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I. PRIMEVAL MAN.

DURING recent years the science of anthropology has made notable progress. Some workers in this field have been careful and conservative; others, perhaps, have been hasty and heedless. In certain quarters far-reaching conclusions are confidently announced, and but little regard is paid to what the sacred Scriptures have to say about some of its topics.

Great diversity of opinion has also been expressed in regard to some of the great questions with which anthropology is concerned. In reference to the length of time man has been upon the earth, as to whether there were races of men prior to the time of Adam, in regard to the relation of man to some brute species, and concerning man's actual primitive state, opinions differ widely. Some of these opinions, as set forth in recent books and periodicals, are evidently inimical to certain plain statements of Scripture. Hence, the theologian has important interests at stake on this field.

Of these questions, perhaps that of man's primeval condition is of greatest moment at the present day to the theologian in the light of modern science, and the purpose of this article is to discuss some of the problems raised by the inquiry concerning man's primitive status and endowments. In itself this inquiry is of absorbing interest; but its importance is greatly enhanced when we consider the fact that the conclusions to which we may be led by this inquiry will largely determine our opinions regarding the other questions just named. For if it be made out that man was at first a rude, untutored savage, it will be easy to establish his

III. ANSELM.

IN the year 1839, Rev. Robert Wharton Landis was residing in Allentown, Pa. While on a visit to Philadelphia, he explored, according to his wont, the musty treasures of a book-stall situated, we believe, on Seventh street. He fished out from a lot of rubbish a quarto in vellum cover, printed on heavy linen-laid paper, its exterior embossed prettily with leaves, flowers, and some figures resembling the *fleur de lis* of France. It proved to be a copy of Anselm's works. He turned quickly to the back of the book in search of a famous passage whose very existence had been disputed. This passage, if there, would give an ancient tradition concerning the personal appearance of Jesus Christ and also of his mother Mary. He found it on the last page following a passage under the title "*Invocatio matris virginis Marie simul et filii ejus.*" Overjoyed with the find, he asked the price of the book. "Nothing. You may have it." "But I do not wish to get it for nothing." "Well, you have been a good customer of mine, and are welcome to it for nothing. But if you insist on my naming a price, I will say one dollar." The tradition varies at this point, like a river dividing about an island, only to come together again below. One account is that Mr. Landis paid the dollar down, the other that he had not so much as a dollar with him, but sought and obtained permission to take the book to his lodgings and bring back the money to the bookseller. But both accounts agree in this, that he never let go the book.

So few men of this kind are left in the world that they have become a study and their memories should be cherished. We think of Charles Lamb lugging home from a London book-stall the long-coveted folio of Shakspeare, for which he had been saving up odd shillings and pence for such a while, then carefully unwrapping it beneath the pleased eyes of his sister Mary.

After these fifty-four years, the precious volume lies before me. The clasps are gone, though leaving their traces quite visible on

the cover, near the top of which is written in the now familiar chirography, "*Ex Bibliotheca Roberti W. Landis, An. 1839.*" On the title page we find printed, "*Opuscula beati Anselmi, archiepiscopi Cantuariensis ordinis sancti benedicti.*" The letters are in black ink, with some adornments in blue and red. Over this, pen-printed, is the inscription, "*Liber Canoniorum cathedrae Sancti Gothardi in Marsburg.*" At least, if the third word, *cade*, with a long, straight dash over the a and the d, does not represent *cathedrae*, we have been unable to decipher it.

Under the printed title, we find, in pen-print again, "*Johannes Kramer Breviarius Sancti Martini dedit*"; *i. e.*, it was a gift of John Kramer, a breviary, which we take to mean a reader of the breviary or daily service of the Romish church. There is no printed date to the book, but Dr. Landis has written across the middle of the title-page, "*Printed An. Dom. 1490.*" Why did we never ask him his reasons for assigning this date? He is reported to have said that there were only four known copies of this edition in the world. If so, we hope that one or more of the owners or custodians will report possession to the writer of this article. In hope of this, we shall be more minute in our description of the book than might be necessary to the general reader.

