



ALLEN MACY DULLES.

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Our Intellectual Ideals. Every technical school has an ideal towards which it is, or should be, working. Each student who has been faithful and who receives its diploma is to a greater or less degree a representative of that ideal. He gives it concrete embodiment and shows its value. It is, therefore, of no small moment that this ideal, in the case of any given institution, should be generally known in order that students entering its doors may have a clear idea of what they may gain.

With such an object in view we are led to set forth in brief the intellectual ideal of our beloved Seminary. It can be stated in a single word, viz: the preparation of men to be scholarly *preachers* of the gospel. The emphasis is upon the word "preachers." In the preaching of the gospel ought to appear all the best results of training. The whole intellectual energy and power of the preacher should focus upon his pulpit. All that bears upon the correct interpretation of the truth and the forceful presentation of it is involved in the discipline which the Seminary seeks to give. Attractive as the university idea may be in accordance with which a man is offered a broad range of study and opportunity for especial work along advanced lines, it can have place here only in so far as it contributes to the realization of the ideal of getting men ready for the pulpit. The intellectual work of the Seminary is never out of line with scholarship of an advanced degree, but the course is not laid out with the purpose of making specialists except in the work of the active ministry. The curriculum presupposes and demands the culture which college can give. It aims to bring all the

THE CHARGE.

BY JOHN DE WITT, D. D., LL. D.,

PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY, PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

DOCTOR DULLES: It gave me great pleasure to receive and accept the invitation of Auburn Theological Seminary to deliver to you the address officially named—"The Charge." The practice which this Seminary has begun, of inviting the representative of another Seminary to undertake this function, seems to me a very happy one. For it serves to bring into view—what is sometimes too much obscured—the unity of these institutions of the Church in the work they are doing and the spirit with which they are imbued. Of course, each Theological Seminary has its own traditions and customs and habits of mind and life, which its Alumni and teachers justly esteem and cherish; and each has peculiarities in its curriculum, by which it impresses a distinctive character on its students. But the unity is far more profound than the separating individualities; and therefore, though not an Auburn graduate, I feel thoroughly at home to-night. For what minister of our Church can visit this city and walk about this campus without gratitude to God for the memories of the great and good men which his visit to the scene of their labors makes more distinct? How rich a history is that of Auburn Seminary! This is not the time to dwell on it. But, surely, I may be permitted, before proceeding to the special duty devolved on me, at least to speak with reverence the noble names of Richards, Perrine, Dickinson, Hickock, Hall, Shedd, Huntington, Hopkins, Welch, Upson and Booth.

I do not know how I can better render the service which I have been invited to undertake than by asking your attention to the elements of the spirit of the Christian Apologist. These elements I think I can best bring before you by setting them over against the distinctive perils to which the

defender of Christianity is exposed. And I shall be aided in making the traits of the Christian Apologist clear, by dwelling on them as illustrated by some of the greatest of those who, in the course of the Church's career, have vindicated to the human reason Christianity as the absolute and universal religion.

Anyone, who will give to the subject careful reflection, will be convinced that one of the most serious dangers which confront the Christian Apologist is the danger of undue concession. The tendency to concede inheres in the nature of his work. He is in charge of the defense of a supernatural religion; but he is defending it at the bar of the natural reason. The common point of departure for both him and his opponent is the fundamental affirmations of the human intellect. His temptation is analogous to that of the Jesuit missionaries in India who, in their anxiety to convert the Hindoo population to Christianity—so at least it was charged by other Roman Catholic missionaries—conceded so much to the prejudices of those whom they brought into the Church, that it was difficult to distinguish their converts from the unconverted heathen about them. So the Apologist for Christianity, particularly in an age like the one in which we live, is tempted by his laudable desire to commend Christianity to the human reason to go no short way toward reducing Christianity itself to the dimensions of what, in the eighteenth century, was apt to be called Natural Religion.

I do not mention this tendency simply to condemn and denounce it. As I have said, the tendency is inherent in the work to which every Christian Apologist is committed. He and those with whom he contends must occupy common ground, or debate between them will be impossible. They must stand at the bar of a common court or their case cannot be adjudicated. It were idle to talk of Christian Apologetics, if the Apologist were to shrink from asking the judgment of the human intellect upon the claims of our holy religion. In this sense the Apologist is a rationalist; and the assertion

that he is not a rationalist is a contradiction in the terms of the statement. But the tendency is perilous. And the peril is precisely this, that the supernatural will be denied and the case of Christianity will be lost; and this, whether the Apologist be arguing in the sphere of philosophy or in that of history.

Hence the Christian Apologist must have both in philosophy and in history a fixed and immovable conviction. I do not see how he can usefully do the work of his chair, unless, in philosophy, he is convinced that the supernatural is the real, and that it is not only the complement but the source and origin of the natural; and unless, in history, he is convinced that the supernatural has appeared under the conditions of time and space, and has made an impact upon the senses and the intelligence of men as the miraculous in the Hebrew history, culminating in the person and work of Jesus Christ, our Lord and Redeemer. Unless this is a fixed and immovable conviction, he will find himself under the tyranny of an ever strengthening tendency to explain the Central Figure of human history by heredity and environment, and to discredit the Apostolic documents the trustworthiness of which it is his mission to vindicate. Well will it be for him if he not only possesses this conviction, but if it is his in that emotional mode, which we term victorious and enthusiastic faith.

