venial*, and others that are denominated *mortal*.

By *mortal* sins, the Romanists understand those which they admit subject the parties committing them to the penalty of *death*—even death eternal. But there is, according to them, another class of sins which they

call *venial*, and which do not subject those who commit them to such an awful penalty—sins which are in their nature so small and trivial, that they may be expiated by *penance*, or by some other mode of making satisfaction for them by the offenders.\* We believe that this distinction, in regard to the *nature* of different kinds of sin, is not warranted either by reason or scripture, but directly opposed by both. All sin, by the verdict both of reason and scripture, is an evil of the *same kind*, however differing in degrees. We can give no other just definition of this evil, than that which is given in the sacred oracles—"Sin is the transgression of the law"—and of course—"where there is no law, there is no transgression"—no sin. What

\* "The Romanists mention three kinds of venial sins—*Some* which are in their nature really bad, as an *idle word*, *excessive laughter*. *Others*, which are not voluntary, as the first motions of anger, or of envy, which occur by surprise. *Others*, which are so small that they scarce claim attention, as the purloining of a *denier*"—[The twelfth part of a French penny.]—*Pictet Theol. B. vii. c. 9. Note.*

Pictet also remarks, that the term *venial* was applied to sin by the Protestant Reformers, but in a totally different sense from its use by the Romanists. The Reformers used it to denote those sins which are pardonable, and which are actually forgiven to believers in Christ—thus distinguishing these from the unpardonable sin, or the sin unto death.

I took of my case became, by custom, less pungent and affecting. By degrees I began to have a little hope that I might not have committed the unpardonable sin; but there was no particular thing that made me hope. Sometimes, for encouragement, I thought it was only a dream, and dreams were not absolutely to be depended upon: but it would return upon me that I knew the dream was according to my case, and this would cut me like a knife. After this I never lost a sense of my guilt, so as to omit praying in secret twice a day, on any account. Nor did I, after this, ever allow myself in any thing that I knew to be a sin. My concern was never so great as to prevent my daily business; and in about a month or six weeks after this dream I went to a grammar school, and began to learn Latin, which was in December, 1738.

(To be continued.)

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

##### *Phenomena of Volition.*

The class of exercises denominated volition, is very simple, and but little diversified. It will, however, be requisite to examine, with some degree of care and at length, several questions concerning this class, which will often be referred to in the application we intend to make of the doctrine.

The nature of the exercises constituting this class is *voluntary exertion*, or to use the very familiar term which is sufficiently understood, we call it *willing*. The terms used to denote the operations of this class are not so numerous, and the exercises are not so much diversified as those of intelligence and feeling. The modifications of volition are only two, and those are very simple, viz. *choosing* and *refusing*, or *willing* and *nilling*, to use an old fashioned word which

sounds awkwardly to us from its disuse. Whatever is voluntary belongs to this class, and nothing else can belong to it. The exercise is so simple and so uniform that no further description is necessary, in order to direct every mind inductively to ascertain the facts in his own experience.

There is, however, a question of importance to be examined, which relates to the classification; and which will involve some further description of the operations. Some have denied that there is any generic difference between what we call feelings and volitions. As far as we know, or now recollect, the majority of writers on mental science have classed together all the emotions and voluntary exertions of mind. They have entirely overlooked the difference in their nature, and the distinction in their faculties. A very simple account of this matter seems to us like the following; viz. The mind *apprehends* an object—*feels* pleased or displeased—then *chooses* or *refuses* it. Here the volition differs essentially from apprehension, and is not less different and distinct from feeling. All the exercises are connected together and relate to the same object, which must be perceived in order to excite pleasure or pain; and an emotion, either pleasing or displeasing, must be awakened, or no volition will exist. In the concatenation of these exercises each one has its distinctive character; and we must not substitute one for another, nor confound them as if they were parts of one and the same operation. Volitions have nothing in them of the nature of pleasure or pain. Those feelings may attend, precede and follow the elective operation; but they are readily distinguished, by every observing mind, in their true character, and according to their appropriate classification. At different times and under different circumstances the same voluntary exertion is attended

with opposite feelings. Objects, which are painful, are often chosen, and those which are agreeable, are often refused, whereas it could not be thus, if volition and feeling were identical. The facts to which we here allude are so plain and certain that none can doubt them; and they prove incontestably that there is a distinction, in the nature of these exercises, between feeling and choice. The full explanation of the facts, just alluded to, must be reserved for another place, when we discuss the doctrine of ultimate and subordinate objects of choice, which should be well understood in the illustrations of mental science.

We here make a passing remark, because it is needful to illustrate the distinction between pleasure and choice, pain and refusing, that ultimate objects are always chosen because they are agreeable; but subordinate objects are often disagreeable, although voluntarily chosen. Take a familiar example in the case of a sick man; he chooses health because he loves it, and nauseous medicine, for the sake of health. It will be obvious that health is an ultimate object, and medicine subordinate. This explains a common fact in the phenomena of volition, while it proves most conclusively the difference between feeling and choosing.

Voluntary exertions are sometimes described by different names, because they are so combined with other mental exercises that willing is the most prominent. Such are determination, decision and resolution. But commonly the relations of our volitions are denoted by associating the name of the object; and few qualifying terms are used to describe the acts of choosing or refusing. Sometimes we say a wise, a prompt, hesitating, obstinate, or final choice; but very seldom do we employ adjuncts with the names of volition, which are expressive of moral quality. Moral qualities are predicated of the ob-

jects and motives of choice, but seldom of choice itself. We make these remarks to show how simple and undiversified are the operations belonging to this class, and how readily they are distinguished from the affections, with which moral qualities are constantly associated. We do not mean to assert that there is no moral quality in the act of volition; a wrong employment of any faculty produces a wrong action. But the seat of praise and blame, right and wrong, is not the volition, and its moral quality is always relative.

We are now prepared to say that all volitions belong exclusively to the *will*, which is a distinct faculty. According to the principle of classification by which we distinguish mental operations, the inference is conclusive; and as we have before said, there must be some aptitude in the mind, distinctive and permanent, whose character is precisely developed by each class of operations. This permanent aptitude, which is now the subject of inquiry, we call the faculty of *will*, whose appropriate development is volition. No other character ever belongs to simple exercises of *will*. This faculty never feels, nor perceives, but simply acts.

An important inquiry here presents itself to our view, and demands attentive examination, viz. What are the laws of volition; or, in other words, does the *will* act according to any known rule? The true answer to this question, inductively ascertained, will be of great service in other investigations of mental science, and in the estimation of human character. The laws of human action are obviously of great importance, and yet they are variously understood and explained by different persons: hence much of the confusion and uncertainty in mental philosophy. There has been much controversy on this question from the earliest attention to mental science. The great dis-

pute concerning the freedom of the will has been one of deep interest to the cause of truth, and its decision has an influence on the rules and results of biblical interpretation.

Some have told us that the will possesses, inherently, a self-determining power; and that such an ability is necessary to freedom and responsibility. But we think such a supposition impossible, as President Edwards has conclusively shown in his treatise on the "Freedom of the Will." We mean not to advocate all the statements and arguments of the work alluded to, because we verily believe some of them erroneous; but in reference to this single point, which was the president's main object in writing the above treatise, he has satisfactorily shown that the will cannot determine itself. Without entering, at present, into the discussion of the doctrine of freedom, whether moral or external, we here observe that it cannot belong to any one faculty, but to the mind, considered as the agent, in the employment of its capabilities. All we wish here to say is, that no such self-determining power can belong to will, because the supposition contravenes the laws of volition as inductively ascertained. Edwards recognised this fact, when he said, "the will was always as is the greatest apparent good." This statement is substantially true, but we do not like the form of expression, because it is not sufficiently definite, and may be liable to misconstruction. To state the matter clearly, let it be observed that volition always supposes an object chosen or refused—the object chosen is, on some account, agreeable; and the object refused, for some reason, disagreeable—the volition is always governed by the affection of the heart. Previously to choice there must be an object, apprehension, and feeling; and the election is just according to the character of that feeling.

We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the will is always governed by the affections; and can never act contrary to them. Take another illustration or statement of the same fact; the heart is the spring or source of action or choice; the ultimate object is the excitement, and pleasure is the motive. This every man will find to be the uniform law of his volition: and this is the reason why a man's choice is considered the index of his character. If it were otherwise, we should have no rule of ascertaining human character. If the objects, which a man chooses for their own sake, were not chosen because they are agreeable to the temper of his heart, or affection, we should have no means to ascertain the character of the heart. The doctrine of motive will require some discussion, when we shall attend to that of ultimate and subordinate objects. But lest it should be thought by some, that we are advocating a scheme of selfishness when we say the motive is pleasure, it may be proper to observe here, that we speak of motive in this place, not as applicable to the object chosen, or pursued, but exclusively to the pleasure which the object excites, or is expected to excite. In this statement, it will be perceived that the object, and not the motive, determines the selfishness or benevolence of the feelings and the actions. The rule, therefore, by which the will acts, is known and uniform; the will is always governed by the feelings, and cannot act otherwise. Whatever inconsistency may appear in the conduct of any man's will, in reference to the same objects, at different times, that inconsistency must be traced to the feelings of the heart, which are often influenced by a change of circumstances and prospects. Whether objects shall please or displease us, depends not on volition, but on the nature of the object or its relation; but whether we shall choose them or not, depends

on our pleasure. If every object were chosen only for its own sake, we should never choose a disagreeable object; but since we choose some objects for the sake of others with which they are inseparably connected, it may be our pleasure, in such cases, to choose subordinatedly those which give us pain. Take an illustration of this remark in the case of a good man, who visits and relieves his friend in distress. He is pained at the distress of his friend, and all his sympathies, which are excited, are painful. He would not visit or sympathize with him for the sake of the pain, but he chooses the painful intercourse for the sake of that which is agreeable to him, the relief and happiness of his friend. Take another illustration from the case of the convinced sinner, who is alarmed at the view of his danger, but has not submitted his heart to God. He is told, and he accredits the statement, that he must trust in Christ or be lost for ever: With this view of his danger, and the only method of salvation before him, he will choose any thing that he believes will interpose for his safety. He will choose Christ and coming to him, for the sake of escaping hell, while he has no love to him or his method of salvation. Show him any other way of deliverance, and he will manifest his hatred to Christ, by refusing him and all that pertains to his method of eternal salvation. Thus it is to be feared that many awakened sinners choose to come to Christ, and never do come. But this will more fully appear, when we discuss the doctrine of ultimate and subordinate objects and motives.

The question now arises, what are the uses of this faculty of volition? The first use of the will which we mention is, to render men active. We speak more particularly of bodily action. The will moves the body, and directly regulates the greater part of its motions.

We say the greater part, because there are some motions of the body which are wholly involuntary, such as digestion of food and the circulation of the blood. These, and some other motions which are constant or occasional, depend not at all upon volition. But the ordinary movements of the hands, feet, tongue, &c. are the effect of will and under its control. All effects which are under the direction of the will are called voluntary motions, or the result of voluntary exertion. What constitutes the connexion between the will and the effects which follow its volitions, we are not able to discover. It is to be resolved into the constitution of God. Our Maker has seen fit, in a way which we cannot comprehend, to connect the motion of the hand, walking, &c. with the will, but not with other things which, for aught that we can see, might just as easily have been connected with the will, if God had seen fit. The facts, and the laws of those facts, and not the reasons of them, are the subjects of inquiry. God has formed and sustains this connexion in ordinary cases, but sometimes it is broken, as in the case of a paralytic, where neither the hand nor the foot obeys the volition: and force can overcome the influence of the will. Here it seems proper to remark, in passing, that from this connexion between volition and effect we get the idea of power. Wherever this connexion exists we say there is power to produce the effects, and where it does not exist there is not power.

Another use of the will is to direct the employment of the understanding. We can direct our thoughts and investigations from one subject to another, for the acquisition of knowledge, and attaining the objects of desire. Our apprehensions and perceptions do not depend on the will, except so far as the direction from one object to another, and the fixedness of attention necessary for greater distinct-

ness, are concerned. It does not depend on the will whether we perceive the difference between a square, circle and triangle, but it may depend on the will whether we understand the properties of each, so as to be able to describe all the points of difference. It does not depend on the will whether we perceive the difference between truth and error, but it may depend on the will whether we discover truth under certain circumstances of obscurity and difficulty.

Another use of the will is to manifest the character of the heart. It is through the medium of the will as the servant of the heart, that we become acquainted with each other's characters. We judge of men by their external actions; in doing this, we proceed upon the principle that those actions are voluntary, and that they express the feelings of the heart. Through the operations of this faculty, we learn how we ought to treat others with whom we have intercourse, and give others to understand how they should treat us; all that we do in this world for the melioration of man's condition, is through its agency. Every enterprise of good or evil, of benevolence or wickedness, is under the conduct of the will, and shows the disposition of the heart. The affections are in no case under the control of the will, except so far as directing the understanding to the investigation of truth, or objects calculated to affect the heart, the will may *indirectly* exert an influence over the feelings; but as we have before stated, it does not depend on the will, whether we shall be pleased or displeased with any given object. Volition cannot change the heart: the will cannot bring the carnal heart under subjection to God's law, nor turn it to love Christ. It must be, according to the gospel, the medium by which the heart displays itself. The understanding is the medium by which objects affect the heart,

and the will is that by which the affections are manifested, and objects attained for the heart's gratification.

The will is also necessary in performing the duties enjoined by the second table of the law; indeed all the duties of an external character, and those which pertain to the government and direction of the understanding, involve the agency of the will. There is an obvious distinction between those commands which respect the heart and its affections exclusively, and those which respect other mental exercises and external actions. In the former there is no agency of the will, except in the indirect influence before stated. The heart loves or hates in obedience to another law, not the will. But in every other duty, the volitions are essential. In searching the Scriptures, prayer, observing the Sabbath, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, sending the gospel to the destitute, and doing good to all men as we have opportunity, the agency of the will, as well as the affections of the heart, is involved. A destitution of this faculty, would be a want of physical qualification to obey the commands of God which respect human conduct.

What will be the use of this faculty after the soul is separated from the body, we are not distinctly informed; but even in this inquiry we can apply, to a certain extent, the principles of induction. We are furnished in the revelation of God, with information concerning the employments of redeemed souls in heaven, which communications, fairly and on philological principles interpreted, are to be taken as facts. From these facts it will be easily perceived, that the will is to be employed in praise, however that may be expressed, in doing the will of God, and in conveying the spirit wherever it is to be sent. What missions of good the souls of the redeemed are to execute in heaven, or in any part

of God's universe, we do not know, and therefore we say not in what agencies this faculty may be employed. How spirits communicate with kindred spirits, we do not know and do not affirm; but for aught that we can say, there may be use for volition. When the bodies shall be raised and reunited to their spirits, it is likely they will be under the control of the wills which have before controlled them. In heaven, we may suppose that this faculty will be employed to bring every power into holy subjection to heavenly laws and principles. In the world of misery, we affirm not the precise agency of the will; but we can conceive of its employment to execute a torturing influence upon the associates in misery, as well as in uttering blasphemies against God and all that is good. It would seem as if there would be a restraint upon this faculty, as there always is in confinement; and that while in the voluntary expression of the heart's malignity, the will shall not be employed, as here on earth, to procure the heart's gratification. Its instrumentality will be self-infliction of misery upon the soul for ever. In this case, therefore the use of will is fearful beyond description; to blaspheme God, self-infliction of torture, and a malignant agency in augmenting the wretchedness of associates in misery. But in heavenly blessedness and glory, its employment will be desirable, elevated and dignifying, beyond expression.

In concluding this article let it be observed, that we know of no phenomena of mental exercises, incapable of being classed according to the principles we have recognised, in one or the other of these three—*apprehending, feeling, willing*. We may make secondary and sub-classes, but all mental phenomena belong to those three; and the faculties of *understanding, heart and will*, are sufficient to account for all mental exercises and

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actions. These constitute man a complete moral being, and qualify him to be a moral agent. By these he is qualified to be placed under responsibility, and made accountable to God for all his character. By these he is qualified to be employed, under all the weight of obligation, in effecting the purposes of God, and promoting his declarative glory. By these faculties he is qualified to receive his Maker's law, to feel responsible, to act with reference to the judgment to come, and according to the moral estimate of his character, to be rewarded or punished. What more is necessary to constitute man a proper subject of moral government? We answer nothing. F.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

No. III.

The presiding individual of a large deliberative body—whether the individual be denominated president, speaker, chairman, or moderator—has always a difficult office to perform; and for this reason his official acts ought certainly to be viewed with some indulgence, and to receive, so far as they will fairly admit of it, a favourable construction. On this principle, as well as because small errors, left uncorrected, are a less evil than much delay and frequent interruption in business, appeals from the chair to the house are seldom sustained in deliberative assemblies, except where there is palpable evidence of error, or partiality.

In cases, moreover, in which parties confessedly exist, and are in ardent conflict with each other, a presiding officer is always expected to favour, in some measure, the views of the party by whom he has been elected to office. It is understood that he has been chosen for this purpose, and there would be disappointment on all sides, if he

THE

# CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

OCTOBER, 1831.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LX.

Having shown in the last lecture what every sin deserves, we are now to consider, that "to escape the wrath and curse of God due to us for sin, God requireth of us faith in Jesus Christ, repentance unto life, with a diligent use of all the outward means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption."—Much that is contained in this answer of our Catechism, we shall have occasion to treat of hereafter under separate propositions, which therefore we shall endeavour not to anticipate. Several ideas of importance, however, which appropriately belong to the position now before us, will demand your present attention—

1. The first is, that there is an "escape," which may be made from the wrath and curse of God. It is too little recollected, that for the possibility of such an escape we are entirely indebted to the sovereign grace and mercy of the Deity. You know that for the angels "who kept not their first estate," no way of escape was provided or possible—they were immediately consigned to unavoidable, hopeless, and endless perdition: and God was under no obligation to deal in a different manner with our fallen race. He

would have done us no injustice, if he had treated us just as he did "the angels that sinned." But in his boundless love and compassion, he has provided for us a Saviour, and through him a way of escape.

Farther—The very word *escape*, suggests two other important ideas. One is, that this word is never applied to any but to those who are in a state of *peril* or *danger*. We have seen in what an awfully perilous condition man was placed by his original apostacy, and how the divine benevolence has opened a way of deliverance. But it is not enough that the way should be opened—it must be used; it must be entered and pursued, till it leads to a refuge of perfect safety. Every unregenerate sinner is still in a state of the most awful peril. Believe it, beloved youth, if any one of you who is not yet reconciled to God through Jesus Christ should have his eyes opened at once, to see all the danger of his condition, it would make him tremble. Awakened sinners, who get only an imperfect view of their fearful condition, do often tremble; and the only reason why any wonder that they do so is, because they themselves are blind.

The other idea suggested by the word *escape* is, a *flight* from the impending evil. He who escapes *hastens* away, with all possible speed, from the peril which threatens to destroy him. Now this inti-

what he said, nor did I much attend to it—my own case was enough for me. But I thought it rational and probable that every one who came from the sermon was affected in that manner; and I was much surprised, when I returned to my room, to hear my room-mate ask me where I had been, and that he should appear in all respects as unaffected and unconcerned as usual—which I thought next to impossible for any one to be—In my retirement I had a great sense of the evil of sin,—of my own sin—heart sin—nature sin—and of the justice of God in damning sinners. It appeared fit and proper, and even necessary. I condemned myself ten thousand times over—I had such a sense of God's infinite greatness and goodness, holiness and excellence, and of the creature's littleness and meanness, that no punishment appeared too great for the sin of such vile creatures against such a God. I thought my lying in hell to all eternity would be little, very little, for such a vile wretch as I was, to bear for sin. I could not form any conception of any punishment, that would be any way adequate to the desert of such a monster as a sinner against such a God as Jehovah is, and then appeared to me to be. I past ten thousand sentences of damnation against myself, with all possible freedom. I could find no words that would suitably express the desert, or deserved punishment of sin. It appeared to me infinitely fit that God should be glorified—glorified by all creatures; and that it would be but little for a sinner to be damned to all eternity for the glory of God. I thought that my eternal suffering would be little, compared with the glory of God's justice that might be by it. My thoughts would run in this manner—the reasonableness or propriety of such thoughts I did not then consider—they came spontaneously, and I could not well help indulging them. Nothing of this kind, as I

remember, was said or offered in any sermon of Mr. Tennent that I heard, or heard of.”\*

(To be continued.)

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

##### *Phenomena of Conscience.*

Having examined three classes of mental phenomena, and ascertained that they belong to three different faculties, which are entirely sufficient to account for all mental exercises, it remains to examine some combinations, including certain operations of two or more faculties. We begin with *Conscience*, which has been differently explained.

The important influence of conscience on human character and conduct renders it necessary to understand what it means, and its appropriate place in mental science. Perhaps no phenomena of mind have been more variously explained than those of conscience. We have been told it is the monitor of God in the human mind—heaven's vicegerent—a remnant of goodness which escaped the ruins of the fall in our progenitor—a distinct faculty by whose agency all moral actions are controlled, and we know not how many other theories have been published on this subject. It is not our intention now to examine

\* It will afterwards appear that the subject of this sketch was no advocate for a person's being willing to be damned for the glory of God—He saw, what it is wonderful that all who think on the subject do not see—that a state of damnation is not only a state of suffering, but of the most awful, and incessant, and endless rebellion and blasphemy against God. There is surely a wide difference between seeing what our sins deserve and justifying the sentence of condemnation, and being willing to have that sentence executed, when the most fearful part of it is, that the guilty shall for ever continue to do that which makes them guilty; and when there is a method of deliverance both from sin and punishment.—EDIT.

those theories in detail, to refute or establish them. There is one question involved in the investigation which must be more particularly examined and answered, viz. is conscience a distinct faculty of the mind? We ask this question distinctly and examine it, because the affirmative has been maintained with much plausible acuteness, and by respectable names. In this inquiry no authority can be acknowledged unless supported by facts, ascertained on the principles of induction. Nor can we yield to arguments, however acute, which are derived from theories or speculations. We must have facts well ascertained, and their laws of occurrence distinctly pointed out in all solutions of mental phenomena, before we can yield our assent.

Before describing the operations in question, we dispose of this inquiry by recurring to the principle of classification already established, by which we ascertain the distinction and character of mental faculties. So far as we are able to ascertain there is no distinct class of mental exercises differing in their nature from apprehension, feeling and volition. These have been shown to be distinct, and to prove distinct faculties. But in the range of our discovery there is no evidence of another faculty distinct from *understanding, heart and will*. So long as we adhere to the principle of classification which assigns all mental operations of the *same nature* to the same class, we shall have no difficulty in saying that conscience is not a distinct faculty and that there are no evidences of more than the three already described. On this point it is enough to deny the existence of another faculty, and show that the true principle of classification sets aside all pretended evidence of its existence. There is, it is true, a phraseology on this subject, which would seem to imply a faculty of conscience: We say, conscience ap-

proves or condemns, estimates the morality of conduct, and the like. But the same is true of judgment, reason and affection, all which are known to be mental operations, not faculties. We need not stop here to explain the customary phraseology which, although figurative, has become so familiar that we overlook the metaphor. The direct explanation of conscience will present, in the analysis, a full refutation of all the arguments and hypotheses which are intended to prove it to be a distinct faculty.

Taking the principle of classification before illustrated as our guide; what is the character of that which we call conscience? We answer, it is *apprehension and feeling*; nothing more. There are some things presupposed and necessarily implied in the operations of conscience, which require to be explained in order fully to understand the phenomena and their analysis. Conscience always respects one's own feelings and actions, their moral relations and estimate. The moral qualities of our own conduct are the appropriate objects of the operations called conscience. The *rule* by which the morality is estimated, must always be taken into account in the analysis of these phenomena. There is a *rule* of estimation—a *consciousness* of our own conduct—an *intellectual apprehension* of the agreement or disagreement of our conduct with the rule—and the consequent *approbation or disapprobation*, which is a mode of feeling; either pleasure or pain. We are not able to find any thing more in the analysis.

But this needs some further explanation, in its several parts. The *rule* by which we ascertain the moral estimate of our conduct should be perfect, obvious and uniform; otherwise there may be doubt and great diversity in the estimate. Such a rule God has furnished in the revelation of his will; one that is definite, plain and perfect. Who-

ever adopts this, as the rule of estimating his own character and honestly applies it in all cases, will not essentially err. Very few, however, if any do this. Most minds adopt a rule, which they have received by education, from the customs of society, or from some favourite course of speculation. It is seldom the result of reflection or careful examination into the origin, character or authority of its provisions; but is adopted without notice, not at once, but by degrees. The rule may never have been expressed in words, or written in a book; and yet it may be as efficient in its application as though it had been engraved on a tablet of stone. To give it efficiency the rule must be familiar to the mind, and distinctly apprehended, that we may readily know the result of comparison when our conduct is brought to the test.

As to the consciousness of our own conduct, we have already explained this act of the mind, and its necessity in the operations called conscience will be perfectly manifest from a slight examination. It is entirely plain that conscience can not relate to those things of which we have no knowledge or consciousness. We must, therefore, have a consciousness of the feelings or conduct which are to be compared with the apprehended rule. Here it may be proper to say that our conduct is morally right or wrong, good or evil, independently of our estimate. We of course mean not to include those actions which have no perceptible relation to the standard of right, the perfections of God. Breathing, walking, and in general all those actions which indicate no development of the heart or affections, which will not distinguish good men from bad, have not in themselves or in their relations any moral quality. But these are exceptions to the general rule of estimating the conduct of responsible beings. The general principle is

this, that the conduct of responsible agents has a moral character, and must be right or wrong. This estimation is ascertained by comparing our actions with the rule of right. By this comparison we know the character of our conduct and judge of actions. Here is the intellectual apprehension of the agreement or disagreement of our actions with the rule of right, which is the most essential operation in the process called conscience. The only remaining operation in the process is the feeling consequent upon the discovery of moral character. Strictly and technically speaking, conscience is no more than an apprehension of the right or wrong of our conduct, according to the rule of the mind's adoption; but use has given the term a more extended meaning, so as to include the feeling of approbation, or compunction, connected with the apprehension. We object not to this acquired meaning of the term; it is convenient and appropriate. But we think this fact has misled some to consider conscience a distinct faculty. It has also led to a phraseology that seems to justify the same opinion; thus we say, conscience condemns or justifies, accuses or acquits. But when we analyze the process we find it to consist of apprehension and feeling. To express the same thought in another form, conscience is judging of our conduct, and the pleasure or pain which follows. We sometimes speak principally of the intellectual exercise, and sometimes principally of the feeling, which may also have led some to consider conscience a faculty of which these are the operations. This impression will also be readily removed by a careful analysis of the facts as they occur in the mind. Another cause of mistake on this subject is, that an apprehension of right in one's own conduct gives more lively and lasting pleasure than any perception of abstract truth. This consideration

has led some to suppose there is a distinction in the nature of those exercises called judgment and conscience; but let the analysis be carefully made, and the only difference will be found in the objects of the exercises, and the degree of pleasure or pain following them. Any further discussion of this particular is deemed unnecessary in this place. The principles and hints contained in the foregoing analysis are sufficient for our present purposes.

There are now a few practical questions on the *use* and *influence* of conscience, which require some attention. The first which occurs is, whether it is always a right rule or sure guide of conduct? The principles involved in the true answer to this question have already been recognised. It is settled on the correctness or incorrectness of the rule, by which the mind estimates conduct and feelings—and on the distinctness or indistinctness of the apprehension. If the rule of judging be right, and the apprehension of the agreement or disagreement be distinct and clear, the judgment will be according to truth and righteousness. In such case no man can be justified in violating the dictates of his conscience. But if the rule which the mind has adopted be wrong, and the apprehension be ever so distinct, the decision will be wrong; or if the rule be right and the apprehension be obscure or mistaken, the decision may be wrong. The question may, therefore, assume an inductive form: Do men's minds always adopt a right rule of estimating the morality of their conduct? Facts settle this question incontrovertibly in the negative. Nothing is more certain or clearly ascertained than the fact, that those rules are indefinitely multiplied and diversified: often they are directly opposed to each other, in principle and practical application. It is impossible that all should be right. If

they were all supposed to be right, every distinction between right and wrong would be set aside. Filial kindness and parricide, on such a principle, would be equally innocent. The truth is, that the only unexceptionable rule of judging is the word of God, revealing his perfections as the holy standard of right for all moral beings in the universe. That mind, which adopts this rule of judging, has a right, and that mind which adopts another diverse from it, has a wrong standard of estimation. The one will do right when he follows the dictates of his conscience, and the other will do wrong. All that has been said by many about sincerely obeying one's own conscience, amounts to nothing in determining a man's true character, until his rule of judging is known and estimated by the only unerring standard. The Christian sincerely follows the dictates of his conscience, in cherishing with tenderness his offspring; the worshipper of Juggernaut follows sincerely the dictates of his conscience, in offering his child a sacrifice to the ghastly idol. Multitudes of illustrations will readily occur to every thinking mind, to show that conscience cannot be a sure guide in moral estimates of heart or conduct.

Another question, which claims some attention is, why do men adopt such different standards, by which to estimate the moral character of their conduct? On the supposition of a moral sense, or distinct faculty, of which this judging is the appropriate exercise, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to account for the fact. The fact is, however, certain, and we think the analysis here given, furnishes the solution. Men adopt rules of estimating their conduct which accord as nearly as possible with the propensities of their hearts. These are exceedingly various, and are excited, strengthened or diminished by circumstances of edu-

cation, and by many adventitious things. If it be admitted that originally man had but one rule of judging and no disposition to seek any other, the depraved principles of his fallen nature will account for the diversity. On the admitted fact of man's fallen state, we place the solution. The process we need not trace in its details, or inquire how the different systems of religion and moral standards first originated; they may all be ascribed to the fallen principle of man's nature, under the influence of which "he has sought out many inventions." On this ground it is perfectly easy to perceive, that men will be inclined to vary and lower the standard of estimation, whenever they can persuade themselves that it is within their province to adopt their own rules. And what is obvious, on principle, is fully illustrated by facts. Education, custom, aversion to what is good, and a constitutional propensity to avoid painful feelings, are sufficient to account for the diversity of standards, in different minds and at different times in the same minds.

There are some phrases in common use, the explanation of which properly belongs to this description. The phrases to which we allude are those that connect such qualifying terms as *enlightened* and *stupid*, *tender* and *seared*, *good* and *defiled*, with conscience. An *enlightened* conscience indicates an enlarged apprehension of moral principle, a ready comparison of conduct with the standard of right, and an accurate discrimination of one's own actions. It refers more particularly to the intellectual exercise, than to the feelings of the heart. An *enlightened* mind intends the acquisition of extensive knowledge; an *enlightened* astronomer, mathematician or theologian, means one skilled in those branches of knowledge. So an *enlightened* conscience, referring us to the operations of the

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understanding in estimating the moral character of our own actions, means an extensive knowledge of the rules by which the estimation is made, and skill in applying them.

A *stupid* conscience is just the reverse of the former. Without knowledge of the correct rule of estimate, or without skill in its application, no man's conscience will exert much influence over his life. Arguments and appeals to the conscience, or estimates of his conduct, will avail nothing with his stupidified mind.

A *tender* conscience refers us to the feelings of the heart, and denotes a sensibility, easily excited by an apprehension of the agreement or disagreement of conduct with the rule of judging. Some minds seem to have, by nature, much more delicate sensibility of feeling than others; which is discoverable in childhood. The influence of early education, improves or diminishes this susceptibility in view of right and wrong in conduct. A habit of carefully observing the conduct, and regulating it according to the rule adopted, will increase the susceptibility of feeling which constitutes the tenderness of conscience.

In the opposite course, a habit of disregarding the decisions of conscience, diminishes not only the readiness of apprehension, but the susceptibility; and by neglecting to compare the conduct with the rule, the sensibility is blunted and the influence destroyed. This explains what is meant by a callous or *seared* conscience. Having been, for a long time, neglected or denied its proper influence, it sleeps, or in other words, the heart loses its sensibility, and becomes indifferent to right and wrong. Other propensities of the heart may be cherished and strengthened; some of them may be even of a delicate, susceptible character, while this is blunted and

its character well described in the phrases being "seared as with a hot iron," "being past feeling, and hardened through the deceitfulness of sin."

A *good* conscience denotes the adoption of the right rule, a readiness to apprehend the agreement or disagreement of conduct with it, and a constant, uniform regulation of feelings, words and actions, according to the rule. This is what the apostle sought to preserve when he exercised himself, "to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and man."

