

LECTURES
ON
HUMAN NATURE,

BY

Rev. SAMUEL DOAK, D. D.

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF STUDENTS AT COLLEGES, ACADE-
MIES, OR IN OTHER SCHOOLS, OR IN PRIVATE.

TO WHICH IS ADDED
AN ESSAY ON LIFE,

BY

REV. JOHN W. DOAK, D. D. & M. D.

Attention, aided by consciousness and common sense, at last,
must teach us what our own nature is.

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PREFACE.

This Epitome written by Rev. Samuel Doak, D. D., was used by him as a classic through the whole of his long course of instruction on the Philosophy of Human Nature. He recommended to his students the reading of Watts, Locke, Reid, Steward, Brown &c. as collateral books. With him it was a primary object to bring up his students to the investigation of all parts of the subject for themselves, by applying the testimony of consciousness and common sense regardless of what they had read.

The origin of this Epitome is this. Rev. William Graham, the founder of Washington College at Lexington, Virginia, delivered a course of extempore lectures on the Philosophy of Human Nature, while said Doak was one of his students. He took short notes on Mr. Graham's Lectures. While a student afterwards at Princeton, he heard Dr. Witherspoon lecture on the same and kindred subjects. When he had graduated at Princeton, he spent some time as an assistant of Dr. Smith at Hampden Sidney college where he read, as he had done at Princeton, much on the subject, written by many authors. But finding no regular coherent system furnished by any one, and that each aimed more at demolishing the systems of others than at establishing one of his own, he felt there was a *want*. When he came to Tennessee, organized Salem and some other churches and opened a classical school, he delivered several courses of extemporaneous lectures on the subject. In these lectures he was regardless of what had been said and written by others; he aimed at establishing a regular coherent system of his own, under the guidance of consciousness and common sense. Many of the features, and outlines of this system, no doubt, were suggested by the recollection of Mr. Graham's lectures. He wrote a

summary of his first course which he required his students to transcribe and study, and which, he from time to time, amended and improved. His lectures were never written; if they had been, they would have been too voluminous for general use. In this little book we have the sum and substance of the whole, expressed in the simple, concise and lucid style of the lecturer. While this Epitome exhibits the subject in such a manner as may call forth all the energies of the college student, it makes the subject at the same time so plain that it can hardly fail to be read and studied with much interest and profit by children in academies and common schools, and by individuals who would study it without an instructor.

The 22d lecture was written and is added by the publisher, because he thought that something more explicit on the subject of conscience than what was in the preceding lectures ought to be in a work of this kind. He has added a full set of questions to each lecture and to the Essay, (not because he approves the plan,) but because fashion requires them. They will be convenient for the teacher who is not master of the subject, and for children who cannot undergo the labor of investigating the subject for themselves.

No branch of science contributes more to the strengthening of all the faculties and the useful training of the mind than the philosophy of the mind itself, when the student can be prevailed on to think, and think for himself, and not depend on others to think for him: yet no real improvement of the faculties nor maturing of the mind will be attained when the memory alone is exercised in treasuring up answers to the questions in the language of the book.

THE PUBLISHER.

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LECTURE I—ON EDUCATION.

WHAT is the end of an Education? It is to train the mind to exercise its faculties properly. It is also to furnish the mind with truth and useful knowledge which will enable the student to pursue whatever business he may think proper in after life. Another end of an education is the knowledge of language, which enables a person to convey his ideas to others with ease, and to express his sentiments so as to be easily understood. But this last is not the most important end of an education, as it is only to answer a secondary purpose.

It may be asked here, what are the best means to acquire an education? To which I would answer diligence and application. Here I would observe that the student ought to be very careful to avoid the running into two extremes;—grasping at too much at once and being neglectful of his business. We are so constituted that we can neither take in much at once, nor acquire an education without diligence or application. We ought therefore, in pursuit of an education to observe a proper medium.

In our enquiries after truth, we should observe certain maxims, or general rules which may preserve us from error. We ought to enquire to what branch of science the subject belongs, and what evidence would afford the most suitable illustration or proof;—Whether the illustration or proof will depend on the testimony of our senses, or of consciousness, or of mathematical axioms, or philosophical principles. Truth, for want of applying the proper evidence, may be left in the dark. If I put my hand into the fire I immediately feel pain, but this feeling will not prove to me the fifth proposition in Euclid, nor that gold is yellow. If a philosopher tell me that a man on the moon is seven feet high, I would ask how he knows that—what evidence he can

produce to prove his assertion? If he would reply, 'I have seen him,' I would laugh at the whole as a fiction of his own brain, knowing that he had never gone to the moon to measure the fancied man, and that nothing short of actual measurement would be proper evidence in the case.

Questions on Lecture I.

What are the ends of an education? What are means for acquiring it? What extremes should be avoided? In our enquiries after truth, what should be observed? For want of what is truth often left in obscurity?

LECTURE II—ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.

Such is the constitution of our nature that we cannot take in many things at once, nor see far into nature at the first glance. We ought, therefore, to begin with those things which are most plain, and then proceed to those which appear at first view more intricate.

Before we proceed in any science we must take some things as granted, which are called first principles or axioms.

First principles cannot be proved: they are seen by immediate perception which surpasses all other proof whatever. Who does not perceive that two and two make four, or that a whole is greater than a part. If you prove first principles, you must prove them by something more plain, and you must prove that also by something still plainer than itself, and so on ad infinitum. But as these first principles cannot admit a doubt, their demonstration would not only be impossible but altogether needless. These first principles are the foundation of all reasoning, and without them there can be no reasoning. To become acquainted with human nature we must ourselves examine it, not depending on the hypotheses of Metaphysicians on the subject, but, directed by certain axioms or self evident truths established by

consciousness and common sense. We should enquire what is the nature, what is the constitution, and what is the capacity which God has given to man?

1. I lay it down as a first principle, that I *exist*.

All men in all ages have believed their own existence except a few cracked brain Metaphysicians. Were I asked how I know that I exist, I would not answer in the language of Descartes "cogito ergo sum," I think therefore I am, but that I know I exist, because I am conscious that I do exist. If any one would attempt to convince me that I do not exist, whilst I am conscious that I do, his attempt would be vain, because my belief is prior to and independent of all argumentation on the subject. The argument "cogito ergo sum" is manifestly defective, for we may with equal, if not greater propriety, invert the order and say—sum, ergo cogito, I am, therefore I think. This axiom then is founded on consciousness, which is the strongest possible testimony. It is therefore, unnecessary as well as useless to seek arguments for its establishment. I take it, therefore, as a dictate of consciousness and of common sense that I exist.

2dly. I lay down as a dictate of common sense that I *think*.

This also depends on the testimony of consciousness.

3dly. I lay it down as a dictate of common sense that *I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday, or at any other period of my life.*

It is true the body of man is subject to changes: It may be much wasted by sickness, and on the return of health, it may acquire a new recruit of matter, yet the person is the same. Some attempt to establish the identity of person by telling us that there are certain stamina vitæ or threads of life, which are born with us, which remain the same through childhood, manhood, old age, and from death to the resurrection, and are, therefore, say they, sufficient to establish identity. But we have no evidence, from our senses, nor from consciousness, nor from any other source, of the existence of these stamina

vitæ; nor can any one tell us where they reside. We have no reason for believing any such thing. All conjectures on this subject are equally vain and unsatisfactory. I am conscious that I *am* what I am to day, and I am conscious that I remember that I was ten years ago, or at any other period of my life, the *same person* that I *am now*, and this is sufficient for all the purposes of government human or divine. If a man has committed a crime twenty years ago, however his body may have changed, he is conscious that he is still the same man and sensible of his guilt, and that he is the one who deserves punishment for that crime. Hence we have an easy solution of the infidel question. How are the dead raised and with what bodies do they come forth? If God can make me conscious that I am the same in the morning when I rise, that I was when I lay down at night, he can make me conscious in the morning of the resurrection, that I am the same person that I was, while I lived on earth; and this is sufficient for all the purposes of moral government. Identity, then, is established by the most convincing of all testimony i. e. consciousness.

Questions on Lecture II.

What is the subject of this lecture? How should we proceed in our search after truth? How are first principles perceived? What is the foundation of all reasoning? Can they be proved? To be acquainted with human nature what is necessary? What is laid down as a first principle? How do you know that you exist? What is, secondly, laid down as a first principle? What thirdly? By what is identity of person established? By what is it not?

LECTURE III—ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.

4thly. I take it for granted that my senses are *true* and that the information they give me is to be depended on. The senses are five, Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting and Feeling. I see a man. From the constitution of my

nature I must believe that a man is there, and all the argument that can be invented cannot convince me that a man is not there, when I am conscious that I see him.

If I be asked why I believe my senses? I answer, I am so constituted by my creator that I cannot do otherwise. Some Metaphysicians have endeavored to prove that our senses are not to be depended on, and that they sometimes deceive us. For, say they, the sun appears to be not more than one foot in diameter to the eye, when to the philosopher it is known to be many thousand miles: therefore, they say, our senses are not true, and are not to be depended on at all times unless regulated by reason. To this I reply, that reason alone would never have discovered to me that there is a sun, nor could I have known it without sight or hearing; then the knowledge of it is derived from the evidence of sense. It appears then their mistake lies in this—they apply one of the senses to that which principally belongs to the office of another. My eyes were given me to discover the shapes and colors of bodies, but if I wish to know the length, breadth, or distance of any object I must apply actual measurement. Reason may and does assist in forming instruments for that purpose. I find that all men in all ages have been disposed to credit their senses independently of reason. If there were a criminal at the bar accused of murder, and two men of good character would testify that they saw him kill a man and heard him say previously that he would do it; the Judge would not hesitate to pronounce him guilty and worthy of death, because the evidence of sight would be sufficient proof that he did the deed, and the evidence of hearing sufficient for the discovery of his intention. I feel pain from the puncture of a pin. I am conscious that I feel pain, but I cannot prove it any other way than by saying that I feel it; though the circumstances may correspond with what I say, viz: the blood flowing and the distortion of my countenance.

It may be said that the senses may be disordered; true

enough, but this cannot be remedied by reason. To a jaundiced eye (it is said) all things appear yellow; but in this case we must refer to former experience, and recollect whether these things always appeared so: or we must enquire if they appear so to men in general; if not, we may conclude that our sight is disordered.

5thly. I take it for granted that I remember. If I be asked how I know that I remember? I answer I am conscious of it, therefore I cannot doubt it.—Mankind in general are disposed to credit their memory prior to, and altogether independent of reason.—Although memory is not dependent on reason, reason is dependent on memory. It is impossible to reason without first principles, and it is impossible to use them without remembering them.

6thly. I take it for granted that there is a material world—Sun, Moon and Stars, and other objects which I see, feel and smell. All men have believed this, a few Metaphysicians excepted; who have denied every thing they could not prove; and as they could not prove the existence of matter, have therefore denied its existence. For, say they, a body cannot act where it is not: the moon is not an inhabitant of our minds, therefore, she cannot act there except in idea only. But this may easily be refuted by an example. Although France is not in America yet she may transmit business here by an agent. So although the moon is not in our minds, nor can our minds leave our bodies to go to the moon, yet the evidence conveyed to our minds is so strong and convincing that we must believe that such a body exists in reality. We can conceive of objects being in certain places when they are not there. I can conceive of my horse being in the cornfield, when he is not, and I know that he is in the stable. I believe a stone is hard and that snow is white as I believe I exist.—I must believe then, that there is something existent more than mere ideas. I believe that the sun, moon and planets are more than mere sensations, or images impressed on the

brain, as some Metaphysicians tell us. This doctrine of ideas has given rise to all that system of metaphysical non-sense taught by George Berkley of Trinity College, Dublin, who reasoned away the material world and left nothing but spirits, and David Hume, a Scotchman, completed the work of annihilation, and left nothing but a bundle of ideas floating in vacuum. This affords us a lively example of man's liability to err, when he forsakes the plain path of common sense. But if we adhere to the principles laid down in the beginning we can have no reason for believing any such things.

7thly. I take it for granted that there are certain relations established between things in nature. I must believe there is a relation between cause and effect before I can believe the cause will produce the effect, and that there is a relation between the ruler and the ruled, before the ruled can be under obligation to obey, and that there must be a relation between 3 and 2, before they can make 4.

Questions on Lecture III.

What is, fourthly, laid down as a first principle? What are the 5 senses? Why do we believe our senses? How does it appear that all men trust their senses? Can the testimony of the senses when disordered be corrected? How? What is, fifthly, laid down as a first principle? What establishes this? Have all men trusted memory? Whether is memory dependent on reason or reason on memory? Why? What is, sixthly, laid down as a first principle? Have any denied this? Why? How is it established? What is the seventh first principle? Is this essential in all reasoning?

LECTURE IV—ON PERCEPTION AND ITS CONCOMITANTS.

Perception is simply the seeing of an object presented to the mind. In perception there are three things to

be considered; the agent, the energy and the object. I perceive a tree, as it is more commonly expressed, I see a tree. The pronoun I, represents the agent, the verb *see*, expresses the energy and the noun, *tree*, the object. We are so constituted by our Creator that whenever we see, hear, feel, taste or smell, we immediately perceive. Hence we use the operation of the senses for perception itself. Thus, I see a man, I hear a sound, I feel a surface, I taste an apple, I smell a rose. The senses are the only means of perception, they are distinct from it, yet the senses and perception are often blended together. A question on which there has been much metaphysical reasoning is "Whether the mind is active or passive in the perception of an object?" For an answer to this question, I appeal to the common sense of mankind, and I find men in all languages use active transitive verbs to express their perceptions—verbs expressing the action of an agent passing to the object which is expressed in an objective case required by the verb or energy which governs it. From this manner of expression, which is common to all languages, it must be inferred as a universal sentiment of mankind, that the mind is active in perception in all cases whatever.

Belief inevitably accompanies perception. I see a house, I instantly believe a house is there. I hear my friends' voice, I immediately believe that it is my friend's voice. If I be asked why I believe so? I can give no other reason than this, that I am so constituted that I must firmly believe whatever I clearly perceive. If I should be required to define my belief, I would reply, I cannot, because it is too simple to admit of a definition. I believe there is such a city as Philadelphia because I have seen it, or have heard of it. But were I requested to define my belief I would laugh at the request. If you ask a plain Christian whether he believes the scriptures, he will say yes. If you ask him if he believes the Gospel of Christ? he will promptly assent.

But ask him to define his belief, and he will either laugh at your request, or he will be much puzzled to say any thing satisfactory on the subject. But if you recur to his former experience, he will not only understand you perfectly, but also give you satisfactory answers.

Whatever we perceive, we immediately believe prior to all reasoning. Yet there are some things which we believe, though we may have forgotten the evidence on which we first believed them; but if we now remember that the evidence on which our belief then rested, was sufficient to induce belief, we still believe them.

Emotion is also a concomitant of perception and is closely connected with it.

A pleasant or painful emotion always attends the perception of objects that arrest the attention. I see a house well arrayed and situated on a beautiful eminence, I feel a pleasant emotion. But if I see a house badly formed, illy proportioned and situated in a dark valley, I feel a painful emotion.

Belief as well as perception is attended by consciousness. I see a house; I immediately believe there is a house there. Here I am conscious not only of the perception, but also of the belief which follows it. A question here arises more fit to be solved by the refined Metaphysician than by him who enquires after plain truth, viz: Does consciousness go before belief or belief before consciousness? To this I answer; I do not know which goes before, because I am not conscious of any difference, and it would be difficult if not impossible to point out any difference. Consciousness is perhaps more simple than belief and always accompanies it. We say we are conscious of our existence, but never say we believe we are conscious of it. The emotions that accompany perceptions are sometimes called impressions, and are either strong or weak. If I meet my friend who has been long absent without any previous notice of his coming, I feel strong emotions. But if I meet a friend with whom I am daily conversant; although I may

have as great a regard for him as for my long absent friend; yet the emotion or impression is much weaker.

Questions on Lecture IV.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is perception? What three things must be considered on this subject? Example. What expresses the agent? What the energy? What the object? What are the means of perception? Is the mind active or passive in perception? How do you prove that it is active? What accompanies perception? Examples. Why do we believe? Can belief be defined? Does the belief of what we perceive depend on reasoning? Do we sometimes believe things when the evidence is forgotten? What besides belief accompanies perception? Emotions are of what two kinds? According to what? Examples. What accompanies perception besides belief and emotion? Which is first in the mind, consciousness or belief? May emotions be in different degrees of strength? Example.

LECTURE V—ON EMOTIONS.

In order to understand this subject fully it will be necessary to attend to the following question, viz: whether the object or the attributes be the immediate cause of the emotion? Experience teaches us that we cannot conceive of an object distinct from its attributes, nor can we have any idea of the qualities without conceiving of some object in which they exist. I cannot conceive of material substance without some form; neither can I conceive of form entirely abstracted from all matter. I see a broad spreading tree adorned with beautiful flowers and green leaves. This object excites a pleasant emotion. Now it is not the tree of itself, abstracted from its qualities, that excites the emotion; nor is it the verdure or the blossoms abstracted from the tree; but it is the tree with all its agreeable qualities.—We, therefore, answer the question by saying, that it is an object

so qualified, perceived by the mind, that is the immediate cause of emotion. Such is the constitution of our nature that on the perception of any object an emotion either pleasant or painful, in proportion as the object appears agreeable or disagreeable is excited. Thus a gentle flowing river, or a wide extended plain excites a pleasant emotion. But a muddy stagnant lake, or a tract of barren hills excites a painful emotion. Emotions either painful or pleasant, may be heightened by external relations. If I see a smoky hut, the emotion arising from the perception is painful; but if it be situated between rugged mountains in a dark valley the emotion is still more painful. On the other hand, an elegant building will excite a pleasant emotion however it may be situated; but if it be placed on a beautiful eminence in the midst of an extensive plain the emotion is heightened; but if there are around it beautiful meadows and vast herds of thrifty cattle grazing in them, and a broad river gently flowing through the plain, the emotion is still increased. A man possessed of amiable qualities such as benevolence, cheerfulness &c., excites a pleasant emotion. On the contrary a man possessed of hateful qualities—malevolence, envy, moroseness, dullness, &c. excites a painful emotion.

