

DR. BRECKINRIDGE'S 4th ARTICLE ON THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

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THE CIVIL WAR: ITS NATURE AND END

BY THE

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ART. III. — *The Civil War: — Its Nature and End.*

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I. The Restoration of Peace shown to be impossible, except on the condition of the Preservation of the Federal Union and Constitution.

I. For what are we fighting, on one side, and on the other? What are the interests at stake, so immense and so opposite, that justify either party to this war in embarking in it at first, or in prosecuting it with the terrible earnestness everywhere manifest? What is the present aspect of it, generally considered — what is its probable future course — what the conclusion that must be reached, at last? What are to be its probable effects — directly upon ourselves, indirectly upon the other nations of the earth, and in both ways upon the immediate future of the human race, and possibly upon generations to come? How much of what either party is fighting for is really attainable, and of that which is attainable, how much is worth what it will cost? These are questions which every enlightened man — every free citizen — is bound to ask himself. The answer to them involves our lives and fortunes and liberties; nay more than even these, our *duty* as citizens, as patriots, and as Christians. It is to render such aid as we may be able, to all who will accept our aid, in deciding these vast questions, that we now attempt to develop still further the great truths we have discussed several times heretofore, and to apply them to the posture of public affairs now existing.

There are considerations of various kinds, and of the most decisive force, which render it impossible for peace to be restored to the country, except upon the condition of a single National Government, common to the whole American people, and embrac-

cing every loyal and every revolted State. As a question of national strength in the presence of all foreign nations — and therefore of national independence; as a question of permanent national life struggling against anarchy in the form of secession; as a question of law, and government, and constitutional freedom, measuring its strength against an immense and utterly profligate political conspiracy; as a question of personal freedom, and popular institutions, in conflict with a class minority possessed of vast wealth, and reckless of everything but its own aggrandizement; as a question of the universal domination of this daring class, not only in the Slave States, so many of which it had temporarily subjugated, but over the nation itself, which it betrayed, plundered, insulted, and to which it claimed to dictate ignoble terms of composition, at the head of a military force threatening the capitol; as a question of the duty of the nation to its loyal citizens, constituting at that time the actual majority in the fifteen Slave States — but suddenly and by fraud and violence reduced to a state of helpless degradation: we attempted, from the beginning, to show that there was no course, either of honor, or duty, or safety left to the nation, except to meet force by force, and to maintain the institutions of the country, and enforce the laws of the land, by the whole power of the American people. Nor do we suppose there is a single loyal person on this continent, who does not now look with contempt, or with execration, upon the conduct of Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet, during the last year of his administration: nor a single one who does not applaud the vigor and determination which the Congress of the United States, under the lead of Mr. Lincoln, have manifested in maintaining the integrity of the Union. But what we have now to urge goes beyond the state of the question heretofore discussed, and briefly recapitulated above. Influenced by such considerations as these, the nation accepted the war as unavoidable. What we maintain is, not merely that those considerations forbid the nation to terminate the war forced upon her, except in its complete success, but that in the very nature of the case, of the country, of all our institutions, and of the war itself, permanent peace is impossible, except upon the condition of a single national government. We will endeavor to illustrate this idea.

Whoever will look at a map of the United States will observe that Louisiana lies on both sides of the Mississippi river, and that the States of Arkansas and Mississippi lie on the right and left banks of this great stream — eight hundred miles of whose lower course is thus controlled by these three States, unitedly inhabited by hardly as many white people as inhabit the city of New York. Observe then the country drained by this river, and its affluents, commencing with Missouri on its west bank, and Kentucky on its east bank. There are nine or ten powerful States — large portions of three or four others — several large Territories, in all a country as large as all Europe, as fine as any under the sun, already holding many more people than all the revolted States — and destined to be one of the most populous and powerful regions of the earth. Does any one suppose that these powerful States — this great and energetic population — will ever make a peace that shall put the lower course of this single and mighty natural outlet to the sea, in the hands of a foreign government far weaker than themselves? If there is any such person, he knows little of the past history of mankind; and will, perhaps, excuse us for reminding him that the people of Kentucky, before they were constituted a State, gave formal notice to the Federal Government, when General Washington was President, that if the United States did not acquire Louisiana, they would themselves conquer it. The mouths of the Mississippi belong, by the gift of God, to the inhabitants of its great Valley. Nothing but irresistible force can disinherit them.

Try another territorial aspect of the case. There is a bed of mountains abutting on the left bank of the Ohio, which covers all Western Virginia, and all Eastern Kentucky, to the width, from east to west, in those two States, of three or four hundred miles. These mountains stretching southwestwardly, pass entirely through Tennessee — cover the back parts of North Carolina and Georgia — heavily invade the northern part of Alabama — and make a figure even in the back parts of South Carolina and the eastern parts of Mississippi; having a course of, perhaps, seven or eight hundred miles, and running far south of the northern limit of profitable cotton culture. It is a region of 300,000 square miles — trenching upon eight or nine Slave States, though near-

ly destitute of slaves itself—trenching upon at least five cotton States, though raising no cotton itself. The western part of Maryland and two-thirds of Pennsylvania, are embraced in the northeastern continuation of this remarkable region. Can anything that passes under the name of statesmanship, be more preposterous, than the notion of permanent peace on this continent, founded on the abnegation of a common and paramount government, and the idea of the supercilious domination of the cotton interest and the slave trade, over such a mountain empire, so located, and so peopled?

As a further proof of the utter impossibility of peace, except under a common government, and at once an illustration of the import of what has just been stated, and the suggestion of a new and insuperable difficulty; let it be remembered that this great mountain region, throughout its general course, is more loyal to the Union than any other portion of the Slave States. It is the mountain counties of Maryland that have held treason in check in that State; it is forty mountain counties in Western Virginia that have laid the foundation of a new and loyal commonwealth; it is the mountain counties of Kentucky that first and most eagerly took up arms for the Union; it is the mountain region of Tennessee that alone, in that dishonored State, furnished martyrs in the sacred cause of freedom; it is the mountain people of Alabama, that boldly stood out against the Confederate Government, till their own leaders deserted and betrayed them. Now, is the nation prepared, under any imaginable circumstances, to sacrifice these heroic men, as a condition of peace conquered from them by traitors? Will the nation sell the blood—we will not say of a race of patriots—but of even a single one of them? The Representatives of these men sit in Congress; their Senators are in the capitol. Will the rebel States dismember themselves, that cotton may have peace? Will the nation turn its back on the five Border Slave States—deliver over Western Virginia to the sword—and cover its own infamy under the ruins of the Constitution? Never—never! Our sole alternative—is victory. To know this, is to render victory certain.