The principal thing intended directly by a *good* conscience is, uniform obedience to its enlightened dictates, but it implies all that belongs specifically to an enlightened and tender conscience.

A *defiled* or *evil* conscience is the reverse of one that is good, and denotes the adoption of a wrong rule, a blindness of apprehension, or a callousness of feeling: either will produce an evil conscience. There is one thought more, which may sometimes be intended by an evil conscience, that is a sickly feeling that leads to a wrong application of the rule, which in itself may be right. Any thing, in short, which distorts the apprehension, or perverts the sensibility to moral character, may produce an evil conscience.

A general remark should here be made, on the influence of habit and education in forming and improving the apprehension and sensibility of the mind in relation to morals. The facility and readiness with which the mind apprehends any relations are greatly improved by a habit of discrimination, and injured by neglect. Every student must be aware of the influence which habit gives to his mind in fixing the attention, in the investigation of exact science, and in associating numbers or facts. It induces a discipline of intellect, that makes things easy which were before extremely difficult. Not unlike this is the

influence of habit upon the readiness, distinctness and accuracy of the mind, in apprehending the relations of conduct to the rule of right. A habit of carelessness often produces a sleeping conscience, and a habit of strict attention a wakeful, influential one.

Sometimes another effect of habit is seen in its influence upon the heart. By neglecting the compunctions of conscience, the sensibility to error and sin becomes deadened, and the heart is hardened in sin, although the apprehension of wrong may be present. The understanding may make a righteous decision, but the heart be too callous to feel. This state of mind is always acquired by degrees, from sinful indulgences, and never at once by any individual.

Sometimes men have great sensibility, and they are very conscientious to avoid some things which are wrong, while, in regard to other things, even more sinful, they have no sensibility at all. This fact may be accounted for in one of two ways; either the rule adopted is defective, and so the fault is principally in the understanding; or the feelings are perverted by the deadening influence of sinful indulgence, and so the fault is principally in the heart. The association of thought and feeling, in some things, has been broken up by the habit, but in other things it remains unbroken.

The whole discussion shows the importance of early education, in the true principles of sound morals and pure religion. The mere acquisitions of science, arts and business talent, however valuable in their place, have vastly less influence in the formation of character, than moral principles and religious doctrines. Every child must adopt, as he grows up, some rules of estimating his own conduct; to avoid it is impossible, from the very constitution of his mind. To estimate the relations of things in the coa-

stant and almost exclusive employment of his mind, the relations of his own conduct to the objects sought, are the most prominent and important to be estimated. To bring these suggestions to their proper bearing, which to some may seem not very obvious, it must be recollected that happiness is the great object of every man's pursuit, and that the relations of conduct to that object involve moral principles, so that every man must estimate his own conduct by some moral rule or standard. On the admitted principle and influence of human depravity, children will be disposed to adopt rules that are wrong, and ultimately subversive of their own and others' happiness. Education, correctly and wisely conducted, may do much towards forming an enlightened and tender conscience.

This law of mental operation has more to do with the formation of character, than is generally supposed by the teachers and guardians of youth. As character is estimated by the people of this country generally, good morals are more valuable to human happiness, social order and public prosperity, than wealth, or power, or science. Care should, therefore, be taken to furnish the young mind with correct rules of judgment, so that in subsequent life it shall have no occasion to alter them, or adopt different rules of estimating the conduct. These remarks may help to account for the fact, that an early religious education is so very efficient in restraining men in after life from gross outbreakings in vice. Religious truth ever has more effect upon such men, and they are more likely than others, to become subjects of permanent religious impressions. They have adopted correct rules of estimating their character, consequently they cannot endure the compunctions of their consciences, in the commission of crime. This will always be true of all such, who have not hardened their hearts or

perverted their intellectual apprehensions, by long continued violations of truth and duty.

We close this article with a single direction for the formation and preservation of a good conscience. The first thing to be carefully observed is, to study the revealed will of God, and adopt its maxims and principles as the rule of estimating conduct. The adoption of a correct, righteous rule, is indispensably important to the formation of a good conscience. The next thing is, to habituate the mind to compare the conduct in all its parts with the rule thus adopted. A just and delicate discrimination of one's own character, must be the result of much and careful observance of the comparison. It is equally necessary, to the readiness and efficient influence of the comparison and judgment, that the care should be habitual and constant.

Another thing is, punctually and resolutely to obey, in practice, the feelings consequent upon the comparison. This will cherish a tenderness of feeling, and serve to discipline the whole mind to its proper exercise and character. The last part of the direction is, a prayerful reliance on the teaching of the Holy Spirit for guidance. Philosophers may smile at this direction, incorporated in a discussion on mental science; but we shall show hereafter, that this is in its place, and vastly important to the correct knowledge of the subject.

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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

No. IV.

Having in our last number given our views of the manner in which the Moderator of the late General Assembly discharged the duties of his office, we expected to proceed immediately to a consideration, *seriatim*, of some of the principal

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LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LXI.

In the former part of this course of lectures, when treating of justification, adoption and sanctification, and on the offices executed by Christ as our Redeemer, it was found necessary to explain, to some extent, the nature of saving faith, and of repentance unto life; without this, it would have been impracticable to do any justice to the subjects then discussed. But faith and repentance are of such vital importance in the economy of redeeming mercy; they enter so intimately and extensively into all the gracious exercises of the true believer, that they justly claim a particular and formal treatment; and we accordingly find a distinct notice and description of them, in the unrivalled summary of theological truth contained in our catechism. The first of these graces is thus defined, in the answer which is to be the subject of the present lecture—"Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel."

*Faith*, it is important to remark and remember, is a term of various signification in the holy scriptures. The whole of these I shall not enumerate, as such an enumeration is

not necessary to my present purpose—You may find them all mentioned by Cruden in his *Concordance*, under the word **FAITH**, and it may be useful to examine them at your leisure. He specifies, as all the systematic writers do, four principal senses of the term, which we shall notice distinctly.

I. *Historical or doctrinal faith.* This is a simple assent to the truths of divine revelation, both historical and doctrinal; which is yielded by many, probably by the most of those who have received a religious education. Of those who are embraced in this description, some may take more interest than others in the contents of the sacred volume; but so long as none of them have more than a speculative or intellectual conviction of its truths, they have nothing beyond what the apostle James denominates a *dead faith*, and which he tells us the devils possess as truly as they—"the devils believe and tremble." It has been justly remarked, that persons of this character give their attention chiefly to those things in the volume of inspiration which interfere the least with their sinful passions, and occasion the least disturbance to their consciences in a carnal and unregenerate state. Yet even this intellectual knowledge and reception of biblical truth, may have considerable influence in restraining men from gross vice; and it may be found of great practical benefit, if

and in that way I applied to him with the greatest satisfaction—'Tis impossible to express with what freedom I ventured my soul upon Christ in those views of things. But so far as I can remember, the glory of God by Jesus Christ engaged my thoughts, much more than my own salvation.

I had, at times, as I have said, great joy and unspeakable satisfaction in trusting my soul with Jesus Christ; but in some weeks, I lost some of my sense of divine things, was dull, and my mind not so much engaged in duty as it had been. I also found my corruptions were not dead—I felt some dreadful stirrings of them. These things seemed to alarm and considerably damp me. I judged my state by my frames—I had not yet learned any better. When I was dead or dull, I condemned myself as being graceless, a hypocrite, and the like; and when I had a lively sight and sense of spiritual things, then I had hope of myself as being in a good state: and thus I altered hundreds of times in the space of two or three years, while yet I fully believed the doctrine of the saints' perseverance. When I was in darkness and dull, I feared my experience had all been short of saving grace; but when I had a lively sight of divine things, and could freely plead the merits of Christ, and venture my soul upon him, it would give me satisfaction.

I had always a disposition to think my case bad. I had, somehow, from my youth, been led to think it was proper and becoming to think meanly of myself—to censure and condemn myself—and I did it to a great degree. I found from time to time, that my corruptions were yet strong, and my nature not sanctified as I hoped it would be. I could not prevail against my spiritual enemies as I would. These things were the grounds of my doubts and fears, and they made me often almost

condemn myself and my state as graceless. Sometimes I would have light, joy and comfort, for a week or two together, and then for as long a time, I would be in darkness, doubts and fears. In this manner I spent a great part of the three last years that I lived at college. Sometimes I had raised, clear, strong—almost or quite an enthusiastic sense of divine things, with raptures of joy; and I think I never sunk quite so low as I sometimes rose high. I never got into dispondency and discouragement. I always followed hard after divine things, with hope of obtaining, though I often condemned myself as in a measure graceless. \* \* \* \* \*

(To be continued.)

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#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *Motive, Ultimate and Subordinate Objects.*

We have some miscellaneous remarks, which may as well be disposed of in this place, since they will be of use in considering other mental operations. It may excite surprise and perhaps a smile with some, that we introduce these topics in discussions on mental science. But we think it will appear that the doctrine of motive, and the character of ultimate and subordinate objects, have so intimate and so important a connexion with the laws of mental operation, that their discussion is appropriate and necessary. The laws and principles of human action cannot be fully explained, without recurring to the doctrine of motive, and the distinction between ultimate and subordinate objects. Action always supposes and necessarily implies an agent, an object, and a motive. The character of the agent is best learned by his actions, and those are estimated by their objects and motives. In this statement we take for granted one law of mind, which

we intend to examine and illustrate hereafter; that is, freedom. But that will be more intelligently explained, after the topics placed at the head of this article are discussed. All that we now assume, in reference to the subject, is that the human mind acts without any foreign violence or constraint. By action we now mean choice, operation of the will. There cannot be choice and nothing chosen, nor can there be choice without a motive.

The doctrine of motive, as it exists in fact, is very simply and easily described; but there is complexity and difficulty attending the subject, because it is confounded with ultimate object. In common style, the motive and excitement are the same. The principal object, or that which excites to a series of actions, is called motive. This is a substitution of terms, which in popular discussions, leads to no erroneous result, because motive and ultimate object are inseparably connected. The error is therefore common and venial; and scarcely any other substitution of terms would lead to less error in reasoning.

Motive, properly speaking, is never an object of pursuit, but the feeling, or expected feeling of the heart. Pleasure is the motive with all men, whether they be good or bad. There can be no other motive with a rational mind than its own pleasure, and that is always future. Present pleasure cannot be a motive to action, because no action is performed without an object, and that once gained, cannot become an excitement to future exertion. The history of the case is this: the ultimate object excites the feeling, and the feeling moves the will; but in order to be a motive to choice, the object must be future, and the enjoyment future. If it were otherwise, there would be no criterion by which to judge of character; actions would be no index

of the feelings. Good and bad men have the same motives, not in character, but in name. The truth is, the pleasure is derived from totally different objects, consequently its nature and character are as different as its excitements or objects. What is said, therefore, of good and bad motives, must apply to the objects, or to the character of the motive, or pleasure, which always corresponds with the character of the objects.

To this doctrine of motive it has been objected, that it represents all men as supremely selfish. If every man's pleasure is his only motive to action, then, it is said, all his actions proceed from a principle of selfishness. This is the strongest form in which we have heard the objection stated: and if it were a just inference, it would annihilate all benevolence, and we must talk of good and bad selfishness. In the view of those, who consider selfishness the essence of sin, it would certainly seem very singular. But the objection is only an inference from other premises, and unjustly assigned to this doctrine. We admit the justness of urging the absurdity of legitimate inferences, from any doctrine against its truth. But in this case, we deny the legitimacy of the inference. It is a *non sequitur*. What is selfishness?—It is seeking one's own interest exclusively, without regard to the good of others, and often in opposition to it. But what is the selfish man's motive?—Undoubtedly it is pleasure from the promotion of his own exclusive interest; no matter whether that interest be treasure, power, or fame. What is benevolence?—It is doing good to others, for the sake of their best interest. But what is the benevolent man's motive in promoting public good?—According to our view of the fact, it is pleasure from the promotion of public happiness or interest; and this proves him to possess a benevolent heart. He takes pleasure

in benevolent objects. But suppose he derives no pleasure from doing good to others, or in benevolent objects, what is his motive? Will it be said that duty, or a sense of obligation to God, is the motive; then we ask, is it pleasant or painful, to honour God? If pleasant, then we say, the glory of God is the object, and pleasure the motive. If it be painful, or indifferent to him, whether he honours God, we ask for his motive: and moreover, we ask for the character of that heart, which has no pleasure in benevolent objects, or in the glory of God? Whatever may be considered the doctrine of motive, few will contend that such a heart is good.

We repeat, that the common substitution of an object of choice for motive does not so far mislead as materially to weaken the force of argument or illustration, provided always that subordinate objects are never so used. But we think, the more distinctly and uniformly our language corresponds with fact, the better for science, truth, and argument.

One important use of this distinction between motive and object; is to learn the true character of the heart. This fact, always understood, that pleasure is the motive, if we can ascertain the objects which are chosen for their own sake, and know the character of those objects, we shall be certain what is the ruling propensity of the heart. This is the principle upon which all investigations of character proceed in social relations, in judicial process, and in self-examination. Contravene this doctrine of motive, and we lose the link that binds the action to the heart. We have no method of ascertaining the character. Men may be sometimes successful in concealing what are really their ultimate objects, but when they are known, their character is ascertained.

The doctrine of ultimate and sub-

ordinate objects should be well understood, for several reasons which will appear in the sequel.

The objects of choice are indefinitely multiplied; and they sustain a great variety of relations to each other in themselves, and in the voluntary disposition of them by the human mind. It is not our intention to examine any except ultimate and subordinate relations. It may be sometimes necessary to show their relations to feelings, and speak of their character, as suited to produce happiness or misery.

The terms, ultimate and subordinate, express the relation of superiority and inferiority in order, time, plan, value, nature, dignity, importance, or whatever else to which they are applied. The ground of this distinction, so far as we propose now to consider it, is in the fact, that ultimate objects are chosen for their own sake, and subordinate for the sake of those which are ultimate. There can be no choice without an ultimate object to furnish the motive. According to the laws of volition, the will is always governed by the affections of the heart: and all objects of volition are chosen either because they are in themselves agreeable, or because they are connected with those which are agreeable. Ultimate objects must be loved for their own character, subordinate may be, in themselves, agreeable or disagreeable. Objects may be ultimate in relation to certain others which are subordinate; yet they may be subordinate when considered in relation to some others. To illustrate this fact, take the case of a merchant who trades for gain. All his plans, toil and means, are employed with reference to that object; he provides his building, goods, and assistance; he buys, sells, and barter, calculates his expenditures and income, with reference to the increase of his wealth. But beyond this, it must be asked,

to what use does he appropriate his gains? If it be to do good to others, gain is subordinate; if it be to hoard it up and gratify a miserly disposition, it is ultimate. Suppose he employs it to promote the cause of Christ, and glorify God; then however any one object in the series may be ultimate with reference to certain departments of operation, it is subordinate to the glory of God. The distinction is very plain, and needs no further definition or illustration.

The use and importance of this distinction deserve particular consideration. It is important in judging of our own character. Suppose a man sets himself to examine his own moral estimate, the character of his heart; what must be the process? The character of the heart must be developed by the affections; and these are to be known by their objects—We speak of their nature, not of their degrees of strength or feebleness. Let him ask himself what objects please him for their own sake, and he may form some correct estimate of his heart. But understanding the doctrine of motive, and the distinction under consideration, he may come more directly and more satisfactorily to the result. Let him ask himself what objects he chooses, because they please him, and for no other reason? He will find, connected and intermingled, objects of choice, painful and agreeable, subordinate one to another, and all to some higher object; and at length he will come to that most dear to his heart, that to which all others are subordinate. The ultimate object, once clearly ascertained, furnishes the key to his heart's character.

But the use and importance of this distinction appear more conspicuously in judging of others' characters than in our own case. We can better judge of our own feelings than of others', in some other important respects, such as the readiness and strength with which

they rise in view of certain objects. Of others, our rule of estimate is the character of their ultimate objects. This is always safe. There may be some difficulty in ascertaining the ultimate objects of men, though we may be very familiarly acquainted with their general conduct. They may sometimes conceal the grand object which most excites their feelings, and in this sense, governs all their conduct. That object may be so distant, requiring so many subordinate movements, and be so artfully concealed by contrary professions, that we may be deceived. Besides, this relation is not fixed; the disposition of subordinate objects is according to the mind's own decision; and sometimes it may not be possible to make a subserviency where it is intended, or to detect it when it really exists. But after all the difficulties in ascertaining character, the ultimate object is the only key by which it can be certainly ascertained.

Another use of this distinction, is to *develop* character. If we have a knowledge of what ought to be the ultimate objects of conduct, by a proper representation of those objects, the feelings will be excited, and the conduct regulated according to them. There is no doubt that the glory of God should be the ultimate object of all men. When, therefore, the appropriate illustration of God's glory is presented before the mind, one of three things must be the effect; either the affections will kindle with delight, and so the conduct will show a subordination in its promotion; or emotions of disgust will be discovered, which tell the iniquity of the heart; or else a cold indifference will show a callousness of feeling, characteristic of a hard impenitent heart. Other illustrations might be given, but this is probably sufficient.

The distinction is useful in explaining the principles of action, and in applications of truth to the

judgment and conscience. Its applications to the principles of human action have already been intimated; but one or two illustrations may be here appropriate. Men can and really do choose subordinate objects, which are in themselves disagreeable, but never those which are ultimately painful. No man can ever choose objects which are painful for the sake of the pain. But let them be connected with objects which are agreeable and necessary for their attainment, and they will be as really chosen as those which are agreeable, but for a very different reason. The sick man chooses nauseous medicines for the sake of health. The convinced sinner will as really choose the fear and service of God, and even the change of his own heart, as the sick man does the medicine, and in the same manner, that is subordinately. Such a sinner, apprehending that a change of his own heart is indispensable to his salvation from ceaseless misery, will choose it, and seek it with great anxiety. We doubtless state a familiar fact, when we say that we have known many unrenewed sinners, who have been deeply anxious for weeks and months; and in this subordinate manner, chosen from day to day the change of their hearts, and to love God; but the effect has not followed. To show the truth and sincerity of their choice, they have not only said that such was their choice, but have used the external means of grace with great diligence, and tried every possible measure to bring their hearts under the control of their wills, without success. At length they have despaired utterly of accomplishing the object of their choice, and have relied on the agency of the Holy Spirit, to change their heart, and excite the affection of love to God, and then they have speedily rejoiced in a gospel hope. We have referred to this common case of subordinate choice, because

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it serves to illustrate the principles of voluntary actions, and confirms the importance of the distinction in apprehending many declarations and facts found in the scriptures.

In the application of truth to the judgment and conscience, this distinction is important. An appropriate example of this is found in our Saviour's instruction to the young ruler. This young man, in many respects, amiable, thought he had kept all the commandments, and had no suspicion that there was any deficiency in his obedience. Christ brought him to the test, by directing him to subordinate all his wealth to the direction and cause of him whom he had just addressed as his Master. The ultimate object of his choice and delight was his possessions. These he could not relinquish for the sake of heaven, because that would have been to relinquish an ultimate for a subordinate object; no free and rational mind can do this. It would be violating the laws of human action.

Without this distinction it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince men that they deserve condemnation for their feelings, when their conduct is fair in the world's estimation. Men, who think little, and feel less on religious subjects, must be led to distinguish between their ultimate and subordinate objects, if we seek to convince them of sin. Good men and bad men may do the same things, as subordinate objects of choice and desire, with ultimate objects as widely different in their nature as right and wrong. If the things done, irrespective of this distinction, were to be taken as the indexes of character, conscience would never accuse men for wrong feelings in the performance of duty. But admit this distinction, and men may feel guilty when they choose and act right, with a wrong end in view. This fact has often been used by the Spirit of God to con-

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vince men of the depravity of their hearts.

There is one inquiry more of importance, to be answered on this subject—What are the ultimate objects of good and of bad beings? The answer to this question has been in part anticipated already, but it deserves a little more particular consideration,

The ultimate objects of all men are few, and depend, both as to number and character, on the governing propensity of the heart. They must be few in a strict technical sense, because the term implies the last in the series, and because the highest and strongest affection cannot rest on many objects.

God has told us what is his ultimate object, in all his works of creation, providence and grace. It is his glory. To manifest his own perfections is the highest object of his delight, and he has told us that our highest happiness should be derived from the same object. Of the good man, therefore, the glory of God is his ultimate object. With reference to his whole life, he can have no other. In all things whatever he does, he must do all to the glory of God. But according to the statement above made, there may be objects pursued with reference to this, which are ultimate in relation to a series of actions. So, in this sense, a good man may have more than one ultimate object. But every ultimate object must possess the character of holiness. It may be safely said, that holiness is the ultimate object of all good men. Every thing should be subordinate to this; and if all the objects of pursuit were entirely subordinated to that high aim, the character would be perfect. The reasons why good men do not always furnish such a character, are two. One is ignorance. Men cannot always perceive distinctly the real tendency and relations of things, and consequently make some mistakes. But the principal reason is

found in the remaining corrupt propensities in the hearts of good men. While good men are sanctified only in part, there remain some propensities to evil, which, under circumstances calculated to excite them to action, bring the men into captivity to the evil propensity.

The ultimate objects of bad men are more numerous, but in one respect, they have a general character; that is, sin, in opposition to holiness. Thus, according to this principle, we class bad men by their ultimate objects. The ambitious man, whose ultimate object is fame; the tyrant, the miser, and the voluptuary, have their appellations from the governing propensity of the heart, developed by their ultimate objects of choice. It is not necessary here, to give an extended illustration of this doctrine. What has been stated may be sufficient to furnish data for its appropriate applications, in all the investigations of human conduct and character. The way is now prepared to examine the doctrine of freedom and of power, one or both of which will be examined in our next article. F.

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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

No. V.

Among the first minutes of the last General Assembly of our church, and before the choice of a Moderator, the following record appears—“The Assembly proceeded to consider the case of the person denominated ‘standing committee’ in the commission; and after considerable discussion, it was resolved that the member be received, and enrolled among the list of members.” Against this resolution a protest with 67 signatures was entered; and a committee was appointed on the part of the Assembly, to answer the protest.

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

DECEMBER, 1831.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LXII.

IV. There is a *justifying faith*, or a faith which, in the answer of the Catechism now under consideration, is called a *saving grace*. In treating of this grace, I shall endeavour to bring the several clauses of the answer before us under the four following particulars—

1. The object of saving faith—Jesus Christ, as he is offered in the gospel.

2. The author of faith—God in Christ, working by his Spirit a saving grace in the human soul.

3. The nature and acts of faith—receiving and resting on Christ alone for salvation.

4. Some of the consequences, fruits, or effects of saving faith.

We are first to consider the object of saving faith, which, although mentioned last in the short definition of the catechism, must manifestly take precedence of every thing else, in an orderly view of this important subject. Faith, it is plain, must always imply an object; that is, something to be believed; and this object, it is equally clear, must be distinctly apprehended, in order to a rational and unwavering faith or belief.

The whole revealed will of God,  
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so far as it is known and understood, is *the general object* of that faith which is unto salvation. God speaks in his word, as recorded in the Bible; and he who understandingly disbelieves any word that God has spoken, is chargeable with the awful sin of making him a liar, and certainly can have no faith that is saving. It is not, however, essential to salvation, however desirable in itself, that the whole of revealed truth, as it is now contained in the Bible, should be known and believed. The people of God at first had no written revelation; and for a series of ages they had but a small part of what we now possess. Even at the present time, the heathen, to whom the gospel is carried by the missionaries, and many of whom appear to receive its saving benefit, have, at first, nothing but oral teaching; and for a considerable time after being taught to read, they have only a few detached parts of the sacred volume. Nor is it, we believe, fatal to salvation, when, through mistake or imperfect information, some apparently good and honest men do not receive as canonical scripture, a portion of that which is really so. Luther, at least for a time, was disposed to exclude the epistle of James from the sacred canon; and till that canon was finally established on good evidence, several books of the New Testament were not received, by some of the primitive churches.

which a copy of the instrument was transmitted to the executive of the several states. Yet the Board of Missions is not the Board of the Assembly, because it was continued by compromise! It is surely not necessary farther to expose this monstrous absurdity.

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MENTAL SCIENCE.

*Doctrine of Freedom.*

There are few facts more certainly ascertained than man's *free agency*, and yet few things have been subject to greater diversity of speculation. We have not time now, nor will the limits of the pages allotted to this discussion permit us, to review the speculations and theories of man's freedom, which have occupied the schoolmen, and perplexed philosophers. Nor is it necessary to our present purpose, that we should encumber our discussion with the statement and refutation of errors, which serve only to perplex the subject. A simple exposition and plain illustration of the true doctrine, will be entirely sufficient for our purpose.

Let the question first be answered, what is freedom? The abstract notion of liberty is, the absence of all restraint from action, external, or internal. But the thought is modified by the relations, or subjects, to which it is applied. Political freedom does not imply the absence of law and government, which are intended to operate as a salutary restraint. The absence of all the restraints of law and government would be political licentiousness, undesirable and disastrous to man's best interests and happiness. With this liberty we have no concern at present, any further than to distinguish it from the subject of present discussion. Nor do we intend to discuss the franchises, immunities, or privileges of

political, social, or religious freedom. What we have in view, is *personal liberty*, which belongs to every rational man, in all his external actions, and in all the volitions of his mind.

Every man, having the faculties of understanding, heart and will, undangered, possesses two kinds of liberty or freedom. One relates to external action, the other to the mind alone.

*External liberty*, when examined inductively, will be found to consist in an unbroken connexion between choice and external action. We have already seen that one important use of the will, is to move and direct bodily action. Whenever those actions are unrestrained and so directed, they are free, because there is a connexion between the choice and the action. This kind of liberty may be partially or wholly obstructed. The slave has this connexion often broken by force. It is true that many of his actions are free—entirely the result of choice, but others are the result of constraint. The violence done to the freedom of external action in the case of the slave, rather respects some privileges and immunities, than the connexion between the actions which he does perform, and the choice of his mind. The child also has his external liberty interrupted by force. He chooses to do many things, and to obtain many things, which the watchful parent prevents in various ways. Men often have this external liberty obstructed—sickness, palsy, a broken limb, and external force, may break the connexion between volition and choice. But it is of less importance to discuss this kind of liberty, than that which belongs to the mind. There is no difficulty in understanding, and accurately defining, external freedom. Every man of common observation can tell what it is; and although he may not be able to give the shortest or most technical definition of it, he

will make out an intelligent description of its exercise, and point you to that in which it consists. Every man can tell when it is obstructed, and it would be strange if he could give no account of that which suffers obstruction.

Mental liberty, or as it is sometimes called, moral freedom, is more difficult to define, and vastly more important to be described. It requires a careful examination of mental exercises, their connexion, relations and laws, in order to understand definitely and clearly what mental freedom is. Without lingering here to write the process of discovery, which is inductive, we state the result in brief and plain terms.

Mental, or moral freedom, consists in a connexion between the *pleasure* of the heart and the *choice* of the will. Or if any person should object to the distinction of faculties implied in this statement, we say the mind chooses just as is most agreeable to itself, which in our view implies the same thing—a connexion between pleasure and choice. This is freedom, and nothing else can be mental liberty. It is the highest kind of freedom conceivable, and the only kind of freedom desirable for the mind. Indeed the whole is implied in the single term *choice*. The mind always chooses just as is most agreeable, and in no other way—nothing else is choice. If it were conceived that men had liberty to choose for the sake of pain, they never would use it, nor is such a supposition possible; it is not choice, nor freedom. It is however true, that men sometimes choose objects which are disagreeable, and even painful; but always do this for the sake of something which is agreeable: so that in all those cases the connexion subsists between the pleasure and the choice. This statement involves the doctrine of ultimate and subordinate objects of choice, which we have discussed in a former ar-

ticle. In the same article, we think the doctrine of motive, there settled, shows conclusively that pleasure always governs the choice.

It has been supposed by some, that moral freedom includes an independence of the will, and a control over the temper, or disposition of the heart. The doctrine of self-determination belonging to the will, was once a popular doctrine, and it bids fair to become so again, although it has been so often and so ably refuted. Its refutation is exceedingly simple, plain and conclusive.

The operations of mind, in a connected order, may be thus briefly stated; perception, feeling, choice. The first operation, is *perceiving* the object, the next is *feeling* pleased or displeased with it, and the result is *choice*, or *refusal* of the object. This is substantially the analysis of mental process in choice. We appeal to every man, who can hold his mind fixed to the examination of his own mental process, for the correctness of this statement. Now if this be so, where is the self-determination of the will? It is out of the question altogether; it is not possible that moral freedom should involve such an independence of will. But if there be no such self-determination of the will, it can exercise no control over the temper of the heart.

It has been denied by some, that men are free moral agents, and there has been much philosophical speculation on the subject. But one single argument sets aside all the philosophy which has denied, and mocks at the speculations, which would deprive man of his mental freedom. It is an argument founded upon consciousness. Every man is conscious of choosing as he pleases, or in other words, is conscious that his mind is free, whether he choose right or wrong. All arguments against a man's consciousness are useless, because its testimony is paramount to all other.

We may perplex a man on the subject, but to convince him that his mind is not free, is impossible; it is the same thing as to convince him that he does not choose at all. Consciousness furnishes incontrovertible evidence of choice to every man. If it were necessary to confirm the decision of consciousness, we could do it by the evidence furnished from the actions of man, many of which would be inexplicable on any other ground; and we could do it from the word of God, which every where describes man as a free, responsible moral agent. But we think it altogether unnecessary in this place, to give any details of this confirmation. The whole administration of God, under which we live, is confirmation strong and conclusive.

There is a question, here, that has perplexed many a theologian, as well as the plain unlearned Christian, which we ought to consider. Is moral freedom consistent with dependence on God? We answer in the affirmative, without the least hesitation. There is one very short method of making out this consistency, which must be perfectly satisfactory to every mind. It is as simple as it is short, because inductive. All men are conscious of this freedom—all men who reason at all, are convinced that they are dependant on God for all that they have—and their experience has always shown their agreement. Thus, men have the testimony of consciousness that they are free—the testimony of reason that they are dependant—and the testimony of constant experience that they are consistent. No man has ever known them to come in collision, through the whole course of his life. Each of these is also confirmed by the testimony of scripture.

There are other methods of illustrating this consistency, equally satisfactory. One method is, to obtain a distinct apprehension of each, and then compare them together.

A plain definition of moral freedom is, as above stated, a connexion between pleasure and choice. Of dependance there are several definitions and theories, some of which are absurd. But it is not necessary now to examine theories. Facts are all that we need. Take the following illustration of dependance: God gives and sustains our life and our faculties, preserves their connexions and relations, gives vigour and activity to them all. In the language of inspired philosophy, "we live, move and have our being in God." So that this dependance on God is entire. Take, now, the two thoughts and compare them together. Their consistency is obvious. Here are faculties sustained by God's power, acting in dependance on him, always in a certain relation and connexion, which constitutes the essence of freedom. Is there any inconsistency in this? So far as the present question is concerned, we care not with what notion of dependance this definition of moral freedom is compared. Only admit the fact as it is, a connexion always between pleasure and choice, and the more absolute or entire the dependance, the more certain and permanent the freedom. Any change wrought in the temper of the heart, or the entire dependance on sovereign grace to effect it, can never affect the principle of mental liberty. The temper of a man's heart is pleased with sin, and he therefore chooses it—God changes that temper, and then his heart is pleased with holiness; he now chooses holiness for the same reason that he before chose sin—because it pleases him. His moral freedom is not at all affected. The character of his feelings and choice are widely different, but his freedom is the same.

A still more perplexing question is often asked:—Are free moral agency and God's decrees consistent with each other? A common

form of pressing this inquiry is the following: If God has irreversibly decreed a man's actions, he cannot do otherwise, and if he cannot do otherwise, then he cannot be free. This form of the statement involves both kinds of liberty, external and moral. Let us compare them both with the divine decrees. Suppose God has irreversibly decreed that a man shall act just as he chooses to act in accomplishing a given purpose, or in all his life; does this destroy the connexion between his external action and his choice, which is external freedom? Certainly not. But suppose God has decreed that a man shall not, in a given case, accomplish what he chooses to do; then there may, or there may not be, an obstruction of his external freedom. If it relate to an ultimate object or action, there is no abridgment of liberty, so far as subordinate actions are concerned. Take, for illustration, the case of the lyers in wait for Paul's life. God decreed that they should not do the ultimate thing they chose, but all the subordinate actions, banding together, providing their weapons, selecting their stations, abstinence from eating, and lying in wait, were done, and freely done. Take another illustration; men choose to obtain riches, but God disappoints them by his Providence; yet all their efforts are directed to the object as the result of choice. But a man chooses to walk, and God has decreed that his limbs should be paralyzed. In such case his external liberty is obstructed; he is not free in this case. In all cases when God's decree cuts off the connexion between the choice, and the direct object of choice, this kind of liberty is destroyed, but never otherwise.