The action of others is the cause of emotion in us; but the intention is the most material circumstance by which the emotion is excited in us whether painful or pleasant. For example. I see one man give another a piece of money, it excites little or no emotion either pleasant or painful until I learn the intention or, at least have some conjecture about the design, because here the quality of the action is out of view. But if I learn that he gave it in payment of a just debt, I have an idea of his honesty, which excites a pleasant emotion; or if I find that he gave it for a favor received, the emotion is heightened by the expression of gratitude, or if I discover that he gave it for the relief of some poor distressed family, the emotion is still greater. But if I find he gave

it as a reward for the assassination of an honest citizen, the emotion is exceedingly painful; but if I find that citizen was my father or my greatest earthly friend, the emotion is still much higher and rises to indignation. Here I would observe that the intention is always supposed to arise from some antecedent disposition. A man may do an action that is productive of good effects, and yet he can claim no merit if he does it from a malevolent disposition.—An action that proceeds from a good intention, though productive of bad effects, cannot be accounted a crime: it may be thought imprudent but not wicked. But as the merit and demerit of action are to be considered more appropriately in another lecture, the subject we pass over for the present. Motion is another cause of emotion. To see a man walk with ease and unaffectedness excites a pleasant emotion; but to see a man walk stiffly and affectedly excites a painful emotion. The feelings of others excite in us emotions pleasant or painful. I hear a noise in a solitary place, I pause and listen: I perceive it to be the cry of some one in distress; I approach the place; the cry becomes more bitter; I am compelled to hasten to the relief of the distressed. I conclude this lecture with the observation, That emotions are excited in us by all the interesting objects with which we are conversant; and if the object be agreeable the emotion is pleasant; but if the object be disagreeable the emotion is painful.

Questions on Lecture V.

What is the subject of this lecture? To understand the subject what is necessary? What does experience teach? Examples. What does not excite emotion? What does excite it? Emotions will be according to what? What will heighten emotion? Exaggerated. Are the actions of others the cause of emotions, and selfishly what? Examples. The intention is always supposed to arise from what? What will render a good action bad? What will be some excuse for a bad action? Is motion a cause of emotion? Will the feelings of others

excite it? Examples. Do all interesting objects excite it?

LECTURE VI—ON PASSIONS.

Having in the last lecture treated on Emotion we now proceed to consider some of its concomitants. We have already shown that on the perception of an interesting object, an emotion either pleasant or painful is excited in us.

Some emotions are followed by desire, others are not.

A beautiful garden well laid off, filled with useful vegetables and adorned with a rich variety of well scented flowers, will excite a pleasant emotion and a desire of possessing so beautiful an object. A well formed horse, well trained for the saddle or for the draught will excite emotion, and if he be for sale, a desire of possession will probably ensue. A cloud is a beautiful object and excites a pleasant emotion; but no one of common sense desires to possess it, or to walk upon it. I see a beautiful young lady of correct taste, amiable dispositions and good habits, a pleasant emotion is excited. And if I find she is attainable as my companion, a strong desire may be excited in me to have so lovely an object: but when I find she is not to be obtained my desire subsides, but the pleasant emotion remains. We may observe that objects out of our power are not generally objects of our desire.

There are some cases in which emotion and desire subside at the same time; in others they do not. I am passing by the highway, I hear an uncommon sound; I am given up to an emotion, and also of a desire to know what caused the sound. I approach the place and find it was caused only by some children at play. Here my desire subsides with the emotion. Desire arises after emotion, and accompanies it, and generally remains after it has subsided.

We now proceed to show in what respects emotion differs from passion. Emotion, accompanied and followed by desire, is passion. For what is the passion of love besides a pleasant emotion accompanied by a desire of possessing the beloved object? or what is hatred but a painful emotion accompanied by a desire of evil to the hated object? Here then we may easily discover the difference between passion and emotion; in as much as emotion, accompanied and followed by desire, constitutes passion. We may have an emotion without passion, but passion is always preceded by emotion and includes it. Another distinction between passion and emotion is, that emotion has a law but no object, whereas passion has both. We always suppose emotion to have a cause which excites it in the mind. We never speak of the object of emotion; but we often hear people talk of the object of passion. Here I would observe, that the same thing that is the cause of emotion, is the cause and also the object of passion. A beautiful woman will cause a pleasant emotion, and if the emotion be followed by desire, it becomes passion, of which the woman is both the cause and the object.

Having explained the difference between passion and emotion we now are to consider passion as selfish or benevolent. Every passion has some gratification as its object; when this is obtained the passion ceases. When a person has nothing but his own interest in view, his passion is selfish; but when the happiness of others is its object, then it is benevolent. If a man gives a piece of money for his own benefit, his passion is selfish; but if he gives it for the benefit of another, it is benevolent.

These passions often unite, and are gratified in the same object. A man may entertain his friend for his own improvement and thereby gratify a selfish passion. He may do it also to make his friend happy and so gratify a benevolent passion.

What is impulse? I answer, Passion so inflamed that

it drives its subject to act without deliberating on his action or its consequences. A man in a crowd receives a blow. He forthwith strikes the person nearest to him prompted by impulse. This is called impulse, because the man was impelled by his passion to strike without considering what he was doing. Hence we have these phrases in our language—impulse of passion, impulse of appetite, &c. A person, who kills another by impulse, is not considered guilty of murder, but of manslaughter only. But if he had time to reflect, and went to some other place, procured a weapon, returned, searched for his adversary and killed him, he was actuated by a malicious passion: he is guilty of murder. In the former case, the man is considered as acting, as brutes act, from instinct without reflection; but in the latter case the action was intended to use a law phrase, with malice afore-thought.

We shall conclude this lecture by showing the difference between passion and affection. They are nearly allied to one another, but the following example will show a difference. I see a lovely woman possessed of all the perfections belonging to her sex. This object excites a pleasant emotion, and if followed by desire, it is passion: but when the object is possessed, passion is changed into affection. In other words it may be said, a man has a passion for his sweetheart, but a man has affection for his wife. We say a man has the passion of anger, of envy, of revenge, of malice &c; but we never say we have the affection of anger, the affection of envy, of revenge, or of malice. Passion, is a state of mind more turbulent and boisterous, affection more calm and uniform. Passion agitates with some degree of violence. Affection being calm gives the mind real pleasure in the enjoyment of the object.

Questions on Lecture VI.

What is the subject of this lecture? Some emotions are followed by what? Examples. Are objects known to be out of our power desired? Will emotion

and desire ever subside at the same time? Examples. Does desire rise before or after emotion? Which generally remains longest? What is passion? Can we have emotion without passion?—passion without emotion? Has passion both a cause and an object? Has emotion both? Is the same object both the cause and object of passion? Is passion always either selfish or benevolent? Examples. May both be gratified in the same object sometimes? Example. What is impulse? Example. Why called impulse? How will you show the difference between impulse and passion by an example? How do you distinguish between passion and affection?

LECTURE VII—ON APPETITE.

What is the difference between passion and appetite? To answer this question satisfactorily, it will be necessary to observe what appetite is, and to what part of our constitution it belongs.

1. Appetite is an uneasy sensation accompanied by a desire for a gratifying object.
2. When the desire is gratified the appetite subsides for a time and again returns.

Hunger, thirst and animal love have these properties and are, therefore, properly called appetites.—Hunger is an uneasy sensation accompanied by a desire to eat. Thirst is an uneasy sensation accompanied by a desire to drink. When the desire of eating or drinking is satisfied those appetites subside for a time, but afterwards return. The returns of thirst are not so periodical as those of hunger. The same may be said of animal love. It is probable that hunger and thirst, in infants, are nothing more than painful sensations. We cannot suppose them to be followed by desire, when the infants cannot know that eating and drinking are necessary to remove the sensations.

We have these appetites in common with brutes. There is in them the painful sensation accompanied by a desire of gratification. The brutes desire the object of gratification by instinct, but habit or custom has considerable influence on them. A horse long accustomed to eat oats and hay, will not, at first, readily eat corn and fodder. The ends for which these appetites are given are too obvious to require remarks, viz: the preservation of animal life and health and propagation of the species.

The cravings of the appetites are often so dangerous that they withdraw the attention from every other object and fix it on the objects of their gratification. Hence we have an easy solution of the question, what is the difference between passion and appetite? Appetite craves a general object; as hunger craves *food in general*. Yet custom has considerable influence in directing the desire to particular articles of food. Thus I may eat oysters or tomatoes or beets from fancy; or I may eat beef, mutton, pork, or potatoes for the sake of health. Thirst craves *drink in general*, but the influence of habit may cause it to select, for its object, a particular sort of drink.

But passion has its *particular object*. A man when hungry may desire a particular sort of food, but if he cannot obtain that, another sort will satisfy his appetite. But if he hates one man it will not satisfy his passion to be revenged on another, or on any one besides the man he hates.

Another distinction is: Appetite is prior to object; but passion is posterior. A man does not desire food because it is first presented to his view, but no one has pity without having first a pitiable object in contemplation.—Appetite goes before and suggests its object to the mind, but passion follows after, as an effect follows its cause.

The appetites above mentioned have their seat in the body.

These appetites in inferior animals have nothing in them morally good or evil. Nothing has changed them from their original state. In man they may be vitiated by indulgence, yet indulgence of them is not criminal unless it goes beyond the limits prescribed by laws human or divine. These appetites are called in the scriptures "the desires of the flesh, the lusts of the flesh" from the influence they have over us in determining our choices.

There are other appetites belonging to our constitution such as the desire of rest after fatigue, and a desire of motion after long continued rest. When these have become very strong, we are said to be weary or restless. These appetites are in different degrees in different persons. Some men can plan their business well, who are too indolent to put their plans into execution: some are too restless to lay their plans well, or to stick to any business until it is completed. These appetites as well as all others, by indulgence, may be increased in all men and especially in the young. Hence it is that so many youth go astray by giving loose play to all their appetites. Hence I would observe, that the young man who keeps his appetites under due subordination, and whose genius, education and industry all conspire to promote his respectability and usefulness, can scarcely fail to become a useful and respectable member of society.

Questions on Lecture VII.

What is the subject of this lecture? To see the difference between appetite and passion what is necessary? What is appetite? When the object is obtained what takes place? The appetites are what? Are the returns of appetite periodical? Hunger and thirst in children are merely what? Why? Are the appetites common to men and brutes? Has custom an influence on the appetites? Example. Do appetites and passions differ with regard to their objects? How? Examples. Is appetite prior or posterior to its object?

Is passion? Examples. Appetites have their seats where? Passions where? May they be increased by indulgence? When is indulgence of the appetites criminal? What other appetites belong to our constitution? Are they equally strong in all men? Example. How may they be increased?

LECTURE VIII—ON ORIGINAL DESIRES OF THE MIND.

There are other original principles in the human constitution, besides those mentioned in the last lecture, which agree with the appetites before mentioned in some respects, but differ from them in others; such as the desire of esteem, of knowledge, of wealth and of power.

They agree with the appetites in being prior to their objects,—in having their objects general,—in being strengthened by indulgence and weakened by restraint. Hunger craves food in general, yet a person may prefer one sort before another. So the desire of wealth craves a general object; yet, as there are many kinds of wealth, a person may prefer one kind before another. The general desire is common to all men. Hunger, when gratified to excess, terminates in gluttony. So the desire of wealth may grow to avarice.

They differ in this respect; Hunger and thirst are periodical; and when gratified subside for a time: but the desire of wealth, power, esteem and knowledge, do not subside when they are gratified. The appetites have their seat in the body, but these desires have their seat in the mind. Lord Cames called these desires appetites;—Professor Reed calls them general desires, to distinguish them from particular ones. But I think they may be called, with more propriety, original desires of the mind: yet it is of little importance by what name they are called.

Let us examine and see whether there be any such

desires in our constitution. It is evident that we were designed by our Creator for social, and not solitary beings. It was necessary that there be in our nature some stimulus—exciting us to society. Without this we would not be social. The desire of esteem answers this purpose. This desire is easily discovered in children at an early period. We observe them endeavoring to engratiate themselves in the favor of their nurses and playmates. They desire to be esteemed more than others. The desire is no less discovered in advanced age. The attention paid to dress and to deportment in company, on examination, is found, for the most part, to grow out of this desire. When men attempt to gain esteem by pursuing a course of conduct truly polite and moral towards men, and pious towards God, they are justly esteemed and commended for it; but when men endeavor to gain esteem by immorality, impiety, selfishness, pride or arrogance, they are truly detestable. The gratification of this desire affords great pleasure to the mind, while the want of it leaves the mind, in some degree, miserable. Suppose a man to know that he is disesteemed and considered perfectly detestable by all human beings, must he not be a most miserable object? There is in brutes something like this principle: We observe horses, that are much fed and wrought together, discover mutual attachment for one another. The same may be said of almost all domestic animals.

The desire of knowledge is also a principle common to all mankind. This principle is discovered very early in children. We see them examining things very minutely and sometimes breaking them open to see what is in the inside. Prompted by this principle, the savage leaves his hut and travels over distant mountains and valleys in pursuit of discoveries. It is this principle perverted that excites people to enquire into the scandals of their neighbors.

When this desire has become strong and is directed to many objects it is called curiosity.

Some brutes show this desire. A dog coming into a strange room will examine every corner. A fox going into a hollow tree examines all its turns and windings.

The desire of wealth is not less common or universal among all ranks of men. The child, the slave and the savage, each desires something that he may call his own. The child is fond of his toys and desires new ones. The slave values his dog and his patch of vegetables. The savage values his beads, his belt and instruments for hunting and warfare.

We are so constituted by our Creator that every individual has his wants, and in many cases he alone is the best judge of his wants: and the infinitely wise Creator has given to every man a desire for some objects to relieve his wants. The pursuit of wealth, with a view to supply our real wants, or the real wants of others, or to accomplish some laudable purpose, is commendable: but when the object is merely to supply some imaginary want, or to gratify some vicious lust, it is blameworthy.

The desire of power over others is also a universal principle among mankind. In uncivilized and rude nations, superiority in bodily strength generally decides; but, in more civilized nations wisdom, fortune or birth, generally determines the superiority in power. Brutes show this desire. Among them superiority is always decided by superior strength. A strange beast comes into a herd; he must fight each one before he knows his proper place; those that beat him take their station above him, and those that are beaten by him take their station below him.

Questions on Lecture VIII.

What is the subject of this lecture? What are named as original desires? In what do they agree with the appetites? Hunger gratified to excess, terminates in what? The desire of wealth in what? They have their seats where? What prompts man to society? How do children show the desire of esteem? How do all men show it? How do horses? How does the de-

sire of knowledge appear to be universal? How do children show it?—Savages? A perversion of it is shown how? How do inferior animals show it? Examples. Is a desire of wealth a universal principle in man? How does this appear? Children show it how? Savages? When is it commendable? When not? Is the desire of power universal in mankind? How is superiority determined among the uncivilized? How among the more civilized? How among brutes? Example. How among brutish men?

LECTURE IX—OBSERVATIONS ON APPE- TITE.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS DEDUCED FROM THE TWO PRECEDING LECTURES.

We deduce from the two preceding lectures the following observations:

1st. That these appetites and desires, eight in number, including the desire of motion and rest, are original parts of our constitution; and have for their objects all things in nature. When but little attention is paid to these appetites and desires, and to things in nature, it clearly appears evident that there are objects suited to each of them. There are many objects for the gratification of hunger, &c. The desire of esteem extends to all those actions and gratifications for which we esteem others, or for which we expect to be esteemed ourselves. Many are the objects suited to gratify the desire of power. The objects suited for the gratification of the desire of wealth are many and various. There is scarcely an object that will not, in some degree, gratify the desire of knowledge. These principles of action prompt us to pursue those objects which we suppose suited to the gratification of either of these appetites or desires. And when the pursuit becomes too ardent, fatigue and a desire for rest serveto moderate the pursuit.

2nd. I observe, that though these appetites and desires are evidently distinct from one another, yet they are often joined together in the same individual, at the same time and in the same pursuit; and the appropriate objects of one are frequently sought to gratify another. Thus a man in pursuit of wealth may be hungry, thirsty and fatigued. And wealth may be sought as the means of gaining power over others, or of gaining esteem from fellow men. These appetites being so blended together is, no doubt, one reason why the science of human nature is so difficult to understand. Man, stimulated to action by strong desires, without attending to the principle by which he is actuated, is, of all the objects of knowledge, most ignorant of himself.

3d. I observe, that these appetites and desires, being prior to their objects, give particular objects a great advantage in raising particular desires in us. The constitution of man is formed for the part of the world in which he acts, and he is formed susceptible of influence from the various objects with which he is conversant. He having these general principles antecedent to, and independent of reason, the particular objects, when presented, immediately excite in him emotion and draw the desires after them. We shall illustrate this by examples. A man has been accustomed to acquire wealth by some mechanical trade; a method offers itself, that appears more advantageous, viz: trading in lands. Now his general and prior desire for wealth prompts him to use the most effectual means for acquiring it. He immediately leaves his shop and turns his attention to lands. This change gives a new turn to his conversation and company. Before he associated with mechanics and talked about mechanical business: now he chooses to associate with speculators in land, and his conversation is turned to land speculations. When an unexperienced youth sees a man of high character have on a beautiful and uncommon coat, his general desire of esteem prompts him to wish for one like it. And

he even tries to imitate the admired man in his gestures, looks and articulation of words. Hence, we see that general principles give particular objects a great advantage over us in raising particular desires in us. And we may add that if there were no general desires, there would be no particular ones excited.