It was his victorious and enthusiastic faith which gave to the labors of the greatest Apologist of the age of the *Ecclesia pressa* their highest value. Tertullian's exceptionally wide culture put him in thorough possession of all the labors of the Greek Apologists; his theological genius enabled him intelligently to value them; and his studies in jurisprudence and probably his labors as an advocate prepared him as few men of his day were prepared to strengthen and enforce, against Jewish and philosophical opponents, the argument for Christianity. While preparing this address it fell to me as an editor of *The Princeton Theological Review* to read an

able, learned and deeply interesting essay in Doctrinal History, not yet published, written by my colleague, Dr. Warfield, in which he defends the thesis, that Tertullian is the author of the Church doctrine of the Trinity, in the sense in which Augustine is the author of the doctrine of Original Sin, or Anselm of the doctrine of Satisfaction, or Luther of the doctrine of Justification by Faith. I think it might be shown that he is quite as really entitled to be described as by eminence the victorious Apologist of the Ante-Nicene Church. And he was a victor in virtue, most of all, of this profound and unalterable conviction of the truth of Christianity, existing and energizing as triumphant faith. There is not a little in Tertullian which we may well pray to be delivered from. His temper was not the mildest; nor were his judgments of men always the most charitable. If his zeal for the great New Testament truth, that the *Charismata* are not the exclusive possession of the priesthood should claim the sympathy of Protestant Christians, we cannot forget that it carried him into Montanistic fanaticism; and if his demand for personal holiness in the disciples of Christ led him to anticipate our modern Puritanism, we must also remember that mixed with it is a legal and what sometimes looks like a self-righteous asceticism. But these defects cannot blind us to the glory of his indefectible and victorious faith in the supernatural and in the Christian history, or to the power with which his faith endowed his Apologetic. How eloquent the paradoxes in which this learned scholar and able advocate confessed it! "*Credibile quia ineptum*"; "*Certum quia impossibile*," "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church." It is this triumphant faith in the spiritual and the supernatural, and in the miracle of Christ and Christianity, that constitutes the basal element of the spirit of the Christian Apologist.

A second peril inherent in the nature of the work to which you have been called, somewhat akin to the one I have mentioned and yet quite different from it, is the temptation to

regard Christianity in its minimum as the distinctive object of the Apologist's solicitude. Christianity in its maximum is supposed to be the special theme of the dogmatic and polemic theologian; but Christianity reduced to its lowest term is that which the Apologist, speaking for the common Christendom, is to vindicate to the common reason of mankind. In this view, one of the most important labors of the Apologist is to find and formulate this minimum. For in doing so he will find and define his precise theme, and get the right point of departure for the organization of his course.

Now, I am strongly of the opinion that an approach to the great work of the Apologist with this minimum of Christianity conceived of as his special theme will result in the reduction of his work to a comparatively small and unimportant task. Moreover, I believe the conception to be radically wrong. It is, of course, true that while the systematic theologian conceives of Christianity as distributed into its dogmatic contents, the Apologist conceives of it as a unity; and this unity called Christianity is his distinctive theme. But this unity is no minimum. It is a large, living and complex whole. It is an organism whose total life is in every part of it. Conceived of simply as a body of truth to be apprehended by the intellect, the Apologist will do Christianity great injustice if he endeavors to compress it into a single proposition, or into what a former Professor of this Seminary in one of his lectures, delivered in one of your lecture rooms, called "a couple of half-starved and hunger bitten dogmas." I am quite sure that, very soon after beginning your work, you will reach the conclusion that the Apologist is engaged in a fatuous search, who is looking for the way to reduce Christianity to its lowest term and to formulate this lowest term in a proposition. You will soon find that the most stimulating of American Apologists, the late Henry Boynton Smith, pointed out the true path for those holding similar chairs, when he asserted that Apologetics "is the whole contents and substance of the

Christian faith arrayed for defense and defensive assault," and that "every part of doctrine must have a rational side or relation, historical evidence, and an attitude of defense."

Nor must it be forgotten that, though Christianity must first be thought of by the Apologist, as it is by the systematic theologian, as a body of truth, this is not the only view of Christianity. It is truth indeed; but truth incarnated in a person, contained in a historical record, organizing itself in an institution, issuing in a characteristic spiritual experience, legitimating a distinctive ethics, and exerting a specific influence on social and national life. In every one of these aspects of Christianity it has been attacked. Its founder has been called an impostor; its record has been declared historically untrustworthy; its Church has been held up as the defender of kingly prerogative and special privilege against the rights of man; its spiritual experiences have been dismissed as dreams; against its ethics more than one revolt has been organized in the name of altruism and human brotherhood; and its total influence on the life of nations and human society has been described by an adjective as violent as "infamous." And these aspects of Christianity, which have thus been attacked, have yielded to its defenders the most cogent and impressive arguments in its behalf. Indeed, the largeness, the wealth and the profound importance of the department you are to have in charge will be put out of sight, the moment you begin your *ignis fatuus* search for that irreducible minimum in which it is sometimes thought that the Christianity of Apologetics, as contrasted with the Christianity of Dogmatics, may be formulated.

Nevertheless, this conception of the distinctive theme of the Apologist has high authority on its side. And perilous as it is, is an engaging one; since it offers to reduce to unity by precise definition and so to make scientific the work of the Apologist. Because it is so engaging, one needs a prophylactic against it. And this is to be found only in a

rich and large conception of Christianity itself. I have spoken of victorious faith as the distinguishing characteristic of the great Ante-Nicene Apologist, Tertullian. I think that with equal justice we may say, that this large and rich conception of Christianity is the marked trait of by far the greatest Apologist among the Post-Nicene Fathers; I mean, of course, Augustine of Hippo. No other writer of the Church has equaled him in making explicit in doctrine all that is implicit in Christianity. No other writer has so richly set forth its corrolaries or unfolded its relations in experience. It is his large and rich conception of Christianity which has led each of the conflicting parties of Western Christendom to claim him as especially its own. It is to Augustine that Thomas Aquinas most often appeals in the *Summa* for support, as he explains and defends the perfected sacramental theology. And it is the harmony of the Reformed Churches of France with Augustine, on which John Calvin lays the greatest emphasis in the noble address to Francis I with which he introduces *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Of course, Augustine was not consistent. His doctrine of the Church can be successfully quoted against his doctrine of sin and grace. But the amazing richness of our religion, whether conceived of as a revelation of God or as a remedial system for man, the variety of its interests, the closeness of its relations to all learning and all life, as he apprehended it, may well excuse his inconsistency. It was this richness of conception that enabled him to write the greatest of all the Patristic Apologies—*The City of God*—which, more than any other single work, sustained the faith of the Western Church during the disorganization of society that attended and followed the breaking up of the Western Empire. It was because he always saw Christianity not in the minimum but in the maximum of its content, and because his habit of mind led him to pursue it through all its implications that he produced its richest apology. The Apologist of today, with the great career of Augustine in his mind, may well pray to be blessed with a like conception of Christianity.