Let us now examine the consistency of moral freedom with divine predestination. Here it is important to be remembered that God has decreed this connexion between pleasure and choice, in every ra-

tional mind, and nothing can ever obstruct it. The more irreversible we may suppose this decree, the more secure the freedom. We need not enter into an argument to prove that the human mind is so constituted as always to choose as is most agreeable. The fact, as already shown, is proved by consciousness, and no rational mind can doubt it. Without undertaking in this place an exposition or defence of the doctrine of God's irreversible decrees, which, in its appropriate place, might be profitably and triumphantly done, it is sufficient now to say, that they never do, and they never can, interfere with moral liberty. Suppose God has ordained every choice of the mind, and the mind invariably chooses just as it pleases, or in other words that the connexion between pleasure and choice is never broken—then this kind of freedom is not interrupted. Let the supposition be varied as often as will suit any caviller, only retain this connexion, and there cannot possibly be any infringement of liberty. Suppose God has decreed the temper of the heart, the object of its pleasure and the choice: the mind remains as truly free as is possible. Now compare this definition of moral freedom with the doctrine of special grace, or the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit, and their consistency will be just as obvious. In all the operations of the Holy Spirit on the minds of men, this connexion is never broken. We have already seen that in renewing the heart, there is a preparation to be pleased with holiness, and that holy objects are then freely chosen. In all Christian graces, which are called fruits of the Spirit, because produced under his influence, this freedom is never interrupted. We refer the reader to the descriptions which are given of the Spirit's influence in the holy scriptures, and request him to compare our definition of liberty with these descrip-

tions, to satisfy him that they are entirely consistent. We have not room to protract this discussion. Man is morally free in his fallen state. Whatever else he may have lost, he cannot have lost his mental liberty. He has lost power and goodness, privilege and happiness, but moral freedom he has not lost, and never can lose it, while he remains in possession of his mental faculties.

There is one error on this subject which deserves some attention. It is the confounding of *ability*, and *freedom*. We design, in our next article, to examine the doctrine of power, and cannot now enter upon its discussion. But while men's minds are only vaguely and indefinitely informed on the subject of power, they often blend it with freedom, and are bewildered, and find it a profitless task to inquire into its consistency with some of the revealed doctrines of grace. The reasons of this confusion are these—men usually take their notions of power from the connexion between choice and external action, and their apprehensions of freedom from the same connexion; and when this is done, they transfer both together to their views of mental liberty. After all this, if they contemplate the commands of God, they seem to infer that liberty and ability are the same. But let a man take the definition of mental liberty as consisting simply in a connexion between pleasure and choice, and we think he will have separated many vague and perplexing thoughts which often improperly cluster with freedom. Agency or action supposes power; but the freeness of the agency respects not the power, only the manner in which it is employed. This is sufficient for our present purpose, hereafter it will be more fully examined.

This doctrine of moral freedom conducts us to what may be called the basis of accountability, respon-

sibility, or moral obligation, in men. Primarily the faculties of knowing, feeling, and choosing, are the basis; and secondarily, the uniformly existing connexion between pleasure and choice. Take these together, and man is a fit subject of moral government, of obligation, of reward and punishment. Although liberty is not the basis of moral obligation, it is essential to its existence, in all cases where choice or external action is concerned. There are, it is true, some cases in which men are under moral obligation to perceive and feel, and so far as the specific duty is concerned, it includes no choice; but even in those cases there are inseparable duties associated which do include choice. To perceive the glory of God is a duty—to love it is a duty—but obedience is inseparably connected, although in the perception and the affection there is no act of will. No being can be a complete moral agent without this kind of liberty. His volitions must be according to the pleasure of his heart, in order that his agency should express his character, and procure objects that may promote his own happiness, or that of others. Let it here be remembered that we speak of those faculties as described in our previous articles. This is necessary to be recollected, lest it should be inferred from so summary a statement of the basis of responsibility, that all animals that perceive, feel and act, are proper subjects of moral obligation. Man has a faculty of perceiving moral relations, a faculty of feeling in view of them, and a faculty of choosing or refusing freely moral objects. This renders him a proper subject of responsibility.

We conclude this article with a brief statement of the doctrine of moral obligation, corresponding with the above view of its basis in man. Obligation supposes a standard of right, which may be called its foundation. This must be in him to whom we are responsible.

form of pressing this inquiry is the following: If God has irreversibly decreed a man's actions, he cannot do otherwise, and if he cannot do otherwise, then he cannot be free. This form of the statement involves both kinds of liberty, external and moral. Let us compare them both with the divine decrees. Suppose God has irreversibly decreed that a man shall act just as he chooses to act in accomplishing a given purpose, or in all his life; does this destroy the connexion between his external action and his choice, which is external freedom? Certainly not. But suppose God has decreed that a man shall not, in a given case, accomplish what he chooses to do; then there may, or there may not be, an obstruction of his external freedom. If it relate to an ultimate object or action, there is no abridgment of liberty, so far as subordinate actions are concerned. Take, for illustration, the case of the lyers in wait for Paul's life. God decreed that they should not do the ultimate thing they chose, but all the subordinate actions, banding together, providing their weapons, selecting their stations, abstinence from eating, and lying in wait, were done, and freely done. Take another illustration; men choose to obtain riches, but God disappoints them by his Providence; yet all their efforts are directed to the object as the result of choice. But a man chooses to walk, and God has decreed that his limbs should be paralyzed. In such case his external liberty is obstructed; he is not free in this case. In all cases when God's decree cuts off the connexion between the choice, and the direct object of choice, this kind of liberty is destroyed, but never otherwise.

Let us now examine the consistency of moral freedom with divine predestination. Here it is important to be remembered that God has decreed this connexion between pleasure and choice, in every ra-

tional mind, and nothing can ever obstruct it. The more irreversible we may suppose this decree, the more secure the freedom. We need not enter into an argument to prove that the human mind is so constituted as always to choose as is most agreeable. The fact, as already shown, is proved by consciousness, and no rational mind can doubt it. Without undertaking in this place an exposition or defence of the doctrine of God's irreversible decrees, which, in its appropriate place, might be profitably and triumphantly done, it is sufficient now to say, that they never do, and they never can, interfere with moral liberty. Suppose God has ordained every choice of the mind, and the mind invariably chooses just as it pleases, or in other words that the connexion between pleasure and choice is never broken—then this kind of freedom is not interrupted. Let the supposition be varied as often as will suit any caviller, only retain this connexion, and there cannot possibly be any infringement of liberty. Suppose God has decreed the temper of the heart, the object of its pleasure and the choice: the mind remains as truly free as is possible. Now compare this definition of moral freedom with the doctrine of special grace, or the controlling influence of the Holy Spirit, and their consistency will be just as obvious. In all the operations of the Holy Spirit on the minds of men, this connexion is never broken. We have already seen that in renewing the heart, there is a preparation to be pleased with holiness, and that holy objects are then freely chosen. In all Christian graces, which are called fruits of the Spirit, because produced under his influence, this freedom is never interrupted. We refer the reader to the descriptions which are given of the Spirit's influence in the holy scriptures, and request him to compare our definition of liberty with these descrip-

tions, to satisfy him that they are entirely consistent. We have not room to protract this discussion. Man is morally free in his fallen state. Whatever else he may have lost, he cannot have lost his mental liberty. He has lost power and goodness, privilege and happiness, but moral freedom he has not lost, and never can lose it, while he remains in possession of his mental faculties.

There is one error on this subject which deserves some attention. It is the confounding of *ability*, and *freedom*. We design, in our next article, to examine the doctrine of power, and cannot now enter upon its discussion. But while men's minds are only vaguely and indefinitely informed on the subject of power, they often blend it with freedom, and are bewildered, and find it a profitless task to inquire into its consistency with some of the revealed doctrines of grace. The reasons of this confusion are these—men usually take their notions of power from the connexion between choice and external action, and their apprehensions of freedom from the same connexion; and when this is done, they transfer both together to their views of mental liberty. After all this, if they contemplate the commands of God, they seem to infer that liberty and ability are the same. But let a man take the definition of mental liberty as consisting simply in a connexion between pleasure and choice, and we think he will have separated many vague and perplexing thoughts which often improperly cluster with freedom. Agency or action supposes power; but the freeness of the agency respects not the power, only the manner in which it is employed. This is sufficient for our present purpose, hereafter it will be more fully examined.

This doctrine of moral freedom conducts us to what may be called the basis of accountability, respon-

sibility, or moral obligation, in men. Primarily the faculties of knowing, feeling, and choosing, are the basis; and secondarily, the uniformly existing connexion between pleasure and choice. Take these together, and man is a fit subject of moral government, of obligation, of reward and punishment. Although liberty is not the basis of moral obligation, it is essential to its existence, in all cases where choice or external action is concerned. There are, it is true, some cases in which men are under moral obligation to perceive and feel, and so far as the specific duty is concerned, it includes no choice; but even in those cases there are inseparable duties associated which do include choice. To perceive the glory of God is a duty—to love it is a duty—but obedience is inseparably connected, although in the perception and the affection there is no act of will. No being can be a complete moral agent without this kind of liberty. His volitions must be according to the pleasure of his heart, in order that his agency should express his character, and procure objects that may promote his own happiness, or that of others. Let it here be remembered that we speak of those faculties as described in our previous articles. This is necessary to be recollected, lest it should be inferred from so summary a statement of the basis of responsibility, that all animals that perceive, feel and act, are proper subjects of moral obligation. Man has a faculty of perceiving moral relations, a faculty of feeling in view of them, and a faculty of choosing or refusing freely moral objects. This renders him a proper subject of responsibility.

We conclude this article with a brief statement of the doctrine of moral obligation, corresponding with the above view of its basis in man. Obligation supposes a standard of right, which may be called its foundation. This must be in him to whom we are responsible.

It supposes, also, proper qualifications on the part of those who are responsible, and a relation subsisting between them and him to whom they are obliged. But this is too abstract. Let us state it more fully. God's perfections are the standard of right for the universe. They are holy. We are fully authorized to say that holiness is the standard or principle of right, and as such the foundation of moral obligation.

The faculties described in this series of articles, qualify men to perceive, feel, and choose, in view of laws which embody the standard: and qualify them to sustain a relation of responsibility. The sum of the matter is, therefore, that men are bound to be holy, because God is holy. This is the whole tenor of his law—"Be ye holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy." F.

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## Review.

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We have been delayed longer than we expected we should be, in fulfilling an intimation given in our September number, that we would before long, *Deo juvante*, review a Review in the *Christian Spectator* for June last, but published in the month of May—We are now to redeem our pledge.

The Review on which we are going to remark, is entitled—"CASE OF THE REV. MR. BARNES.—*The Way of Salvation, a Sermon by the REV. ALBERT BARNES.*" Now we certainly are not disposed to question the right of the *Christian Spectator* to review this sermon, or any other publication, and to express his opinion of its inherent merits or defects, with all possible freedom. But this paper, although appearing as a Review, is, in fact, and indeed without any disguise, a plea in favour of Mr. Barnes, against the censure passed upon him by the *Presbytery of Philadelphia*.—and we might add of the Synod of Philadelphia too; for the Synod had participated in the measures which the *Spectator* condemns. Had the Review been of the ordinary character, it assuredly would have received no formal notice from us. But the doings of two judicatures in the Presbyterian church are deeply implicated by it; and it was sent abroad a considera-

ble time before the stated period of issuing the publication in which it appears, that it might be read, and have all its influence on the members of the General Assembly, before they should even hear the statement of the parties criminated, and on whose proceedings they were to pronounce a sentence either of approbation or censure. Was not this very much like a partial friend endeavouring to get the ear of judges or jurors, to impress them favourably in behalf of a party, before they hear the cause in which he is concerned opened in court? And where, in such a case, is the respect due to the court itself?—and in this case, the highest ecclesiastical court in the Presbyterian church? We verily think the hope expressed by the *Spectator*, that he "would not be thought obtrusive," was an unreasonable and vain hope; a hope that must meet with complete disappointment from every candid mind. He expresses great solicitude that concord and fraternal feeling should be preserved between Presbyterians and Congregationalists; but if the course he has taken has any tendency to secure such a result, or rather, if it is not calculated to produce exactly an opposite effect, then we must acknowledge our utter ignorance of the principles of human

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

MARCH, 1832.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LIV.

In our last lecture, we entered on the consideration of the important doctrine of repentance, as stated in our catechism; and I proposed to make the several clauses of the answer relative to this doctrine, the subject of discussion, in the same order in which they stand in the answer itself. Without recapitulating any thing already said, I now ask your attention to the clause which states, that in repentance unto life, a sinner “doth, with grief and hatred of his sin, turn from it unto God.”

There is a very striking passage in the prophecy of Zechariah, [xii. 10] which will furnish us with a just view of the chief source, and the just measure, of that grief which a true penitent will feel on account of his sin—“They shall look upon me whom they have pierced; and they shall mourn for him, as one mourneth for his only son, and shall be in bitterness for him, as one that is in bitterness for his first born.” We know from the quotation of these words by the beloved apostle, [John xix. 37] and his referring them to the

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crucifiers of our blessed Lord, that this was intended to be their primary application: and there was a striking fulfilment of the prophecy on the day of Pentecost, when many of those who had been concerned in the actual crucifixion of Christ, “were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, men and brethren, what shall we do?” But this, though the *special*, was not intended to be the *exclusive* application of the prophecy, it was doubtless intended to exhibit the feelings of *all*, who truly repent of their sins under the gospel dispensation, in a view of their guilt as exhibited in the cross of Christ. Scott’s remarks on this passage, in his commentary, is unquestionably just. He says—“Whilst we condemn the conduct of him who betrayed, and of those who crucified the Lord of glory, we shall not exculpate ourselves. We shall remember, that in fact our sins were the cause of the Redeemer’s crucifixion; our ingratitude and dishonourable conduct have often tendered towards the guilt of crucifying him afresh. We may therefore all look to him whom we have pierced, and upon our sins as the thorns, the nails, and the spear. This will increase the poignancy of our sorrow and remorse, while we hope for mercy through that

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view; and sometimes one question would introduce several new and unexpected ones. This practice I continued for several years, but it was laborious and trying to my constitution. Another method I took was, to visit families by name. This I did for more than a year, till I had nearly or quite gone through the congregation. I usually visited two days in the week; and on the previous Sabbath told them the families I would visit, on such or such a day—This I did that they might have opportunity to be at home. When I came to the house, and the family was collected together, I first prayed with them; and then I began with the youngest, and so proceeded on till I came to the heads of the family—asking questions and discoursing, according to their several capacities and circumstances. This method I continued but little more than a year, and once over my charge. In general, through my ministry hitherto, my visiting has been more occasional than stated—just as I have had opportunity. But I have been deficient in this duty; and in general people complain more of this deficiency in ministers than of any other.

To promote religion in our several congregations, most or all of the neighbouring ministers encouraged family meeting societies of young persons, and days of prayer. I used, when I could, to meet with these societies in my own charge, for prayer—sometimes in one part of the congregation, and sometimes in another. This I did both for my own advantage, and for the encouragement and edification of others—Another method which I, with my elders, attempted for the promotion of religion, was the care and discipline of the young people: Or more properly, of such of them as were baptised. These we looked upon as in a sort within the church, and under its care. We proceeded in

this, not without some good effect. But the want of this discipline in all the other neighbouring churches, prevented our carrying it to a proper extent. It was thought best by others that we should not, at least for the present, proceed to suspension, or cutting off from our care; and we found that without this, we could do no more than give good advice, and reprove in private. The elders and myself also tried to promote family government; and I wrote articles of agreement, by which families should concur and join in the same practice, for mutual help and encouragement to one another.

In many such ways have I endeavoured to promote religion among the people of my charge; but after all, I have done but little; not so much as was my duty to do, and the effect has been but small.\*

(To be continued.)

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#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

##### *Doctrine of Power.*

The doctrine of power is more perplexed than any other department of mental philosophy. For this reason it will require careful attention, and protract the discussion beyond what has been devoted to any other topic in this series of articles. Our present intention is to settle the doctrine, and remove some of its perplexities; reserving

\* It will be recollected, as elsewhere stated, that this was written nearly thirteen years before Mr. Green's death; and that he died in the midst of a most remarkable and general revival of religion, among the people of his charge. They were ripening for the harvest, which although delayed, was at last rich and abundant—Probably no congregation in our country was composed of a better instructed people than his. Hence an entire freedom, from all that is so justly considered as exceptional and injurious, in many of those which have of late been denominated revivals of religion.—EDIT.

for a subsequent article certain of its applications and uses.

The terms used to indicate power are so indefinitely and variously employed, that it need not be considered strange, if there should be much confusion and perplexity attending the investigation of certain mental and theological subjects. These terms are used in law, in government, in rights, in wealth, in martial operations, in physics, in mathematicks, in argument and in mental philosophy. In some departments, as in numbers and mechanics, the terms are fixed in their meaning, but in a great majority of the sciences they are not. Though they occur in all departments, their meaning varies exceedingly, and it is oftentimes impossible to ascertain their import.

But the origin of all our apprehensions and conceptions of power is from a connexion between cause and effect. This connexion is a dependence of the effect upon the cause. Whenever such connexion is recognised, we ascribe it to power; but if none is recognised, no existence of power is suggested. It should here be observed, that neither the effect, nor the cause, nor the connexion, but that on which the connexion rests, is the power, and nothing else can be properly so called. Now if men always spoke and wrote on all subjects with this notion of power distinctly in view, there would be no perplexity or confusion from the use of those terms. But it is far otherwise, as must be evident to all who reflect carefully on the subject.

The question has often been asked, What is power? It is easily asked: but has it ever been answered? Has it ever been defined? If it has, we confess it has not been our happiness to see the answer or the definition. The best substitute for a definition, that we have yet seen or conceived, is

the *connexion* between cause and effect. This we can recognise and describe, but it is not power. The thing itself is utterly beyond our cognizance. We cannot see it, describe it, or define it at all. But since power is that which binds the effect to its cause, we may use that relation in place of its definition, without error, and often with great advantage. Let any man fasten his attention upon this inquiry and seek to define or describe power; he will soon find himself in difficulty, and at length yield the object, in despair of success. Some philosophers have found themselves so perplexed with inquiries relating to power, that they have chosen to do what we consider equivalent to a denial of its existence. They have denied, in theory, any other connexion between cause and effect than mere antecedent and consequent. Without stopping to discuss the theory, and expose at length its absurdities, we say that every effect supposes a cause, with power to produce it. Whether the power belongs to the cause, inherently, incidentally, or instrumentally, will not affect the question in its present aspect. The simple fact, to which we allude, is that the connexion between cause and effect, involves a dependence, which always denotes power. The terms have no appropriate meaning on any other supposition. It is absurd to speak of a cause without the idea of power; of an effect, without power to produce it.

We recur again to the propriety of using this connexion between cause and effect, as a substitute for the definition of power. It cannot mislead us to use that relation, which power alone supports, and which alone suggests the idea, as its substitute. In physics it is not necessary to employ any substitute, but in mental philosophy and theological discussions, it is often very important. The perplexing vagueness and great diver-

sity of meanings, attached to the same term, render it necessary that some terms, more fixed and certain in their meaning, should be substituted in its place. But this will be more evident, when we come to the application and uses of power.

Before we proceed to the direct object, a few remarks on the *source* of power are appropriate and necessary. The first remark is, that power is always associated with *intelligence* in its source. Instruments may be employed to connect cause and effect, which have no intelligence; but, however numerous or frequently they may be so employed, they cannot be considered the source of energy. Whenever we recognise, or conceive of power, we greatly mistake if the idea of intelligence is not always, and necessarily, associated with its source. Matter is in itself inert, in all its forms of organization; it cannot, therefore, be the source of any action, energy, or even motion. All its motions, and the laws of their regulation, indicate a governing energy from an intelligent source. We need not enter into a minute and extended illustration of this remark. We think all inquisitive minds will readily arrive at the irresistible conclusion, that intelligence is essential to the source of power.

Another remark on the general subject is, that the source of power is *voluntary*. Its exercise is always connected with will, or volition, the operation of will. All the laws of motion, which philosophy recognises, necessarily indicate both an intelligent and voluntary source. Whatever material agents are instrumentally employed, earth, water, air, fire, electricity, magnetism, or any of the chemical agencies, we recognise no power in them, but in some source of their motion, in which there must be design and volition. Experience demonstrates the truth of this statement; and no philoso-

phy, which claims to be rational, can invalidate or contradict it. Here we leave this remark, confident that all thinking minds will readily perceive its truth. We might have said before, that power must have a *living* source. But it was no part of our intention to engage in a philosophical discussion of *life*. We, therefore, take for granted, that none will doubt, that life, whatever its definition may be, is essential to the source of power. Our object, at present, is to show, that the source of all power is *mind*, which must live, know, feel, and choose. If mind be capable of volition, it must *feel*. There can be no such thing as volition without feeling. This has been illustrated in a former article, and needs no further discussion for our present purpose.

The original source of all power is the eternal, self-existent, and independent Mind. He has infinite power, and is irresponsible for its exercise; but He is infinitely good, as well as infinitely intelligent and powerful; therefore his government is infinitely safe and desirable. But what most concerns the present discussion is, that all our conceptions of divine power connect with God's will: it is indicated by the connexion between his volition and the effects produced. This connexion, according to the sure testimony of divine revelation, is illimitably certain.

God has created minds, which are finite, dependent on his will for existence, for all their faculties and all their power. These minds are, by God's will, constituted immortal and indestructible. We speak of two orders, angels and men; whether there be other minds we know not, and need not inquire. We do not suppose that either angelick or human minds are incapable of annihilation by that power which gave them being, but we know that it is his will they shall live for ever. Our present

inquiry respects the ability of dependent, mortal and immortal men.

One more general remark may here be made. It relates to man's responsibility, as connected with power. For all the power given to creatures, they must be responsible to their Maker and Sovereign; both for its estimation and employment. This is directly inferred from their relations to him who made, sustains, and governs them. The basis of this responsibility to God, so far as found in men, is their faculties of *knowing* the use of power, of *feeling* the influence of obligation, and of will, or *volition*, to direct its use. Mind is, therefore, the source of man's power, and responsible for its employment. But mind, unintelligent, insensible and inactive, could not be a source of power, nor be held responsible. Such a supposition, however, takes away the essential properties of mind—the faculties of intelligence, feeling and action. This general remark is all we need at present. The subject of responsibility and its connexion with power, will occupy more properly, and more fully, another place in this discussion.

That men have power is demonstrably certain. The whole face of the inhabited earth bears testimony to the fact, every man's consciousness certifies it, and the revelation of God abundantly confirms the truth. This power is derived, dependent and limited. It is derived from the great Source of all things. God has endowed men with life and faculties, capable of producing certain effects. This capability, like life, is the gift of God, and is found in different degrees in different persons, just as the great Author has seen fit to bestow it on them. Can this be doubted? The facts, in proof, are before every eye.

For the continuance of this ability, men are dependent on the will

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of God, as really and as certainly as for life. We often see men utterly, or partially, deprived of it, while life yet continues. Derangement of intellect takes it away, or diminishes it; insensibility of feeling destroys or misdirects it; and various circumstances of its medium and instruments change or destroy it. The whole phenomena of power show its dependence on the omnipotent source. That man's power is limited, admits of no question. But to fix some of its limits, and define its applications, is very difficult. The general fact of limitation to men's ability is admitted on all sides, but much controversy obtains among philosophers and theologians, concerning several particular limits. Were this controversy confined to subjects of speculative philosophy, it would not be worth the pains of investigation. But since it has an important influence in scriptural interpretation, and the discussion of theological doctrine, it will be necessary to examine some of those limits in question. But this also belongs to a consideration of the uses and applications of ability.

Here it is proper to say, that man's power, derived and limited as it is unquestionably, is man's own, as certainly as life is man's own, and in the same sense that the faculties of mind are his. The derivation, dependence, and limits of the power affect not its connexion with the mind, to which it essentially belongs. We have said that mind is the source of power in man. To the mind or spirit belong, essentially, life, faculties of intelligence, feeling and volition—to it also belongs power. We are not able to determine which faculty is the source of ability; nor is it necessary to decide such a question. We know that the primary source of agency or action in man is the faculty of feeling, but this agency is manifested by the will, and has some connexion with in-

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tellect. Man's power is always indicated by a connexion between the volition and the effect; it is therefore immediately connected with the will. It resides not in matter. Let mind be separated from the body, and the whole material machine has lost its power. While life and spirit inhabited the organized matter, its functions were the medium of manifesting ability in various forms; but when deprived of life, the whole is powerless. Man's power must, therefore, have a living, intelligent, feeling and voluntary source: and it is enough that we show its connexion with mind, and trace its manifestation to the will, without attempting to define its precise residence. Here we obtain our substitute for a definition of power—the *connexion between volition and effect*.

Ability is suggested by something being done: and if it be man's ability, it is something voluntarily done. Let any man, who thinks carefully, examine the idea of man's ability, he will come at length to that which actually connects, or may connect, the effort with his volition; this is power. This is its true description; and with a single *exception*, so far as man's ability is concerned, there is no other, which corresponds with the fact. Whatever a man has power to do will be done, if he wills to do it. This expression, if we mistake not, meets the common sense and common apprehensions of men—what is more, it corresponds with the general current of the Holy Scriptures. With a single qualification, which respects the opportunity of exercising the power, we make the appeal to all the above authorities, and fearlessly assert that whatever a man has power to do, give him the opportunity to do it; and it will be done, if he *wills* to do it.

The *exception* to which we al-

luded applies to certain exercises of body and of mind, which have no perceptible dependence on volition. The idea is suggested by this fact, and has several applications, with various shades of meaning, from mere susceptibility, to a close resemblance to what we have already considered power: and we have no objection to call it ability, in certain cases, although not indicated by our substitute for a definition of power. Thus the process of digestion, circulation of the blood, growth of the muscle, and other parts of the body, are involuntary—the perceptions and feelings of the mind are not under control of the will. It is often said of the body, in the cases referred to, that the organs have power to perform those functions; and of the mind, it has power; or is capable of perceiving and feeling. In this sense of ability, we readily concede that the exercise of any faculty denotes a power to exercise. But without stopping to examine the theory of involuntary bodily motion, it is proper to discuss a little the laws of mind, involved in its involuntary phenomena. The mind is capable of exercises appropriate to each faculty, but the principal advantage of using the term power is, to describe the nature of mind—thus the mind has power to perceive, feel, and choose. The idea is suggested by a connexion between the faculty and its appropriate exercise, as between cause and effect. Whatever this power may be, the most important principle to be recognised in its law is, that this capability of feeling is not under control of the will. Pleasure and pain, ecstasy and disgust, are not under the influence of volitions.

The distinctions of power have been many, and most of them useless. There are, however, two classifications, which have been made in reference to those differ-

ent applications above considered, and which may occupy a few moments.

It has been called *active* and *speculative*. Active power moves the body, and turns the thoughts from one subject to another. Speculative power is that included in the exception made above—the ability of judging, remembering, and all intellectual exercises. The other classification referred to is, *active* and *passive*. Passive power is the capacity of receiving impressions or suffering. In these classifications, *speculative* and *passive* power are both of doubtful propriety. At all events, passive power is merely susceptibility, which we hesitate much to call ability.

We had intended to dispose, in this place, of some remarks on several uses of terms indicating power, but it will divert us more from our object than to take notice of them as they occur in the next article. Some remarks on the *kinds* of ability, as distinguished by its *source*, *instruments*, *limits* and *effects*; particularly some of the latter, are important, and will close the present number. From the *sources* these are distinguished, divine, angelick, human and animal power, because it is connected with the volition of different agents, and recognised as from a different origin. This need not be discussed. With respect to the *instruments* employed, there are mental, muscular, mechanical, gravitating and chemical power. Of this distinction in denominating the kinds of power, it is only necessary to observe, that instruments do not alter the nature, but only change the relation or use of the ability. It is of some importance to recollect this, because many are misled by the diversity of names and terms, which only denote the various instruments and relations of power. As to *limits*, there are *small* and *great*, of indefinable varieties and degrees. If we speak

of divine power, it is unlimited—infinite; but of finite ability the degrees are many, and the limits not easily defined. Hence men often over estimate their power, and are often disappointed in their expectations and efforts, in many things important to their interest or usefulness. Again, on the other hand, men frequently make an under estimate of their ability, and drone away their time to little purpose, when, if roused to exertion, and made acquainted with the extent of their power, they might accomplish much that is important and useful. In most cases, however, of the above classifications, there is, comparatively, little difficulty in ascertaining the signification of the terms employed. But the most difficult classifications and indefinite terms in use, are those relating to the *effects* produced. With many of these our present object has no connexion—such as political, ecclesiastical, judicial and martial power. We are aware that these terms suggest other associations than those which we have described as connected with power; but the difference, when carefully analyzed, would be found less than may seem at first view. In this class there are in extensive use the distinctions of *physical*, *natural* and *moral* power, which require particular examination.

Physical and natural are often used synonymously, but sometimes distinctively, although it would seem that there can be little difference in their technical meaning. It is not worth our while to examine here the different shades of meaning attached to these terms, as connected with power; our purpose will be answered by considering them as having the same meaning when opposed to moral. We shall, therefore, use them indiscriminately as synonymous.

Man has *physical* and *moral* power, entirely distinct in character, each limited to its proper sphere,

and no wise interfering with the functions of the other. We learn this fact, and the knowledge of this distinction, from the effects produced and the relations of men's actions. This fact, however, is greatly abused, misconstrued, and misapplied. We doubt very much, whether the metaphysico-theological writers and preachers, who abound in this speculative age, and who use so freely this distinction, have ever examined, inductively, or even settled in their own minds, what they mean by *moral* ability. Multitudes seem not to have any fixed association of thoughts with *natural* ability, although they hobby the phrase so constantly. It would be easy to illustrate this remark by a reference to a host of modern writers; and any thinking man has only to open his ears to the metaphysical jargon from many pulpits in the land, to be more than convinced of its truth. We think it very questionable, whether the distinction between *natural* and *moral* ability is useful at all, in theological discussions. What is more, we think it extremely doubtful whether the only proper meaning of *moral* power is apprehended at all, by those who make the most free use of it in theological subjects.

What is intended by man's physical power? This question has been already answered, if we have succeeded at all in our object. A condensed view of the doctrine involved in the answer to this question may be given. It is suggested by a connexion between volition and the effect—mind, living, intelligent, sensitive and voluntary, is its source—it is dependent and limited; distinguished by its source, instruments, limits and effects. A substitute for its definition is, the connexion which suggests the idea of power. All that need be added is, the reason why it is called physical or natural. To us it seems

evident, that it is so denominated from the effects produced. Physical effects are produced by physical power. Walking, and in general, bodily motions, are physical effects. The arts and employments of life, are of the same character. But we have not room for extended illustration.

What is man's moral ability? We only say now that it is so called, because the effects are of a moral character. This subject, together with some of the *uses* and applications of power, will constitute the objects of inquiry in our next article. These objects are among the most interesting topics of discussion before the Christian publick.

F.

(To be continued.)

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EXTRACT FROM THE CHRISTIAN OBSERVER.

We take the following instructive and pleasing paper from the Christian Observer of September last. The writer shows himself to be an Episcopalian, and to have some partialities, such as all good men have for the Christian denomination which they conscientiously prefer. But he is neither a bigot nor an exclusionist, although his charity extends to some who are so. A principal object which he had in view was, to oppose those in Britain, of whom there are at present a considerable number, even among protestants, and those too that are esteemed truly pious, who believe in modern miracles, and a revival of the prophetic spirit. As yet, this example of *improvement and the march of mind*, has not, so far as we have heard, been exhibited in this country, unless it be among the Mormonites, and the followers of Jemima Wilkinson. But we shall not be at all surprised to hear of it soon, among

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

APRIL, 1832.

## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LXVI.

Having shown what are the *inward* means by which the benefits of the great redemption of Christ are to be obtained—faith and repentance—we are now to consider the *outward* means—And our Catechism teaches us, that “The outward and ordinary means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption, are his ordinances, especially the word, sacraments and prayer; all which are made effectual to the elect for salvation.”

