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THE

QUARTERLY

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

THE REV. EZRA STILES ELY, D. D.

OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

“Whosoever transgresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God; he that abideth in the doctrine of Christ, he hath both the Father and the Son.”

VOL. II.

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1819.

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit:

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, on the 12th day of May, in the forty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America, A. D. 1819, the Rev. *Ezra Stiles Ely*, D. D. of the said District, hath deposited in this Office the Title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as Author, in the words following, to wit:

The Quarterly Theological Review. Conducted by the Rev. *Ezra Stiles Ely*, D. D. of the City of Philadelphia. "Whosoever transgresseth, and abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, hath not God; he that abideth in the doctrine of Christ, he hath both the Father and the Son." Vol. II.

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, intituled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned."—And also to the Act, entitled, "An Act supplementary to an Act, entitled, 'An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned,' and extending the Benefits thereof to the Arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other Prints."

D. CALDWELL,
Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

THE
 QUARTERLY
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

 VOL. II.

FOR JANUARY, 1819.

 No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*Letters to the Rev. Ezra Stiles Ely, A. M. Author of a Contrast between Calvinism and Hopkinsianism. By James Wilson, A. M. Pastor of the Second Congregational Church in Providence, (R. I.) Boston, 1814. pp. 325. 8vo.*

DIVINE PROVIDENCE has, until lately, withheld from us the opportunity of paying our respects to our ingenious opponent, the Rev. James Wilson, of Providence. He is in good repute for piety, and zeal in performing ministerial duties; and, if we have not been misinformed, is pastor of the most flourishing congregation of believers, in the state of Rhode Island. This corroborates the sentiment often expressed, that God frequently makes use of pious men, who are quite heretical on many subjects, but who preach a great portion of his truth, for the purpose of building up his kingdom in the world. Most graciously he neutralizes the poison of their theory, which they mingle with *the sincere milk of the word*: so that babes begotten by his Spirit, actually live and grow thereby.

Mr. Wilson is a bold controvertist, that deals largely in assertion and irony; yet he evidently thinks for himself, hates all "Isms," but his own, and defends Arminianism with much of the skill, and little of the caution of Whitby. We readily accredit his assurance, that he is not our enemy, that *victory* is not the object at which he aims, and that should it be obtained by him, at the *expense of*

truth, he would consider it an event deeply to be regretted; p. 28. He may be assured, that we are not fond of whining, canting, simpering opponents, in our contention for the faith once delivered to the saints, and we like him the better for "handling us without mittens." Should he ever take it into his head to write any thing more against our Calvinism, he need not make apologies for "any liberties taken" with our arguments, or defects. In theological controversy we ask no quarters. Our opponents are welcome to assail and overturn our reasonings as they can; and if the forces we muster prove finally unable to stand, we have lost nothing, but gained much by their destruction. Personal reflections and abuse, we must say, however, belong not to theological controversy; and yet, if they choose it, Messrs. Anderson, Holley, and the Spirit of the Triangle, into whatever form it may transmigrate, may expose the whole of our character from infancy to the present moment. Upon the score of morality and good nature it will not suffer by a comparison with that of any man. To this boasting our opponents have constrained us; for not a few of them have propagated the most improbable lies against our entrance upon the scenes of life. Mr. Wilson is not of this number.

It was evidently his design, like a good general, to step between Calvinism and Hopkinsianism, with a two edged broad sword, and cutting all down on the right hand and on the left, to say, "Arminianism is the truth; let Arminianism, in my person, stand." His blows at the already decapitated Hopkinsianism, we shall not attempt to parry; but for Calvinism we must yet contend; conscience constrains us. Perhaps we have *undertaken too much*, but we still think the Calvinism of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, defensible against all opposition. Mr. W. is pleased to say, "By adducing Calvinism as the true test of christian doctrines, you have given your opponents a decided advantage over you; as they must all consider the Holy Scriptures to be the only true test—and your substitution of Calvinism, therefore, as an unequivocal and very unhappy departure from orthodox christianity." p. 5. We make no Confession paramount to the Bible; nor in-

deed of any authority in matters of faith, any further than we judge it to express the pure doctrines of the word of God. So far as we have been able to examine and understand the Holy Scriptures, it does appear to us, that our Confession contains an accurate summary of the fundamental doctrines of God, our Saviour. We appeal to it merely as an expression of what is, in our judgment, the true sense of the most important passages of the Scriptures. You read the Bible, and have no objection to state in a production of your own, what you think to be the system of doctrine contained in it: we read the Bible too, and in the writings of the divines at Westminster, find a production already extant, that accurately expresses our views on the same subject. How then can you say, unless you design to convict yourself of the same thing, that we set up some other test of orthodox christianity than the Holy Scriptures?

Our author unites with us in reprobating the doctrine, that God is the author of sin; but he accuses Calvinism of maintaining premises from which this horrible tenet is fairly deducible; so that on this point the Hopkinsians may be denominated *thorough Calvinists*. The premises alluded to are these, that God hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, by an immutable decree, or predestination; that *means* as well as *ends* are fore-ordained; and that unrenewed men have power only to choose evil. The Hopkinsians teach, that God makes men wicked by a *direct agency* upon their wills and hearts; and the very pivot on which Calvinism turns, says Mr. W. is, "that Deity makes men wicked by an *indirect* influence, in order, for his own glory, to consign them over to eternal misery." p. 14. "A power necessarily to choose evil, but no power to refuse it, implied no freedom of volition in Adam. The government of his will was not in himself, but in another being, who, as the *efficient* or *first cause*, governed Adam, as the *agent* or *secondary cause* of sin; so that Hopkinsianism to all intents and purposes results herefrom." p. 11.

To cut this dispute short, we admit at once that man is an *agent*, for he really acts; that he is a *free agent*, for he

acts from choice, without any physical, extraneous influence upon the faculty of volition; and that all his mental and other operations are effects of which the agent himself is the efficient cause. All man's actions, of every kind, are as truly his own, as they could be, were there no God that minds the affairs of men. In this the Calvinists will agree, and of course, it cannot be laid to their charge with any propriety, that they make God the author of any one of man's thoughts, feelings, volitions, or actions. It is a man that thinks, and not a God in his form that thinks for him; it is a man that feels, wills, and performs what he wills, and not Jehovah, that in different nominal agents performs every mental and corporal operation. We would as soon say, that *God commits adultery*, as to say with the Hopkinsians, that *he is the efficient cause of a man's looking upon a woman to lust after her*; for we can discern no difference of meaning between the two assertions. Mr. W. is correct in distinguishing between *the faculty of willing*, and the different acts of this faculty, called *volitions*. *It is the man*, through this faculty, that determines, chooses, inclines, purposes, refuses, designs, or wills: it is the man, *who is the agent*; it is the man, *who is free*. Agency, liberty, and necessity, are predicates of the man, who has faculties of agency; and who is, or is not, physically restrained from thinking, feeling, willing, and acting, according to the laws of his nature. On the subject of moral agency Mr. W. has written much which we approve. Men are, he says, "the real efficient of their own volitions and actions." p. 212.

In perfect consistency with these things, we now proceed to declare, that the providence of God extends to all his creatures, and all their actions. Can Mr. W. deny this? If he admits any kind of providence, must he not admit a particular and universal providence? Well, then, we next affirm, that the providence of God is either *intentional* or not. If it is not intentional, then God extends his providence to all his creatures and all their actions, *without intending to do it*; which would be inconsistent with all the attributes of a free, wise, moral agent, which undoubtedly belong to him. On the other hand, if his uni-

versal providence is intentional, we assert, for it is but expressing the same thing in other words, that God *intended* to extend his providence to all his creatures and all their actions. If he intended to exercise this providence, it must have been at least some time before it was exercised, for *intention* implies some determination of the mind relative to something future. And if at any time before the exercise of his providence, he intended to exercise it, he must always have intended to exercise it, for he is immutable in his intentions, "he is of one mind," and none can turn him. Those persons, therefore, who will not withhold the attribute of *immutability* from the Deity, will admit, that God always intended to extend his universal providence to all the objects of it. This is what we mean when we attribute to Jehovah *immutable decrees*, or an eternal purpose according to the counsel of his own mind, whereby for his own glory, he has fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.

Our Calvinistic views may be stated in another form, which can hardly fail of securing the approbation of reflecting minds. Jehovah is an intelligent, voluntary agent. Before he performs any thing he determined to do it. Before the worlds were made he determined to make them. A divine *determination*, is a *volition* of the divine mind; and every volition of God is in consequence of some adequate motive. All his volitions, that is, purposes, intentions, destinations, determinations, or decrees, are perfectly consistent with his inherent attributes; they are all such as he knew it was right, fit, and best they should be. A *destination* fixed upon before hand, is a *predestination*. Intelligent, voluntary men, *predestinate* their own future actions, as far as they have any pretensions to wisdom, prudence, and intelligent conduct; and if we will not conceive of the Deity as possessing attributes inferior to those which he has conferred on his creatures, we must agree that he has predestinated all his own conduct. Other divine predestination than this we cannot ask any man to admit; nor can we conceive that any person of common sense, not an avowed atheist, can deny that God has predestinated every one of his own

actions. If he has not, he must perform some things which he once did not intend to ; and if Mr. W. can admit a being, that acts unintentionally, that is mutable, forming purposes and determinations which once did not exist in his own all seeing mind, to be God, we cannot. Such a being is not our Jehovah.

That the Deity *fore-knows* all things, is admitted by our opponents. If they connect with the idea of fore-knowledge this divine predestination of all that God will ever do, they will soon learn how God *fore-ordains* all future events : for he must know what will result from his own actions ; and knowing all the consequences of his own actions, by performing them, *sets in order before* each event the train from which it will result. If the event is a particular, voluntary, moral action of a man, the fore-ordination of that event, implies the predestinated *creation of the man*, with all the faculties of a moral agent, and the extension of divine providence to him after his creation, until, according to the established laws of mental empire, the identical, voluntary, moral action is performed. Suppose the fore-ordained event to be the writing of the volume of Letters now under consideration. Then the *creation* of the Rev. J. W. was a predestinated act of God, necessary to that event. It was decreed, that he should be born at a certain time and place, for " our times are in his hands ;" that he should receive a suitable education ; that he should see a certain book called *The Contrast*, and that his thoughts and feelings should induce in him a volition to write the said letters in reply. This illustrates our meaning when we say, that God in his holy and wise providence fore-ordains all those events which we denominate voluntary, moral actions. Mr. W. cannot deny that God made him, and ordered the circumstances of his birth, education, and studies, until he actually chose to write the volume before us : nor do we think he will say, God was ignorant that such a man as Mr. W. under certain given circumstances, would write it. Will he then say, that Jehovah did not fore-ordain the event of which we now speak ? Either God intended that these letters should be written, or he did not intend that they

should be written, or he intended that they should not be written. Let Mr. W. say which he pleases. If God intended that they should be written, then he foreordained the event; and we should suppose every other event. If he intended that they should not be written, he has been disappointed, and is no longer the Almighty God. If he did not intend that they should be written, he had no purpose about the letters; which none can admit, who think them likely to do either good or evil to the church of God; for that would imply indifference in the Divine mind to his own most glorious interests. It must be admitted, then, that voluntary moral actions are in some cases foreordained, without interfering with the freedom of man's agency; and without rendering God liable to be considered the author of them; for Mr. W. wrote these Letters—God did not: and yet, God determined, before the world was, to do that, in making, preserving, and governing Mr. W. which he foreknew would be followed by the actual writing of these Letters; and in this way foreordained their existence. In like manner, it might be shown, that every moral action of every man is an event foreordained by God, and yet the moral agent who performs each is the accountable and sole efficient of it. In short, men think, feel, will, and act; they accomplish, within the limits prescribed to their nature and circumstances, what they please; while Jehovah accomplishes all his own immutable pleasure concerning them.

Calvinists, however, it is said, make God the author of sin, by maintaining that unrenewed sinners have neither power to choose that which is morally good, nor any freedom of volition to any thing which is holy. Now we assert, that every man has been, or will be free, or at liberty, to exercise every volition of which he has ever been, or ever will be the efficient; and that every person has had or will have power, to exercise every volition, which will be found in the last day charged to his account. We assert, also, that the Deity never exerts any physical energy upon any man's will, so as to put him under the physical necessity of having any volition; that the law of God gives every man liberty to choose that which is good; and that God, in the constitution and establishment of the laws of

mind, has given every man liberty to will from every motive which he may find in his own mind. His volitions in every case will correspond with the nature of the motive: and any thought, any feeling, we have often had occasion to state, may prove a motive to volition. Jehovah has established it, as firmly as the laws of gravitation, that no rational being shall ever put forth a volition except in consequence of some previous motive; for should one choose, will, or determine, in any case, without having some motive for so doing, his volition would be both unaccountable and irrational. This law of mind, however, does not in the least impair man's freedom in volition, any more than the law, that every voluntary act of writing shall be consequent upon some volition to write, destroys a man's freedom of agency in writing.

According to these principles of moral agency, it is manifest, that an unrenewed sinner has liberty to act from all the motives that he has; but no liberty to act from motives which he has not, until he shall possess them. And here we maintain, that no unrenewed sinner has any morally and spiritually right thoughts or feelings; and, consequently, that he is not free to the exercise of holy volitions, until he is renewed in his thoughts and feelings; that is, in the operations of his intellectual faculties and heart.

If Mr. W. thinks impenitent sinners can repent, or choose to repent, without any motives, why should he in preaching from year to year labour to present to their minds some sufficient inducements? The institution of a system of religious instruction, the appointment of the Christian ministry, and the promulgation of the Scriptures, all prove the dependence of the will upon the intellectual faculties; for they are all designed to excite such thoughts in man, as will be productive of right feelings, and subsequently of right volitions and actions.

It is objected against the Calvinists, that they deny that sinners have *the power of refusing evil*. Now every one of the accused, we are persuaded, will teach, that an impenitent sinner has power to refuse natural, and even moral evil. Many, who know nothing experimentally of Jesus and his salvation, think of many gross sins, and refuse to practise them; in other words, they choose not to perform many ac-

tions that are moral evils. It is not true, then, that we deny even unrenewed sinners to have the power of refusing evil. Nevertheless, we maintain, that no impenitent sinner refuses any moral evil, from any morally and spiritually good motive. He refuses it from some other motive; from love of reputation, from pride, from fear of shame, from habit induced by education, while he has no holy hatred of the moral evil, because it is moral evil, or opposed to the moral law which God has given. Many men refuse to drink excessively, and swear profanely, in the presence of clergymen and ladies, who will, without fear of God, be drunken and blaspheme in their absence: they refuse moral evil, but from no morally good motive; and therefore their volitions to refuse under such circumstances cannot be holy. Let any man refuse a morally evil action, because he hates it, and disapproves of it as moral evil, or because he loves God who forbids it, and we will undertake to prove from the Bible, that he is a divinely regenerated person. The Spirit of God has so enlightened him as to give him the power of holy volition. He is born of God.

We do deny, that any man has power to refuse a moral evil, at the very moment in which he chooses not to refuse it, but to perform it; for this would imply the co-existence of two directly contrary powers of volition in the mind, at the same time; and consequently a present choice contrary to his present choice; which is as great an absurdity as to affirm, that a man does not choose when he chooses, or that a volition can exist and not exist in the same instant.

“Well, then,” the Calvinists deny, it is said, “that the government of man’s will is in himself;” and so make God the author of sin. Our author has wisely abandoned the ancient Arminian doctrine, *that human freedom of will consists in a self-determining power in the will itself over its own acts.* p. 105. “But happily for us, this mighty reasoner, [Dr. West,] and the still more mighty Edwards, have directed their resistless force of argument, not against ‘ability in men themselves to originate their own acts of will,’ but against the false notion of its residing in the will itself. And of its existing in contingency, in equilibrium,

&c. &c. Against these erroneous definitions of the power in question, they waged mighty warfare, and over them obtained many a victory ; but against the power itself truly defined they have not obtained the like success." p. 107.

It is well that President Edwards has forced a few of the more sensible Arminians to abandon their former ground, for a position, which, so far as we have learned, he never assailed, that every man is the author of all his own volitions. Every man has, moreover, we assert, and think it a doctrine of Calvinism, much power of government over his own faculty of volition. He cannot, indeed, by a volition change the nature of a volition past ; nor can he, by willing it, instantly produce any contemplated volition ; for every volition is consequent upon some motive ; but he may will to exercise holy volitions in future from some present apprehension of a holy motive, and may will to employ his thoughts upon such subjects as he has learned from experience, or the word of God, ordinarily occasion holy volitions. He may employ his faculties of thinking according to his volition in this case ; and thus, through the intellectual faculties, and through them alone, the man who wills it may govern his own will. In the same way, if he wills it, he may govern his heart, and in some sense make himself a new heart, in obedience to divine command. Before, however, any man can thus govern his own will, so as to promote holy volitions, he must will to do it ; and before he can will to do it, he must have some motive for doing it ; he must have some holy thoughts or feelings. Now, the man that, from a sense of duty and the love of God, wills to will hereafter aright, has some right thoughts, and some right feelings, and of course is a regenerated man. Should it be demanded, Can any impenitent sinner will, without divine and saving illumination, rectifying his thoughts and feelings, to have holy volitions in future ? we answer decisively, He cannot ; for if he could, a man might come to Christ without being drawn of the Father, which Christ declares to be impossible. It is not true, then, that Calvinists wholly deny men to have a power of government over their own volitions. If they will to govern them, and to take the requi-

site measures for doing it, they can govern them to a very great extent.

Last of all, then, Mr. Wilson must elicit the doctrine of the divine causation of sin from our theory of the introduction of moral evil into the world, or withdraw his imputation of the Hopkinsian inference from Calvinism, that God is the author of sin. Calvin did teach, "that the fall of man proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God;" and that "when we affirm that God foreordained that man should sin freely, he could not but sin freely, unless we would have the event not to answer to the preordination of God." We have already shown, that the foreordination of a moral action does not interfere with the freedom of the moral agent in performing it. The laws of moral agency which we have enumerated were all in force in the days of Adam and Eve. Neither before the apostacy, nor after it, nor at the time of it, was any physical energy exerted upon the wills of our first parents to make them choose in any instance. They could will only from some sufficient inducement, or motive. For a time they freely exercised holy volitions, and holy ones alone: but, in a sad hour, they chose to perform a forbidden action. They ate of the interdicted fruit because they *willed* to eat of it: they willed to eat of it, because they *desired* it; and they desired it, because the *perception* of it through their eyes produced a *pleasant sensation*, and they *conceived* that it was fruit desirable to make one wise. To this we may add, that with Eve the *fear* of eating it was taken away, by *believing* that she should not surely die; and Adam was probably much influenced by a desire to please his fair companion. Such were the inducements which moved them to resolve, that they would touch, and taste the forbidden fruit. Every one of these mental operations was performed according to the established laws of mental empire, by which Jehovah as undeviatingly governs human minds as he does matter, by certain well known physical laws. Adam and Eve, of course, were the efficient causes of all their own mental operations, and God was the efficient cause of none of them.

Nevertheless, it is certain, that Adam would not have acted at all, had not God made and upheld him in be-

ing; that he would not have eaten had he been destitute of a mouth; that he would not have willed to eat, unless he had felt some desire to eat; that he would not have desired to eat, had he not perceived the fruit, and conceived that, for some reason, it was desirable for him to eat it. It is equally clear, that he could not have perceived it, had not the fruit been created, and placed in a situation to be seen; that he would not have conceived it to be desirable, when he did, had not his partner persuaded him to partake with her; that Eve would not have persuaded Adam, had she not previously tasted of it; that she would not have eaten of it, had she not believed that she should not surely die, but should acquire desirable knowledge; and that she would not have believed as she did, had she not heard the devil utter the lie. She would not have heard him utter this lie, had she not been endowed with the faculty of hearing through her ears. Nor would she have heard the lie which she believed, had there been no devil to utter it in her hearing. We have now got back to the origin of sin in our world; and we perceive that every act introductory to it, is the result of some creature's efficiency; while each creature was made by a predestinated act of the Almighty; and by his providence so upheld and situated, that the voluntary transgression of man was a foreordained event. If any choose to enquire how the devil became a sinner, and felt an inclination to tempt Eve, they must ask of Heaven some additional revelation, or resort to the ingenious speculations of *Milton's Paradise Lost*.

God foreknew that Adam, placed in the state of probation, and left to the freedom of his own will, would sin; and foreknowing it, resolved still to make him a free agent, and place him in that very state of probation and of freedom, in which his fall was certain to the Divine Mind, and not physically necessary from any predestinated divine agency. In determining to make him, his partner, and the fruit, and to place him in a state of probation, Jehovah predestinated his own actions; and by actually performing those actions, foreordained the foreknown event.

Thus, we have shown, that God immutably foreordains every event, by performing his own predestinated actions.

And would it not have been strange indeed, had Jehovah set himself about the erection of a universe, without thinking and choosing what sort of a universe it should be? Would it not derogate from the perfection of God to perform any action, without intending it, and without certainly calculating upon all the intermediate, and ultimate consequences of it? Indeed, we shall adhere to the doctrine of divine predestination and foreordination, so long as we retain our reason, and believe in a God. Mr. Wilson did well to anticipate our strenuous defence of these points. p. 250.

Some of the principal doctrines of Mr. W. concerning predestination are the following:—that some of God's decrees are eternal; that some of them are not eternal; that some of them are immutable; that some of them are mutable; that some of them are conditional, and others unconditional. Yet in all this maze he can "discover man's free agency in operation, and yet, the accomplishment of God's steadfast purposes taking place." p. 236. It was eternally and immutably decreed, he says, that Joseph should be taken to Egypt; but the conduct of his brethren in selling him was not decreed to be the means of it; and had his brethren conducted aright,

"The divine decree would not have been at all frustrated thereby; for the decree was not that the patriarchs should sell Joseph, but, that he should be sold into Egypt. Had they not volunteered to effect this purpose, others stood ready to have accomplished it. The slave-dealing Ishmaelites, how readily would they have kidnapped this forlorn youth, had they but found him distressed, and straying in the wilderness; or if some feeling yet remained in the bosoms of these traders in human flesh, some other remorseless band of the Ishmaelite robbers of the desert, seizing him as their prey, might have sold him to this Caravan for the twenty silver pieces." p. 238.

Were the Supreme Being so unwise as to decree an end without knowing and fixing the means of its accomplishment, he might be much obliged to Mr. Wilson for telling him how he might accomplish his purposes. We should like to know of our author, what but a divine foreordination could have rendered it certain to the Divine Mind, when he decreed that Joseph should be sold into

Egypt, that Joseph would wander in the wilderness, that any slave-dealing Ishmaelites would have met him, that a caravan would have been passing at the time of his being kidnapped; or that any band of robbers should exist to seize the forlorn youth. If neither the conduct of the patriarchs, nor of these said Ishmaelites was foreordained, the Lord might have been under the necessity of seeking other instruments for the accomplishment of the thing fixed in his purposes; and unless he had decreed that these other instruments should exist, we humbly conceive, that they might not have existed; and so the Deity would have been disappointed in executing one of his eternal and immutable counsels.

In like manner, Mr. W. thinks that, according to the foreknowledge and determinate counsel of God, Christ was to be betrayed, and crucified. It was eternally and immutably fixed that the person who should betray Christ should be an apostle; but it was not decreed that any one in particular should be that apostle, or that Judas should sell Christ, until Judas was born, and had become so incurably wicked, that it was an act of punitive justice in God, to elect him to the office of an apostle, that he might perform the part of a traitor, a reprobate, and a devil, among the twelve.

“Kings and rulers are implicated, but kings and rulers there were many. The people, and the Gentiles, are mentioned, but all the people of Israel, and all the Gentiles are not meant. The traitor was to be in ‘office,’ and to eat familiarly of Christ’s bread, at his table: but he was to be yet chosen to that office. The unalterable decree is gone forth, but the lot is not yet fallen to any one of the actors. Before it can justly fall identically to any individual, kings, rulers, people, Gentiles, and an individual, must each render himself worthy of such an allotment. This worthiness must personally be acquired, whilst in the possession of a self determining power over their own wills, and be effected by a free and obstinate abuse of reason, a perversion of conscience, a corruption of natural affections, a rejection of the gospel, and a resistance of the strivings of the holy spirit; and such persons were those prodigies in depravity, unto whom God, in his holy providence, assigned irrevocably the several parts which they finally performed. Judas, as we have already seen, was, at his elevation to the apostolic office, incurably corrupt, for he was a devil. He

was not, however, always such, but like all other men, was once a candidate for salvation, and eternal life.

“ ‘ For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together ; for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel, determined before to be done.’ The things to be done, and the rank and stations of the performers, are predetermined, but not the individual persons. Just like Joseph’s being sold into Egypt, that was determined on, but by whom left for volunteer candidates to decide. Christ must be betrayed by an apostle. But the choice of that apostle, who shall perform the foul deed, cannot be made, until a candidate has rendered himself worthy of that disgrace, through an *avoidable, voluntary, and base* corruption of himself. Christ is to be ‘ delivered unto the Gentiles, to be mocked, spitefully entreated, spitted upon, scourged and crucified.’ But these things cannot be done, until fit instruments, self qualified, offer their personal services.”