Again: Consider the question of boundary, as preliminary to peace. We have shown, on a former occasion, that the States

of Maryland and Missouri stand in such relations, geographical and otherwise, to the nation, that they must necessarily share its fate. Since we gave expression to that opinion, much has happened to strengthen it, and increase the difficulties of any peaceful division of the country. Amongst other things, Congress has openly recognized the revolutionary Government in Western Virginia — and received Senators and Representatives from States in open rebellion: the armies of the Confederate States have invaded Western Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky: and to *conquer a boundary* extending to the Chesapeake, the Ohio, and the Missouri, is one of the avowed objects of those invasions. Whatever may have been the state of public opinion in any of the five Border Slave States, at an early stage of our national difficulties, at present there is not, probably, a single loyal citizen in either of them, who would entertain, for a moment, the idea of being attached to the Southern Confederacy — or who would not denounce as atrocious, on the part of the General Government, any suggestion that looked toward the surrender of those five States to the Southern Confederacy, as a condition of peace. On the opposite side, it is most probable that every secessionist in those five States would greatly prefer the continuance of the war, to peace, accompanied by such a division of the nation as would attach the Border Slave States to the Northern portion; while the more violent portion of them would, probably, prefer the continuance of the war, to the complete restoration of the Union on any terms. But these Border Slave States are, and must continue to be the chief theater of the war, so long as the issue of the war hangs in the least suspense. We say nothing, here, of the absolute necessity of the conquest of the secession party, and the restoration of the Union and the power of the National Government, as the solitary condition upon which the peace or safety of the whole country is possible. What we say is, that in the actual condition of the country, of the war, and of the avowed aims and recognized obligations of both parties, the question of boundary renders peace impossible, even if both parties desired peace upon every other ground. We readily admit that there is hardly an imaginable contingency, in which the Confederate Government can ever conquer, or the nation ever concede, any

boundary — that ought to be an allowable basis of peace. But this only shows how clear it is that the nation can contemplate no alternative but triumph or ruin; and that the conspirators against its peace and glory have madly plunged into a wicked rebellion, which could have no result but the subjugation of the whole nation, or their own destruction. At first, their pretext was — the *right* of each State to secede. Now, they seek to *conquer* States that refuse to secede. Perfidious, at first, to all the States; perfidious, now, to each separate State.

There are difficulties of a kind different from any of those yet suggested; and so aggravated by the conduct and principles of the secessionists, that there seems to be no possibility of even so much as finding a basis on which to negotiate. Take, as an example, their conduct toward the Indian Tribes which occupy, thinly, at least one-half of the whole area within our national boundaries — and some of the most civilized of which are settled upon the finest lands adjoining our inhabited borders, and were bound, by treaties highly advantageous to them, to the United States. As far as the public has information, it appears that the Confederate Government has made diligent efforts to excite these savages to war ~~against~~ us, along the whole Indian frontier, and along all the emigrant routes to the Pacific States. Thus much is certain, that the Tribes of the Southwest have taken up arms, that many thousands of them are boastfully declared by the Confederates to be ready to join their armies, and that a considerable force of their warriors is now with the troops invading Kentucky. We do not say they are unfit allies for the refugee Kentuckians who are leading them to the slaughter of their kindred, and the devastation of their country. Nor do we say that either the savages or the refugee marauders are unfit instruments of traitors, who first subvert every principle which holds society together in installing their rebellion — and then subvert every pretext on which they revolted, by banding with savages and paricides in an atrocious attack upon the only sovereignty they pretended to revere. We leave to others to depict these enormities as they deserve, and confide to a just posterity the retribution of such crimes. What we demand now is, what figure are these savage allies of traitors to cut, in the preliminaries of

peace? What stipulations are the Confederate States to demand—what guarantees are the American people to give, as the price of peace—concerning its future Indian policy, and concerning recompense for past Indian perfidy and outrage?

The question of slavery offers us another example, in the same category with the preceding one, of the madness of the whole secession conspiracy; and another proof that the restoration of permanent peace to the country by means of its division into two confederacies, or by any other means except the restoration of the Union and the maintenance of a single national government coëxtensive with the whole nation, is totally impossible. Upon the supposition that all parties were willing to divide the nation on the slave line, *provided* the new confederacies could make mutually satisfactory agreements, and could be mutually made to keep them in regard to negro slavery; such a basis of peace would rest on this childish absurdity—that the obligations of a treaty between hostile States are more effectual than the obligations of a government over the different portions of its own citizens—notwithstanding governments have the sanction of force in a hundred-fold greater degree than treaties can have, and have, in addition, ten thousand sanctions which no treaty can have. We think we have demonstrated, on a former occasion, that the profitable continuance of negro slavery anywhere on this continent, and its continuance at all in the Border Slave States, depends absolutely upon the existence of a common national government embracing both the Free States and the Slave States; and it seems to us that the developments of the war add continually to the force of what we then said. The preservation of the Union and the Constitution preserves at the same time, in all its integrity, the national settlement of the question of slavery made at the adoption of the Constitution itself; which was effectual for all the purposes intended, through more than seventy years of unparalleled prosperity; and is competent still through all coming time to give peace and security, if anything under heaven is competent to do so. On the contrary, forfeiting that settlement as soon as we subvert the Constitution and destroy the Union—it may be confidently asserted that the new confederacies which are to arise will find themselves incompetent to set-

tle even the preliminary basis of a treaty concerning their mutual rights and obligations touching the negro race on this continent; and that, even if they should be able to come to some uncertain and temporary understanding on the subject, stable peace between the parties, much less stable security to slave property, would be impossible. Our political system, made up of sovereign commonwealths united under a supreme Federal Government, affords not only the highest, but the only effectual protection for interests that are local and exceptional—and at the same time out of sympathy with the general judgment of mankind. And of all possible interests, that of the owners of slaves, in a free country, stands most in need of the protection of such a system. It is extremely difficult to say what effect, precisely, this war and its possible results may have upon the institution of slavery in America. So much at least is certain—that the total suppression of the present revolt, is hardly more important to any class of American citizens, than to the slaveholders of the country: and that the obstinate continuance of the war, by the South, will do nothing more surely than drain the slaves, owned by secessionists in the Border States, farther south—and leave the slave interest in the restored Union, a far weaker political element than it was when they sought to strengthen it by revolution.

We need not press any further the proof of the great truth we are asserting. The service we are doing is not so much to disclose new truths, as to make a clear statement of the grounds of a common and fixed conviction, which the public mind has widely and instinctively adopted. It is a conviction just in itself, and noble both in its origin and impulses. We will not agree to the ruin of our glorious country; and so we are not grieved to see that we cannot do it with any hope of peace thereby. We will not allow the Constitution to be subverted, the Union to be destroyed, and the nation to be divided; and so we are glad that in the order of God's Providence, the alternative to which the nation is shut up—is victory. If the people in the States which have taken up arms against our national life, will rise up in their might, recover their liberty, and put an end to the traitorous dominion of the cruel and perfidious class minority which is de-

grading and oppressing them, the nation has no further cause of war with them. If they will not do this, or if they cannot do it in their present miserable condition, it must be done for them — and it will be. The American people have not sought this war; they were led to the brink, not only of ruin, but of infamy, in the attempt to avoid it. The American people have neither approved nor participated in the injuries or the insults, inflicted on any portion of the nation by any other portion of it. On the contrary, their whole national history attests that, whatever factions and sections may have done or attempted, the nation has been faithful in its lot, and true to its sublime mission. And now, in this great crisis, if God will own our efforts, we will retrieve our destiny — and teach mankind a lesson which after ages will be slow to forget.

II. The Power of the Nation shown to be complete, and its duty imperative, to crush this rebellion, and preserve the Federal Union and Constitution.