4th. Most or perhaps all particular passions and affections are founded on these general principles and arise out of them. It is obvious that a desire for any particular kind of food rises out of the general appetite, hunger, and love for wine, or for a particular companion out of their correspondent appetites. But whether the malevolent passions, such as envy, hatred or malice, are founded on these general principles of our nature or not, is more difficult to see. Envy is emulation carried to excess. When we wish to suppress a competitor, this is envy, and arises from a supposition that he has injured us, or prevented us from obtaining that esteem, that wealth, that power, or some other object of desire, to which we thought ourselves entitled, or which we would otherwise have obtained. Hatred rises from the supposition that the hated object has injured us or is likely to injure us, by directly inflicting pain, or by depriving us of the means necessary for the gratification of some of our appetites or desires. Malice is habitual hatred, and arises from the supposition that its object is continually opposing our happiness. Hence we clearly see why the carnal mind is enmity against the law of God, i. e. because that law continually opposes either the mode, or the degree of gratification, in which the degenerate mind supposes its chief happiness consists.

Questions on Lecture IX.

What is the first observation? Are the appetites and desires original? How many are there in all? Are there objects suited to each? What will gratify hunger? What the desire of esteem?—of power?—of wealth? What prompts to pursuit? What is the

second observation? Examples. Why is the science of human nature so difficult? What is the third observation? Are the desires dependent on reason? If there were no general desires would there be any particular ones? All particular passions and affections arise out of what? What is difficult to see? What is envy? It arises from what? Hatred arises from what? What is malice? It arises from what? Why do men hate God's law?

LECTURE X—OBSERVATIONS CONTINUED.

5th. I would observe, that the distinction between the appetites of the body and the desires of the mind appears to have been known to Paul and John. Says Paul, Ephs. ii, 3, "Among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind." John in his first epistle, Chap. ii, 16, says: "For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world." By this he means the objects of lust, or the various objects that are suited to the appetites and desires. The fleshly mind (as it is sometimes called) is the mind continually employed in meditating on these objects and devising ways and means for obtaining them. The law in our members is that commanding influence which the appetites of the body have over the mind. In connection with this we may observe:

6th. The great influence the body has over the mind. In all ages men have observed the influence the body has in exciting particular desires in the mind: yet few have attended to it with that care, or explained it with that accuracy, which the subject requires. Some have observed "that the state of the mind depends, in a great measure, on the health of the body, and that the body may have a tendency to reduce the mind to a state of

ignorance and stupidity by enslaving it to the appetites," but have not traced out such a connection as merited a place in moral disquisition. The omission of which has left their systems extremely dark and confused. A little attention to some of the most obvious parts of our nature, will make the connection and influence very evident. The appetites hunger, thirst and animal love, being *original*, and *prior* to their objects, suggest their objects to the mind and solicit gratification from them. That solicitation is also enforced by the fancy of pleasure, and the pain of wanting it; which are strengthened and made still more urgent by delay. As these appetites do not depend on choice, but are antecedent to it, when their cravings become so clamorous, they are more than a balance for any mere theory or speculative opinion. The objects suggested by opinion or theory are too remote to raise feelings strong enough to counterbalance the strong cravings of appetite. Hence we have an easy solution of the question: Why are men of good understanding, and extensive knowledge, often guilty of great debauchery, gluttony and sottishness? Though their knowledge be great, and at times their resolution strong, yet these are not equal to their fancy of pleasure, arising from the gratification of their appetites, and to the pain of wanting that pleasure. Thus the saying of Media is daily verified, "Video meliora proboque, et deteriora sequor." I see and approve the better and pursue the worse.

7th. We may observe the influence the mind has over the body in certain circumstances. When objects are presented to the mind which excite in it terror, grief or joy, to a high degree, this effect on the mind is communicated to the body and often produces violent convulsions and sometimes even death itself. Agreeable objects, by exciting agreeable emotions, brighten the countenance, whilst painful objects, by exciting painful emotions, cover it with a gloom, or cause tears to flow from the eyes. Objects suited to the appetites when

presented to the mind elicit desire, excite emotion and the craving of the appetites.

8th. We may observe, that these appetites and passions, being original and prior to their objects give evil tempters a great advantage in tempting us to transgression. The objects, being presented to these appetites and desires, tend to inflame them, and they prompt us to indulge in the gratification of them beyond the limits prescribed by the law of God. There are two remarkable instances found in scripture which will sufficiently illustrate this observation. The temptation offered to Eve was addressed to the appetite of hunger, and to the desire of knowledge. "And when she saw the tree that it was good for food, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." The beauty of the fruit is a circumstance naturally added, because the beauty of the object in all cases tends to influence the desire for it. The other is the temptation of Christ, which was addressed to him in the wilderness, on a mountain, and on a pinnacle of the temple. The temptation was addressed first to the appetite, hunger, and the desire of esteem; secondly, to the desire of wealth, of power and of esteem; and thirdly to the desire of esteem, and a disposition, discovered in him, to obey and trust God and his word.

Questions on Lecture X.

What is the fifth observation? What is the sixth? Are appetites prior to their objects? What do they do? What enforces solicitation? What strengthens the cravings of appetite? Are the appetites dependent on choice? Why are men of good understanding sometimes subjects of debauchery, gluttony and drunkenness? What is the saying of Media? What is the seventh observation? What effect have agreeable objects on the body?—Painful what?—Objects suited to the appetites what? What is the eighth observation? How do they give tempters the advantage? Examples. The temptation of Eve was addressed to what?

LECTURE XI—INCLINATION.
INCLINATION, DISPOSITION AND HABIT, IN-
CLUDING PROPENSITY.

Inclination is the leaning or bending of our nature toward an object. The term is used to express any moderate desire. It is sometimes used in expressing a strong desire, but not without some word to qualify it, as, strong, violent, invincible inclination.

Inclination prompts and leads the mind to choose. An example will make this sufficiently plain. I am asked if I will go to see the show to-day? I answer, I am not certain. Every one who hears me, must believe that I have some desire to go, and that this desire is counterbalanced by some other desire, or that it is not sufficiently strong to determine my choice. There is something in every man's nature that distinguishes him from every other man; this we call disposition. Some are said to be of an amiable disposition, others of a hateful disposition, some of a cheerful, others of a moral disposition.

Disposition differs from principle in this—principle is a law of our nature, and is common to all our species, but disposition is that which makes a difference between men, and produces a diversity in their characters. If I were asked what disposition is? I would reply, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define it. If we appeal to common sense and the experience of mankind, we find that men are as distinguishable by their dispositions as they are by their features.

There are two other states of the mind nearly allied to disposition, viz: Good humor, and its opposite, bad humor. These are not so periodical as appetite, nor so habitual as disposition, though there may be such states as habitual good and bad humor. Good humor often arises from uninterrupted success in our pursuits, and its effects are of the most agreeable nature. It renders us happy in ourselves and agreeable to others, and is accompanied by benevolence and every social affection. We may, therefore, say, that our happiness will be either perpetual or temporary, as our good humor may be.

On the other hand, habitual bad humor is a source of habitual misery, and temporary bad humor of temporary misery. It casts a gloom over every object, and sours every enjoyment. It renders us unhappy in ourselves and disagreeable to others. And it stirs up in the mind malevolent passions.

There are two other states of the mind similar to these, viz: Elevation and dejection.

Elevation is joy excessive, which arises from the mind's approbation of itself for having done some good actions. This, some have called the pride of virtue, or it arises from some unexpected and desirable turn of fortune, or a sudden transition from a very miserable, into a very comfortable state.

There is an elevation of mind which arises from a mistaken and vain opinion we entertain of ourselves, as persons endowed with very good or extraordinary abilities, and mental accomplishments, or some distinguishing excellence of body. This elevation discovers pride, the parent of many atrocious evils, such as arrogance, selfishness, haughtiness, disdain, contempt of others, &c.

Dejection may arise from various causes, such as disappointment in our anxious pursuits, privation of something we accounted very valuable to us, or to our friends. Dejection is of different degrees, and may be increased by indulgence, or by repeated losses or disappointments, until it becomes what is called melancholy. To define clearly what melancholy is, would be a difficult task: All that is necessary to be said is, that it seems to be a bodily complaint, of the nervous kind, which effects the mind in an unusual manner—casts a gloom on every object, and excites strange and absurd notions on religious subjects, as well as on other subjects of contemplation.

Habits have been distributed into two classes, natural and moral. But this distribution seems to be neither accurate nor complete: because we have no habits by nature, they are founded upon custom, and they are all

acquired. We are constituted by our Maker, susceptible of habits: but this will not justify the application of the term *natural*, merely because they are acquired by means of the pliancy of our nature. A better distribution of habits would be into three classes, *mechanical*, *animal* and *moral*.

Mechanical habit is an acquired facility in doing a thing, arising from our having frequently done it.

An apprentice learning his trade, at first, finds his work very difficult, requiring his whole attention, but by frequent performance of the same thing, it becomes easy, and he acquires such facility in the performance, that he can both work and talk, or meditate on some other subject at the same time. In this way we acquire all our skill and dexterity in all the arts. Thus we learn to speak, to read, to write, &c. Children, though they cannot at first pronounce words distinctly, yet after frequent trials and long continued practice, acquire facility in pronouncing them. What the physical cause, of this habit is, we do not undertake to say, but the important ends, for which we were made susceptible of these habits, are obvious to all. Without this susceptibility of habit, we never could have been able to acquire much more knowledge than the inferior animals, and a man at sixty, would be as ignorant as he was at five years old. If a young man has spent ten or fifteen years, diligently endeavoring to acquire some mechanical art, and can perform no better than he could at first, his acquirement of it is hopeless, or if one has spent as long a time in the attempt to acquire the knowledge of a language, and now can perform no better than he could at first, all must agree that it would be useless for him to spend more time in it.

Animal habits are habits of doing and indulging, that are acquired by doing or indulging.

A man, by accustoming himself to holding his hand in his bosom or his pocket, acquires a propensity to do so. This we call animal habit. By frequently sitting

cross-legged, or playing with a watch key, or playing with the ends of the fingers on a table or chair back, or cutting sticks with a knife, a man may acquire the habit of doing these and like things, so that he can do them without design, and sometimes even contrary to his general intention. We may here observe, that, generally speaking, there is nothing either morally good or evil in these habits except what arises from circumstances, or the customs of the place.

Moral habits are such as regard moral actions.

If a man, by drinking spirits, acquire a habit, and consequently a desire to drink, this is a moral habit; because, when excessive, it is contrary to the law of God, which is the standard of moral rectitude. Any habit which prompts to the breaking of any law, that we are bound to obey, whether human or divine, is a bad moral habit, such as the habit of lying, swearing, gambling, &c. It is called *moral*, to distinguish it from *animal* habit, and always regards actions or omissions which are conformable or not conformable to some rule, which requires or forbids them. That inclination which we acquire by doing or indulging frequently, we call *propensity*, whether it respect moral or animal actions.— We speak of a propensity to get drunk, a propensity to chew tobacco, &c. We shall conclude this lecture with an observation on the error of some who admonish others of the duty of engaging in religion, saying, “although it may be difficult at first, to love the divine character and laws of God, yet habit will make it easy.” If by religion they mean what always should be meant, love to God, faith in Christ, &c., it is a great mistake; for the christian finds it no easier to love God after having loved him twenty years, than he did when he first beheld his beauty exhibited in equal light.

Questions on Lecture XI.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is inclination? Does it lead to choice? Example. What does this show? In what do men greatly differ? Is dispo-

sition a principle of our nature? Why not? What is disposition? What other two states of mind are mentioned? Good humor rises from what? Bad humor from what? Good humor is accompanied by what? What effect has it on us? What effect has bad humor? What two other states are named? What is elevation? It arises from what? Does it ever arise from mistake? What is pride? Pride leads to what? What is dejection? It arises from what? What is melancholy? How have some classed the habits? What objection to this classification? How should they be classed? What is mechanical habit? Example. Dexterity in the arts depends on what? Examples. Why is the susceptibility of habit important to us? Animal habits are what? Examples. What are moral habits? Examples. What are bad moral habits? Examples. What do we call propensities? Examples. Will habit make moral exercises of mind easy? Why not?

LECTURE XII—COMMON SENSE. COMMON SENSE, REASON, MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.

What is common sense? It is the energy of the mind, by which we perceive the most plain and obvious truths without the assistance of intermediate relations. Although this definition be incontrovertably true, yet, without further explanation it will never satisfy a minute philosopher, or an enquiring mind. In order, therefore, to ascertain the true meaning of the terms accurately, it will be necessary to analyze them as used in the question; and also to attend diligently to the operation of our own minds.

The above question may, with propriety, be divided into two. 1st. Why is it called common? 2nd. Why is it called sense? I answer these questions by giving an example for the illustration of the subject. I lay down

this axiom, "the whole is greater than a part." I understand the terms, I perceive the thing asserted, I believe confidently the truth of the axiom. Here there are three things to be considered: 1st. The agent, I, who perceive. 2nd, The energy or act of perception. 3rd. The object perceived. I invincibly believe the reality of what I perceive, and I am conscious of my belief. As perception always precedes belief, when I say that I believe any thing, all will understand that I first perceived it.

Farther, I find a certain vivid force accompanying every perception, which is called emotion or sense, and this is stronger or weaker according to the objects that excite it. When I say that I believe this axiom, every man supposes that I perceive it, but when I say I am sensible of its truth, every one who hears me supposes that I feel a consciousness of the force of the evidence of its truth. Now all men in all ages and nations, who understand the terms, immediately perceive the truth of this axiom. There are many other self-evident truths equally plain, which are believed by all men, and are, therefore, called common truths, and are perceived by the sense, by which every man discriminates between truth and its opposite. For this reason it is called common sense, or the common sense of mankind.

2nd. Why is it called common sense? We have already observed that there is an emotion, feeling or sense, accompanying the perception of any object. I can assign no other cause for our susceptibility of emotion, than that we are so constituted by our Creator, that we are moved by all the objects which we perceive. This sense is often put for its concomitants as in the instance now before us. When we say that we are sensible of any truth, we mean that we perceive it, and consequently believe it. Hence it is called sense—common sense.

Common sense, therefore, means nothing more than common perception and belief, which all men have of

certain truths. When we appeal to common sense, we mean that common perception and universal sentiment which all men have in regard to the point in question, and suppose the thing to be so obvious and plain that all men may perceive its truth.

It is very common to say that such a man has a good share of common sense: by which is meant that he not only perceives plain truths, but also the connection of things, and the fitness of means to an end.

What is reason? It is that series of connected energies of the mind, by which we discover truth not before known, or by which we bring to view truth through the medium of known truths, or find out the connection of known truths: this we call reason. Though this definition of reason be just, yet it is not sufficiently satisfactory, therefore we shall attempt to illustrate it by examples stated in a sylogistecal manner.

My Creator should be honored.

God is my Creator.

Therefore God should be honored.

Here I perceive the two first propositions distinctly, and by retaining them in memory I perceive the connection between them and draw the conclusion, "God should be honored." But had I forgotten the first proposition "My Creator should be honored," or the second, that "God is my Creator," or had I not perceived the connection between them, I could not have drawn the conclusion. Again. Every virtuous man is happy. A. B. is virtuous. Therefore A. B. is happy. Here I remember that virtue always makes its possessor happy, and I also remember that A. B. is virtuous, therefore I immediately perceive the connection between them, and draw the conclusion accordingly. But had I forgotten the two former propositions, commonly called the premises, or not perceived their connection, I could not have drawn the conclusion. Thus we see if one step be missed the conclusion cannot be drawn. In this manner, Mathematicians, by laying down cer-

tain first principles, or self-evident axioms and proceeding on them, demonstrate truths more obscure and intricate. Now the result of this investigation is, that reason is nothing more than perception and memory.

Reason is of different degrees both in the practice and in the capacities of men.

A propensity to seek happiness is a principle of our nature. Whatever, therefore, we suppose would produce most happiness, we think it reasonable to pursue, some choose to be employed in sailing, some in merchandizing, some in agriculture, and others, in various other ways. There is a kind of instinctive delight which every man feels, in the pursuit of some particular object: and that object he will pursue, if not diverted from the pursuit by necessity, education or authority. And that pursuit which affords a man no happiness he will abandon as soon as he can. Some men have a capacity for acquiring mathematical knowledge, others for learning languages, others for history, others take delight in poetry. This difference seems to depend on the difference of memory in different persons. Those whose memories are accurate and strong, and who can retain truths and connect them together with accuracy and promptness, will find it easy to study mathematics, whilst those whose memory is weaker, or of a different cast, will retain facts with equal, if not greater facility. There are some people who can remember the ages of almost all the young people in their neighborhood, and all the scandals that have occurred in it for many years, yet could not be taught understandingly and clearly to demonstrate one proposition in Euclid, in a month. What particular cast of the muscles or of the nerves may effect this difference, we know not. We can only say that it is the will of the Creator, that men should be endowed with different capacities and talents for reasoning, and this difference is as obvious as the difference in their faces.

We come now to speak of memory and recollection,

and the difference between them. When any thing past recurs to mind without an effort, we call this memory: but in recollection the mind is conscious of an effort. Things which we remember are held in view of the mind involuntarily, but to recollect requires an exercise of will, and an effort of the mind. A familiar example will make this plain. I ask any friend if he remembers a certain past event; if it occur to his mind immediately, he answers, "I do." If not, then he tries to recollect it, and to ascertain with certainty whether or not he ever knew it. He thinks of the time and place, the occasion and the consequences of the supposed event, and a variety of circumstances that might tend to suggest assistance to his recollection, at length his past knowledge of the event is recalled with the evidence by which he once knew it. Memory is independent of the will but recollection in some measure, is dependent on it.

Questions on Lecture XII.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is common sense? What three things are included? What accompanies these? Why is it called common? Are there many self-evident truths? Why is it called sense? Whence arises the motion? What is meant then, by common sense? What do we mean, when we say a man has a good share of common sense? What is reason? Example. Is memory necessary to reason? Is perception of relation necessary? Is the capacity for reasoning the same in all men? Is a propensity to seek happiness a principle in our constitution? How does this appear? Why do men pursue particular objects? What is said about the difference in capacities? The difference arises from what? What is memory? What is recollection? Is memory dependent on the will? Is recollection? Example. Circumstances suggest assistance to recollection.