“ Scriptural predestination, so far as it involves human agency, and as it is here admitted and maintained, consists of two distinct kinds. First. It implies such a subjection of human volition and action to divine control, as in reality makes them, as to cause and effect, the actions of God ; as where ‘ the king’s heart, in the hand of God, is turned, as the rivers of water are turned.’ For rivers of water are invariably turned by a natural, and not by a moral influence. And to these we may add such predicted actions of Cyrus and Josiah, as left neither of them any possibility of refraining from the performance of these things. And secondly. It comprehends all such events, as the holy scriptures have predicted shall *inevitably* come to pass ; but yet, not allotted *unavoidably* to any particular individual actors ; but *suspended in reserve*, as punishments, to be justly inflicted on such *future* great transgressors, as shall so corrupt themselves, in despite of the strivings of the divine spirit, as to *rush* with *greediness* on the perpetration of those actions, when Divine Providence may judicially afford them the awful opportunity.”

“ Predestination, as thus taught in the holy scriptures, is a doctrine differing widely from predestination, as taught by Calvinism and Calvinism improved. Scriptural predestination embraces *some* things *only*, but the predestination of the two Calvinisms comprehends *all* things whatsoever.

“ Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.” Acts ii. 23. Here, it

seems, is one point, eternally and immutably ordained; but, in the opinion of Mr. W. the means of Christ's being taken, the persons that should take him, and the hands that should crucify him, were not objects of an eternal foreordination. Had he attempted to deduce this doctrine from a criticism on Acts iv. 27, 28, we should not have been surprised; for we admit, that, using the nominative case in its proper place, we read, "For of a truth, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." But, granting Mr. Wilson's scheme every advantage which can, with any degree of plausibility, be taken in its favour; we are astonished that any man of intelligence can advocate it. We shall not weary ourselves and our readers by following our theologian step by step, but shall confirm the statements already made by a few remarks.

The scriptural assertion, "*that the king's heart, in the hand of God, is turned, as the rivers of water are turned,*" in our apprehension, implies nothing more than the fact, that as certainly and truly as God governs the rivers of water according to the laws of fluids, so certainly and truly he governs the king's heart, according to the laws of mental operation. And since the king's heart, or soul, (*for heart* here seems to denote the whole human soul, spirit, or mind,) is constituted like every other man's soul, we infer that God completely governs every mind, in all its operations, in a way perfectly consistent with free, accountable agency. There is no proof, that, in any case, as God *physically* turns the rivers of water, so he *physically* turns a human soul in its operations. The actions of Cyrus and Josiah were as free as those of Judas and Joseph's brethren.

In relation to the supposed predestination of an event, the means of accomplishing which are to be predestinated at some subsequent time, when certain instruments have rendered themselves meritorious of being used in some baneful agency; we would ask, When Jehovah decreed the death of the Redeemer, did he know that Judas would betray him, and Pontius Pilate deliver him up to be cru-

cified? If he did not know it, he did not, at the time of fixing the event, know the means of its accomplishment. If he did not know them, he did not choose them, for intelligent beings cannot choose any means of accomplishing any thing, without first having some knowledge of the means. They must be conceived of, before they can be chosen. Now, if the very means of the Redeemer's being betrayed and delivered into the hands of them that crucified him, were not chosen by God, he acted without wisdom; for wisdom consists in selecting the best means for accomplishing any predestinated end; and God, according to the theory of Mr. W. was so far from selecting the best means, that he did not choose any. He designed an end, when he was, at the time, ignorant of the means by which that end was to be obtained. Of course, Mr. Wilson's theory cannot be correct, because it would prove Jehovah destitute of wisdom.

Again, if Jehovah knew the part which Judas, Herod, and Pilate would act in the scene of Christ's death, before they were born, it must have been certain to his mind, that they, and no other persons, would act the very part which they did. If it was certain, something must have caused it to be certain, or else the certainty must have existed without any cause; but there is no effect without a cause; therefore something must have caused it to be certain to the Divine mind, that Judas, Herod, and Pilate, would act the part they did, in relation to our Saviour's death. If we proceed to enquire what this something is, which rendered the agency of these persons in the death of Christ certain, before they were born, we shall be obliged to decide that it was neither their thoughts, nor purposes, nor wills, nor mind, nor impiety, for these had no existence at the time of its being certain in the divine foreknowledge; and that which has no existence cannot be the cause of any effect. Pursuing this train of thought, we shall find that when God foreknew what Judas and others would do, there was no being in existence but himself; and that it must have been something in himself that rendered their agency, as well as their existence certain.

The foreknowledge of God being denied, every one may see that all the other divine attributes may be dis-

proved ; but this being granted, we defy all opposition to our scheme of the predestination of all Jehovah's actions, and the foreordination of all events.

Intimately connected with this subject is the doctrine of election. That God from all eternity elected some individuals and some nations, to particular offices and privileges, is admitted by all. The dispute among theologians respects an election of individuals to everlasting life, not founded upon any foreseen goodness in them. Mr. W. believes, that "election to life eternal was *purposed* towards all obedient believers, and perdition was *designed* as the reward of impenitence and unbelief." p. 277. According to this statement, *God purposed to give eternal life to all obedient believers.* When he thus purposed, which was eternally, did he foreknow all the individuals who ever will believe? If he did not, there was a time, when he did not know all things ; and of course, infinite knowledge is not one of his attributes. It will be granted, that he did foreknow every individual believer. Of course, it was certain, to the Divine mind, that every one who ever will believe, would believe. Mr. W. teaches, that the believing of all to whom God has purposed to give eternal life was foreseen by him ; and of course that their believing was eternally certain. Here we ask, again, what rendered it certain, before they existed, that they would be born, and in time believe? Reason answers, that it was God himself who rendered it certain. It must be evident, that if he rendered certain the actual believing of all that ever will believe, he must have *chosen* to do it, for he never acts without volition. Now, this volition of God to render the believing of all that ever will believe certain, and to bestow eternal life on them, is what we call the divine election of individuals to everlasting life. If he chose to render their believing certain, it was for some reason ; for the Divine mind never chooses without a sufficient inducement. The reason of his choice cannot be any foreseen believing in them ; because there is no faith in them to be foreseen, except that very faith, which he chose to render it certain they should exercise. The same is true of every other grace, and species of moral excellence that they will ever possess. Some other consideration then was

the motive of the Divine mind for choosing to render their believing certain, who shall be saved. What it is, precisely, we may be unable to say, but we have fairly made it appear, that God, acting as a rational being, has elected all the persons that will be saved, not from any foreseen faith, or other excellence in them. It is true that the faith of all believers was foreseen; and this very foresight proves, that God purposed to secure their believing, from some other reason than a foresight of it as already certain.

The immutability of the Deity is asserted by Mr. W. not to be universal. If we must believe him, God has sometimes changed his purposes. It was decreed, he thinks, that *something figuratively called death* should be experienced by Christ, and yet this evil was averted by our Lord's prayers. This he argues from Heb. v. 7. *Who in the days of his flesh, when he had offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying, and tears unto him, that was able to save him from death, and was heard in that he feared, &c.* It is much more natural to paraphrase the passage thus. God could have saved Christ from death, had it been consistent with his counsels. To this Almighty God, Christ as Mediator, while performing the work of redemption here on earth, frequently prayed, and made supplication, with strong crying and tears, for such things as he needed for his human nature, and encouragement in his mediatorial work: and because as man and as mediator he *feared* God, or was perfect in his duty, the Lord heard him always, and granted his requests.

And his next proof that God is mutable in some of his decrees is this. The Deity had fixed the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, and the duration of the siege; but not the day of the week, nor the season of the year, in which the Roman army should approach. Jesus therefore taught his disciples to pray, that their flight should not be in the *winter*, nor on the *sabbath day*. That God *changed* his *purpose* concerning the duration of the siege, he deems evident from the declaration, that "except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved; but for the elect's sake, those days shall be shortened." Matt. xxiv. 22. "Nothing, therefore, is plainer as to the approach of the Roman armies to Jerusalem, and their con-

tinuance in warfare in Judea, than that the former was a *contingent* event, and the latter, one concerning which the divine *purpose was altered.*" p. 262. Mark, he says, records the fact of "this shortening of an implied primary decree, in respect of duration of calamity, by a secondary restricting decree." p. 263.

In a note, the author labours to corroborate his doctrine of the mutability of the divine purposes. The 1 Sam. ii. 30, proves, to his satisfaction, that "a divine decree was altered, if not reversed," for God said to Eli, "I said indeed, that thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me forever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me; for them that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed."

In Numbers xiv. 30—34, we read, "Doubtless, ye shall not come into the land, concerning which I swear to make you dwell therein, save Caleb, the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua, the son of Nun. But your little ones, whom ye said shall be a prey, them will I bring in, and they shall know the land which ye have despised. But as for you, your carcasses they shall fall in the wilderness.—And ye shall know my breach of promise." This was "a judicial breach of divine promise," Mr. W. informs us; for God said to Abraham concerning his seed to be afflicted in Egypt, that "*in the fourth generation, they shall come hither again,*" into the land of Canaan. Gen. xv. 16. This fourth generation was born in Egypt, he says; and to this generation God promised Canaan; but judicially breaking his promise, and altering his decree, he cut them off in the wilderness; and brought the fifth generation into the land flowing with milk and honey. Lest we should be subjected to a similar judgment, from a breach of some promise made to us, he supposes the warning voice is uttered, "Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it;" or as it is more correctly rendered, "should actually fall short of it." Heb. iv. 1. Finally,

"Should the objector be disposed *still* to continue his cavil against the supposed defect, in respect to analogy, he may in such predicament, be referred to the well known cases of Ahab

and the Ninevites ; in each of which, divine determinations were altered, at the suggestions of *mercy*. And should his reluctant mind demand *still further* proofs, he may, by consulting Jeremiah xviii. 7, 8, 9, 10, obtain such further evidence, as shall obliterate the last remaining doubt ; unless his *judgment is perverted* by *deep rooted prejudice*, and *unconquerable wilfulness*."

It is our happiness, we think ; notwithstanding all this *declamation*, to believe that *Jehovah is of one mind, and changeth not*, in any of his purposes, oaths, and promises. *Wilful* we may be, for we certainly *will* to wipe away the stains which Mr. Wilson's pen has shed upon these perverted passages of scripture. They are difficult texts, and therefore we bring no accusations of "*deep rooted prejudice, and unconquerable wilfulness*," against the writer to whom we reply.

Dr. Macknight is such a favourite author with Mr. W. that we cannot help expressing our astonishment that he did not consult him, on Heb. v. 7, 8. While we should never quote Dr. M. as a consistent theologian, we must nevertheless think him a most profound critic in the original language of the New Testament. His literal translation runs thus : *He in the days of his flesh, having offered up both deprecations and supplications, with strong crying and tears, to him who was able to save him from death ; and being delivered from fear, although he was a son, he learned obedience by the things which he suffered.* "In answer to his prayers," says Dr. M. "his Father assured him that he would raise him from the dead, and thereby delivered him from his fear of lying under the power of death." If the explanation which we have given of the passage is not satisfactory to him, we hope that Mr. W. will be convinced that this last interpretation is far preferable to his own.

Christ's direction to his disciples to pray, that their flight from Jerusalem, and the besieging of the city, should not be in the *winter*, nor on a *sabbath day*, affords no proof, that the day of the week and the season of the year on which the Roman army should approach, were not fixed from all eternity ; for it is not the design of prayer to induce the Deity to frame new purposes, or change ancient ones. For those things, which he has promised to per-

form for his people, he will be enquired of; and many of his eternal purposes respect the answering of prayers. Nothing is more positively determined on high than that God's kingdom shall come; and yet we are required to pray for it daily. Prayer is designed to prepare us for the divine dispensations, and to promote Jehovah's declarative glory, in answering his people. We have no reason, therefore, to conclude that the siege of Jerusalem was decreed to take place on the sabbath, and in the winter, or that every circumstance was not immutably foreordained according to an eternal counsel.

The *shortening* of the days of Jerusalem's calamity, is the only thing in Matthew's gospel, which *seems* to favour Mr. Wilson's doctrine of revised, abrogated, and mitigated divine decrees. Now this expression, instead of denoting that the days of the siege were shorter than they would have been in any other similar season of the year, or were rendered fewer in number than God had once decreed that they should be, is but a Hebrew form of expressing the idea, that unless God should *render the time short*, during which the siege should continue, no flesh should be preserved alive; and that God did *make the time short*. It is like other expressions, in which God is said to *cut short* his work in righteousness, when he executes it in a shorter time than is ordinarily occupied by similar judgments. One who has many troubles in early life is said to become soon old, and hence it is said of David, and of Jesus his antitype, "the days of his youth hast thou *shortened*." Ps. lxxxix. 45. The siege of Jerusalem was much shorter than could have been expected by men, and shorter than sieges of such cities ordinarily are. Hence God is Hebraically said to have shortened the time of it. Dr. Gill gives several instances of this form of speech among the Jews, in his commentary on the passage. Next to Dr. Macknight, we esteem Dr. Campbell as a critic in biblical Greek; and his rendering is, "for if the time were protracted, no soul could survive; but for the sake of the elect, the time shall be short."

The case of Eli and his sons, exhibits a conditional promise. *God said, that the house of Eli, and of his father Ithamar should walk before him for ever.* This was

probably said, when Eli was inducted into office, but we have no other record of the transaction, than this incidental mention of it. Whether the Lord then expressed this condition of honouring his family with the priesthood for ever, *that they should honour him*, or not, we are unable to say; but we are certain, from 1 Sam. ii. 30, that this condition was implied; and that such a condition was generally understood; for God had repeatedly informed his people, that he was to be understood as promising them good if they were obedient, and as threatening them with evil, that should not be executed if they repented. Thus Moses was accustomed to say, in the name of Jehovah, "therefore shall ye keep all the commandments which I command you this day, that ye may be strong, and go in and possess the land, whither ye go to possess it." Deut. xi. 8. We learn, also, that, with the promise of establishing the priesthood in the family of Aaron, Jehovah coupled restrictions and threatenings which implied a condition. Thus God said, "*Take thou unto thee Aaron thy brother, and his sons with him, from among the children of Israel, that he may minister unto me in the priest's office, even Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, Eleazor and Ithamar, Aaron's sons. And the priest's office shall be theirs, for a perpetual statute.*" Exod. xxviii. 1. and xxix. 9. At the same time, God prescribed (Exod. xxviii. 43.) particular articles of dress which they should wear, and said, "*they shall be upon Aaron and his sons, when they come into the tabernacle of the congregation, or when they come near unto the altar to minister in the holy place; that they bear not iniquity and die.*" Now, had every one of Aaron's sons borne iniquity and died, the promise of God, that theirs should be the priesthood, for a perpetual statute, would not have been changed, for the promise always had this limitation. *If they bear not iniquity, and die, they shall enjoy the priest's office for ever*, was the spirit and the substance of the promise. In the twenty-second chapter of Leviticus, we find other restrictions. If any one of Aaron's sons was a leper, or had an issue, or profaned the name of the Lord, he was to be cut off from the priesthood, without infringing upon the divine promise to

Aaron, because that promise contemplated these very exceptions.

In Jer. xviii. 7, 8, 9, 10, we find a general rule for the establishment of a condition where none is expressed. *At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and pull down, and destroy it; if that nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. And at what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said that I would benefit them.* The excellent Charnock* remarks, that "this God lays down as a general case, always to be remembered as a rule for the interpreting his threatenings against any nation, and the same reason will hold in threatenings against a particular person. It is a univereal rule, by which all particular cases of this nature are to be tried, so that, when man's repentance arrives, God remains firm in his first will, always equal to himself, and it is not he that changes, but man." The same learned divine also says, that "*Repentance in God is only a change of his outward conduct, according to his infallible foresight and immutable will.*—God is said to repent when he changes the disposition of affairs without himself; as men, when they repent, alter the course of their actions, so God alters things, *extra se*, or without himself, but changes nothing of his own purpose within himself."† In relation to the Ninevites, we have an example of the application of the general rule recorded in Jeremiah, and of God's repentance. The decree of Jehovah was, that Nineveh should be destroyed in forty days, if the people did not repent; but it was also foreknown that they would, and foreordained that they should, repent and be spared. God intended to manifest his indignation against their sin, by threatening them with destruction; and then he intended to change the course of his providence, as men would change from actual repentance, and treat them in a gracious manner.

* Works, vol. i. p. 496.

† Charnock's Works, vol. i. p. 494.

Here is a change of dealings according to an eternal predestination; but nothing like mutability in the divine decrees. Jonah delivered a message, which exhibited a part of the divine purpose, and the event exhibited the remainder of it, relative to *that great city*. At first God said, *Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown*; and subsequently added, *except they repent*. Now, God is under no obligations to reveal the whole of his counsels at once; and the revelation of it in different portions is no proof that they were originally incomplete, or that one portion of them is a judicial or merciful abrogation of another.

The case of Ahab is so much like that of Nineveh as to require no comment. The expression in Numbers xiv. 34, *ye shall know my breach of promise*, is a mistranslation. The original contains nothing for *promise*. The expression is, וירעתם את-תבואתי, *they shall know my abruption*, meaning *from them*, or *of them*. Buxtorf renders it, *abruptionem meam*. The whole passage we paraphrase thus: *Doubtless, ye of this generation that are adults shall not come into the land, concerning which I swore to Abraham, to make you, as a people, his descendants, to dwell therein, save Caleb, the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua, the son of Nun. But your little ones, whom ye said shall be a prey, them will I bring in, and they shall know the land which ye have despised: so that I will still perform mine oath to Abraham. But as for you, who are more than twenty years old, your carcasses they shall fall in the wilderness. And your children shall wander in the wilderness forty years, and bear your whoredoms, until your carcasses be wasted in the wilderness. After the number of the days in which ye searched the land, even forty days, (each day for a year,) shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years, and ye shall know my abruption of you. You shall be broken off, or suddenly and violently separated from the congregation of the Lord. The abruption of this murmuring people, by the sword of the Amalekites and the Canaanites, by the opening earth in the rebellion of Korah, by a consuming fire from the Lord, by fiery flying serpents, and by various forms of*

sudden death, evinces the justice of our interpretation, and the execution of this awful divine threatening.

Still Mr. Wilson will affirm, that there was a breach of divine promise, because the Lord said to Abraham, (Gen. xv. 13, 16,) that his seed, having been enslaved in Egypt, four hundred years, should in the fourth generation return to the land of Canaan, whereas this identical fourth generation was destroyed in the wilderness. His words are, "but in the fourth generation they shall come hither again; for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full." Jehovah did not hereby promise that all of the fourth generation should be peacefully settled in the land which Abraham surveyed; nor did he stipulate that any one of them should pass the river Jordan. In Gen. xv. 18, we learn that the land of promise given to Abraham and his seed, extended from the River of Egypt unto the river Euphrates. "*In that same day the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.*" The River of Egypt may be found on the south western extremity of the promised land; and north east of it is Hebron, in the plain of Mamre, in the wilderness of Paran, at which place Abraham resided, when the promise was made. Gen. xiii. 18. All the land he could see, probably from the *mountains of Seir*, was included in the promise. And *hither*, to the wilderness of Paran, the fourth generation actually came. See Numb. xii. 16, and xiii. 26. This same land is described in Exodus xxiii. 31. "I will set thy bounds from the Red Sea, even unto the sea of Philistines, and from the desert unto the River." The sea of the Philistines was the Mediterranean; and the River, *the River of Egypt*. The twelve spies penetrated even to Hebron, and the wilderness of Zin. Num. xiii. 21, 22. They represented the twelve tribes of Israel, and thus the seed of Abraham, in the fourth generation, actually came to the land of promise, and journeyed about in a portion of it for many years. Caleb and Joshua, moreover, were made to *dwell* in the land; so that instead of finding any evidence of a divine breach of promise, and change of purpose, we are confirmed in the doctrine of the immutability of Jehovah's

counsels. His pleasure, in all events, shall be accomplished.

On the subject of *reprobation and non-election*, we must beg Mr. W. to consider what we have written on the two hundred and eighty-fifth, two hundred and eighty-sixth, and two hundred and eighty-eighth pages of our first volume as our answer to himself.

“*Calvinistic views of depravity*” Mr. W. labours to prove unscriptural. *David's being conceived in sin, and shapen in iniquity*, he construes to mean, his being born “the *tenth* from *Pharez* the *incestuous bastard*, of Judah and Thamar, and the *third* from the *Moabites Ruth*, by her husband Boaz.” p. 49. Instead of reciting the texts of scripture which are commonly adduced in proof of the total depravity of man, and which Mr. W. has wildly perverted, we will express what we deem Calvinistic sentiments on this subject, in the following propositions.

1. Infants, before they can discriminate between moral good and evil, cannot sin actually, or *after the similitude of Adam's transgression*.

2. God imputes the first sin of Adam to every one of his posterity, so that the whole race of man by this imputation becomes guilty, or liable to penal suffering, before God.

3. Had Adam's original righteousness been continued to the end of the probation allotted to him, in the covenant of works, it would have been imputed to every one of his posterity; but now it is not imputed, so that every man wants original righteousness.

4. If God should never justify an infant, who is by imputation guilty, and who wants original righteousness, but who has never committed actual sin, until that infant should personally merit justification, and remove from itself all liability to penal suffering, he would do no injustice.

5. All infants that die before they have committed actual sin, are, it is most probable, saved from future evil, and admitted to heaven, through the gracious imputation to them of the passive and active righteousness of Christ.

6. So soon as children do discriminate between moral

good and evil, they actually sin, in thought, feeling, volition, and action: and were they left destitute of divine instruction, restraint, and favourable moral influence, would never perform any one morally and spiritually good mental operation.

7. The first morally and spiritually good mental operation which any man performs, is evidence of regeneration, and consequent upon that work of God's Spirit accomplished in him.

8. Unrenewed persons may have many naturally good attributes of character, mental endowments, and social feelings.

9. Some unrenewed persons are more wicked than others, and the worst man on earth may become in his moral character and conduct worse than he now is.

10. Every man, who finally perishes in an unrenewed estate, will be punished in exact proportion to his own actual sinfulness.

11. No person, not actually sinful, will, in the future life, be punished at all.

The whole tenour of the holy scriptures has convinced us, that these propositions are true, and if there is any thing absurd, improbable, or unreasonable in them, we are not able to discover it. The ranting which is commonly heard, and which Mr. W. reiterates, against the pretended, and unjustly imputed, Calvinistic doctrines, that all men, whether infants or adults, are equally depraved; and that children are damned, who die before they have committed actual sin, deserves no other notice, than a simple statement of our own sentiments.

It would be an easy thing to expose the fallacy of Mr. Wilson's doctrines, that the material heart is the seat of natural affections; that the brain is the seat of reason; that *mind* and *soul* are different things; that God extends his superintending providence to every sparrow, but has not decreed "how many sparrows should exist through all time, or when and where each should fall through every age;" and that the Calvinists make the decrees of God the cause of divine foreknowledge; but we have neither time nor room, unless we exclude from our Review more weighty things. We give him praise for energy, frank-

ness, and perseverance; but we think he would have honoured himself, by treating President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Bellamy, and especially Dr. Emmons, with more respect for their native talents, literature, and decided piety, notwithstanding their errors, which we cordially unite with him in detesting. On the subject of atonement, we shall leave *The Contrast* to defend itself against the *criticism on our critique*. Mr. Wilson, we sincerely hope, will find at last, that the Father *intended* to save him, that Jesus Christ, according to an everlasting covenant, *died to redeem him in particular*, and that the Holy Spirit *created him anew in Christ Jesus*, through the gospel, that he might embrace the offered Saviour, be adopted, justified, sanctified, and glorified. He will then own, that had Jehovah done nothing more for him, than for the lost, he too would have continued unredeemed, unrenewed, impenitent, and would have experienced the everlasting effects of the inflexible justice of God. Then will he own, that salvation is all of grace reigning through the righteousness of Christ, unto all that were given him, by the sovereign act of God the Father; and that damnation in its procuring cause, continuance, and degree of misery, is of unmingled justice; for not a particle of mercy is ultimately experienced by any one who sinks down to hell. It requires nothing but perfect justice to damn a sinner; but it requires both mercy and justice to save one. *God is not obliged to be MERCIFUL TO ANY; he is under the binding law and influence of his own nature to be JUST TO ALL; and, if we confess our sins, he is faithful, to his own promises, and just, to his own character as the moral governor of the universe, and to Christ our Ransom, to forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness.* Blessed be God for ever!

ARTICLE II.—*A Serious Call to those who are without the Pale of the Episcopal Church. By a Consistent Church Man. To which is added An Appendix, containing animadversions upon the conduct of Inconsistent Church Men.* pp. 24. 12mo.

THIS "serious call" is addressed "to Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, and all of every denomination who do not belong to the Episcopal Church." It begins with "*Fellow Travellers to Eternity*," and is continued in the same solemn style to the close. And well might the writer adopt the language of *Alley's Alarm* or *Baxter's Serious Call to the Unconverted*; for his subject is "EPISCOPACY OR PERDITION," p. 23, 24. In the character of a *Consistent Church man*, he undertakes to demonstrate, that except the persons whom he addresses become members of the Episcopal Church, they cannot be saved.

His premises are derived from the declarations of "the Right Rev. Henry Hobart, D. D.* Bishop of New York and Connecticut, according to the twentieth article of the Canons; the Rev. Thomas Y. How, D. D. late Assistant Rector of Trinity Church, New York; the Rev. Menzies Rayner," of Connecticut; and the Holy Bible. His inferences from his premises are logical; and cannot be avoided, but by a rejection of some of the principles of induction whence they are drawn. His argument may be thus stated.