II. The *Art of War* — for even those who are the most devoted to it as a pursuit, hardly venture to call it a *science* — has probably produced a smaller proportion of individuals who have, in the settled judgment of mankind, deserved supreme eminence, than any other reputable calling to which the human race has addicted itself, or to which its progress has given rise. And notwithstanding the perpetual slaughter of the battle-field, during the whole life of the world, it would probably be impossible to designate as many as twenty pitched battles, in the whole history of mankind — concerning which it can be made apparent that the destiny of our race would have been materially changed, if they had never been fought, or if they had resulted differently. There is no adequate evidence that any man now lives, who is competent to wield, with the highest efficiency, an army of the largest class; and we are free to risk public ridicule, by expressing the opinion that if Napoleon, or Wellington, or Marlborough, or Cromwell — not to mention a few more ancient names — had been placed in a day's march of Manassas, ten days before the bloody and resultless battle, with a force equal to the smallest, and provided no better than the worst, of the two armies that fought there; he would probably have cut both of them to pieces within

the ten days. From generation to generation, the art of war progresses slowly, and gradually establishes itself upon certain axioms and certain results: and then some great genius suddenly appears, and, despising the axioms and setting at nought the results, creates by his conquests new ideas and a new school of the art. And then the old process of codifying his campaigns into the body of the art of war, is renewed, till another great genius appears. And so on,—till our own day: in which, if God shall be pleased to point out the man—and the nation shall have sense to recognize him—the end will have come. Till such a captain appears—one of God's most uncommon gifts—we must content ourselves with such judgments as can be formed, from the common causes and the common course of events. Or if he should appear on the side of our rebellious countrymen—and no match for him on ours—we must put forth as much additional force and courage, as will counteract the excess of skill against us. It seems to us to be plain—upon any supposition that can be made short of the effectual interposition of God for the total change of the course and destiny of this great country, and as a necessary consequence of the whole order and result of human affairs—that this nation is not only perfectly competent to crush this rebellion, and extinguish the doctrine and practice of secession; but that there is no ordinary possibility of any other result. It is this which we now desire to illustrate.

If the five Border Slave States (Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri) had stood firmly by the Union—the ten remaining Slave States could hardly have made a show of military resistance to the overwhelming power of the nation, even if they had all seceded, and been unanimous. The white population of the whole ten may be stated, in round numbers, at about four millions, against twenty-four millions in the remaining twenty-four States. In fact, however, but for the treasonable conduct of the secession minorities in the Border States, and especially but for the outrage perpetrated in Virginia, by means of which the secessionists usurped the control of that State, and suddenly threw it into a condition of war with the Federal Government; it is in the highest degree probable, that neither North Carolina, Tennessee, nor Arkansas would have seceded. Moreover,

if the State Governments in Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, had been loyal, their influence — backed, as it undoubtedly would have been, by the mass of the people in those States — would, at the very least, have placed the loyal population in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas in such a position as to have kept the traitors in check in all those States — even if they ventured to secede. The very worst that can happen, has already occurred: four of the Border States are the chief theater of the war; three at least, if not four, of those States, are for the Union; one, possibly two of them, may be considered against it. For the purposes before us let all five be omitted, in reckoning the strength of either party. Let it be supposed that their whole white population, which may be stated at about four millions, is equally divided — and will add as much, taking the five States, to the military force on one side as on the other side. What follows is, that the war is to be decided by the relative force of the nineteen Free States, and the ten most southerly Slave States. But the case is far stronger, in favor of the General Government, than this statement would make it appear. For by making these Border States the theater of war, however much the ten Southern States may gain, the nineteen Northern States gain far more, in every way. They gain physically, by gradually drawing, as the war progresses, a greater and greater proportion of Union men into the Federal army; while to the whole extent that these States are occupied by Federal troops, the secession element is greatest at the first violent military movement, and becomes relatively less and less available afterwards. They gain morally, by the whole effect produced upon the Union people of the Border Slave States, fighting side by side with the Northern soldiers, in a common and glorious cause; and by the whole effect produced on the Northern troops, by seeing for themselves, who and what the loyal people of the South are. But they gain also, in a military point of view. To menace Nashville, is a very different thing from being menaced at Cincinnati. A victory at Springfield in Southern Missouri is widely a different thing from a victory at Springfield in Central Illinois. When the theater of war passes out of Virginia and Kentucky to the South — the beginning of the end to rebellion is reached. If it

were to pass out of Virginia and Kentucky to the North, it would only mean the annihilation of whatever Confederate troops might venture across the Ohio River. The Confederate armies will find their attempt to invade Kentucky a very serious matter before all is over; though there is only an air line in their rear, and a million of people — one-third of whom are disloyal — immediately before them. What could they expect, north of the Ohio River — with that broad and generally difficult stream in their rear, and six or seven millions of loyal and warlike people, in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, in point blank range of them? The secession gasconade about wintering in Cincinnati — with which the air of the West has been laden for some months — when last heard of was making good time, with a strong force, through the north-eastern mountains of Kentucky, hurrying toward Virginia, out of the way of a small column of raw troops, under a navy Lieutenant, (NELSON,) who has lately become an amateur General.

Upon the whole, therefore, the case against the nation is not quite so bad as we before admitted — when, counting out the Border Slave States, it seemed to stand about twenty millions in the nineteen Free States, against about four millions in the ten secession States of the South. In both clusters of States, we leave out all but the white population; and every one will judge for himself how far the leaving out of a few hundred thousand free negroes may be unjust to the stronger side, and the leaving out of some three millions of slaves, several hundred thousand free negroes, and an indeterminate quantity of Indian savages, may be unjust to the weaker side. There certainly are conditions in which this vast body of slaves may be considered a very powerful element in the military strength of the South: the chief of which conditions are — *first*, that the military force of the United States should not be able to penetrate the heart of the disloyal slave region, — and, *secondly*, that after penetrating that region, the General Government should be weak enough to treat slave property, in the hands of rebels and traitors, as if it were sacred. On the other hand, there are conditions in which this Indian and slave population may become fatal to the weaker party; as, for example, if the Indian savages who have been enlisted

against us were required, as the condition of peace and protection to their tribes, to ravage those who have engaged their scalping knives against our women and children; and if the slaves were supported from the estates of their disloyal owners, and made to labor upon every species of military work — the number, variety, and extent of which needed by a hostile force, in such a country as the South, and in the present state of the military art, are so great. Still, however, omitting these populations altogether — as neither a weakness nor a strength — there remain the abiding elements, face to face, twenty millions against four millions. It is certainly true, that no one can tell beforehand how a particular battle may eventuate — or how a particular campaign may end. No one can guess how many cowards a few brave men may conquer — how many fools a man of genius may set at nought — how many advantages may be gained over numbers, by superior activity, intelligence and daring. Oliver Cromwell conquered Great Britain, Ireland, and Scotland, with a handful of men: Bonaparte annihilated three Austrian armies, each greater than his own, in one of his brief Italian campaigns: Alexander the Great conquered the whole known world with thirty thousand men. And to come to our own times — *somebody*, we don't exactly know who, has held Manassas, and menaced Washington City, during this whole war, in defiance of the whole power of the nation: and, what seems to us really a marvelous achievement — *somebody* has virtually blockaded the Potomac River from one of its shores, in defiance of our whole naval power, and in the face of probably a hundred and fifty thousand good troops, in his front, and upon his flanks. Still, however, here are our twenty millions against four millions — any four millions of the former, equal to the latter four millions — and we having every possible advantage which they can possess, and many besides of the greatest importance, which they do not possess. This is the undeniable state of the case, considered as a whole. Upon it, there is no ordinary possibility of but one final result. Concerning it, whatever is known to be out of the ordinary course of human affairs, is, in the aggregate, more for us than against us. With regard to it, no motive that can operate upon a rational mind or a patriotic heart, is wanting to impel us to do

with our might, what has been now shown to be completely in our power; — what, it was before shown, involves our national ruin if we fail; and what, we must add, covers us with ignominy if we omit.