There is another danger which menaces one engaged in the work to which you are to give yourself; namely, the undue predominance of the intellectual or scientific spirit. Here again, I must disclaim any hostility to scientific method, or to the intellectual construction or defense of Christianity. But I am sure that the theological teachers in this audience will agree with the statement that we are tempted, as our predecessors were not tempted, to subordinate everything else to the scientific spirit and to our intellectual work. And the reason is that we are in the midst of a great intellectual war for the integrity of our religion. The war must go on. And we who are teachers of the ministers of the Church, must fairly meet and attack our opponents on the field of the reason. There is great danger that we shall be wanting in the religious, the devotional spirit; and that the total influence exerted by us on our students will have an intellectual and scientific rather than a religious distinction. Such a distinction will be unfortunate. But is there any remedy for it? Does it not lie in the nature of his work that the Apologist, if he is true to it and successful in it, will become more and more exclusively intellectual, and relatively less spiritual and devotional in the life he lives, the impression he makes, and the influence he exerts?

With this question before me, I am reminded of a phrase in one of the great lectures on Homiletics delivered in this Seminary, when he held your Chair of Sacred Rhetoric, by the late Professor Shedd. I am quoting from memory. He is describing the ideal sermon as ideally delivered, and is pointing out the necessity, to the best result, of uniting the intellect with the emotions. He says, "the head must be in the heart and the heart in the head; the light must be heat and the heat must be light." I am sure that you already feel both the desirability and the difficulty of the realization of a like ideal in your labors as a Professor of Christian Apologetics. What a vantage ground the defender of Christianity occupies, whose labors are suffused with

the devotional spirit! I am sure I need not dwell at any length on this part of my address. But since I have illustrated the traits of the Apologist of which I have spoken by the two greatest Apologists among the Latin Fathers, permit me to call your attention for a moment to the greatest Apologist of the Latin Mediaeval Church.

Than Anselm of Canterbury no mediaeval writer more earnestly, more ably or more successfully labored to set forth the ground of the Christian doctrine in the absolute principles of reason. He was a Realist, holding that the universal has a real existence in the particular. He was a Platonist, holding firmly to the reality, the imperative character, and the constitutive force of the Idea. His Realism or Platonism appears in all his Apologetic work. It is not the Roman legislation, but the Platonic Idea of the right or the just, on which he bases the necessity and by which he explains the character of the Atonement, in *Cur Deus Homo*. And it is on the positive, necessary and controlling Idea of the perfect that he constructs, in the *Proslogium*, his great argument for the necessary existence of God, of the Perfect Being, the Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived. No more penetrating and subtle intellect wrought for fundamental Christianity during the Middle Ages. But what I wish particularly to call attention to as his most striking trait, is this fusion, not only in his personal life, but in his apologetic work of the intellectual and the devotional. It is not only in the *Orationes* and *Mediationes* that his devotional spirit appears. It is most clearly regnant when he is carrying forward the most abstract and subtle argument in behalf of the fundamental truth of Christianity; until in developing the ontological argument for the existence of God, the argument becomes a prayer. "The head and the heart are one; the light is heat and the heat is light." This union of intellect and heart every theological professor should hold continuously before him, as of all achievements the one of the last importance.

There is another serious peril to which your particular work exposes you. It is the peril of becoming a mere advocate; and in the advocacy of your side sacrificing fairness to your opponent. We excuse the heated orator in a Presidential campaign, if, when addressing the people, he is not ideally candid in dealing with the political party he is opposing; and we positively praise the member of the bar who exhausts all the resources of oratory and of legal interpretation in the interest of his client. But ours is a cause to which we seek to convert those whom we are opposing; and absolute fairness and candor must characterize our Apologist. In other words, one of the traits of the ideal Christian Apologist is the judicial temper.

Now as the Ante-Nicene Apologist, Tertullian, has illustrated for us victorious faith; and Augustine, the great Post-Nicene Apologist, that rich conception of Christianity so necessary to the best work in your chair; and the great Mediaeval Apologist, Anselm of Canterbury, the fusion of the intellectual and devotional spirit; so, I think, we find the judicial temper best illustrated in the greatest of Modern Apologists, for so I esteem Joseph Butler the author of *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*. Whatever may be thought of some features of his argument, as the first chapter on "The Future Life," everyone who has come into contact with him is impressed by the fact that his is the temper, not of the advocate, but of the judge. He never announced a conclusion which he was not sure was implicated in his premises. He never claimed anything like demonstration when he had attained only probable proof. And, so far as I know, he never asserted a degree of probability which he had not fully justified. What is called the difficulty of his style is due, quite as much as to anything else, to the careful consideration and righteous qualification of his statements. He is candor itself in portraying the habit of mind he was attacking. And he is never more candid than in the careful measurement and, indeed,

the reserve of his claims. Of course, the *Analogy* is great intellectually. But I believe that its vitality today, after a career of deep and wide influence lasting more than a century and a half, is best explained by the absolute fairness or what I have called the judicial temper of its author. I do not think that I could say anything more important than, study Joseph Butler, above all the *Analogy*, until his judicial temper becomes yours.

Here then, suggested by the perils of your calling and illustrated by the greatest of your predecessors in your work, are the traits of the spirit of the Christian Apologist. I could offer for you no better prayer than that, in the great work to which you have been called, Tertullian's victorious faith, and Augustine's rich conception of Christianity, and Anselm's devotional spirit, and Butler's judicial habit of mind may be eminently yours.

Perhaps I ought to stop at this point. For, should I continue to name the perils to which the Apologist is exposed and the traits by virtue of which the perils are made innocuous, you might turn on me with the charge, that I am holding up an ideal which, if not impossible of realization, might if actualized destroy one's usefulness by leaving no room for his individuality. And, certainly, what I have already said would seem to show, that every defender of Christianity, to be serviceable to the cause in the highest degree possible to him must display that kind and degree of sincerity in his work which can issue only from the free play of his own personality. Suffer me however, before I close, to call your attention to a trait of the Christian Apologist as valuable as any I have mentioned; a trait which you are in no peril of neglecting to cultivate, if you have imbibed the spirit of the age in which we live. I mean a sympathetic appreciation of your opponent's position. I am quite aware of the fact, that this sympathetic appreciation is too apt to pass over and, as a matter of fact, too often passes over into unjustified concession. Nevertheless, I believe that the