The Bible asserts, that none but such as have a covenanted title to salvation, can possibly be saved:

Dr. Hobart, Dr. How, and Mr. Rayner assert, that none out of the Episcopal Church have a covenanted title to salvation:

Therefore, none out of the Episcopal Church, can possibly be saved.

* The writer should have given the Bishop his modern style, "the Right Rev. John Henry of New York;" for *Hobart* he seems to have dropped, for reasons of honour, or dishonour, best known to himself. Had the writer omitted a little word in the modest title assumed, it would have been acceptable, no doubt, to his reverence; for "*John Henry, New York*," without the little Presbyterian *of*, would be truly English, and exclusive. This *of* will go next.

About the first of these premises, none but an Atheist or a Deist can entertain any doubt: and what consistent churchman will dispute the high pretensions, and solemn decisions, of the aforesaid Episcopal trio? If none can be saved, but those who have a covenanted title to salvation; and none have such a title but Episcopalians; then, beyond controversy, none but Episcopalians can be saved. How sad is the dilemma, to which all the dissenters from Episcopacy are reduced! Why! we must either dispute the word of God; or else think, that Doctors Hobart and How, and the Reverend Rector of two of the *Saints'* churches in Connecticut, have inculcated false doctrine. Rome herself is not more full of compassion than her high episcopal daughter; for "the Mother and Mistress of all Churches" teaches nothing more harsh than this, that "There is neither holiness, nor remission of sins, nor, consequently, any salvation or eternal life, out of the Catholic Church." *French National Catechism.*

What a pity it is, that our good Bishop White, of Pennsylvania, should not have learned these important truths. Does he, indeed, know, that his Presbyterian and Quaker neighbours are all infallibly going to endless perdition? Surely, if he did, he would write, preach, and pray, until his venerable hands should be palsied, and his mild eyes extinguished with weeping over his amiable, moral, but heathen fellow citizens.

Let us attend to the evidence of the truth of the premises, whence it is inferred that all but Episcopalians must be damned.

"A covenanted title," says the writer under review, "is a title secured by promise. Those, then, and those only, have a covenanted title to salvation, to whom salvation is promised." This is unquestionably true. Now in the Bible, says our author, salvation is promised to all believers, *John v.* 24.—to those who repent, *Ezek. xviii.* 30.—to all who love God, *James i.* 12.—to the righteous, *Ps. lviii.* 11.—to the godly, *1 Tim. iv.* 8.—to the just, *Prov. iv.* 18.—to the merciful, *Matt. v.* 7.—to the meek, *Ps. cxlix.* 4.—to the upright, *Ps. cxl.* 13.—to the pure in heart, *Matt. v.* 8.—to them that fear the Lord, *Ps. ciii.* 17.—to those who call upon the Lord, *Rom. x.* 12,

13.—and to all in every nation who fear God and work righteousness, *Acts x.* 34, 35. To all persons thus described God has *covenanted* to give salvation.

“ One question only remains ; Can any who do not come under some or all of these titles be saved ? Let us look into the Bible and see. Can any who do not believe be saved ? What saith the Scripture ? *He that believeth not shall be damned. Mark xvi.* 16. Can any who do not repent be saved ? *Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish. Luke xiii.* 3. Can any who do not love God be saved ? *If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema, Maran-atha. 1 Cor. xvi.* 22. Can any who are not righteous be saved ? *Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God ? 1 Cor. vi.* 9. Can any that are not godly be saved ? *If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear ? 1 Pet. iv.* 18. Can any that are not just be saved ? *The hope of unjust men perisheth. Prov. xi.* 7. Can any that are not merciful be saved ? *He shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy. James ii.* 13. It is needless to search any further. Nothing can be plainer from the Bible, than that the promises and threatenings include all descriptions of people. In other words, all to whom salvation is not promised, are under condemnation. Every man is a believer or an unbeliever, penitent or impenitent, righteous or unrighteous, godly or ungodly, just or unjust, merciful or unmerciful. Now to the believer, to the penitent, to the righteous, &c. salvation is secured by promise. But the unbeliever, the impenitent, the unrighteous, &c. are under condemnation, and dying in this state must be lost. No man, then, can possibly be saved, without coming within the pale of the covenant. Now I have shown from the writings of Bishop Hobart, Dr. How, and Mr. Rayner, that out of the Episcopal Church, there is no covenanted title to salvation. The point then is established, that all who are not members of the Episcopal Church are in the road to Hell.” p. 10.

But has he shown this from their writings ? Have these wise, reverend, and *celebrated* divines taught the doctrines ascribed to them ? Let us be satisfied with nothing less than their own words, and repeated declarations.

“ Where the gospel is proclaimed, communion with the church, by the participation of its ordinances, at the hands of its duly authorised priesthood, is the INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF SALVATION.” *Bishop Hobart's Companion to the Altar*, p. 203. “ In order to be effectual, to be acknowledged by God

and accompanied by his power," the sacraments "must be administered by those who have received a commission for the purpose from him."—"None can possess authority to administer the sacraments, but those who have received a commission from the BISHOPS of the Church." *Comp. for the Altar*, pp. 193, 200. "In the sacrament of baptism, we are taken from the world, where we had *no title to the favour of God*, and placed in a state of salvation in the Christian Church." *Hobart's Sermon on Confirmation*, p. 36. "Into this church, the body which derives life, strength and salvation from Christ its head, baptism was instituted as the sacred rite of admission." *Comp. for the A.* p. 186. "Wherever the gospel is promulgated, the *only mode* through which we can be admitted into covenant with God, the *only mode* through which we can obtain a title to those blessings and privileges which Christ has purchased for his mystical body the Church, is the sacrament of baptism." *Comp. for the A.* p. 189. "Until we enter into covenant with God by baptism, and ratifying our vows of allegiance and duty at the holy sacrament of the supper, commemorate the mysterious sacrifice of Christ, we cannot *assert any claim to salvation.*" *Comp.* p. 190.

Dr. How, (and he was the right hand man of high Episcopacy;—let not his aberrations from the path of duty prejudice any one against his doctrines;) supported his Bishop with a zeal worthy of the cause in which they were engaged. Hear Dr. How :

"The Episcopal Church expressly declares,—that no man shall be accounted a lawful minister without Episcopal ordination.—Outward ordination, then, is essential to the very existence of the church, and, of course, to *all covenanted title to salvation.*—If Episcopal ordination be of divine institution, then, Episcopal ordination alone can create a minister of Christ: and if a minister be essential to the church, *Episcopal ordination must be equally essential.*—Baptism is the seal of the covenant. Entrance into the church, then, gives us a covenanted title to the benefits and blessings of the Gospel dispensation. *The ONLY appointed road to heaven is through the visible church on earth.*—The members of the church, then, having received the seal of baptism, possess a covenant title to salvation. *They ALONE are in the appointed road to heaven. Aliens from the church have no covenanted title.*" *How's Letters to Miller*, pp. 9, 21, 51, 79.

Mr. Rayner, with all the energy he could command, reiterates these sayings. It is needless to quote him. Thus

our author has made out his case. He adduces, however, another argument in confirmation of the position, that out of the Episcopal church there is no salvation. It stands thus :

Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God :

Except a man be baptized by an Episcopal minister, he cannot be born again :

Therefore, except a man be baptized by an Episcopalian minister, he cannot see the kingdom of God.

Here the only possible doubt that can be entertained, rests on the second proposition ; but the Trio have made the truth of it evident,—to their own profound satisfaction—by the following process :

Duly administered baptism is regeneration :

Baptism cannot be duly administered by any but a duly appointed clergyman :

No clergyman but one episcopally ordained is duly appointed : wherefore,

There is no regeneration without baptism by an Episcopal clergyman.

It is not our business to show how scriptural and logical all this is ; for who can argue against the authority of such divines of imperishable fame as the New York Hobart and How, and the Connecticut Rayner ? Like our author we will listen to these lights of American episcopacy. Dr. Hobart says, when speaking of baptism, “ In this *regenerating* ordinance fallen man is *born again*, from a state of condemnation into a state of grace.—In baptism they are born into a new state, in which they receive the influence of the Divine Spirit to enable them to work out their own salvation.” *Comp. pp.* 186, 44. “ By baptism we are admitted into the church ; but baptism can be performed only by a clergyman, and there can be no clergyman without an outward commission.” *How's Letters to Miller*, p. 21.

In his APPENDIX, the author of this pungent little pamphlet shows, that many of the Episcopal clergy in this country are in a most deplorable state, for they were never baptized by any person better qualified than a Presbyterian or Congregational clergyman. This is a fact, we have

been told, in relation to some of our American bishops themselves. It is evident, according to the principles of Drs. Hobart and How, that these presbyterially sprinkled Episcopal clergymen "have never been baptized;"—"are not members of the church;"—"have never been regenerated or born again;"—"have no title to salvation;"—"are not regular ministers of the gospel;"—"have no right to administer ordinances;"—and have been administering ordinances *invalid and nugatory*. How lamentable is the state of the Episcopal church! How full of the bitterest grief moreover is the thought, "That out of the Episcopal church, there are no true believers,—no true penitents,—none that love God,—none that are righteous,—none that are godly,—none that are just,—none that are merciful,—none that are meek,—none that are upright,—none that are pure in heart,—none that fear the Lord,—none that call upon the name of the Lord,—and none in any nation that fear God, and work righteousness:" for such persons as these have a covenanted title to salvation; and all who have a covenanted title to salvation belong to the Episcopal church,—either of England or Rome.

One thing alone seems wanting to make the Right Rev. John Henry New York, Dr. How, and Mr. Rayner perfect in their episcopacy; and that is the "*Oath of Bishops at Consecration*," which we copy.

"I, N. — from henceforward will be faithful and obedient to St. Peter the Apostle, and to the Holy Roman Church, and to our Lord, the Lord, N. —, Pope N. —, and to his successors canonically coming in. I will help them to defend and keep the Roman papacy, and the royalties of St. Peter, saving my order, against all men. The rights, honours, privileges, and authority of the Holy Roman church, of our Lord the Pope, and his aforesaid successors, I will endeavour to preserve, defend, increase, and advance. Heretics, schismatics, and rebels to our said Lord, or his aforesaid successors, I will to the utmost of my power persecute and oppose. So help me God, &c." *Pontif. Rom. Antw. 1626. p. 59. 86.*

ARTICLE III.—Glorifying in the Cross: a Sermon delivered before the Associated Congregational Ministers of Salem and vicinity, at Malden, Mass. on Tuesday, Sept. 8, 1818. By James Sabine, late Pastor of the Congregational Church, St. Johns, Newfoundland. Boston, 1818. pp. 31. 8vo.

IT is a new thing in the metropolis of New England, for a minister of the Congregational order, to *preach*, without *reading* his sermons; to proclaim Christ repeatedly, with plainness and zeal, in the course of a week; and to insist on the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, as the only means of reformation and salvation to a lost world. That the Rev. Mr. Sabine should meet with opposition, and should be deemed very ungrateful to the charitable people of Boston, was to have been expected. They sent important assistance to the distressed inhabitants of St. Johns, in Newfoundland, soon after the dreadful fires of 1817, of which the congregation then under the pastoral care of Mr. Sabine participated. Mr. S. preached and published a Sermon in *Commemoration of the Benevolence of the Citizens of Boston*, on that occasion, and soon after removed to that town, bringing this grateful tribute of praise in his hand. Could this man, who was under such obligations to the liberality of the clergymen of that place, and to their parishioners, for "a gratuitous supply of bread and flour," ever be so ungrateful as to publish to the world, that the Boston ministers are mere *Inquirers after truth*, "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" whose "faith does not so much consist in believing as in seasoning, not so much [in] a submission to revelation as in hesitating to believe in all its peculiar doctrines?" *p.* 11. Surely, a man of such effrontery must expect opposition. We do not wonder that the newspapers have exposed the audacity and ingratitude of this said Mr. Sabine. Continue, gentleman editors, to complain; until all men learn, that this Reverend Reformer, when half starving, ate of the bread and cheese which you were so full of Christianity as to send him, and then came to Boston, to tell the people of the most liberal and enlightened cast in New England, that they are in God's sight, poor, miserable,

guilty, condemned rebels, in want of all spiritual blessings, and enemies of the cross of Christ. Are these things to be borne? Should not the liberal people of Boston in defence of their ministers, and of themselves, raise a hue and cry of extermination against such a man, who is striving to *turn*, not merely Boston, but *the world upside down*?

Mr. Sabine is a very bold man. It astonishes the people among whom he now resides, that he should fear God more than man; and risk all his popularity, by teaching doctrines that have been almost wholly discarded in Boston for more than twenty years past. What single individual will he find in that great town, if we except the Rev. Mr. Williams, a Baptist, who believes that Jesus Christ died to make penal satisfaction for the sins of the elect alone? What preacher will he find there, in any of the Congregational, Paedobaptist churches, except Messrs. Huntington and Dwight, who inculcates the tenet, that Jesus Christ is one divine person for ever, being constituted of a human and divine nature, so as to be both God and man? Who, besides these two, just named, the Baptist ministers, and one Episcopal clergyman, does not believe in the final salvation of all mankind? Who of all these Universalists teaches, that men are justified by God, solely, or in any measure, on account of the righteousness of Christ?

Yet Mr. Sabine dares to stand alone, and without even tolerable accuracy of style, or any pretensions to extensive learning, oppose all these mighty men of science, with all their hearers, whose natural dispositions of mind prepare them to receive and cherish the modern *liberal, improved* Christianity, to the exclusion of that which was delivered in its *unimproved, and unrefined state*, by Jesus of Nazareth!

The sermon before us is introduced by an address "*to the Churches of Christ in Boston and vicinity with their Pastors and Deacons.*" In this the author remarks that

"The origin of the New England churches, the incidents under which they were planted, and especially the principles which gave them being, are circumstances which have produced, and ever will preserve their relation to the free and in-

dependent churches of the mother country, as long as pure and undefiled religion shall be maintained among them; and this is a relationship, which no distance of time or place, which no political condition or constitution, can alter or dissolve.—That spirit of religious liberty in particular, and the principles of freedom in general, asserted and maintained by the old Puritans, and by them transferred to the New England colonies, have, no doubt, proved to be the salt of the earth. These principles, like a plant in a new but congenial soil, have taken deeper root, and shot their branches far and wide. That system of liberty at first chartered to your fathers by the British monarchs, and then, after a dreadful but successful struggle, confirmed in an independent constitution of your own, has been a warning voice to the tyrannies of Europe in general, and a secret check to the ministers of oppression and persecution in England in particular. Had the champions of liberty fallen on the western shores of the Atlantic, had the abettors of despotism and absolute power triumphed in the issue of that important conflict, the doom of Britannia had been fixed, and her witnesses had prophesied in sackcloth." p. 4.

He proceeds to inform the churches, that their religion was not borne by "a bold and brazen Socinian scepticism;" was not "nurtured in the cold and icy embraces of Unitarianism;" and did not "mature in the school of a *liberal* and *rational* Christianity." From having read the *Platform* of the New England churches, and heard "the heart-gladdening representations of revivals and outpourings of the Spirit," our author was prepared to contemplate a new scene of things, and "had considered Boston as the meridian of this glory, the capitol of the New England City of God." He was sadly disappointed, he informs us, for in Boston he found no distinct "line drawn between truth and error, between the faith of the gospel and no faith at all." p. 5. He found also a *great scarcity of the public means of grace*; for "there are in Boston every Lord's day almost as many gospel ministers silent as there are actually preaching to the people." Now, it might be a question, whether there are more than *three gospel ministers* resident in Boston, of the Congregational order, Mr. Sabine himself being included as one; so that if his statement is true, the gospel ministers that are silent must be few, even when all of them are dumb. Of ministers that have no relation to the gospel, except that of op-

ponents, they have enough, and it would be well if they were always to hold their peace. "The churches are closed and fast bolted," he says, "on a Lord's day evening, while a vast multitude of souls are perishing for lack of knowledge; they are on the walk of pleasure, or on a dissipating visit, or at a *sacred* music party, with scarcely any means being tried to counteract these evils. As it respects evening lectures, it is well known that some have serious objections to such means." Mr. Sabine did not probably recollect that all the ancient Puritans of New England considered the Christian sabbath as beginning at sunset on Saturday evening, and as ending at evening twilight on the first day of the week. The modern Puritans of New England imitate the practice, and retain on this subject the opinions, of their ancestors; so that it is not deemed reprehensible for the young people of the most pious families to devote sabbath evening to courtship; but the *liberal and enlightened* people of Boston would think it a reflection unfavourable to their understanding, to intimate that they regard any one evening as more holy than another. Indeed there are few of them who deem any part of the Lord's day holy time, but that which is spent in the morning service of the church; and as for meetings at the "meeting-house" in the evening,—who in Boston does not think them more favourable to immorality, than any "night meetings" at the ball room, the tavern, the festive parlour, or the theatre? You will not find a stiff Arminian, or a lax Antitrinitarian, in any part of New England, who will not show you how pernicious nocturnal assemblies for religious worship are; especially to those maiden servants and apprentice lads,—who never attend on any parties of pleasure.

We pass to the sermon. It is founded on Gal. iii. 14. "*God forbid that I should glory,*" &c. By the *cross of Christ* he understands the gospel system, or the plan of salvation by Jesus Christ: and glorying in the cross includes, 1st, a most decided avowal of its peculiar character: 2dly, a defence of it against its enemies: and, 3dly, an attempt to spread its fame as widely as possible.

Under the first of these heads he remarks, that "the death of Jesus, and the *manner* of it, we find to be in per-

fect conformity to that law, which by man had been violated and broken, and by Christ magnified and made honourable." "The death of Christ was not only necessary for the redemption of a lost world, but this ACCURSED death was absolutely necessary to the satisfying Divine justice, and the honour of God's law. This view of the death and crucifixion of Christ arises naturally out of a scriptural view of the *First Covenant* into which God entered with man." "The Son of God takes the cup of trembling from the sinner's hand, he takes the sinner's place in the covenant, and becomes surety for him." All who glory in the cross must preach, or at least publicly avow, this doctrine of atonement! It was the doctrine of Boston in former times, Mr. Sabine; but such opinions are out of fashion now. By the cross of Christ, you should know, that the Socinians mean, *the evidence of Christ's sincere belief in his own doctrines and prophetic character*; and in this your liberal Bostonians glory, just as the more ignorant Catholics glory in the golden cross suspended from the neck of a fair daughter, or in the tinsel cross, as long as a child, displayed on the coffin of a deceased relative. It is a matter of glorying to the clergymen of your present place of residence, that Christ was an honest man, and did not teach any thing but what he firmly believed himself; which they deem, possibly from their acquaintance with teachers of a different description, a matter of high praise. In other parts of the country, it is considered a mere matter of course, that a preacher should believe what he himself inculcates.

Under the second head of discourse, Mr. S. teaches, that the enemies of the cross, against whom all that glory in it are to defend it, may be considered either as *violent persecutors, false teachers, or unsanctified professors*. "False teachers abound," he says; and the very summit of our preacher's insolence consists in saying, not obscurely, that persons who deny the true character, person, and work of the Lord Jesus Christ abound in Boston. After quoting a passage or two, about *certain men crept in unawares, who privily bring in damnable heresies, denying the only Lord, and our Lord Jesus Christ; whose pernicious*

ways many follow ; by reason of whom the way of truth is evil spoken of, he adds,

“ In putting these passages of Scripture together, I was never more forcibly struck with any thing in my life, than with the exact resemblance which the description bears to the once disguised, but now unmasked Unitarian clergy of these regions. The true character of this class of pretenders to the order of Christian ministers is delineated by themselves, or at least by an apostle of their own, and therefore to give them the credit of telling the truth in this case, can be no slander. They tell us that they propagate their sentiments by *cautious* and *prudent* sermons, gradually and insensibly bringing over converts to their system. Persons thus converted, while beguiled into *insensibility*, must be very senseless converts at best.”—“ The Unitarians of these regions are of two classes. One of these boldly and in an undisguised manner declare that the doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, the atonement, &c. is [are] all superstition, and that *it has its* [they have their] foundation in ignorance or in priest-craft. The other class do not speak out thus ; they even declare that they abhor such an avowal, and suffer not these honest Unitarians to stand in their pulpits ; for years they have passed in their own churches for Trinitarians ; in fact they have taken no steps towards a developement of their real sentiments ; they have gone on year after year practising a system designedly framed to deceive their hearers, and thus while they have tacitly acknowledged a *Trinitarian platform*, they have intentionally been endeavouring to bring their people into a very opposite creed. It is not asserted that it is a sin for these gentlemen to be Unitarians—who can dispute their right to their own convictions ? but it is most certainly a sin to play the hypocrite. The Congregational churches of New England are by platform Trinitarian churches ; does it not savour of hypocrisy to assume the office of teachers in such churches, when they know in their consciences that they are themselves Unitarians, and that they cannot as conscientious men preach a Trinitarian faith ? If any thing in the world be of a serious nature, religion is that thing : to trifle, therefore, and play at make-believe, under the garb of so solemn a calling, is to display no very rare virtue of character.” pp. 19. 21.

Greatly to aggravate this insult upon *the most enlightened, liberal Christians in America*, he exhorts his orthodox brethren, saying,

“ Preach the word, continue instant in season and out of stated season, rebuke, exhort, reprove with all long-suffering and

doctrine. Let there be no truce or compromise with these doctrines, assail them by all possible and legitimate means. Institute a most systematic attack, by preaching among these benighted people wherever an opening offers. Let your mission to these regions of darkness be as direct and systematic as your mission to the Chickesaw and Choctaw Indians. Can you think of men in a more deplorable condition than such as are taught to make light of Christ, and to count the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified an unholy thing, and to despise the Spirit of grace?" p. 22.

Such a preacher as this has not resided in Boston for an age past. He must be looked upon, by some of the oldest people there as one of their ancient preachers risen from the dead; or one having the Spirit which actuated them. If he succeeds in doing good to the souls of men in that proud metropolis, it will not be by persuasive and smooth speech, nor by accurate and profound reasonings, but by plain truth, accompanied to the hearts of his hearers by the agency of the Holy Spirit, sent down from heaven. This, however, is all foolishness, to the present race of Boston divines, and Bostonian Christians.

Seriously we would urge Mr. S. when he writes, to pay a little more attention to the grammatical construction and punctuation of his sentences; and to maintain the same doctrines with the same boldness and zeal. Such a sentence as appears on the 30th page, ought not to be found in any *American* writer. "Pelagianism, Arianism, Socinianism, and Unitarianism, with all its shades, are systems of Anti-Christian error, and these doctrines whether they are preached under an orthodox or a heterodox profession; whether in the church of England or of Rome, in the churches of Calvin or of Luther; in Old England or in New England, *they* will produce a bad moral effect, *they* exhibit a worldly religion, *they* will cherish a worldly temper, and a worldly mind; *they* will [and] introduce a spurious morality, which at last becomes real immorality." The words we have put in *Italics* should be omitted, and the conjunction *and* inserted. This is the worst specimen of our author's style; but the more correct he is in his manner of speaking and writing, the more useful he will be likely to be, in New England; for the common people of that section of our

country have been accustomed to grammatical phraseology from their infancy.

If the reverend author of this sermon will take the same stand against Hopkinsianism, that he has against Socinianism, and admit none to preach in his place who do not maintain a system of thorough and consistent Calvinism, he may be the honoured instrument of producing a religious revolution in Boston : but we warn him, that a temporizing policy in relation to *any* system of error will not prosper. So far as we know any thing of Mr. Sabine's views and exertions, we wish him God speed.

ARTICLE IV.—*Review of Several American Writers on Moral Agency.*

THE questions, What constitutes a moral agent? and, What is a moral action? are of immense importance in theology. Could these be settled, it would terminate many disputes about moral agency.

President Edwards, in his "*Inquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency,*" &c. Part I. Sec. v. gives us his opinion, in the following words:

"A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral agency belongs a *moral faculty*, or sense of moral good or evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.—The essential qualities of a moral agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy."

Man is *capable* of doing all those things for which he has the requisite faculties and powers. A moral agent, therefore, must have faculties for moral agency. What then are these faculties? First, *Conscience*, or a *moral sense*, is one of them; and without this, men would surely be *incapable* of any sense of obligation to observe any law. Secondly, *The faculty of choice*, that is, *the will*, is also requisite; for a being who should not *will, choose, resolve, determine, or purpose* to act as he does, would not be a voluntary agent. Thirdly, *The faculty of conception*, or of understanding, is also necessary, that we may *discern* between moral good and evil; that we may *conceive* of our duty; and that we may *comprehend* the law. President Edwards names, fourthly, *reason*. These are the only *faculties* which he speaks of, as necessary to constitute a moral agent. His language would imply, the necessity of other faculties, especially that of *agency*. He states other things besides faculties, nevertheless, which belong to a moral agent; such as *power* to understand, choose, act, and exercise the conscience. A moral agent, moreover, must be so constituted and governed by the laws of mental operation, that he shall conceive of motives for every act of the will; and that every volition shall be consequent upon, and connected with, the apprehension of some sufficient inducement. So far as this we argue with our great American metaphysician. But he has stated only a part of the faculties and powers, and only one of the laws of volition, which are essential to a moral agent. It is not requisite, that *choice* should always be *guided by understanding*; for moral agents sometimes choose, or will, from a dictate of conscience alone, and sometimes from a sensation, a passion, or an affection. It is a law of moral agency, that every act of the will shall be consequent upon some motive; but any thought, any feeling may be that motive. Should any one choose without being able to assign some motive for his choice, he would not act rationally, or as a sane, intelligent being. It enters into the very nature of the human mind, that we should never feel, but in consequence of some thought; that we should never will, but in consequence of some thought or feeling; and that a

great portion of our mental and all of our external moral operations should be consequent upon volition ; so that man is a *thinking, feeling, voluntary agent*.