In one of our former papers, published in the month of March last, we endeavored to point out the method in which the national peril at that dark period could be averted, and to designate the elements, few but immense and decisive, in which the triumphant deliverance of the country lay. Nine or ten months of herculean efforts on the part both of the nation and of the rebels, have passed since that paper was published. The whole field lies far more clearly open before us now than it did then. Public opinion, everywhere, has been consolidated in one direction or another, and is far more comprehensible. The whole continent has passed into a state of war, military operations have been conducted on the most gigantic scale, and the nation and the rebels have reached a position in which their relative strength must be fairly and speedily measured. It seems very clear to us, that all the indications, taken together, are in a high degree favorable to the country; and that this can be made apparent in the shortest manner, by a slight recapitulation of the points in which our national safety seemed to us to lay at the darkest period, and a general view of the tendency and present state of public affairs, with reference to them.

It seemed to us, in the *first* place, that the salvation of the country depended upon the Federal Government's recognizing and assuming its great position as the true and only representative of the nation, and as the supreme authority in these United States: that so acting, its highest mission was to save the nation — to that end putting forth the whole strength of the country — rallying every loyal citizen to its support — and crushing treason everywhere. Whoever will compare the state of the national administration and of the country, as left by Mr. Buchanan and as found by Mr. Lincoln on the 4th of March, with the present aspect of both; will not need any detail by us, to be convinced that what we then declared to be the first condition of our deliverance, has been completely realized, and has produced all the effects that we anticipated. The nation was betrayed by the

Federal Government, and was virtually lost on the 4th of March, 1861. The Congress of the United States, under the lead of Mr. Lincoln, and by means of a sublime outburst of national patriotism, has retrieved the ruin elaborately prepared for us, through long years of perfidy, conspiracy, and treason. The whole difference between the two positions of the country may be clearly estimated, by picturing to ourselves, on one hand, five hundred thousand brave and loyal men under arms; and by picturing to ourselves, on the other hand, a traitorous faction everywhere shouting "*no coercion,*" to a betrayed and stupefied people.

In the *second* place, the deliverance of the country seemed to us to depend upon a vigorous, and, as far as possible, successful effort, to arrest the spread of secession, at the cotton line — and if that failed, then at the Southern boundary of the Border Slave States. It was always our opinion, frequently expressed, that a national movement of the whole fifteen Slave States, against the Union, could not be defeated. It was our opinion for thirty years, that a growing school of Southern politicians, had no other object but the production of this result — an opinion, the truth of which no one, we suppose, now doubts; and we have personal knowledge that the support of Major Breckinridge for the Presidency, in Kentucky, was largely given to him under the delusion — countenanced, at least, by himself — that the designation of himself as the candidate of the Southern wing of the Democracy, meant that they had definitely abandoned this conspiracy and all schemes of disunion, and would risk their fate as a party and as a people, in the Union. Yes, we perfectly well know that under this delusion, and because of the decisive influence of this pretended change in the South upon the perpetuity of the Union, multitudes of men — who never saw a moment in which they would not willingly have laid down their lives for the Union — supported him for the Presidency who, in effect, was the representative of disunion. Such is treason. The effects which have been produced by the course of events in Virginia, plainly show what might have been expected, if all the Slave States had cordially united in the revolt: while the effects that have been produced by the course of the intrepid Union men of Kentucky, under the most difficult circumstances, as

plainly show what might have been expected, if all the Border Slave States had cordially espoused the cause of the Union. The pestilence was not arrested at the cotton line — nor even fully stayed at the Southern boundary of the Border States. But enough has been done to show how just and important the opinion we expressed in March was; to show how fatally the vacillation and timidity of the nominal Union party in most of the Border States, has operated; and to show how certainly these five States will be preserved to the Union, and how decisive that fact must be, upon the fate of the revolt.

In the *third* place: About the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and in full apprehension, on one side, of the terrible fact that Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet had sold the nation to the Southern conspirators, and that they were preparing to seize it; and, on the other side, with the profound conviction that the state of public feeling and opinion throughout the North was incompatible, in the existing temper of the times, with the continuance of the Union, or the steadfast loyalty to it of a single Slave State — we did not hesitate to declare that a revolution in opinion and feeling at the North must promptly occur, or all was lost. We ventured to predict that it would occur; — that the extreme principles of the party which had carried the Presidential election, would not be, could not be carried out; that new, better, and more exalted ideas, would supersede the vehement and exaggerated principles of the newly triumphant party; and that the people of the North would stand by the Union, and by every man, everywhere, that was loyal to the country. And now we confidently assert, that no more illustrious instance of patriotic ardor, no more striking proof of the warlike spirit of a free people devoted to the pursuits of peace, has been exhibited in modern times — than is to be found in the conduct of the people of the North, at this terrible crisis of their country. We have felt obliged, many times in the course of many years, to condemn certain tendencies in the Northern mind, and various acts which seemed to be approved by the mass of the Northern people, hostile to the rights of the Southern States, and incompatible with their own duty as citizens of the United States. In the same spirit of fearless justice, we now give expression to our grateful

and confiding admiration of conduct on the part of the North, full of high and multiplied proofs of wisdom, magnanimity and heroism. We solemnly believe, this day, that the North is willing to do for the loyal States of the South, more, in every way, than any magnanimous Southern man would have the heart to ask. What a shame — what a burning shame — that men should be betrayed by villains, to seek each other's lives — who, if they did but know one another, would rush into each other's arms.

The *fourth* necessity asserted by us, was such a counter revolution — throughout the more southerly States that had then seceded, or were then deeply agitated on the subject — as would put down the secession movement, and bring the loyal party of the South into power, everywhere. Our hope, at first, was that this counter revolution would manifest itself in the most powerful of those States — as for example, in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee — by means of popular elections, and other ordinary peaceful means; and that the weight of an irresistible public opinion — the comparative weakness of the disloyal States — and the effectual but forbearing interposition of the Federal Power, would deter the leaders of the conspiracy, and give the patriotism and common sense of the people space and opportunity for reaction, concert and triumph. Under any but the most extraordinary circumstances, that would have been the course and result of affairs. To state and explain these circumstances fully, appertains to the historian of these eventful times: we have heretofore given a brief and general account of them. We still await, still confidently expect, the counter revolution throughout the South — which, under ordinarily wise and courageous treatment, would have crushed the secession conspiracy as soon as it had developed its nature, spirit and designs — but which must now extinguish it when its course is run. The grounds upon which we expect it, instead of being removed, are every way confirmed by the progress of events. It is more certain now than it was at first, that the conspirators have reason to dread, and that loyal persons may confidently rely on, the resolute purpose of the American people to uphold the Union, the Constitution and the laws: so that the assurance of unavoidable failure to the one, and of speedy and complete deliverance to the other,