Next in order on the title page we read, "*Vide Biblical Repository, Vol. II., pp. 369, 797, and Vol. VI., pp. 349, 350.*" Anselm was born at Aosta, in the year 1034 (says Firaboschi), and studied under Lanfranc at the monastery of Bec in Normandy, where he afterwards, in his twenty-seventh year, devoted himself to a religious life. In three years he was made prior, and then abbot, of this monastery, whence he was taken, in the year 1093, to succeed to the archbishopric made vacant by the death of Lanfranc. Here he remained till his death in 1109, though often disturbed by dissensions with William II. and Henry I. respecting immunities and investitures. His theological works have much precision and depth; and it is an observation of many modern writers that the demonstration of the existence of God, taken from the idea of a supreme Being, which Des Cartes is thought to have originated, was first suggested by Anselm. Leibnitz himself affirms this. (*Opp. Tom. V., p. 570. Edit. Genevae, 1768. R. W. Landis.*)

As the different editions of Anselm's works vary so much in their contents, it may be stated that the page succeeding the title gives a list of twenty-eight distinct treatises in this volume, to which must be added the before-mentioned "Invocation of the Mother Virgin Mary and also of her Son," and especially the very last passage under the heading "*Ex gestis Anselmi colliguntur forma et mores beatæ Mariæ et ejus unici filii Jesu.*" We give the Latin here because it indicates that Anselm is not the author of the passage, but had copied it from some older source. It contains the statements that our Saviour's hair was of the color of an unripe Avellan nut, *i. e.* a filbert, for which the city of Avella or Abella seems to have been noted; that it lay smooth on his head nearly back to his ears, whence it flowed in a curling manner down to his shoulders; that after the custom of the Nazarenes (*Nazareorum*) it was parted in the middle; that his forehead was smooth and most serene; his face without wrinkle or spot; his complexion somewhat ruddy; his features faultless; his beard copious, manly, and divided in the middle; his eyes gray-blue, lively and bright. To which is added the non-scriptural and incredible statement which still lingers in the pulpit, that he was never seen to laugh, but often to weep. *Qui nunquam visus est ridere; flere, autem, sæpe.* The common pulpit tradition is that he was never seen to *smile*, which is farther from the truth than the original *ridere*.

These ancient statements are of no historic value, but they tally with modern supposititious pictures of Christ, and show what many people believed long ago.

LIFE OF ANSELM.

This was written by his friend Eadmer. We have not as yet seen a copy of either the original Latin or of Dean Church's translation; but we have read so many more or less direct quotations from it that we feel almost as if we had personally known Anselm. Eadmer was a monk of Canterbury. Anselm says of him (Letter 22, to Boso): "The book I have written, of which the title is "*Cur Deus Homo*," is being copied by Master Eadmer, my very dear son and the staff of my old age, a monk of Bec, to whom my

friends are indebted in proportion to their love for me, or rather to the church of Bec, whose son he is."

Anselm was born in or near Aosta at the foot of the Graian Alps, and, we think, in the year 1033. His father, Gundulf, did not give much attention to him in his boyhood; but his mother, Ermenberga, faithfully instructed him in piety. Before Anselm reached the age of fifteen, he warmly desired to enter the monastic life. Not getting his father's consent to this, he gradually lost his zeal, and after the death of Ermenberga fell into worldly and even immoral habits. A decided unpleasantness grew up between him and his father, and he left home, crossed the Alps, spent three years in Burgundy and France, dwelt some time at Absinca, a city of Normandy, and finally was drawn to the famous monastery of Bec, which was presided over by the illustrious Lanfranc. At the age of twenty-seven he assumed the monkly dress, A. D. 1060. Three years after, A. D. 1063, he was made prior; fifteen years later, A. D. 1078, he was unanimously elected abbot; and fifteen years thereafter, in 1093, succeeded Lanfranc as Archbishop of Canterbury. High positions are not always the most quiet and peaceful. Anselm became involved in controversies with William Rufus, the reigning king of England; he left the country and took refuge in Rome. An arrow of Walter Tyrrel, that had been aimed at a stag, glanced from a tree and slew William the Red. His brother Henry succeeded to the throne; the English greatly desired the restoration of Anselm to his archiepiscopal see, for he was a man much beloved wherever he lived; and so in A. D. 1100 he was honorably recalled to England. But a dissension having arisen between him and Henry on the question of lay or clerical investitures of presbyters, Anselm was compelled to leave England again in the year 1103. The strife having been at length composed, he once more returned to Canterbury in 1106, "with great joy of all the people"; and there, at the dawn of the morning a few days before Easter, A. D. 1109, his soul passed peacefully into the day that knows no night. The annals of the church are adorned with few more attractive characters. The mediæval Augustine, as he has been well called by Neander, he combined wonderful acuteness of intellect with un-