You may observe that this answer speaks not only of *outward*, but of *ordinary* means—by which latter designation we are to understand those means which are most commonly and extensively used, and most frequently blessed, for the conversion of sinners and the edification of saints. All the ordinances of God are to be regarded, and are of great use in the church. These, in our larger Catechism, are said to be—in addition to those mentioned in the answer before us—“church government and discipline; the ministry and maintenance thereof; swearing by the name of God; and vowing

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unto him.” These, as being divine ordinances; that is, *commanded duties* in the divine word, are all to be regarded and observed, in their proper place and season; “yet *the word, sacraments and prayer*, are the *chief, or principal outward means*, for communicating the benefits of redemption.”\*

The providences of God are doubtless frequently blessed, to awaken and alarm careless sinners, and to correct and recall backsliding believers; but this is done, only by leading them to reflect on their duty as taught and enjoined in the written word of God; and therefore the providences themselves, are not, in the Catechism, considered as standing on the same ground with those which are more directly means of grace.

There are two ideas of great importance, that here demand your most serious attention. The first is, that the means have no inherent efficacy in themselves, to produce the blessings of redemption—This is distinctly taught in the answer before us, where it is said that they are “*made effectual to salvation.*” *Means* are not *ends*, and are never to be rested in, till the end is attained, for which alone they are used. To this error of resting in means, there is

\* Fisher.

pect it is with many others—The reason that they are partly Calvinists, and partly Arminians, is, that they dare not look the Calvinistick principles through, follow them to their source, and receive them with all their consequences. They see some of them so clearly that they cannot but believe them; but follow them a little farther, they are shocked, they appear terrible—Here they drop them, and entertain some inconsistent notions for the remainder of their creed. They believe the perfections of God, and that he foreknew all things; but when from God's foreknowledge, wisdom, power and goodness any argue that the accomplishment of all things is, and will be, according to God's plan—

Here the Sketch of Mr. Green's life, as written by himself, is abruptly terminated, by the loss of the last leaf of his manuscript. A member of the sentence which follows the above, or of which it is a part, remains, but it is not finished. Some account of the last thirteen years of his life, we hope to give in the next number of our work.

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#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

##### *Uses and Distinctions of Human Power.*

The department of mental science, with which we head this article, is at all times important. But at this time there is an importance attached to its discussion, of absorbing interest. The philosophical speculations of the age are leading theologians astray, perverting the holy scriptures, unsettling the principles of orthodoxy, and exerting a mischievous influence in practical duties. What can, therefore, be more interesting to the Christian publick than the discussion of those points, where philosophy has concentrated its sub-

tlities and force, to undermine the truth and pervert the spirit of the gospel. This may sound to some like a tone of needless alarm, others may smile at the discomfiture of our feelings; while not a few may think we attach undue importance to the topicks, which we have promised to examine in this article. Be all this as it may, we honestly believe that orthodoxy, truth and practical godliness, are more endangered by certain philosophical speculations on the doctrine and relations of human ability, than from all other speculations of the age. There seems to us more danger of undermining the citadel of truth, by errors of this class, than by any, or all others. When an errorist attacks, directly, the doctrines of grace, such as atonement and justification by the imputed righteousness of Christ, we meet him with a "thus saith the Lord," and feel secure in the argument. But when he comes with his false philosophy, and succeeds in perverting the views of human character, sin and ability, he has fixed a standard of interpretation which he applies to the scriptures, and entirely changes the plainest declarations of God's word. By settling a principle of interpretation which disregards philology, analogy, and the *usus loquendi*, bringing language and doctrine to the test of a philosophical theory, the process of the interpreter is short, and the labour easy. It serves also to give men a vain and reckless confidence in the deductions of their own reasoning, the danger of which has been experienced in ages long since passed. But no disastrous results of former ages can alarm the speculatists of the above description. They stand upon their own imagined independence, and are intent upon some great improvements in theological doctrine. We do not suppose that all the errors in doctrine, which infest the

church, nor all the errors in practice, which abound at the present day, have their origin in the influence of the false philosophy to which we allude; but we do suppose that a very large share may be traced to this source. Our views will be developed on this subject, before we end the discussion.

We proceed now to redeem our pledge, given in the last number, on the subject of *moral ability*. It will be necessary to bear in mind some things which we have said of power, the idea of which is always gained from a connexion between cause and effect. Why do we speak of moral power? Is it not because we attach moral character or qualities, to effects or actions; and from this infer that something moral belongs to its source? Moral faculties, employed in producing moral effects, suggest the idea of what we call moral ability. What is it? Wherein does it differ from any other ability, except in the character of its source, and its effects? A question here occurs which ought to be distinctly understood and answered—What belongs to man of a moral nature; and why is it moral? An answer to this question might be gathered from what we have already said; but to prevent the necessity of turning back, and to present the facts in their proper relation to the topick now under examination, we recapitulate them in this place. *Moral* has relation to holiness, or sin, right, or wrong. That which is holy or sinful, right or wrong, is properly moral, and nothing else. There may be some things belonging to man, or done by him, which have no moral character. Whatever will not distinguish a good or holy being from a sinful being, has no moral quality; it is common to both. What distinguishes a holy from a sinful man? It must be something which belongs to mind, and not to matter.

Is it intellect? Is it will? Is it heart? If we speak of each faculty in abstract terms, and by itself, neither will distinguish them. Good and bad men have understanding, heart and will; but in one man they are right, and in the other wrong. What is the primary ground of distinction; or, in other words, in which faculty is the foundation of this wide discrimination? To us the *heart* seems to answer the question. Good and bad men may perceive the same things, and choose the same things, to great extent, but the moment we examine the feelings, we perceive direct opposition. One loves, the other hates, holy things. It may be necessary to say here, that we admit a distinguishing difference, both in the exercises of intellect, and in volitions: And we hold the doctrine of divine illumination as a guidance. But the difference in the exercises of intellect, is in the degree of clearness in perceiving the truth. Wicked men must perceive something of the holiness and truth of God, else they would not hate them.

We consider the heart, or faculty of feeling, as possessing a moral character in itself; it is the primary spring or principle of action. Let this be right and the man is good, though his knowledge be limited or extensive; but if the heart be wrong, he is bad, however ignorant or informed. We do not say equally good or bad, whatever may be the extent of knowledge. But man is a moral *being*, because he has a faculty in its nature moral; it loves or hates holy objects. Man is a moral *agent*, because he has a principle of agency, and it belongs to his moral faculty: consequently man is a *moral agent*.

Now in order to apprehend clearly, the idea of moral power, take the following synopsis of several things already discussed. The *heart* is the principle of moral

agency, and is necessary to constitute man a moral agent, because without feeling he could not act, could not be blameable, or praiseworthy; and could not be rewarded with happiness or misery. The *understanding* is also necessary to moral agency. Not because it is a principle of action, but because unknown objects cannot affect the heart. It is the faculty of intelligence, through which the heart receives all its impressions of pleasure or disgust; and without which medium there could be no action. It is the office of the intellect to devise the means of obtaining the objects which please, and of avoiding those which pain the heart. In its moral relation, it is necessary to discern what is right and what is wrong; to know the reason of praise and blame, and the propriety of rewards and punishments. The *will* is also essential to moral agency. Obedient to the feelings of the heart, the will, or faculty of volition, directs the understanding and bodily motions to obtain or accomplish the objects agreeable to the heart, or to avoid those things which are disagreeable. The will is necessary to perform many, if not all, the duties involved in moral agency; and to manifest the character of the heart. These are the elements of a free moral agent. What now is his *moral power*? It is suggested by those moral elements, employed to produce moral results or effects. If man acts right or wrong, he has moral power; if he does both, he has power to do both. As we said before, that the principal idea of natural or physical power is the connexion between volition and the effect, or to have the substitute before mentioned, that which forms or sustains the connexion; so we say here, the leading thought, expressed in moral power, is the connexion between the feelings of the heart and the effects, or actions.

We proceed now with the main object of this article; some inquiries into the uses and applications of human power, together with certain uses made of the distinction between material and moral ability.

One general use of power is obvious from the preceding discussion. Men are by it constituted agents, and may be voluntarily employed to accomplish the purposes of God, and promote the welfare of their fellow men. Man's power may be employed for valuable purposes in his social state, and for his individual benefit. But is it always so employed? Far from it. The inquiry may be pursued; why not? What controls and perverts man's ability from obedience to his Maker, from his own and his fellow creature's happiness? This question deserves careful examination. We say the heart is the spring or source of action. Let this be right with God, and all will be right; let it be wrong, and all will be wrong. The desires and feelings will always express the character of the heart. Man's ability to do mischief, or *accomplish* that which is good, will depend upon his opportunities, means, sagacity, and intellectual discipline; but whether actually he do good or evil, depends on the temper of his heart.

We may as well come directly to the use made of the distinction between natural and moral ability, because its discussion will show the most important limits and uses of human power. It is alleged, by a large class of metaphysical theologians, that *men have natural power to obey all God's commands*. Let us examine this philosophy: and if we can spare a little space, we will also examine its theology. For we hold that the philosophy and theology of this dogma are distinct things, although they may be blended together, and involve each other. But if we examine

the theology of the allegation, we should bring it to the test of what God has said, fairly and philologically interpreted. But we now inquire into its philosophy. How are the facts?

We say the allegation is partly true, or it is utterly false, just as it may be understood. If the meaning be, that men have natural power to do all those things which appropriately belong to their natural ability, then it is true; but these are not all the things which God commands. So that in the form of its statement, it is only true in part. Again, if it mean that men have this kind of power to perform all the duties in which natural power is employed, it is partly true. It is true, that men have just that natural ability, which God requires them to exercise, or the employment of which is involved in obedience to the command. But this affects not the point in controversy. It is not the employment of physical ability which gives moral character to actions: nor is it the province of natural power to effect moral results. If the meaning be, what seems to be the plain construction of the terms of its statement, that men are naturally able to obey all God's commands, it is utterly false in its philosophy, and worse than false in its theology. It is admitted by all, that God's commands are, many of them at least, moral. We know that many external actions, which God commands, men are naturally able to perform. Such are, labouring with their hands, tilling the ground, sowing and reaping, together with many acts of beneficence. But the whole controversy respects natural power to produce moral results; or in more common style, to do that which is exclusively moral. To bring the examination to a point, let us take *love* to God, which is indisputably a moral action of the heart, and which God most pe-

remptorily commands, and examine the application of this philosophical doctrine of natural ability. Have men natural ability to love God? Our opposing philosophy affirms: we deny. Is there any physical power employed in this simple affection of the heart? We answer no; and this brings out the first reason and ground of our denial. It may be connected with the exercise of physical power, and followed by its employment in many ways, but the affection itself is a moral feeling of a moral faculty, and that is its whole philosophical description. There is no physical power in it: and to think of looking for this moral feeling from the exercise of natural power, is no more rational than the attempt to gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles. We stand, therefore, on firm ground in this denial. We show that the philosophical pretension does violence to the principle on which the distinction between natural and moral ability is founded. Take any ground, which the advocates of the distinction may choose, and this application of it to the simple affection of love to God violates that ground. This we fearlessly assert. We have seen, it is true, several, and widely different, reasons of this distinction, and several grounds on which it is maintained; and this application of natural power to loving God is inconsistent with all of them. If men loved God with the hand, or foot, or intellect, or with any thing except their hearts, the case would be different. The fact, that all the faculties of mind and body may be under the influence of love to God as a principle of action, is distinctly admitted; but still, it is incontrovertibly true, that love is an affection of the heart, and belongs exclusively to that faculty.

A second reason of our denial is, that natural power never did

govern, and it never can control, the affections of the heart. They are moral exercises of a moral faculty, and it would be degrading man from his high rank in the workmanship of his Creator, to place his moral character under the control of physical power, in any sense which might be implied in the subjugation affirmed in the philosophy which we oppose. To bring this matter to the test, we appeal to known and common facts, so multiplied and familiar, that we need only make one general statement. It often occurs that men's judgments are convinced that they ought to love certain others whom they dislike, or to dislike others whom they love, but after all their conviction and continued efforts, no change of affection takes place. But we will not spend time in illustrations from analogous facts, which must be familiar to all who will think. Let us examine the case as alleged. And here we ask the advocates of the philosophy, if they have ever seen a man convinced that he ought to love God, filled with agonizing distress at the discovery of his crime in hating God, employing all his time and efforts to change his affections, for days and weeks, without success? During all this time, his whole physical ability has been employed to place the affections on God and Christ, and holy objects, without approximating the change attempted. Will it be alleged that it is because he mistakes, or knows not the proper method of employing his power? Where is the defect? He apprehends his danger and his sin; he believes fully that he must perish, if he love not God; he bends all his intellectual efforts to the investigation of God's character and truth; he seeks instruction from those skilled in the direction of sinners to Christ; and, after all, he remains, by the evidence of his own consciousness, unreconciled to God.

He does, externally, the same things to great extent, which those do, who love God; and he gives evidence that his intellect is employed about the same subjects. Could his volition change the character of his affections, he is sure it would be done without delay. Where is the defect? There is inducement enough present to his mind; but after all, no love springs up in his heart. The truth is, the defect is not in the employment of his natural ability; the difficulty lies in the temper of his heart, which all his physical power can never control.

Again, we ask these philosophers if they are acquainted with the mental exercises called the Christian warfare within. If so, will they explain, on their principles, the facts, over which they lament with an apostle—"a law in their members warring against the law of their mind, and bringing them into captivity to the law of sin?" Why are not Christians as holy as they desire to be? If they have natural power to perform all that God commands, why do they not at least love him as much as he requires? The fact is most evident that the hearts of Christians have remaining propensities to evil, and these constitute the controlling "law of sin," to which they are captivated, and by which their natural ability is often directed.

We have many reasons for denying the allegation, which has been so popular with a certain class of theologians: but we have not space to illustrate them. We have stated two, which present the philosophical facts and principles contravened by the dogma. These might be presented in different forms, and lead us to several inferences. We make two or three inferences, from the principle involved in the use made of natural ability in the statement which we oppose. Of course we do not as-

cribe our inferences to those who hold and preach the dogma; but they are inferences which we could not avoid, if we admitted the principle. If it were a law of mental operation that the affections obey the volition; or which is the same thing, were under the control of physical ability, there would be no pain or mental suffering in the world. All men would be happy, no matter what objects might be presented, what disappointments might occur, or what calamities might befall them: they would only have to choose to be pleased with what is called calamity, or disappointment, and they would be happy.

Again, men might always possess just such characters as they choose; be just as penitent, humble, devout and holy as they choose, without the mission or agency of the Holy Spirit. The whole plan of salvation by Jesus Christ, and the mission of the Holy Comforter, would be unnecessary. In short, we see not how, according to this law of mind, any man could be punished in a future state, though he should be cast into outer darkness; let him choose to delight in what the Scriptures call torment, and his happiness would be complete for ever. To us these seem legitimate inferences from the principle, and may be included in the reasons why we deny the statement.

What then, it may well be asked, is the use of this famous distinction between natural and moral ability? Before we reply to this question, upon our own principles of philosophy, we beg leave to state some of the uses which we think it actually subserves, as employed by those to whom we alluded in the statement above. One purpose which it evidently subserves, whether so intended or not, is to make ignorant and indiscriminating hearers think the preacher very wise, while they profess not to understand the distinctions. We have seen such hearers gape with

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astonishment, while they listened to those metaphysical distinctions; and when they left the place of preaching, we have heard them say, the preacher must be a very learned man, he seems to be familiar with things which we do not understand at all. We leave others to estimate the value of this result. Another effect is produced on many thinking minds, by the manner in which the terms natural ability are used by many preachers; they conclude there is some real contradiction in the revelation of God, to conceal which, the preacher resorts to metaphysical philosophy. But these are comparatively harmless effects, when some others are considered. It misleads multitudes in estimating their character, danger and duty. They perceive, what is true, that they have power, which they are told is physical, to perform the common actions of social life; and that they cannot be held responsible for the exertion of power which they do not possess. This becomes a maxim of extensive application; and because it is true in its legitimate application, they think the more confidently that it bears them out, in estimating their natural ability as fully competent to perform all that God requires. An inference from this strain of argument is practically felt and acted on, to a fearful extent, which leads them to think they have little need of a Saviour, and less need of the Holy Spirit's influence. They cannot, therefore, be very criminal, and are in no danger but what it is in their power, at any time, to avoid. Men will think, under the influence of this philosophy, that their intentions are very good: they may have committed some mistakes, which they are abundantly able to correct and avoid in future. They may be told, and told truly, that it is their duty to repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ at once: to this they may assent, but

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as they have power to perform these duties at any time, they feel not the urgency of the obligation, and rely upon their own ability to secure the boon, whenever they shall choose. We do not say this is the instruction given them, but we do affirm, that such is the use; or, if it better please a certain class of teachers, the abuse of such philosophy. By the way, the abuse is not so great as many apprehend; nor is it so great an abuse of their preaching, as is their abuse of the doctrine of power. The abuse to which we allude is this: after dividing man's power into natural and moral, they represent him as capable of accomplishing, with one division, that which appropriately belongs to the other; and that which God requires to be performed by both. It is not at all strange that such a perversion of true philosophy, should be followed by greater aberrations from truth.

There are some other evils connected with the use of this philosophy; but our intention is, in a subsequent article, to examine, more at length, the different parts of this system, misnamed philosophy. We have only room to say here, that the advocates of the pretended improvement in mental science tell us, that it subserves an important purpose in bringing men to a consciousness of their responsibility. They set out with the principle, that men are not bound to do what they have not power to perform; or in other words, man's ability is the measure of his responsibility. Hence the necessity of the distinction between natural and moral power. Men must have natural power to perform all that God commands, or the commands are unjust. This, if we do not mistake, is a candid statement of the principle, in its most plausible form. But plausible as it may seem, we think it unsound. Physical ability is not the measure of man's responsible-

ness to God, because he owes to his Maker feelings which involve no such ability. The highest act of obedience is love, is moral, and proceeds exclusively from a moral source. The plausibility of the statement consists, in the truth of its application to those actions which are appropriate to natural ability; and its fallacy in its application to feelings of the heart, in which there is no employment of natural power. There is still another fallacy; it implies that all moral good and evil belongs exclusively to volition. This is sometimes considered as an inference from the maxim above stated; but by some it is considered as a primary principle, and the doctrine of responsibility, measured by power, derived from the voluntary nature of all that is moral. It is immaterial whether one or the other be primary or inferential, both principles are involved. We have not room, in the present article, to pursue this topic. In our next number we hope to set this matter in its proper light.

F.

*(To be continued.)*


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MODERN MIRACLES, AND PHRENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS.

A series of extended and very interesting papers has lately appeared in the *Christian Observer*; and was still to be continued, when the number of that work from which we have made the following extract was published—The papers bear the title of "A Visit to a Cathedral." The erudite and elegant writer of these papers, makes the historical recollections, awakened by the monuments of antiquity in the cathedral church of Winchester, the starting point of a variety of religious, moral, and literary observations, of much interest and considerable instruction.

THE  
**CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.**

MAY, 1832.

**Religious Communications.**

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LIVII.

The instrumentality of the word of God in the conversion and subsequent edification of sinners, is to be the subject of discussion in the present lecture, on the following answer of our catechism, viz.—“The Spirit of God maketh the reading, but especially the preaching of the word, an effectual means of convincing and converting sinners, and of building them up in holiness and comfort, through faith, unto salvation.”

The gospel of Jesus Christ, under which it is our high and peculiar privilege to live, is a dispensation of the Spirit—It is so in a more eminent degree, by far, than the preceding patriarchal and Mosaick dispensations. Our catechism, as we have heretofore seen, teaches us, that—“We are made partakers of the redemption purchased by Christ, by the effectual application of it to us by his Holy Spirit.” The *application* of the finished work of the Redeemer to his elect people, both before and after their conversion, belongs *officially* to God the Holy Ghost—They are “born of the Spirit,” and all their graces are “graces of the  
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Spirit.” Neither the reading nor the preaching of the word, would ever become effectual to the salvation of a single soul, if they were not made so by the powerful influence of the blessed Spirit. This is a truth never to be overlooked or forgotten. The word of God is called the “sword of the Spirit;” and as a sword can effect nothing without a hand to wield it, so the word of God itself remains wholly inoperative, in the matter of our salvation, till it is taken into the hand of the Spirit, and applied by his almighty energy, to the purpose for which it has been provided. Yet, on the other hand, it must be kept in mind, that the Holy Spirit does not, ordinarily, work any saving change in the hearts of adult persons, without the word; and hence the unspeakable importance that the word should be carefully read and faithfully preached.

It is scarcely necessary to remark, that by “the word,” in the answer before us, we are to understand the whole revealed will of God contained in the Bible, consisting of the Old and New Testaments. No part of this word is superfluous; although, as I have heretofore shown, some portions of it are more practical than others, and on that account ought to be more frequently perused, and more

as to his future well being. He answered—"I have a hope"—and after a short interval added—"and some fear." These, it is believed, were the last words that he uttered. Such was the death-bed scene of this eminent saint. Had he expired, as he fully expected to do, about fifteen years before his actual decease, in the illness of which an account has been given, he would have left the world in the joyful assurance of Christian faith and hope. But it pleased the Sovereign Disposer of death, as well as of life, that this his faithful servant, having once exhibited a triumph over the king of terrors, should at length bow to his stroke

in a state of stupor; and with "some fear," mingled with his "hope"—thus giving him, in his departing moments, the allotment of many, perhaps of a majority, of the people of God. Yet, "precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints," whatever variety there may be in the circumstances of their death, or in the measure of their dying consolations.

An attempt was made by the writer, to mark the chief lineaments of his father's character, in the following epitaph, which is inscribed on his monumental stone—

Under this stone are deposited  
The remains of the REV. JACOB GREEN, A. M.  
First pastor of the Hanover church,  
Who died, 24th May, A. D. 1790,  
Aged 68 years,  
Of which, 44 were spent  
In the gospel ministry.  
He was a man of temper  
Even, firm and resolute;  
Of affections temperate,  
Steady and benevolent;  
Of genius solid, inquisitive,  
And penetrating;  
Of industry active and unwearied;  
Of learning, various and accurate;  
Of manners, simple and reserved;  
Of piety, humble, enlightened,  
Fervent and eminent.  
As a preacher, he was  
Instructive, plain, searching, practical;  
As a pastor watchful, laborious;  
Ever intent on some plan  
For the glory of God,  
And the salvation of his flock;  
And, by the divine blessing,  
Happily and eminently successful.

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *Uses and Distinctions of Human Power.*

We resume the consideration of two principles, stated in the close of our last article, on power, viz.,

man's natural ability the measure of his obligation—and moral good and evil belonging exclusively to volition.

These two principles naturally go together, and constitute parts of the same philosophical system.

The greater portion of those who advocate one, hold the other. We are aware, at present, of very few exceptions. We conceive ourselves fully authorized to consider and treat them as parts of the same scheme, belonging together, and maintained by the advocates of what is sometimes familiarly called new school philosophy.

Let us examine these principles more fully, and see to what they would lead us. They involve the self-determining power of the will, or else they blend together mental exercises essentially distinct, that is, feeling and choice. On this point, however, it is fair to state, there is a diversity of opinion, among those who adopt the general theory. Some affirm, and others deny, the existence of a principle distinct from exercise. Some hold the *exercise* scheme, and others advocate pre-existing faculties, but both agree in denying moral character to any thing, antecedent to free, voluntary exercise. It seems to us that the scheme is fairly stated, in positive terms, thus: All moral character belongs exclusively to exercises of the will—the power, which produces the moral exercises, belongs exclusively to the will—and this power limits and measures moral obligation. Here we have, necessarily included in the scheme, three principles which form the basis of a theological system, whose every part is modified and adjusted to this foundation. To use another figure, they form a prism, by which every truth of theology and mental philosophy is refracted from its original intention. It is not strange, therefore, that we have truths separated, which belong together; and others combined, which have no immediate connexion. But in plain language, let us look at some of the results to which this philosophy will lead. Take the first principle, that guilt attaches exclusively to

volition, and then it is inferred that men have no connexion with the "guilt of Adam's first sin," and no "corruption of the whole nature," from which actual transgressions proceed. Thus we have one method of sweeping away original sin and innate depravity: but there is another. Natural ability, according to the second principle, belongs exclusively to man's will, therefore it would be absurd to suppose this self-determining power represented by another. Adam could not be constituted the representative of his race, unless each individual so chose, which is utterly impossible according to the assumed principle. But there is still another method: natural ability, according to the third principle, is the measure of moral obligation, and that is not transferable, therefore, one man cannot be held responsible for another's act or sin. The doctrine of representation in Adam is hence inferred to be inconsistent with the nature of morality and justice. The result from this philosophy is, that men are born free from all sin and corruption. Now we should suppose, according to this doctrine, that when God kills them, as he sometimes does, in this state, they are annihilated with the beasts that perish. We have found no place in God's revelation for rational beings who are neither holy nor sinful. But we have taken only one side of the absurdity, and this last supposition requires to be connected with both. The other side is this, righteousness is as much voluntary as personal, and no more imputable than guilt. Men are, therefore, born neither holy nor sinful; not worthy of happiness or misery; and yet some of them die. Imputation has no place in the theory, because voluntary actions are personal, and nothing else can be moral; and because moral character can be no more transmitted or imputed than

the acts themselves. These are some of the legitimate results from the principles above stated; from which it will be readily seen, their application must have an influence to neutralize or modify all the doctrines of christianity. But we will not, at present, trace further the absurdities to which the theory would lead us. Although we consider it perfectly lawful to reason from the absurdities of consequences legitimately drawn, to the falsity of the premises, we propose now to examine the premises themselves.

The first position, that all moral character belongs exclusively to exercises of the will, is bad philosophy and worse theology. Examine its philosophy. The will, which is governed by the affections and must receive its entire direction from them, is represented as exclusively virtuous or vicious. It makes the source of action neither good nor bad: in other words, the heart, which controls all the volitions, and directs all man's ability, has no moral character. This is an effect without any adequate cause. Should it be alleged that volitions include all that we call feelings of the heart, or affections, the philosophy would be no better, although the theology might be slightly improved. We have abundantly shown, in former articles, that such a supposition does not accord with fact, and we now repeat, if any man will be guided by facts, inductively examined in his own investigation of the mental phenomena, he cannot fail to reject a theory so absurd.

The second position is equally untenable—it is the old dogma of self-determining power, with a different phraseology of explanation. Now it is a well ascertained and established law of mental operation, that the will is uniformly governed by the pleasure of the heart. The supposition of a self-determining power in the will is, therefore,

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absurd and impossible. The will cannot act without motive, and that motive must be in the controlling faculty. We use the term motive as defined in a former article, and not for the ultimate object which excites the affection of pleasure.

The third position requires a more particular examination; and we are now prepared to show that man's natural ability is not the measure of his moral obligation. We here request our readers to recollect the illustrations of natural power already given, together with admissions and explanations, which we have made in a former number, concerning all the instrumental agencies and limitations of physical ability. With these in view, we apply the alleged principle to the duty of loving God, to which all admit men are morally obliged. It will stand thus—if men have not natural power to love God, they cannot be under obligations to love him. This is considered by many as strong ground, is asserted with great boldness, and repeated with pertinacious earnestness. But it is one thing to assert and repeat a proposition, and quite another matter to prove it. So it will be found in this case. Let it be remembered that this ability cannot mean self-determining power of the will to love God: man has no such power. It cannot mean a control which the volition of the will might be supposed to have over the affections to change them from hatred to love. The supposition contradicts the law of mental operation. It cannot mean that men love God with any thing, or faculty, purely physical and destitute of moral character. Such a supposition would do violence to every principle of sound philosophy, having any relation to the case, and destroy all distinction between natural and moral power. If we are not deceived, very many philoso-

phers, whom we oppose, would be unwilling to lose this distinction. But whether they would like to lose it or not, we are not yet prepared to relinquish it; although we may retain it for a different purpose from theirs.

The question still recurs, what does the dogma mean? Does it mean, that unless men have hearts disposed to love God they are not bound to love him? Surely none can advocate such a sentiment; its philosophy would be as bad as its theology is obviously false. Does it mean that unless men have all the faculties of a moral agent they cannot be bound to love their Maker? This would be giving it a meaning true in itself, but it cannot be the meaning of the declaration; because these faculties are not power, nor could all the natural power conceivable constitute man a moral, responsible agent. Man must have a moral faculty, in order to be morally responsible. With that faculty, and with that alone, he loves God, if he ever love him at all. We know that other faculties of mind and body are instrumental in manifesting this love; but love in itself is purely an affection of the heart. Now if a man naturally hates God, does he violate no obligation? We say *naturally*, not with his physical power, but with that temper of heart, with which he was born; and this is what we mean by naturally hating God. We think every man thus violates a sacred obligation, not because he omits to employ little or much physical power in loving God, but because he omits the appropriate exercise of his moral faculty, and exercises it in hostility to his duty and the Lawgiver. Take these statements in another form, and the result will be very plain. Men love God only with the heart, or moral faculty—there is no exercise of natural power at all in the affection—men's natural ability is always under

the control of their moral power, and not the moral under the control of physical power. It must, therefore, be clearly evident that natural ability is not the measure of men's moral obligation.

But there is plausibility in the assertion; and since many admit it as true, it may be worth inquiry why it is plausible. On a careful examination, the reasons will appear obvious. The declaration is true in its application to external actions, which always involve the employment of natural ability. Nothing can be more plain. A man must possess the power and instruments indispensable to the accomplishment of any external action, in order to be placed under obligation to do it. Natural power is employed to move the body in all its voluntary motions. Whatever, therefore, men are bound to perform by the bodily instrumentality, must be limited by the physical ability possessed. Here it should not be forgotten that we use the term for that which connects the effort with the volition. A man cannot be obliged to fly, to lift a mountain, or to perform any such external acts as exceed his ability and his means. It is perfectly evident that in all such cases no obligation can exist where there is no power. The applications of this principle being so numerous, as well as true, it is not strange that the principle should be carried out of its proper sphere, and applied to all the relations of obligation. It is no matter of surprise that men, who do not accurately discriminate, should not apprehend the impropriety of applying a principle, true in itself, and in so many legitimate uses, to emotions exclusively moral. Moreover, one use of the will is to direct the understanding to investigate or neglect subjects of thought. A man cannot be under obligation to investigate what it is impossible for his intellect to investigate. Be-

yond the capacity, obligation cannot bind the intellect. The perversion and blindness of the understanding from its appropriate employment and apprehension, are altogether apart from this statement and admission. The whole intellectual capacity may be criminally perverted and blinded by the influence of the heart. This blindness to the truth and ways of God, though it may take away the natural ability to discern spiritual things, cannot release from obligation. But our meaning and our admission are that, in things which depend on men's intellectual capacity, or on what is often called intellectual acuteness and strength, we have no objection to apply the principle. It is true in this application, and this serves to illustrate the plausibility of its application to feelings of the heart. But we need not linger on this part of the inquiry, since the application of the principle is only plausible. We offer two reasons which set aside the plausibility.

The first reason is, that natural ability is not employed at all in the emotions of love and hatred, pleasure and pain. It cannot, therefore, be said that men have natural power to do what involves no such ability. The second reason is, that the heart, or moral faculty, is the principle of agency and source of action. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that man's natural power can ever control that of which it is only an instrument. Natural ability is not, therefore, and it cannot be, the measure of man's moral obligation to God. We have only examined the sentiment with reference to loving God, but the same may be said of all the emotions, as penitence, gratitude, &c. It is not necessary that we pursue this part of the discussion any further.

We may here add that moral ability is not the measure of man's obligation. This has not, as far

as we know, been advocated; and yet we have often wondered that, in this age, so prolific in speculations, some men have not risen up to advocate and contend that moral ability is indispensable to man that he should be under obligation to perform moral acts. We think it would be quite as rational and tenable as the other, even if it were applied to man's whole duty. The truth is, power, of any kind, limits responsibility only instrumentally. It is not a standard nor measure of moral obligation. It is undoubtedly true that men have, by nature, moral power to hate God, not natural power, nor have they moral power to love him, and this proves their crime. We have been the more prolix in the discussion of this topic, because so much plausible deception has been mingled with mental philosophy; and because it seemed necessary, in order to understand the legitimate use of that famous distinction between natural and moral ability.