LECTURE XIII—ON POWER.

Power is one of the most ambiguous terms in its signification, in the English language, and at the same time the most general in its use. It is applied to all the principles of our nature, to all habits and improvements, to all the influence we have over others, to all mechanics, and in short, to all things that move or are moved. In this lecture we shall confine ourselves more particularly to the meaning which it has in the philosophy of the human mind.

I observe that the words can and cannot, able and unable, possible and impossible are synonymous with the term power and the want of it. Thus we say we *can* do a thing; that is we have *power* to do it. We are *unable* to do a thing, i. e. we have *not power* to do it, &c.

Power, when applied to the body or the mind, means nothing more than a capacity to perform certain operations. Thus we speak of the powers of the mind, the faculties of the mind, and we mean only that the mind is capable of certain operations which we know it does perform, and not that the mind is made up of several parts, or consists in several operations, as some have vainly imagined. This doctrine, that the mind is a composition, has rendered this part of the science of human nature obscure and unintelligible. The mind is to be considered as void of parts, or not composed. It is one, simple, living, active principle or being, which is capable of understanding and choosing. When I understand any thing, it is my mind that understands it. When I am affected, it is my mind that is affected. When I choose, it is my mind that chooses. Hence the powers and capacities of the mind or soul are only its *capacity* of performing different operations. We say we have power to think of an object when we do not think of it, to choose when we do not choose, to love when we do not love. ~~The true~~ ^{one living} ~~part~~ ^{power,} of the whole is this, *the mind is capable of thinking, loving and choosing*. ~~When applied to the body,~~ ^{When applied to the body,} means that firmness ~~of the nerves~~ ^{of the muscles and tendons} by

which we put other bodies in motion. I have power to lift fifty pounds, to move my body from this place to another, although I choose to do neither. Having explained the term power as we intend to use it, we now proceed to a farther investigation of this important subject. We may lay it down as a universal sentiment, that there are some things that we can do and others that we cannot do; some things that we can know and other things that we cannot know. I can remove a weight of fifty pounds, but I cannot remove Clinch Mountain. I can know the length and breadth of this room, but I cannot know what General Jackson is thinking about at this moment. So we see that our power is limited within certain bounds, beyond which we cannot go.

It is also a universal sentiment that any thing is in our power, the performance of which depends upon the will. The body is so far subject to the mind, that in all cases when it is possible, it instantaneously obeys the choice. We may here observe that the degrees of our power are known by experience. The body, being nothing more than organized matter, fitted to produce motion in other bodies, and capable, within certain limits, of obeying the choice of the mind, will do what the mind wills till by new choices and greater exertions, we find that we can go no farther. A child knows by experience when he can walk or run, and a man knows when he can walk twenty miles in a day, or lift one hundred pounds. A man tells me he can lift a hundred pounds. I ask, can you lift no more? he answers, no. How do you know you cannot? He answers, I have made repeated trials and have not succeeded in the effort to lift more. So limited is man, that notwithstanding his desires may be unbounded, yet he cannot move any body whatever, without first moving his own; hence he may easily know to what extent he can produce motion in other bodies, and here is the limit of his power over matter. We now see that the determination of the mind gives motion to the body, but whether

choice is the immediate cause of the motion or not, we cannot know. We are not conscious of any agency operating between the choice and the motion, yet how the choice can produce the motion is to us wholly inconceivable. We can only extricate ourselves from this difficulty by resolving it into the will of our Creator, who, in our constitution has established the connection between the cause and the effect, whilst the *modus operandi* is concealed from us. The motion of the body and the choice of the mind are so uniformly and instantaneously connected from infancy to old age and death, that their distinction has been overlooked, not only by the vulgar, but also by the most of learned writers on this subject: yet, they are evidently distinct, and should be so considered. We now see the dominion that the mind has over the body in influencing us to certain actions.

That capacity of the body, by which it performs the determinations of the mind, is called our bodily strength. This we have at all times, but it lies dormant until by the choice it is put into exercise.

There are some motions of the body which do not depend upon the choice of the mind, such as instinctive motions. To these we do not apply the term power.

We come now to consider the dominion the mind has over itself. We find from experience that in many cases, we can, by our choice give our thoughts a certain direction. This may be made plain by an example. This hour I determine to think on the extent of human power, and to think the next hour on Mathematics. In consequence of my determination a number of thoughts occur relative to the subject. Though many other thoughts may interfere, yet particular attention to the subject will follow the choice, and when I choose a new subject, attention follows the choice and is directed to the new subject. My neighbor proposes a bargain to me. I reply, I am not determined yet, but I will think about it. If I find it inconvenient or disadvantageous, I

tell him it does not suit me, or I do not like it. He insists on me to think of it. I reply I cannot. He urges that I can if I will. Hence it appears that the mind has power over itself.

Although thinking does not originally depend on choice, yet the particular train or current of our thoughts may be dependent on it. The subject must have been the object of our thoughts before we could choose, yet when the choice is fixed, a new train of thoughts and choices will ensue. The power of thinking, therefore only means the soul's capacity for turning and fixing its attention on a subject. The result of the whole is that bodily motion and the direction of thoughts to particular subjects follow the choice of the mind. But the physical cause and the manner of its operation lie beyond our conception. What choice is, and how determined, will be the subject of the two following lectures.

Questions on Lecture XIII.

What is the subject of this lecture? The term power in general, is applied to what? In mental philosophy what does it mean? When applied to body or mind, it means what? What is the mind? Power of body means what? What is a universal sentiment with regard to power? When is a performance in our power? From what do we learn the degree of our power? The body is what? Obeys what? Can the mind move any other body by volition without first moving its own? What is bodily strength? Are all motions of the body dependent on the will. Has the mind any power over itself? What? Example. Does thinking originally depend on choice? What then depends on it? What follows choice?

LECTURE XIV—ON THE WILL.

What is the will and what is moral agency? The will is the soul choosing or determining. It is not a dis-

inct being, as some have supposed, but is only the act or operation of a being. This is the common sense of mankind as appears from the structure of all languages. I am willing, or I will, is a mode of expression common to all languages. I, a living, thinking agent, perform the act or operation, or will. Moral agency is the action of a being under a law.

“Man is under obligation to obey the revealed will of his Creator, and reason is given to him to assist him in discovering his duty. He is therefore to be considered as a moral agent. This naturally implies that he is accountable and will be rewarded or punished according to his works. But brutes, acting from instinct only, are not moral agents, and therefore not accountable. A man’s morals are denominated good or bad, according as his actions are conformed or not conformed to the standard of his duty.

What is free will? I answer I do not know what it is. I can have no conception of its opposite—bound will or choice. If it has no opposite it is as improper to say *free* will as it would be to say wise wisdom or foolish folly. I am sensible that phrase has been sanctioned by long usage and that it may appear in me arrogant to reject it: but in philosophical disquisitions we should not admit the use of any term unless we can fix a distinct meaning to it, and as no such meaning can be fixed here, I shall reject it. I can conceive of a free man and its opposite a bound man, but if there were no such thing as bondage it would be as great folly to talk of freedom, as to say a man with a face, when all men have faces. Choosing is as much the law of our nature as it is the law of a rock to gravitate, whether we choose conformably to the standard of our duty or not, that is whether our choice be good or bad.

All men are conscious of choosing and refusing, and they can generally give a reason for their choice or refusal. This is a simple representation of the subject and if men would follow the plain road of commo

sense, there would be no difficulty in understanding it. One man chooses a religious course of life because he conceives it to be his duty and to be productive of the greatest happiness. Another chooses merchandising, because it is a means of accumulating wealth. But when you, with parade, bring forward your logical definitions and metaphysical hypotheses the subject is involved in obscurity, so that the refined as well as the plain man can scarcely understand what you mean. Let us now enquire what moral liberty is.

Some have defined it to be the power of acting as we please. To this definition I have the following objections: 1. It cannot be proved that any such liberty exists among men in civilized nations, where the law prevents them from doing as they please, and in savage nations where government and custom operate as law, there is still less power of acting at pleasure. We are prevented, in innumerable instances, by the limited state of our nature from doing as we please. Besides, if this definition be true and just, every restraint takes away moral liberty and accountability. The greatest moral liberty is supreme love, which is equally as practicable to Paul and Silas in a dungeon as to Herod on his throne, to the enslaved and ignorant African as to the free and enlightened American.

2nd. I object to this definition of moral liberty because the word *acting*, on which the propensity of the definition depends, is very ambiguous. It may mean either the choice of the mind, or the motion of the body, or both. This occasions great confusion. The choice of the mind which is the cause, and the motions of the body, which are the effect, are improperly blended together, when they are distinct, both in perception and name. I cannot conceive that the choice of my mind and the motion of my body are the same, any more than that my choice, and the motion of a pulley or a pendulum are the same. In the former case, I know nothing of any intermediate agency between my choice and the motion

of my body; but in the latter case there is necessity for the motion of my body to produce the motion in the pulley, because the pulley is not immediately under the direction of my mind as my body is. If my maker had put a pulley under the immediate direction of my mind as he has my body, then I could have moved the pulley by my choice without the intervention of bodily motion as easy as I now can move my body.

3d. I object because the operations of the mind are too simple to admit of a logical definition. In order to gain an accurate knowledge of human nature, we should attend immediately to the operations of our own minds: the want of this attention has been one great cause of the knowledge of moral science being involved in so much obscurity. The substitution of logical definitions and metaphysical reasoning in the place of this attention will always perplex and involve in obscurity the plainest subject. Some have included all the appetites, desires, propensities, inclinations, passions and affections, under the will, and call them modifications of the will. That this is a great mistake in morals will appear from the following example: I am hungry; consequently I determine to eat. Here it is evident that hunger and my determination to eat are distinct, or if I be too much engaged otherwise, I determine not to eat, then if my appetite and will be the same, they will cease together, but experience teaches us that they do not. Therefore, it is plain that hunger is entirely independent of the will. This is true with regard to all the appetites. A man who has acquired a propensity to drink spirits will feel the cravings of that appetite, though he should have a fixed determination of will not to indulge it. Appetite is, therefore prior to choice and independent of it; choice is posterior and dependent. Appetite is the cause, choice the effect. The same may be said of all other propensities, inclinations, passions and affections. It has been asserted by some that we choose our own actions only, but this manner of expression seems am-

biguous. If it mean any thing, it must mean barely the motions of our bodies. I think it is an universal sentiment that we choose any action that we wish to be done, which depends upon our choice. If this be true, a master may choose the actions of his servant, who is bound to obey his will. It is true, he must make his will known before it can be executed. But, if I am not mistaken, the thing to be done and the means for doing it, are always included in the same choice. I choose to raise a weight of five ounces: to effect this a little exertion of body is necessary, as means. Here I am conscious of one choice only, which appears to me to include both the thing to be done, and the means for doing it. Again. I choose to lift a hundred pounds: here a greater exertion of bodily strength is necessary, yet, as before said, it is included in the same choice. That one man may choose the actions of another, appears evident from the notion of government, where the ruled are bound to perform the will of the ruler.

Some have said, that things out of our power are not objects of our choice. But this assertion appears inaccurate, from the following example. I am taken sick at a distance from home; I have a strong desire to be at home; I choose to pursue my journey, but I find it impossible to get home, yet my desire continues the same, though I have determined not to pursue its object. I would rather say, that things *known not to be in our power* are not objects of our choice. I would only observe farther on this subject, that the will is the soul choosing or determining, and the thing chosen is called the object of choice. There is always some perception of the object, and some reason or motive which leads the mind to choose. What these motives are, and how they operate, shall be the subject of the next lecture.

Questions on Lecture XIV.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is the will? Is the will a distinct being? What is moral

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agency? What is a moral agent? Why are brutes not moral agents? When are man's morals good or bad? What is free will? Why is the term absurd? Is choosing a law of our nature? Is choice a simple operation of the mind? How have some defined moral liberty? Is this a correct definition? What objections to it? First? Second? Third? Some have included what in the will? How is the error shown by an example? Whether is appetite dependent on choice, or choice on appetite? Examples. Do we choose our actions of body?—the actions of others? Does volition include as its object, both the means and end? Do we choose things known not to be in our power? What is the will? It always implies what?

LECTURE XV—ON MOTIVES.

Any thing which leads us to choose or refuse, is called a motive. Motives may be considered in two lights; first, as they are in themselves, and secondly, as they affect us.

1st. Motives, considered in themselves, are either stronger or weaker: Thus the improvement of the mind is of more importance than the ornaments of the body. The concerns of eternity are of greater importance than the concerns of this life, and ought to have the preference whenever they come in competition.

This appears to me as plain as any proposition in mathematics. In things relating to this life, the common sense of mankind determines the difference in the strength of motives; no man will hesitate to choose a thousand pounds rather than a hundred, when either of them may be obtained on terms equally honorable and easy, and when one only can be obtained. No man can be undetermined whether to educate his own son, or a stranger—when the prospect of their happiness and usefulness in after life, is now the same. These and

many others are easy cases. It is the common sense of mankind that we should choose, that which we judge to be most advantageous to us. If, then, it be the common sense of mankind, it is the law of our nature, and if we choose otherwise, we violate a law of our nature, and contradict common sense.

2nd. Motives may be considered as they affect us. Experience teaches that we are, in many cases, less affected by the motive that is in itself stronger, than we are by the weaker. The cravings of hunger and thirst are, in many cases, stronger motives to action than higher principles. Even the concerns of eternity do not always affect us more than the low pleasures of this world. We often pursue the gratification of our appetites to the neglect of our more important concerns. Hence it appears that the motive which *seems* to us to be the strongest, and not that which *should appear so*, always determines the choice.

We proceed to another important division of motives, viz: into external and internal.

External motives are all the objects in nature, arguments, commands, threatenings, and advice. The internal are all the appetites, desires, passions and propensities. These appetites, &c., have formerly been explained. There is, however, one property that is common to all motives, namely, a desire to attain some object.

Here a question arises; whether the external or internal motives determine the choice?

It seems to be the general sentiment of mankind, that the internal motives determine the choice. I ask whether it is food or the desire of food, that determines in me the choice to eat? Whether drink or my desire of drink, determines me to choose it? I immediately perceive that it is my desire that is the motive, which moves me to choose. It is the common sense and experience of mankind that men do not choose that which they do not desire. Hence we often hear it asked,

Why should I choose that for which I have no desire? Thus it appears to be the common sense of mankind, that desire must precede choice.

Again it may be asked, Do we choose without a motive? I think not. A man at rest rises up to take exercise, but has no particular kind of exercise in view. Here it would seem as though he acts without motive, if we did not know that his general desire of action is a sufficient motive to general action. Although he had no particular motive to any particular action. A man can never be without motives so long as he is capable of acting.

Does the strongest motive always prevail? I appeal to experience, and I find universal experience decides in the affirmative. We shall conclude with a few observations.

1st. Many desires may unite in craving the same object and lead to choice. A rich, virtuous and beautiful woman, of a good family, is an object that excites several particular desires, which all unite and influence the mind to choose.

2nd. The circumstance that gives to motives, in many instances, a deciding influence is very trifling. A man has occasion to spend one guinea out of a hundred. Which of them shall he take? and what determines him to take one more than another? He takes one, because it is nigher to his hand, or because it either first or last met his eye.

3d. We sometimes choose contrary to our inclination, but not contrary to the strongest desire. A man, coming to a river that is swelled by rain, desires to go across, but is afraid of losing his life in the attempt, therefore, he determines not to go over.

4th. It has been supposed that the will has a self determining power; but this is an absurd supposition, because it implies that one choice must precede and determine another, and another precede and determine that, and so on back, *ad infinitum*, which is impossible.

It also implies that a volition can be prior to itself, and both the cause and effect of its own existence.

5th. Some have supposed that God has power to do evil: this also is absurd and unphilosophical, because power to do evil implies a will to do evil; therefore, if he has a will to do evil, he must love to do evil, which is totally inconsistent with every idea we can have of a being who is infinitely perfect, holy and righteous.

Questions on Lecture XV.

What is the subject of this lecture? What do you mean by motives? Motives are of what two classes? Are motives in themselves different in strength? Do the strongest motives always effect us most? Examples. What always determines us? External motives are what? Internal are what? What is common to all motives? Do external or internal motives determine the choice? Examples. Do men choose without desire? What always precedes choice? Do we ever choose without a motive? Does the strongest motive always prevail? What is the first observation?—the second?—the third?—the fourth? What reasons are assigned? What is the fifth observation? What reason is assigned?

LECTURE XVI—ON GUILT.

By guilt we mean obligation to suffer punishment. Here punishment may be taken in its most extensive signification, including any painful emotion, arising from a consciousness of having done bad actions, or of having entertained evil passions or affections. I would observe, it makes no difference whether the body be the instrument in the suffering or not. The emotion of shame is painful, arising from having done shameful actions, as well as stripes inflicted on the body. It is painful to fall under the censure of our fellow men. Guilt, as accounted by mankind, is of different degrees,

from the lowest to the highest. This may be illustrated by an example. If a hunter, in pursuit of his game, should chance to kill his neighbor, when concealed so that he could not be perceived, and should it be made appear that reasonable precaution had been taken by the hunter to guard against injuring any person, he would be acquitted as not guilty. But if he fired his gun without reasonable precaution, and killed his neighbor, he falls under the censure of men, but he is not thought worthy of punishment. But should it appear that he hated his neighbor, and shot and killed him, under the pretext of shooting at his game, the judge will pronounce him guilty of murder and worthy of death. Thus it appears there are different degrees in human guilt. Here a question naturally arises, which we will briefly answer.

What constitutes human guilt? I answer:

1st. The action must be voluntary. 2nd. The action must be intended. 3d. The action must proceed from a bad motive. A few examples will make this sufficiently plain. One man takes hold of the hand of another and with it strikes a third person. Here the second person, who is the instrument in doing the action, is altogether free from blame, because he had no intention: but if he had intentionally been the instrument in doing the mischief he then would be equally guilty with him who did the deed.