cultivation of a sympathetic attitude toward those who are so oppressed with the difficulties of belief as to be tempted to deny the faith, is a necessity to the Christian Apologist's highest usefulness. And the opponents of Christianity in no other age of the Church so merited this sympathy as do the opponents of Christianity in our time. You are to antagonize men of a different spirit from that either of the coarse and violent Celsus or of the cynical and jesting Lucian in the patristic age; and men too of a far different spirit from the deists of whom Joseph Butler said, they take for granted "that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry" and "nothing remained but to set it up as a principle subject of mirth and ridicule." The doubt of our age doubts its doubts, as Browning pointed out in *Bishop Blougram's Apology*. I think I ought also to say that compared with the unbelief of other periods, it is reverent and it is philanthropic. It does not pray, yet out of its very agnosticism it gives voice to the highest aspiration ever breathed forth from the human spirit—"O that I knew where I might find Him!" And if it does not believe, it often shows the temper and follows the example of the good Samaritan. Certainly, we must be true to our cause. But if we are even tempted to be harsh and censorious and unsympathetic in our Apologetic, let us recall our great Example's sympathy with Thomas, and remember that the sinless Son of God and Man was not ashamed to call sinful men his brethren.

I wish you great joy in the important and difficult work you have been called to undertake. If you will permit a personal remark, I will take the liberty to say that I know something of its importance and its difficulties. Seventeen years ago I became, in another seminary of our Church, the first incumbent of the chair of Apologetics. I believe your department to be second to none in the Theological Seminary in importance, and I know it to be second to none in difficulty. But this is no reason for discouragement. Admiral Togo, after his great victory, sent substantially this

dispatch: "We were able to win through the illustrious virtue of the Emperor and the spirit of our ancestors." You too will win through the illustrious virtue of your Emperor, the King of Kings; and as the spirit of your great predecessors is incarnate in you. For their characteristic traits are not mutually exclusive or in any degree inconsistent with each other. They are complementary; and the possession of one will prepare you for the possession of the others. May all of them be eminently yours; that in this great professorship you may be that "man of God" who is "thoroughly furnished unto all good work!"

THE NEW APOLOGETIC.

COMMISSIONERS OF AUBURN SEMINARY, TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND FRIENDS:

I thank you for your assistance at this service which formally introduces me to my work here as a professor, and I especially thank Dr. De Witt for the charge, so full of the best lessons from the great Apologists of the past. The chair which I am asked to occupy is a new one in name so far as this Theological School is concerned, although it is not altogether new in fact. Indeed, every professor has been, and will continue to be, a defender of the faith; for whoever aggressively teaches the religion of Jesus Christ is defending it in the best possible manner. But there is a recognized specialization in religious, as in other subjects of teaching. There is the department of doctrine or the development in a logical and systematical manner of the beliefs which enter into the religion taught; there is the department of sacred literature which is occupied with the history, criticism and interpretation of the writings which every religion of value sooner or later calls into being; there is the history of the religion as it develops and propagates itself; there is the practical side of the religious life, the pro-

clamation of the faith; and the work and worship in which it is embodied, the church life in which it finds expression. When we consider that this course of training is so complete, as well as the fact that each professor is continually meeting opponents or questioners at his own place as he stands on the walls of Zion, any general defense of our religion as it stands exposed to misconception, criticism or attack might seem unnecessary. Nevertheless, few, if any, will question the advisability of at least one person in a Theological Faculty devoting all his time to the preparation of students so that they may understand religion in general and their own religion in particular as a mode of thought, feeling and action, in relation to the thoughts which constitute the world-view of the times (*Weltansicht*). With attacks upon particular doctrines, or dogmas, unless these affect the essence of religion, Apologetic is not concerned. In Germany a distinction is made which seems an advisable one, between apology and apologetic. The former concerns itself with particular doctrines, the latter concerns itself with the generic idea of religion.

The problem of apologetic is whether it is rational to be religious at all, whether it is reasonable to be religious in some particular way. This is always a pressing problem. It is so today. Irreligion is openly advocated. Our universities, under cover of being non-sectarian, are many of them non-religious. The skepticism of the day is more subtly dangerous because often beautifully moral. Substitutes of an ethical sort are put for religion. While evangelism may induce a temporary and local vitality through stress of effort, nevertheless the real progress of religion is today greatly dependent upon a true apologetic. We must present religion rationally and reasonably. Religion cannot, should not, rest on any human or visible *authority*. Any religion can *claim* authority. We cannot wait for *effects* to demonstrate which, if any, religion is best, we may ourselves be gone before effects are fully manifest. We cannot assume or threaten, we cannot say in

highwayman fashion, "Your assent or your life," "believe or be damned." Creeds should be formed carefully and without haste, and not under threat. The Christian religion when best represented, presented itself as rational and reasonable. That is, it has appealed not merely to man as a feeling and desiring creature, but also as one whose volition is associated with what we call reason. It is not like the Greek mysteries, nor is it an Oriental abstraction. It is for the practical, reasonable man. Jesus Christ invited inspection and investigation, "Come and see." Luke wrote his gospel in order to assist reasonable faith. The Epistle to the Hebrews is distinctly apologetic.

The Christian religion has never lacked noble and devoted defenders. Indeed, no other religion has enlisted so many in this kind of service. A list of even the most able apologues would be a long one. How are we to regard this fact? In some respect it pleases us, as indicative of the vitality of the Christian religion. It does show the vitality of this religion in one respect, because only a vital religion could have carried such a load. While it is a testimony to the interest which the Christian religion has aroused, yet we cannot help asking why by this time the Christian religion should not be *beyond the need of defense*. Why is it not as convincingly true, for example, as the law of gravity or the Copernican theory?