We recur now to the question, what is the proper use of a distinction which has been so often echoed from the pulpit, and which is so mischievous in its perverted applications? It must readily occur to those who examine the subject with care, that distinctions of power, so undefinable in itself, and so perplexing to all who attempt its investigation, cannot be of the utmost importance, nor have any indispensable use in the plain illustrations of revealed truth. It would seem strange if that revelation which is intended for all men, whether learned or ignorant, should require, in its illustration, the use of distinctions so subtle, and belonging to a subject beyond comprehension. When a man has asked, what is power? and can find no satisfactory answer, we would ask, in turn, if that man can be persuaded there is indispensable necessity, or great utility

attached to a distinction into natural and moral, of what he can obtain no definition? We think not. Let the advocates for this distinction tell us what power is, then we will discuss the utility of the distinction. Still, we have admitted that there is truth and some legitimate use in the distinction; although not in the connexion and for the purposes contended for by many.

There is one use to the philosopher who undertakes accurately to define the laws of mental operations, and discriminate the character of human actions—To such a purpose, the distinction is useful and important. Although power is not defined, there are certain relations to natural and moral sources and results, which render the distinction necessary. But the most acute and skilful mental philosopher might spend his life in teaching the discriminating fact, without ever inducing the multitude to understand it. He might employ some substitutes for definition, which is often done, and to these apply with some success his distinction. But if those substitutes are not cautiously made, and immediately associated with the relation which suggests the idea of power, they will mislead the metaphysician himself. There cannot, therefore, be very great importance for its use in illustrating gospel truth, and impressing it upon common minds.

There is, however, a popular use of the distinction as it exists in fact, which has some value. It is to assist in estimating, and sometimes in ascertaining, the proper object of praise and blame, that is, the heart and the feelings. Men are conscious that their natural ability, which might otherwise be employed for God's glory and their own greatest good, is controlled and misdirected by a perverted moral power—an ability to do evil, and to bring the whole man under its

influence. We repeat, therefore, that we do admit, men are conscious, both of power and of the distinction as it exists in fact, but not as defined and used by many. Men are also often conscious of inability, both natural and moral; and often make the distinction in the common concerns of life. We have heard such facts as the two following, cited, to show the character of these two kinds of inability: Joseph's "brethren hated him and *could not* speak peaceably unto him"—the other is the case of the sailors before they cast Jonah into the sea; "the men rowed hard to bring the ship to the land, but *could not*." The first is cited as a case of moral and the latter of natural inability. We admit their appositeness, but what does the distinction avail in these cases? We answer, to show where the blame centres in one case, and praise in the other. In the first case, the hearts or moral faculties of Joseph's brethren, or if our opponents like, their moral ability, controlled their natural ability, and perverted it to evil, and prevented them from speaking peaceably to him. In the other case humane feelings of the heart, or moral faculty are developed, and they directed the natural ability to a good effort, but the wind and waves prevented the accomplishment of their object. Did not the feelings as entirely control or direct the natural ability, in the latter as in the former case? In the latter case there was no fault, simply because there was no bad feeling. But suppose the sailors had hated Jonah and toiled hard to effect a landing, for the purpose of burning Jonah at the stake, would there not have been crime, although the wind and waves prevented the deed? We make this supposition for the purpose of showing the use of the distinction, in ascertaining and estimating blame. It attaches to the heart because here is the source of action.

But we ask again, if the case of Joseph's brethren does not set aside the doctrine contended for, by those who affirm that men have natural power to change their hearts, love God, repent, and obey all God's commands? The affirmative of the question is plain, else why should the phrase, "*could not speak peaceably*," be used? If natural ability, by the laws of human action, may govern the feelings, it would not be proper to say they *could not* speak peaceably. We might pursue the analysis of this case much further, but it would bring us again to the result already made plain, that natural power is not the measure of obligation, and show that the most important use of this distinction between natural and moral power and inability, is to aid in estimating the character of the heart. But even here the vagueness of the terms is such, that the thing intended is better secured by other terms. If we do not mistake, there are many who have been in the habit of using and urging the distinction, who are now discontinuing its prominent use. We think the distinction is fast going into disuse. But the errorists of the same school assert, without qualification, that men have power to perform all that God requires of them. This is a legitimate inference from the doctrine that power is the measure of moral obligation. The consequences to be apprehended from this and the like errors, are many and grievous, but we have not room here to pursue them. Suffice it for the present to say, what we seriously believe will soon be realized, that the tendency of that philosophy which disregards the plain interpretation of God's word, and dispenses with the mission of the Holy Spirit, is so rapidly onward, that it will soon have run its race, and landed its reckless adherents in blank infidelity. It is to be hoped, however, that many who are tinctured with the

philosophy, but less reckless, will take the alarm, see the error, and retrace their steps back to the sober truth of God's word. They will see that to be guided by this speculative philosophy is to "transgress and abide not in the doctrine of Christ."

We have been diverted a little from the course which we had prescribed for these brief articles, by the consideration that errors on the doctrine and uses of human power are rife in the church. We wished to cast in our mite, in this season of agitation, to settle the great controversy, on the side of truth and regard for the bible, in its plain meaning. Should Providence favour us, we intend hereafter to resume our plan, and bring the radical principles of our mental philosophy to the test of Divine revelation. If it shall be found that those principles will bear the test and abide the trial, we may have confidence in using them, to correct some of the speculations which have a mischievous influence in the church at the present time. F.

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*From the Evangelical Magazine.*

ON THE METHODS BY WHICH PROVIDENCE CHECKS THE ABUSE OF PARDON.

The wisdom of God is apparent in the manner in which he bestows his favours; he imparts them on such grounds, in such circumstances, and in such a manner, as may prevent their being abused by the folly, or by the presumption of man. Thus, even in the works of nature, he distributes his bounties in a manner which impresses us with the majesty, as well as the indulgence of the donor; the meridian sun, while it gladdens and beautifies the face of nature, dazzles and blinds the eye that gazes presumptuously on it: and the

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**Religious Communications.**

In place of a catechetical lecture, which our engagements for the past month have not permitted us to prepare, we insert, as the first article in our present number, the following pastoral letter from the General Assembly of our church, issued at the sessions which have just been closed.

**PASTORAL LETTER.**

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, to the Ministers and Churches under their care—

**DEARLY BELOVED BRETHREN—**

You will perceive by the narrative of the state of religion which we this year publish, that the God of all grace has been pleased, during the last year, to pour out more copiously of his blessed Spirit on the people of our denomination in this land, than perhaps in any period of equal extent, in former times. For this signal and ineffable benefit, we desire that you may unite with us in ascribing humble and fervent thanksgivings to Him from whom we have received this transcendent mercy; and "from whom cometh down every good and every perfect gift."

And suffer us to remind you, dear brethren, that one of the best and most acceptable expressions of gratitude to God for the unspeakable favour we have received,

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is, to be exceedingly careful, not to abuse it. It is of more importance than we know how to express, that we should, together with much prayer for direction and aid from on high, use all our influence and put forth our best efforts, to preserve the glorious revivals of religion with which we have been blessed, from all that may mar their beauty and prevent their extension; and where any thing of an injurious tendency has already taken place, that we should labour to correct the evil as speedily as possible.

Let it not be supposed, however, that we would willingly say any thing that might encourage or countenance those who condemn all revivals of religion—condemn them because they may be attended by some errors and irregularities, which, it is readily admitted, ought to be deplored and avoided. Far, very far, be this from us. Those who cherish an aversion to revivals of religion, because they are accompanied by imperfections and are liable to abuse, should recollect that there is nothing with which the human powers and passions have to do, whatever be its general excellence, that is not open to the same objection. In revivals of religion in which there are confessedly some things to be lamented—as there was in the abuse of

character a dispensation of justice, it is to man *wholly of grace*. There is grace, on God's part, in admitting a substitution, and accepting the sinner on his pleading that vicarious satisfaction. In the plan of redemption, God the Father maintains the rights of the divine government and authority; and I see no objection to the grace of man's salvation, though the Mediator paid the uttermost farthing, whilst the benefits of his mediation are given to man most gratuitously. The divine plan secures a perfect satisfaction to the law. It is a matter wholly between the glorious persons of the Trinity. And having made a wise and holy adjustment, with a view to the salvation of sinners, they bestow it on man according to the riches of divine grace. The Scripture speaks of grace, not so much with respect to the motives or measures of God's acts in themselves, as in their effect on men.

The special application of the effects of atonement, is as much a matter of sovereign pleasure, and distinguishing grace, on the vicarious plan, as on the other. An atonement for sin in general, it is said, leaves it as a matter of sovereign pleasure to whom it shall be applied. True; but God's purpose ascertained to whom this application would be made. This purpose also ordained the death of Christ, and ascertained to whom *that* application should be made. In either way, the sovereign freedom and grace of salvation is the same.

The scheme of abstract atonement, therefore, removes no difficulties alleged to belong to the contrary scheme; but increases them in magnitude and number. M.

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *Radical Principles brought to the test of Revelation.*

Truth is worthy of being sought, examined, and treasured as pre-

cious and imperishable. But it has often been said, no certainty can be gained in mental science. Attainments in this department are only theories, which may or may not be true: these theories are built on mere speculation, contradictory, unsettled, and changing as often as the fashions of the times. Now in sober earnestness, we believe the above representation has more of truth than of caricature or prejudice, in its application to the multiplied theories for explaining mental phenomena which have prevailed for ages. Even since Bacon furnished the key to knowledge, and taught men how to explore the recesses of philosophy, this department has been left mostly in the hands of speculative theorists. It is not now entirely rescued from the mysticism and dogmatism of theoretick speculation; and we fear it is not likely soon to be so rescued. There is ground for strong prejudice, not against the science itself, but against the manner in which multitudes have written and spoken on the subject; and against the unwarranted application of the speculations.

Every man who now undertakes to write or speak on the subject, is met by this prejudice, and will be considered by many judicious and good men as enamoured of deceptive and uncertain speculation. We propose now to disabuse ourselves of such an imputation; and we think this can be done in two ways—by a fair and candid examination of the method which we have pursued, and which we have called *inductive*—and secondly, by bringing the radical principles of our articles to the test of divine revelation. If we do not, greatly mistake, both these ways will bring us to the same result, and conduct us to the truth.

The first method will ascertain the facts as they exist, together with their character and relations, which must be true. If this method

be properly understood and followed, there can be no doubt of what is fully ascertained. The only difficulty that can be found in this method, occurs in the process of examination. It is confessedly difficult to adhere rigidly and throughout to the inductive method. In a subject so abstracted in its nature from material things, which claim so much of our attention and contribute almost solely to form our habits, an honest mind may mistake some part of the process and substitute theory for fact; this being done in the examination of radical principles, the whole result may be vitiated. For we maintain that facts, truly estimated, constitute the whole science: consequently if some are mistaken or falsely estimated, it will be analogous in the end to the results produced in arithmetical calculations, when a false value is applied to some of the numbers employed. But difficulties are not to be esteemed impossibilities. We think this whole-subject may be so examined as to dispel all reasonable doubts, and bring us to a satisfactory conclusion. It has been our object in the preceding articles to examine facts as they are found, without regard to theory. If we have succeeded in our object, it is unnecessary to reconsider the inductive test in this place. We call upon all those who are accustomed to examine their own minds, to bring the radical principles of these essays to the inductive test, and we fearlessly abide the result. If we have made a mistake in any fact, or in the estimation of any fact, we shall be glad to correct it, and ascertain the whole truth. We pass over this method for the present, and proceed to bring the radical principles, which we think sufficiently ascertained for the purpose, to the scriptural test.

We have said, an honest mind may err in the inductive process, therefore, let the principles of our

philosophy be brought to the standard of divine revelation. But even in this process there is a liability to error, against which we should be specially guarded. There is a strong propensity in men to interpret the holy scriptures by *theory*, and not on philological principles. This method will prove any dogma, however absurd, provided it correspond with the theory. By using a theory which gives a peculiar shade and meaning to all those passages of the scripture which recognise the phenomena and principles of human action, that particular theory will be established, however absurd in itself. Great care should therefore be taken, first to ascertain the meaning of such passages as develop the laws of human action and faculties of mind, from the legitimate rules of interpretation. This difficulty will be readily appreciated by the careful and conscientious interpreter of revelation.

We mention one other ground of liability to err: taking detached portions of the scriptures, without due regard to the scope and intention of the writer, the *usus loquendi*, and all appropriate methods of ascertaining the mind of the spirit. But if we can ascertain the true meaning and intention of the Holy Spirit, and find the principles and laws of the human mind recognised in the bible, we shall have a sure test by which to estimate any given principles of mental philosophy. We shall endeavour to take such a course in the present examination. In doing this it is not necessary, nor will our limits permit us, to attempt the interpretation of all those portions of the scriptures which refer to the radical principles of mental science, or which may be supposed to recognise the elements of true philosophy. It will at once be perceived that such an extended examination would furnish a volume instead of a brief essay. That on which we intend particularly to insist is,

that all the radical principles of mental philosophy which can stand, must be brought to the test of the scriptures, fairly and philologically interpreted. And while we insist on this, we shall adduce a few examples to illustrate the principle. A few cases, if they be fair specimens, may as truly and satisfactorily prove the doctrine, as to go over the whole ground and attempt to collect all those passages which recognise the facts in this science. Some of those facts are so obviously on the face of the whole bible, that it is scarcely necessary to mention them at all. This is one feature of divine revelation which adapts it so precisely to the wants and condition of men.

We have said that "all the high and holy communications of revelation are made to man, and principally respect his mind. The character of man's immortal spirit is there described; its present obligations are defined, and its future prospects indicated." In the application of this doctrine, we may be sure that the facts, which constitute the basis of all correct mental philosophy, will be found in the infallible revelation. We are not sure that the facts will be found together, and arranged in systematic form. It was not the intention of God's revelation to teach men a system of mental philosophy, but all the facts which are the elements of the science must be directly or incidentally recognized. Were it not so, the document would be imperfect in its adaptation to men's condition, and fail to accomplish the object for which it was given.

We have also said that "all men are governed in their interpretation of many things in the bible, by some principles of mental science, which they have adopted. This is matter of necessity, inasmuch as many directions refer men to their own consciousness of mental phe-

nomena." This we still affirm, and therefore insist, that all the radical principles of mental philosophy so employed, in order to be safe, must accord with facts, and be tried by other portions of revelation, which distinctly recognise the facts as they actually exist. Otherwise theory may be substituted for fact, and speculation for dictates of the Holy Ghost. But we need not here pursue this topic, because we have already stated the doctrine in our remarks on the proper method of investigating this branch of philosophy. The reader will find those remarks, as they are connected with some other important principles in vol. IX., pages 125 to 131.

We now proceed to the examination proposed, which is the principal object of this article. Here it may be proper to collect the *radical principles* of our essays, and state them briefly in connexion, that we may distinctly perceive what are to be examined. So far as will be necessary for our present purpose, the following enumeration will be sufficient.

Mind is a simple, immaterial, spiritual substance, cognizable by its exercises. This mind has three distinct faculties, which we call understanding, heart, and will; and to which we ascribe all mental phenomena according to their appropriate classification—the doctrine of motive and of ultimate and subordinate objects—the doctrine of freedom and of power—and the doctrine of responsibility.

When this enumeration shall have been brought to the test, and found to correspond with the infallible standard, whatever parts of the system remain will be readily seen and proved.

The *radical principle*, with which we commence, is, that the human mind is a *simple, immaterial, spiritual substance*. If this be not true, the very subject of all our

investigations has been mistaken; and all our inquiries are worse than lost. If this will not bear the test of revealed truth, we shall have occasion to proceed no further. But on this principle we encounter very little opposition from any believer in divine revelation. The doctrine in its length and breadth, is so conspicuous on the pages of that infallible word, that there is almost an entire agreement among all who receive the document as inspired. Still, it may be well to examine the alleged principle, and compare it with a few passages selected from a great multitude. If we have proved any thing on this topick, we have ascertained that mind is the permanent subject of those numerous and diversified phenomena, of which we are conscious, and which differ in their nature and laws from all that pertains to matter. This permanent spiritual substance we call *mind, soul, or spirit*. The scriptures, in the common translation, use the same terms, and add one most important item of intelligence concerning its destiny: it is *immortal*.

The Hebrews employed three terms with great frequency to denote this incorporeal part of man. Those terms, it is true, have various other significations, but it is not possible to doubt, that they are often used for the purpose here alleged. And we consider it unnecessary to attempt any protracted inquiry into the radical meaning of those terms. A few passages containing each of the terms, will be entirely sufficient to furnish an undoubted test in the present case.

The first word alluded to above, is נֶפֶשׁ, which is employed in Gen. ii. 7: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living *soul*." With reference to this Hebrew word, it may be proper to say

that the sacred writers have used it to denote *respiration, a living creature, and the animal economy*; but neither of these can be intended in application to the soul of Adam. We might cite multitudes of other passages where the immaterial soul of man is intended, but a few will suffice. Take Gen. xxxv. 18. "And it came to pass, as her [that is, Rachel's] *soul* was in departing," &c. We know that it has been said this *soul* intends her breath, but if she had an immortal spirit, it is certainly most natural and most rational to suppose that the historian intended to refer us to its departure. The same term is used in 1 Kings xvii. 21, 22. When Elijah prayed, "let this child's *soul* come into him again;" and the recorded answer to his prayer is—"the *soul* of the child came into him again." Can any one doubt that this Hebrew term here refers to the living, immaterial spirit of the widow's child? We think the circumstances of the history render its meaning exceedingly plain. Take one specimen of God's command to Israel, from Deut. xi. 13—"to love the Lord your God, and to serve him with all your heart, and with all your *soul*." This must mean something in men not corporeal; and if so, it includes all that belongs to their spirit. Take another passage from the prophet Isaiah, chap. lv. 3. "Incline your ear, and come unto me; hear, and your *soul* shall live." We consider this decisive in its reference to the immortal spirit. We cite only one example more, and that is from Ezek. xviii. 4. "Behold, all *souls* are mine; as the *soul* of the father; so also the *soul* of the son is mine: the *soul* that sinneth it shall die." The testimony of these passages, and of multitudes more, is conclusive that the Hebrews used the term above mentioned to designate an immaterial, spiritual principle in man.

The next Hebrew word above alluded to, is  $\text{רוח}$ , which primarily signifies breath, but is applied in its secondary meaning to the incorporeal spirit. Job asks, chap. xxvi. 4—"Whose *spirit* came from thee?" It is a question which Job puts to Bildad, in the cutting reply which he makes to the allegations of his friend. Solomon has used the same term, Prov. xx. 27, with application to the soul of man; "The *spirit* of man is the candle of the Lord." But there is a passage in Isah. lvii. 16, which is very decisive. "For I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit should fail before me, and the *souls* which I have made." This solemn declaration of Jehovah concerning the *souls* which he had made, must have reference to the incorporeal spirit, and decides the meaning of the term as here used. It can have no other application consistent with the scope and design of the preceding and subsequent verses.

The remaining Hebrew word is  $\text{נפש}$  which has nearly the same signification as the first, and is translated breath, wind, air, and spirit. It is very often used to denote the immaterial soul of man. We cite a few of the many. The prayer of Moses and Aaron is worthy of notice, Num. xvi. 22. "And they fell upon their faces, and said, O God, the God of the *spirits* of all flesh, shall one man sin, and wilt thou be wroth with all the congregation." Moses used the same form of expression, "God of the *spirits* of all flesh," as is recorded in Num. xxvii. 16. In the thirty-first Psalm, verse 5, we have the words of David, "into thine hand I commit my *spirit*." To the same purpose is the sentiment of Solomon, Eccl. xii. 7—"The *spirit* shall return unto God who gave it." In the prophecy of Ezekiel, chap. xi. 5—"Thus saith the Lord—I know the things that come into your *mind*, every one of

them." Evidently this *mind* is the *spirit* of man recognised in the other passages by the same Hebrew word, and which in Zach. xii. 1, it is said, "the Lord, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the *spirit* of man within him." These passages are sufficient to show a prevalent meaning in the use of those terms in the Old Testament—a meaning which need not be mistaken, and which cannot, without violence to the plain import, be applied to any thing else than the immaterial soul of man. Can any man read attentively these and hundreds of other similar passages, without perceiving that such a spirit is ascribed to man, and that it constitutes by far the noblest part of his being? We think not. But we have yet to examine some passages of the New Testament, where we find the same principles recognised.

The Greeks used several terms to designate this immortal and incorporeal principle. More commonly two are used in the New Testament, viz.  $\text{\piνεμα}$  and  $\text{\ψυχη}$ , but  $\text{\νοϋς}$  and  $\text{\διανοια}$  are sometimes used. These words are not invariably used in the same sense, nor are they precisely synonymous in their meaning. What we affirm is, that the sacred writers have used all these terms to denote the same thing. We have not room to discuss the various meanings of  $\text{\πνεμα}$ , nor is it necessary, since the principle which we allege is so conspicuous throughout the New Testament. It is doubtless true, that  $\text{\πνεμα}$ , like the Hebrew word for which it is used in the Septuagint, means breath, air, and wind. But it may be doubted whether the New Testament writers ever use it for wind. It is rendered wind in but a single passage, John iii. 8, and the correctness of that translation is questionable. However that may be, it is perfectly certain that the

New Testament writers applied this word to something belonging to man, and something distinct from the body which it inhabits. It was this *πνευμα* which Jesus yielded up and commended to the hands of his Father, Luke xxiii. 46. It was the same which the martyr Stephen besought the Lord Jesus to receive, Acts vii. 59. It is the same which knows the things of man, as stated in Paul's interrogatory to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. ii. 11. It is that in which we are commanded to glorify God as well as our bodies, 1 Cor. vi. 20. It is the same which is described as completing the first man Adam, 1 Cor. xv. 45. But quotations might be extended to very great length. All the New Testament writers use this term for an immaterial and immortal soul,

The other word, *ψυχη*, is frequently used by the same writers in the same sense as *πνευμα*, but is more commonly applied to life. We had marked seven or eight different shades of meaning, in the one hundred and four times which it occurs in the New Testament. But it would extend this article to unreasonable length to give them here. We cite a few passages to show one of its common meanings, Matth. x. 28—"Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the *soul*; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both *soul* and body in hell." To the same purpose as it respects the meaning of *ψυχη*, is Matth. xvi. 26. "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own *soul*; or what shall a man give in exchange for his *soul*." See also in Luke xii. 20—"This night thy *soul* shall be required of thee." In Acts xiv. 2, *mind* is used in the translation—"But the unbelieving Jews stirred up the Gentiles and made their *minds* evil-affected against the brethren." See also Phil. i. 27, and Heb. xii. 3. In Heb. x. 39, it is said  
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of believers, we are "of them that believe to the saving of the *soul*." In James v. 20—"he who converteth a sinner from the error of his way, shall save a *soul* from death." We mention but one passage more, found in the first epistle of Pet. iv. 19. "Wherefore, let them that suffer according to the will of God, commit the keeping of their *souls* to him in well doing as unto a faithful Creator." An examination of these passages, to say nothing of many others which occur, are sufficient, not only to show a common meaning of the term, but to prove the doctrine, so fully ascertained from the Old Testament, of a spiritual existence, antecedent to all its acts, and distinct from its exercises.

For the Greek words *νοος* and *δυναμις* which are sometimes figuratively used for *mind* or *soul*, we refer the reader to some of the passages where they may be found. Rom. i. 28, also vii. 23 and xii. 2; Eph. iv. 17, 23; 1 Tim. vi. 5, and 2 Tim. iii. 8. In these passages, if we mistake not, *νοος* will be found to indicate man's immaterial soul. The following passages may furnish a specimen of the same meaning attached to the use of *δυναμις*, Eph. ii. 3—"fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the *mind*," Col. i. 21—"Alienated and enemies in your *mind*." See also Heb. viii. 10, also x. 16; 1 Pet. i. 13; 2 Pet. iii. 1. To all these many other passages both from the Old and New Testament might be added, which teach in plain terms that man has a soul or mind incorporeal, a simple, spiritual substance. This is a first principle in our philosophy, and which bears the test of divine revelation. We have spent more time on this topic, than was perhaps necessary to prove the truth of the doctrine. But as it lies at the foundation, it seemed proper to give a somewhat connected view of the revealed fact.

The next radical principle to be  
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examined is, that the mind possesses *three distinct faculties*, which we call *understanding, heart, and will*,

But this, with the other principles, will constitute the subject of a future number. F.

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## Review.

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### REVIEW OF SCOTT'S THIRD VOLUME.

*Concluded from page 231.*

We proceed to offer some concluding reflections, and they shall be brief, on particular points in the character and theology of Calvin. We of course allude to his doctrines relating to the predestination and election of Almighty God. These are the chief grounds of odium against his theology, for which we at once frankly avow that some cause was given. He carried his metaphysical deductions from Scripture beyond the statements of the inspired oracles; he employed the word reprobate in a sense in which it does not occur in the Bible; he alluded too frequently to the secret will and purposes of God, and spoke of men in that point of view so as sometimes to seem to contradict the general tenor of Scripture, and the universal practice of the inspired teachers; and he framed too boldly a system, which was drawn, as he conceived, from Scripture principles, but certainly not found explicitly in the sacred volume.

The consequence of this admixture of over-statement was, that a controversial air was given to Protestantism; that the Lutheran churches were by degrees cooled in their communion with those of Switzerland, and the separation occasioned by the Sacramental question was widened. And, what is worse, the first encouragement was given to all those subsequent systems and courses of preaching, which, going far beyond Calvin, and omitting the sound and practical views, which, in his theology,

corrected his opinions on predestination—paved the way for the Calvinistick controversy, and for that decline in vital religion and really Scriptural truth which overstatements invariably occasion. Arminianism, Semi-Pelagianism, cold-hearted orthodoxy without spiritual life, and the acerbity of theological debate throughout the Reformed churches, were in no small measure the consequences of Calvin's incautious language.

But after this admission, let it still be remembered, that his doctrines upon the deep and difficult subject of the Divine purposes, were, upon the whole, no peculiarities of his; that they were not his main subject; and that on nearly all the additional points which have been called Calvinism in later times, he took the opposite side to that which his supposed followers occupied. We will briefly corroborate these statements.

With regard to the first, it is remarkable, as Mr. Scott justly observes, that we pass through more than half of the twenty-eight years of Calvin's ministry without even hearing of the question of predestination. His sentiments were before the world on that subject, and he never varied respecting it; but no controversy arose upon it among Protestants. Calvin, though he reduced the tenets he held on this head to a more regular system, and sometimes carried them, as we have remarked, to a faulty excess, yet invented none: he has said nothing which St. Augustine had not said eleven hundred years before he was born. And what is more important, he rather softened

# THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.

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## Religious Communications.

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

### LECTURE LXXII.

In the lecture on which we now enter, we are to consider who are the proper subjects of baptism. Our Catechism teaches us, that "Baptism is not to be administered to any that are out of the visible church, till they profess their faith in Christ and obedience to him; but the infants of such as are members of the visible church, are to be baptized."

In order to a right understanding of this article of our creed, you must observe that it consists of two distinct parts; the first part referring exclusively to persons of *adult age*, and the second part to *infant children*.

1. In regard to those whose faculties or powers are so far matured that they are able to comprehend the truths of the gospel, and who have not been baptized in infancy, and of course "are out of the visible church," it is declared that they are not to be baptized, "till they profess their faith in Christ and obedience to him." Small indeed was the number of those who had faith in Christ, when the ordinance of Christian baptism was instituted by our

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blessed Lord, shortly before his ascension into heaven. Even among the Jews, the company of believers was emphatically "a little flock," and among the Gentiles it was still less.\* But the injunction to the apostles was, "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

It is plain from the nature of the case, that adults were, in this commission, contemplated as the first recipients of Christian baptism; for till they had become believers themselves, they would not be disposed, even if they had been permitted, to receive this sacrament for their children. It is therefore no valid objection to infant baptism, that in the original institution there was a command

\* The Syrophenician woman, the Greeks introduced to our Lord by Philip at the last passover, the Centurion whose servant our Lord healed at Capernaum, possibly the nobleman also who received a similar favour at the same place, appear to have been believing Gentiles. Of the Samaritans, beside the woman who first met our Saviour at the well, it is said that "many believed on him." Yet in all, the number was probably less than the 120 mentioned Acts i. 15.

tain should be unlocked, and then the stream of this fountain becomes to thirsty man,

"Sweet as the streamlet's limpid lapse  
To the sun brown'd Arab's lip."

To all that the Redeemer has done to restore the world, must be added the purifying influences of the Spirit. It is his office to enlighten the mind, to awaken the conscience, and renew the heart. In all renewed hearts he plants and fosters the germ of grace, and all his operations upon the heart are beautiful, beyond the power of words to express. Now he breaks the chains of the captive mourner, or expands the heart into philanthropic emotions, or at times kindles a blazing fire of love, in the furnace of the soul. It is the office of the Spirit to interpret the scriptures to the spiritual understanding of those who read them. When the scriptures are largely used, the restoration of the world is going on apace. The Waldenses have taught us a lesson in past ages, of the value of the scriptures. They were hunted down by power, over the mountains and among the valleys of Italy.

"E'en in the lowly, rural vale,  
Truth, weeping, tells the mournful tale."

But the dove, that once beautified the person of their Saviour, shed meekness over their hearts. Their light as a people, is nearly extinguished, but the light of the Scriptures, is inextinguishable, and it will shine brighter and brighter, when that sun shall rise which will gild the earth for the long space of a thousand years.

If the world be restored, then ought we to partake in that restoration. If a lost world has been found again, how promptly ought we to seek its finder. Of what avail will it be that new light should be given to the earth, unless that light shine into our hearts? What signifies the bend-

ing harvest, if there be no reapers, or what signifies plenty, if there be none who feel their wants.

Our Saviour has provided for leading this world, so long astray, back to the universal fold. He has given us many privileges, and many mercies. He has planted his church in the world, and sent us Sabbaths that steal over our heads with a delicious influence. He now holds out the olive leaf of reconciliation, and if we embrace the offer, he will say to each of us at the hour of death, "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise."

#### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *Radical Principles brought to the Test of Revelation.*

In resuming the discussion of this subject, we owe our readers an apology for the delay and long interruption of our numbers. Want of health has been the sole cause of the interruption.

We now begin with an examination of the radical principles, mentioned in the close of our last number—It is this, *the mind has three distinct faculties*, which we have called *understanding, heart, and will*.

Before we proceed to examine several passages of the Scriptures in detail, one general remark deserves consideration. The supposition that God has made a revelation to men, necessarily involves the position, and the general tenor of the Scriptures establish its truth incontrovertibly, that if God speaks to men, it must be on the ground that they are capable of *intelligence*, or knowing something of what he says. The supposition also involves a capability of *feeling*, or being impressed with the apprehended communication, else the communication is useless: and if any good result is to be obtained, men must be capable of *acting* under the influence of feeling and

inducements. This may be thought by some *a priori* reasoning, and not *inductive*. But we have a right to use this argument, if we have ascertained a fact, which is implied in the supposition of a revelation from God to men. Need any thing more be added, to show that the implication is all contained in the fact of a revelation to mind? Would not the idea of a revelation to men, incapable of *understanding, feeling, or acting*, be absurd? Nothing can be more plain. Now if the facts, that men are capable of knowing, feeling, and acting, are proved by this general argument, the only remaining step in the argument is to show that the facts prove the mind to have these distinct faculties. This we think is plain without any further illustration.

But it may be important to examine the manner in which these faculties are recognised in the documents of revelation. We wish to proceed on sure ground, and ascertain the truth as it is contained in the sacred pages; also to learn as definitely as practicable, the correspondence of facts in philosophy with those of revelation.

When we look into the sacred documents, to ascertain what is said, which expresses or implies the faculties or capabilities of mind, we shall find the passages so full and numerous, that a selection will be difficult. We request, therefore, the reader, after he shall attend to the examples which we shall adduce, to bear this thought in mind while reading the Bible, that he may be able to test its correctness.

Take now the faculty of *understanding*, and inquire, what saith the Scriptures on this subject? Here we have all those passages and expressions which ascribe *knowledge* to men—all those which command them to acquire knowledge—all those which reproach them for neglecting its acquisition

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—all those which describe or furnish the means of teaching men intelligence, which, it will be readily perceived, are very numerous; and all of them necessarily imply a capacity for knowing. This is what we mean, and what we have explained, as the *faculty* of understanding. Here let it be asked and the question pondered well, if men have no faculty of knowing, why should they be taught? Why else should God, their Maker, teach them?