Some acute writers have objected to President Edward's Enquiry, that it makes *motives* to be something existing without the mind ; and thus represents the human will as being irresistibly governed in its determinations by external objects. Much of his language would admit of such a construction ; but an attentive reader will see, that he really accounts a motive to be some operation of the understanding which is the occasion of a volition ; and under the term understanding he includes the faculties of *Reason, Judgment, and Apprehension* or *Conception*. p. 17.*

“ By motive,” he remarks, “ I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind ; and when it is so, all together are as it were one complex motive. And when I speak of the *strongest motive*, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.” p. 7.

All this looks like material motives, and the exertion of physical energy upon the will ; but the very next paragraph sets the matter right, so far as respects one class of our motives : for he says,

“ Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is *extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding*, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view ; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.” p. 8.

“ Perception” is here used to denote any act of *conception, perception* properly so called, or *consciousness* ; and the meaning of the writer undoubtedly was, *that men cannot will except in consequence of some operation of the un-*

* Enquiry, London Edition, 8vo. 1790.

derstanding, of which they are conscious. We would add, after the word understanding, the clause, *or of the faculty of feeling*, and then the whole proposition would be the truth on this subject. We *feel*, and are *conscious* of feeling; and *will*, from feeling. The *feeling*, and not the consciousness of it, is the motive to volition in this case. When any one thought or feeling constitutes the motive to an act of the will, it is called a *simple motive*; but when two or more mental operations conspire to constitute a sufficient inducement to volition, the will is said to be governed by a *complex motive*. Let a man, for instance, choose to eat, simply because he *feels* an agreeable *sensation* attendant on eating, and *his motive* for willing to eat *is simple*: but let him will to eat, because he *desires* to live, to be useful, and to glorify God, and because he *finds* an agreeable *sensation* accompanying the gratification of his appetite, and *his motive* for willing to eat *is complex*.

The greater part of the volitions of adults are consequent upon *complex motives*. The right volitions of pious persons are the result of a sense of duty, the feeling of love for God, and regard to their own and their neighbours' interest. *Conscience* particularly capacitates us for the sense of duty, and *the heart* for exercising *feelings* of love for ourselves and others. Our mental constitution and the laws of God indicate the divine pleasure, that our motives for voluntarily keeping the commandments should be complex. No man ever yet hated his own flesh, and no man was ever wisely religious, without intelligence and feeling, or without love to himself, his fellow-men, and his God. Indeed, our own personal happiness, and our duty to our Maker, are so intimately connected by the Divine hand, that it is impossible, in obedience to his counsels of wisdom and goodness, to consult one without promoting the other.

President Edwards repeatedly calls the motive, in consequence of which we will in any case, the *cause* of that act of the will. This use of the word *cause* has produced much confusion in the minds of many of his readers. The fact is, that no motive is *the efficient cause* of any act of human volition: but some human soul is the efficient

cause of every act of the will; and indeed of every other mental operation, which can justly be predicated of man. We agree with Mr. Locke, that *a cause is a substance exerting its power into act, to make something begin to be.* In this strict sense of the word, it is evident, that no one act of the mind, no one motive, that is, *thought or feeling*, is the *cause* of another act of the mind, denominated a volition; for the agent himself, the man, is the efficient cause of all his own mental operations. He makes them exist, or *begin to be.* The word *cause*, however, is used to denote *the reason*, and even *the occasion* of any action and event; and in this sense President Edwards would be understood, when he says that motive is the cause of volition. His words are these:

“I sometimes use the word *cause*, in this Inquiry, to signify any *antecedent*, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is true; whether it has any positive influence or not. And, in agreeableness to this, I sometimes use the word *effect* for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a cause, most properly speaking.” p. 58.

Having thus explained his meaning, he lays down the indisputable axiom, *that every effect has some cause*; and this law of mental operation, that *every act of the will is excited by a motive.* Then he proceeds to show, that

“If the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their being put forth into act and exercise. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives.—And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are *necessarily* connected with their motives. Every effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that, which is the proper ground and reason of its existence.” p. 118.

The words *necessity*, and *necessarily*, are used in the *Inquiry* in a limited sense, generally, in the same manner

as *cause* is; to denote the *certainty* of those events which are said to be necessary. The words, however, are frequently misunderstood; and the more so, because President Edwards uses them sometimes in their common acceptance, instead of invariably attributing to them, what he has explained to be their philosophical meaning.

It is this philosophical necessity, which he asserts to be perfectly consistent with, and indeed essential to moral agency; for were there no *necessary* connexion between motives and volition, men would never will as rational, intelligent agents. His doctrine is true, but his sentiments might have been expressed in a more faultless, and profitable manner. In our exhibition of the nature of moral agency we would shun that use of the words *cause* and *necessity* which is uncommon, however philosophical may be the meaning which may be definitely attributed to them, because few will read with philosophical eyes and attention. Let us express the doctrines of President Edwards so as to defy all opposition, from men of common sense and candour.

1. No intelligent being wills, in any case, without some motive.

2. There is a sure connexion between every volition and the motive for that volition; so that he who could foreknow what motives a man would have, might be certain what would be his volitions.

3. This *certainty* that a man will always choose, purpose, determine, or will, according to motives, is not inconsistent with free agency.

4. Should a man will without motive, his volitions would not be the volitions of an intelligent agent.

5. God foreknows what will be the thoughts and feelings of every man, in every given situation; and equally what will be his volitions, consequent upon such of those thoughts and feelings, as will be the occasion of any volitions. This foreknowledge implies the actual and certain connexion between those motives, or mental operations, which will induce certain volitions, and those volitions.

6. The connexion is not of the same nature with that which subsists between physical causes and physical effects; but it is as infallible; for it is no more certain, that

God has established some laws of physical operations, than that he has made it a law of mental operation, that there shall be no volition without some motive; and that a man, if he *will* at all, shall *will* from such motives as he has.

This is the sum and substance of *President Edwards' Inquiry*.

The common clamour of Arminians against this celebrated work is, that it represents moral agents to be mere machines, destitute of any actual efficiency in producing their own mental operations; and yet it expressly declares, that "THE ACTIVITY OF THE SOUL MAY ENABLE IT TO BE THE CAUSE OF EFFECTS." p. 67. The great point in dispute between President Edwards and all Arminians, is not whether man is the efficient cause of all his own volitions, but whether the will has in itself the power of determining its own volitions. He affirms that it has not, and they maintain that it has. If the faculty of the will, he argues, correctly, determines to produce a certain volition, it must be by a volition to produce that volition; and that previous volition must exist in consequence of some act of the will anterior to itself, or it must exist in consequence of the operation of some other faculty, in which case volition depends on something besides a self-determining power of the will. The Arminians, therefore, must admit an infinite series of volitions, or relinquish their favourite thesis.

Yet, President Edwards, we think, has gone too far, in maintaining that a volition is in no case the result of a previous volition.

"I can conceive of nothing else," he says, "that can be meant by the soul's having power to cause and determine its own volitions, as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul, sometimes at least, to excite volitions at its pleasure, or according as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a choice preceding all volitions which are thus caused, even the first of them. Which runs into the fore-mentioned great absurdity." p. 71.

Every man will find upon reflection, that he is not conscious of ever producing *immediately* one volition by another. But every man may be conscious, we think, of

approving in his conscience, of a virtuous course of conduct, and of *resolving*, or *willing*, from that approbation, to pursue it. He may *will*, or *choose*, or *resolve* too, (and these are all *volitions*,) that he will *choose* the same course of conduct to-morrow; and may *purpose* then to attend to the same considerations which induced him to approve and will to-day, that he may repeat his volition. When to-morrow arrives, he may *remember* his choice, purpose, or intention to *choose* the same course of virtuous conduct, which he pursued yesterday, and from the *remembrance* of his previous purpose, together with a *reconsideration* of his ground of approbation, may actually will as he intended to will. In this case one volition produces another, through the purposed interposition of some of the faculties of the understanding: and yet, we are not reduced to the absurdity of a *choice preceding all volitions*, or of a series of volitions without end. The first volition of which we have spoken, in the supposed case, had for its motive an act of the *conscience*; and that volition secured the existence of the second, similar volition, on the ensuing day. Very frequently the recollection, or the remembrance, of a former volition, is a motive for another volition; and by willing in consequence of some previous purpose, (and every act of the mind in *purposing* is a *volition*,) we form habits of continued operation. If the recalling of a previous volition did not in some cases induce a subsequent volition, there could be no intentional fulfilment of promises; for when we sincerely promise to do something at a future time, we intend at that time to will the performance of it, or else we are so absurd as to expect to perform our promises without any volition to do it, at the time of performance.

Although one volition cannot, therefore, induce immediately another volition: yet mediately it can, through those intellectual faculties, which obey the will in recalling the motives which have once induced volition and are likely to do it again; or which recollect some previous purpose to will, in a certain manner, at some subsequent time. We fearlessly assert, therefore, that *God has given power to the soul of man, sometimes at least, to excite volitions according to its pleasure; and indeed very*

frequently as it chooses. And on this power depends all that consistency of religious character, which we discover in some intelligent Christians; for having come to a deliberate choice of Jehovah for their God, and of his service for their employment, they *resolve*, that is, they *will*, to renew their choice of him, and their volitions to serve him, daily; so that *in the inner man they are*, through a divine blessing on the operations of their own minds, *renewed day by day.* In this way, to a considerable extent, the soul determines what its future volitions shall be.

Freedom, or Liberty, President Edwards predicates of a moral agent, when he is "free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills." p. 38. Such an agent we agree with him is *free.* But he maintains that *liberty* cannot be predicated of *the will itself,* (p. 39,) because the existence of the faculty of the will is essential to the idea of liberty in any being; and it would not be good sense to say that *the will acts according to its will.* It may be deemed presumption to oppose this eminent divine in any thing; but we would that our understanding should bow only to conviction. We cannot think it nonsense to affirm, that the faculty of volition is free to will, from the recollection of some previous volition, when there is no impediment in the way, and no extraneous energy exerted to prevent the operation. A moral agent to be free in his moral actions must have a will, we allow; but we see no impropriety in saying, that every faculty of the soul has a *natural freedom* in its operations, when no *constraint, force, compulsion, or coercion* is exerted to prevent it from operating according to, or to make it act contrary to, the constitution of the human mind, and the divinely established laws of mental operation. Our readers will permit us to quote, what we have elsewhere published, as an exhibition of *moral liberty.*

"LIBERTY OF ACTION consists in such a connexion between the faculties of volition and efficiency, that a man may perform what he wills. So far as a man may effect what he wills, so far he is free in his agency.—LIBERTY OF VOLITION, or freedom of will, consists in such a connexion be-

tween the will and a sufficient inducement to volition, that a man may will upon the presentation of the motive. Hence man has no such freedom of will that he can choose without motives, or independently of all knowledge, judgment, conscience, and feeling. Hence, also, a man cannot will from such thoughts and feelings, whether they be holy or unholy, as he has not; any more than he can see what is not to be seen.—LIBERTY OF THOUGHT is predicated of any faculty of the understanding, precisely so far as a connexion is established between that faculty and our voluntary efficiency.”

Both kinds of liberty, of which we have spoken, namely, a natural freedom from the physical compulsion of any faculty; and the moral liberty of thought, volition, and action; seem absolutely essential to the constitution of a moral agent; and the continuance of his moral agency. Should the divine energy physically constrain the mind to any act, that act would be a work of God, and not an act of any human efficient being, or agent. Should man be the efficient of mental operations, and yet be prevented from exercising some voluntary government over his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, and actions, he would not be A FREE MORAL AGENT.

Had President Edwards avoided the use of the word *cause*, when he did not intend an *efficient cause*; and of the word *necessity*, when he meant *certainty*, the REV. JAMES DANA, D. D. would probably never have written “*An Examination of the late Rev. President Edwards’s Inquiry on Freedom of Will.*” Boston, A. D. 1760. pp. 138. 12mo.

Dr. Dana says, “we readily grant, that there can be no act of choice without some motive or inducement.” p. 109. This is one great point which the President laboured to establish: but he unfortunately said, that there is a *necessary* connexion between every volition and the motive which is the occasion of it. That there is a *necessary* connexion Dr. Dana denies, and asserts that if every volition be *necessary*, man is not accountable for *necessary* volitions, or the actions that *necessarily* flow from them. President E. informs us, that he means a *moral*, or a *metaphysical*, or a *philosophical necessity*; but this Dr. D. overlooks, and insists upon it, that necessity is necessity, of whatever kind it may be. Had President E. asserted,

that in the Divine foreknowledge it was *certain* that all men would infallibly choose as they do, from the motives which induce them; so that in the Divine foreknowledge there was a *sure* connexion between each motive and the volition consequent upon it, Dr. D. would never have contradicted him.

The President asserts, that a motive is the *cause* of a volition, and *produces* it. Then replies Dr. D. *man* is not the *cause* of his own volitions; his soul is not; nor does the will produce them: for they cannot have two distinct causes. This inference is just; but if the President had said, *man never wills but from some motive*, which was the very thing he intended, his acute opponent would have found no fault with his doctrine.

The chief part of the *Examination* is devoted to a very loose paragraph of the *Inquiry*; and truly Dr. Dana makes the great metaphysician appear ridiculous, by substituting *volition* where the President uses the word *motive*; because the *Inquiry*, (p. 11, and 12,) says,

“ I have rather chosen to express myself thus, *that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable is*, than to say, that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be perfectly and properly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the *voluntary action* which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the preference or choice itself; but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which *causes it to appear* most agreeable.”

Dr. Dana was a divine that always *insisted on strict propriety of speech*. If then, says he, *a motive*, which is *an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind*, is not *properly* DISTINCT from *the mind's preferring and choosing*, which is a *volition*; we may use *motive* and *volition* as synonymous; for if they denote not *distinct things*, they must be two names for *the same thing*. With this weapon, thus prepared by the President himself, Dr. D. dissevers every bone and muscle of his opponent's

Inquiry. *Motive causes volition*, says the President. Then *volition causes volition*, according to your own scheme, and contrary to it, says Dr. Dana. *Volition is always as the greatest appearance of good*, says the former : and the latter remarks, then *volition is always as volition* ; and then, *a man always wills as he determines to will*.

Into this difficulty the President was brought, we must think, by not accurately distinguishing between the operations of the faculties of the understanding, and those of the heart, or faculty of feeling. *Agreeable* is an attribute of certain sensations and emotions, in which human happiness consists. All our happiness consists in such sensations as are termed agreeable, or in those emotions which are termed affections. Were we destitute of these, we could not be the subjects of happiness. This is the principal sense of the word agreeable ; but it is also used to characterize any thing which is the occasion of an agreeable feeling. Hence those material objects which excite pleasing sensations are called *agreeable objects* ; and those thoughts which are followed by felicitous affections are called *agreeable thoughts*.

Any thing is said to *seem* as it is mentally *seen*, that is, *perceived* or *conceived of*, or *thought of*, by any one. That contemplated action which *seems agreeable*, is an action which we conceive would promote or indulge some agreeable feeling. When several acts are contemplated, and we *conceive* that one would *most* promote those feelings in which our happiness consists, it is said to “*seem most agreeable*” to us. Now an *agreeable feeling* is one mental exercise ; the *conception* of that agreeable feeling another ; and the *thought*, that any particular act of body or mind will induce that agreeable feeling, is a third.

That is said to *appear good* to us, and for us, which we *think* of as conducive to our happiness ; or, which we think will be, or remember has been, the occasion of agreeable feelings.

Thoughts are the operations of the seven faculties of the understanding ; *feelings*, of the heart ; and *volitions*, of the will. Now it must be manifest, that *a motive*, according to the scheme of the President himself, is either

some *thought*, or some *feeling*; is either a *conception* of something in an action contemplated; or a *judgment* that the act will be good, or agreeable; or a *remembrance* of some pleasure afforded by a similar action; or a *feeling* of an agreeable kind. In consequence of some one, or all of these operations, the contemplated action is, by the faculty of volition, *chosen* to be done; or *preferred* to some other contemplated action. This *choosing* or *preferring* is an operation of a very different faculty, from any which perceives, conceives, judges, approves, reasons, remembers, is conscious, or feels; so that *an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, DO SEEM, actually, to be perfectly and properly distinct.* They are as distinct as any two operations, or exercises, of the human mind, that can be mentioned: and *if strict propriety of speech is insisted on*, as it ought to be, we shall deserve reprehension if we confound them.

We agree, that "voluntary action," whether it be purely mental, or connected with bodily motion, is the effect of a mental faculty of agency, *which operates either instinctively, or in consequence of the mind's volition*, so that voluntary action is the *fruit of volition*, and is determined by it.

"If strict propriety of speech be insisted on," says the President, "the act of volition itself is always *determined* by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which *causes it to appear* most agreeable."

Here is the very root of the difficulty, Dr. Dana judges, which the President attempted to explain; and in which he has failed. Dr. D. remarks,

"The enquiry in this place is not, Whether the highest motive hath always a causal influence on the will? But, admitting this to be the case, what is it that *causeth* any supposed motive to *be* highest in the mind's view?—Now, as there is a manifest difference between an object's *actually appearing* most agreeable, and the *cause* of this appearance; the proper question, in the first place, is, What is the ground, reason, or cause of the agreeable appearance *itself*? For, admitting the strongest motive to be the more *immediate* cause of volition, how doth this prove that it is the *original* cause? *Whence* is it that any proposed object hath the greatest appearance of good? From

what cause? Hither we must *ultimately* recur for the ground of volition.—Till the answer to this question is found, the original ground of volition is not discovered." *Examination*, p. 1.

These interrogations are certainly very pertinent, for the President had informed the Doctor, that an act of volition is always *determined* by something which *causeth it* [the motive] *to appear most agreeable*. Dr. D. insists upon knowing what this *something* is, which in fact *causeth* the motive, which *causeth* volition.

On the assertion of the President, that "the act of volition itself is always *determined*," by something, we must remark, that a *mental determination* is neither more nor less than a volition, or an operation of the faculty of will. A mind that *determines* to perform any act, *wills* to do it. Now the President would not have maintained, that every act of volition is the consequence of a prior volition. He must have intended, therefore, that every act of volition is in consequence of some mental view, which is a motive; and that every mental view which moves us to volition, becomes a motive in consequence of being caused by something in or about the mind's view, to *seem* or *appear most agreeable*. What this something in or about the mind's view, which *causes* one view to be more agreeable, and another *most agreeable*, he has not informed us.

Shall we, then, undertake to say what it is? We can but give our opinion; that those *views* which are followed by the most agreeable *feelings*, are the most *agreeable views*. Man has *feelings*, because his Maker has given him a faculty of feeling; and has placed him in a situation favourable to the operation of that faculty. Of his feelings some are agreeable and others disagreeable; and of the agreeable ones, some are more agreeable, and others most agreeable. Why one feeling is, in its own nature, more agreeable than another, we can assign no other reason than this, that God has so constituted the human mind and the nature of things, that it is so. No other reason can be assigned why we think, or feel, or choose, or act at all. No other reason can be offered, why *love* is a felicitous, and *hatred* a painful *emotion*; or why the *sensation* consequent upon touching a smooth substance is pleasing; or a rough, gritty surface unpleasant, to one of a delicate hand.

It is a fact, too, that some thoughts are ordinarily the occasion of our having certain agreeable affections; while others are almost invariably followed by some one of the disagreeable passions; and for this we can account, in no other way than by saying, that God has so constituted the mind that it is so; or that it is natural for us thus to feel. God, who intended to make *Wisdom's ways, ways of pleasantness, and the way of transgressors hard*, has rendered the amiable affections pleasing, in their own nature, to him who exercises them, and all immoral passions painful. With the same design his hand has coupled, in the formation of our mental nature, certain thoughts with certain feelings. Hence if a man's conscience condemn him, the mental act of *disapprobation* is followed by the painful emotion of *shame*. If his conscience *approves* of his own conduct, his heart feels *esteem* for himself, and *delight* in the approved actions.

It is worthy of remark, that *similar views* of the same thing are not always equally agreeable or disagreeable; but our agreeable or disagreeable feelings, consequent upon any views, *are dependent on, and according to, the nature and degree of the antecedent mental operations, which are the occasion of them*. Thus a very lively and energetic *view* of the goodness of God to us, will be followed by a proportionate emotion of *love*, or of *gratitude*, or of both.

Would we, therefore, pursue our investigations into the nature and origin of all those motives that excite our wills to volition, we must attempt to account for our *thoughts*; for we never *feel* but in consequence of some *thought*, and our *feelings* correspond with them, as accurately as our actions of an external kind with our volitions. "*As a man thinketh, so is he,*" in his feelings, volitions, and actions.

Should one be able to show how a man comes by every one of his thoughts, and what is the occasion of each; he would then be required to account for the difference in energy and vivacity, which he experiences, at different times, in similar thoughts about the same thing; and so would arrive at that which CAUSETH *any particular VIEW TO BE MOST AGREEABLE, at any particular time*.

To the work of giving the history of the thoughts and

different states of any human mind we confess ourselves inadequate. Who but God could tell, in relation to all men, why they think as they do think? A few general remarks, however, we can make, and the experience of all men will vouch for the truth of them. 1. There could be no mental *perceptions* of external objects, if they did not exist, in such a state relative to us, that we can perceive them. We can no more touch, taste, smell, and hear, things not to be touched, tasted, smelled, and heard, than we can see *what is not to be seen*. 2. All our *sensations*, which are sometimes motives to volition, are dependent on our *perceptions*; and those *perceptions* could not exist, without the existence of percipient beings, and of all those objects which are perceived, in such a state as to be capable of being perceived by them. Hence, had God never created objects of sense; or having created them, had they been situated beyond the circle of our observation, we should never have had any perceptions, or any consequent sensations. If there are mines of platina in the moon, we cannot at present see them; nor can we have any sensations from seeing them.

3. Some of our *perceptions* exist without our volition; some of them contrary to our volition; and some of them in consequence of our volition. Without willing it, we may perceive a blow upon our head: finding the light unpleasant we may will not to perceive the sun when our face is turned towards it, and yet perceive it; and having heard of Pittsburgh, we may will to perceive it, and to use the proper means for so doing, in which case we shall behold that emporium of the west.

4. Some of our *judgments* are formed in consequence of voluntary attention to the subject of them, while others are the result of our mental constitution. Our *judgments* are frequently motives to volition.

5. *Acts of reasoning* are always voluntary, and terminate in *inductive judgments*.

6. Some of the operations of *memory* are voluntary, and some involuntary. *Remembrance* and *recollection* both may occasion volition.

7. Those operations of mind, which are termed *conception*, *intuition*, *the forming of an idea or notion of a thing*,

comprehension, apprehension, imagination, and the understanding of a subject, are all of one class, and are performed by the faculty of conception. In the exertion of this faculty we are frequently voluntary; but sometimes we conceive without volition to do it, and sometimes in opposition to the will. A sinner may will to form some conception of heaven, and do it; he may not will to understand his own character, and yet form just notions of it; and he may will not to conceive of his own perdition, and yet do it in spite of himself. We rarely will from bare conception, but very commonly from conception and the emotions that follow it; or from the combined influence of conception and judgment, or of conception and conscience. Let a man *judge* that certain good, of which he *conceives*, will follow any action, and the judgment and conception may be a motive for willing to perform that action: or let him *conceive* of a deed, and *approve* of the same, and he may will its performance.

8. We may will to consider a subject, that our *conscience* may be exercised about it; and some dictates of conscience may follow this voluntary consideration; but still conscience approves or disapproves according to our conceptions and judgments upon moral subjects. Conscience is not under the direct control of the will.

9. *Consciousness* seems to be essential to every motive; for did we not *know* what we think and feel, we could not be influenced by our thoughts and feelings. Nor could we know that we will at all. Consciousness is a *necessary* mental operation.

10. It must be thought evident from inspection, that all our *involuntary thoughts* result from our constitution, our state, or the agency of some other being. Men certainly have some power over each other's thoughts, and by their actions are the occasion of them. Thus a parent states a truth to a child; the child conceives of the meaning of the statement, judges it to be true, and in consequence of this judgment wills to perform something. In the way of revelation, and by his allotments of providence, God is the agent that occasions many of our involuntary thoughts; and by the constitution of the mind he lays the foundation for consciousness and all our constitu-

tional judgments. We are, moreover, informed by revelation, that some of the angels of the spiritual world are able to excite thoughts, and thereby tempt us, in our present fallen state. One, we know, the Devil, was able to utter a lie in the hearing of the ear of female innocence, and was the occasion of Eve's judging it to be a truth.

11. Neither our constitutional mental operations, nor the thoughts suggested by divine instruction, ever of themselves become motives to sinful volitions. On the contrary, they are calculated to restrain, and counteract, the depravity of mankind.