becomes day by day the very nourishment of the reëction which is inevitable in its set time. That which is thus unavoidable, in the nature of the case as it exists, cannot be called in question, by any one who believes that there are such human endowments as patriotism and common sense; by any one who confides in the capacity of mankind for self-government; by any one who knows that to deceive a people, and then betray them, and then oppress them, and then impoverish them, are crimes which no people ever forgive; by any one who understands that the indignation of mankind is relentless, in proportion as the sacrifices have been costly and bitter which the folly of corrupt rulers forced them to make, to no end but ruin and ignominy; by any one who accepts the assurance of God, that civil society is an ordinance from heaven, and is incompatible with the permanent reign of anarchy. Nor do the innumerable facts, which, in a thousand ways, reach us from the whole area covered by the usurped power of the Confederate Government, fail to confirm, in the public mind, the conviction already stated. On the one hand, there comes up a subdued but incessant wail of a loyal people groaning for deliverance; on the other, a fierce cry for blood and plunder, mixed with a wild clamor about cordial unanimity. The nation pities and heeds that wail of our brethren, and, by God's help, will make it audible throughout the earth, as a lesson to all conspirators. And so far is it from being credible that their deliverance cannot be accomplished except by the slaughter of vast populations—nor maintained afterward except by immense standing armies; all the facts of this sad case show, that what has happened in all ages and countries, will happen again here; and *the mass of the people* speedily and joyfully return to their allegiance, as soon as the military force of the rebels is broken, and society is allowed to return to its ordinary condition. These are terrible episodes in the history of nations. No people has escaped them: it is the feeble only that perish by means of them: the great survive them, and become greater.

The Internal State of the Country, as affected by the War.

III. Supposing what has been said to be worthy of serious consideration, as pointing out the single condition on which the

restoration of peace is possible—and as showing the complete ability, and the clear duty, of the American people to enforce that condition, and conquer peace: it becomes all the more important to observe with candor, the actual state of the country, as that is influenced by the war, or as it may, in turn, influence its progress and end; because, according to our apprehension, the indefinite continuance of the war can be arrested only by the triumph of the nation. Classified in an orderly way, the Civil and Military condition of the country is sufficiently though incidentally brought to light, for our present design, in the course of the two preceding divisions of this paper. What remains, relates, therefore, more particularly to the Moral, Political, Financial, and Industrial condition of the country—considered with relation to the war. It is to some general consideration of this aspect of the case, in relation to our general course of thought, that we now proceed.

When we speak of the Moral condition of the country, we do not intend, especially, its spiritual state, as in the sight of God. We mean that moral state which is the sum of all the good and all the evil, presented in our mixed and confused probationary state—and presented to us now and amongst ourselves, as characteristic of our condition, and as decisively influential upon the future. This rebellion begins in an outrage upon many of the clearest obligations of Natural Religion—loyalty, love of country, fidelity to public trusts, gratitude for honors bestowed, truth and manhood in the discharge of obligations voluntarily assumed, nay, eagerly sought. How many of the leaders of this rebellion are free from the stain on their personal honor, of deliberately transgressing some or all of those natural obligations, which no contingency under heaven can justify any one in violating! We speak not of the mere fact of treason, as defined by human laws. What we speak of is the perfidy, in every revolting form, which has marked this treason, in its birth, in its growth, and in its present frantic struggle: men seeking to overthrow monuments, cemented by the blood of their immediate ancestors; men dishonoring names, illustrious through many generations; men betraying their friends, their neighbors, their kindred; men seducing children to take up arms against their parents—and then band-

ing them with savages to desolate their own homes with fire and sword. It is a madness — a fearful madness. No madness can be greater, except the madness that could induce this great nation to suppose that God allows it to let this go unpunished.

Perhaps the most dangerous, as well as the most universal form, in which this characteristic perfidy has made itself manifest, is the suddenness with which thousands of *spies and informers* have appeared throughout the nation, the tenacity with which they have everywhere followed their degrading employment, and the alacrity with which honors and rewards, almost to the very highest, have been lavished upon them by the rebel government and people. In the States which have seceded, the mass of the loyal people, overwhelmed by force, have quietly acquiesced. In the loyal States, the mass of the disloyal people — wherever opportunity offered — seem to have given themselves up to a regular system of espionage, by means of which the rebel authorities, civil and military, have been kept perfectly informed of all they desire to know. All ranks of society, persons in private life and those in every kind of public employment from the lowest to the highest, persons of every age and of both sexes; appear to make it the chief business of their lives to obtain secret and dangerous information for the benefit of the rebel authorities. Betraying their country, they break with indifference every tie that binds human beings to each other. The humiliated parent doubts whether his own disloyal child will not betray him; the husband may not safely confide in his disloyal wife; and as for the obligation of civil or military oaths, or the honor which should bind every one in whom trust is reposed, no loyal man in America any longer believes that the mass of secessionists scattered through the loyal States, recognize the validity of these sacred bonds. It is, we suppose, certain, past doubt, that every important military movement since the war began has been betrayed to the enemy before it was made; and nine-tenths of the evils and miscarriages we have suffered have been occasioned by *spies and informers* in our midst.

Such a state of affairs as this cannot be endured. The danger of it renders it intolerable. The enormity of it justifies any remedy its extirpation may require. And they who are innocent of

such turpitude themselves, instead of raising a clamor at the use of any means by which society seeks to protect itself, ought to be thankful for any opportunity to clear themselves from the suspicion under which they may have fallen. And they who are guilty, and expect to silence public justice by clamor about irregular proceedings against them, ought to bear in mind, that a people outraged past endurance, has much shorter processes than any that imply infallibility in corrupt judges, or writs out of chancery. It does not appertain to us to argue and determine nice and doubtful points of criminal law — concerning which men who ought to be competent to decide, are pleased to differ and to dispute; and which the present Chief Justice of the United States is alledged to have decided in two exactly opposite ways. The boundaries between the civil and military authorities, in time of war, under the Constitution and laws of the United States — may be sufficiently obscure, to serve the turn of those who habitually transgress both. And the boundaries between those powers which can be exercised, in war, by the President alone, and those which must be exercised jointly by the power both of Congress and the President, may be liable to grave questioning by persons, amongst others, who are not very desirous to have their career of mischief cut short. Spies, and other persons who may be justly considered liable to military punishment, can look, we suppose, with very small hope to honest civil tribunals, for deliverance from military authority; and it is very certain that all the prisons in the United States would not hold the tenth part of those, who have made themselves liable to punishment for such offenses. As for offenses of other kinds, especially for the highest offense known to the laws of all civilized countries, *Treason* — these, when added to the highest military offense, that of being a *Spy*, (and no one can be a *spy* in *this* war without being a *traitor* also) — the public authorities are certainly inexcusable if they punish innocent men, when so many are flagrantly guilty — and are hardly excusable when they punish insignificant men, when so many of great distinction have been allowed to escape, or are still unquestioned. The legality of particular modes of arrest, the proper legal treatment after arrest, and the whole doctrine about the writ of *habeas corpus*; are matters, no doubt, of

great importance in their place. As for us, we are ready to stand by the chief law officer of the Government, the Attorney General of the United States, who, as we understand the matter, has given the explicit sanction of his high professional standing, and that of his great office, to the course which the President has taken. And we suppose all loyal men will agree with us, that — if the American people can endure the pretended violations of law, which their enemies say are daily perpetrated in the arrest and detention of suspected, and indicted, Spies and Traitors — it is no great thing to ask of those who declare the Constitution to be already a nullity, and all lawful government at an end, that they will bear with composure irregularities which loyal men do not complain of. And, perhaps, all earnest patriots would agree, that, at the worst, the salvation of the country from the reign of anarchy and the despotism of traitors, is worth all the human laws and constitutions in the world. We can make governments; for society is supreme over them. But we have only this one country. And it is audacious hypocrisy, for those who are seeking alike the overthrow of our government, and the degradation of our country — to revile us about some pretended irregularity, in our attempt to subject them to punishment, for their crimes against the existence of society.