An action may be voluntary, and yet not worthy of blame. I aim to shoot a highway man who is attempting to kill and rob me. I miss him and shoot my brother, who is innocent. I am not accounted guilty, because I did not intend to kill my brother, nor was the action, though voluntary, done with a bad design.

Here it may be proper to observe the distinction between volition and intention. Volition respects the action of the body only: Intention regards the effects of that action: yet for the most part they are viewed as inseparable, because they are so nearly connected. But intention always precedes volition.

As volition without intention does not constitute guilt, so neither does intention constitute it without an evil motive. I meet a man on the highway; he says he will take my life. I expostulate with him, but to no purpose; he persists, and actually attempts to execute his purpose, but having missed his first aim, I throw a stone and kill him. I am brought to justice. The first question asked by the court is, Was the action alleged performed by me? The second, from what intention was it done—from the intention of making necessary self-defence, or from accident, or from a malicious design against the life of the man who is killed? If I prove that I did kill him only from the design of making self defence, and that seemed the only possible means of making it, I am acquitted of guilt, because my motive was not bad. But should it appear that I had entertained a premeditated and malicious design against his life, then I would be found guilty and worthy of death. We should never judge of actions before we are acquainted with the motives. Though actions at first view may appear very bad, whilst the motives are concealed, yet, upon a full investigation they may appear praiseworthy. In my way home I meet my neighbor, conveying away my property, at first I think him guilty of theft. But on examination I find that my house by accident was burnt, and that he has, by running great risk, got it out of the burning house, and is preserving it for my benefit. Instead of prosecuting him as a thief, I thank and commend him as a kind neighbor.

As the merit or demerit of our actions arises from their motives, so also does their denomination. Actions which arise from love, benevolence, &c., are denominated good actions, but those which flow from avarice, malevolence, &c., are called bad. We shall now conclude with a few observations.

1st. When we see any person acting under a law we suppose that he knows that law, or has it in his power

to know it. If he violates that law we account him guilty and worthy of punishment. But if he knows not the law, and has no possible means for knowing it, he is altogether guiltless. Now, our relations to law, and consequently our duty, arise out of our relationship to God and man, as has been before observed. Some of these relations are more plain than others. Every man knows that it is wrong to destroy his neighbors life, or fraudulently to take away his property: yet but few of us are acquainted with those things that relate to the making of peace or war, to commerce, &c. Hence we see the necessity of laws, both human and divine.

Here we may observe the difference between the divine law and human laws. The divine law regards not only the actions and motives, but also our most secret thoughts. But human law regards only the overt act and the motives, as far as they can be learned from the action; for the action discovers the motive, though the discovery may be made more definite and clear by attested circumstances. We never heard of a man being punished according to law, for his wish to commit theft or murder, without doing the act itself. If mankind had no knowledge whatever of God, and had no possible means of knowing any thing about him, they would not be guilty for not fearing, loving and serving him. But if we know him, or have opportunity for knowing him, and do not love, fear and obey him, we are then, in a high degree, guilty.

2nd. We always suppose a capacity to deliberate, to be necessary in order to constitute human guilt. Hence we see how idiots and infants are not accountable for their actions. Yet, a person may have a capacity to deliberate, and the want of time may excuse him. A man in a crowd receives a blow; he, in the heat of passion, and without deliberation, strikes and kills a person. This man is not thought guilty of murder. But, if he enters his room, arms himself, and some time after goes in pursuit of his adversary, finds and kills him, he

is guilty of murder, because he had time to deliberate.

Questions on Lecture XVI.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is meant by guilt? Are there different degrees of guilt? Example. What constitutes human guilt?—first?—second? Third constituent? Examples. May an action be voluntary and yet blameworthy? Example. What is the distinction between volition and intention? Which precedes? Does volition constitute guilt without intention? Does intention without a motive? Example. What characterize actions as being good or bad? Explain. What is observation first? How does the divine law regard the conduct of men? How do human laws? Is opportunity to know law necessary to constitute obligation? What is observation second? Why are idiots and infants not accountable for their actions?

LECTURE XVII—ON TASTE.

In treating on this subject we shall notice three things: 1st. The nature of taste. 2nd. Enquire whether there be any standard of the seeming difference among men in regard to taste. 3d. Consider some of its characters, and sources of improvement.

The term taste, when applied to discourse or writing, is used metaphorically; it is, therefore, necessary to attend to its literal meaning. When sugar or honey is applied to a sound palate, it makes an impression which we call a sweet taste. When vinegar or wormwood is applied to the palate, it makes an impression which we call a sour or bitter taste. Here we have but one word to express the different qualities of the objects sugar, vinegar and wormwood, and the different sensations they excite in us; yet, no person is at a loss to understand our meaning, nor to discover the different tendencies of those objects to produce those different sensations. We can easily discover the difference be-

tween things that are simple or uncompounded, such as sugar, vinegar and wormwood; but when several ingredients are compounded, it is more difficult to discover the composition or the nature of the compound, and it requires not only a sound palate, but also much experience. By experience we learn to distinguish the ingredients in some compounds with a degree of exactness. Taste is either simple or compound. Upon the application of any thing to the palate, it excites in us the sensation of either sweet, sour or bitter, or a compound sensation, and all that is necessary to distinguish between compound and simple taste, is experience. So much, about the literal meaning of the term taste, we have said.

We now proceed to consider the term taste as metaphorically used. One man is said to have a taste for music, another for oratory, a third for architecture, &c. Now as the term is too simple to admit of a definition, it will be necessary to illustrate taste by an example. I hear a harmonious sound. I am instantaneously delighted, and not only feel pleasure, but I know also the reason why I feel it: viz, harmony. But when I hear a discord in music, I am immediately disgusted; I am not only disgusted, but I also know discord to be the cause. If I be delighted with good and harmonious sounds, I am said to have a good taste. But if I cannot distinguish between harmony and discord, my taste for music, if I have any, is bad. If I see a beautiful house, well arranged on a beautiful eminence, this gives me a pleasant emotion. Taste not only implies a pleasant or painful emotion, but also a discernment of the cause by which the emotion is excited in us. The emotion and its cause are closely connected, because at the very moment I feel an emotion, whether pleasant or painful, I am sensible of its cause.

The seeming difference of taste among men is very obvious. Some have a taste for one thing, and some for another. Some are more pleased with the low fancies

of Bunyan, than the high conceptions of Homer or Milton.

2nd. Enquire if there be any common standard of taste.

There are certain properties belonging to every part of creation, which distinguish it from every other part. There are certain properties belonging to man, which distinguish him from every other creature. A deviation from these properties, in the description of man, would be thought monstrous: As a man with two heads, four eyes, or six feet. If a limner would draw the picture of a horse with the horns of a buffalo, the head of a cat, and the tail of a cow, it would be disgusting to every person of good taste, because it would not be a true representation of the species. But if the picture of a man be rightly drawn, and exhibit his properties justly, it would not fail to please. Although lively colors, in an unnatural picture, may please for a time, yet the picture of an ox, with the head of a hog, the tail of a sheep and the claws of a cat, would cause a disagreeable emotion in the mind of every person of taste: there may be monsters in pictures as well as in nature, and the effect upon the mind in both cases is the same. Thus the particular properties, which every species of being has, peculiar to itself, lay a sufficient ground for the establishment of a standard of taste. When a picture or a poem is made naturally, it will never be disgusting. However time may alter, and description be filled to the peculiarities of taste in different ages and among different people, still an unnatural picture or poem cannot please long. But the poems of Homer and Virgil have been universally admired, because, in writing, they were guided by nature and wrote with simplicity. Though in taste, as in morals, habit may prevail for a time, yet the general principle, to which taste should be reduced, remains the same.

3rd. The characters of taste, and its sources of improvement.

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The leading characters of taste are two, sensibility and correctness. Sensibility of taste regards the sensation which the objects excite in us, whether pleasant or painful. Correctness of taste regards the judgment we form concerning those objects. Sensibility was originally implanted in us by nature, and is capable of being greatly improved, but cannot be acquired. A man can never acquire a taste for music if he has none naturally. We are formed by our Creator susceptible of emotion. All the beauties of nature are calculated to excite pleasant emotions in all men; yet, some men are more pleased than others with the same objects. This is wisely so ordered by the author of nature: consequently every kind of business is pursued, and machines of every description are invented and used. This difference in taste does not arise from the difference in the objects only, but also from custom, education and the natural sensibility of men. Some are pleased with merchandize, others with farming; some with music, others with poetry. Though these tastes are different, yet, they are good, because all those objects possess real beauty.

The second characteristic of taste is correctness. Correctness arises from improvement in the knowledge of the imitative and descriptive arts, such as poetry, oratory, painting, statuary and music. To acquire accuracy of taste, we must be well acquainted with the nature and qualities of things in general, and especially those concerning which we are about to form a judgment. If we treat of morals, it is necessary that we be acquainted with the relation that subsists between God and man, and the relations between man and man. If we treat of physics we should be well acquainted with the nature of man, and how he is operated on. A politician should be well acquainted with the rights of man and the laws of nature and nations in general. A divine should be well acquainted with the perfections of God, and with the sacred scriptures. It is a common sex-

timent of mankind, that he who judges or decides on any matter should be well acquainted with it.

To have a correct taste, requires much experience. In short to become a good critic, a person ought to have experience, not only in particular things but also in things in general, and must also have a sound understanding. We shall conclude this lecture with a few directions and an observation.

1st. If we judge of any composition we should understand the subject.

2nd. We should have a regard to fitness and design. It is necessary in architecture, that all the parts tend to an end, and form one regular whole. Thus we may judge of any composition.

I observe that taste and the moral sense are nearly allied. Both have regard to the propriety and impropriety of things. For he who gives himself up to reveling and drunkenness, will become so habituated to vice, that he will scarcely discern the difference between right and wrong. So he who does not desire improvement, and makes no proficiency in useful knowledge, cannot have a refined taste.

Questions on Lecture XVII.

What is the subject of this lecture? The term taste when applied to discourse, is used how? It is used to express what, when literally used? When is taste used metaphorically? When is taste for music good, or when bad? Taste implies what besides emotion? What, in every species of being, lays the foundation for a standard of taste? How must a picture or poem be formed so as to please? What are the characters of taste? Sensibility regards what? Correctness what? Is sensibility in us by nature? Can it be improved? Can it be acquired? The difference of taste in men arises from what? What consequences follow this difference of taste in men? Correctness of taste arises from what? To acquire accuracy of taste requires what? What is necessary besides knowledge?

judging any composition what is first necessary? We should have regard to what? What is said about taste and the moral sense?

LECTURE XVIII.—GRANDEUR AND SUBLIMITY.

The most of writers on this subject, have considered the terms, grandeur and sublimity, as synonymous, but they are really terms of different import. Grandeur regards the greatness or vastness of an object, sublimity its height. The emotions excited in us by grand, and those excited by sublime objects, are very different, as is evident from the manner of expression amongst the most illiterate of mankind. When they attempt to describe a sublime object, they stretch themselves as much as possible: and when they attempt to describe a grand object, swell themselves. As has been observed before, man is formed for that part of the world in which he acts; and his nature is made pliant, so as to be susceptible of emotions, excited by the various objects with which he is conversant, in a greater or less degree, according to the quality of the objects. This is the reason some critics, in treating on sublimity, say "it is that which astonishes, ravishes and captivates." This definition is exceedingly vague, as will appear from an example. I contemplate the starry heavens. If I be not captivated, ravished and astonished, I cannot tell whether the heavens are grand and sublime, or not. We are so accustomed to view those vast shining luminaries, that they do not excite in us any of the above emotions; therefore we might conclude, according to that definition, that they are neither grand nor sublime, notwithstanding their vast extent and immeasurable height, which render them both grand and sublime. The most intelligible way of treating this subject, is to state the qualities belonging to the objects, and then attend to

their meaning. Now, as has been before observed, grandeur respects the greatness of objects, and sublimity their height. A widely extended plain is a grand object, but not sublime. A May pole is sublime, but not grand. Grandeur and sublimity often unite in the same object; the starry heavens are both grand and sublime, the shining orbs dispersed there, add greatly to their grandeur. High mountains with broad bases are both grand and sublime, as the Andes or Alleghany, on account of height and vast extent. The ocean, because vast in extent, and sublime, because it seems to rise and obscure the heavens at the horizon. Large rivers are grand objects, such as the Ohio, Mississippi, Danube and Amazon. Large hills with extensive bases, smooth surfaces and gradual ascent, are grand.

Wonder is nearly allied to sublimity. Anything that is unaccountable or incomprehensible, excites in the mind wonder. Thus when we contemplate God, who is the most grand and sublime object that human nature is capable of contemplating, the immensity of his nature, his inflexible justice, his inviolable faithfulness and truth, his omnipotence, infinite wisdom and unbounded goodness, fill the mind with wonder.—Immensity of space comes into the estimate of grand and sublime objects. Hence, all men speak of heaven far above, and hell as far beneath. Robes of state are made large, thrones high. In savage nations the chiefs are distinguished by their wearing of higher caps than others wear. Two armies arranged for battle, are grand, and more so if all are in uniform, and attended by bands of musicians, yet, the associated thought of the havoc of human life, made in battle, renders the emotion unpleasant.

As there is sublimity in objects, so there is in sentiments. The reply of King Porus to Alexander, is truly sublime. When taken prisoner and asked how he expected to be treated, answered, "like a King." This showed such firmness and undaunted valor, that we

wonder at the sentiment, because it is so uncommon for men to speak thus in such circumstances. The reply of Governor Reid, to a lady who was employed by the King of England, to bribe him to sell his country, who offered ten thousand pounds for that purpose. "Madam" said he "I am not worth purchasing, and if I were, the King of England is too poor to do it." Sublimity does not consist in a multiplicity of high flowing words, but in a subject that is sublime, described in the most plain and simple manner. In Moses' description of creation, there is a most sublime phrase, and at the same time the most simple. "And God said let there be light and there was light." Here we have the greatest exertion of power, expressed in the most familiar terms. Also Psalm 18. 6—10. "In my distress I called upon the Lord, and cried unto my God, he heard my voice out of his temple, and my cry came before him even into my ears. Then the earth shook and trembled; the foundations also of the hills moved, and were shaken because he was wroth. There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured: coals were kindled by it; he bowed the heavens also and came down, and darkness was under his feet. And he rode upon a cherub, and did fly; yea he did fly upon the wings of the wind." Here the language is exceedingly simple and very expressive. In describing a great man, the leading circumstances of his life, and his most celebrated actions, should be described in the most plain and simple manner. In the description of objects we should avoid two extremes. 1. Coldness or languor, which is called frigidity. 2d. Bombast, which arises from vanity. Bombast is an attempt to raise an object by a description higher than its nature will admit. This is also called rant or fustian.

Questions on Lecture XVIII.

What is the subject of this lecture? Grandeur regards what? Sublimity regards what? A wide extended plain is what? A May pole is what? The

starry heavens what? Why? Wonder is nearly allied to what? The most wonderful, grand and sublime object is what? Is there sublimity in sentiments as well as objects? Examples. Sublime sentiments should be expressed how?

LECTURE XIX—ON BEAUTY.

The beauties of nature and art have pleased all men in all ages, but not to an equal degree: for some are more pleased with the same objects than others are. That some things are beautiful, and others the opposite, has always been an universal sentiment. Beauty is a very comprehensive term, and may be applied to a variety of objects, both external and internal. Thus, we say a beautiful horse, a beautiful tree; a beautiful poem. Colour and form are constituents of beauty. Whatever object has its qualities in high perfection, is accounted beautiful. A child will choose a pebble from a large heap, which appears to him to have the most beautiful colour, and neatest form. This choice of the child would also be the choice of a man, provided utility have no influence on him. Colour is the most simple of all the qualities belonging to the beautiful in nature. The most refined colours of art can never equal in simplicity and beauty, the colors in the rainbow. Some particular colors please some people more than others according to their association with ideas in different minds. All men have acknowledged the rainbow to be a most beautiful object, and its different colors to be in the highest perfection. In figures, uniformity, and variety, contribute greatly to beauty, if the variety be not carried to too great an extent. A circle is more beautiful than a square, and a square than a polygon; because the variety in the polygon destroys the uniformity in too great a degree. To render an object beautiful, in works of art, it is necessary to pay attention to colour,

proportion, regularity, simplicity, and fitness to an end. These are obvious in a well formed house. Colour regards the materials: proportion requires the materials to be of proper size, and to be neatly put together; regularity regards the arrangement of the whole according to rule—that the doors and windows, as to size and distance, correspond with one another, and with the other parts of the building: simplicity respects the omission of all superfluity and fantastical show of ornament: fitness to an end requires that there be nothing wanting, that is necessary to fit it for answering the end for which it was intended. Now the beauty of a house, a tree or a garden is different from a poem. We should, therefore, attend to its original meaning. Beauty seems to have been originally applied to objects of sight. Objects well formed and of agreeable colour, were always found to excite pleasant emotions: and the term beauty, by an easy transition, has been applied to any objects that excite such emotions. Here, for the better illustration of the subject, I would make two remarks.

1st. That the mind is conscious of a pleasant emotion which is excited by the perception of a beautiful object. Here we should observe, that the emotion excited by perception of a beautiful object is pleasant and *gay*, whilst that which is excited by a grand object, is pleasant and *serious*.