We pass on to another question concerning moral agency. *Does the will always follow the last dictate of the understanding?* President Edwards says it does, if the word *understanding* be taken in a large sense, "as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called *reason* and *judgment*." This opinion he was necessitated to maintain, or else give up his position, that the *view most agreeable*, or *the greatest appearance of good*, constitutes the motive for every volition. Dr. Dana denies this position. We answer that it is true, only in this sense; we are always *conscious* of our thoughts and feelings; so that if *a feeling* be our motive, we are always *conscious* of that feeling immediately before volition. According to the President's scheme, nothing but *a thought* can be a motive; and that *thought* must be a *judgment* that the contemplated thing is good for us, upon the whole. Dr. D. denies, very properly, that we are always moved to choice by such a judgment. Numerous instances might be stated, in which our *feelings* are our motives to volition in direct opposition to our conception and judgment of what is good for us upon the whole. Let us take for example the *feeling of hatred*. We *hate* a man, and *desire* to smite him. Shall we smite him or not? Conscience disapproves of the contemplated action. Judgment decides that it is not best for us, upon the whole, to perform it; but we *hate* him, and therefore we *will* to smite him. Here the last act of *the understanding* is a *judgment* that the action we have chosen to perform had best not be done; and the act previous was

that of disapprobation. The mental act which moved us to will was a *feeling*, of which we were conscious. It is in this way, that men *choose*, very commonly, to act contrary to their conscience and judgment: and the pious man, in hostility to his unhallowed *feelings*, that cry for indulgence, is moved by his approbation to voluntary, holy self-denial.

Another work of considerable celebrity is entitled, *An Essay on Moral Agency: containing remarks on a late anonymous publication, entitled, 'An Examination of the late President Edwards's Inquiry on Freedom of Will. By Stephen West, D. D. Pastor of the Church in Stockbridge (Massa.) Second Edition. Salem, 1794. pp. 313. 8vo.*

Dr. West teaches, that "moral agency consisteth in spontaneous, voluntary exertion." This he repeats at every turn, through three hundred pages. Of course, any action which springs up in any mind, that is a voluntary action, is a moral action: and any mental operation which is not a spontaneous voluntary action, is not a moral action.

So far as we derive any idea from the word *spontaneous* in this connexion, it is equally applicable to every mental operation, and denotes that without compulsion men think, feel, will, and act. *Thought* is as *spontaneous* as *volition*. Is, then, every *voluntary operation* of any creature, a *moral action*? Dr. West affirms, "that spontaneous, voluntary exertion, is such an agency as hath moral desert in it;"—and such as *really renders us fit subjects of punishment, or reward.* p. 17. Mr. Wilson of Providence,* here remarks, "This definition, if correct, would render every beast of the field, every bird of the air, every fish of the sea, and each and every insect and creeping thing, a moral agent deserving of reward or punishment; for every one of them performs 'spontaneous, voluntary exertion.'"

Dr. West should have described men, angels good and bad, and the Deity; and then he might have said, *that the voluntary mental operations of any one of these beings, which are either required or forbidden by moral law, are MORAL ACTIONS, and deserving of praise or blame.* This

* Letters to the Rev. E. S. Ely, p. 94.

would have been true : but it would not have been the whole truth. Dr. W. is correct in saying, that “ when we talk of moral *agency*, we talk of some kind of *action* or *exertion* ;” p. 18. but it is not true, that our notion of a moral agent includes nothing but the conception of a being *in exercise* ; or of the fact of *his having put forth* some exertion ; for “ it is agreeable to the common sense and understanding of men,” to conceive of a moral agent, as a being possessed of certain faculties, capacities and powers, for obeying or disobeying some moral law that is laid down for the regulation of his conduct.

“ Moral liberty,” says Dr. W. p. 20. “ essentially consisteth in voluntary exercise.—Although liberty and volition may not be precisely the same, yet all the idea we have of liberty is to be found in voluntary exertion.” p. 21. This is strange indeed ; but then it is Hopkinsianism ; and therefore,—if we believe the advocates of it,—it must be metaphysics ! But why can we not form an *idea*, or *conception*, of liberty, of volition, or any voluntary mental operation, and of the difference between these objects of thought ? We certainly use the verb *may* to denote *liberty* ; and *can*, to signify *power* or *possibility*. Now a man is at *liberty* to do any thing which he *may* do : and he has *power* to perform any thing which he *can* do. Men of common sense say, that a man *may* will, choose, love, reason, remember, and the like ; and they conceive that *liberty* to do these things, is something wholly distinct from his actually doing them. Men may do many things which they never will do ; so that liberty of agency,—and actual agency, by no means run parallel to each other ; nor is it necessary to conceive of them as inseparably connected. A man *may* do, or has *legal liberty* to perform, any thing which the law allows : and he has *natural liberty* to perform any act, whether mental or bodily, for which he has the requisite faculties, provided he is not the subject of some physical restraint. Hence, a man may have *natural liberty* to perform actions, for which he has no present *moral ability*. For instance, a man may have faculties for *loving God*, and no *physical restraint* prevents him from performing this mental, moral operation : but not only the existence of faculties, but the actual *apprehension* of the loveliness of the

Deity is requisite to constitute the *moral ability* of loving God. This *apprehension*, or *right view* of God as lovely, he has not, and therefore he has not the *moral ability* of performing the moral action of loving God. Hopkinsians very frequently mistake *natural ABILITY* for *natural LIBERTY*; and hence they assert the absurd doctrine, that all men, by nature, have a *natural ability*, and a *moral inability* to love God. They have *natural liberty* to love God, it is true, but until they are changed in their views, they have *no requisite ability* for performing the *mental, moral operation* in question.

The enquiry, "Whether the *will is free*?" Dr. West pronounces to be "utterly unmeaning and impertinent." p. 21. Yet we cannot think it impertinent to enquire, whether the will of every man is, at all times, *free from physical restraint*? or, whether man's faculty of will is free in its operations, from the causal influence of every thing without his own mind? Neither does it seem unmeaning to ask, Is the will free to choose without any motive? We should think it good sense to say, that the original constitution of the mind effectually prevents the faculty of will from operating, except in consequence of some motive; so that the will is not free to act at all, without motives.

Of all the Hopkinsian metaphysicians which we have read, no one but the Rev. Isaac Anderson equals Dr. West, for confusion of thought, and abuse of language. To follow him into all his absurdities and expose them, would be a tedious labour. We shall advert to a few only. He remarks,

"The mind is conscious of nothing otherwise than in and by its own exertions. As it is conscious of a power of thought and idea, only in thinking and perceiving; so it is conscious of a *power of will*, only in the *exercise of volition*. That the mind should be conscious of a *power of choice* which is distinguishable from *actual choosing*, is no more conceivable, than that we should be conscious of a power of thinking and perceiving, without, at the same time, *feeling or exercising any perception or thought*." p. 22.

Consciousness is the knowledge we have of our own present mental operations. *The mind, truly, is conscious*

of nothing otherwise than by one of its own exertions ; even one of its own exertions, called an *act of consciousness*. The mind is *not* conscious at all, of " a power of thought and idea : " nor of " a power of will, " nor of a " power of choice ; " because power is not an object of consciousness. We are conscious of every kind of thinking, of feeling, of choice, or actual choosing ; and of every mental operation ; but we *conceive* of the *power* of choosing, and *judge* that it is distinct from the *act* of choosing. We *conceive* and *judge* that we *can* come to a choice, or that we can speak, or write, and thus form a notion of the meaning of the expressions, *a power to choose, a power of speaking, and a power of writing*. It will not follow, that we have no knowledge of *power*, because we are not conscious of it ; for we are not *conscious* of the existence of God, or of our neighbour, and yet we know there is a God, and that we have neighbours. The mind of man constitutionally *judges*, that actual volition implies a power of volition ; just as infallibly as we decide, upon the first apprehension of the meaning of the proposition, that there is no effect without an adequate cause. Dr. West continues to say, "*Minds* are conversant only with their own ideas ; they perceive and are immediately conscious of nothing beside their own exercises and ideas." An *idea* is a *conception* or *notion*. We are conversant about all our own mental operations, as much as about our ideas. Minds are conversant with material things, for they perceive them through their five senses : and they are conversant with all the objects of their thoughts, as well as with their thoughts themselves.

Dr. W. says, p. 24, that " all mankind have immediate consciousness of spontaneous, voluntary exertion." It is agreed, that men are conscious of each volition, and of each mental act that results from volition. But are they conscious of nothing else ? Certainly we are conscious of mental operations which are not consequences of volition. We remember frequently when we do not will to remember ; yes, and even when we choose not to remember, and are *conscious* of these acts of memory. We are *conscious* of many judgments too, of many perceptions, of many conceptions and imaginations, of many acts of

conscience, and of many sensations, affections and passions, which are not the result of any acts of will; and which therefore may be termed *involuntary*. Are any of these *involuntary* mental operations moral actions or not? Dr. West must say they are not. Indeed he does affirm, that in voluntary exertion all moral agency consists; and that in voluntary exertion consist all the *liberty* and *power* which are necessary to render any one a moral agent, an accountable creature, and the proper subject of reward or punishment. p. 24.

“ This is a sort of agency which is the object of command and prohibition in the word of God. Accordingly we find that the exercises of affection, voluntary exertions, are subjected to law, and are the direct object of Divine precept.—Nor can any thing justly be considered as having the nature of obedience or disobedience any farther than it partaketh of voluntary *exercise and affection*. Mere voluntary exercises, of a certain kind, are accepted as obedience. These, and these only, are our conformity to the Divine law. And so much do all obedience and disobedience consist in the exercises of the will, so much do our voluntary exertions constitute the very essence and formal nature of virtue and vice, that no man will ever be, either rewarded or punished, for any thing besides his exercises of affection—spontaneous, voluntary exertions. Whatever action or event taketh place without any concurrence of our wills, or otherwise than as the fruit of our voluntary exertion, and which hath nothing of our will or choice in it, will never be set to our account for adjusting our reward or punishment. It is agreeable to the common sense and opinions of man, that all spontaneous, voluntary exertions carry in them desert of either punishment or reward. It is a maxim, established by the universal sense of mankind, that the exercises of our affections are, in their very nature, either virtuous or vicious. And so universally doth a sense of desert on this account prevail among mankind, that, in order to determine any man’s character and desert, we always accustom ourselves to enquire into *his motives*, and the *temper, disposition, or state* of mind from whence his outward actions and conduct proceed. Here, all acknowledge, are to be found moral quality and desert. In the *exercises of affection* do men place virtue or vice.” p. 25.

This is a pretty good specimen of Hopkinsian metaphysics and theology. Let us analyze the extract.

1. By *exercise* Dr. W. and every one else mean *operation*; and by *mental exercise, mental operation, or action*.

2. *Voluntary exercises* must include all the operations of the faculty of the will, that is, *all volitions*; and *all other mental operations which are the result of volitions*.

3. All virtue and vice, all sin and holiness, consist in *voluntary exercises*, as thus defined; and, of course, nothing is blamable or punishable but voluntary exercises; nothing is to be rewarded but voluntary exercises.

4. Of course, if we have any mental operations that are not "the fruit of our voluntary exertion," those operations are no part of our moral agency, and for them we can neither be rewarded nor punished, with propriety.

5. Yet we form our opinion of a man's moral character, by judging of *his motives, temper, disposition, or state of mind*.

6. Hence, *motives, temper, disposition and state of mind*, are all of them *voluntary exercises*, or else we "determine a man's character," by enquiring into, and judging of, things which are neither virtuous nor vicious, neither rewardable nor punishable.

7. All *exercises of affection* are *voluntary exercises*, because in them men place virtue or vice; and nothing is either virtuous or vicious but voluntary exercises.

8. "All obedience and disobedience consist in the exercises of the will;" and, therefore, all our *affections* are operations of the faculty of the will;—or, all our *affections* are *volitions*. So says Dr. West.

That we have not misrepresented this writer may be evinced by some additional quotations. "There is nothing morally beautiful or deformed in any thing beside the exercise of affection—spontaneous, voluntary exertion." p. 26. In this passage he makes *voluntary exertion* exegetical of *exercises of affection*. This he frequently does; so that our *affections and volitions* must, in his esteem, be the same mental operations. "Mankind are *agents* in nothing but *spontaneous, voluntary exertions*." p. 28. Of course, our thoughts and feelings are all of them voluntary actions. "So that, upon the whole, nothing is found in the mind more than *voluntary, spontaneous exertion*." p. 29. "A view or conviction of what *the heart or the affection* really is, or of what is indeed *the very choice of the mind*, always terminates the enquiry,

and fixeth the judgment in regard to the beauty or deformity of the action. Upon this ground alone it is, that we form our judgment of the characters of men, or any moral beings; determining and judging them to be either good, or bad, only by their *volitions*, and according to the nature of them." p. 30. Here *the heart and an operation* of the heart, called *an affection*, are confounded: the heart, an affection, and the very choice of the mind, are represented as one and the same thing; and all voluntary mental operations, together with all man's affections, are reduced to *volitions*. "In the mind's perceiving any thing, which is fitted, by the nature and constitution of it, to be an object of its affection, is really all the choice which is ever made of it. Nothing that is, in its nature, the object of affection, is ever either chosen, or refused, with any feeling, exercise, or perception of mind, different from what is necessarily and certainly implied in the mind's perceiving it." p. 60. "The perception of the beauty of an object,—is not the cause and ground of choice, nor any thing distinct from it." p. 60. "There are but two senses in which the term Motive is commonly made use of among men. In the first of these, it importeth the very choice of the mind itself: in the second, the external object or quality which doth, or ought to, terminate it, and which is exhibited as a reason, in the view of which the mind ought to act, either in choosing, or refusing." p. 61. From these passages we learn, that perception is volition, is choice; and that motive is either volition, or some external object or quality. "An agreeable appearance to the mind, is no more distinct from choice, than a fixedness and cohesion of parts is distinct from solidity." p. 68.

If this is a specimen of the metaphysical science of the new divinity school, we do not wonder at the celebrity which the advocates of it enjoy, with some portion of the community, for profound obscurity. *Volition, misunderstood*, is the substance of Dr. West's Essay, and the mystery of Hopkinsianism. Men of common sense believe, and all but very uncommon writers say, that the expressions, "I will—I purpose—I intend—I design—I refuse—I choose—I resolve—I determine," denote acts of the faculty of will, which are called *volitions*. These they

deem a class of mental operations distinct from those which are called *feelings*.

Perceptions, again, are another class of mental exercises which always have for their object something without the mind. We *perceive* only through *the five organs of sense*. *Perception* is figuratively used to denote *conception*; as when we say, "we *perceive* the meaning of a proposition;" just as we figuratively say we *see* some statement to be true, or have a *view* of some object not visible through our eyes.

Affections, instead of being *volitions*, are a species of *feelings*; and very frequently are independent of volition.

We may *perceive* an object which is beautiful, and instantly *feel love* for it, without *willing to love* it. It is true, we may not have willed *not to love it*; so that our *feeling* of love is not *opposed to volition*: and it is moreover true, that, having perceived its beauty, and having loved it, we may will, from some motive, not to love it any longer, and yet feel the emotion of love in direct defiance of *the will*. In this case, the mental operation of *love* is consequent on *perception*, and is so far *involuntary* as to be *against our will*. Is this act of love a moral operation of the mind, or not?

We are conscious of feeling sensations immediately consequent upon perceptions, and both passions and affections that follow some of our thoughts, without any intervention of volition; and we cannot help judging, that other human beings are conscious of similar exercises. Our experience teaches us, that our feelings are dependant on some operation of some faculty of the understanding; and our volitions on our thoughts and feelings, much more frequently than our feelings on our volitions. Indeed, we are not conscious of ever exciting ourselves immediately to any particular feeling by a volition to do it. *Our hearts*, figuratively speaking, command *our wills* directly; but if *our wills* would regulate our hearts, they must do it, indirectly, by overruling our faculties of thinking. We *will* to act very frequently because we *love*; but we less frequently *love* because we *will to love*. If we love from volition, it must be by contemplating the

object from willing to do it, that we may discern its loveliness, and then the operation of love will follow.

Is the mental operation of *loving*, then, without a volition to love, and even without a volition to take such views of a subject, as may induce love, a moral action? Dr. West says it is not. But we ask, why should the mental act of *volition* be deemed a moral action, any more than an exercise of spontaneous *love*? Volition is as dependant on some motive, (by which we mean some previous thought or feeling,) as the feeling of love on some previous apprehension of loveliness in the object loved. *Loving* is as important an operation, for our own happiness and the glory of God, as *volition*. *Loving* some objects is as plainly required by the law of God, as *volition* to perform certain actions. For *loving* as well as for *willing* we are to be rewarded or punished: and for *loving* as well as for *willing* our consciences either accuse or else justify us. This is true even of an act of love which is performed not immediately in consequence of any volition, but immediately in consequence of some conception, judgment, remembrance, or approbation of loveliness in the object beloved. The same may be said of very many affections and passions.

One general remark, we are persuaded, will express the truth on this subject. It is this: *Any mental operation which is either required or forbidden by the moral law, is called a moral action, in contradistinction to a physical operation; and any mental operation required by the moral law is called a moral action, in contradistinction to an immoral action, which is forbidden by God.* In the last case, it seems desirable to insert *right*, or *holy*, or *spiritual*, so as to distinguish a *holy moral action*, not only from a *physical*, but also from an *immoral* operation.

By a *moral law* we intend any rule of conduct laid down for the regulation of any intelligent, sensitive, voluntary agent. By *the moral law*, we intend that law which God has given for the regulation of human actions. Now the law of God neither requires nor forbids men to have involuntary *perceptions*. We may *see* a flash of lightning, *hear* the sound of thunder, *smell* the fragrance

of the new mown grass, by which we pass, *touch* a rock upon which we stumble, or *taste* food which is forced into our mouths, without willing to perform either act; and these *five perceptions* are not *moral actions*; are neither holy nor sinful.

From these involuntary *perceptions*, involuntary *sensations* may result, which are neither required nor forbidden by the law of God. The moral law neither requires nor forbids us, to *feel cold* in winter, nor *hot* in summer: it neither rewards nor punishes men, for *feeling* hungry and thirsty; it neither praises nor blames any involuntary *appetite*.

Those *feelings*, on the other hand, which are denominated *emotions*, and which are divided into *affections* and *passions*, are all of them objects of moral law. God requires us to *feel*, for such things as are proper to excite them, all the different *affections*; and forbids us to exercise them in relation to improper objects; or in relation to proper objects in an improper degree. His law approves of the right exercise of affections, and condemns the wrong operation of them, whether they immediately result from volition or not. He forbids some *passions* altogether, and forbids the exercise of some of the passions in relation to some objects, while he requires them in relation to others, so that every passion is either forbidden or required; and is either censured or praised, whether it be immediately consequent upon volition, or some other mental operation. All our *passions* and *affections*, therefore, are moral, as opposed to physical, operations.

In like manner, all the operations of our faculties of conception, judgment, reason, memory, conscience, volition, and agency, are required by the moral law to be right, and all these, together with our voluntary perceptions and feelings, are declared to be either morally good or morally evil. We are even required to be *conscious* of our mental operations which are holy; and we are not forbidden to be conscious in any case; for God has so made every man that he is necessarily conscious of every thing which he is doing. External operations, such as eating, drinking, writing, walking, and speaking, are all of them under requisition by the moral law, and all of them imply

volition, and some other mental operations. Thus we have candidly shown what actions we believe to be of a moral nature; and trust that our readers are convinced, that all moral agency does not consist in *volitions*. After man was made a moral agent in Paradise, he must have had some thoughts and feelings, before he had any volitions; for on the supposition that a volition is the first mental act which any man performs, that volition must be without any motive, or reason; and of course wholly an irrational volition. And if the first holy mental act of any moral agent should be a volition, he would have a holy volition, without any holy, or morally and spiritually good motive.

Several other errors, on the subject of moral agency, in Dr. *Stephen West's* Essay, we have not time to expose. We pass to a publication entitled, "*A Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity; containing Remarks on the Essays of Dr. Samuel West, and on the writings of several other authors, on those subjects. By Jonathan Edwards, D. D. Worcester, 1797. pp. 234. 8vo.*"

The author of this Dissertation was the son of President Edwards. Dr. Edwards in general defends the President. The Essays of Dr. *Samuel West*, we have not been able to procure. We should judge, however, from the extracts before us, that his principal objections to the *Inquiry* had their origin in the improper use of terms; for, says Dr. Edwards, "When Dr. West, p. 46. holds, *that there may be a CERTAINTY, that a man will do such a thing, though he may have at the same time a physical power of not doing it*; he holds, that there may be the very thing which President Edwards calls a *moral necessity*, that the man will do the thing, though he may have at the same time a *physical* or *natural* power not to do it." p. 18.

This *power not to do a thing*, we do not pretend, however, to understand, unless by it Dr. Edwards intended to denote, a power of will to *refuse* doing it: for although power is requisite to perform every thing which is done, yet no power is required to do nothing, or not to do any given thing. To *refuse* to do any contemplated action, is

doing something; is an act of *volition*, and requires a *moral power*, quite as much as any other operation of the faculty of will.

Physical, mental, and bodily faculties man has; and some of these may be active or not active, according to his volitions; but *power* to do any action, always implies every thing which is requisite to the actual performance of that action. The existence of a *natural faculty* for performing any action, which may be in exercise or not, President Edwards, Dr. Edwards, and multitudes of other metaphysicians, have confounded with *natural ability*; which always includes, not only the existence of the requisite natural faculties, but of every thing else, in connexion with those faculties, requisite to the actual production of the *natural operation*.

Of *moral necessity* we shall not write, for "absolute *certainty*," says Dr. Edwards, "is all the necessity for which we plead," in relation to moral actions. "*Certainty* is the *necessity* in question." p. 39. *Certainty* is quite as intelligible a term in this controversy, as *necessity*; and when we mean *certainty*, therefore, we resolve to use that word. To the Divine Mind, all future events, that will ever occur, are absolutely *certain*; and of a *certainty* they will take place.

"Volition," says Dr. Edwards, "never takes place without the consent or with the entire opposition of the will." p. 21. Every operation of the will is a volition, this author being judge. *Consent*, therefore, in this case, is a *volition*. Now what propriety is there in saying, that volition never takes place without the volition of the will? It is a mere truism. If the will *opposes* any thing, it must be by a *volition*; for every act of the will is a volition. We learn, then, that volition never takes place when the will exercises an entire volition not to have the volition in question: that is, we never at any time will, contrary to our then present volition; which is another truism.

Dr. Edwards maintains, that *every volition is an effect of a cause extrinsic to the will itself*. He also asserts, that the efficient cause is *extrinsic to the mind* of him that wills. The dispute between him and his opponent would have been reduced to a point by an agreement about

the use of the words *cause*, and efficient cause: for Dr. W. says, "the sense in which we use self-determination is simply this, that we ourselves determine; i. e. that we ourselves will or choose." To this Dr. E. replies, "We doubtless will and choose as really as we think, see, hear, feel, &c.—It is to be presumed, that no man ever denied, that we determine, that we will, or that we choose." p. 22. 42. Dr. W. then affirms, that our own minds are *the efficient causes* of all our own volitions. Dr. E. denies this statement to be the truth; for while he and his father hold, "that we ourselves will or choose; that we ourselves act, and are agents;" they deny "that we efficiently cause our own mental acts." p. 30.

"President Edwards does not hold," says his son, "that we are *mere* passive beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills. If this be the meaning of it, he does hold it, and the believers in his system are ready to join issue with Dr. West on this point. Though we hold, that our volitions are the effects of some extrinsic cause, and that we are passive, as we are the subjects of the influence of that cause; yet we hold, that we are not *merely* passive; but that volition is in its own nature an act or action, and in the exercise of it we are active, though in the causation of it we are passive so far as to be the subjects of the influence of the efficient cause. This we concede; and let our opponents make the most of it: we fear not the consequence. In this sense we hold, 'that we are determiners in the active voice, but not *merely* determined in the passive voice.'" p. 31.—"But who or what is the efficient cause in either case, remains to be considered. To say that we are determiners in the active voice, and not the determined in the passive voice, gives no satisfaction. We grant, that we are determiners in the active: and yet assert, that we are determined, or are caused to determine, by some extrinsic cause, at the same time, and with respect to the same act: as, when a man hears a sound, he is the hearer in the active voice, and yet is caused to hear the same sound, by something extrinsic to himself. It will not be pretended, that a man is the efficient cause of his own hearing, in every instance, in which he hears in the active voice." p. 42.—"It is no more possible or conceivable, that we should cause all our own volitions, than that men should beget themselves." p. 38.—"If we cause our own volitions at all, we cause them either by a previous volition, or without such volition. If we cause them by a previous voli-

tion,"—" this volition is produced by another preceding, which runs into the infinite series." pp. 50, 51.—" From the supposition, that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cause of it; because it is absolutely impossible, that the mind itself should be the cause of it." p. 59.—" But that we should thus cause them, is neither possible nor conceivable. If we should thus cause a volition, we should doubtless cause it by a causal act: it is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act. And as it is supposed, that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a *free* act, *i. e.* an act of the will or a volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal volition must be caused by another, and so on infinitely: which is both impossible and inconceivable." p. 38.—" The causing of one act of volition by another is attended with this absurdity also, it supposes the causing act in this case to be distinct from the act caused; when in reality they coalesce, and are one and the same. For instance, to choose to have a choice of virtue, is nothing but a choice of virtue; to choose the choice of an apple, is to choose an apple: so that we have the volition before we have it, and in order that we may have it." p. 48.—" Some of the advocates for self-determinaation hold, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own volitions, yet not by any *act* or *exertion* of the mind, but by the *power* or *faculty* of the will. And how can this power or faculty produce volition, unless it be exerted *first* in order to the effect?" p. 50.—" So long as it is granted, as Dr. West does grant, that motive is necessary to volition, and that every volition, whether choice or refusal, is occasioned by motive, and never exists without it, every thing is granted on this head, for which we contend." p. 64.—" I do not pretend, that motives are the *efficient* causes of volition.—When we assert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cause of it; but we mean, that there is a stated connection between volition and motive." p. 66.—" A motive can have no influence, before influence is given to it; and nothing can be a motive, which has no persuasive influence or tendency. Therefore, the influence of motives and the connection between them and volitions, are the effect of some cause extrinsic to the mind." p. 109.—" It is an undoubted truth, that no agent can bring any effect to pass, but what is consequent on his acting." p. 128.—" Our volition must either be the effect of an extrinsic cause, or of an intrinsic one, or must happen without cause." p. 45.—" Motives, then, are the reasons, the occasions, the necessary previous circumstances or antecedents of volition. And what are these but *second causes*? Causes in the sense, in which President Edwards explains himself to use the

word *cause* with relation to this very subject. We say, that fire is the cause of the sensation of heat; that rain and sunshine are the causes of vegetation, &c. Yet they are no more than the stated antecedents. In the same sense, motives, according to Dr. West, are causes of volitions. Besides, all second causes are the effect of the First Cause. Therefore ultimately volitions are effects of the Great First Cause." p. 133.— "If we be the efficient causes of our own volitions, they are effects. But an effect is produced by a previous exertion of the efficient cause, which act is as distinct from the effect, as the divine creating act was distinct from the world created." p. 172.—"We grant, that the Deity is the primary efficient cause of all things, and that he produces volitions in the human mind by such second causes as motives, appetites, biases, &c. and the human mind, in being the subject of the Divine agency whether mediate or immediate, is passive. Still we hold that volition is an *action*." p. 178.—"My thoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are *mine*; yet it will not be pretended, that I am the efficient of them all." p. 181.—"The volitions of rational beings are in their own nature moral acts, and for that reason the subjects of them are accountable for them." p. 185.—"Virtue and vice, desert of praise and blame, consist in the acts themselves, and not in their cause." p. 184.