The financial condition and prospects of the country — the cost of the war in money, the questions of public credit, taxes, currency, public debt, and the like — are of great importance in themselves; and the use which is made of the popular ignorance on such subjects — by exaggerating whatever is evil and suppressing whatever is favorable, and by both means shaking the public constancy in pushing the war to a complete triumph — adds greatly to that importance. They who are familiar with such topics can do no greater service to the country than to remove all mystery from them, and disclose with precision our condition and prospects with reference to them. For ourselves, we readily admit that, in our judgment, the end demanded — namely, the independence of the nation, the freedom of the people, the security of society, and the glory of the country — ought to be achieved, let the pecuniary cost and the financial result be what they may. After our triumph, the country will remain, and it will be-

long to our posterity; and no one need doubt that the triumphant people will make the glorious country worth all it cost us to save both; nor that posterity will venerate, as they should, the heroic generation that sacrificed all, to save all. There is, however, no ordinary possibility that very great pecuniary sacrifices will be required of the loyal portion of the nation; and it is not out of the reach of probability that they may, as a whole, derive considerable pecuniary advantage from the aggregate result of this unnatural war. We will explain ourselves in as few words as possible.

So far as the great losses, if not the total ruin, of large numbers of people in a nation, are necessarily pecuniary misfortunes to the whole population; we do not see how the restored nation is to escape very great loss by this war. For it seems to us impossible for the Southern States, even if the war could be arrested at once, to extricate themselves from their deplorable financial condition, without extreme sacrifice; just as it seems to us certain that the main source of their affluence, in their own opinion — their virtual monopoly of cotton in the market of the world — is forever ended. If they protract this war to their utmost power, the Confederate Government, and every State government connected with it, will come out of the war utterly bankrupt. The creditors of all those Governments will be so far ruined, as the loss of some thousand millions of dollars due to them by those Governments, can ruin their creditors. Some thousand millions more will be sunk in individual losses, unconnected with the Governments. Every species of property will fall, say one-half or more, in its merchantable value. The whole paper currency, after falling gradually till it ceases to be competent for any payment at all — will fall as an entire loss on the holders of it; the precious metals having long ago ceased to circulate. In the meantime, if the country is not speedily conquered, it passes over from the hands of the present usurpers, into the hands of three or four hundred thousand armed men — whose only means of existence is their arms. This, in every item of it, means desolation. In the aggregate, it presents a condition, which all the statesmen in the world have not the wisdom to unravel into prosperity, without first passing through multiplied evils,

the least of which is infinitely greater than the greatest of those for which they took up arms against the Union. No such revolution as that attempted in the South can succeed; and its inevitable failure draws after it, always, a revolution in property. The present disloyal race of cotton and sugar and rice planters of the South—its great property holders, who ought, above all men, to have put down this rebellion—will, as a class, disappear, beggared, perhaps in large proportion extinct, when the war is over. It is a fearful retribution; but we do not see how they can escape it.

In effect, therefore, the Federal Government and the loyal States of America have no alternative but, besides maintaining their own financial solvency and credit during the war, to retrieve the ruin of the Southern States, as a part of the nation, after the war is done. No enlightened man ought to have any doubt of their ability to do both. At the present moment, we will enter no farther into the question of the national ability to do the latter, after the war is over; than to desire the reader to make, for himself, a full and just comparison of the present financial conditions of the United States, and the Confederate States—and satisfy himself of the true causes of the immeasurable difference between them. It is, just now, the other point—our financial ability to carry the war triumphantly through, without great pecuniary sacrifices to the loyal people of the nation—that interests the public mind; and about which we have a few words to add.

A nation, like an individual, can spend its entire annual accumulations, within the year, without being a cent the poorer, or a cent in debt. It can do this forever; and it can do it in carrying on war, as well as in any other way. If all the people of the United States would put the whole of their annual accumulations in the hands of the Government, *as a gift*, their boundless wealth might be spent on war, forever, and nobody be any poorer—and the Government owe no debt. If they will not let the Government have it *as a gift*, there are two other modes by which the Government may obtain the whole of it—and still no one be any poorer. It can be done by taxation;—limiting the taxes—at the highest—to the available annual accumula-

tions; and distributing the taxes so that they shall fall only on the accumulations: both very nice operations, which few public men have ever understood, and few nations have willingly endured. It can be done also, by means of *Public Credit*; which is at once the highest product of civilization, and its greatest safeguard. There is a third method by which, emphatically, in wars like this, conquering nations are accustomed to relieve themselves: *first* by making the conquered party pay, in whole or in part, the expenses of the war; and *secondly*, by confiscating the property of enemies, and especially of rebels. The equity of these latter methods cannot be questioned; and they have this high justification, that they discountenance all rash, needless, and criminal wars. It was a madness in the Confederate States — as the weaker and the aggressive party — to set us the example of the most sweeping confiscations; for it pointed to a fund, in the hands of traitors, too large to be stated with even approximate truth, out of which we might conquer them without costing any loyal man a farthing.

The Congress of the United States has resorted to both of the two expedients first stated above: Taxation and Loans to the Government. To state the matter in other words, this generation agrees to take on itself its fair share of preserving the country; and this share is expressed in the form of taxes and interest upon money borrowed by the Government. It justly proposes to cast on future generations, some portion of the cost of that which concerns them as deeply as it does us; and this share is expressed in whatever amount of debt and interest this generation may leave unpaid. Let us observe, however, that the nature of wealth is such, in the present state of human civilization, that the surplus capital of the world, to an almost boundless extent, is constantly seeking for safe and easily convertible investments; amongst the most eagerly desired of which, are such as are the most likely to be perpetual. The debt we may leave to posterity, therefore, may be truly said to be no more than the interest in perpetuity, on the amount unpaid, and which posterity may prefer not to pay, when it shall enter upon the most glorious inheritance in the world, charged with a very small comparative annuity, created in defence of the inheritance itself. If