Why is it not as natural to be rightly religious, at least in theory, as it is to take wholesome food? Why has not our religion reached the stage when its main elements may be taken for granted, as almost axiomatic? What is there about religion which leaves it perpetually in question? You may say the human heart is evil and inclines to unbelief. You may say that religion is so important that its claims for that reason must be constantly inspected. You may say that it is the tendency of human nature to seek personal satisfaction, and that human reason is constantly growing in its demands. We might say that the Christian religion was

born at a time of great intellectual activity and skepticism, and that it has made its way chiefly among the intellectual races who are, as the Greeks of old, constantly seeking some new thing. These all contain elements of truth, and yet we cannot help feeling that apologetics as a science has not succeeded in continually strengthening itself. Nor has it succeeded in placing what it would defend absolutely beyond attack. Indeed, many of the old defenses are not unlike war vessels which, antiquated, are allowed to rot in the harbors. We admire the great apologetes; yet, making all allowance for the change in attack, and without questioning that past apologetes have helped many who believe, or who would believe, nevertheless the persistent and substantial gain seems relatively slight. Religion needs to be defended *ab initio* today, after two thousand years since Christ. One explaining fact is that every apologete has tried to meet the peculiar difficulties of his own age upon the platform of the intellectual thought of that age. Hence, his usefulness was confined to that age. First there came the criticism of the Jews, later came the prejudices of the Pagans, the slanders of the evil-minded, the mockings of the Greeks, the disdain of philosophers. Then came the outward triumph of the Christian religion, and the tone of the church apologist becomes haughty and commanding. With Augustine, apologetic is a cry of triumph, and we may say with him apologetic reaches a climax and ceases. And for a thousand years we have merely apology, and the Church spins out its own thoughts and constructs its dogmas. That a religion must develop doctrine, possibly dogmas, is a fact, and these doctrines may call for apology or explanation. This is largely a matter within religion itself, but that a religion should be itself a dogma, or become inseparably identical with a dogma, is not necessary. Christianity became a dogmatic religion, and so almost superseded the religion of Jesus Christ. Christianity eclipsed Jesus Christ. To be a Christian in the Catholic period of the Church required as-

sent to, or assertion of a creed. Whatever may be the value of creeds as personal doctrines, the identification of religion and dogma has proved well nigh fatal to the religion of Christ. From 500 to 1500 A. D. apologetic became apology, a defense of the Church and its creeds. The Greek and Roman spirit combined in an unhappy union, the one supplying a speculative tendency, and the other an un-speculative authority. From this union the Christian religion was partly delivered by the Germanic and the Celtic spirit which was powerful in the Reformation. It is the undeniable glory of Luther that he substituted faith for belief. But the deliverance was not complete. The Church still carried with it a dogmatic spirit which brought on conflict with free thought and science. The very essence of religion was involved in matters which are purely historical or critical or psychological, *i. e.* matters of science in the narrow sense. It was not the development of doctrine, which is inevitable, but the spirit of dogmatism which bred conflict. The church religion was like a vine which has grown about a dead tree, which time and weather demolishes. Dogmatism led to perilous positions. To illustrate, the very substance of the religion of Jesus Christ was made to depend on the fact that a fish swallowed Jonah. What agility of mind has been displayed in the efforts to secure the scientific content of the first chapters of *Genesis*. What marvelous adaptability has been shown as each new geological or cosmological theory has arisen and fallen. Interpretation and defense have wavered with every wind of scientific doctrine. This facility, which is vacility, has often brought religion into contempt and rendered the science of apologetics ridiculous. Science in no form will stop to ask permission of the Church as to what shall be believed. On the contrary, no human power can hinder the intellectual among mankind from going to the science of geology and astronomy to find out how God made heaven and earth; from going to historical criticism to find out how and when men wrote their writings, for going

to psychology to study the soul processes, even conversion and faith. So far as religion makes itself out a philosophy or a science, then science and philosophy will judge it. If religion appeal to Caesar, to Caesar it will go. So far as belief in God is metaphysic (and I am not saying whether it is or not), so far will metaphysicians discuss it as any other metaphysical doctrine. If religion have a head of gold, like Nebuchadnezzar's image, this will not save it from falling if it rest on feet of clay. There is truth in Sabatier's remark that traditional theology is always in distress. The absorption of the scientific or philosophic ideas of any age has involved our religion in a conflict with the progressive spirit of human thought. The antagonism of science has been aroused at finding its field invaded by dogmatitions. In the resulting duel christianity has suffered repeated defeat. This has brought discredit upon religion among thinking people. Men of science and philosophy are today largely alienated from the Church. The hold of the Roman Catholic Church is due to the fact that it has ceased to be a rational religion and makes it appeal solely to the emotions. Men do not ask whether the doctrines of the Catholic Church are reasonable. The Church forbids inquiry. But the Reformed churches assume no such position, therefore their peril is great when the Church assumes positions which science must assail. The first duty of apologetic is to put religion beyond the reach of science. Until religion is lifted above the region of possible discovery and alterations in theories as to nature and history, it cannot have that permanency which it should have. Religion must be on an immovable foundation. The Roman Catholic Church is wise in its assertion of its own infallibility and superiority to either defense or attack, as a living force. This constitutes the essence of Loisy's great defense of Catholicism. The children of this world are wise. Religion must be a living fact. God must no more need proving than one's earthly father. When religion identifies itself with debatable matters,

when it is more or less inextricably involved in science and philosophy, then religion must needs be defended with such methods as prevail in science and philosophy. That is, there must be proof of a scientific or logical sort. Now, I believe that religion can be put beyond the reach of science and philosophy in a truly and purely scientific spirit. I do not say that the inferior doctrines of a religion can be so elevated. I am not on the ground of apology. But it is the main, I might say the whole purpose of the new modern apologetic to put our religious faith where no science or philosophy can touch it for its harm, but only for its glory. I believe that science and philosophy can be made ministers of religion, not her critics and not her masters. I believe that these, given the chance, will place religion above themselves. It is science and philosophy which tell us that religion can do better than rest itself on such evidence as Thomas demanded. *The new apologetic abandons the old arguments.* Every effort to prove God's existence fails, because God cannot be put in any syllogism. Miracles cannot logically and scientifically prove Jesus divine, though they may exhibit his divine nature. Nicodemus concluded that Jesus was a teacher come from God because he did these miracles. Nicodemus drew the largest conclusion he could, but it is inadequate. Jesus said that to arrive at the truth he must be born again. Prophecy is not without significance, and miracles are a testimony; but neither are adequate to make faith a certainty. All efforts to prove by argument "leave doubt well defined, the other side the line." Who seeks by arguments to secure his faith, will probably end as John Henry Newman, by handing all over to authority, grown weary of reasoning, or as his brother, F. W. Newman, in vague Theism. Life cannot be trusted to a bridge when it fails but an inch. A gap in an argument will make it necessary that one grasp at authority, or fall into the abyss of unbelief. When we consider the many works called Evidences of Christianity, one sympathizes with Coleridge, when he exclaims: "Evidences of Christianity,—I am weary of the name."