In these extracts may be found the substance of Dr. Edwards's *Dissertation*. Some of his doctrines we shall certainly oppose; but before we do it, let us declare our hearty assent to some of his propositions. We believe, that "as volition always implies and supposes a motive; so does a motive as evidently imply and infer a volition. For by the very terms, that is no motive to a man, which does not persuade, move, or excite him to volition." p. 68. We agree, that "there is no absurdity in the supposition that one volition," or rather the *recollection* of one volition, "should be a motive to another volition." p. 110. We believe, "that we efficiently cause our own volitions, but invariably according to motives:" (p. 70,) that there is no effect without an adequate cause: that God has so constituted and governs the human mind, that no man can will without a motive: that God from everlasting foreknew all human volitions and their motives: that to the Divine Mind it was always *certain* that every volition would be exercised in consequence of its motive: that

Jehovah has determined all his own actions; and that all events accord with the Divine foreordination of them.

Having premised these things, we proceed to a consideration of the foregoing extracts.

By an *efficient cause* of any effect, we understand that cause which by its own efficiency produces that effect. Of *efficient causes*, we think, there are two classes; the first of which contains the Deity alone, and the second all created souls. The Divine Mind is the only uncreated, infinite, efficient cause. All other souls are finite, efficient causes. Besides these we know of no efficient causes in the universe. Nothing but a soul, a spirit, a mind, has any real efficiency. Material things have nothing more than an *instrumental* agency in the production of any effect. We define a soul, a spirit, a mind, to be a substance that can think, feel, will, and act. Of any spirit, soul, or mind, we have knowledge only by its operations, and our own conception, reason, and judgment. It is not an object of perception or of consciousness. The knowledge we have of matter is derived from our *perception* of its attributes, and our constitutional judgments, that the objects of our perception really exist; and that there could be no attribute without something to which it belongs.

The existence of a spirit is just as evident as the existence of a portion of matter; notwithstanding this variety of manner in becoming acquainted with the two objects. We have knowledge of a mathematical line and point, not by our senses; not by *perception* of any marks upon paper, which really have length and breadth, whereas a mathematical line has no breadth, and a point neither length nor breadth; but by conception. Our knowledge of a point is nevertheless as perfect as our knowledge of the existence of a man, or a mountain. In like manner, *power* is not an object of *perception*; and yet we *conceive* of it, and constitutionally judge, *that every operation implies the existence of the power to perform that operation.* This is as evident, upon inspection, as the truth upon which Dr. Edwards insists, *that every effect implies the existence of its cause.* Indeed the word *cause*, if properly used, must denote *power*, for evidently there can be *no*

causation of an effect, where there is *no power to cause an effect*. CAUSE, however, we do not use for OCCASION ; nor do we intend by it, in this connexion, an *instrumental cause*.

It seems to us incontrovertible, that every mental operation of man, proves the previous existence of power to perform it ; or else, the operation must have existed without any efficient cause of its existence. Of course, every *volition* evinces the existence of the requisite *power* of producing that volition. Under the term *power* we include every thing requisite to produce an effect. *Power to will* implies the existence of a being who has a faculty of volition, and the actual apprehension of some motive to a volition. Without these there *can* be no volition : so that the power of volition includes the notion of a motive.

Now then, we affirm, that every man has had power to perform every mental act, whether volition or other act, which he ever did perform ; and that he will have power to do every thing, which will ever be truly predicated of him.

Of all those mental operations, which man has power to perform, and actually does perform, we say that man is *the efficient cause*. Man *effects* them, by his own power. Yet his power, as well as his existence, is of God his Maker ; for had he not been created, had he not been formed with the faculty of volition, had he not been rendered capable of thought and feelings which constitute his motive to volition ; had he not been so constituted as to will from motives ; had he not been formed a finite efficient cause, he would have possessed no power of volition.

A real agent of an action, and *the efficient cause of that action*, we hold to be expressive of the same thing ; for *instrumental agents*, we distinguish from *real agents* ; and *the efficient cause*, from the *motive*, *reason*, or *occasion*, of any volition. Whether our use of language be correct, or not, our readers must judge ; and we fear not the verdict of common sense.

We *do pretend*, that man is the efficient cause of all his own mental operations : and that he really does every thing which he performs. God has made him *an agent*,

an efficient, who acts within prescribed bounds, and according to certain laws of mental empire, as really as God himself acts, and produces effects. He is the author of all those mental and bodily operations which are truly predicated of him, as much as God is the author of the universe. But these things, in Dr. Edwards's opinion, cannot be; for, "if a man be the efficient cause of any given volition, he must cause it by some previous act, or exertion of his agency; so that we must suppose one act to precede the first act, which is an absurdity." This is the drift of his reasoning. A volition, he says, is an *effect*, and of course must have some *cause*; and that cause must produce the effect, by some previous causal act; for "it is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act." A volition is indeed an *effect*, that is, something produced by *an efficient cause*; but it is such an effect as we call an *action*, and requires nothing but *an agent*, having requisite power, to perform it. In performing the very act, the agent causes the effect; and a previous act is not necessary to its existence; any more than an action before every action is requisite to an agent's performing an action. Volition is a mental operation; and for the production of such an effect as volition, nothing is requisite but the power of volition in actual operation. One who has the power to will, actually wills, and thus the efficient produces this given effect, called a volition.

Every mental operation is an *effect*; and Dr. Edwards might have said, the human mind can perform no mental operation, without performing a previous mental operation, that is, it cannot act at all, with just as much propriety as he asserts, that no man can be the efficient cause of his own volition, without having a volition before any volition. By *the agent*, *the author*, and *the efficient cause* of any mental act, we mean one and the same thing, the soul of whom the act is predicated. This we think is the common, the justifiable use of these expressions.

If "volitions are the effects of some extrinsic cause;" that is, of some cause without the mind of which they are predicated, they are effects of some other being than the person to whom they are charged; and since these *effects*

called volitions are *actions*, they must be the actions of some other being than the person who is the agent of them. This is the same as to say, that a person's actions are not his own actions; that they are not done, produced, or effected by himself. The *causation* of a volition, Dr. Edwards attributes to the efficient cause; "and this efficient cause," he says, "is not the man of whom we predicate the volition; for he does not cause it: it is inconceivable, it is impossible that he should." Now by the *causation* of an effect we understand the production, the effecting, the performing, the doing of any thing. The effect in question is a volition; and if we may not ascribe to the man who wills, the causation of his volition, we may not say, that he performs, produces, or effects the mental operation called volition: we may not call him the doer, the author, the agent of his own mental action.

We read much about man's being a *determiner*, in the active voice; and at the same time *determined* in the *passive voice*. This means, we suppose, that man *wills* and at the same time *has his volition caused*; or that he is the agent of every volition which some other being than himself causes to exist. He wills, we grant, because he has power to will; and this power to will implies the existence of some motive to volition, besides other things. We grant, too, that some other agent may be instrumental in furnishing the motive to volition, than the being who wills; so that an extraneous efficient, or object, may be the *occasion* of volition, and may contribute to our ability for volition in a particular case. Nevertheless, a volition is an effect, and the cause, the performer, the efficient, the producer of volition, let him be whom he will, causes the effect in question, when he actually wills. We have no other idea of the causation of a volition. He wills, and this is the causation of such an effect as we call a volition. How we can be active and passive in the same mental action; how we can ourselves perform it; while another is the efficient of it, is beyond our power of conception. *What we do, another does not*, however he may assist, dispose, and enable us, to perform the act; and what another effects we are not the authors, agents, or efficient of. Had Dr. E. taught that we are *passive* in re-

ceiving those motives, which are the occasion of our volitions; and *active* in volitions, it would have been a doctrine much more probable than this; and yet, not true.

Dr. E. seems to have thought that motives exert some causal *influence* on volitions, and that we are passive in being acted upon by this influence. "We are passive," he says, "so far as to be the subjects of the *influence* of the efficient cause:" and this *influence* is given by the Great First Efficient Cause, he intimates, to motives. "*A motive can have no influence, before influence is given to it; and nothing can be a motive, which has no persuasive influence or tendency.*" This *influence*, he says, *is an effect of some cause extrinsic to the mind.* What, then, is this *influence*? What is its nature? How does it operate? After God has given a motive influence, how does that influence affect the will? Is it by any voluntary or involuntary operation, causation or agency? Dr. Dana, with great force, remarks,

"The original (that is, the *true and real*) cause of volition is, therefore, yet to be explained. For if it be the immediate effect of motive, still this cause is an effect in regard to something preceding,—and whatever is the next or immediate cause of the strength or energy of motive itself, this again is an effect in relation to a cause preceding, as well as a cause in relation to motive,—and thus the inquiry may be pursued *in infinitum*.—Should it be said, that the energy of motive, in every case, is to be attributed to the First and Supreme Cause, as the immediate efficient—this, indeed, is making short work; but it is cutting the knot, rather than untying it. However, when it shall be shewn, that every act of will, in every creature, is an immediate, necessary effect of the Supreme Cause, the dispute will at once be at an end." *Examination*, p. 6.

When all this is proved, it will be a settled point, that there is but one efficient cause, one agent, one author of all physical and moral operations in the universe.

Of the influence of motives we know nothing more than this, that, when we exercise a volition, it is in consequence of some thought or feeling, which we call a motive; but we cannot conceive of any causal influence which one mental operation has upon another, nor are we conscious of any. Should any one say, "I chose to eat an apple,

because it seemed desirable to me to do so;" he would exhibit a volition and its motive. Now, can any one tell us, how this motive, this conceiving, judging, or thinking it desirable to eat an apple, exerted any causal influence on the act of choosing, or on the faculty of choice? Is this causal influence a volition, a thought, a feeling, or a physical operation? The motive is itself one mental operation of mentally seeing, that is, of conceiving and judging; that a certain action is desirable to be done; and the volition is an act, related to the former mental act, as a volition to a motive; but of any causation in the case, strictly speaking, we have no knowledge. This we know, that God has made us capable of thinking, and choosing; and that such are the laws of mental operation, that we never choose but in consequence of some motive; yet the motive cannot cause the volition, because motive is not an efficient cause, is not a being possessed of a faculty of agency.

Dr. E. would illustrate his notion of the activity and passivity of man in his volitions, by referring to the act of hearing. "*When a man hears a sound, he is the hearer in the active voice, and yet is caused to hear the same sound, by something extrinsic to himself.*" Hearing is a mental act, called a *perception*; and the *efficient cause* of it, is the mind that performs the operation of hearing. Yet God, who made and governs man, has ordained this law, that man shall perform this operation only through the medium of his ears, and the percussion of the atmosphere. His ears and the percussion of the atmosphere are, therefore, called *instrumental causes* of hearing. They really do not produce the effect called an act of hearing; so that a man is *the efficient cause* of his own hearing, in every instance in which he hears. His ears exert no efficiency in the case, neither does the atmosphere. It is *conceivable*, by us, that a man should really perform all his own mental acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, whatever be the appointed, but not, in the nature of the case, essential, instrumentality, of material organs. We can even conceive, that all our mental actions should be performed by a spirit in a state of separation from the body. It is quite as conceivable, that God should create a mind ca-

pable of seeing and hearing, as that his own uncreated, immaterial spirit should hear his own thunder, and see the stars which his own hand has made. We can, moreover, as readily conceive of man's efficiently exerting himself, of man's originating his own finite actions, as of any causation on the part of the Deity.

We have shown, we trust, to the satisfaction of our readers, that although a man cannot *immediately* cause a volition by a volition, yet *mediately* he can. Indeed, Dr. Edwards admits, that one volition may be a motive to another, and have influence in producing it; and Dr. Stephen West, his coadjutor, says, "Habit means nothing more than a certain fixt connexion between our *present* exercises of will, and *future* voluntary exertions of the *same general nature, and denominations.*" *Essay*, p. 56. Yet Dr. E. thinks it absurd to speak of one volition's causing another, (he must mean *immediately*,) because the two volitions, in the case of a man's choosing to choose, in his opinion, *coalesce and are one and the same.* "For instance, to choose to have a choice of virtue, is nothing but a choice of virtue; to choose the choice of an apple, is to choose an apple: so that we have the volition before we have it, and in order that we may have it." To-day we may choose to have a choice of virtue to-morrow; and this choice of to-day is something distinct from the choice of virtue; for it is a volition concerning a future volition; so that it is not quite so absurd, *to choose to have a choice*, as Dr. E. seems to have imagined. The expression conveys good sense. And if we may now choose to have a choice to-morrow, why may we not this evening, an hour hence; or one moment after our present volition?

Besides, a man may not choose virtue from the love of it; and so strictly speaking does not choose virtue; while he may be convinced that virtue is necessary to everlasting happiness, and from the desire of the latter may choose to have the choice of the former as the requisite means of everlasting felicity. An unrenewed man may thus, from selfish motives, now choose at some future time to choose virtue; just as one who loathes medicine may choose to have a volition by and by to take it,

as the necessary means of self-preservation. Should a man choose virtue for its own sake, or from a desire to glorify and enjoy God, he would in this volition have evidence of being a renewed person. The pious choose virtue for the present, and will to choose it in future ; but the ungodly, when afraid of hell, will, purpose, intend, determine, or choose, as a matter of direful necessity, to have a choice of it, at some more convenient season. This is a matter of daily experience : it is nothing like *having a volition before we have it, and in order that we may have that identical volition.*

That the Deity is the sole efficient cause of the existence of all substances is undeniable. Of course, he is the maker of every human soul and body, with all their constituent faculties. He has ordained all our modes of mental operation ; as infallibly as all modes of physical operation. Yet should we advance still further, and affirm that the Deity is the efficient cause, the producer, the author of all human volitions, we should, in our own esteem, make God the only sinner in existence. We deeply regret, that Dr. Edwards should have been of the opinion, that God efficiently causes all sinful volitions, and think he has not exonerated his Maker, according to his own theory, from deserved blame, by allèging, that all virtue and vice, desert of praise and blame, consist not in the *cause* of volitions, but in the acts themselves. Any mental operation contrary to the moral law is a vice ; any one conformable to it, is a virtue : and any being who is the performer, the producer, the efficient, the doer of any one of these, is blamable or praiseworthy according to the nature of the operation performed. This is the language of common sense, and of the Bible. The divine law blames, censures and condemns those *persons* who produce any moral evil, for their criminal efficiency in the matter : so that the criminal author of any mischief is the being censured by God. Could he, then, excuse himself, were he to produce, or efficiently cause every rebellious thought, feeling, volition, and action ? May the Lord preserve us from charging all, or any of our sinful mental actions, and voluntary external conduct, upon Him, who cannot look upon sin without abhorrence.

Moral Disquisitions and Scriptures on the Rev. David Tappan's Letters to Philalethes, by the Rev. Samuel Spring, D. D. require a little attention. The edition from which we quote was printed at Newburyport, in 1789. Dr. Spring tells us that man's *intellectual exercises are no more depraved than his finger nails; for, they are not of a moral kind.* Exercises of reason, judgment and conscience, he says are not *moral exercises.* p. 9.

“Mere desires to enjoy pleasure and to escape misery are natural exercises, and not moral.” “Natural gratitude, sympathy and natural affection,—are not of the moral kind,” p. 10. “That sin consists in self-love it is evident from this consideration, that it is impossible for it to consist in any thing else. Sin, every one grants, whatever be the nature of it, is inseparable from volition. It is a wrong choice or volition.” “Sin is nothing but self-love in some shape or other; for it cannot possibly be any thing else. That all sin consists in self-love, it is evident from this consideration, that self-love is the only exercise which is opposed to disinterested love. As disinterested love, therefore, is holiness, self-love is sin.” p. 16, 17. “It is impossible to prove that sin is not a volition: and it is equally impossible to prove that there are any volitions which are neither selfish nor benevolent.” p. 39. “The term motive denotes not only an object of choice, but it denotes the choice of an object.” p. 51. “These are the two senses in which the term motive is frequently used, by those who write and speak with propriety. And, if the word be used properly in a third sense, I wish to see it pointed out and exemplified. Motives are objective and subjective.” “In one word, motive sometimes means the object of volition, and sometimes the volition itself. p. 52.—What is a moral action? A moral action is the exercise of the will, or heart of man. For the heart of man is the only source of moral exercise.” “In other words, a moral action is the volition of a moral agent: and not any animal, intellectual, visible, or external motion.” p. 54.” “Moral actions and motives are the same thing.” “For there is no difference between moral actions and motives.” p. 55.

In the foregoing extracts we have the following doctrines:—That *the heart* and *the will* of a man are the same thing:—that every operation of the heart is a volition:—that *love* as well as *choice* is a *volition*:—that a *motive* is an act of the will, or a volition:—and that nothing in man is either morally good, or morally evil,

but acts of volition. It is needless, after all we have formerly written concerning the heart, the will, and motives, to expose the inaccuracy of Dr. Spring. His attempt to simplify mental science, by reducing every mental act of a moral nature to a volition, produces nothing but confusion. He is the only writer we have ever read, that ever called a volition a motive. A motive to volition cannot be the volition itself, unless a thing can exist before it exists. If we take his term *volitions*, however, to denote not only volitions, properly so called, but also all of our affections and passions, it will not be true, that nothing is either morally good or morally evil, but "exercises of the will," or the "volitions" of man. We refer for the proof of our assertion to the word of God. "The *thoughts* of the righteous are right," says the author of the Book of *Proverbs*. xii. 5. Now *thoughts* are distinguished in the Bible from *volitions* and *feelings*. If some *thoughts* are right, in a scriptural sense, they must be morally right; they must be holy. Yet Dr. Spring says, nothing is morally good or evil, but "the *volition* of a moral agent." A *thought* is an *intellectual operation* of a moral agent, and the Bible tells us, that thoughts are good or bad, holy or sinful; but Dr. Spring insists upon it, that no intellectual operation of a moral agent can be either holy or sinful any more than a man's "finger nails." This is Hopkinsianism.

"The *thoughts* of the wicked are an abomination to the Lord." *Proverbs* xv. 26. Such *thoughts*, as well as such *volitions*, *affections*, and *passions* as the law of God requires, are morally good; while any mental operation that is forbidden by the law of God is morally evil. This is a doctrine of Calvinism.

Dr. Spring, to be consistent, would no doubt say, that thoughts are volitions. In short, all mental operations are volitions, according to his theory; for it is as easy to show, that perceiving, understanding, reasoning, judging, memory, consciousness, and conscience, are volitions, as that love, hatred, fear, hope, desire, and disgust, are acts of choosing. But the Hopkinsians are the metaphysicians! No doubt of it! For they assert that they are metaphysicians; and how can they, in profound disinterestedness, misjudge concerning their own talents and acquisitions?

ARTICLE V.—1. *Christian Baptism. A Sermon, preached in the Lal Bazar Chapel, Calcutta, on Lord's Day, Sept. 27, 1812. By Adoniram Judson, A. M.* Reprinted in Boston 1817. pp. 71. 8vo.—
2. *A Treatise on the Mode and Subjects of Christian Baptism. In Two Parts. Designed as a Reply to the Statements and Reasonings of the Rev. Adoniram Judson, Jun. as exhibited in his Sermon, &c. By Enoch Pond, Pastor of the Congregational Church in Ward, Mass. Worcester, 1818. pp. 104. 8vo.*

MR. JUDSON informs his readers, that he “was, by education and profession, a pædobaptist. In the spring of 1812 he was sent by the *American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* to India. On his passage thither “he began to doubt the truth of his former sentiments. After his arrival in” India, “and before he communicated the exercises of his mind to any of the Baptist denomination, he became convinced, that the immersion of a professing believer, into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is the only Christian Baptism.” To exhibit “the reasons of his present belief,” and particularly to furnish “his distant friends in America with a more full and satisfactory statement of the reasons of his change, than could be made in private communications,” Mr. Judson has published the sermon before us. In it he enquires, “*What is baptism? and To whom is baptism to be administered?*”

We have Mr. Judson's authority for it, that the Greek words βαπτω and βαπτίζω always signify a complete immersion; that there are no instances in the New Testament that require any different interpretation of these words; that “the circumstances attending the instances of baptism, recorded in the New Testament, plainly indicate immersion;” for “John baptised *in the river Jordan*, and in Enon, because there was much water there:” “that the idea of immersion is the only one, which will suit all the various connexions, in which the word is used in the New Testament;” that βαπτίζω must mean nothing but immersion, because the Greek church *immerses* in baptism; and that “the whole christian world, for the space of thirteen hundred years, practised immersion, as the only valid baptism.” To confirm his own high authority

Mr. Judson quotes from *Mr. Booth's Pædobaptism Examined*, his many learned quotations, to show that Pædobaptists in all ages have admitted immersion to be baptism. And thus he proves, to his own satisfaction, that baptism is immersion, and can be nothing but immersion.

Now, then, for the second *Inquiry!* To whom is baptism to be administered? Why, to believers, who profess faith; because the commandment of Christ on which *Christian* baptism is founded requires that we should "teach all nations, baptizing them." The Apostles were required, he says, by teaching to "make disciples, from among all nations, and then baptize them." For infant baptism, he says, we have neither command nor apostolical example in the New Testament; for he sees no reason to think there were any young children in the *households* of Lydia, Stephanas, and the jailer.

Thus we have analyzed the twenty-five first pages of Mr. Judson's sermon. The remaining forty-six pages are devoted to a refutation of the argument for infant baptism, from the nature of the Abrahamic covenant, and the *oneness* of the visible church of God in all ages of the world, since its first constitution. Of the nature of the Abrahamic covenant Mr. J. seems to have no just conceptions. The present church of Christ he thinks founded on *the covenant of grace*, which he, and most of our New England brethren, believe to be a covenant, between God and each individual believer, distinct from *the covenant of redemption*. This *covenant of grace*, Mr. J. informs us, is distinct from the covenant made with Abraham; while Mr. Pond insists, that they are substantially the same. Both Mr. J. and Mr. P. admit, however, that, by the covenant made with Abraham, all persons born of Jewish parents, and all proselytes with their families, were members of the church of God, from the circumcision of that patriarch, until Christ was offered a sacrifice. Mr. Pond correctly maintains, that the covenant made with Abraham is still in force, and is, strictly speaking, an *everlasting* covenant. Mr. Judson will have it, that *everlasting*, when predicated of the Abrahamic covenant, means, that the covenant shall last so long as the Hebrew nation shall possess the tempo-

ral Canaan. With all the Baptists, he now maintains, that the Christian church is founded on some other than the Abrahamic covenant, and is a new, a totally different visible church from that which was with Moses in the wilderness.