2nd. That the mind has a belief that the qualities which constitute beauty, do really exist in the object. I have been induced to make these remarks, and especially the latter, in order to guard you against some errors, into which some Philosophers some times fall, who say that 'heat, cold, colour, &c., do not really exist in the mind that perceives them.' Yet, they acknowledge that we are convinced by our senses, that these qualities do really exist in the objects: but say also that "nature, for wise purposes, deceives us, and that philosophy sets us right." But it must be a very ridiculous sort of philosophy that contradicts the common sense and universal

experience of mankind. It would be ridiculous to attempt to convince a man that greenness does not belong to the forest in summer, whiteness to snow, or heat to a hot body. And he would be justly met with contempt who would attempt to convince a lover that beauty does not exist in his sweet heart, but exists only in his own mind. But, however ridiculous and unphilosophical it may be, they attempt to prove it by saying that 'by rubbing our fingers over a soft velvet surface, we refer the pleasure we feel to the ends of our fingers, and not to our minds.' But we do the same in all other cases, that is, our senses are the only medium by which external things convey sensation to the mind. I bruise my heel. I refer the pain I feel to my heel. But if my mind were separated from my body, I could not feel this pain.

We now proceed to the better illustration of this subject, by dividing beauty into two kinds, original and derived.

Original beauty is that which an object of itself possesses, without any assistance from art, or any relation to any other object. Derived beauty is that which the object receives from art, or from its relation to some other object. The beauty of the sun is original. The beauty of the moon is derived. You will recollect while treating on taste, it was observed that every species of being has peculiar properties belonging to itself, which distinguish it from all others. Thus man has peculiar properties belonging to him which distinguish him from every other creature. In whatever object we see the peculiar properties of its species, in high perfection, we say that it is a beautiful object. Thus we say a beautiful man, a beautiful woman, a beautiful horse, &c.

In objects, whose beauty is derived, the chief thing to be considered, is their fitness for answering a desirable end. Thus a plough is a beautiful object when it is well adapted to the end for which ploughs are intended. A ship is beautiful when it is well adapted to the use of commerce and navigation. Any machine is beautiful

when well calculated to answer the purpose for which it was designed.

Original and derived beauties frequently are found in the same objects. A horse may possess all the properties belonging to his species in great perfection, and at the same time he may have the training that renders him well fitted for the use of riding, or the draught. A beautiful man may have his features made more beautiful by increase of knowledge, and the cultivation of a sweet temper and amiable dispositions. Simplicity and fullness as well as fitness, contribute to the beauty of works of art. Objects that are beautiful are without any thing superfluous, and without deficiency. Superfluity or a defect will always lessen the beauty of any object. This may be considered a good criterion by which to judge of beauty: a just description of a beautiful object will cause a pleasant emotion, yet, not so strong as the object itself, if placed before the senses. Beauty in composition, consists in the proper choice of words, and their arrangement so as to express the sense clearly and plainly. The style should always be simple and plain, free from bombast, and also frigidness, for the more simple and plain the language is, it is the more beautiful.

The display of ingenuity, design and contrivance adds greatly to beauty in the works of art: but in the works of nature, the most beauty appears in the display there made, of Gods power and wisdom in the adaptation of the means to their respective ends, and these ends to the promotion of one, the ultimate, greatest and best end. When we take into view the Globe on which we live, and find it furnished with all things necessary for man's temporal happiness, and ornamented with the various beauties, which every where present themselves to our view: When we consider the order in which she moves round the sun in her orbit, to produce the succession of seasons, and also her revolution around her axis, every twenty four hours, to produce alternately day and night;

that she is surrounded by a vast atmosphere for the benefit of man, and all living creatures: I say, when we take into view all these things, we may justly conclude that they indicate infinite wisdom, power and goodness in Him who formed, preserves and governs the whole.

We shall conclude this lecture with a few observations, relative to the beauty of the human frame, as to colour, form, expression and grace. If we examine from the equator to the poles, we will find a variety of colour in the human species, and probably every nation thinks its own colour the most beautiful. We may observe, that any colour that indicates health and vigor is beautiful, but the color that shows languor and decay is disagreeable. The form of the human body is certainly more beautiful than the form of any other creature with which we are acquainted. The great variety of parts, all formed with exquisite skill, exactly filled to answer their several ends, and adorned with an agreeable mixture of colours, contribute to make man an object most beautiful. To the beauty of form is added an indescribable beauty of countenance called expression. The creator has constituted the face of man so pliant and flexible that it expresses almost all the qualities of the mind. That countenance which expresses courage, good sense, compassion and benevolence is beautiful; but on the contrary, that which expresses cowardice, ignorance, selfishness and cruelty is truly disgusting. A beautiful countenance in females is that which expresses modesty, sensibility and humanity; but that which expresses wantonness, ignorance and pride is uncomely.

Gracefulness is a quality of motion, and contributes to the beauty of man. Graceful motion is that which is easy, smooth, unaffected and indicates composure, serenity and cheerfulness of mind, prevalence or some amiable disposition: but an affected, awkward jerking, violent motion that indicates pain, vanity, pride, laziness or any odious temper, habit or disposition, is ungraceful and displeasing.

Questions on Lecture XIX.

What is the subject of this lecture? Does beauty please all men equally? Do colour and form contribute to beauty? To render an object in art beautiful, we must attend to what? What two remarks are made? How is beauty divided? What is original beauty? Derived beauty is what? Examples. When does an object appear to have original beauty? In objects, whose beauty is derived, what is chiefly to be considered? Do original and derived beauties ever meet in the same object? Examples. What would be a good criterion by which to judge of the beauty of objects? The beauty of composition consists in what? The display of what adds beauty to works of art? What is said about colour in the human species?—about the form of the human body?—the countenance?—what expression is beautiful?—What is disgusting? What is graceful?

LECTURE XX—INSTINCT, CONCEPTION AND IMAGINATION.

Instinct is a blind impulse impelling to action without a view to consequences, without deliberation, and often without knowing what we do. Thus an infant cries by instinct without knowing it will excite pity in its parent, or be the means of obtaining sustenance. The instinct of pain causes every other creature to cry. It is by instinct that any being, when pained, cries out without consideration. Prompted by a similar impulse, infants, and the young of all animals, suck nutriment from their mothers, without knowing it to be necessary for the preservation of life, or for the gratification of hunger. The action of sucking is done with great facility. The muscles necessary for the performance of all instinctive actions are so constituted that they work without thought or deliberation. An infant breathes without knowing the vivifying quality of the air, or determining to use it for the preservation of life.

In the progress of human life, experience and observation, teach us that there are many actions for the performance of which, volition and intention are necessary, and that there are many that are to be performed so often, and in so quick succession, that we could not deliberate and determine to act every time that action is necessary. In many cases we act without thought or desire, and sometimes even contrary to volition. Thus we continue constantly to breathe, whether awake or asleep, without thought, desire or intention. If we were obliged to think every time we breathe, or to determine to breathe every time breath is necessary, it would be impossible to attend to the business of life. To provide against this inconveniency the all-wise author of our nature, has so ordered that, in this case, as in many others, we should act by instinct, and independently of design and volition. I see the point of a sword, directed to my breast; upon its approach I am immediately impelled to start backward, though I am assured that I am in no danger. The frequent winking of our eyes is necessary to preserve them in a state of soundness and lustre. This we perform with the greatest ease and without any predetermination to do it; nor can we easily prevent ourselves from winking. If my friend make a motion at my face with his hand, although I am determined at first not to shut my eyes, yet at the appearance of approaching danger instinct overcomes my determination, and I am impelled to shut them instinctively. There are many other cases in which we are actuated exclusively by instinct. When we slip, we lose that balance which is necessary to keep the body upright and firm, we are immediately prompted to recover ourselves, by throwing out our hands or some other motion of the body which is necessary to restore the equilibrium; and if we find this impossible, we throw out our arms to break the fall. The actions of the inferior animals are performed by instinct generally, but those of men by reason. That animals come to perfec-

tion so soon is very remarkable. We have no reason to believe that bees now build their cells in a manner different from that in which they built them in Virgil's time, or that they have made any great improvement in their manner. But every work of art has had an inventor, who discovered and designed it, and constant improvements are made in works of art, from age to age. That this is not the case in the works of inferior animals is evident from experience and observation—from the wonderful construction of the nests of many birds, the productions of the silkworm, the webs of spiders, and the unexampled skill exhibited in the combs of bees; all these exceed the works of any artist. It is well known that bees construct their cells on opposite sides, fit for holding the honey and rearing their young. There are only three possible figures that will make cells all equal and similar, without any variation: viz, the equilateral triangle, the square, and the regular hexagon. Of these three the hexagon is the most proper for convenience and strength. The bees, as if they knew this, make their cells regular hexagons. As the combs have cells on both sides, the cells may be exactly opposite, with partition against partition, or the bottom of the cell may rest upon the partition between the cells on the other side which will serve as a buttress to strengthen it. The latter way is the best for strength. Accordingly the bottom of each cell rests against the the point where three partitions on the other side meet, and give it all possible strength. The bottom of the cell may be either one plane, perpendicular to the side partitions, or it may be composed of several planes, meeting in a point in the middle. It is only in one of these two ways that all the cells can be made similar without losing any room. Now it has been demonstrated that by making the bottoms of the cells to consist of three planes meeting in a point, there is a saving of materials and labor. The bee, as if acquainted with the principles of solid geometry, follows this manner of construction most ac-

curately: the bottom consists of three planes, which make obtuse angles with the side partitions and with one another, and meet in a point in the middle of the bottom; the three angles or planes being supported by the three partitions on the other side of the comb, and the point by the common intersection of the partitions. It has been a curious question, "At what precise angle the three planes, which compose the bottom of the cell, should meet to make the greatest saving of materials and labor?" The solution of this question clearly shows that the bee, in making its comb, works most geometrically without knowing any thing of Geometry. But the truth is, the geometry or wisdom displayed in making its comb, is not in the bee; it works by instinct.

It is by instinct that the young of animals are prompted to suck the dugs of their mothers, without knowing that this is necessary for the support of life. By instinct the infant is soothed by the smiling countenance of its mother, and affrightened by her angry countenance.

In man there is a kind of instinctive imitation. Thus, if a man come into a neighborhood of people, whose customs and dialect are different from his own, and at first even disagreeable to him, yet, by frequent intercourse, he will adopt their dialect and many of their customs. It is, therefore, highly important that young people should be very careful in choosing the company they are to keep, while their passions are strong and they are more prone to imitation than they will be when they shall arrive at riper age; for by keeping bad company, they are likely to contract bad habits, that will prove injurious both to their present and future welfare. It is very difficult to restrain evil habits when they have been formed, even when their injuriousness is discovered.

We come now to explain conception and imagination. Conception is the image, notion or representation, which the mind forms of an absent object. When m

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friend is present, I perceive him and am conscious that I perceive him as being present; but when he is absent I remember him, and when I form an image of his structure, complexion, &c., I have a conception of him. Memory respects what is past, but conception is not limited to any point of time. I can remember that I have seen Philadelphia, but I can only have a conception of ancient Troy. Memory does not always imply conception: for I can remember that I saw a person twenty years ago; but can have no conception of his size, shape or complexion. Nor does conception always imply belief of the real existence of its object. If any person would describe to me the structure of a Centaur, I could conceive of such a being, yet, I firmly believe that no such thing ever existed. Some philosophers have asserted that belief is never implied in conception; but I am led by experience to think otherwise. When I conceive of my absent friend, I as firmly believe that my conception of him is true, as that he is my friend.

Imagination is a complex operation, and not easy to be understood. I shall, therefore, analyze it. I can form an image in my mind, of a horse seven feet high, and having wings and claws. Here it is easy to perceive that memory, invention and conception are essentially necessary in forming this image in my mind. I remember that I have seen a horse and wings and claws. Invention joins them together and extends the image to the height of seven feet. By conception I form a representation of the image thus composed. Imagination literally signifies the discovery of some thing before unknown. I think in imagination we are always conscious of an effort. Thus, I form in my mind the image of the horse above mentioned. I have to call to mind the idea of a horse, extend him by imagination to seven feet in height, and then conceive of the image thus formed. It is easy to see that imagination does not always imply belief: for though I can imagine such a

monster as a horse with wings and claws, yet, I do not believe that such an animal ever existed.

Imagination and conception have generally been used as synonymous terms, and it is sometimes difficult to mark the difference between them. I think, strictly speaking, the operation of imagination in the mind is prior to that of conception in those things that have no real existence: for the image must first be formed in the mind before we can conceive of it. Conception has for its objects things that do exist, either in reality, or as the creatures of the imagination, and is a simple operation of the mind: but imagination is a complex term that is not applied to objects which have real existence, but the mind, by compounding and extending such things as are known, forms a notion of something that has no real existence.

From what has been said on imagination, it is easy to account for that fearfulness of apparitions which so generally prevails amongst mankind. They being accustomed in childhood, to hear frightful stories concerning apparitions, told them with the confidence of truth, are so strangely impressed that they are afraid to walk alone in the night, though they are convinced of the folly of such fear. Yet, by imagination, the ideas of darkness and of danger are so associated together as to cause us to fear.

Questions on Lecture XX.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is instinct? Examples. What is said of the muscles for instinctive action? What does experience teach? Is instinct dependent on design and will? Examples. Inferior animals act from what? Man from what? What in animals is remarkable? Do they improve in their manner of working?

What is remarkable in the construction of the combs of bees? Are men's works of art improved? How do bees construct their cells? Are bees acquainted with geometry? By what are they guided? Could any

Geometrician plan the cells better? By what are infants and animals guided in sucking sustenance? Does instinctive imitation belong to man? How does this appear? Why should young people avoid bad company?

What is conception? Examples. Memory has respect to what? Is conception limited to any point of time? Does memory imply conception? Example. Does conception always imply a belief of the reality of its object? Example. Is belief ever implied in conception? Example. What is imagination? What operations does it include? Examples. What are remembered? Invention does what? Conception does what? Imagination literally signifies what? Does imagination always imply an effort?—belief? Example. Whether is imagination or conception prior in the mind? Why? What is the difference between imagination and conception? How do you account for the common fear of apparitions?

LECTURE XXI—ON THE RELATIVE STATE OF MAN.

In the preceding lectures we have briefly explained the leading principles of human nature. Our researches might have been much extended, but in a course of Academical study, a very extended knowledge of this or any one subject, is not to be expected yet, it is expected that the principles be well understood, and when understood, the application of them is easy in the acquisition of more extensive knowledge in future researches. We now proceed to consider man in his relative state, and point out some of the principle duties which arise out of his relations. Man in his relative state, may be considered in three points of view: 1st. As he is related to God. 2nd. As related to his fellow men, and, 3rd. As related to himself. But before we

tully enter upon this subject, it will be necessary to answer two important questions. 1st. What reason have we for believing that there is such a being as God? and, 2nd. If there be a God what properties does he possess? Before we answer these questions it will be necessary to take, as granted, some plain truths as first principles, viz: 1st. I take it as granted that I exist. 2nd. That there is a material world. 3rd. That there are certain relations between things. 4th. That no one thing can be the cause of its own existence. 5th. That whatever begins to be, must have a cause. 6th. When we discover marks of intelligence in the effect, we infer intelligence in the cause that has produced it. The first three having been stated before, we would not have introduced them now, had it not been necessary in reasoning upon any subject, to have in view the principles on which our arguments are founded. The fourth is, that no thing can be the cause of itself. Now if this be not true, then a thing *may exist and not exist* at the same time, and a thing *may act before it has existence*, which would be an absurd supposition. The fifth is, that whatever begins to be, must have a cause. This truth is a universal sentiment of mankind. The sixth is, that whenever we discover marks of intelligence in the effect, we infer there must have been intelligence in its cause. Thus, if we find, in a wilderness, a neatly constructed edifice, we immediately conclude that some intelligent builder was its cause, and that the structure is not the production of Nature, of irrational beasts, or of undesigning chance, but of a being that had intellect and a rule to work by.

Taking the above principles as granted, which are as plain as any propositions in Euclid, we infer that something must have existed from eternity, or nothing could have existed. This same thing we call the eternal and self-existent God. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to conceive clearly of an eternal and self-existent being. Yet, this difficulty is no argument against the belief of such a being: for there are many things which we do

believe, and cannot avoid believing, that we cannot clearly conceive of. Every man believes there is a union between soul and body, but no one can conceive of that union. I believe there is a self-existent being, not because I can clearly conceive of him, but because I am constrained to believe, by evidence that will not admit a doubt, concerning the object. The Psalmist has, therefore, wisely said, "The fool hath said in his heart there is no God."

We may observe that as there are some things true, of which we cannot have a clear conception; so also, we can have conception of some things that are not true, or have no real existence. I can conceive of Don Quixotte and his Squire Sancho Panza, yet I do not believe there were any such beings. As before observed, there are many things which we believe to be true, of which we can have no clear conception, so I believe there is one self-existent being, though I cannot comprehend this being clearly. There have been many arguments advanced to prove the existence of God, but we shall mention only a few. In every species of beings, and in every form of matter, we have strong proof of the being of some great first cause. When we contemplate the heavens above, decorated with vast numbers of shining orbs, dispersed through unbounded space, the sun scattering his rays in every direction, and the earth beneath with its surface diversified with oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, mountains, valleys, continents and islands, all composed of a few simple constituents, combined so variously as to exhibit almost an infinite variety of kinds, species and individuals; all fitted for answering innumerable subordinate ends, and also one great ultimate end of the whole. All exhibit works of superior power and design in their first cause. When we take a view of the planets revolving round the sun in order, we see the effects of unsearchable wisdom in some being who must have arranged, and who governs them. This wisdom we call infinite, because we cannot set to

in any bounds. When we contemplate the structure of our own bodies and see how beautifully the several parts are formed, how nicely they are adjusted, and exactly fitted for performing the several functions assigned them, we are a wonder to ourselves, and we cannot find out the depth of that wisdom and power, that formed us. When we contemplate the earth and water, filled with innumerable living creatures, all (for ought we know) capable of enjoying happiness, we plainly see that nothing is made in vain; we, therefore, conclude there must have been an intelligent great first cause, that existed before all creatures, self-existent from eternity, who is unbounded in goodness as well as in wisdom and power, who gave existence to these beings. This first cause we call God.

We also have a book, called the Bible, which leads us to the same conclusion. This book contains such internal evidence, and is accompanied with such external also, as clearly prove that its origin is not human, and can be no other than that infinite first cause himself whom it reveals and teaches us to call God.