common sweetness of disposition. Humble, devout, tender-hearted, self-denying, firm, courageous, and, excepting some few Romish vagaries, orthodox in the main and sound in the faith. Such is the estimate a Presbyterian of A. D. 1895 would put upon this venerable man.

Mr. Hume, in his history of England, has occasion to advert to Anselm and his contests with William Rufus and Henry I. Mr. Hume undertakes to ridicule the illustrious father of the scholastic theology in an ungracious sort of way. It is probable that Anselm held no opinion with which Mr. Hume was in sympathy.

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

Few questions in apologetics have awakened more interest in the minds of theologians than that which respects the validity of Anselm's famous argument for the being of a God. Six centuries before his birth a casual remark had fallen from the pen of Augustine, in his treatise on the Holy Spirit, to the effect that God is something than which nothing greater can be thought: *Quo nihil majus cogitari potest*. The great Latin father does not seem to have employed the phrase in any apologetic way, and never could have dreamed that more than half a millennium after his death the seed of this thought would take root in the heart of an Anselm. The argument, as stated in the second chapter of the *Prosologion*, is as follows: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone. For, even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought to be also in thing [*in re*, in reality, in actual existence], which is greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality."

This is a purposely close translation. We give "understanding" as the rendering of *intellectus*, to correspond with "understand" as the proper English of *intelligo* in the unquoted context.

This, then, is the argument; and we think that this is all of it, and that no substantial addition to it is made anywhere by Anselm, while he says much in the way of illustration and explanation.

Gaunilo, a monk, wrote a respectful, and, we think, an able, answer, which has been preserved, and is found in full in the Landis copy of Anselm's works. Anselm had quoted from the fourteenth or the fifty-third Psalm, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God," and had endeavored to show that the fool was inconsistent with himself. Gaunilo playfully styles his own tract *Pro Insipiente (A Plea for the Fool)*. Immediately after this comes Anselm's reply. The English reader will find a translation of these two tracts in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1851. It is wonderful how acutely they reasoned in the eleventh century.

Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 A. D.) rejected Anselm's argument. René Descartes (1596-1650 A. D.) gives the following as one of his arguments for the being of a God: "And as from this that the mind perceives, for example, that in the idea of a triangle it is necessarily contained that its three angles are equal to two right angles, it plainly persuades itself that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, so from this alone that it perceives that a necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of a most perfect being, it ought to conclude plainly that a most perfect being exists." (Quoted from Hagenbach's *History of Doctrine*, II., 316.) If this is not absolutely identical with Anselm's argument, it is very closely akin to it. See, however, Shedd's *Theology*, I., 235-'36.

Ralph Cudworth (A. D. 1617-1688) gives the arguments for and against Anselm, and inclines to Anselm's side. (*Intellectual System*.) John Howe leans the same way, as quoted by Dr. Shedd from *The Living Temple*.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, takes ground strongly adverse to Anselm. Kant's name does not weigh much with theists in this controversy; his arguments, however, must be allowed to stand for themselves, and they are certainly very forcible.

Coleridge, of England, Neander, of Germany, and Dr. Charles Hodge, of America, are anti-Anselmists. Indeed, we think Anselm's argument would have been given up, but for the powerful advocacy of Dr. W. G. T. Shedd in his *History of Christian Doctrine*, and more recently in his great work on *Dogmatic Theology*.