Neither of the authors under review appears to have any very clear notions of that covenant with Abraham, which is the charter of the visible church; and hence, their reasonings about it amount to but little. Mr. Judson confounds this *ecclesiastical covenant* with the one made *fourteen years before*, in which God gave the land of Israel to the father of the faithful and his natural descendants: and Mr. Pond does not discriminate between them. He considers *the covenant of circumcision* as a *national covenant*, and says, that, since the introduction of the gospel dispensation, "with regard to the Gentiles, the token of the covenant of circumcision has been forbidden;" whence he infers, "that the covenant is abolished." Yet Mr. Judson tells us, that God gave Abraham circumcision as a *seal, or token, of the righteousness of faith*, which righteousness of, or by faith, he had, before "God gave him the covenant of circumcision;" and that this same righteousness of faith is imputed to every believer, for his justification. Was circumcision a seal of that covenant, in which God promises to impute the righteousness of Christ to every believer for his justification? If it was, circumcision was a seal of *the covenant of redemption*, which we call *the covenant of grace*, between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, because in it God binds himself to bestow saving grace on certain persons, on condition of Christ's performing the work of redemption. If circumcision was a seal of the righteousness of faith, it must be a seal at the same time of that covenant of God by which righteousness is imputed to every believer, so that faith is reckoned to him for, or answers him all the purposes of, perfect righteousness. It is an external token, or symbol, that God, by covenant, accounts all believers to be perfectly righteous, through the righteousness of Christ, which is imputed to them. This covenant sealed by circumcision, this covenant of redemption, this only covenant of grace, by which the believer is saved, we hope in God, is not abrogated,

even if no external rite has come in place of circumcision, which ought no longer to be practised by Jews or Gentiles, except as a mere matter of indifference in itself, or of innocent expedience, under some peculiar circumstances. Of this same covenant, which secures to every believer a perfect righteousness through faith, we think baptism now a *seal*; and a *seal* is nothing but an external *token* of a covenant, appended to that covenant. It also denotes, that the persons who wear the seal belong to the visible church, under the Christian dispensation of the covenant of grace, or of redemption, which covenant secures saving grace. Circumcision *was* a seal, in like manner, of the covenant of redemption; and was a badge of membership in the visible church, during the Abrahamic, the Mosaic, the comparatively legal dispensation of the same everlasting covenant of life, peace, grace, and complete redemption for all the elect.

All admit, that there is but one covenant of redemption, according to which Jehovah dispenses his saving grace; and most persons, we think, will admit, that there have at different times been two seals of this one covenant, *circumcision* and *baptism*. But a controversy respects the persons who are to wear the last, and concerning the mode of affixing it to the proper subjects. None but believers, say the Baptists, should wear the seal of baptism, and it should be affixed to them by a perfect immersion. The Pædobaptists say, all male persons born of Jews, or under their care and control in their families, and all male proselytes to Judaism, with males of their households, received the seal of circumcision: and to this the Baptists assent. The Pædobaptists again assert, that all persons, whether male or female, born of members of the church, or belonging to their families and under their control, with all proselytes and their households, ought to be baptized: but the Baptists say, no person, whether born of a person in the church or out of it, ought to be baptized, unless he shall make a credible profession, that he actually believes on the Lord Jesus Christ, to the saving of his soul. Any solemn application of water to a proper subject, by a minister of Christ, acting under his commission, in the name of

the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, say the Pædobaptists, is Christian baptism.

No application of water, except a complete immersion into it, of a proper subject, and by a minister of Christ, acting under his commission, say the Baptists, is Christian baptism.

To illuminate our minds upon either of these subjects of dispute, neither Mr. Judson nor Mr. Pond has written any thing that is new. They have given many opinions from dictionaries, and fathers, and moderns; but after all, Protestants will allow nothing to be of binding authority upon this controversy but the Bible. We shall, therefore, trouble ourselves to quote none of their wise men; for we have the Bible as well as they, and every man must resort to this for his own personal satisfaction. What do we learn from the Bible about the church in the world, circumcision, baptism, the proper subjects of these rites, and the mode of administering them? These are the questions we should endeavour to answer; and every thing else may go for mere opinion of others, tradition, fable, or human history.

The only thing in, or about Mr. Judson's sermon which required Mr. Pond's answer, was the circumstance that Mr. Judson's change of sentiment would induce many people, of little sense, to judge, that since so wise and benevolent a missionary as he, found the doctrine of Pædobaptism incapable of being supported, it must be unscriptural. Mr. Pond's answer is well calculated to counteract this effect; for he more than insinuates, that Mr. Judson's reasons for changing his creed were not very benevolent.

Messrs. Newell and Judson, with their wives, sailed for India in the same ship, and arrived in Calcutta June 17, 1812. During his passage, when he began to doubt, he communicated none of his doubts to his companions. With them he entered into no discussions; no, not during a long voyage, which might have been enlivened, one would think, by friendly, Christian controversy. Verily, he despised the understanding of his brother Newell, or he *wished* to doubt; or he did not doubt. On the 8th of August, 1812, his companions, Messrs. Hall, Nott, and Rice, with the wife of Mr. Nott, arrived in Calcutta; but

before this arrival, "Messrs. Newell and Judson had been ordered away;" (shame on the *unchristian government* of the truly Christian people of Great Britain!) "and Mr. Newell with his wife had actually sailed for the Isle of France. He left Mr. Judson, say the prudential committee" of the *American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, "without any knowledge of his change." From June 17th, to August 8th, it seems, then, that Mr. J. kept his doubts to himself; and concealed them from his brother-missionary. "Four days after Mr. Newell's departure, the other brethren arrived at Calcutta. They were there in company with Mr. Judson, nearly three weeks, when, on the 27th of August, he left them to go to Serampore, for the purpose of *being immersed*. His brethren, even at this *last moment*, were totally 'unapprized of the object of his visit' to Serampore, 'and received their first intelligence on the subject, two days afterwards, from DR. MARSHMAN!!!!—We cannot forbear adding a word or two more. A letter was written, about twenty days after Mr. Judson's immersion, and signed by MR. RICE, wherein mention is made of what had happened, as a '*trying event*.' Yet within less than four weeks of the date of this letter, MR. RICE *had followed him!*" Those who have any knowledge of the Rev. Luther Rice, and of his subsequent *labours* and *thriving* in the missionary cause, will not wonder at this.

Were this all, we should have reason to congratulate our Baptist brethren on the acquisition of Messrs. Judson and Rice, two of the *young lights* from the seminary at Andover. But alas! Mr. J. having heard that his metamorphosis was imputed to certain equivocal motives, to say the least of them, writes to the REV. DR. BALDWIN, Pastor of the second Baptist Church in the town of Boston, a letter dated Rangoon, Dec. 23, 1815, which was inserted in the *Baptist Missionary Magazine*, vol. iv. p. 346, in which the unfortunate proselyte to Anabaptism says, "The American Board of Commissioners NEVER GAVE ME A REPRIMAND. In proof of this, *I can appeal to any of the members*. Furthermore, I NEVER HAD THE MOST DISTANT IDEA THAT THE BOARD THOUGHT ME DESERVING OF A REPRIMAND. When I left my native

land, it afforded me much comfort, that I came out under the patronage of *such men.*”

Now, unfortunately for Mr. J. if he is a bad man; and fortunately for his repentance, if he is a good man, that once in his life deliberately and awfully lied, Mr. Pond undertook to ascertain the truth on this subject. He wrote to the corresponding secretary of the board, the Rev. Samuel Worcester, D. D. of Salem, Mass. and the prudential committee of that Board, through their secretary, reply, officially, that

“In the beginning of the year 1811, Mr. Judson was sent by the prudential committee to England, for purposes distinctly specified in his instructions. In that mission, what he was instructed not to do, he did; and what he was instructed to do, he neglected. On his return, in July of the same year, he kept himself aloof from the prudential committee, made no regular report of his doings, and assumed the management of matters in his own way. At the meeting of the Board at Worcester, in the following September, his answers to questions, his conversation, and deportment, were in the same spirit and manner which had marked his previous proceedings. Great dissatisfaction was expressed by every member present; and it became a very serious question, whether Mr. Judson should not be dismissed. After deliberation, however, *it was resolved, that he should be in a formal and solemn manner admonished.* **THE ADMONITION WAS ACCORDINGLY ADMINISTERED IN PRESENCE OF THE BOARD.** Mr. Judson was much affected—appeared to yield to the admonition—made concessions and gave assurances—and was continued under the patronage of the Board. Yet after all this, and even after a passage had been engaged for him, with others, to India, in the February following, his deportment was such, that it again became a serious and most trying question with the prudential committee, whether he should be permitted to go. And it was not without great heaviness of heart, many fears, and particular but tender cautions, not to him only, but to the other missionaries respecting him, that he was finally sent out. The sequel is publicly known.”

After this disclosure, our respectable Baptist friends, surely, will not boast of the conversion of Mr. Judson; nor glory even in his best missionary labours, until he shall confess and forsake the sin of lying.

Of Mr. Pond's treatise it is but just to remark, that he has beaten his antagonist with his own weapons; for he has quoted as many learned authorities in favour of his views, as Mr. Judson has in opposition to them; and that too, without taking them from the hand of some previous scholar. Nevertheless we dissent from several of the doctrines of *the treatise*; and especially to this, "that God made *but one covenant* with Abraham." "His covenant transactions with this patriarch," says Mr. P. "are spoken of throughout the scriptures in the *singular number*."—"There is as much reason to suppose that God made *eight covenants* with Abraham, as that he made more than one." We admit that God appeared, at eight different times, to Abraham, and *addressed him in covenant language*, at each time; but still see no necessity for making out eight distinct covenants, or for asserting that there was but one. God promised Abraham, when seventy-five years old, that he would make of him a great nation, give his seed the land of Canaan, and bless in him all the families of the earth. This was one covenant, that continued without any addition, although it was renewed, until Abraham was ninety-nine years of age; when in addition to all that was promised before, Jehovah promised something else, *that he would be a God to him, and his seed after them in their generations, that should be circumcised*, so as thereby to make them his visible covenant people. He promised, moreover, that Sarah should have a son, and the children in the visible covenant should descend from her. These were distinct promises of distinct things, and were so many covenants; but when the same thing is promised, a hundred times over, it is but one and the same covenant.

ARTICLE VI.—*Review of Mr. West's Painting, descriptive of Christ healing in the Temple.*

THIS celebrated painting may be *viewed*, and *reviewed* with great delight, not only by persons skilled in the fine arts, but by all whose eyes are not weary with looking at

most interesting, and natural objects. It is a splendid present to the Pennsylvania Hospital, from the venerable artist, whom we are happy to know is a native of this state; and we should naturally expect the income of it would afford support to many of the children of disease and want. Few make such presents; few are able; and fewer still, were they able, would be willing.

The effect produced upon most minds by a sight of the picture, is solemn, pleasing, and deeply impressive. People gaze upon it, until their eyes ache, from long continued, intense vision; and hardly believe, that an hour has passed away like a few moments, while they have been employed in studying the features of the wonderful group. We cannot profess to be connoisseurs in matters of this nature; but this we may say, that we never saw any painting that might be compared with it, in our judgment, without unspeakable disadvantage.

It may be questioned, however, whether the ultimate influences of this picture on the truly Christian mind are not unfriendly to his best interests. Many have complained, that after seeing it, the figure designed to represent the body of Jesus has haunted them in their devotions. When they would think of Jesus, as he is in heaven, they have involuntarily been shorn of their wings of prayer, faith and love, and dropped down into the little temple in Spruce Street, to see how the Saviour looks as he came from West's hand. Their conceptions of Immanuel have thus been degraded, and their solemn intercourse with their exalted head interrupted. Indeed, every picture, designed to represent the Deity, whether acting as Father, Mediator, or Sanctifier, has a tendency to produce disagreeable associations, if not a species of vile idolatry.

If we may offer a *theological criticism* upon West's painting it is this, that his head of Jesus is the most defective part in his whole piece. The head of Judas is much better done. In short, we like every figure and face but his principal one. The sick, lame, blind, and insane appear natural as life. But the subject in which the greatest painter in the world has failed to meet the conceptions of Christians, is one to which no human pencil can do justice; unless that pencil were dipped in colours mingled by the

hand which formed the sun, the moon, the stars, the rainbow, and all the light of heaven; and were guided by the skill of uncreated wisdom. When Jesus Christ is painted; the Holy Ghost should be the only painter.

The head and features of his prominent figure are too small to represent a man of august intellectual faculties. They might do well enough for an amiable young lady, or a very tender youth, who has amability without greatness; but we cannot conceive that those features through which the Godhead shone were so little characteristic of any thing sublime. The eyes, through which Divinity looked on man, were mild, as West has painted them; but they were penetrating too, and indicated his omniscience. Instead of having a soft, fair face, the *man of sorrows*, in his humiliation, had a countenance *more marred than that of any man*. His features were perfect in themselves, but they were so changed in their expression and relation, that he looked like innocence, and truth, and might, and majesty, and dominion, under the curse of God.

Should any ask, what we could have wished the great artist had done?—we should answer, that he had never attempted to paint the face of Christ. He might have represented the Saviour as standing with his back to all spectators; and as facing the persons on the canvass whom he is both healing and instructing. Then we should have been left to conceive more than any one can paint, of the dignity, greatness, and compassion of Christ. It would have been natural for Jesus to have fixed his eyes on his auditors; but Mr. West has painted him as looking on nobody. What a painter cannot depict, he should contrive to make us imagine, when we look on his work. This is the great art in historical painting. When Jehovah Jesus caused all his goodness to pass before Moses, he put him into the clift of a rock, and covered him with his hand, while he passed by, saying, “thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen.”

The scene which Mr. West selected for his pencil on this occasion, is a peculiarly enchanting one. The contemplation of Christ teaching, and performing all manner of cures, is calculated to inspire us with faith, hope, and confidence in him. On this subject, a lady has favoured

us with a few lines in manuscript, composed by herself, on seeing the painting under review. As they have never been published, we shall give them entire.

On Christ's Healing the Sick.

WHEN law divine, in love was given.
 To link this earth with distant heaven;
 To shield from danger and disgrace
 The new created human race;
 Man by obedience might renew
 Allegiance to his Sov'reign due;
 And by a sweet experience find
 Duty and bliss for ever joined.
 While yet the first of men observed
 This holy law, nor from it swerved
 In wish, in thought, man fully blest,
 Last of his Maker's works, and best
 That all this goodly globe could boast,
 Firm stood:—he sinned, and all was lost.

God's image in this lower world
 Was then to swift destruction hurled;
 The living soul, by His own breath
 Inspired, became a prey to death,
 And learned the good from ill to know,
 By change of happiness for woe.
 No longer wise, nor just, nor pure,
 (The ruin sealed was sad as sure,)
 The heavenly mind was earthly grown,
 Which converse sweet with God had known:
 Sickness, disease, and wasting pain,
 A fearful, lingering, fatal train,
 Sin's products, and its likeness too,
 Must now arrest man's troubled view.

But no—with joy and wrapt surprise,
 List! to the music of the skies;
 "Glory to God! good-will to men!
 And peace descends on earth again!"

A scene of wonder now appears,
 To change to songs our sighs and tears:
 'Tis Love! in human form arrayed,
 To be a conquering victim made;—

The willing captive of the grave,
 The sons of Death from death to save!—
 Oh! depths surpassing all our thought,
 Of works by the Eternal wrought!

Behold! the sinless sufferer comes!
 The dreadful penalty assumes;
 Illustrates fair creation's plan,
 And shows forth Deity in man!

Here let us pause,—while we adore
 Those heights to which we cannot soar;
 Those heights and depths of matchless grace
 Which signalize our favoured race:
 Those myst'ries of God's sacred book,
 Which angels view with prying look;
 Which must evade all scrutiny,
 Till finite grasp infinity.
 Here with the mildest radiance shine
 Distinctive lineaments divine:
 Here let us fix our raptur'd gaze;
 Though all unsearchable his ways,
 So much God's glories are displayed,
 That all created splendours fade;
 All grandeur here compared is mean,
 Before this soul-transforming scene.

Oh! Source of wisdom! deign t' impart
 Thine influences to my heart,
 Else should I dare attempt to bring
 My feeble powers thy name to sing?
 But 'tis thy word dispels my fears,
 Which so benignly still declares,
 Whoever humbly *offers* praise,
 His mighty Maker glorifies.

As from the everlasting throne
 Of God, who is the Lord alone,
 Descended the Eternal Son,
 "I and my Sire," he said, "are One."
 Co-equal* with his Father, God,
 He left his high and bright abode;
 And, as if shorn of all his rays,
 This Sun in darkness hid his blaze;
 And made himself of no repute,
 And grew a rod of Jesse's root.

* Eph. ii. 6.

Creation owns his sov'reign sway,
 The seen and unseen worlds obey.
 Thus did the Sun of Justice rise,
 To chase the darkness from our eyes.

Great multitudes, who heard his fame,
 With all their sick, to Jesus came :
 They thronged around the Saviour sweet,
 And cast the wretched at his feet.
 His goodness, great and unconfined,
 Admitted all of every kind :
 His power, as infinite as free,
 Removed their every malady.
 He, who restored to sight the blind,
 Illumines the benighted mind ;
 He clears the films of vice away,
 And beams irradiating day.
 When ignorance obscures the soul,
 Disordered thoughts tumultuous roll,
 As stormy waves on waves are driven,
 To wage unequal war with heaven ;
 And Error's dire illusions glare
 Like meteors in the troubled air,
 That draw the wildered wanderer far
 From help or hope, when not a star
 Or sheds its influence through the gloom,
 To lead his weary footsteps home ;
 Or lends one glimmering, friendly ray
 To cheer or guide his doubtful way.
 'Tis by incarnate Truth alone
 The path of peace can e'er be known.
 He made blind souls by faith to see
 The light of immortality :
 And let us magnify his name,
 His grace is evermore the same ;
 The Sun of righteousness still brings
 Life, health, and healing in his wings.

Strength is from him, he is the Rock
 Who caused the lame and maimed to walk ;
 Like a young hart, or bounding roe,
 He made the lame exulting go ;
 He is the Rock, whence waters flow,
 That make the trees of Eden grow.
 Thus by his energies of grace,
 When helpless sinners seek his face,

(And ask with confidence the boon,)
 They are invigorated soon
 To walk with joy in all his ways,
 And show forth his victorious praise ;
 To march on with increasing strength,
 Till they arrive in Heaven at length.

'Twas he unstopped the deafened ear,
 The world of varying sounds to hear ;
 From storms that rend the largest trees,
 To softest whispers of the breeze ;
 The melting tones of human love,
 The warbling music of the grove,
 And the far sweeter, nobler lays
 Of sacred, solemn, grateful praise.
 But, oh ! when first the deaf ears heard
 The glorious Redeemer's word !
 When first their long, long silence broke,
 As restoration Jesus spoke ;
 Of whom from Heaven on high, God said,
 " Hear Him ! and by his words be led !"
 How precious is the sense that's given
 To guide the weary soul to Heaven !
 So, when the sinner's conscience sealed,
 Cannot to strong conviction yield,
 Or list to wisdom's charming voice,
 That calls the mourners to rejoice ;
 By rooted prejudice is clos'd,
 And e'en to evidence oppos'd,
 He opes the intellectual ear,
 Instruction's blest reproofs to hear.

'Twas he the stammering tongue untied,
 To prove sweet speech before denied ;
 He made the dumb with joy to sing,
 And to his power their tribute bring :
 He makes dumb souls to speak in prayer,
 (For souls are his peculiar care,)
 And when the poor unto him cry,
 Their humble suit he'll not deny.
 Oft, when the faculty misused,
 The gift of speech, was thus abused,
 He, from a renovated heart,
 Caused them wise counsels to impart.
 When conscious guilt the lips had closed,
 His pardoning mercy interposed ;

Opened their mouths to speak God's praise,
And sing in consecrated lays.

The outcast lepers of the land
Were cleans'd by his renewing hand;
The leprosy of sin he cures,
And purity of soul ensures.
The palsied, lunatic, possessed,
And many others, Jesus blessed,
Their various maladies he healed,
Their woes removed, their pardon sealed.

Those who a mental cure desire,
In seeking him should never tire;
Though his delays our faith may prove,
He still will pity, still will love.

'Tis but our sorrows to express,
To One who e'er delights to bless,
To spread our wants before his face,
And crave the teachings of his grace ;—
Referring to his sovereign will
How to remove our every ill,
Who best, of all things will dispose,
And how to govern wisely knows :—
'Tis but to throw us at his feet,
To be directed as is meet ;—
Be ruled and ordered as he please,
Prefer our safety to our ease ;—
Submit our case to him alone,
That he may take us for his own,—
And he our every foe will quell,
“ Our Jesus will do all things well.”
He'll not inflict one needless pain,
But every loss will make our gain,
None shall in vain in him confide,
But find the Lord is on their side.

The multitudes whom he restored,
The God of Israel adored :—
Let us exalt his glorious name,
When he performs for us the same.
If we, by grace, have been preserved
From ills unnumbered, but deserved,
With which those Israelites were tried,
Who their Deliverer glorified ;

Have we not equal cause to bless
His love, and gratitude express?
Should we not our thanksgivings yield,
As if, like them, we had been healed?

As they, who saw those wonders done,
Worshipped the great and lofty One;
(Who manifested forth his power
That all Messiah might adore;)
So we his goodness should confess
In saving others from distress;
And know that Israel's God alone,
Such works of mercy could have shown.

The lepers cleansed, the sick he healed,
The waves he trod, the storms he stilled,
The demons quelled, the dead he raised,
In Christ, the God of Israel praised.

But would we further know his worth?
The darkened sun—the rocking earth—
The rending veil—the *rising* dead—
That *he was* God of Israel said—
When he for sins, but not his own,
Did everlastingly atone—
When, "It is finished," Jesus cried,
And bowed his holy head, and died.

Miss Livingston.

May Christ heal the spiritual maladies of every one of our readers; and then, after death, they will see him as he is, and be like him in heaven.

ARTICLE VIII.—*The Character and Success of Barnabas; or the connexion between eminent piety and distinguished usefulness: a Sermon preached on Acts xi. 24. By Thomas Durant. London, 1818. pp. 48. 8vo.*

BARNABAS was a good man, and full of the Holy Ghost, and of faith; and much people was added unto the Lord. He was eminently pious, and distinguished by his usefulness in the ministry of reconciliation. From the character and success of Barnabas, Mr. D. infers this ge-

neral doctrine, *That where there are equal powers and advantages, the greatest success will attend the labours of that minister of the gospel who is most pious.* Or, the success of a gospel minister will be as the compound ratio of his powers, advantages, and piety. Let the talents and advantages of A. and K. severally be as ten; let the piety of A. equal ten, and the piety of K. equal an hundred degrees; and then the success of A. will bear the same proportion to the success of K. as one hundred to one thousand. K. will be tenfold more useful, in winning souls to Christ, and in edifying the saints, than A. This is an encouraging doctrine for zealous, humble, indefatigable heralds of the cross, and although Divine Sovereignty may introduce a few exceptions, yet as a general rule we verily believe it is true. Our author thinks this established connexion between piety and usefulness in the ministerial office, may be accounted for on two general principles; 1st, That God adapts means to the ends which he designs to accomplish; and 2dly, That God will honour those most who honour him most. He illustrates these general truths in the following manner.

Other things being equal, *superior piety will give a warmer glow and richer unction to a man's preaching;*—will dispose and enable him more clearly to conceive, and steadily to present those truths which are of most essential importance;—will induce him to labour more abundantly in his holy calling;—will present a more practical illustration and confirmation of his doctrine;—will enable him to state the truth with greater confidence;—and will incline him to study more an adaptation of his discourses to the circumstances of his hearers;—and so will be an instrument better suited to the work of convincing, converting, and edifying his hearers, than a teacher of an inferior religious character. Under the head of adaptation of discourses, he has subjoined the following striking remarks:

“The celebrated author of ‘Political Justice,’ [Godwin,] it is well known, was educated for the ministry among dissenters. It is needless to say, that he has long ago totally abandoned the profession of Christianity: but while, in the exercise of his ministry, he made a short stay at what Mr. Wilberforce has facetiously termed, ‘The half way house to infidelity,’ he made

an exchange for a sabbath with a most revered friend of the author. His text was, 'Jesus said unto her, *Mary*. She turned herself, and saith unto him, *Rabboni*.' His subject was '*The sententious and expressive style of Scripture*.' A pretty subject, truly, for a discourse to a congregation, the chief part of whom were weavers and peasants! As a purely literary subject, it might have done very well for a chapter in Blair's Rhetoric; and, in passing, a man of refinement and taste might in a sermon have glanced at the thought, as among the literary and minor glories of revelation; but, while souls were perishing through ignorance of principles, or neglect of duty, it was criminal not to direct an attention to the heart in language and in a manner adapted to the capacities of their understandings. Christianity can well dispense with such triflers, and must deprecate their avowed friendship rather than their hostility."

The second general principle he confirms by showing, that the most pious minister will be most honoured, by a blessing bestowed on his labours, in answer to his more fervent prayers for success; and as a manifestation of the Divine approbation of his *humble, sterling piety and goodness*.

The subject is surely calculated to "supply ministers of the gospel with a strong subsidiary motive to be eminent in religion;" and to 'teach hearers that they have "personal reasons, of highest importance, for praying and studying that their ministers be eminently holy."

May every minister of Jesus Christ be a Barnabas!

ARTICLE IX.—*Stewart's History of Philosophy, Dissertation First; exhibiting a General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy, since the Revival of Letters in Europe.* Boston: Republished by Wells and Lilly, 1817. pp. 260. 8vo.