Having briefly stated a few of the reasons for believing that there is a God, we come now to consider what properties he possesses. The attributes of God have generally been divided into two classes, Natural and Moral; not because either of these are separate from the divine character, but because they are found in different degrees in inferior beings. Thus we often find in men great intellectual powers, joined with bad moral dispositions, and sometimes weak intellectual powers, joined with good moral disposition. Another reason for this division of the divine perfection is, that the manner of ascertaining them is different. The natural perfections of God are inferred chiefly from the material world, but his moral perfections mainly from the nature of man. The natural perfections of God are, *spirituality, immensity, wisdom and power*. To these might be added *eternity and immutability*. Wherever we find marks of in-

telligence in an effect, we infer its cause must have been intelligent. That God is a spirit is evident, because wisdom belongs to him; and wisdom is not a property of matter but of spirit only. It is difficult to conceive of a spirit, abstract from its operations, and no less difficult to conceive of operations without an operator: so also it is difficult to conceive of matter abstract from its properties, and of the properties of matter as the properties of nothing. The truth is, we cannot conceive of any object wholly abstract from all its properties; but we may conceive of objects as qualified by their properties.

Questions on Lecture XXI.

What is the subject of this lecture? To whom is man considered as related? What previous questions must first be answered? What must first be taken as granted? What is the first?—the second?—the third?—the fourth?—the fifth?—the sixth? Why are the first three introduced here? What must follow if the fourth be not true? How does it appear that the fifth is true? What example illustrates the sixth? From these principles what is inferred? Is it easy to conceive of an eternal, self-existent being? Does this difficulty disprove it? What else do we believe that we cannot conceive clearly? What constrains us to believe there is such a being? Are some things true that we cannot conceive of? Can we conceive of some things that are not true? Examples. We find proof of a first cause in what? What exhibit marks of power in the first cause?—wisdom?—intelligence and goodness, in the first cause? What besides the creation and government of the universe, proves the being of God? How does it appear that the Bible is a credible witness on the subject? The attributes of God are divided how? What reasons for this division? His natural perfections are inferred from what? His moral from what? What are his natural perfections?—moral What? What evidence have we that God is a spirit? Is it easy

to conceive of a spirit abstract from its operations?—
or of operations without an operator?

LECTURE XXII—THE RELATIVE STATE OF MAN CONTINUED.

Immensity is that property of the divine being by which he is, at all times, every where present. Here a question arises, whether space can be, with propriety, applied to spirit? A spirit cannot operate where it is not. God's operations can be circumscribed within no smaller bounds than the utmost extent of creation, which can only be known to himself. His presence, therefore, must be in all space, included within the limits of creation. If God be an infinite spirit he may not only fill the limits of creation with his presence, but immensity of space unlimited. We know that created spirits are limited in their operations. With regard to ourselves, we know that our spirits are confined to our bodies while connected with them, that we are here and nowhere else. Wisdom, as a property of God, is infinite knowledge, and implies his aim at good ends, and the knowledge of the best means for accomplishing good ends. In all the works of creation, at least as far as we know, the best means have been used for the accomplishment of the best ends. Power is that perfection by which God is able to do all things that are objects of power. Two opposites cannot both at the same time be proper objects of power. It is no limitation of God's power to say, that he cannot make a thing exist and at the same time not exist. Power is a term of very general signification, and is applied to every thing that moves or is moved. When it is applied to ourselves we have some idea of mechanical force, because we are so limited in our nature that we cannot move any other body without first moving our own, and being so accustomed to use the term when such force is applied, we

generally affix the idea of power to the idea of mechanical force, but when the term is applied to the supreme being, no mechanical force should be conceived to be included, because he is purely a spirit; and the term power, when applied to him means nothing more than his will, as evidently appears from the description Moses gives of creation's work: "And God said let there be light and there was light." He wills the effect and immediately it comes to pass. We have something similar to this in our constitution. We find from experience that the choice of our minds determines the motions of our bodies, and as long as the volition continues, so long the motions continue. So it is with the supreme being. He has more power over all the material universe, than we have over our own bodies. He can move all bodies with greater ease than we can move our fingers.

The holiness of God is the aggregate of all his moral perfection, and includes his justice, goodness and truth. Sin, its opposite, is a general term also, which is used to express all moral evil.

Justice is a fixed and unalterable disposition in God to render to all, that which is due to them, whether rewards or punishments. Goodness is a disposition to promote happiness and show kindness. Mercy expresses a modification of goodness, and is a placable disposition in God. Goodness has for its object the happiness of beings that are not illdeserving and capable of enjoying happiness. But mercy has for its object the happiness of beings capable of enjoying it, that are both miserable and illdeserving, or guilty.

Truth is that perfection of the divine nature that makes it impossible for God to lie. Falsehood amongst creatures always arises from weakness, or from wickedness in them, but in God there is no weakness nor wickedness, consequently there can be in him no want of veracity or integrity. Faithfulness does not essentially differ from truth, and is nothing more than a uniform

and persevering conformity with his truth and other attributes pledged for the accomplishment of certain ends.

With this infinitely perfect being man is connected in important relations, out of which arise certain rights and obligations.

1st. Man is related to God as his Creator. Hence God has a *right* to require man to submit to his will, and man is under *obligations* to render to him this submission, for right and obligation always imply each other. Man has the right to use or dispose of, at pleasure, the product of his own industry and skill.

2nd. Man is related to God as to a benefactor. God has not only made man capable of enjoying happiness, but also has furnished him with innumerable and inestimable objects of enjoyment. Whenever favors are received, the receiver is laid under the obligation of gratitude to his benefactor and is bound to use them as the will of the giver prescribes.

3d. Man is related to God as to his law-giver. It is God's undoubted right to give laws for the government of his intelligent creatures and beneficiaries. Hence arises obligation resting on us to yield obedience to his laws. It is a universal sentiment that the right to make laws implies a correspondent obligation to obey those laws.

4th. Man is related to God as to his Judge. Man is so constituted by his maker that he has a sense of responsibility when he learns his duty, and feels his obligation to perform. This lays us under obligation to study to have all our moral conduct, such as will meet his approbation. As these relations make our general obligation to God sufficiently plain, we shall now consider the duties we owe to him as they may be summed up under two classes, first, internal, and secondly, external duties.

1st. The internal duties may be comprehended under two heads, 1. A moral state, bias, disposition or in-

clination of soul, such as Adam had before the fall, predisposing us to give the preference to right moral conduct when discovered. 2. Right mental exercises; which may be arranged under three heads, *love, fear and trust*. Under *love* are comprehended esteem, gratitude and every benevolent passion, which have for their object God as a being possessing lovely properties. A question has been often raised whether "Love to God be disinterested or selfish?" When we love inferior objects, our love may be selfish or disinterested, or it may be mixed. When I love an object merely for its own excellence, without any view to my own happiness, this is disinterested love; but when I love an object only because I see it is calculated to promote my happiness, then my love is selfish; so when I esteem an object for its amiable qualities which I perceive, and also for its adaptedness as a means to promote my happiness, I call this mixed love. I doubt not but the mind may be so wholly occupied in the contemplation of God, as to have no regard to self, but is not the mind happy in this contemplation? If so, will it not desire the continuation and increase of this happiness? And when it has subsided will it not seek the renewal of it, by resorting to the contemplation of the same lovely object? It is impossible for the soul of man, constituted as it is, to desire misery, or be indifferent as to misery or happiness. Where there is no desire, there can be no gratification, and where there is no desire, a stimulus, prompting to action, will be wanting. God is a proper object of desire as well as of esteem; loving God, therefore, is a gratification of that desire, and desire a motive exciting us to pursue gratification. Fear includes those exercises that are expressed by the terms awe, reverence, &c., which have for their object a being of infinite greatness, majesty, wisdom and power, as well as purity. That servile dread that arises out of a sense of guilt, distrust and hatred of God, being not dutiful, is not included in this class. The perfect exercise of love to

God, casts this slavish fear out of the heart.

Trust is a continual reliance on God for all we need, and submission to be at his disposal and ordering, with all our interests, and implies a confidence that all things are to be well under his management. This class has for its object God, as a being of infinite veracity, faithfulness, goodness, power, wisdom and immutability. This class of exercises spring up in the mind from a perception of its object, of God's promises, and of those promises as being made to us.

2nd. Having very briefly brought to view the internal duties we owe to God, we proceed to the consideration of the external.

The external duties may be all summed up in few words. They are all proper expressions of the internal exercises, love, fear and trust. If the internal exercises be really due to God, and if he has so constituted us that we are capable of making the external expression of them, this external expression also must be due to him; and if due to him, he who is infinitely just and faithful, cannot fail to require it of us. The external expression of the internal sentiments, is made by prayer, thanksgiving and praise, by keeping all God's ordinances and obeying all his commandments.

Though we cannot render God more happy or glorious in himself, who is already infinitely happy and glorious, by our loving, fearing, trusting, and worshipping him, yet these are duties, which ought to be performed, because the performance is justly due to him. The performance of them is profitable to ourselves, as the means by which right mental exercises are cultivated, cherished and strengthened—as the means by which our minds may be chastened, elevated, assimilated to the moral likeness of God, and prepared for communing with him, and for fellowship with holy beings.

Questions on Lecture XXII.

What is God's immensity?—his wisdom? Wisdom

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always implies what? Can two opposites be both proper objects of power at the same time? When power is applied to ourselves, what idea is always included in the term? When applied to God should the idea of mechanical force be included? Why? What does the term mean when applied to God? Examples. What in our constitution resembles this? Has God more power over the universe, than we over our bodies? What is the holiness of God?—his goodness?—mercy? What has goodness for its object?—mercy for its? Truth is what? Falsehood always arises from what? What is faithfulness? Rights and obligations arise out of what? In what relations is man connected with God? What rights of God arise out of these relations? What obligations on men rise out of them? The duties we owe God are of what two classes? The internal comprehend what? What do you mean by a right moral state? How may right mental exercises be classed? Love comprehends what? What its proper object? What properties may love for inferior objects have? When is it disinterested? When selfish? When mixed? Examples. When is our love to God disinterested? Are we interested in loving God? Is a desire of happiness constitutional in man? Can there be gratification when there is no desire? What prompts men to the contemplation of lovely objects? Fear includes what? What are their proper objects? What is excluded from this class? Why? Trust is what? Trust implies what? They have for their proper objects what? They rise in the mind from what? The external duties we owe to God may be summed how? How does it appear that this external expression is due to God from us? How is the expression to be made? Is the expression to benefit God? Why should it be practised? How may it be beneficial to ourselves?

LECTURE XXIII—ON CONSCIENCE.

The soul, mind or spirit of man is a living, thinking, active, immaterial being, endued by its creator with susceptibilities and capacities, which render it a fit subject of moral government. The soul is so constituted that it is susceptible of knowledge, and also of emotions or impressions corresponding with its knowledge. The soul is endued with a capacity for comparing known objects and for discovering a difference between virtue and vice, right and wrong, good and evil, when presented to its view—a capacity for feeling obligation, to obey a moral ruler, when he and his right to rule, and his will are known—a capacity for knowing by immediate perception of its own exercises and acts when its attention is directed to them—a capacity for feeling pleasure when its own acts are perceived to accord with the laws previously known, and remorse and horror, when they are seen, to be contrary to it. The soul is also endued with a capacity for choosing and refusing objects, and for exercising agency according to its own determinations. These susceptibilities, capacities and faculties, are constitutional principles, with which the human soul is indued by its creator. They belong to its nature and are innate, and not acquired. Having these constitutional principles, man is a moral being and a fit subject for moral government. As soon as the knowledge of his obligation to obey his ruler, and of the will of his ruler, as a rule of conduct, is acquired, he has a sense or feeling of obligation to obey, resting on him. Idiots and inferior animals, not being indued with these constitutional principles, are not moral beings and are not responsible to God as a moral governor; but we, who have them are responsible, and conscious of a sense of our responsibility to God for our exercise of moral agency.

What is conscience? various are the senses in which the term has been used, and different lexicographers have given various definitions of it. From this circumstance, the most, if not all the disputes on this subject have no doubt arisen, whilst the disputants have not differed so much in their views of the comprehension of the

term. The term conscience is a Latin participle transferred to the English language and is used by us as a noun, being changed only in its last syllable. *Consciens*, in Latin, is composed of two words, *con*, which signifies together, or in connection with, and *sciens*, which means exactly what we express by the word knowing. Some have used the term as the name of a distinct innate faculty of mind; some as the name of some emanation from God, infused into the mind to guide man to the knowledge of his duty; and others, as a name given only to that sense of guilt, remorse and horror which the guilty feel, or that pleasure which follows virtuous action. Regardless of these and other senses in which individuals have used the term. I would define it agreeably to its original meaning and the sense in which it is used in the Bible.

Conscience is the mind viewing its own acts in relation to a moral rule previously known and felt to be binding, and deciding or judging those acts to be agreeable to that rule.

The mind becomes acquainted with its own acts only by consciousness or immediate perception.—Its capacity for being conscious or immediately perceiving its own acts, its capacity for comparing them with the law, and deciding on their moral character, and its capacity for knowing the law and for feeling obligation to obey it, are all natural or innate capacities in man. These capacities may be improved but are never acquired. But the knowledge of our actions, of what the law requires and forbids, and of our obligation to obey, and also the judgment we pass on our own acts in the exercise of those innate capacities, are not innate but acquired.

We obtain certain knowledge of our own acts by consciousness whenever the attention is turned to them. But the knowledge of God's law, we can acquire only by the instrumentality of our bodily senses, exercised in learning it as revealed by the Bible, and by his works of creation and providence, and by our reasonable facul-

ties exercised in view of this revelation. Conscience, then, is the exercise of the human mind, and a result inseparable, both from innate capacities and from acquired knowledge and feeling of obligation. All we know of God, or of his law, or of our obligation we have acquired from the manifestation which he has made of himself, his law and our obligation, and from our perception of what he has manifested. Conscience is therefore, not one simple operation of the mind only, but a combination of many operations. An example will make this plain.

I swear profanely. Conscience condemns me as guilty, as a consequence of my swearing profanely. This judgment of my mind that I am guilty, implies a knowledge that the deed is done and a consciousness that I myself have done it; it implies that I *know* a law which forbids profane swearing as a crime. I must know also that that law was *binding* on me and required me not to do that deed.—It also implies a comparison of what I have done with my obligation to do otherwise, and a consequent perception of my act as contrary to my obligation.—Hence follows the decision or judgment that I am guilty of violating my obligation to obey the law, and that I now deserve punishment. All these operations of mind are included in what we call conscience and each one is essential to it. They are all the consequence of the mind's attention being directed to the act, the law, &c., and the effects of truth brought to bear upon the mind, and are the mind operating according to those constitutional capacities with which it is endued by its Creator.

The infant of a day having not the knowledge of law or of obligation to law, and having no opportunity for receiving the knowledge of law or a sense of obligation, for want of the developement and exercise of its innate capacities, cannot either approve or disapprove of its own actions. Here there is no law and can be no transgression. The heathen whose capacities are de-

veloped and exercised, are a law, unto themselves, having the law written on their minds. Their conscience accusing or excusing is proof of this. Their mental operations being more or less under the law of their own rational and moral nature, they cannot but perceive evidence of the existence of a Supreme Being exhibited by the light of nature. The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handy work. From this light of nature they learn that there is a difference between pleasure and pain, between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, obligation and independence, relative to some moral rule. Hence they have their idols and their forms of idolatrous worship. They have their national laws, by which they encourage the practice of many virtues, such as truth, fidelity, justice, &c., amongst themselves, and punish and suppress many vices such as crimes, frauds, impiety towards their gods, &c. Having the light of nature thus to teach them correctly concerning God and the relations they, as his creatures and beneficiaries, sustain to him, and consequently their obligation to him, and having their understanding more or less exercised in learning these instructions, and their agency exercised in conformity or opposition to these instructions, they are prepared for the exercise of conscience and for feeling pleasure or pain from a view of their actions as being right or wrong.

The possession of constitutional capacities for obeying God's law alone, does not constitute a ground of obligation to obey, without the opportunity for knowing the law and obligation to it, more than the publication of the law and its obligation on men alone, would bind men to obedience if they were destitute of the constitutional capacities. Both the capacities and the publication are necessary to lay a ground of obligation. The heathen have both, and having both, this constitutes a ground of obligation to obey the law as far as it is revealed. Conscious of having the capacity and of the perception of

the law as revealed by the light of Nature, they have a sense of obligation to obey. Hence they are a law unto themselves, and their minds approve or condemn their conduct accordingly. These constitutional capacities, the knowledge of duty and a turn of mind, inclination or disposition to obey, constitute ability or power.

Though these capacities and this knowledge lay the ground of obligation, yet they do not constitute power to obey it without the disposition, more than the disposition would constitute power without the capacities or knowledge. They are all three essential constituents of power.

A man may have a general disposition to obey God. This may give rise to a particular disposition for the performance of a particular part of his duty, but fail to excite a disposition essential to the performance of another part of duty. This failure must be a consequence of a misconception of the duty, or the counter influence of some vicious appetite, desire, habit or particular disinclination. The constitutional capacity, and opportunity to know duty, then, and not power to perform it, lay the ground of man's obligation.