We are well aware that the terms knowledge, understanding, intelligence, and others which imply them, are variously used in the English translation of the Scriptures, but this will by no means prove that they have no defined meaning. The same remark is true of the Hebrew and Greek words which are translated by these terms. *Understanding* has several significations in the Bible. Sometimes it means a *faculty* employed in obtaining knowledge, as Prov. iii. 5. "Lean not unto thine own understanding." Prov. xix. 25. "Reprove one that hath understanding"—also Prov. xxx. 2. "And have not the understanding of a man." Isaiah xxix. 14. "The understanding of their prudent men shall be hid." Luke xxiv. 45. "Then opened he (Christ) their understanding"—and Eph. iv. 18. "Having the understanding darkened." Sometimes it is used for the exercise of the faculty, or the actual process of acquiring knowledge, as 1 Kings vii. 14. "Filled with wisdom and understanding." Ps. cxix. 104. "Through thy precepts I get understanding"—Prov. iii. 13. "Happy is the man that getteth understanding." Sometimes it is used for knowledge acquired, as Luke i. 3. "Having had perfect understanding of all things, &c." 1 Cor. i. 19. "and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent." It is sometimes used for all the

mind's faculties, as Job xx. 3. "The spirit of my understanding causeth me to answer." Dan. iv. 34. "Mine understanding returned unto me"—and Rom. i. 31. "Without understanding, covenant breakers"—and sometimes it is used for true religion, as Col. i. 9. "In all wisdom and spiritual understanding"—and Col. ii. 2. "Unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding." It is entirely clear, that this term must, in some of those instances, be used figuratively; and the question to be decided is, what is its proper meaning? This question must be decided from the common and prevailing use of the word in the Bible, or from its technical signification. As to its technical meaning, we need not say much, since it is perfectly obvious that as a participle, it means apprehending the objects of knowledge, and as a substantive, it means the faculty of mind which apprehends. It is only necessary further to say, what we think every attentive reader will readily perceive, that the most common uses of the term understanding, in the Scriptures, are two, for the *faculty*, and its *exercise* in the acquisition of knowledge. Now from this obvious fact, which corresponds with the technical meaning of the substantive and participle, it is fair and conclusive to affirm, that the scriptural uses of the term designate the mental *faculty* as its proper meaning, and the *exercise* of that faculty as its secondary meaning. But if any one should insist that the mental exercise is the proper signification of the term, we shall still be brought to the conclusion that there is a *faculty* so called in the Scripture, and that it is so denominated from the character of its exercises. This will vary but little the result, although it accords not in our estimation with the accustomed use of language, or the common style of the Scriptures.

If it were at all necessary to record in this article the process and result of a critical examination into the meaning of the Hebrew and Greek words translated by the term *understanding*, we would give the analysis of the words and phrases, together with the various uses of the words, which would bring us to the same conclusion stated above. But of this there can be no necessity, except for a specimen and a few references. The case is so exceedingly plain, that every candid mind will perceive and admit its truth. The principal Hebrew word used for understanding is  $\text{יָדַע}$ , which radically a verb in *Kat*, signifies to distinguish, to discern, to understand. When it is used as a substantive, it means understanding, discernment, knowledge. Let any one, capable of examining those passages in the original, which we have already quoted from the Old Testament, investigate their meaning, and he will not fail to recognise the truth and full force of what we have asserted. By recurring to Taylor's Hebrew Concordance, it will be seen that this word is used as a substantive more than eighty times in the Old Testament, with many different shades of meaning. Sometimes it indicates knowledge simply, sometimes wisdom, as in Psalm cxxxvi. 5, and Prov. xxiii. 4. Sometimes it means true religion, as in Prov. ii. 3; iii. 13; iv. 1, 5, 7; but in many of the uses it plainly indicates the intellectual power or faculty; and in every one of the whole, such a faculty is necessarily implied. The conclusion may therefore be stated thus; the revelation of God teaches that man has a *faculty*, which we call understanding, distinct from all other faculties, and distinct from all mental exercises. The plain construction of both languages, [Hebrew and English] conveys this truth in multitudes of passages,

and every use of the term necessarily implies the fact.

If we now examine the Greek of the New Testament, the result will be the same. The words principally used for the intellectual faculty are, *νοῦς*, *νοημα*, *διανοια* and *συνεσις*. Of these, *νοῦς* is used more frequently than the others, it being found twenty-four times in the New Testament. The four following passages have the meaning restricted to the faculty of knowing. Luke xxiv. 45. Rom. xiv. 5. Apocalypse xiii. 18; xvii. 9. All the rest necessarily imply the same fact. The word *νοημα*, is read but six times in the New Testament, but it is used distinctively in Phil. iv. 7, for the understanding of those who are kept. *Διανοια* is read thirteen times, and used distinctively in Eph. i. 18—iv. 18. Heb. viii. 10—xx. 16. 1 John v. 20. *Συνεσις* is found in the Greek Testament only seven times. In Luke ii. 47, and 1 Cor. i. 19; it may be understood of the faculty, or if it be not necessarily so understood it must imply the philosophical fact. Our limits would not allow us to give the exegetical analysis of these and several other Greek words, which are used to denote either the faculty or its exercises and acquirements. We only refer to the passages and the principles which must lead to the true result. They have led us to the result stated above, viz. that the revelation of God recognises and confirms the truth of philosophy. Throughout the Bible, God has treated men as possessing a faculty of knowing his communications to them. On this topic there is an accumulation of evidence and argument perfectly exhaustless. Every man who examines, will find it as clear and forcible as it is abundant.

We now inquire what the Scriptures teach concerning the *faculty* which we call *heart*.

The term heart is doubtless used

in several senses in the holy scriptures, to a few of which we shall advert, but it will be our main object here, and entirely sufficient, to show that it is often used to denote a faculty of mind, and in such a manner that it cannot with any propriety be applied to any thing else, except a faculty of feeling. If this be shown it will establish the philosophical fact, and we think, prove all other uses of the term to be subordinate and secondary to this.

In the Hebrew scriptures the principal word for heart is *לב*. There are, it is true, several words occasionally used to express the same idea in some of its relations, but they need not be here examined. The radical meaning of *לב*, seems to be applied to the physical heart, or muscular organ, and so applied on account of its vibratory motion, or pulsation. The abstract meaning, therefore, would be vibratory motion, but it is never used in the Hebrew scriptures abstractly.—Heart, therefore, being its radical meaning, as used in the bible, it is proper to observe that it is applied to several other things secondarily, or figuratively. From the position of that physical organ in the midst of the body, the word is applied to the middle of heaven, Deut. iv. 11.—to the midst of the sea, Prov. xxiii. 34., Jonah, ii. 3. It is often applied to the mind, and sometimes includes its every faculty, action, passion, disposition, and affection. So it is used, Gen. viii. 21, and many other passages. It will be obvious to every reader of the Hebrew scriptures, that the word is more frequently applied to the mind, its faculties and affections, than to any and all other things. While, therefore, it is true, that the Hebrew language describes the motions and passions of the mind by the effects which they produce upon the body, it is also true that all the descriptions involve some mental faculty of feel-

ing or of being affected. To ascertain the distinctive character of this faculty, is our present object. Take the following as a specimen of very many passages in which the word occurs distinctively, Ps. xix. 9. "The statutes of the Lord are right *rejoicing* the (לב) heart." Ps. xxxiv. 19. "The Lord is nigh unto them that are of a *broken* (לב) heart." Ps. ci. 5.—"him that hath an high look and a *proud* (לנב) heart will not I suffer." Prov. xiv. 13. "Even in laughter the (לב) heart is *sorrowful*." Prov. xv. 15. "He that is of a *merry* (לב) heart hath a continual feast." Isah. xxx. 29. "Ye shall have—*gladness* of (לנב) heart." Isah. xlv. 20. "A *deceived* (לב) heart hath turned him aside." Jer. xvii. 9. "The (חל) heart is *deceitful* above all things." Ezek. xi. 19. "I will take the *stony* (לב) heart out of their flesh." Ezek. xviii. 31.—"and make you a *new* (לב) heart." Nahum ii. 11.—"and the (לב) heart *melts*." These are sufficient to show that the Hebrew word for heart is used for that which feels joy, contrition, pride, sorrow, and gladness; and is deceived, deceitful, and hard, or melts. All those definite and limiting expressions indicate the faculty of feeling in distinction from understanding, or the faculty which knows. With the exception of *deceiver* and *deceitful*, none of them could be applied to understanding without violating all propriety of language: nothing except a faculty of feeling can agree with the appropriate meaning of those terms. Let any man substitute faculty of feeling for heart in the above cited passages of the English translation, and the sense will not be altered.

Let the inquiry be pursued in the New Testament, and learn its result. The examination of a single Greek word (*καρδια*) will be sufficient for our present purpose, although some other words are used to indicate the same thing.

*Καρδια* is frequently used by all the New Testament writers, and in various senses. The different shades of meaning in the use of this word will be found to correspond with those already mentioned, as indicated by the Hebrew (לב) and with the uses of the English word *heart*. It is not found at all in the New Testament, however indicating the muscular organ, whose vibration sends the blood through the arteries, and receives it through the veins, but this is undoubtedly the radical meaning of the word, being derived from a verb which signifies to pour out. It is used for the middle of the earth in Matth. xii. 40. But what concerns the present discussion is the distinctive use of *καρδια* for the faculty of feeling, from which all the affections proceed, and which is the source of moral character. Take the few passages which follow to illustrate our meaning. In Mark vi. 52, we read "their heart (*καρδια*) was *hardened*." chap. x. 5. "For the *hardness* of your heart (*σκληρο-καρδια*) he wrote you this precept;" and the same sentiment is contained chap. xvi. 14. John xvi. 6, we have the phrase "*sorrow* hath filled your heart (*καρδια*), and verse 22, "*your* heart (*καρδια*) shall *rejoice*." See also, Acts ii. 26. "Therefore did my heart (*καρδια*) *rejoice*," verse 37. "they were *pricked* in their heart" (*καρδια*); also xxi. 13, "what mean ye to weep and *break* my heart," (*καρδια*); Rom. ii. 5, "after thy *hardness* and *impenitent* heart (*καρδια*) treasurest up unto thyself wrath;" ix. 2, "I have great *heaviness* and continual *sorrow* in my heart," (*καρδια*); and 2 Cor. ii. 4, "For out of much *affliction* and *anguish* of heart (*καρδια*) I wrote unto you." These are a few of many passages in which *καρδια* is used to denote the faculty of feeling, and when it cannot consistently mean any thing else. It is entirely plain that there must be a permanent something, call it *fa-*

culty, or principle, or what we please, which is distinct from understanding, and distinct from all mental exercises. The above associated expressions which limit the application, and define the meaning of heart, cannot be applied to mind in its general signification, without perverting the intention of the Spirit; and they would make nonsense if applied to understanding, or to any mental exercise. It would express neither sense nor truth, to speak of a *hard* or *pained* understanding: and it would be still more absurd to speak of *sorrow* filling their *exercise*, or of being *pricked* in their *exercise*. If there be any distinction in language, between things and the motions of things; there must be in the language of the bible distinctions between faculties and their exercises. Can any one, who believes the divine origin of the scriptures, entertain the absurdity of ascribing to the Holy Ghost such instruction as this phraseology would convey, a *deceived*, *hard*, and *pained* exercise, *desires* of the exercise, &c. Nothing can be more inconsistent than such a supposition with the language of the bible. Enough has been intimated on this subject. Every man, who examines the scriptures for himself, whose mind is not governed by prejudice, and whose opinions and exercises are not guided by speculative theories, will perceive that the New Testament most clearly recognises the existence of a distinct faculty of feeling denominated the *heart*.

As we enter on the inquiry which respects the *will*, it may be proper to state the philosophical doctrine contained in our essays, that it may be distinctly compared with the scriptural instruction. The doctrine is this, *the will is a distinct faculty of choosing, and is always governed by the pleasure of the heart*.

It will not be our object, at any considerable length, to pursue this

examination here, because the subject will again recur in a subsequent article. We have now room only to say some general things on this part of the subject.

It is obvious that the terms for *will* in the Hebrew, Greek, and English scriptures are used in various senses. As a matter of interpretation it is important to distinguish those meanings. Sometimes the meaning will be found to be equivalent to command, sometimes to express desire, at other times volition, and often the faculty of choosing. If it shall be found on examination, that in some instances, the latter is its meaning, the doctrine will be established, and it must have an important bearing on some speculations which are disturbing the church at the present day. On the right interpretation of those passages, which contain the recognition of the human will depends the settlement of many controversies which have often disturbed the peace of the church. We deem it, therefore, of great importance, at the present day, to examine this subject with great care. This we propose to do in our next article.

In the mean time, let those who take any interest in this discussion, apply some of the suggestions, relative to the discriminating use of the terms *heart* and *understanding*, to the scriptural use of the term *will*. A few experiments in substituting the phraseology involving the doctrine which we have stated for *will*, cannot fail to convince them that any other meaning would be inadmissible in many instances. Let them substitute heart for will, in those passages where faculty or principle is intended, and the sense will be much perverted or destroyed.

We are aware that the distinction between the heart and will is esteemed by very many as either of little consequence, or untrue. We hope to show that the scrip-

tures recognise this distinction, in a manner which settles both its truth and importance. If this should be done, much vague theology may be settled, and much erroneous philosophy corrected.

These remarks are intended only to intimate the importance of the investigation, and invite the most careful attention to the interpretation of God's word, which, as a revelation from him, must settle the question. No man, acquainted with the history of errors in the church, will doubt that this has been the starting point of almost all heresy. Views of the human will enter into the first principles of the most numerous class of errors. Correct these views, and the errors may be corrected; and the true interpretation of God's word is the only effectual corrective.

F.

#### PRESBYTERIAN MISSIONS TO THE HEATHEN.

At the late ordination of the missionaries, Messrs. Pinney and Barr, the editor of this Miscellany was appointed by the Presbytery of Philadelphia, to make an address to the audience. In preparing it, he thought it might be useful to endeavour to remove some impressions, or apprehensions, unfavourable to the contemplated mission, which he knew existed in the minds of a number—not believed, however, to be a large number of the audience present. But he entirely omitted this part of his address in the ordination service, on account of the length of the previous exercises, and the late hour of the evening at which he spoke: Yet believing it may be of some use to that portion of the religious publick among whom this work chiefly circulates, the editor now inserts it in the Christian Advocate. After a short introduction, the subject referred to was introduced as follows—

A degree of currency has been given to what I hold to be a very unsound opinion—it is, that the General Assembly is the only body that is authorized, by the constitution of our church, to send missionaries to the heathen. On the contrary, I am satisfied that it is perfectly competent to any presbytery, or to any Synod—which is only an enlarged presbytery—to institute, sustain, and direct a heathen mission—always subject, no doubt, to the supervision of the General Assembly—as are all other ecclesiastical concerns, in our church—to see that nothing is done, inconsistent with the purity and peace of the church, and the general interests of religion. It would, indeed, be marvellous, if any thing contrary to this were the doctrine of our standards. A more sacred, important, and fundamental duty, is not required of the church, than the maintaining of missions, of every description. By missions, as a principal instrument, the world is to be evangelized, and converted unto God: And to suppose that the primary judicatures of the church—as presbyteries confessedly are—the fountain of power, and the direct and efficient agents in propagating the gospel, are never to originate and execute plans and operations for its propagation, is, in my apprehension, absurd and monstrous in the extreme.

The General Assembly—for whose legitimate powers no one would more strenuously contend than the speaker—the General Assembly is a delegated body. It possesses not a particle of power which has not been conceded to it by the presbyteries, in a written constitution, and all power which has not been expressly granted, is retained. The question then is—Has this power of originating and sustaining missions—primarily and entirely inherent in presbyteries and synods—been by them

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LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LIXIII.

The Lord's supper, which is to be the subject of the ensuing lecture, is, according to our catechism, "a sacrament, wherein by giving and receiving bread and wine, according to Christ's appointment, his death is showed forth; and the worthy receivers are not after a corporal and carnal manner, but by faith made partakers of his body and blood, with all his benefits, to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace."

The sacrament we now consider is called the *Lord's supper*, because it was instituted at the close of the Jewish passover, which was always celebrated in the evening. It does not appear, however, that the time of the day at which the celebration takes place is important; farther than that it be that part which is most convenient to the communicants. It is probable that in the primitive church there was scarcely an hour of the four and twenty, at which this holy ordinance was not sometimes administered—occasionally, to avoid interruption or persecution, at a late hour of the night, or just before the dawn of the morning.

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In some periods of the church there have been warm controversies, and even at present there are some Christian sects that are disposed to be exceedingly strenuous, in relation to the mere circumstantial of this sacred rite: whether the bodily attitude in which it should be received, should be kneeling, sitting, standing, or a recumbent posture; whether the kind of bread that is used, should be leavened or unleavened; whether the wine that is employed should be in colour red or white; whether all the communicants should be seated at a table, or whether any other table is necessary than that on which the sacred symbols are placed; and whether the officiating minister should himself hand the sacred symbols to each individual communicant, or whether this may be done by deacons and lay elders, or by communicants themselves, passing the bread and wine from one to another. There has also been a difference of opinion as to the frequency with which this sacrament should be celebrated. I would by no means say that all these circumstantial stand exactly on the same footing. So far as any of them are superstitious, or uncommanded, and yet are treated as of divine obligation, they are certainly, in that view of them, not to be admitted.

## MENTAL SCIENCE.

*Radical Principles brought to the Test of Revelation.*

We have already stated the doctrine to be examined in this article; viz. the will is a distinct faculty of choosing, and is always governed by the pleasure of the heart. The question to be settled is whether this doctrine be recognised in the revelation of God. When this shall be fairly and satisfactorily settled, the uses of the doctrine will be obviously ascertained, and its importance more readily estimated.

It will not be necessary to examine all the passages of scripture, in which the will and its exercises are indicated, in order to settle the question. Nor have we room for a full analysis of those passages in which the words are used figuratively, for other faculties or their exercises. It is easy to see why the term for *will* should be used, in its various forms, and in all the languages, for the exercises of mind without discrimination—for the heart—or its exercises—and for commands, orders, or decrees, which the mind may have made. This will be evident from an examination of a few selections, out of multitudes found in the Old and New Testaments.

The principal Hebrew words used to indicate will or its acts are, *אנה*, *נר*, *נפש*, *רעה*. These all occur, more or less frequently in the Old Testament, to indicate the will or its exercises; and they are used frequently in other senses. It is sufficient for our purpose to examine a few passages where each word occurs in the sense which indicates the human will. It might be more satisfactory to give a full analysis of all the different meanings of the words above cited, and the passages in which they occur, but we cannot now pursue that course: besides, if we had room, it would be a tedious examination,

and transcend the design of these articles.

*אנה* is used in the following passages to express the exercise of will: Lev. xxvi. 21.—“if ye walk contrary unto me and *will* not hearken unto me.” 1 Chron. x. 4. “Then Saul said to his armour-bearer draw thy sword, and thrust me through therewith—but his armour-bearer *would* not.” Chap. xi. 19. When David longed for water from the well of Bethlehem, and three men had jeopardised their lives and brought it to him, he poured it out to the Lord—“he *would* not drink it.” Ps. lxxxii. 11. “But my people *would* not hearken to my voice; and Israel *would* none of me.” Isah. i. 19. “If ye be *willing* and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land.” Ezek. iii. 7. “But the house of Israel *will* not hearken unto thee: for they *will* not hearken unto me: for all the house of Israel are impudent and hard hearted.” These are a few of the passages in which this Hebrew word is used to denote the exercise of will, but they are sufficient to determine three things: that the conduct of men is directly the result of volition, that volition proceeds from a faculty of determination, and that the will is governed by the feelings of the heart. We are not aware that this word is used in its substantive form for the will, but as a verb it denotes the exercise, and is so associated in its connexion as to involve both the faculty and the law of its government. In the specimens above given, the word cannot answer to the future tense of the fact expressed, because both volition and obstinacy are involved in the thoughts expressed.

*נפש* will be found in the following passages, and might be compared with many others of like import. Exod. xxxv. 29. “The children of Israel brought a *willing* offering unto the Lord, every man and woman, whose heart, made

them *willing* to bring for all manner of work, which the Lord had commanded to be made by the hand of Moses." 1 Chron. xxviii. 21. After David had given Solomon, his son, the pattern of the house of the Lord, he said to his son, "there shall be with thee for all manner of workmanship every *willing* skilful man, for any manner of service." In chap. xxix. 5. David said "who then is *willing* to consecrate his service this day unto the Lord?" Ezra, iii. 5. In the account of the "set feasts of the Lord that were consecrated," it is said that the people brought their offerings to the priests, and they "offered the continual burnt-offering" and of the feast; and "of every one that *willingly* offered a free-will offering unto the Lord."

These may suffice for one important use and meaning of נָרַב. They show conclusively the same things as stated under אָמַר; volition directing the conduct, proceeding from a faculty of determination, and that under the government of the heart. The interpretation of this word according to the connexion and scope of the passages where it occurs, cannot fail to show the recognition of the doctrine we have stated before.

שָׁבַד seems to have primarily the meaning of animal life, but it has a secondary meaning which indicates *will*. Take the following passages as a specimen of its occurrence in the latter sense. Exod. xv. 9. "The enemy said, I will pursue, I will overtake, I will divide the spoil; my lust shall be satisfied upon them." Ps. xxvii. 12. "Deliver me not over unto the *will* of mine enemies." Ps. xli. 2. "Thou wilt not deliver him unto the *will* of his enemies."—Ezek. xvi. 27. "Behold, therefore, I have stretched out my hand over thee, and have diminished their ordinary food, and delivered thee unto the *will* of them that hate thee" We need not multiply quo-

tations; these show distinctly a recognition of the doctrine.

For the same meaning of נָרַב we direct only to the three following passages as sufficient for the purpose. Levit. xix. 5.—"if ye offer a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the Lord, ye shall offer it at your own *will*." Chap. xxii. 19. "Ye shall offer at your own *will* a male without blemish of the beeves, of the sheep, or of the goats." Again, verse 29. "And when ye will offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving unto the Lord, offer it at your own *will*."

That here is a recognition of the doctrine, we think no one can rationally doubt, who will examine the passages and interpret them according to their obvious meaning and connexion.

The New Testament abounds with the full recognition of the same doctrine, but we shall content ourselves with the examination of some passages in which *Θελημα*, and *Θελω*, the principal Greek words occur. The more frequent meanings of *θελημα* are three, *will*, purpose, design, or intention, for the first class; for the second class is the object of one's will, in general, without specification, or specifick command, statute, or law; for the third the pleasure of mind is indicated. Although we distinguish three significations of *θελημα* they are all directly or indirectly connected with the faculty or the exercise of will; so that they all directly or indirectly recognise the doctrine.

We quote a few of the many passages in which *θελημα* is found, that we may present the varieties of meaning intimated above. John i. 13: "Who were born, not of blood, nor of the *will* of the flesh, (*ουδι εκ θεληματος σαρκος*) nor of the *will* of man, (*ουδι εκ θεληματος ανδρος*), but of God." *Θελημα* here must involve volition, whatever particular meaning may be given to its interpretation. The intention of the inspired historian is very plain: it is

to ascribe the regeneration of those who received Christ solely to God, and to deny that it was effected by human agency, either by bloody sacrifices offered for them, by natural dissent, or by the determination of man. *Θελημα* is used to express the determination, or volition of God in the following passages, as well as many others. 1 Cor. i. 1: "Paul called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ, through the *will* of God, *δια θεληματος Θεου*." 2 Cor. i. 1, has the same phraseology. Gal. i. 4, reads thus, "Who [that is Christ] gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world, according to the *will* of God, and our Father," *κατα το θελημα του Θεου*. In Eph. i. 5, we have the phrase, *κατα την ευδοκiam του θεληματος αυτου*, "according to the good pleasure of his *will*;"—in verse 9, *το μυστηριον του θεληματος αυτου*, "the mystery of his *will*;" and in verse 11, *την βουλην του θεληματος αυτου*, "the counsel of his own *will*." These passages involve the idea of volition or exercise of the determining faculty of God the Father. We refer to these passages to show that wherever *θελημα* is used, whether applied to God or man, it involves the faculty, or exercise of the faculty of determination. These few are sufficient for our present purpose. Recur now to the application of *θελημα* to man's will. 1 Cor. xvi. 12: "As touching our brother Apollos, I greatly desired him to come unto you with the brethren; but his *will* was not at all to come at this time," *και παντως ουκ ην θελημα ινα νυν ελθη*. In Eph. ii. 3, *θελημα* is used for desires, including both pleasure and choice, or feelings of the heart, and volitions of the will; *ποιουσις τα θεληματα της σαρκος και των διανοιων*, "fulfilling the *desires* of the flesh and of the mind." The word is rendered *desires*, in our English version, although *volitions* would be more literal, because no word which

would express merely the exercise of will, would reach the meaning of the Apostle in this place.

It will be sufficient to cite two or three passages more in which the verb *θεισω* is found applied to volition. John v. 40, [*ου θελεις*] "*ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.*" John viii. 44. "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father [*θεισει ποιειν*] *ye will do.*" Rev. xxii. 17. "And the spirit and the bride say, come. And let him that heareth say, come. And let him that is athirst, come. And whosoever [*θεισει*] *will*, let him take the water of life freely." Every one acquainted with his bible, will at once recollect that there are multitudes of passages where *will* is used in the same sense, to signify the determination of the mind; or to speak more specifically, to denote the exercise of the faculty called *will*. As for *command*, statute or decree, we need not quote the passages where *θελημα* and *θεισω* are used to indicate them. The reader of the Greek Testament will readily perceive them, and know how to interpret their meaning. We leave the passages to speak for themselves on the plain common sense principles of interpretation. Confident that every mind, unprejudiced by philosophical speculation, will find obviously a recognition of the doctrine which we have stated. We have made our quotations few and our analysis b. ef, because we think that the recognition of the principles, is exceedingly plain, and because we wished to reserve room in this article, briefly to compare some other suppositions with the same standard.

There is a pretended philosophy which represents the mind as consisting of exercises only, without any permanently existing principle. But this is so absurd on its face, and so contradictory to the whole current of the Scriptures,

that we will not stop gravely to examine its claims. It never can be admitted, without setting aside all legitimate rules of biblical interpretation.

Another scheme of philosophy, worthy of more regard, blends together in one class, the exercises of the heart and the will. But we have shown conclusively that the Scriptures do sometimes distinguish them, and ascribe qualities to one class which cannot belong to the other. Between the source of affections, and the source of volitions, there is often a wide discrimination in the holy Scriptures. The *heart* is *hard* or *soft*, *grieved* or *joyful*, *pacified*, or *angry*, but not so is the *will* ever represented in the Bible. It would not express the meaning of the sacred writers oftentimes to substitute heart for will, or will for heart. Take the specimen from John i. 13, and read it—"which were born not of the *heart* of the flesh, nor of the *heart* of man"—and it will be readily perceived that the sentiment is changed. It might express a *truth*, but not the mind of the Spirit. Take many other passages which express the appropriate exercise of either faculty, and substitute one for the other, and the discrimination will be clearly seen. There must be a different meaning attached to the different terms *heart* and *will* in the passages quoted in these articles, and in many other passages, which the careful reader will readily observe.

But there is a philosophy which we think is mischievous in its theological influence, denying all distinction of faculties, or rather all moral character belonging to any principle or faculty of mind. According to this philosophy, all moral character belongs to voluntary exercises, and attaches not to their source. This scheme of philosophy subverts the plain exegesis and common sense interpretation of the Scriptures. In addi-

tion to what we have already said of the obvious distinction between heart and will, and the difference in the nature of their exercises, we see in many passages a recognition of the principle that the will is governed by the affections. To the heart is ascribed a character evinced by its exercises, but belonging to the principle, antecedent to its development. It is the *heart* upon which the Lord looketh; but why should he look upon it, if it has no moral character? Why should men be commanded to keep the *heart* with all diligence, if it be without character? Besides the reason given in the connexion, "for out of it are the issues of life," involves clearly the character as belonging to the heart. The phrases *hard*, *stony*, *new*, and *evil* heart, are all connected with a permanent moral principle, not with exercises merely; and we think "the *hidden man* of the heart" denotes a good or wicked principle. The ornament of this "*hidden man*" may relate to the exercises of gracious affection, which proceed from the heart. If we have not mistaken the principles of interpretation, the whole current of the Scripture opposes the philosophy in question.

The mischievous theological influence to which we refer, is at present extensive in the church. The definition of the philosophy identifies it with the first principles of Pelagianism. It would therefore be natural to expect its application to the same doctrines, and its tendency to the same errors. The usual, and at present popular theological form of the first principle is, that "all holiness and sin consist *exclusively* in voluntary exercise." This is subject to some variety of modification, according to the more full or partial understanding or adoption of the principle. It is also applied more or less extensively to the interpretation of the Bible, and ex-

erts its transforming influence upon the doctrines of the gospel. One modification of the scheme admits the distinction between heart and will, but ascribes the government of the heart to the will, and adopts under some modification the old theory of self-determining power of the human will. But in all its various modifications the principle, that moral character hangs exclusively to voluntary exercises is retained.

The mischief which it operates in the interpretation of the Bible, depends upon the extent of its application. It sets aside the doctrine of original sin, and teaches that children are not born in sin, are not morally depraved until they act in view of known law, but are innocent and without character. We think the advocates of this philosophy are consistent with its spirit and principles, in denying the doctrine of original depravity, and exploding the long established formula of faith, that "the sinfulness of that estate into which man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature which is commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it." But consistency is of little value, when preserved at the expense of truth; and such we think is the only redeeming quality in the application of this philosophy. This, however, is only the beginning of the havoc made with the orthodox faith, and with the interpretation of the Bible. With the doctrine of original sin, is also set aside the whole doctrine of representation in Adam and in Christ. The philosophical dogma is, that voluntary exercises are personal acts, and neither transferable nor imputable to another—consequently we can in no sense be responsible for the fall of Adam, and Christ could not bear our iniquities, nor can we

be healed by his stripes. We do not mean to say, that all who adopt the philosophical principle, apply it in this extent; but it has long been an established maxim, that the tendency of error is rapidly onward in its departure from truth. We think the application of this philosophy explains the fact, and illustrates the maxim. Men of speculative minds, who adopt the first principle, may be pious and not discover the legitimate tendency of the error, or they may be kept from its controlling influence by their love of truth. But let them yield their minds to the influence of this philosophy, and apply it to the interpretation of the Bible throughout; and we see not where they will stop, until they have swept away all the distinguishing doctrines of grace. The doctrine of regeneration undergoes an entire transformation, and becomes a mere change of volition or governing purpose, effected by moral suasion, without any special agency of the Holy Spirit. Thus men make themselves new hearts, regenerate themselves, and create themselves anew in Christ Jesus. And when men have philosophically broken loose from dependence on the influence of the Holy Ghost, the next step is easy and legitimate, from the principles to a dependence upon human reason as the guide and revelation only an auxiliary, which after a little may be dispensed with entirely. Such we think the legitimate tendency of this philosophy. But what saith the Scriptures on those doctrines mentioned? On the doctrine of original sin, they speak thus, "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean," not one. Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. Wherefore as by one man, sin entered into the world, and death by sin: and so death passed upon all men for that (in whom) all have sinned. For if by one man's

offence, death reigned by one. Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation. For as by one man's disobedience, many were made sinners—sin hath reigned unto death." On all the other doctrines the Holy Scriptures are very explicit, and so plain that he who runs may read. We have not room to quote the passages, and we cannot think it necessary, since the specimens already given are plainly contradictory to the philosophy in question, and recognise principles perfectly opposite. Besides, on the face of the scheme which we oppose, there is such a glaring absurdity, that an unsophisticated mind will not be misled by it. Let the whole subject be carefully and fairly investigated, and we fear not the result. E.

ON REVERENCE FOR THE NAME OF  
GOD.

Since the Synod of Ulster, in Ireland, purified itself from the leaven of Unitarianism, which threatened to leaven the whole lump, Dr. Cook, whose eloquent speech we published in our 7th volume, has become the editor of a monthly publication at Belfast, entitled *The Orthodox Presbyterian*. We have not hitherto made any extracts from this valuable work, but intend in future to present our readers, occasionally, with some of its short articles. We earnestly recommend the following to the serious consideration of all who lead in social worship; both clergymen and laymen; the evil which it seeks to correct has often exceedingly marred our devout feelings; and we think its correction a matter of no small importance. Among other reasons for endeavouring to avoid it, one is—that its existence furnishes one of the strongest objections against free or extemporaneous prayer, by  
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those who advocate forms and an established Liturgy. But the evil is sometimes apparent in sermons and exhortations, as well as in prayers.