The fact is plain, few of us believe because of proof; we prove because we believe. There is no scientific objection to supporting our belief by reasons or arguments, and thereby clarifying our faith. But there is scientific objection to the procedure which says, when we have simply proved our previous belief, that "we believe because we have proved." Another reason for a new apologetic is that the principles of science, while they allow a tentative hypothesis as giving direction to investigation, yet these forbid the deliberate effort to seek for evidence which favors any hypothesis to the ignoring of what may be contrary evidence. Yet much prevalent apologetic lays itself open to the charge of the genuine scientist that it is bribed and blinded, in the interest of that to which it has already given its adherence.

From these remarks it will be apparent that our new apologetic departs from the old, both as to its purpose and its method. The purpose is *not immediately to prove Christianity true*. Christianity is a most uncertain, almost unknown thing, about the essence and the what of which hundreds of writers are asking. It is almost anything you please, according as you are a Latin Christian or a Russo-slav, or an Englishman or an American, as you are a Catholic or a Protestant, a dogmatician or a free thinker. In fact, the adjectives to distinguish the various forms of this religion have almost completely swallowed the thing itself. It is not Christianity which the world needs but Christ. Emerson has somewhere said, "There is a statement of religion possible which makes all skepticism absurd." Our apologetic seeks such a statement so that religion may be at once clear from all arguments and may become a self-evident fact. Our apologetic would commence by exhibiting religion in its simplest form assured that her charms will be irresistible to those who are chosen of God. We propose to so state religion that the subordination of life to that which religion presents as worthy shall be not only rational but any other course irrational and unreasonable. Our apologetic is then occupied with this

thought, can we state religion is such a way that it shall carry its own evidence ?

We make this statement, Rational religion is the valuation of phenomena at their spiritual worth. This definition has in it these ideas : Phenomena—valuation—worth —spiritual—religion.

1. All life, therefore religious life, is a valuation of phenomena.

2. The true worth of which is to be found in (1) their permanence or reality in our consciousness and (2) their life-givingness.

3. These phenomena have spiritual as well as material worth.

4. This valuation is religion.

1. We never get beyond phenomena in our consciousness and what these phenomena say to our spirit.

Outside of his consciousness no man can live. Until what we call the outer world enters our consciousness through some channel of experience, it is not existent for us. Helen Keller must come in contact with the world through sense experience before she can know the world, or God, or her own soul. And, *all our life is the volitional valuation* of this world which is in our consciousness. Every concept, every idea, every individual element of our consciousness has value. As Lotze says : "Associated with every mental impression there is a feeling of pleasure, a pain." We are such a unity that our thought, our feeling, our willing, are never disassociated. Our thought and our volition are inseparably associated with feeling. "I must act in the direction of my greatest satisfaction," as both Augustine and Kant have said. The martyr for Christ, for country, or for truth, has a value idea which determines, or at least marks the direction of the volitional life. Life then is rational, which is subordinate to that which has the most worth, the most value for man. It is reasonable when this which man values has actual real worth. We are reasonable only as we value, according to their real worth, the elements of our consciousness.

2. The worth of phenomena is first (1) their reality.

1. The question as to reality is the most difficult question in philosophy. What is reality? What has reality? Am I real? Is the world real? Is the food I eat real? Is the sunset real? Is the dream real?

Without going deeply into this profound matter, I would say that that which has permanency as an idea in our minds is real to us. Royce defines fact as that which determines whether that which an observer says is true. We can never get nearer to reality than the permanency, the abidingness, the unalterableness of the mental concept. We necessarily predicate reality of that which abides in our consciousness. To the monomaniac, his one idea has reality. Introduce other ideas which weaken the force, the permanency of this idea, and he ceases to be a monomaniac.

There goes on in our consciousness a continual struggle of ideas contending for their place and position, just as seeds cast promiscuously into a field. There is a constant inflow of impressions, a continual call for re-arrangement, re-adjustment, re-valuation, of what is in my consciousness. Thinking is a mental process of weighing, assorting, arranging our ideas, so that they shall not conflict. We say the world is real, because—and only because—we have a permanent world consciousness, nothing disturbs it. New York City is real, yet tell me that a tidal wave one hundred feet high rolled over Manhattan Island, and this new idea makes New York City unreal. A thing is real so long as it has undisturbed and undisputed place in consciousness. Permanence, or reality, is the first mark of the true value of that which we estimate as of worth in our consciousness.

2. Besides this element of permanence or reality, there is, constituting the true worth of that which we value, the relation in which the valued thing or thought stands to my life. My own life is a supreme end. "What shall it profit a man if he lose his own soul?" It is necessary for each to put uppermost his own life. He may do this unconsciously or

consciously, but this is what all must do. Because in glorifying God man most truly lives, this becomes his reasonable duty. In some fashion everyone seeks the fullest life, the richest life—be it for the moment, be it for eternity. I necessarily value any thing or thought in its relation to my life. I may identify my life with that of my family, my nation, the human race. These become mine, my life is diffused, or rather infused with this larger world-life. In such a case my estimate will be according to the contribution that any thing or thought makes to the life of the family, nation or race. Thus Jesus did not value the glory He had with the Father; a life ending in the cross was of more value because thereby His life saves an innumerable multitude to the glory of his God.

Does it produce life, the life I will to live? This forms the reasonable basis of estimation. As I live a fleshly life I value food. As I live a student life I value books. As I live an artist life I value nature. We value things and thoughts, we cannot help so valuing them, as they satisfy life and life's desires.

The sensualist values what gratifies his passions. The spiritual one hungers after righteousness.

3. Phenomena have *spiritual* value. Besides the value which phenomena in my consciousness have for me as a being who is in some relations material, there is also a value which phenomena have for me as a spiritual entity.

Am I assuming too much when I speak of my spirit life? Is there any such thing? The denial of the spirituality of myself, the assertion that I am but matter involves one in the absurdity that matter as matter can think, and perform and experience all the operations we call spiritual. Only a spirit can translate sensations into thoughts and thoughts into sensations.