His having power, which includes a disposition to do duty, would excuse a failure to perform it, whilst the want of a disposition leaves him without excuse at the bar of God or of his own mind. When civil law is enacted and published, every man is considered as under obligation to obey it, because he has the constitutional capacity for knowing and obeying it, and also opportunity to know his duty; his disposition to obey or disobey does not affect his obligation. The man who is disposed to pay his debts is neither more nor less bound to do so, than the man who is not disposed. God's law requires men to love him, who is infinite lovely, with supreme affection. The law is published, supreme excellence is exhibited, the man who loves him supremely is no more bound to love him than he who hates him. Inclination or moral state of mind in man cannot alter

his obligation nor the operations of conscience. If it could, then the deliberate murderer ought not to be punished, and the more he is inclined to commit murder he would be the less guilty; but the opposite of this is true. The more a man is inclined to hate God and practise all manner of wickedness, when he reflects upon his inclinations and obligation and sees the contrast between them, he is the more sensible of guilt. Hence a man in the world of ruin, when he can never forget the obligation he has been under to obey God, nor forget that an evil inclination led him to disobey, will ever reproach and condemn himself as guilty and deserving of punishment. The feeling of remorse, terror and horror cannot be prevented nor suppressed by the present evil disposition nor the will. As long as the unfailing memory will retain the knowledge of guilt, as the attention which can never cease, will be directed to it, so long will the operations of conscience inevitably continue and the consequent torment be perpetual.

Conscience has been called the voice of God, a monitor for God, and God's vicégerent in the human breast! It is such when the mind is sufficiently enlightened and its decisions accord with his revealed laws.

The question "Whether conscience is natural and innate, or acquired and the effect of education?" has been often controverted with zeal and devotion.—We consider this question as both very improper and absurd, because opposite answers may be given to it, which are both true. If we say conscience is *natural* and *innate*, because the constitutional capacities, essential to conscience, are natural and innate; this is undoubtedly true. If we say that conscience is acquired and the effect of *education*, because the knowledge of law, the feeling of obligation, and the decision of the mind, which are essential to conscience, are *acquired* and the *effects* of *education*; this is equally true. Again, if we say that conscience is *not natural*, or *innate*, because the knowledge of law, obligation, &c., essential to conscience, are

not natural or innate, but acquired; this is true. If we say conscience is *not acquired* nor the *effect of education*, because the constitutional capacities, essential to conscience, though they may be improved, are *not acquired* nor the *effects of education*; this also is true.

Those who consider the term, conscience, as comprehending the constitutional capacities only, which are essential to conscience, would consistently with this view, contend for the proposition, that conscience is natural and innate. Those who consider it as embracing only the *exercise* of these capacities and the knowledge, which are essential to conscience, would with equal consistency, advocate the proposition that conscience is acquired. Each has correct views of that part of the subject embraced by his definition of the term; but both are wrong in excluding from the meaning of the term, an essential part of its meaning. Conscience is the mind exercising its natural or innate capacities in viewing its own actions as they are related to a moral rule previously known and felt to be binding, and deciding or judging that those actions are agreeable or disagreeable to that rule.

AN ESSAY ON LIFE.

Life is not a being, but a state of being, in something which exists. Its opposite is death. Both life and death are alike predicated on the same being, which at one time is alive, and at another time is dead. Mind can exist only in the living state, but, matter, organised or unorganised, may exist as matter in either state. There are different kinds of life belonging to different orders of living beings. The great "I am," the only living God, possesses life which is underived, necessary, independent, immutable and eternal. Created minds possess another kind of life, which is essential to their existence as minds. Man, who is the connecting link between the material and immaterial worlds, has, superadded to the life last mentioned, a life which he enjoys in common with other animals. This is denominated animal life. When we descend still lower to the vegetable kingdom, we perceive the phenomena of another, and inferior kind of life, which is denominated vegetable life.

In those different states of living beings, we discern a regular gradation, so that each inferior state evidently approximates to that which is next in order above it; which all agree in exhibiting, but in different ways, the phenomena of life.

Our ideas of life are originally derived from consciousness. I am conscious of the operations of my own mind, of the reality of my existence as a person—that I have a body, and that this body is alive. These propositions need no proof, because they are self-evident, nor do they admit of proof because there are no principles more evident, from which their truth could be deduced in a process of reasoning. My belief, therefore, of my existence as a living and animated being, simply rests on the testimony of consciousness. But I am not conscious of the mental operations or animated

existence of other beings; consequently, my belief of their existence as minds, or as animals, or as living substances depends on another kind of evidence, either the testimony of other persons, or my own perception of certain phenomena of life, which they exhibit. This kind of evidence, however, could not produce in our minds a belief that such beings do exist in the living state, had not we, previously derived some ideas of life from our own consciousness. If, then, our ideas of life are primarily derived from consciousness, the best mode of correcting any false ideas we may acquire on this subject will be, to analyze the operations of our own minds in relation to life, and view them accurately in detail.

As different kinds of life, exhibiting different phenomena, exist in man, he is evidently formed for having intercourse with other grades of living beings, both superior and inferior to himself. No general definition of life can be given, that will apply to any two different kinds of life, because each kind, in some respects essentially differs from every other kind.

I know not that we ever have a direct and intuitive knowledge of life itself, aside from the phenomena it exhibits. We know that inert matter, whether in a moving or quiescent state, is always in a state of mobility; but this knowledge is derived not from an intuitive perception of this state of matter, but from the phenomena exhibited by it in the state of motion. So our consciousness of life results from our attention to some of the phenomena of the mind and of the body in a living state. We are apt to err on the subject of life, from considering it as a *being* having real existence, or as the *quality* of an existing subject. It is not a being, and therefore does not possess any one of all the properties of mind or matter. It is not a quality, because when abstracted, the subject to which it belonged remains essentially the same. The soul and body of man disunited undergo a change of state, yet retain their primary qualities.

Another source of error is the confounding of *life itself*, with the *phenomena* and *evidence* of life from which it ought to be distinguished. Life is that state in which the living being, under favorable circumstances, will exhibit the various phenomena of life, which correspond with such a state; and the phenomena, when perceived, are to us so many evidences that the being, in which they are exhibited, is in a living state. But the same being in the opposite state, or when dead, ceases to exhibit, when under the same circumstances, every one of these phenomena.

There are various different states in which living matter may exist. If we trace an animal from its existence in embryo to its state of maturity, and from maturity to the verge of declining life, at every step we are met by a succession of changes. We see it motionless, and again in active excitement—asleep and presently awake—congealed with chilling frosts, and afterwards resisting cold with all the energies of vitality—in a death-like torpor, with every sense completely locked and every power dormant, then, after weeks and months have past them in this state of insensibility, again renewing every animal and vital function, and exhibiting all the phenomena of perfect life.

Life may be truly predicated of a being though, some of its members be destroyed, and some of its functions ceased to be performed. We know not how far the work of destruction may possibly extend, and yet vitality be still preserved. This, however, is certain. An animal may still be alive after many of its limbs have been amputated, and after the the process of putrefaction has widely spread its ravages. Perhaps the general decomposition of the body is the only infalible indication of extinguished life.

Life is prior to all the phenomena peculiar to the living state. It is vitality co-operating with the appropriate stimuli by which all these phenomena are produced. When a change of state, from life to death, has occur-

ed, the same stimuli, operating on the same organized substance, prove inadequate to the production of any one of all the phenomena of life, but, a series of affinities which denote the absence of life is the only result.

It appears to be a dictate of common sense, that all the phenomena peculiar to the living state, depend as well on the preexistence of life itself, as on the influence of stimuli. For this reason most of the phenomena apparent in animated beings, are commonly expressed by verbs indifferently used, either in the active or passive voice. Such language is so common and familiar, that we often use it in a vague or figurative manner, to express the motions of dead matter, especially those which bear some resemblance to the phenomena of life.

From the view I have taken of this subject, I am led to reject all the theories of life, which are founded on the suppositions that life is a substance, either material or spiritual—that it is a primary quality of a substance—or that it is the same with irritability, excitability or a susceptibility of impressions from stimuli; and to adopt the conclusion, that life is simply a state of being, which state is coeval with the existence of its living subject, and in which the living being, under the influence of appropriate exciting powers, will exhibit those phenomena, which are objects of its original destination. In consistency with this conclusion, I consider the terms health and disease, watchfulness and sleep, excitement and torpor as expressing so many modifications or changes of the living state, which are attended with different phenomena, but are not inconsistent with vitality; and the term death, as expressing that final change of the vital state, which is incompatible with life and all its functions.

The second inquiry is: What are the distinguishing phenomena of mental, animal and vegetable life?

To find a satisfactory solution of this question, it will

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be necessary to take a general view, at least of the most prominent phenomena of the three kinds of life mentioned. Examples of the two first we find in man, and of the last in the vegetable kingdom.

Man is a compound being, composed of substances whose natures and qualities are essentially different. That mind and matter are combined in the constitution of man, has been the common sentiment of mankind in all ages and all nations. It would be strange indeed, if not wholly incredible, that a belief so common and universal, should have no foundation in truth. But this belief, while it accords with reason, is yet independent of it, and rests on the testimony of consciousness. Man, in the present state of his existence, is conscious that he possesses a body. He betrays this consciousness, when he resists or evades the operation of such physical causes as threaten to make an unfavorable impression upon it. He is equally conscious of the existence of a thinking principle. This thinking principle possesses properties inconsistent with, and dissimilar to all the known properties of the body. It can travel, if I may use the figurative expression, from world to world without motion and without change of position. Can this be truly predicated of any material substance?

The distinguishing phenomena of mental life, are the various exercises of the understanding, the affections and the will. Where one of these faculties exists, and wherever one of these phenomena is exhibited, there, the presence of a living and immaterial substance is infallibly indicated.

The following statement will give a concise and general view of the phenomena of animal life. An animal, that it may continue to live, "must have the free use of air, as applied by the organs of respiration. In order to grow, it must have likewise food, which is a substance somehow adapted to its constitution; and which, on being received into the system, is prepared by *digestion*—taken up by *absorption*—distributed by *circula-*

tion—assimilated by nutrition. And the whole carried on by means of *secretion*.

We again may perceive that the functions are all dependent on a general principle—*irritability*. By which the system is rendered by stimulants susceptible of *motion*—accommodates itself to different circumstances by means of *habit*—alters its shape by successive *transformation*—produces the species by *generation*, and when the business of life is finished, is after many a languid affection, *sleep*. It is at last subjected to the fate of all living bodies, *death*.”—*Dobsons Encyclopedia*.

To the above statement we may add, that animated bodies have the property of preserving a temperature, either above or below, as necessity may require, the surrounding medium in which they may happen to be placed, and of resisting the operation of other physical causes, which, if operating on the same bodies when devoid of life, would infallibly produce decomposition and putrifaction.

These phenomena, however, when collectively viewed, can constitute a very obscure line of distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Most of them exist in greater perfection in animals; yet, something very nearly allied to each is perceptible in plants. Were we here to terminate our views of the animal economy, we would be strongly tempted to consider animals and vegetables, as only different species of one common genus.

But extending our views a little farther, we discern the phenomena of *sensation* and *voluntary motion*, which are true characteristics of animals. Now if the *vis inertiae*, or inactivity of matter, which universally is accounted one of its essential properties, be no philosophical illusion, it then follows that something more than matter enters into the composition of every animal, which makes it capable of feeling pleasure or pain, and of voluntary, action under the influence of its perceptions, emotions and propensities.

Let us now inquire for the distinguishing phenomena of vegetable life. Vegetables devoid of sensation and voluntary motion, by these phenomena are distinguished from animals. By their organization, their growth from secretion and assimilation, their powerful resistance of the operation of physical causes, while they continue in the living state, and by the various and peculiar phenomena, which are common to animals and vegetables, a conspicuous line of discrimination, is drawn between the vegetable and animal kingdoms.

One question more still remains to be considered.

What is the efficient cause of life?

The living state of mind or body is universally viewed as being an *effect*, and must, therefore, be attributed to some cause either real or imaginary. It will tend to facilitate and render more conspicuous our views of this subject, to mark well the distinction that has been made and which evidently exists in nature, between life itself and all its variegated phenomena. Without keeping in view this distinction, our ideas must necessarily be indistinct and confused. This being premised, I am ready to state and to defend the following proposition. That the life of any created being is an effect produced by the omnipotent will of the Creator.

In the production of this and similar effects, he is pleased to employ his almighty energy agreeably to certain prescribed laws; and with a view to the free agency and general happiness of rational creatures, to bring into operation a variety of secondary causes. These laws are not agents, yet their existence is necessary to render the free agency of finite intelligences a real blessing, instead of the greatest misfortune; and these secondary causes, although they have an agency, yet their efficiency is dependent on the operation of the first and only efficient cause. It is, therefore, truly said, that in God "We live, move and have our being." At no period since the formation of the material world has one particle of matter been endued with animation, or put in

motion without the positive agency of mind. If we assert that inactivity is an essential property of matter, and that any body has an inherent property of moving itself or communicating motion to other bodies, independent of the agency of mind, the assertion will contain an irreconcilable contradiction. If, then, we admit what never can be disproved, that inactivity is essential, it will then follow that neither organization nor chymical combinations, can impart life and motion to a dead body. It is in vain to object that material substances, devoid of organization and life, obedient to the laws of attraction and affinity, undoubtedly present the most active phenomena. These phenomena are certainly produced agreeably to prescribed laws, the knowledge of which will enable us to predict with certainty future results; but these laws are not active properties of matter, nor are they agents by which the visible effects are produced. These effects depend on the operation of a cause exterior to matter. Were that cause withdrawn, second causes would cease to operate and subsequent action be suspended.

Is life, then, "a forced state?"

If, by this ambiguous expression, we mean only that life is an effect produced by an adequate *cause*, we answer in the affirmative. But if the intention is to assert that life is an effect produced by stimulants, and not a premordial state, we deny the truth of the assertion. What are these mighty stimulants, that a power not inferior to omnipotence should be ascribed to them? At the head of the long list of these life-giving substances, stands *the atmospheric air*. This is denominated "the air of lives" and therefore "must needs" be the author of life. But in vain had the lungs of Adam, when newly formed, been inflated with this air, had not life been superadded by his Creator, to carry on the process of respiration. This and other stimulants cooperate with life and are essential to the production of the various phenomena apparent in animated beings:

but to believe that a dead substance operating on a dead substance, can generate life itself, requires more credulity than I am able to exercise.

In a case of asphixia, or suspended animation, the judicious application of air, and other stimulants concurring in their operation with the remaining life, may produce the phenomena, and evidences of life, which could not be produced by all their united energies of life itself were extinguished. The phenomena of life are, therefore, produced by the united energies of pre-existing life and appropriate exciting powers: but life itself is the effect of a different cause.

With a view to establish an opposite doctrine, a few passages from the Old and New Testaments, have been quoted by one who confessedly shines in the medical firmament, like a star of the first magnitude. "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (as the air of lives) and man became a living soul." From this it is inferred "that the air, by exciting respiration, gave the first impulse of the life to the mind, and body of Adam." But the language of the text is evidently figurative, and it is not necessary that figurative language should be literally true, or true if misunderstood in a literal sense. Air being essential to the phenomena of animal life, it is proper, therefore, to employ the terms, air and breath, figuratively to express that divine agency on which the existence and preservation of life depended.

The same author remarks on another passage, that "the dry bones seen by Ezekiel, in a vision, when brought together, were devoid of life until the winds were invoked to inflate their lungs with air. Immediately afterwards they became living and intelligent beings." But in vain had the prophet expected the reanimation of the dry bones if only the breath of the four winds had been the real object of his invocation. Is it necessary that figurative language, taken literally be true? It is spoken in figurative, "Thus saith the Lord God unto

these bones, behold I will cause breath to enter into you and ye shall live." But when the figure is dropped and the meaning expressed literally it is said, "And shall put my Spirit in you, and ye shall live." Believing it to be unnecessary, I forbear to offer any remarks on the singular interpretation which has been given to other passages.

The strange hypothesis is "That mind itself and its various operations are the production of material stimuli, subversive of the regular order of Nature, equally repugnant to divine revelation and common sense, and resting, only on the reasoning basis of bold conjectures, it cannot merit a serious refutation.

Questions on the Essay.

What is Life? What is its opposite? Is life essential to the existence of spirit? How many kinds of life are there? What are they? How many kinds has man? Do all exhibit the same phenomena of life? From what are our ideas of life originally derived? How? What is a source of error on this subject? Why is life not a being nor a quality of a being? What is another source of error? How will you define life? What are the evidences of life? May living matter be in different states? Examples. Is life prior to its phenomena? What will produce the phenomena of life? Will stimulants produce them if life be wanting? What is a dictate of common sense on this subject? How does this appear? What is the second inquiry? What is necessary to a solution of this question? Examples of the two first are found where? Man is composed of what? Are mind and matter combined in man? What evidence of this? Are the properties of mind and of body essentially different? What are properties of each? The distinguishing phenomena of mental life are what?—of animal life are what? What distinguish animal and vegetable life from one another? What other phenomena distinguish vegetables?

What other question is to be considered? Is the liv-

ing state an effect of an adequate cause? Is there a real distinction between life and its phenomena? What proposition is stated? Agreeably to what does the Creator exert his energy? Are these laws agents, or what are they? Has matter ever been endued with animation, or put in motion without the energy of the mind? Will organization give life? Will chymical combinations impart life to dead bodies? Are chymical affinities prime agents or only secondary causes of their effects?

What is another inquiry? Is life a forced state? Is it the effect of an adequate cause? Are stimulants an adequate cause? Will atmospheric air give life to a dead body? Will stimulants, co-operating with vitality, produce the phenomena of life? What is a strange hypothesis of some materialists? This hypothesis is subversive of what?—repugnant to what? It rests on what?

ERRATA,

On page 22 line 11, read *impereous* for dangerous.

“ 69 “ 34, “ *and the* before prevalence, and *of* for on.

On page 88 line 20, read after agreeable or disagreeable to that rule.

On page 91 line 34, read *infinitely* for infinite.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

I have examined "Lectures on Human Nature," by Rev. Samuel Doak, D. D., with the Essay on Life attached, and believe it to be a work well suited to the different schools of learning, and convenient for the purposes of instruction: indeed, in the course of my studies while at Washington College, those Lectures (in manuscript) were put into my hands by the Rev. Samuel Doak, and I then entertained the opinion that they were well adapted to the proper training of the mind, and a useful branch of science. I still entertain the same opinion.

JOHN BLAIR.

I fully concur in the above statement of the Hon. John Blair,

DANIEL KENNEY.