A light and irreverent use of the name of God is highly unbecoming on the part of man, displeasing to the Most High, a violation of his own special command, and exceedingly hurtful to the feelings of every one, who, as Moses enjoined on the Israelites, "has learned to reverence and fear that glorious and fearful name, the Lord our God." Were the frequent and unnecessary use of this name confined to irreligious persons, those who fear and reverence God would not have so much to deplore; but that the practice is too common, even among Christians, few will deny. This, Sir, is an evil to which I wish to call public attention; and, among the rest, I particularly request the regards of the Ministers of the Gospel. Their business is to minister in holy things; and perhaps the frequency of their engagements in fresh exercises, leads them into forgetfulness on this particular point. In reasoning with men on any subject, unnecessary repetition of the same word is a proof that the speaker is ill informed, and greatly weakens the force of his argument. In writing, the thing is quite intolerable, and at once leads to the rejection of a book so composed.

Various allowances are, however, to be made to those who deliver unstudied, extemporaneous discourses,—they are, I suppose, nearly unconscious of the evil—this, however, they should not be; for in addressing men on religious subjects, and much more so when they address the Majesty of heaven and earth, their words, few or many, should be well chosen. Our Lord particularly charges his disciples "not to use vain repetitions." Now I think it will be ad-

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LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LXIV.

The answer of our Catechism now to be discussed, is thus expressed—"It is required of them that would worthily partake of the Lord's supper, that they examine themselves of their knowledge to discern the Lord's body, of their faith to feed upon him, of their repentance, love, and new obedience; lest, coming unworthily, they eat and drink judgment to themselves."

In our last lecture, a general explanation was given of the terms *worthily* and *unworthily*, as applicable to the manner in which the sacrament of the Lord's Supper may be received; and it was intimated that in illustrating the answer now before us, this point would receive a more particular consideration. This I shall attempt by showing—

I. That self-examination is an important duty, in coming to the table of the Lord.

II. The subjects of this examination.

III. The danger of neglecting the duty prescribed.

First, then, let us consider that self-examination is an important  
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duty, in coming to the table of the Lord. The truth of this position is clearly taught in the apostolical injunction—"Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup;" and it is on the result of this examination, that each individual must form for himself the important decision, whether he can *worthily* partake of this holy ordinance or not. The ordinance requires that every participant should possess some good evidence of his being in a gracious state; and the examination of which I am speaking essentially consists in a careful inquiry as to this fact, and forming an impartial judgment respecting it, according to evidence derived from the Scriptures of truth. "Examine yourselves whether ye be in the faith;" says St. Paul, "prove your own selves; know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates." And as the word of God is to be the rule and test of the trial, so the Holy Spirit, who indicted that word, is to be earnestly implored to enlighten, assist, and guide us to a right conclusion. In the scrutiny we contemplate, the prayer of every communicant should be that of the Psalmist—"Search me, O God, and know my heart; try me and know my thoughts: And see if there be any

thorns; or he may be externally crowned, as was Petrarch in Rome, while morally he may be distant from his Maker.

In Irving's Sketch Book, there is a pleasing paper on those simple customs and funeral rites which still linger in some of the shires of England. When friends die, young men and maidens approach the grave, and cast flowers upon it at the return of each vernal season; the glades are searched, and knots of violets are gathered for the same purpose. Innocent and delightful custom—thus to overlook men of renown, and do honour to the grave of a brother, a sister, and a friend. Still, that sensibility which is natural to man may prompt these offerings, where there is no piety. This sensibility awakens delight in rural customs; and we may enjoy harvest moons, and the tedded hay, and the plentiful harvests, without one emotion of gratitude to the Giver of all good.

The true Christian enters his pastures with the approbation and countenance of his Almighty Shepherd. To Him he is allied and bound, by the strong ties which death itself shall not dissever. He has joys, and consolations, and supports, which the children of this world know nothing of. He indeed often strays; but there is a power which brings him back, both to the pasture and the fold. He is not ignorant of the thicket, and the brake, the precipice and the cataract; they are found in the spiritual as in the natural world. But the Christian looks to his Omnipotent Keeper, and is preserved from the ways and by paths of fatal error. The barren spots of his spiritual life are often succeeded by the meadows of refreshing truth, and the still waters of the divine promises. He often looks away from time, and casts his eyes with faith and hope on the eternal mansions; and there, when dis-

missed from the world, he anticipates a perpetual union with his Saviour.

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MENTAL SCIENCE.

*Radical Principles brought to the test of Revelation.*

The principles which in this article we propose examining by the scriptural test, are included in the doctrine of *ultimate objects* and *motive*.

On this subject the Scriptures teach, upon their whole face and in detail, that ultimate objects are the *excitement*, and pleasure is the *motive* to action. This doctrine is at the foundation of God's moral government, as developed in the book of revelation. The ultimate object, which God proposes as the excitement of rational, immortal, responsible beings, is his own glory; and the motive is everlasting happiness, resulting from its promotion and display. This is the highest, grandest, and purest object for the excitement of responsible agents; and the only available motive is the delight which such a being enjoys, or expects to enjoy, in the contemplation of that object. The command of God, repeated in several forms, is to this purpose—that whether men eat or drink, or whatever they do, they should do all to the glory of God; thus presenting the honour of God's perfections, as the ultimate object to be sought in every thing done by responsible creatures. To the same import is the first table of the moral law, written with Jehovah's own finger upon stone; and condensed by Christ himself—"thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." This expresses the principle, in its commanding influence over the whole man. If we here ask what is love? the plain scriptural and common sense

answer is, an emotion of pleasure excited by an agreeable object: and love to God is this affection of pleasure excited by the perfections of God. Inasmuch as his perfections are worthy to absorb the whole affection, or in other words, to excite the highest emotion of pleasure, it is ordained that he shall be loved with the whole heart; and inasmuch as the whole man should be controlled by this affection, the spirit of the enactment is, that the whole soul, mind, and strength, all the faculties and capabilities of man, shall be under the direction of this principle and affection. The order issued proposes the ultimate object: the promise of happiness presents and describes the motive of pursuit. In all details of means, duties, or pursuits, to attain the high object, the law and the promise are so combined or associated, as to make the strongest appeal to the minds of men, in accordance with the principles of human action. The infinite excellence and loveliness, of the divine attributes are presented and illustrated, in a thousand aspects and relations, to meet our eye in every pursuit; while the sweetness, richness, elevating nature, and permanency of heavenly enjoyment, all portrayed in lively description, as the most efficient motive. If we have not greatly mistaken the general features of what may be denominated law and promise, in the revelation of God, this is their plain and obvious lesson. There is also a recognition of the same principles of human action and government, in all the assurances that God will not give his glory to another, nor his praise to graven images. All the threatenings and enactments of penalty against sin, with all the descriptions of misery and wrath, recognise the same principles. Disobedience is dishonour done to God; and pain, the penalty for sin, is the opposite of pleasure.

The illustrations of this remark are so numerous and so obvious in the Scriptures, that it cannot be necessary here to write them. Now the excellence of God's moral government is conspicuous, in the absorbing loveliness and infinite value of the object proposed for consummation. The divine glory expresses that object, in a summary form. The efficiency of that government must consist in two things, rewards and penalties. If the rewards are certain, high and infinitely valuable, the motive is as strong as it can be made, in this aspect. If the penalties are also certain, just and infinitely severe, the motive is as strong, in its other aspect, as it can possibly be made. The whole principles of moral government are, therefore, adapted to the character and condition of minds, intelligent, responsible, and capable of influence from excitement and motive. But why this adaptation, if ultimate objects are not the excitement, and pleasure be not the motive, by which men are governed? Why this constant holding up before the minds of men the divine perfections as the standard, not only of moral excellence, but as the standard of moral obligation? Why else is this principle spread over the whole pages of revelation; and why else is this perpetual recurrence to promise and penalty, throughout the whole book of God? To us it would seem absurd, on any other supposition but the doctrine of excitement and motive, which we have endeavoured to establish. The plain interpretation of the law and the gospel teaches the doctrine; and the obvious meaning of all those condensed summaries, to which we have alluded, and some of which we have quoted, confirms the sentiment.

Subordinate objects of choice and pursuit are very numerous, and, according to the doctrine before stated, include most of the

duties, offences, and objects of direct pursuit, in all situations of life. Ultimate objects are comparatively few; the subordinate are many. Motive is various, according to the nature of the pleasure enjoyed or expected, which is only learned from the character of the ultimate object. All this, we think, is clearly deduced from the general tenor of the Scriptures, in bringing the principles of moral government to bear on the minds of men. Without proceeding to any details, or the analysis of particular passages of the Holy Scriptures, we gather a plain and satisfactory result. Thus much we deemed it proper to say on general principles, before we attempted to analyze some of the particular recognitions of the doctrine.

The passages which develop and apply the principles of moral government, all of which involve the doctrine of ultimate objects and motives, are so numerous, that we can scarcely read a page in the sacred volume without finding them.

This circumstance renders a selection more difficult; but it is less important to be very choice in the selection, since every interpreter of the Scriptures will observe them as he reads the sacred pages.

Take the following specimens, for the distinct recognitions of the ultimate object. We select them from different circumstances, and where they have an application to individuals and communities. Josh. vii. 19. "And Joshua said to Achan, My son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him." Here is a recognition of God's glory, as the ultimate object of the confession sought from Achan. The next example we take from the song of David, prepared for the occasion, when the ark was brought from the house of Obed-edom to the tent which he had pitched for it. 1 Chron. xvi. 24—29. "Declare his glory among

the heathen, his marvellous works among all nations. For great is the Lord and greatly to be praised: he is also to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the people are idols: but the Lord made the heavens. Glory and honour are in his presence; strength and gladness are in his place. Give unto the Lord, ye kindreds of the people, give unto the Lord glory and strength. Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name: bring an offering, and come before him: worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness." In this passage the whole nation of Israel are called upon to regard the glory of God, as the ultimate object of their worship and service. We might quote many other passages of like import, as Ps. xix. 1. xxix. 1, 2. xcvi. 3—8. cxv. 1. Luke, xvii. 18, but these may suffice for this class. A few specimens from the New Testament, of a little different character, may profitably illustrate the same doctrine. Matth. v. 16. "Let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven. 1 Cor. vi. 20. "For ye are bought with a price, therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." Rev. xv. 4. "Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name; for thou only art holy." See also Rom. iii. 23. v. 2. 1 Cor. i. 31. x. 31. Gal. vi. 14. 1 Pet. ii. 12. Rev. xiv. 7.

In these, and like passages, men are directed by precept and example, to make the divine glory the ultimate object of all they do in body and in spirit. The same instruction is given, in various forms of expression, throughout the Old and New Testaments, presenting that which ought always to be the ultimate object of man's pursuit. Many reproofs for sin against God express the doctrine, as Rom. i. 20, 21. "so that they are without excuse; because that

when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful." 1 Cor. iii. 21. "Let no man glory in men." Can any thing be more plain and certain than the recognition of the doctrine which we have stated concerning the ultimate object? The Scriptures, every where in various ways, teach the doctrine. Every argument used to enforce Christian duty involves the doctrine in some form, and every threatening is based upon the same principle.

As for subordinate objects of choice, little need be said in this place, of their character, or of their recognition. They are spread before us in the Bible, comprehending by far the greatest portion of Christian duties. They hold a relation to ultimate objects, for the sake of which they are to be performed. The ultimate object of Christians is one, but the details of their duties and the subordinate objects, sought for the sake of the ultimate, are numerous and various, according to station and circumstances. Industry in business, attention to the rights of others, efforts to promote the good of others, education of children, instruction and discipline of the church, dissemination of the gospel, and all the multitude of agencies and enterprises of good to men, are, directly or indirectly, recognised in the Scriptures as subordinate objects of pursuit. Take the analysis of one passage already quoted as an illustration of the principle, and the manner in which the Scriptures recognise the relation of subordinate to ultimate objects. 1 Cor. x. 31. "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Here eating and drinking are recognised as matters of duty; and although there may be other objects to be attained by them, and intervening between them and the ultimate, they must all have rela-

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tion to one, the glory of God. We may eat, we may drink, we may do many other things, but however they may be related among themselves, they must all be done for the sake of the ultimate. The same doctrine is recognised in general terms in 1 Cor. vi. 20. "For ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." Multitudes of passages assert and confirm the same truth.

The doctrine of motive may require a little more extended notice, not because it is less plainly or certainly recognised, but because we wish to be distinctly understood, in some uses and applications which we intend to make of the doctrine. We have said that pleasure is the motive to action, in all cases of ultimate choice. Indeed the definition of an ultimate object is one that pleases in itself, or for its own sake. But we need make no exception, all subordinate objects are chosen for the sake of the ultimate, therefore, pleasure is the uniform and only motive to intelligent, responsible, voluntary action. Such is the fact, as taught by our philosophy. The question now is, does the revelation of God recognise this fact? If so the doctrine is settled and proved, if not, we have mistaken the instructions of philosophy, or the philosophy has nothing to do with the subject. On this ground we are willing to abide the test. We have seen that the Scriptures recognise the distinction between ultimate and subordinate objects of choice; and propose the grand and high object of God's glory, as the ultimate end to which every mind should be directed. This is the spirit of every law and command of God, and the motive to obedience, as has already been said, is the pleasure to be derived from the ultimate object. Here let it be observed, that the promises of divine favour, manifested in temporal prosperity and

comfort, under the peculiar administration of the Jewish theocracy, constitute one class of passages, which illustrate the principle in one form. A specimen of this form is found in Isah. i. 19. "If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land." And the form of threatening, recognising the same principle, immediately follows: "But if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." So in the last communication to the children of Israel, by Moses. Deut. xxxii. 46—49. "Set your hearts unto all the words which I testify among you this day, which ye shall command your children to observe, to do all the words of this law. For it is not a vain thing for you; because it is your life: and through this thing ye shall prolong your days in the land, whither ye go over Jordan to possess it." It will be readily granted that the divine honour is the ultimate object of obedience to the directions of this law; and it must be granted that the divine favour, "which is life," or happiness, is presented as the motive to obedience. The same is true of the whole administration, to which we now allude. The same principle is obvious from the correct and plainest interpretation of all the directions and promises of that peculiar theocratic dispensation.

The promises of the gospel afford a still higher illustration of the principle, and a more interesting recognition of the doctrine. If we recur to the gospel promises made to Abraham, the recognition is plain. Gen. xii. 2, 3. "I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing: and I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed." This, taken in connexion with what is

stated in the seventeenth chapter of Genesis, contains the basis of the covenant which God made with Abraham, when he constituted him "the father of many nations." The provisions of that covenant were *national*, or *temporal*, to give Abraham's posterity the land of Canaan; *ecclesiastical*, to organize in the patriarch's family the visible church; *spiritual*, securing the promised Messiah from his posterity, and the rich spiritual blessings to his people through that Messiah. The last clause of the quotation, "in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed," we know is a gospel promise, because an inspired apostle has said, Gal. iii. 8. "The Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, in thee shall all nations be blessed." The explanation of this promised blessing is found in the gospel exposition of new covenant mercies in Christ Jesus. These are spiritual life, peace, joy in the Holy Ghost, and all the benefits which believers receive from Christ. All these benefits, or the possession and enjoyment of those blessings, are the motives to faith and obedience, spread over the whole gospel. Is there not a distinct recognition of the doctrine of motives in the following passages? Some are in the form of promise, and some of threatening. John, iii. 36. "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." Mark, xvi. 16. "He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Luke, xiii. 5. "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish." Acts, iii. 19. "Repent ye, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord." Rom. vi. 22, 23.

“Ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. For the wages of sin is death: but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Rom. ii. 6—10. “Who will render to every man according to his deeds; to them who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile. But glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good; to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile.” Heb. xi. 6. “But without faith it is impossible to please him; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” See also to the same purpose, Eph. v. 1—16. Philip. iii. 16—21. Titus, ii. 11—14. Heb. xi. 24—27. xii. 14—29. James, v. 7—11. 1 Pet. iv. 12—18. See also the epistles to the seven churches in Asia, Rev. ii. 7. 10. 17. 25—28. iii. 5. 12. 21. Also, xxi. 7—27.

We might add to all these the recorded prayers of God's people, for his grace on themselves and others, and for their final acceptance and salvation. Take a specimen from the 51st Psalm. “Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving kindness: according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions,” &c. In Ps. liv. 1, 2. The Psalmist again prays—“Save me, O God, by thy name, and judge me by thy strength. Hear my prayer, O God; give ear to the words of my mouth.” A very large portion of the psalms and prayers connect the ultimate object, God's glory, with the motive salvation, or heavenly happiness. Paul has furnished many examples to the same effect, in his

epistles to the saints. Take a single instance as an example, in his epistle to the Col. i. 9—20. We will not transfer the whole of this interesting passage to our article, but remark that the Apostle prays earnestly and unceasingly for his Colossian brethren, that they “might be filled with the knowledge of God's will—walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God,” and gives “thanks unto the Father, who had made them meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light; who had delivered them from the power of darkness, and translated them into the kingdom of his dear Son; in whom they had redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins.” We forbear a minute analysis of these passages, because we have not room, and because we think the recognition of the doctrine of motive is very distinct and obvious.

It is proper here to make one general remark. These rewards and penalties, which are proposed in the gospel, and which are seen to be subjects of so much solicitude in the prayers of the pious, are the most efficient motive with the true Christian; but have no adequate influence with the wicked. This is a fact, which none will dispute. But why is it so? The reason is obvious. The Christian's ultimate object is the divine glory, or in other words, his heart is prepared to love that object for its own sake; but the wicked, or unrenewed, have no such preparation of the heart; the divine glory is not their ultimate object. Although the motive of the wicked is pleasure, it is sought and derived from another source; consequently the glory of heaven has no charm for them. This illustrates the truth shown in a former essay, that the seat of depravity is in the heart, or faculty of feeling.

It may seem strange to some that we have placed the subject of this number among the radical principles of mental philosophy. But a little reflection will convince them that it is a law of mental operation, and fully recognised in the principles of moral government. It sets aside the modern cry of *physical* depravity, *physical* regeneration, and sweeps away at once all the objections, which a Pelagian philosophy raises against the moral character of principles in our nature. It teaches us that man is a moral being, before he has done good or evil, in the constitution of his nature, and that the tree is known by its fruit. For if we learn the ultimate object of any moral agent, we learn the temper, or disposition of the heart. This depends upon the principle of a uniformity of motive. If any other motive except pleasure, or which amounts to the same thing, avoiding pain, could be supposed, there could be no index of character. Could any man choose ultimately the glory of God from any other motive than pleasure, two consequences would follow. It would not prove him to be a good man; and if he were admitted to heaven, immediately in view of all the unclouded splendour of that glory, it would afford him no happiness, but unmingled pain. But no such absurdity can be admissible. Personal holiness in principle is an indispensable qualification of the Christian, and the personal qualification for admission to heaven. We say *personal* qualification, because we are aware that there is, what some have denominated a *legal* qualification for heaven, as indispensable as the personal. We mean the justifying righteousness of Christ imputed to the Christian, and received by faith. But on this we need not enlarge.

There is one use of this doctrine, which we have mentioned in a former essay, that should not be forgotten. It is to show how ut-

terly inconsistent with true philosophy, as well as with the Scriptures, are those metaphysical speculations, misnamed philosophy, which represent man as acting without motive, willing to be miserable, his holiness and sin as belonging exclusively to voluntary action, and God as the author of sin. All these belong to one family, one scheme of mental philosophy, so called; but all are inconsistent with the doctrine of ultimate object and motive, as recognised by the revelation of God, and constituting in fact a law of mental operation. We have not room in this article to unravel the absurdities of the modern Pelagian philosophy; but if Providence permit, we intend to examine the whole in connexion, when we have brought all our radical principles to the test of revelation. We feel not a little alarmed at the transforming influence which this philosophy is exerting over the church in our land, both in doctrine and measures. Where is the Puritanism, and where is the Presbyterianism of former times? They are transformed, or are transforming, under a new edition of the old Pelagian philosophy. May the Lord avert its tendency, and save his church from corruption and decay. F.

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THE IMPORTANCE AND OBLIGATION  
OF TRUTH.

We know not how we can better fill the space that it will occupy in our work, than by inserting the following

“ADDRESS, delivered to the Graduates in Jefferson College, Pa. at the Anniversary Commencement, Sept. 27, 1832. By Matthew Brown, D. D. President, and published at the request of the Class.”

Young Gentlemen,—It is not possible, in the few moments allotted to this address, to present

THE  
**CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE.**

MARCH, 1853.

**Religious Communications.**

LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LXXV.

We are now to consider the important duty of prayer—the last subject treated of in the unrivalled summary of theological truth set forth in our Shorter Catechism.

“Prayer, says the Catechism, is the offering up of our desires to God for things agreeable to his will, in the name of Christ, with confession of our sins, and thankful acknowledgment of his mercies.”

Previously to entering on the illustration of this proposition, I think it important to obviate certain objections, which the enemies of religion raise against the duty of prayer—objections which go to set it aside altogether, and which I have reason to know have had a melancholy influence on the minds of some young persons, and which indeed, have occasionally operated as perplexing temptations, even to the pious. I shall endeavour to state these objections in all their strength; and hope to reply to them in such a manner as to satisfy every attentive and candid mind that they are utterly unfounded and false.

1. Some have said that prayer  
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is unnecessary and useless, because the Supreme Being is so good that we ought not to suppose that he needs any entreaties to bestow on us what we need; and that he is so wise that we cannot suppose he requires any information of what we want. To this I reply, that God is indeed both good and wise, and that in an infinite degree; and yet that he may, and does, require us to make known our requests to him, for the purposes of *our own benefit*. By asking from him in prayer the supply of all our wants, we cultivate and increase a sense of our dependence on Him, and of our obligations to Him—We are constantly kept mindful that all the good we enjoy proceeds from the hand of God, that we are wholly indebted to him both for its reception and its continuance, and are consequently accountable to him for the right improvement of his gifts. Now, here is the foundation of all religion, and of all moral obligation. The foundation of all unquestionably is, a just sense of our entire dependence on God, as our Creator and Benefactor—and the obligation thence arising, to endeavour to please him, by rightly employing our faculties, and by an obedience to his requisitions: and it is too obvious to need argument, that prayer, in which dependence,

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plause of men, but to secure the approbation of God.

Merciful Redeemer! "Feed thy people with thy rod, the flock of thy heritage—let them feed in Bashan and Carmel, as in the days of old."

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MENTAL SCIENCE.

*Radical Principles brought to the test of Revelation.*

The doctrines of moral freedom and of power, which are to be examined in this article, have been stated and discussed at considerable length in our former numbers. But in addition to the philosophical views then taken, it is important to examine them by the light of revelation. That these are radical principles of mental philosophy, no one will doubt. *Moral freedom* is essential to a sane moral agent; and essential to a rational, accountable mind. It is not a faculty or property of mind itself, but an indispensable law of mental operation. As for *power*, it obviously holds an important place among the radical principles of mental science. Although the investigations of this subject have been much vexed, and questions of difficult solution have been urged and reurged, upon the advocates of different theories, the subject itself cannot be displaced from its claims to investigation, as a radical principle of mental philosophy.

We have defined moral freedom to be an indissoluble connexion between pleasure and choice. In other words, the mind always chooses according to its pleasure. We have also explained the facts as they occur in the choice of ultimate and subordinate objects. The phraseology employed and preferred by some is different in word, but not in meaning—viz. that the freedom of the will consists in choosing as is on the whole

most agreeable, or as is the greatest apparent good. It is true the heart is pleased, and the will chooses always in accordance with that pleasure; but if we use the general term mind, then it is proper to say, the mind chooses according to its pleasure.

We have said that men have two kinds of liberty, *external* and *moral*. The former consists in a connexion between volition and external action. When a man acts as he chooses to act, he has all the external liberty which he can have or desire. When this connexion is broken, as it obviously may be, the man's liberty is obstructed; he is not free. But moral freedom, or a connexion between pleasure and choice, can never be obstructed, so long as the mind is sane. The mind of man can never yield this freedom, nor can another mind exercise any control that shall break up this connexion. But according to the doctrine last examined, of ultimate objects and motives, it is obvious that things agreeable are sometimes not chosen; and things disagreeable are often chosen, for the sake of some ultimate object which must be, in its nature and for its own sake, agreeable. Derangement of the understanding may have an effect upon this connexion; to destroy or pervert it, but we speak of sound minds, having all the faculties in well balanced relationship. It is not necessary for us to investigate the causes, phenomena, or history of deranged minds. Our inquiries respect the freedom of sane minds.

We have deemed it necessary to repeat distinctly the doctrine of moral freedom, that we may the more readily recognise the manner in which the Scriptures teach or imply the facts. It has never been doubted, that revelation recognises the moral freedom of man; but the precise meaning of that freedom has been a subject of

much controversy and misapplication in the theological world.

On the general subject of moral government, as found disclosed in the book of revelation, it is obvious to remark, that the system implies the existence of a freedom, according with the principles of the administration. Inert matter is governed by physical laws, and so may external actions often be restrained by physical force, but mind must be governed by moral influence. Freedom is necessarily implied in such government. The whole doctrine of motive and of ultimate and subordinate objects, necessarily involves freedom. All the commands and threatenings, arguments and promises, contained in revelation and addressed to men, imply their freedom. Men generally, would as soon think of denying the implication of man's reason, as of his freedom, from the general style of the Scriptures and the principles of moral government. Why should any appeal be made to the feelings of men to influence their conduct, if those feelings do not govern their volitions; and if their freedom do not consist in a connexion between their pleasure and choice? All that is said of men choosing objects placed before them, involves the freedom of which we speak. Take for illustration, the statement made by Moses to the children of Israel. *Dent. xxx. 19.* "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." Here, in this conclusion of the last communication made by Moses to his people, he reminded them of what was the great object of his communication. He had prescribed the course of duty, and given them to know distinctly the life and blessedness connected with it; he had warned them against disobedience, and told them the

death and the curse which were inseparably connected with the sin. This proposed to the people a choice, in view of the ultimate ends of the two courses. The proposition for their choice recognises their freedom to elect, and that under the influence of their feelings. If the ultimate object were agreeable to their feelings, they would choose the right way; if not, they must take the consequence of resisting it. Such is the instruction of this passage; and the same of all other passages having a similar character. See *Joshua, xxiv. 15.* "Choose you, this day, whom ye will serve,"—and verse 22. "Ye are witnesses against yourselves that ye have chosen you the Lord, to serve him." Here the implication is as strong as positive assertion. So *2 Sam. xxiv. 12*—the Lord commanded the prophet Gad to "go, and say unto David, thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things, choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto thee." Can it be at all doubtful whether this proposition involves and proves David's freedom of choice? The proposition of Elijah to the people of Israel, *1 Kings xviii. 21*, involves the same principle. There are many cautions and exhortations which teach the same thing; see *Prov. i. 29*, and *iii. 31*—*Isah. lxvi. 12*—*Luke x. 42*. We might quote many injunctions, arguments, entreaties and threatenings, which plainly involve the same doctrine. But the truth is so plain that it would be superfluous. It ought however to be observed, that a definition of freedom, which has obtained among some theologians, and which involves self-determining power in the will itself, independent of motive and inducement, is inconsistent with the principles of moral government, inconsistent with the use of argument, threatening and promise. The Bible recognises no other

freedom of mind than what consists in a connexion between pleasure and choice, or in other words, choosing according to the pleasure of the heart. It really seems to us, that we could scarcely go amiss in quoting from any page in the whole book of revelation, for a recognition of the principle of moral freedom for which we plead. All its doctrines revealed for the regulation of our faith, all its precepts for the regulation of our conduct, all its promises for the confirmation of our hope and excitement of our zeal, and all the histories recorded for the illustration of God's government and the principles of human action, are in perfect accordance with each other; and all recognise the same principle of human ability. The whole are in accordance with the consciousness of moral freedom, of which every man is persuaded, and of which no subtlety or sophism can divest us. We may talk of metaphysical reasoning, and speculate in abstract philosophy or theories, as long as we please; but plain common sense will always decide that the Scriptures of truth recognise man's moral freedom. And in the interpretation of that freedom, revelation and man's consciousness will be found to agree.

But on the doctrine of human ability, there is more difficulty in making this agreement between revelation and human consciousness so tangible, as on this subject of freedom. The facts are just as certain, but not so obvious. The reason will be evident to all who carefully examine the subject. Moral freedom is an established connexion between pleasure and an object of consciousness; while power is neither a relation nor an action, consequently not the object of immediate consciousness. This shows a very obvious reason of the difficulty. Still we think the Scriptures recognise man's ability,

while they settle its doctrine and limit its character. If this be so, and the scriptural instruction could be so collected and arranged as to be distinctly obvious, it might serve to settle many vexatious disputes of the present day, and correct many erroneous opinions of mischievous tendency. Whether we shall succeed in presenting the scriptural recognition, is yet to be seen. Could we be as certain of success as we are of the existing facts and of their recognition, we should felicitate ourselves, and congratulate our readers. But of this we are not so confident.

It may be proper now to restate the doctrine of power, although in a former article, we have stated and more fully discussed this subject than any other. We have said that of power, we have no direct consciousness, and obtain our idea of it from a connexion between an effect and its cause, or in other words, between volition and the effects produced. When we find effects to follow our volitions, we say we have power to accomplish those effects. But the question, what is power? has not yet been answered, nor do we believe it can be answered satisfactorily by man. The true doctrine of human ability is to be ascertained philosophically, in the same way that other philosophical principles are ascertained, only on the principle and process of induction. Any other method of investigation is liable to mislead. Other methods may lead to plausible theories, but we cannot confide in them. We have said, that for all purposes of theological argument and discussion, the relation which suggests to us the idea of power, may be taken as a substitute for a definition of human ability—That is, the relation between volition and effects which follow. In prosecuting our present inquiry, the object is to ascertain whether the

Scriptures recognise such a doctrine of power, and what is in fact the scriptural instruction on the doctrine of human ability, and its more important limitations.

One general remark should here be made and remembered. The scriptural recognitions of power are similar to those of freedom, some of them are general and by implication, without any specific limitations, while others are specific, and describe either the uses, limitations, or applications of the ability. Every command, while it involves a duty to be performed by men, implies both freedom and ability. The same is true of arguments, threatenings and promises, found in the word of God. These are all general recognitions, without any limitations or descriptions of the power, in its nature, origin, or extent. The existence of ability is taken for granted, in the directions and the performance of the duty, which is proof positive of the fact. All the historical illustrations of human character and conduct, contained in the Bible, confirm the implication which we deduce from the commands and promises.

In the details of this examination, we might compare the terms which are used in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, and ascertain their technical and usual meaning, but this is not necessary for the present purpose. The result of such an investigation would not compensate for the labour, time, and room occupied by the discussion. The meaning of whatever terms are used to indicate human ability, is principally to be gathered from the connexion in which they are used; and this may be obviously collected from the English translation.

We propose to examine a few of the numerous passages in which the terms *power*, *ability*, *able*, and *can* are used, all to indicate the same things. It will not be ne-

cessary to pursue this inquiry so far as to ascertain all the various shades of meaning attached to those terms. Some of the more prominent differences of meaning indicated by the terms, and ascertained from the subjects to which they are applied, and the connexions in which they are used, may be important. Take the following as a sufficient specimen for illustration. The following passages are a few of many, in which the terms are used for *property*. Prov. iii. 27. "Withhold not good from them to whom it is due, when it is in the *power* of thine hand to do it." Ezra. ii. 69. "They gave after their *ability* unto the treasure of work." Nehem. v. 8. "We, after our *ability*, have redeemed our brethren, the Jews." Luke iv. 6. "All this *power* I will give thee, and the glory of them." 2 Cor. viii. 3. "For to their *power*, I bear record, yea, and beyond their *power*, they were willing of themselves." Deut. xvi. 17. "Every man shall give as he is *able*, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given thee." Luke xiv. 29. "Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not *able* to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying, this man began to build, and was not *able* to finish." These passages all indicate *property*, as the ability intended, and such like uses of the terms are referred to in 2 Cor. viii. 12, "For if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not."