this war should last five years, at a cost of five hundred millions a year, over and above the income from direct and indirect taxes, we should make our children the foremost nation on earth; and oblige them to pay, therefor, one hundred and fifty millions a year. This is less, a good deal, than the yearly interest paid on the present national debt of Great Britain: and it is extremely probable it could be raised, in a prosperous condition of the country, by indirect taxes, without detriment to a single one of its great interests, and with great advantage to many of them. But, in truth, we may say, the war will not cost so much as five hundred millions a year, over and above the ordinary income; nor will the war last five years; nor will there be any difficulty, under a wise and economical administration of public affairs, for the same generation that makes the war debt, to pay its interest, and gradually redeem the debt itself. Nay; a previous limitation stated by us, is theoretically true, only in a certain sense. For any man, or any nation, in good credit, can borrow, from other men and other nations, and do so borrow continually, immense sums of money, on the credit not of surplus accumulation, nor even of gross income — but of the capital itself; — nay, often to the value of an enormous credit beyond the value of the capital itself. We were originally a thrifty people, economical in paying salaries, averse to high taxes, and shy of public debts; some indulgence in which latter, in later years, has not made us more favorable to them. But of all absurdities, none can be more palpable than the idea of any inherent pecuniary difficulty on the part of the American people, in carrying out this war to complete triumph. Undoubtedly, this is on the supposition of competent skill, in the raising and disbursement of such immense sums of money. And, so far as we are informed and are competent to judge, there is much reason to ascribe the highest capacity to the present Secretary of the Treasury. Undoubtedly, also, it is on the further supposition that this vast fund is neither stolen, nor perverted, nor used wastefully and fraudulently; but that it is skillfully, faithfully, and economically applied to its right use, by the agents of the Government, through whose hands it passes. To this end, it is probable, further legislation by Congress is needed — as well as a sleepless vigilance on the part of

the public — and the condign punishment, without respect to persons, of all official corruption.

There are some other topics of much interest, touching which we had designed to say something — as, for example, the question of paper currency, whether furnished by the Government or the Banks, in its relation to the circulation of the precious metals and the possible drain of them from the country — and the bearing of the actual management of the public finances upon these questions, and upon the internal trade of the country, by means of the substitution of cash payments, instead of credits, both in public and private transactions. But great as the bearing of these topics is, upon the general questions we are discussing, the topics themselves are too much beside the common knowledge of mankind, to be very clearly stated in the remaining space allotted to this portion of this paper. We content ourselves, therefore, with saying that, in our opinion, an incompetent Secretary of the Treasury had it completely in his power to have placed the public finances in a condition out of which immediate and ruinous discredit to the Government would have sprung — and, as a consequence, the general circulation of a depreciated paper currency, the disappearance of the precious metals, a ruinous fall in the value of property, the impossibility of active trade, and the gradual impoverishment of the country, in the midst of the war. Instead of calamities so untimely and dreadful, it seems to us perfectly clear that the course taken by Mr. Chase has had a most powerful influence in maintaining the public credit at a very high point; in opening to the Government, as a favored borrower, the whole unfixed wealth of the nation; and in aiding, in a very high degree, the rapid development of that prosperity which the industrial condition of the country exhibits in all the loyal States. There are, no doubt, other causes — some of them greater than was foreseen by most persons, others which were not foreseen by any one — to which we must attribute the chief influence in producing the universal industrial activity, and the substantial industrial prosperity, which the loyal States enjoy; instead of the starvation to which the mad conspirators of the South expected to reduce those States. It is a great lesson — this unexpected working of this civil war upon the industrial condition

of the two sections of the Union. We would willingly enter into some exposition of the causes, which have warded off so many heavy calamities from one section, and hurled them with such crushing force upon the other. But we content ourselves, as in several previous instances, with suggesting the great fact to the reader, and urging him to verify it for himself. Its bearing is most decisive on the course and end of this war. And its just exposition throws great light on the true interests of the whole country, and on the real sources of its power.

The External Relations of the Country, considered with reference to the War.

IV. The secessionists would have mankind believe, that their conduct is prompted by the most elevated principles, and directed by the noblest instincts. In illustration of these pretensions, those who were in the highest civil stations, plundered the Government under which they were Senators, Members of Congress, and Cabinet officers: those who were in the naval and military service, betrayed the flag of their country, and delivered up, not only strong places, but the troops confided to them: those who had the opportunity, robbed the Government of money: those who were on foreign diplomatic service, used their positions to the greatest possible injury of the nation: and if there were any exceptions of honorable conduct amongst them (we do know of a single one) they occurred amongst those of subordinate rank, and have been concealed by their comrades, as marks of weakness. All these degrading evidences of the total demoralization of the party, occurred in that stage of the conspiracy, immediately preparatory to the commencement of open hostilities by them. At first, they seemed to have supposed that the nation would make no serious attempt to reduce them by force, and that a great people, betrayed and sold, would accept the ignominious fate prepared for it. When they awoke from this stupid dream, their first resort was, very naturally, to an exhibition of the quality of their heroism; and their wail of "*No coercion*" resounded through the land — echoed back by the concerted cry of their secret allies in the loyal States, "*Peace, on any terms, with our brethren.*" Their next resort, just as naturally, was a manifestation of the reality of their boasted confidence in themselves,

in their resources, and in their cause. This, also, they exhibited in a manner perfectly characteristic. Emissaries were despatched to all foreign nations, embracing even the distracted Governments south of us, and not forgetting even our Indian tribes, or the Mormon kingdom. Everywhere, under the sun, where the least help seemed attainable, by whatever means they supposed might be effectual, they eagerly sought it. Sometimes by menaces, sometimes by solicitations, sometimes seeking alliance, sometimes protection, sometimes offering everything, sometimes begging for anything—even for a King, if they could get nothing better. But always, and everywhere, help was what they wanted! Help, against their own country, which they had betrayed. Oh! patriots! Help, against their own people, whom they professed to have terrified, and to be able to subdue. Oh! heroes! A more shameful record does not disfigure the history of sedition.

The United States have had three foreign wars, in eighty-six years; two with Great Britain, one with Mexico; the whole three occupying less than one-seventh part of their national existence. Peace is emphatically the desire and policy of the nation; for peace offers to it conquests, well understood by it, far greater than any nation ever obtained by war. To treat all nations as friends, to treat them all alike, to have alliances with none, to have treaties of peace and commerce with all, to demand nothing that is not just and equal, to submit to nothing that is wrong: this is the simple, wise, and upright foreign policy of this great country. Seated, so to speak, on the outer margin of the world, as the world's civilization stood at the birth of this great nation, the fathers of the Republic understood and accepted the peculiar lot which God had assigned to their country; and their descendants, to the fourth and fifth generation, had steadily developed the noble and fruitful policy of their ancestors, beholding continually the increasing power and glory, in the fruition of which, in our day, they constituted one of the chief empires of the world. Whatever else the nation may have learned, or left unlearned, in a career so astonishing; it has learned at least that the career itself is not yet accomplished, and that it must not be cut short. It must not be; for we dare not allow it, as we would answer to God, to the human race, to the shades of our ancestors, and to

the reproaches of our posterity. The very idea of forcing us, by means of foreign intervention, besides the indignation it begets, shows us how indispensable it is to our independence as a nation, that we must preserve the power by which to defy all such atrocious attempts. The true interpretation for a wise nation to put on such a menace, is that it already behooves it to become more powerful. In the present condition of the chief nations of the earth, invincible strength is the first condition of national independence. And we, who are out of the European community of States, and out of the scope of their fixed ideas of European balance of power, which has, for so long a period, regulated that continent; are, beyond all other nations, pressed with the necessity of augmenting, instead of diminishing our power, if we would preserve our freedom. Two nations of moderate force made out of ours — and the continent is at the mercy of every powerful European combination: and this is the idea of freedom and glory, that characterizes the Confederate Government. One mighty nation — and the United States may defy all Europe combined; and this is the American idea of American independence. Let the fact, therefore, be taken as final, that any foreign attempt to support the secession rebellion, is not merely tantamount to a declaration of war — but to war against the future independence of the United States. And let the Federal Government clearly understand, that this is the deliberate sense of the American people. And let all foreign Governments be made fully aware that this is the sense in which such an attempt will be taken.