WE took occasion, in the *Analectic Magazine* for February, 1817, to express our opinion of Woodward's Classification of the Sciences, and to suggest what we deemed an improvement of his plan. Since that time we have read much on the subject, without seeing cause to retract any praise or censure which was then expressed. Perhaps, however, the undertaking of Judge Woodward and the measure of success to which he attained, were

entitled to a higher encomium than we at that time judged it expedient to bestow. Few things injure a work of any merit more than indiscriminate, high-sounding, universal commendation; and few things do more discredit to any periodical publication, than censure without discretion, and a contemptuous condemnation of a writer, whom the public must believe the critic has never read, or else has not ability to understand. "We have had books of much more lofty pretensions than these," says Mr. Robert Walsh, Junr. in his introduction to *The American Register*, when speaking of three discourses of the Hon. De Witt Clinton, &c. "but of little real achievement; for instance, the vain-glorious rhapsodies of Mr. Ogilvie, under the abused title of Philosophical Essays, and the portentous 'System of Universal Science' of Mr. Woodward—an undertaking greatly above the acquirements and opportunities of the author, as must be evident, upon the face of his volume, to every scholar. The Germans, the proper heroes for such an enterprize, have done all for the classification of human science, that could well be compassed or desired, in its imperfect state; and the American who may be disposed to emulate their labours, might wait at least until we are fairly involved in the labyrinth, before assaying to provide us with the clue. The truly erudite must smile when they find the author of this 'System of Universal Science' declaring,—and with him the reverend gentlemen of Philadelphia, who have so lustily puffed his attempt, and whose kindness he has duly reciprocated in the body of his book—that it will pay, or lighten the heavy debt of gratitude which the western owes to the eastern hemisphere, on the score of science! It is this kind of empiricism on the one hand, and presumption on the other, which arrests our solid advancement, perverts our relish, and degrades us from our true level in the eyes of Europe." *Vol. i. p. 27.*

Would not any candid reader conclude, from this rhapsody, that the highly respectable Editor of the Register deems a classification of the sciences not even a desideratum; that he thinks the Germans have already accomplished as much in the work of systematically arranging the departments of human knowledge as it is possible, or

even desirable, that any one should, in the present imperfect state of science ; that the sciences constitute a labyrinth into which, in preference to a regularly constructed temple, the Americans ought to desire an introduction ; that Judge Woodward has achieved little ; that he has been presumptuous in attempting to do,—what the Germans have already done ; and that he deserves ridicule and contempt for making an effort to accomplish an undertaking greatly above his acquirements and opportunities ? We have hitherto imagined, that to attempt great things is commendable ; have admired the motto “ Nil desperandum ; ” and have been induced to believe, that from the person who essays nothing, is nothing to be expected. But hear Mr. Walsh again, when he speaks, not of an American, (for what can any American do ?) but of “ A General View of the Progress of Mathematical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy, since the Revival of Letters in Europe,” by Dugald Stewart, Esq. F. R. S.

“ What does this great authority say on the subject of *Systems of Universal Science* ? After speaking of Bacon’s classification, he proceeds thus : ‘ Nor must it be forgotten to the glory of his genius, that what he failed to accomplish remains to this day a desideratum in science ;—that the united talents of D’Alembert and Diderot, aided by all the lights of the eighteenth century, have been able to add but little to what Bacon performed. After what I have said, it will not be expected that an attempt is to be made, in this essay, to solve a problem which has so recently baffled the powers of these eminent writers, and which will probably long continue to exercise the ingenuity of our successors. How much remains to be previously done for the improvement of that part of logic, whose province it is to fix the limits by which contiguous departments of study are defined and separated ! And how many unsuspected affinities may be reasonably presumed to exist among sciences, which, to our circumscribed views, appear at present the most alien from each other ! The abstract geometry of Appollonius and Archimedes was found, after an interval of two thousand years, to furnish a torch to the physical enquiries of Newton ; while in the farther progress of knowledge, the etymology of languages has been happily employed to fill up the chasms of ancient history ; and the conclusions of comparative anatomy, to illustrate the theory of the earth. The strictures which I am about to make on the classification of the sciences proposed by N

‘Locke, will afford an additional proof of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, in the actual state of logical science, of solving this great problem, in a manner calculated to unite the general suffrages of philosophers.’” *American Register*, Vol. i. p. 29, and Stewart's Dissertation, p. 20, 21.

“What does this great authority say?” Why! he says, that in quoting him with approbation on this subject, Mr. Walsh has contradicted his own assertions on a previous page: he says, that after all which Bacon, Locke, D'Alembert, and the German heroes too, have done, that a correct classification of the sciences “remains to this day a desideratum.” He says, that this desideratum is a work of such magnitude and difficulty as to have baffled the powers of the most eminent writers; and he intimates, that it will redound to the glory of any person's genius to be able to make any considerable addition “to what Bacon performed.” The Register intimates that a better classification of human science than already exists among the Germans, could not well be “compassed or desired.” Stewart has reviewed the works of the Germans, and he says, that a classification considerably better than that of Bacon has not been invented, and is still to be desired. He thinks the science of logic must be much improved before such a classification of the sciences *can possibly be made, as will unite the general suffrages of the philosophers*; but he does not insinuate, that even in the present state of science every attempt to give a more excellent classification than that of Bacon is ridiculous and presumptuous. When “this great authority” shall peruse the Introduction to a System of Universal Science, he will say, because he has some pretensions to greatness, what many seem afraid to say, before some transatlantic author had said it before them, that Mr. Woodward's classification and nomenclature are proof of genius and research; and that our eccentric judge has accomplished more, in the work of classifying the different sciences, than all writers, except one, that were before him. It would be expecting too much, were we to anticipate an acknowledgment from Mr. Stewart, that the work which he himself attempted to perform in the dissertation before us, Judge Woodward has performed in a much more perfect manner.

ARTICLE X.—*A Sermon, preached before the General Synod of the Reformed Dutch Church, in the Dutch Church in Garden Street, New York, on the evening of the 6th of June, 1816, by Cornelius Cuyler, A. M. Pastor of the Reformed Dutch Church at Poughkeepsie.* 1816. pp. 48.

THIS discourse is founded on 1 Cor. vii. 14. *For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy.* "The principal object" of the writer, "is to answer this question: *Whose children are entitled to baptism?*" "The answer furnished in our text," he says, "is this; *those and only those, one or both of whose parents are real believers.* The reality of their faith gives the title *before the Lord*; the credible profession of it *before the church.*

1. The truth of this proposition I shall establish by arguments drawn from the word of God.

2. Show that the standards of this church admit and enforce it.

3. Answer the objections which are brought against it." Every distribution of the parts of a discourse should be made by one perfect sentence, or by as many perfect sentences as there are divisions of the subject. "A sentence, or period," says Dr. Blair on Rhetoric, "always implies some one complete proposition, or enunciation of thought." Aristotle defines a sentence to be, "a form of speech which hath a beginning and an end within itself, and is of such a length as to be easily comprehended at once." Mr. C.'s first sentence in the distribution of his matter is perfect; but it does not appear which of the propositions immediately preceding, is intended by this proposition. Is it the proposition, that *those children, and only those, are entitled to baptism, one or both of whose parents are real believers?* Or is it the proposition, that the reality of their faith gives the title before the Lord? Or is it this, that the credible profession of faith gives a title before the church?

The second and third sentences of the distribution are imperfect, because they have not a beginning within themselves, unless we understand the words *I shall*, before *show*,

and *answer*. We offer these remarks because many excellent modern sermons are very faulty in the language of their divisions. We presume that Mr. C. intended to say, "In the Lord's sight those children, and only those, one at least of whose parents is a real believer; and in the judgment of the church, those children, and those only, one at least of whose parents makes a credible profession of saving faith, are entitled to baptism. The truth of this proposition I shall, 1st, Evince by arguments drawn from the word of God: 2dly, Prove it to be admitted and enforced by the standards of this church: and 3dly, Defend it against objections." This is what Mr. C. actually endeavours to perform. His first scriptural argument in support of his complex proposition is framed in this manner: circumcision was a seal of the righteousness of faith which Abraham had; baptism is of the same nature with circumcision, and has come in the place of it; therefore baptism ought always to be the seal of the righteousness of faith which one of the parents has, who offers to God a child in baptism. If the circumcision of Isaac was a sign that Abraham had a righteous faith, or such a faith as God required of him, this argument will be conclusive, with all who admit "the identity of circumcision and baptism." But we think our author has misunderstood the apostle to the Romans, who asserts, that circumcision was a seal of that righteousness which is imputed to a sinner for his justification, even that righteousness which Christ covenanted to render in behalf of his people, and which the Father covenanted to accept and reward in the salvation of all believers. It is called *the righteousness of faith*, because a sinner receives it by faith; just as we are said to be justified by *the faith of Christ*, which intends the faith of which he is the author. We cannot yet agree with Macknight on the passage, (Romans iv. 11.) "that like circumcision," baptism "may be administered to infants, to assure the parents that their future faith shall be counted and rewarded as righteousness." Mr. C. has well said in a subsequent part of the discourse, that baptism is a divinely appointed seal of the covenant of grace; and if this is true, it cannot be a seal of any individual's faith; nor was circumcision any more the seal of Abraham's faith than it

was of the faith of Sarah, Hagar, Ishmael, and Isaac. It was a sign, by which God certified to Abraham and his family, and to all who saw it administered, the truth of the covenant of redemption. It was a sign, by which God confirmed his own gracious purposes concerning the redemption, sanctification, and salvation of his people. Abraham "*received the sign of circumcision,*" which sign was "*a seal of the righteousness of faith;*" which RIGHTEOUSNESS he had, it being received through the operation of faith, while he was *in circumcision*; and this external rite was given to him, who was a believer before, *that he might be the father, in a visible church relation, of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised,* as the christian converts to the visible church are not, *that righteousness might be imputed to them also.*

The christian rite of baptism bears the same relation to the covenant of redemption in which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, stipulate for the salvation of the elect, as a seal or a signature bears to a written agreement. It signifies to all, who are made acquainted with the terms of the covenant, the fact, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have established the counsel of peace, through which all that were given to Christ shall in due time be completely purified and glorified. Baptism is a symbolical mode of proclaiming the covenant of life; of exhibiting the righteousness required, and rendered, for our justification, and of reminding believers of HIS faithfulness and justice, who will forgive the sins of the redeemed, and cleanse them from all unrighteousness.

The question then arises, who shall wear this seal of the covenant of redemption? Shall those who make a credible profession of such faith as Abraham possessed, by which he apprehended Christ's righteousness for justification? Shall the children of parents who make such a profession? Shall the servants of those heads of families who make such a profession of faith? We think the word of God answers, they shall; for any adult who makes a credible profession of saving faith is to come into that visible church which was set up in Abraham, and, by the appointment of God, is to bring in with him his children, and all his domestics, that are under his care

and control. Has God, in constituting his visible church, given any other persons a place in it? We answer, that by the same principle which introduces children, from the world, with their parents, into the visible church, the children which are born of persons already within the pale are acknowledged members. They were thus acknowledged from the days of Abraham to Christ, and none has ever shown that the new dispensation of the seals and means of grace has excluded them. All then, who by birth belong to the visible kingdom of God, are to be baptized, even as you would mark a lamb of your flock, because it is allowedly your property. But it will be demanded, who are already members of the visible church? We answer, all those persons who have been baptized, and have not been suspended, or excommunicated, according to the regulations of the Great Head of the church.

The second argument by which Mr. C. would prove the truth of his fundamental proposition "is derived from the *nature of the ordinance*;" of which we have already expressed our opinion.

The third argument is derived from *the confessions and promises which are connected with the administration of the ordinance.*" Here the author begins to shine forth to better advantage than in the former parts of his discourse.

Mr. C. derives a fourth argument in favour of his proposition, that no child but that which has at least one believing parent, is entitled to baptism from that difficult passage of scripture, recorded in 1 Peter iii. 21. "The like figure whereunto *even* baptism doth also now save us, (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God,) by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." "The apostle here plainly intimates," in his opinion, "that baptism, in order to be properly and profitably administered, must be connected with the answer of a good conscience."

We concur with Macknight in reading and explaining the passage. "Eight souls were effectually saved by water. To which *water* the antitype baptism, (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good

conscience towards God,) now saveth us also, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ." "Here a twofold baptism is spoken of; the one consisting in *the putting away the filth of the flesh* by washing; the other *in the answer of a conscience*. This latter, the apostle tells us, is the baptism which is the antitype of the deluge." "This answer of a good conscience being made to God, is an inward answer, and means the baptized person's sincere persuasion of the things, which, by submitting to [an external] baptism, he professes to believe: namely, that Jesus, in whose name baptism is administered, arose from the dead, and that at the last day he will raise all from the dead to eternal life who sincerely obey him."* As Noah and his family were saved by the waters of the deluge which supported the ark, so are all believers saved from eternal destruction by that baptism of the Spirit, by that washing of regeneration, which rectifies and quickens the conscience, and disposes it to answer in faith the calling of God from on high. Of this internal baptism by regeneration, the washing away of the filth of the flesh is but an emblem, a type, or figure. Although this passage does not prove that for which Mr. C. cited it, yet we agree with him in his solemn and weighty exhortations to sincerity in all professions and religious transactions. To a person who is himself baptized, and who offers a child in baptism, without being the subject of God's act of regeneration, we must say, God is *your* God only in a visible church relation, and not yours by any actual union and communion. Should you live and die in your present state, all the baptisms which you have received for your children, or have witnessed in the church, will profit you nothing, even should they be blessed, as they may be, to the saving health of your children, and the conviction and conversion of other spectators.

Jehovah may have authorized the ministers of Christ to baptize your offspring with that external baptism, to which by his own constitution of the church they are entitled as visible members, and yet may have purposed to punish you for the want of faith and love in your compliance with that external ordinance, which he enjoined upon you.

* See Macknight on 1 Pet. iv. 21.

Mr. C.'s last argument is *founded on the uses of baptism*. It is the design of this ordinance, among other things, he says, "*to distinguish believers and their seed, from unbelievers and their seed—As a token of the Divine favour to believers and their seed—and, To secure the Christian education of the children of believers.*"

Under THE SECOND GENERAL HEAD of discourse, the writer clearly proves, that the standards of the Reformed Dutch Church require all persons who offer children in baptism to make a credible profession of faith in Jesus Christ, and appropriate to them such terms as imply at least a hope that their profession will be found to have been sincere.

THE THIRD PART of his discourse, in which he answers several objections to the system which he espouses, contains most important matter, and exhibits, at the same time, a fair specimen of the writer's zeal and talents.

On the whole, it appears evident to us, that all baptized persons, so soon as they can make a credible profession of faith, or give evidence of their having knowledge to discern the Lord's body, and faith to feed on him, are entitled to participate in all the ordinances of God's house. When they make such a profession of faith to the officers of a church, the ministers of Christ have no authority to deprive them of any Christian ordinance, until for some wilful omission of duty, or positive transgression, they have been disciplined for a reasonable time, and judicially suspended or excommunicated. That a man may deserve the censure of the church, and become a fit subject for excommunication, is manifest; but to the doctrine that a man ecclesiastically and judicially disciplines and suspends himself we can never subscribe.

When the omission of duty, and the violation of obligation in relation to the Lord's Supper, furnish a sufficient ground of suspension from any privilege which is desired, the Session, or Consistory, or pastor, if he be the only elder and ruler in the church, must decide. The author of this sermon was evidently made for a solemn herald of acknowledged facts, and for exhortation, rather than criticism and controversy; but with his manly candour and frankness in expressing his opinions, every man who has

ability to appreciate these virtues will be pleased. The divine who wishes to be a Christian disciplinarian will thank him for his researches into the constitution and government of the visible body of Christ before the incarnation; and all may find in his sermon powerful motives presented to induce them to be thorough, consistent, and sincere professors of faith in our Righteousness, Strength, and Salvation.

ARTICLE XI.—*Memoirs of the Life of Miss Caroline E. Smelt, who died on the 21st September, 1817, in the city of Augusta, Georgia, in the 17th year of her age: compiled from authentic papers furnished by her friends, and published at their request. By Moses Waddel, D.D. &c. Second Edition. New York: 1819, pp. 180. 18mo.*

WHILE yet a little child, the subject of these memoirs evinced uncommon tenderness, and delicate sensibility. She was only three years of age, when the tale of woe melted her, and she determined to bring a poor little ragged girl home, that she might give her a part of her shoes and frocks, and a place in her bed. Her mother was pious, and delighted to cultivate the susceptible heart of her only daughter. When between five and six years old, the beautiful little Caroline told her mother, that she would rather be *poor* and *afflicted*, if she could only be *good*; than be *rich* and *fine*, but a vain, proud, undutiful child. She was early attentive to her catechism, and seemed to have an understanding of it, which was not to have been expected. About the period just named, her mother asked her, if she understood the meaning of that command which requires us *to love our neighbour as ourselves*. She replied with great modesty, "I believe I do. You know," said she, "when my dear old grandmamma comes to see us, she always brings some little token of her remembrance to cousin Cornelia and myself; and she always says, 'Come here, my little Caroline, take this, and divide it with Cornelia.' She gives it to me first, because she says I am *your only little pet*. Well, I take it, (perhaps it is only a biscuit, perhaps only a single apple,) and I divide it, taking care always to give cousin

the biggest part. Now, is not this loving my neighbour as myself?" p. 20. At six years of age, "it was thought expedient to take her to a dancing school." The child felt a disgust that she never could conquer. She desired that her mother would never send her to that school again, for, said she, "I can *hop* and *jump* about enough at home, without going to that school to learn." Strange to tell, Caroline was permitted to absent herself only for a few years, and at ten was compelled to learn polite accomplishments from a fiddler. It was strange, she said, "that any thing so *light* and trifling in its *nature*, should qualify her better for the society of rational beings." From a disposition to submit to her parents, however, she soon became an *elegant and graceful dancer*; and then requested leave to retire, before the expiration of the last quarter; but was constrained, notwithstanding she shed many tears of "repugnance to bestow so much time on a thing of which she never should be fond," to complete the prescribed course of dancing, with as much weariness as a hireling his task. Oh! if parents, and professing parents too, were half so persevering in their attempts to convey religious instruction to the mind, and to form virtuous habits of thinking, feeling, speaking, choosing, and acting, in their children, as to make them good dancers, they would in thousands of instances be blessed in the salvation of their offspring. Many parents labour much more to teach their children how to *bow* before men, than to bow before the Lord; and are more anxious that they should shine in the circles of fashion than in the realms of celestial glory. Let parents be warned and encouraged to pursue a better course by the *Memoirs of Caroline Elizabeth Smelt*. Her parents took her to see the *Augusta races*. She came away abhorring them, and would never attend again, on any such amusement. Her recreations were with birds, gardens, plants, flowers, paintings, chaste and solemn music, books, and intellectual friends.

"In her eighth year she was called to experience a most afflictive dispensation of Divine Providence, in the death of a darling little sister, who was three years younger than herself. She was greatly grieved, but displayed much resignation to the

will of God ; and directed her sympathy and affectionate condolence to the consolation of her afflicted mother. Mrs. Smelt had enjoyed but feeble health for several years, and her mind had been deeply exercised, in seeking to secure the best interests of her own soul. This bereavement laid her low in the valley of humiliation. She was visited by many pious friends and ministers of the gospel. When her mother was engaged in conversation with them, reading the Scriptures, or other religious works, little Caroline would give her whole attention to the subject, and she has since told her mother, that from *that period* she dated the first perceptible operations of divine grace upon her heart. For, said she, 'so clear was my comprehension of the plan of salvation through a Redeemer, that I understood it as well, and believed in it as firmly, at *eight years* of age, as I do now on my death-bed.' She also observed, 'that it had often been a matter of astonishment to her, even at that early period, that she should have had such clear conceptions of a subject which caused so much investigation and doubt in the minds of older persons.' She was always attentive to religious instruction, and at the age just mentioned, particularly so. Her mother never asked her to retire with her, for the purpose of private prayer, without finding her ready and immediately willing to attend, let her little engagements be what they might. She would bow on her little knees, with so much sweet humility, and so silently and patiently engage in this solemn duty, as to afford her affectionate mother the greatest delight, particularly when she could see her, at the close of duty, wiping the precious tears from her infantile cheeks." p. 24.

The subsequent parts of this narrative induce us to judge, that Caroline actually experienced, at the time referred to in the last extract, the commencement of a new, spiritual life in her soul, through the regenerating agency of the Holy Spirit. Neither she, nor her mother, nor the readers of her memoirs, however, in general, seem to have dated her conversion at this time. They are inclined to think, that she was regenerated during her last sickness, at a time when she asked and obtained a strong manifestation of the love of God. Regeneration is that act of God, which being performed, a sinner begins to live as a new creature in Christ. Before this act is performed by him, in whom we live, and move, and have our being as christians, the sinner cannot have any right mental operations of any description ; cannot think a

good thought, have a holy emotion, will from a spiritually good motive, or exert one pious energy of soul. His actions may be good for himself, his family, and friends, as natural men; but none of them are morally good, holy, or spiritual. *Every one that loveth God, his dear Son, his truth, his providence, his ordinances, his people, or any spiritually good thing, is born of God; and knoweth God.* Love cannot exist in any fallen man without being itself the evidence that the divine act of regeneration has been performed on that mind. We say the same of every mental operation that is peculiar to a child of God. By the fruits of regeneration, which are holy thoughts, emotions, volitions, and exertions in man, and by these alone can any person ascertain that regeneration has been performed by its author. We apply these remarks thus: if Caroline, in her eighth year, felt *submission* to the will of her Heavenly Father, *loved* pious people because they were pious, *loved* religious conversation; received with pleasure religious instruction; felt attachment to the duty of prayer; understood the way of salvation by Jesus Christ, and approved of it, so as to desire a personal deliverance from sin and hell, she was a christian indeed, that had been regenerated before she was the subject of these exercises of mind. Such knowledge, as the spirit alone gives, and gives in the commencement of the work of saving a sinner, is as much a result of regeneration, as hope, joy, love and peace; and he who *hath begun a good work* in the soul, will carry it on, until it is perfected, in the day of the Lord Jesus.

If Caroline was renovated at this early age, it might have been expected, that she would indicate her piety to a discriminating person; but that she would, while a babe in Christ, *think, speak, and act*, as Paul once did, *like a child*. In our apprehension, this appears to have been the case; and we may add, that she *put away childish things* much sooner than any youth could have done, without experiencing, not only the saving, but very extraordinary influences, of the Holy Ghost. Too much is very frequently expected of those who have just begun to have the thoughts, and experience the incipient energies of spiritual life, in an infant state. If as much, in proportion to their

years of grace, were demanded of older Christians, to establish their title to the Christian character, we fear that many would be struck from our list of believers, whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life.

At an age when other little girls are captivated with their dolls, Caroline "would take no pleasure in *wasting time* with those pieces of *painted wood*;" but "she was very *fond* of *living babes*; indeed, she *loved* them *dearly*, because our *blessed Saviour* had taken *such* in his arms and blessed them." p. 27. At the age of thirteen she was a woman in stature, tall and slender, but delicate in constitution. Her health was impaired by too close attention to her studies, and a journey to New York was found necessary. On her way thither, she spent a sabbath in a small town, in which she heard a sermon that seemed to stir the almost dormant principle of holy life within her. "I think it was an excellent one," she said, "and I am now very glad that I went. I do think if the preacher had continued a little longer, I might have *gotten religion*; for I never experienced such feelings in my life before." "She referred to the exercises of that evening on her death-bed; and said, that she had never lost their impression." p. 33. On her return home she pursued her studies with great assiduity; and fell into the snare of *ambition*. The devil, being unable, at this time, to seduce her by the gay amusements of the world, governed by folly and fashion, filled her with the desire of being considered as *learned*, and of being "distinguished for intellectual attainments." The love of literature, and the hope of literary celebrity, for a time, turned her heart aside from its Supreme Good. From this temptation, which is the more dangerous, because less obviously sinful than the dissipations of the children of pleasure, it pleased the Lord to deliver her soul. Then she yielded, occasionally against her conscience, to the fascinations of the vain and gay.

We pass over some of the best arguments, drawn from the feelings of the pious, which we have ever read, against *balls*, *theatres*, and *splendid tea-parties*; and many tender exhibitions of filial and christian feeling, in the subject of these Memoirs, to the scene of her last sickness and

death. On the 28th of August, 1817, she was affected with a species of *vertigo*, and from the fever which ensued, was destined never to recover. Her pious mother, deeply afflicted at the apprehension of losing her only child, was mainly anxious for the salvation of her soul. In the commencement of this sickness Caroline was greatly exercised in mind, especially with a half formed judgment, that in relation to herself *the harvest was past, and the summer ended*. It was difficult to inspire her with hope, or administer any comfort. Her mother, however, addressed to her the great and precious promises of the gospel, and they kept her from despair. "O that I could know," said she, "that I had passed through the new-birth." Now follows an interesting period of her sickness, and of her religious experience, which many deem the time of her passing from death to life.

"After some short time Caroline said, 'Let perfect silence be observed, and do you, my mother, engage with me in silent prayer to God for a manifestation of his acceptance of my immortal soul.' They then commenced their silent devotions; and in about half an hour afterwards Doctor Smelt entered the room—felt her pulse, and said, 'My dear Caroline, I have just been called upon to visit, in consultation, a sick lady in our neighbourhood. I will be absent only fifteen or twenty minutes. You must not be uneasy; for you have less fever than you had at this time yesterday; and I hope you will have a very comfortable night.' Her hands were still clasped, nor had she opened her eyes while he addressed her. Supposing her silence to be a mark of her disapprobation of his leaving her, for a few moments, her father said in a tone of affection, 'You do not wish me to go, Caroline?' She then spoke and said, 'O yes, go, papa, but do not stay longer than you can possibly help.' He then left the room, and she was still observed to continue her devotion."

(To be continued.)