Another class of passages have the terms to indicate *right* or *privilege*. John. i. 12. "But as many as received him, to them gave he *power* to become the sons of God." 1 Cor. ix. 4—6. "Have we not *power* to eat and to drink? Have we not *power* to lead about a sister, a wife, as well as other apostles, and as the brethren of the

Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have not we *power* to forbear working." 2 Thess. iii. 9. "Not because we have not *power*, but to make ourselves an example unto you to follow us." These and some others, can receive no other consistent interpretation than right or privilege.

In many passages *power* is used for *official authority*. Take the following as a specimen: John xix. 10. "Then saith Pilate unto him, speakest thou not unto me? Knowest thou not, that I have *power* to crucify thee, and have *power* to release thee?" Rom. xiii. 1—2. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher *powers*. For there is no *power* but of God; the *powers* that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the *power*, resisteth the ordinance of God." Luke, xii. 11. "And when they bring you unto the synagogues, and unto magistrates, and *powers*, take ye no thought, how, or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say." All these and many other passages, most evidently indicate official authority.

It may be proper to mention a meaning of *power* for *speech*, as Prov. xviii. 21. "Death and life are in the *power* of the tongue." Luke iv. 32. "And they were astonished at his doctrine: for his words was with *power*." 2 Cor. x. 10. "For his letters (say they) are mighty and *powerful*." So in Heb. i. 3. Christ is represented as "upholding all things by the word of his *power*."

*Power* is also used for *religious principle*, as in 2 Tim. iii. 5. "Having a form of godliness, but denying the *power* thereof:" and 2 Thess. i. 11—"fulfil all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith with *power*."

On these uses of the terms, it is obvious to remark, that when they are applied to *property* and *word*, they are applied by a common

figure of speech to the means and instruments of power. In the same manner it is applied in Rom. i. 16, to the gospel; "for it is the *power* of God unto salvation, to every one that believeth:" also 1 Cor. i. 18. "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish, foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the *power* of God." But in none of these quotations, is there a direct recognition of what is usually denominated human ability or power—There is an indirect but necessary implication of the doctrine.

The following passages are a few of multitudes, which recognise the idea of power, suggested by a connexion between volition and the effects which follow. We select them from different applications, in order to exhibit as fair a specimen as practicable. Gen. xxxi. 6, refers to Jacob's service with Laban, "Ye know that with all my *power* I have served your father." Matt. xx. 22, is the answer of Christ to the two sons of Zebedee, and their reply. "Are ye *able* to drink of the cup that I shall drink of, and to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with? they say unto him, we are *able*." Matt. xxv. 15, refers to the distribution of money—"unto one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one; to every man according to his several *ability*." Mark iv. 33, relates to the capacity of Christ's disciples to understand and improve his instructions; "With many such parables spake he the word unto them, as they were *able* to hear it." Rom. ix. 21, furnishes an important illustration; "Hath not the potter *power* over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Rom. xv. 14, expresses Paul's persuasion of his brethren; "That ye also are full of goodness, filled with all knowledge, *able* also to admonish one another." 1 Cor.

ix. 12, records an example of Paul and Barnabas, which recognises the principle; "If others be partakers of this *power* over you, are not we rather? nevertheless, we have not used this *power*; but suffer all things, lest we should hinder the gospel of Christ." 1 Cor. x. 13, furnishes still a different relation of the principle; "but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are *able*." Eph. vi. 11, is an exhortation which involves the doctrine; "Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be *able* to stand against the wiles of the devil," and ver. 16, to the same effect; "Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be *able* to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked." See also 1 Pet. iv. 11—"if any man minister, let him do it as of the *ability* which God giveth." On these quotations we make a few remarks. They all recognise an exercise of volition, in the use or employment of power. In all the examples, some effect, or the discharge of duty, is the result of a voluntary exercise of ability. Whatever that ability may be, it is that which connects the result with the volition. From these examples it is obvious to remark, that sometimes ability is but for muscular vigour, sometimes skill, sometimes capacity to endure suffering, sometimes knowledge, sometimes benevolence, sometimes religious principle, or all Christian graces, and sometimes mental endowments. These are not power, but the voluntary use of them brings our apprehensions nearer to that indefinable something called power which connects the effects with the volition, than we can otherwise attain.

We may here observe that the Scriptures teach most explicitly, that God is the source of all human ability; it is all derived from him. Deut. viii. 8. "For it is he

that giveth thee *power* to get wealth." 2 Sam. xxii. 33. "God is my *strength* and *power*." Ps. lxxviii. 35. "The God of Israel is he that giveth *strength* and *power* unto his people." Eccl. v. 19. "Every man also to whom God hath given riches and wealth, and hath given him *power* to eat thereof, and to take his portion, and to rejoice in his labour; this is the gift of God." Isah. xl. 29. "He giveth *power* to the faint; and to them that have no *might*, he increaseth *strength*." Dan. ii. 37. "For the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, *power*, and strength, and glory. Mich. iii. 8. "But truly I am full of *power* by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob his transgressions, and to Israel his sin." Luke x. 19. "Behold, I give unto you *power* to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the *power* of the enemy: and nothing shall by any means hurt you." Luke xxiv. 49. "But tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with *power* from on high." John xix. 11. "Jesus answered, thou couldst have no *power* at all against me, except it were given thee from above." Rom. xiii. 1. "For there is no power but of God." 2 Cor. xiii. 10. "Therefore I write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpness, according to the *power* which the Lord hath given me to edification, and not destruction." 2 Tim. i. 7. "For God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of *power* and of love, and of a sound mind." Eph. vi. 10. "Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the *power* of his might." These passages include nearly every variety of meaning and application of *power*, and distinctly ascribe its origin to God. Man has, therefore, no independent ability. It is obvious to remark, that some have

a *power* which other men have not. This is very distinctly recognised in the Scriptures.

We now return to some of the more important limitations of man's ability, as taught in the Scriptures. These are made by various circumstances and insurmountable obstacles. We quote a number of passages of different character. Gen. xxxvii. 4. "And when his (Joseph's) brethren saw that their father loved him more than all his brethren, they hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably unto him:" Ps. xi. 12. "Mine iniquities have taken hold upon me, so that I am not *able* to look up." Prov. vi. 27—28. "*Can* a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burnt? *Can* one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burnt?" Prov. xxvii. 4. "Who is *able* to stand before envy?" Eccl. viii. 8. "There is no man that hath *power* over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he *power* in the day of death." Jer. xiii. 23. "*Can* the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." Ezek. xxii. 14. "*Can* thine heart endure, or *can* thine hands be strong, in the days that I shall deal with thee? I the Lord have spoken it, and will do it." Ezek. xxxvii. 3. "Son of man, *can* these bones live?" See the whole vision. Jonah i. 13. "Nevertheless the men rowed hard to bring it (the ship) to land; but they *could not*, for the sea wrought, and was tempestuous against them." Matth. xii. 34. "O generation of vipers! how *can* ye, being evil, speak good things? for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." Mark vi. 19. "Therefore Herodias had a quarrel against him (John) and would have killed him; but she *could not*." Chap. ix. 18. "And I spake to thy disciples that they should cast him out; and they *could not*"—compared with verse 29. Luke xiii.

24. "Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be *able*." Luke xxi. 15. "For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be *able* to gainsay, nor resist." John vi. 44. "No man *can* come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." Chap. vii. 34. "Ye shall seek me, and shall not find me; and where I am, thither ye *cannot* come." Chap. x. 29. "My Father which gave them me, is greater than all: and none are *able* to pluck them out of my Father's hand." Chap. xv. 4—5. "As the branch *cannot* bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more *can* ye, except ye abide in me—without me ye *can* do nothing." Chap. xxi. 6. "Cast the net on the right side of the ship, and ye shall find. They cast, therefore, and now they were not *able* to draw it for the multitude of fishes." Acts vi. 10. "And they were not *able* to resist the wisdom and the spirit by which he (Stephen,) spake." Chap. xv. 10. "Now, therefore, why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were *able* to bear?" Rom. vii. 23. "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into *captivity* to the law of sin, which is in my members." See the whole connexion. Rom. viii. 7. "The carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed *can* be." Gal. v. 17. "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye *cannot* do the things that ye would." All these passages express or imply a limitation of human ability; and we might extend the list of quotations to a much greater length, if it were necessary. We have quoted the passages in the order of their oc-

currence, without classification. This we preferred, because the arrangement shows how generally, promiscuously, directly and incidentally, the fact is recognised. The limitations are sometimes made by the temper and disposition of the heart, as in the case of Joseph's brethren, those reproved by the Saviour, those accustomed to do evil coming to Christ, Paul's situation, Rom. vii. 23, the carnal mind, and the lusting of the flesh, Gal. v. 17. Sometimes it is by the laws of the elements and providence of God, as in the case of the crew of the vessel in which the fugitive, Jonah, had attempted to escape; the case mentioned, Prov. vi. 28; the case of Herodias; and the net enclosing the draught of fishes. Sometimes a deep sense of guilt makes the limitation, as in the case of David, and the appeal made in Ezek. xxii. 14; sometimes by the interposition of God, as Eccl. viii. 8; by envy, as Prov. xxvii. 4; by demoniacal influence, as Mark ix. 18; by conviction, as Luke xxi. 15. and Acts vi. 10. But we need not enlarge upon the circumstances and interposing obstacles.

It is obvious, and scriptural to remark, that some of these limitations of power excuse from responsibility and blame, as in the cases of the sailors, Jonah i. 13; and death, as Eccl. viii. 8; in short, every thing foreign to the heart and its influence: but in all cases where human ability is limited by the temper and disposition of the heart, there is no excuse from responsibility or blame, as in the case of Joseph's brethren; the Pharisees; what is denominated lusting of the flesh, &c. It should now be remembered, that whatever may be the cause of limitation, it does not alter the *nature* of power, nor change the *character* of human ability. It may alter responsibility, and praise or blame, but the ability is the same. This state of the case

shows the uselessness of a famous distinction between natural and moral ability. It is a distinction not recognised in the Scriptures; and if founded on any thing in the Bible, it must be on the different circumstances and facts which limit the exercise of human power. But that is placing it on facts, which do not affect the nature of ability at all: it is, therefore, unphilosophical and unscriptural.

We have barely room here to say, that, what has been shown to be the philosophical fact, is recognised by the Scriptures: the affections of the heart control the volition, but the volition can never change the affections. The change of the heart, without divine grace, is as much beyond the limit of human ability, as the change of the Ethiopian's skin or the leopard's spots; and if it were not, that what is impossible with men is possible with God, our case would be hopeless. But blessed be God, there is "help laid on one mighty to save;" and the Holy Spirit, purchased and sent by Christ, is fulfilling his mission, in subduing the hearts of men and sanctifying their affections, that they may be fitted for heaven. Under this blessed influence, the disciples of Christ abide in him, as the branch abides in the vine; and thus they bear fruit unto holiness; but without Christ they can do nothing. Such is the testimony of the Scriptures on this subject, by which we must abide, and by which we ought always to be guided in our estimation of human power and character. F.

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#### THE NATURE OF PROOF.

Strictly speaking there is a difference between *evidence* and *proof*; although in popular speaking and writing, these terms are often considered and used as synonymous. *Evidence* is that which *shows truth*; *proof* is the *method* or *way* in which

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LECTURES ON THE SHORTER CATECHISM OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES—ADDRESSED TO YOUTH.

LECTURE LXXII.

In the first three petitions of the prayer we consider, our Lord teaches us in what manner we are to address our Heavenly Father, in praying for the advancement of his kingdom and glory in the world; thus intimating, as we have heretofore remarked, that these objects are to be regarded by us as of the first and highest importance. But having done this, he dictates three other petitions, in which we are to pray for ourselves—for those favours, or mercies, in which both our temporal and eternal interests are involved.

In the fourth petition, which is "Give us this day our daily bread," we pray, says our Catechism, "That of God's free gift we may receive a competent portion of the good things of this life, and enjoy his blessing with them"—You ought constantly to keep in mind, my young friends, that you should supplicate and receive the protection and bounties of God's common providence as "a free gift." This is too often neglected or forgotten. The forgiveness of sin,

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and the saving influences of divine grace, none who know what these things mean, will fail to ask for as benefits, to which, as a matter of right, they have no claim. We have forfeited the favour of God, and to expect its restoration in any other way than one that is purely gratuitous—in any manner but as "a free gift,"—is seen at once to be absurd. But it is not so readily admitted and recollected that by our sins we have also forfeited all *temporal good*—every present enjoyment, as well as all future happiness; and therefore that the very air we breathe, the health we possess, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, in a word, every thing that contributes to our earthly comfort, does actually come to us as "a free gift." Man, by the violation of the first covenant under which he was placed, forfeited life itself, and consequently every thing appertaining to it, into the hands of divine justice. It is through the intervention of Christ the Mediator, that all our earthly blessings are bestowed upon us. His redeemed people receive them in the channel and as the gift of covenant love; and unconverted sinners ought to receive them, as proofs of the divine forbearance, and as affording space, and oppor-

## Miscellaneous.

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### MENTAL SCIENCE.

#### *The Doctrine of Responsibility.*

We have used this term for moral obligation and liability to answer for our conduct and character. Whether this be the best term to express our meaning is not very important to be ascertained. We care little for the name or term, provided the things be understood. It is doubtful whether a system of mental philosophy, unaided by revelation, could ever explain the doctrine of moral obligation so clearly, or enforce it so efficiently as to be serviceable in regulating human conduct. The truth is plain, that the mind of man is capable of knowing right and wrong; of approving or disapproving the objects and course of conduct; and acting under the influence of authority and inducement. It is further evident that man is a moral being and a moral agent, and hence prepared to be a subject of moral government. Beyond this, philosophy sheds at best but a dim light. It may infer some probable facts, but certainly it cannot teach. For example, it may infer from the well ascertained character of mind, its faculties and laws of action, that such a being must be under moral obligation to his Maker, that his attributes are the standard of this obligation, that this bond extends to the mind's whole history and action, that some existing relation must be the foundation of this bond or obligation, and that some ennobling end must be in prospect, to justify the relation and the obligation. But we need a revelation from Him who made and governs mind, to guide us in the satisfactory investigation of our moral relations and the obligations under which we act. And beyond all this, over the account which we must render to God and the final result of all human character and action, uncertainty hangs in gloomy shades; and no light but revelation can dispel it. Under the guidance of revelation, morals may be investigated as a science, and the facts ascertained, compared, arranged and defined in their relations. But without this guidance, our way is dark and uncertain. We have not pretended to investigate the doctrine of moral obligation or accountability, irrespective of the facts displayed in the revelation of God. Still we have not pursued this inquiry with a view to establish the doctrine on scriptural grounds, further than the recognition of such facts and philosophical principles as are necessary to the subject. So far as we have hitherto examined, the philosophy of the doctrine stands thus; obligation arises from the relations of moral beings, first to their Maker and moral Governor, and then to each other, all in appropriate subordination and harmonious influence. Those relations are estimated by the primary faculties and circumstances of moral beings, placed under the obligation, and by the character and perfections of *HIM* to whom they are related. The primary faculties are understanding, heart, and will. Men have understanding to know, a heart to feel, and a will to act. They are therefore intelligent, sensitive, and active beings—they are also moral and accountable beings. Moral, because they possess the faculties above enumerated, and principally because that faculty which feels, is a moral faculty. Accountable, because they have a faculty of know-

ing their duty, and especially because they have also a faculty of feeling a sense of obligation. They are capable of feeling and appreciating rewards and punishments: in these respects they are proper subjects of moral government. They have also a faculty of volition, which fits them to act under the influence of obligation. Thus, it will be perceived that men possess all the elements of mind, which qualify them to be placed under moral obligation and to render them accountable agents. But the mere possession of these faculties does not produce obligation, they must be considered in relation to their Maker and Sovereign, to estimate the responsibility. Here we approach the point where philosophy fails us. We are unable to estimate fully, or with any degree of certainty, the attributes and perfections of God, which, from the nature of the case, must be the standard of moral obligation. It is perfectly obvious that moral obligation must arise from the relations of moral beings; and if the attributes of one party be not known, the relations sustained to that party cannot be defined, however fully the attributes of the other party may be known. As our Maker and moral Governor, we must be responsible to God, but the moral perfections of God are necessary to be ascertained in order to estimate this obligation, because the standard of right must be found, not with the obliged, but with the obliging party and in his attributes. The relations must be modified by the attributes of both the parties, and out of those relations arise the moral obligation; but the standard must be in the attributes of him to whom the obligation is due. This philosophy may teach, but beyond this abstract proposition it cannot lead us. We are, therefore, under the necessity of seeking another guide, in endeavouring

to ascertain the foundation and standard of moral obligation. The *foundation*, if we may so call that of which we directly predicate the obligation, is the *relation*; and the *standard* is the moral character of those attributes, to which the obliged party is related and bound. The question, therefore, now to be settled is, what is the moral character of those attributes, or what are the attributes of God, which are the standard of moral obligation? After this is answered, the relations may be defined with sufficient accuracy for the present investigation.

We have thought it necessary thus to state the doctrine immediately in connection with the inquiry now made, in bringing the radical principles of mental science to the test of revelation.

The attributes of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, may be classed under his infinity, wisdom, power, and holiness. He is infinite in wisdom or knowledge; infinite in power; infinite in holiness or goodness. The *holiness* of God, which is an attribute of his nature, infinite and unchangeable, must be the standard of right for the universe. Nothing else can be substituted in its place. Power cannot be the standard of right to moral beings. It may be necessary to secure an observance or enforcement of that which is appropriately the standard. But it needs no argument or illustration to show, that power may be wielded against right, and utterly subvert the principles of justice and goodness, if not guided by the attribute of holiness. Nor is it more needful to show that knowledge, though it be infinite, cannot be the standard of right. It may be indispensable to provide for the stability and influence of the legitimate rule of moral obligation. Holiness is the standard to be investigated. So it is announced in the revelation of God

“Be ye holy; for I am holy.” 1 Pet. i. 16. See also Lev. xi. 44—45. Chap. xix. 2, and xx. 26.

Of this attribute, called holiness in God, we can form no conceptions, except as guided by the revelation which he has given us. It indicates the purity and rectitude of his nature, an essential attribute, constituting the glory and harmony of all his other perfections. It is that which the Psalmist celebrates as “the beauty of the Lord.” Ps. xxvii. 4. Moses celebrates the same in his song, Exod. xv. 11—“Who is like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders?” God is called “the Holy One of Israel,” as if Holy were synonymous with the name Jehovah. When Isaiah saw, in vision, “the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up,” he saw also “the seraphim—and one cried unto another, and said, Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory”—Isaiah vi. 3. When John had his vision and saw the company of the redeemed, and heard them sing the song of Moses and the Lamb, one part of that song was, “Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name? for thou only art holy”—Rev. xv. 4. We cite these passages to show that the Scriptures represent God as infinitely, originally, and immutably holy in the perfections of his nature. There is not, in such like passages of Scripture, nor do we believe any where else in the Bible, an intimation of some extraneous standard, by which God’s actions are ascertained to be holy and right. We once heard a preacher declare from his pulpit, that “holiness in God does not consist in any taste or attribute of his nature”—but in the same discussion said, “holiness in God consists in his doing right.” We were then, and we still are puzzled to know what was

the preacher’s standard of right, or of estimating holiness in God.

We have heard much speculation on the foundation and standard of moral obligation—and have heard the nature of things, the greatest happiness of the universe, alleged as the standard; and we are not able now to remember the half which we have heard absurdly alleged on this subject. Time would be uselessly spent to name and refute the absurd theories which men have advocated and attempted to prove, first by philosophy, and then by the scriptures of truth. The compass of our inquiry leaves them all out of view at present, and brings us directly to the scriptures alone for intelligence on these two momentous inquiries—What is the *standard* of right or moral obligation? and what is the *foundation* of moral obligation? When these two questions are answered correctly, the whole subject is easy.

To ascertain the standard of right or holiness, take the following method. The scriptures represent the ultimate end or object of all God’s manifestations and administration to be his own *glory*. “The Lord hath made all things for himself.” Prov. xvi. 4. “For of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory forever.” Rom. xi. 36. “The heavens declare the glory of God.” Ps. xix. 1. This sentiment of the Psalmist is recognised in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, i. 20, 21. “The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they *glorified* him not as God, neither were thankful.” Thus the manifestation of God’s glory is the object of creation; and the manifestation is so clearly made,

that heathens are without excuse. The same is true of God's providential government. His counsel stands, and he will do all his pleasure. "He hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all." Ps. ciii. 19. "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Ps. cxxvi. 10. "Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the power, and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty: for all that is in the heaven and in the earth is thine; thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and thou art exalted as head above all." 1 Chron. xxix. 11. These and such like declarations and ascriptions, which abound in the scriptures, show the glory of God to be the object of his governing providence. In addition we assert, without fear of contradiction, that in all that is said of the scheme of redemption, in its counsels, its development, and execution; in renewing, sanctifying, and saving men, the glory of God is the grand object which Jehovah has published to the universe and will confirm at last in the grand consummation. In this great object the redeemed and the angels of heaven will unite their song of celebration, and ascribe "glory to God in the highest."

Let it now be asked what is the glory of God, according to the scriptures of revelation? When Moses prayed that God would show him his glory, the reply was, "I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee." Exod. xxxiii. 19. From this answer it would seem that the goodness of God was his glory. The song of heaven would seem to teach that his holiness is his glory. Other parts of revelation denominate the manifestation of mercy, grace, and judgment, the glory of God. From the whole it is evident that the manifestation

of God's attributes or perfections constitutes his glory. But it is also very evident, that the peculiar lustre of all God's perfections is his holiness. This is his glory. To publish, maintain, and illustrate the holiness of all his attributes, is the great object of creation, providence, and grace. This constitutes the loveliness of his character, in which he most delights, and to which he demands the homage of an intelligent universe.

A consideration of no small importance in this examination, is, that sin is every where represented as the opposite of holiness, in its nature and tendency. It is nowhere represented as opposite in its nature to knowledge or power. The most sinful being in the universe is represented as having great knowledge and mighty power, yea, "the Prince of the power of the air, who now worketh in the hearts of the children of disobedience." Now if sin, for which men are condemned, and for which alone they are worthy of punishment, be every where, in the scriptures, represented as opposite in its nature to holiness, is it not irresistibly certain that holiness is the standard of moral obligation? This argument is so plain and conclusive, and its premises are so obvious, that it needs no further illustration. The result of this brief sketch, which might be greatly enlarged, is conclusive that holiness is the standard by which moral obligation is to be estimated. All men are bound to be holy, because God is holy.

The way is now prepared to inquire after the *relations*, which are the *foundation* of moral obligation. We have said the relations, and consequently obligations, may be modified by certain things in the character of the parties. If God is holy, and man has capacities to be holy or sinful, man must be placed in a relation which binds

him to be like his Maker, in his moral character. We have formerly described the faculties of man, and shown that his heart is a moral faculty and constitutes him a moral being. But in order to constitute him a proper subject of moral government, he is made capable of knowing the rule, and capable of acting under its influence. In other words, he is an intelligent being, a sensitive and active being; and with faculties indicated by these expressions, he is a proper subject of government, of praise or blame, reward or punishment. This is the philosophy of the subject. Now what saith the scripture of man? In answer to this question we may refer to the scriptural proof, already stated in former articles, that man has a spiritual and immortal soul, or mind, possessing the faculties of understanding, feeling, and acting—*understanding* to know, *heart* to feel, and *will* to act. It will be at once perceived that one who has understanding, may be required to know; that one who has a heart, may be required to feel; and one who has a will, may be required to act. One thing more only is necessary to fit him for moral government; that is, liberty to act just as he *feels* pleased to act. Such is man—an intelligent, sensitive, active, free agent.

We have before shown the meaning and place of moral freedom; that it consists in the connexion between pleasure and choice; that it is unbroken and essential to moral obligation. All the commands of God imply both freedom and obligation. All the arguments addressed to men in the Scriptures, imply the very kind of freedom which we have described, all the promises and threatenings involve the same facts, and moral obligation cannot bind a man in that wherein he has no freedom. Such are some of the principal elements of mind and its condi-

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tion, which are necessary to be adverted to as recognised in revelation, and modifying the relations under which man is placed.

It will now be very obvious that such an agent may sustain many relations to Him who made and governs him, and will call him to an account—to the laws and principles of God's government—and to those who are associated with him in action and in destiny. Some of those relations are fixed and unalterable; others are adventitious and temporary. But we have not room to point out all those relations—even if we had the time, and our readers would have patience to read them. A few, however, will be sufficient for the present purpose.

Men are *dependent* on God for their being and well being: and this expresses one relation which is essential to moral obligation. On this topic nothing can be more plain than that as creatures men must be dependent on their Creator; and this relation cannot be destroyed while they exist. But if this relation of dependence could be broken up, and men become independent of their Maker, it would be difficult for us to conceive how they could be under obligation to him. Obliterate the doctrine that men live, move and have their being in God, and the bond is sundered, which binds them to his service. The Scriptures abound with recognitions of obligation, based upon man's dependence. How often was Israel admonished to return unto God, who created them, and to the Lord, who preserved and delivered them? "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth; I have nourished and brought up children and they have rebelled against me." In this relation God's preserving care, his providential favours, his continued goodness, his long suffering kindness and his gracious blessings, are often referred to, for the purpose of en-

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forcing obligation. All the commands of God, given for the obedience of men; all the threatenings and denunciations of revelation against the disobedient; all the promises of good to the obedient and believing; all the persuasions of mercy; and, in short, the whole law and gospel, involve and explain obligation as necessarily connected with the relation of men's dependence on God.

Men sustain the relation of subjects to a Sovereign. God is the Sovereign of the universe, and men are subjects, in one province of his empire. We speak now of men as placed under a moral government; or, in other words, a government for the regulation of intelligent moral agents.

God governs, doubtless, the material and irrational universe; the planets, the elements, the irrational animals are all under his control. It is also true that there are laws by which he governs these things, an order in which he disposes of them; but this describes not the government of God over intelligent, moral agents. This sovereignty over minds is a government of laws with their penalties; and of influences consistent with his moral attributes, and with the moral agency of men. As a Sovereign, God has a perfect right to prescribe the rule of men's conduct, including every feeling, investigation and action, from the commencement to the close of life. He has a perfect right to estimate the character of obedience and disobedience, to annex the rewards and penalties, according to his own pleasure. As a Sovereign he forms and places men under such relations to himself and to one another as he sees fit. Nothing can be more certain, or more clearly revealed, than God's sovereign dominion over men, as subjects at his rightful disposal. The fact, in all its length and breadth, is spread over the whole face of the

Scriptures; and there can be no doubt that it is easily recognised in the administration of God's government over men. It is needless to cite passages of Scripture to prove what cannot fail to be manifest, in every book and chapter from Genesis to Revelation. The modifications of this relation are also pointed out in the revelation of God to men. The fact, that God has given a revelation to men, establishes the truth that God is Sovereign and men are his subjects.

We have named two relations, which, when united and considered in all their various adjustments, present the case in its scriptural and proper light. Men are *dependent subjects* of God's moral government, and all the subordinate relations, included in this state, are included in the foundation of moral obligation. It is not necessary for our present purpose to trace all these subordinate relations, nor to argue the general question. A mere statement of the case will be sufficient. Throughout the whole Scriptures these relationships are recognised as the basis of obligation; and it is perfectly evident that where no relation exists there can be no obligation.

But this is rather a general view of the subject, in the fully recognised relationship of men, with all their faculties entirely developed. There remains a question of its application to the constitution of man's being. On this point not much need be said. We are prepared to affirm, on principles already established, that men are moral beings in the constitution of their nature, antecedent to all agency, or moral action. The relation is of a dependent moral being to a moral Governor. Obligation supposes something to be done, or acted; and whether it has been done or not, is not the question to be asked in order to settle

the idea of responsibility. Moral obligation arises from the relations of moral beings; and demands a conformity of the one party to the standard furnished by the other party. This demand is modified according to various circumstances of capacity, objects and intelligence. If we suppose the case of an infant, who is without any knowledge of God, or of any fellow creature, and one who has never had a single volition, that is right or wrong, we may illustrate the thought. This infant is a moral being, because it possesses a soul in its nature capacitated to apprehend, feel and choose. No matter how small the point of time may be supposed to be between the giving existence to the soul and the soul's appropriate action. The thought is this, the relations, out of which moral obligation arises, are between the mind and its Maker, or the mind and whatever else may be supposed to claim obligation. They are not primarily relations between actions and God, but between agents and God, and between them as moral beings, dependent subjects of God's government.

We have now only room to state a few things on the *measure* of this obligation. We mean something a little different from standard by measure. Moral obligation may be proved to exist by the relations out of which it arises, and by the character of the perfections to which the relations are sustained; and this is the standard, but the extent may be conceived to be modified by some other considerations. Although standard and measure generally signify the same thing; in this case there is a difference—more, perhaps, in the loose and hasty conceptions of men than in the facts.

It is alleged by some, that *knowledge* is the measure of obligation. We have heard the idea expressed as a maxim, that "knowledge is

necessary to the existence of sin." It is also incorporated in the definition, which some men give of sin: it is, say they, "a voluntary transgression of a *known* law." To this doctrine we object. There are sins of ignorance, and opposition of feeling to holiness is sin, whether any law is known or not. The susceptibility or adaptation to be pleased with sin, or to be opposed to holiness, is sinful. Sinning implies action, but sinfulness does not necessarily imply exercise. Knowledge is not therefore the measure of responsibility, although it may increase it, and aggravate sin.

It is also alleged by many that *power* is always the measure of responsibility. In order to make this appear, much is said and written. All the subtleties of philosophy are employed to distinguish between the different kinds of ability; and after all, the application is deceptive and unsatisfactory. We think the case is plain, that a recognition of ability is appropriate and necessary where that identical ability is to be employed in the fulfilment of obligation. But physical power is not employed in the emotions of love, hatred, joy, sorrow and humility. It would be out of place, therefore, to say that men have physical power to love God; and the same of all emotions. On this subject the Scriptures connect power with obligation in many things, but in other things leave it out entirely. Habits of sin are represented as taking away the ability to do good. Jer. xiii. 23. "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil." A man may have an ability to do evil, but none to do good, and yet not be freed from obligation to do good. This is also the fact in the case of fallen spirits, "reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness unto the judgment of the great day."

Paul complained of his inability to do the good he would, and being brought into captivity to the law of sin, not as an excuse, but as a penitent lamentation over his sin. Rom. vii. 7—23. The general principle is stated in strong terms, in Gal. v. 17. "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." By the *flesh* here none can doubt, from the explanation contained in the 19, 20 and 21st verses of the connexion, that the apostle intended a corrupt principle of action, which disabled men from doing good. The same apostle magnifies the love of God in the following remarkable words, Rom. v. 6. "For when we were without *strength*, in due time Christ died for the ungodly." Again the same inability is repeated Rom. viii. 7. "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." And Christ said "no man can come unto me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." John, vi. 44. These and such like passages of Scripture are not intended to release men from obligation to be holy, and yet assert their inability in themselves to become so. The result, therefore, is, that men are under obligation to be what they are unable in themselves to become. And we think the whole scheme of salvation by Jesus Christ, and more especially the mission of the Holy Ghost, show the fact, in all its sad and condemning details. If men have ability to fulfil the whole demands of God's law, there is no necessity for the influence of the Holy Ghost.

On the whole, it is safe to abide by the law of God as the measure of obligation. Speculation can never settle the question, or make it binding if it were settled. There must be authority to settle a ques-

tion of so much importance; and that authority can be found nowhere else, but in the revealed will of God. Still it may be asked, how is it with the pagans, who have no revealed law? We answer, those without law are a law to themselves; and God has not left himself without a witness to them, so that they are without excuse. Men are created to feel responsibility; they are so constituted that they are not only capable of feeling it, but that they cannot possibly avoid a sense of obligation. They may pervert it, mistake and misapply it; but escape from it they can never. It accords with the constitution of their being, as possessing faculties to understand, feel and choose: and not to feel any sentiment of moral obligation would be violating the principles of their nature, and prove them to have no sense of right or wrong. Talk as long as we may on this point, there is no setting aside this fact; men have a sense of right and wrong, and along with it moral obligation. F.

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#### GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

The following statement, published sometime since by Professor Robinson of the Andover Theological Seminary, will afford gratifying information to a portion of our readers.

"The universities of Germany were all founded by the governments of the countries in which they are respectively situated; but up to the time of the Reformation all such foundations, with their rights and privileges, had to receive the confirmation of the Popes. That of Wirtemberg, in 1502, was the first that was confirmed by the Emperor of Germany, and not by the Pope; although the assent of the latter was afterwards applied for.

"At the present day, all the uni-