We do not ourselves believe that any foreign Government will interfere in our unhappy civil war. The doctrine of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of nations, is not only the settled international law of Europe; but it has been of late thoroughly and generally enforced, and its present breach would completely tear in pieces the web of diplomacy that involves the European system of peace. Nor do we see what any European nation could gain by assailing us, comparable to the risk it would run. They certainly would get but little *cotton* by it, if that is what they seek — for some years to come, if ever. Cotton is a product of the plow and the hoe — not of the sword and the gun; and commerce means peace, not war. We do see, moreover, how

any serious injury to the United States, might fatally affect one and another European nation; and we can hardly imagine the overthrow of our national power to be attempted by any European combination, under existing circumstances, without producing a general European war—if not immense European revolutions. France, it is clear, has the highest interest in preventing the destruction of the only maritime power in the world, besides herself, that can even keep in check the dominion of England over the sea; a dominion which, for seventy years, France has been diligently preparing to dispute. England, whatever may be the wishes and feelings of certain classes, is still more thoroughly restrained. For—to say nothing of the probable loss of her American possessions, nothing of the ruin of her commerce throughout the world—her fierce population, educated for a whole generation to a fanatical hatred of slavery, and having hardly finished paying a hundred millions of dollars to extinguish it in their own cotton and sugar colonies; would be slow to indulge in the spending of two or three thousand millions more, in a war which they would understand to be for the maintenance of the very cotton and sugar slavery in foreign States, which they have so lately bought out, at home. They are a people, besides, that when driven to extremity, have small faith in royal dynasties—and have, before now, despatched kings in the closet, on the battle-field, and upon the scaffold. Spain is hardly worth speaking about in this connection, except as the owner of some desirable islands in the Gulf of Mexico; *mare nostrum* (*our sea*) as the Romans proudly called the Mediterranean. And these are the chief maritime powers of Europe—certainly the only ones we need take into this account. We will add nothing concerning the friendly dispositions of all other European Governments; nothing concerning the public opinion of Europe, before which even Governments must bow; nothing concerning the traditional and vehement sympathy of those masses of European population who make revolutions, whose hearts are with the United States even against their own sovereigns, and so many thousands of whose near kindred and friends are to-day amongst the best officers and most effective troops in our armies. Enough, it seems to us, has been said to direct the thoughts of the reader toward

those considerations, which ought to satisfy the public mind on this particular topic. With ordinary prudence, courage, and fair dealing, on the part of our Government, with foreign States, it does not appear to us that there is any ordinary possibility of a serious rupture with any of them, growing out of this war.

If, however, contrary to our judgment of the facts, war should be forced upon us by any foreign nation — or should occur from any untoward accident; there is no reason to doubt our ability to put down the rebellion in the South, and maintain the Union, notwithstanding the utmost aid the greatest foreign nation could give to the rebels. We will not now discuss the subject, in that aspect. Such a war as we have said, will, probably, not occur in our day. If it ever does occur, either it will wholly fail in its avowed object — or its effects will be far greater and more lasting, than they who bring it on expect or intend. Let mankind, at length, receive the sublime truth, that great nations do not die; that great peoples do not perish. Let them accept, at last, the astonishing fact — more palpable in the developments of our age, than ever before — that nationalities once established, are, according to any measure of time known to history, really immortal. And then let them remember, that this is, in truth, a great nation, and that the nationality shared by the American people, is not only thoroughly established, but one of the most distinct and powerful that ever existed.

It seems proper, in this connection, to make some general allusion to the Naval arm of the public service, and to the Naval power of the United States. Proper in some part of this paper; because that element of our national power, must be considered decisive of the contest with the rebel States, even if they were in other respects as strong as the nation itself. Proper in this place; because it is the supremacy of the Navies both of France and Great Britain over ours — that exposes us to the degradation even of a menace, from either of those powers — and that begets the wild hope in the Confederate Government, that either of them will interfere in this war, on its behalf. If the Navy of the United States bore any fair comparison with that of either of the two powers that rank with us, as the great maritime States of the world; no one ever would have heard a whisper about the

armed intervention of either of them, in our domestic troubles. And if, at the commencement of this rebellion, the military marine of the United States, even such as it then was, had been promptly and skillfully used, the revolt could have been suppressed at the tenth part — perhaps the hundredth part — of the treasure and the blood it may cost. It is, unhappily, true that the conspiracy against the country embraced a large number of the officers of the Navy, as well as of the army; and that the ships and Navy Yards, as well as the Forts and Regiments, had been carefully disposed, by a corrupt administration, in such a manner as to render them as little serviceable as possible. But, besides this, both arms of the service, and especially the Navy, were shamefully inadequate to the safety, the power, and the dignity of the nation; and both arms, but especially the Navy, came utterly short, at first, of what might have been justly expected of them. It is to be hoped that the time has fully come, to retrieve errors which have cost us so much.

From the remotest antiquity, the maritime powers of the world have exerted an influence over human affairs, altogether disproportionate to their relative strength, as compared with other nations. The Phœnicians, the maritime cities of Greece, the Greek cities of Asia Minor, the Carthaginians, the Italian Free Cities of the Middle Ages, more recently Holland, and, for nearly two centuries past, Great Britain: everywhere, in all ages, the same truths are palpable — commerce is the parent of national wealth — and a military marine is, relatively to all other means of national power and security, by far the cheapest, the most effective, and the least dangerous to public freedom. The United States are fitted, in every way, to become the first maritime power in the world. And some of the best fruits of the terrible lesson we are now learning, will be lost; unless our statesmen of the present age, and of future generations, comprehend more clearly than hitherto, that the mission set before the American people cannot be accomplished, either in its internal completeness, or its external force, except by means of a military marine equal, at the very least, to the greatest in the world.

The liberty and glory of the Greeks were altogether personal. The freedom and power of the Roman Republic were altogether

public. The great problem yet to be solved, is the transcendent union of both. It belongs to the American people, if they see fit, to give and enjoy this sublime illustration of human grandeur. The indispensable elements of success, are, *internally*, the perfect preservation of our political system, in its whole purity, its whole force, and its whole extent: and, *externally*, the complete independence of the nation, of all foreign powers. In maintaining the former, our immediate necessity is — to extinguish, at whatever cost, this civil war. In preserving the latter, our immediate necessity is — to repel, amicably if we can, with arms if need be, and at every hazard, all foreign interference in support of this rebellion. We are able, if God requires it at our hands, to do both, by His help. Our star is set, when we fail of doing either. With nations, there is a great choice in the way of dissolution — the choice between the contempt, and the veneration, of the human race.

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