Kant put the thought of God, the World, the Soul in his Theoretical Reason, as regulative ideas. Some have charged him with inconsistency because he put these in his "Theo-

retical Reason" and not in the "Practical Reason." There may be inconsistency, but it was necessary. There can be no theoretical reasoning which does not admit the regulative value (Kant did not say constitutive value) of these three ideas. And I say here, that each one of these thoughts is as necessary as the other. We cannot think without postulating the world without us, the soul within us, and the God over, and in and through all.

I must and should value phenomena not merely in a material but also in a spiritual way. The material value of phenomena is that I know these as hard and soft, rough and smooth, long and short, bitter and sweet, hot or cold, loud and soft, clean or foul. But shall I not value phenomena as I know these as good, and true, and pure and holy and loving? There are goodness and pureness and holiness. Is there any reason why I should not value these also? Shall I value weight and not affection? Shall I value cleanness and not purity, and if I classify one set as material and affirm their reality shall I not classify the others as spiritual? The thought of God is as persistent as the thought of the world—some indeed deny God, some also deny the world. There is no living materialist who does not value phenomena as of some spiritual worth. All value the goodness of a gift as truly as its richness. We do not say there are two classes of phenomena, but we do affirm that some phenomena are of distinct spiritual value. When we speak of the other world we are speaking of a world other than this material world which phenomena call into being in our consciousness, the reality of which we have no more right to deny than the reality we attribute to the world we call material.

I cannot deny the spiritual valuation of phenomena unless I deny myself as spirit. To say that ideas, as goodness and holiness and purity, are subjective, born in and of the soul is no objection, because, as Kant shows beyond doubt, so are the other impressions, as hardness and bitterness subjective. Objective causation we cannot know directly. What

we call facts are after all not different from ideals, as Josiah Royce has shown (Problem of Natural Religion, International Quarterly, p. 100, vii. 1.). He uses "the present inability of the human mind to come into desired direct contact with ultimate facts," as a basis to show that ideals may be as real as facts. "The true physical world, of which phenomena are a hint, really has a precise constitution, only our experience is too narrow, too indeterminate, to reveal what that constitution is." But this is precisely our condition as he says, about our ideals, and the Kingdom of God as a chief ideal. Phenomena have spiritual value, value for my soul. I hear the thunder roll. It awakens echoes not merely in the ear, but in the soul. It suggests power as well as loudness. The fruits of the earth awaken not merely appetite, but gratitude. And spiritual value is the highest value phenomena can have, that is worth to make my spirit live. Phenomena which awaken thoughts of grandeur, beauty, purity, goodness, immensity, awfulness, reverence, worship, shall I not value these and see whether these minister to my life? Shall I view the world of phenomena, whether it exist for me as a sense-world, or as historical, in my memory? Shall I view this world merely as of value to feed my body or my spirit? Shall I hear merely the din of the ocean in my ears, or listen as Wordsworth: so that in seasons of calm weather

"Though inland far we be, our souls have sight of
That immortal sea which brought us hither."

No one can deny my right, nay my duty, to value phenomena spiritually. No one can deny the validity of awe, fear, faith, love. To do this is unphilosophical in principle. One man may be susceptible to hardness, and another susceptible to love. If I live putting a material valuation on phenomena my life is no more rational and may be much less reasonable than if I live in a larger, another world of values and value goodness and purity and truth. To value only materially does not indicate superiority, but inferiority. It is animal and not human.

To Peter Bell,—

“A yellow primrose on the river’s brim,
a yellow primrose was to him—and nothing more.”

Is this better? Is this more reasonable than when the poet says :

“The meanest flower that blows can give one thoughts
that lie too deep for tears.”

“Man is one world and hath another to attend him.” says Herbert. So there comes to exist for my spiritual life another world which gives us thoughts of righteousness and the kingdom of heaven. The reality of this spirit world is evident in that it is this other world which really arouses to science and to art, and to patriotism as well as to religion. To deny its reality, not to value it, is to deny the source of all that makes man a man, and not an animal. That all phenomena have spiritual value follows necessarily from the fact that I am a spirit, and whatever has value at all for me has some spiritual valuation. Yet it is a clear experience of our consciousness that some phenomena are more valuable to our spiritual life than others. My valuation of these phenomena which have peculiar value for my spirit will depend upon my subjective condition. Of this I shall have a word to say later.

But phenomena may suggest to me—and every suggestion has some value—the idea of God, of the Kingdom of God and of righteous. Nature may suggest God’s almightiness, His goodness. Even Renan had to put a spiritual valuation on the course of history. He says: “A higher power will righteousness, truth and goodness. The progress of the spirit is only fatal to false gods.” The starry heavens suggested God to Kant, as they did even to Napoleon. To Paul nature said, “There is a divine power.”

There is a spiritual valuation of natural phenomena. Nature, history, man, Jesus Christ,—these phenomena have value for me as a spirit, if I am spiritual. And the spirit does assert itself. None can altogether cease being spiritual.

4. This spiritual valuation of phenomena is religion. I cannot here make this evident as I should like. But, from the lowest to the highest form of religion there is always a value put upon phenomena as these concern the spirit life. Religion is a manifestation of the spiritual man, and this is equivalent to saying that phenomena become in religion spiritual rather than material for man. It is so in fetichism. The fetich has a spiritual value for its worshipper. It is so in christianity. Christ has a spiritual value for His worshippers. All valuation is faith, for faith is nothing else than the actual valuation put upon things or thoughts in our consciousness. So Columbus valued the passage west to India. So Moses valued the promise of God. So Jesus valued God, as His Father. So the valuation of God as seen in Jesus becomes our highest valuation, worth all else because this saves the soul which, as Christ said, is worth more than all the world.

Jesus Christ has, as I know Him, created in my mind an idea, an ideal, of unrealized excellence, of unattained beauty. He suggests, awakens, empowers. He represents to me the divine power as world saving. The centuries as they pass confirm the original thought which the first disciples had. No one arises to eclipse Him. He outshines all others. He is the "strong Son of God," and others are "broken lights." How can I decide whether I should value Jesus more than Buddha? What is His spiritual value? Is it by comparing miracles? How can I decide whether to value Jesus more than Confucius, more than Moses,—by comparing their sayings? There is but one way: Jesus as an object of faith, as a valuation, is worth more to my soul. Where there is soul rest, there is mind rest. It is because the figure rises most luminously for me, that I want to live in His light. Is there any other who so enlightens the world?

The question of faith is a question of value. What is Jesus worth to *me*, the thinking, feeling, willing *me*? The way to reach certainty of a perfect sort in our belief and faith

is by increasing the content of our consciousness so that the persistence of that which we value and its relative importance to our life may be made more evident. This therefore, marks out the course of our apologetic.

III. It remains for me to point out what the duty of apologetics is, when we have succeeded, as I think we have in defining religion so that irreligion becomes absurd and, I would say, immoral as well as irrational. It is to show, make plain, *how far phenomena as spiritually valued, are valued at their true worth.* How is this to be done? As already said, the only way we can arrive at what we may call a certainly true valuation of phenomena is when their permanence is immovably established in the mind and when their life-givingness is determined.

1. The permanency of phenomenal consciousness is established only when no more phenomena can be expected which may affect the equilibrium of the consciousness. For example: That the law of gravity holds true of all matter is certain to me because I can think of no phenomena which can contest the hold this idea has in my mind. It is so of the existence of Julius Caesar, of Jesus Christ. I am certain of the existence of these two men because of my certainty that no disturbing facts lurk undiscovered. Certainty—that is reality—grows as the region of unexplored phenomena diminishes and only in this way. So far Newman was right when he said: “the characteristic of certitude is that its object is truth.” Therefore, the duty of apologetic is to make certain phenomena which can have a spiritual value not by directly proving them, so much as by a putting one’s self and others in possession of all phenomena which can affect the permanency, that is reality, of the phenomena. Thus, the more we study humanity the more certain we become of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. Therefore apologetic will conscientiously consider all human personages who may have religious value with the intent that the soul must value the highest and best, and, it may be quietly expecting that Jesus Christ will con-

tinue to be what he has been, the most valuable, the one valuable, religious asset, who has and shall have preeminence in all things.

We seek that which is abiding and that which is worth most. A religion, a faith, a valuation which is permanent because the mind has closed itself and remains wilfully ignorant, is a faith which has become superstition. True faith never closes its eyes to any light. That which is real abides amid all the inflow of impressions. It rises as a buoy on the rising tide. The very love man has for God and his belief in Jesus Christ assures him that he need fear no other light. Therefore, our apologetic is, as a science which welcomes all phenomena, assured that these will bear home to the soul that which is real. All facts will result in a truer, clearer knowledge of God and of His revelation. Therefore we study all religions and are not afraid of any science. When I know all, then shall I know God.

2. The second duty of apologetic in relation to the spiritual valuation of phenomena is to show what phenomena so valued really produce life. Life, we say again, is the end and goal of all valuation. Jesus said: I am come that ye may have life. "'Tis life whereof our veins are scant.'" True valuations are evidenced in their product of life. Here again we meet the subjective desire. Does a given faith or valuation produce life? What kind of life do we mean? Our subjective condition determines the notion of life. But, we must assume the sanity of the race, and that the race cannot really err in its thought as to what life should be. Therefore we must study, in apologetic, what is the highest form of life and what produces it. Is this found in Buddhism? In Confucianism, in Judaism, or in Christianity? and in what form of Christianity, Catholic or Reformed? What feeds and produces the highest and fullest and purest life we must value, just as we would food. Therefore this is the second duty of apologetics; to seek for the bread and the water of life.

IV. In conclusion this new apologetic which seeks to value phenomena spiritually in order that religion may be pure and true, is in accord with the scriptures.

1. Because it recognizes what is properly named the self evidencing power of the truth. Revelation is known as light is known. Truth bears witness to itself. All values make themselves evident in experience of life. And this is the gospel way. The Christian gospel comes as a command, and faith is required because the gospel has its witness in the spirit of God. Paul explains unbelief because man's heart is blinded. The truth carries its own evidence, no one can do anything against it. Paul says: It pleased God to reveal His Son in me. No man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Spirit. It is the demonstration of the Spirit which produces faith. Eternal truths are spiritually discerned, they are revealed to the spiritual. Similarly, Jesus says that it was His Father who revealed to Peter the real nature of Himself, it was not flesh and blood. It is a new birth which enables one to perceive and receive heavenly things. It is children who receive the kingdom of God. Jesus declared that the only witness he had, besides Himself, was God the Father. Joined with this is the teaching that experience is the permanent proof of the truth, that is, of God and His grace. "Taste and see." "Come and see." The Samaritans said: "We have heard Him ourselves and we know this is the Christ." And the early reformers, emancipated from the thralldom of Roman Catholic authority, and before the authority of Scripture had been substituted for the Church, declared that the Spirit of God is the witness which alone compels assent. It makes man a listener—an observer:

"Nor less I deem that there are powers
Which of themselves the mind impress,
And that these minds of ours
Can learn by a wise passiveness." (Wordsworth.)

2. The apologetic which emphasizes the subjective condition of man, as the final reason or ground of his valuation of that which is presented to his consciousness, is the apol-

ogetic of the scriptures. It is the pure in heart who see God. It is to him that ordereth his conversation aright that God shows his salvation. Those who do His will, know of the doctrine. "If thine eye be single thine whole body shall be full of light." There is here the recognition of the mysterious power which works within the soul, works faith in us, reveals His Son in us, the divine election. But there is also the recognition of the fact that man's moral condition, his spiritual condition regulates his valuation of phenomena at their true worth.

"For he who with his Maker walks aright,
 Shall be their lord as Adam was before,
 His ear shall catch each sound with new delight;
 Each object wear the dress which then it wore;
 And he, as when erect he stood
 Hear from his Father's lips, that all is good." (*Jonas Very.*)

We are led away from the disturbing doubts of science. Serene in the possession of the highest worth, rejoicing with light that grows more luminous day by day, content to value what is most valuable because it is valuable for life and godliness, open-eyed and open hearted, free from pride and narrowness, there is soul rest and mind rest. As one who stands on a rock high above the surging seas, as one who from the lofty height of a mountain above the clouds looks down on the darkness below, so is the one who stands upon the revelation which God gave and gives of Himself and of all that pertain to life.

We worship, we recognize the worth-ship of the best. And who is best? Is it not Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God?

"I say, the acknowledgement of God in Christ
 Accepted by the reason, solves for thee
 All questions in the earth and out of it,
 And has so far advanced thee to be wise." (*Browning.*)