The following suggestions are offered to such of the readers of this review as have not already made up their opinions on the subject:

We might hesitate about rejecting this argument of Anselm, if all the objectors were atheists, and all the theists were favorers. But when theistical metaphysicians like Kant and Coleridge, and theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hodge, deny the validity of the argument, we may well question its logical worth. The bias of judgment in all defenders of the faith would naturally be on the side of Anselm. Quite a good thing would it be, to have a short and easy argument which in half a dozen lines would overthrow atheism. It was this which recommended it to Anselm, as well it might. But it has seemed so unreliable, that many of the champions of the faith unhesitatingly cast it aside. Some of its advocates, too, as Cudworth, lack clearness of conviction; Howe thinks the argument might be so modified, or so stated, as to command our assent. This is not the language of assurance. On the other hand, the opposers of the argument are positive in the assertion of its non-validity.

After repeated examinations of the matter in Anselm's own works, we have arrived at moral certainty of conviction that the argument is ill-founded, and resembles those old Greek sophisms which everybody knew to be sophistical, but of which it was so hard to detect the fallacy. Everybody, sophists included, knew that the swift-footed Achilles could overtake the tortoise; but a Whately gave a wrong solution of the puzzle, and, we believe, Coleridge thought it involved something beyond human powers, while light was thrown on it by the consideration that the sum of an arithmetical series having an infinite number of terms is often a finite number; or thus: conceding the infinite divisibility of matter, if a yard-stick be subdivided into an infinite number of

atoms, and the atoms be put back into their original positions, the restored stick will be, as before, just one yard long. And so of an hour, or a minute. Yet where does the successive division pass from the finite to the infinite? Some way or other infinitude transcends us.

Another familiar instance is furnished by the argument to prove the impossibility of motion: "A body must move in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not. But both of these are impossible, and there are no other places than these two. Hence motion is impossible."

The old—may it not be said, the stupid—answer was, *solvitur ambulando*, it is solved by walking. Now the sophists could walk as well as other people, and doubtless did walk; and knew perfectly that there was a fallacy in their argument, but where and what was the fallacy? The best answer hitherto given is that there may be more than two horns to a dilemma; and in this case a third horn is, that a body may move from a place where it is now to another place where at present it is not. These humorous puzzles of antiquity are not without their utility. They point to that peculiar psychological condition in which we may be absolutely sure that a fallacy is involved in a course of reasoning, while we cannot for the life of us find just where the fallacy lies. If we have no direct and indubitable means of disproving the error, as "solving by walking," two methods of procedure are open to us. The first is very patiently to scrutinize the sophism until we can put our finger on the narrow line which separates truth from error, and sound from unsound ratiocination.

In the present instance we discover that the fallacy is a failure to distinguish between a *conception* and a *belief*. This is, substantially, the main objection urged by the illustrious philosopher of Königsberg: "If I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains, whether this being exists or not." The same thought is implied in his lucid and important distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. But our space forbids us to dwell on this. Coleridge, again, sees the point, though he does not present it so clearly as Kant does: "The Cartesian syllogism ought to stand

thus: The *idea* of God comprises the *idea* of all attributes that belong to perfection. But the idea of existence is such; therefore the idea of existence is included in the idea of God. Now, existence is no *idea*, but a *fact*. . . . The *idea* of the fact is not the fact itself." For our own purposes, however, and for reasons which will appear in the sequel, we direct special attention to the before-mentioned distinction between a conception and a belief, that we may not fall into the same trap into which the great father of the scholastic philosophy fell in the eleventh century.

The forming of a conception, or, if you please, the construction of a concept, is largely volitional. We may form the conception of a God as a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and in his natural and moral attributes; and we may frame a definition in accordance therewith. Indeed, we *must* form some sort of conception of a God before we can affirm or deny his existence, that is, if our words are to have any meaning. Most of the readers, like the writer, of this article could neither affirm nor deny the truth of a page of Sanscrit or Chinese. We could neither believe nor disbelieve it. Anselm's fool, who "said in his heart, There is no God," must, of course, have attached some meaning to the term "God" before saying that he was not.

The next step is a very important one. If the great thinkers to whom we have referred have overlooked anything, it is just here. We must *conceive* the meaning of the second, as well as of the first, word in the phrase GOD IS. Kant saw very clearly the distinction between *is* as a word of definition and *is* as a statement of a real, objective existence. The writers on logic emphasize the same distinction. Anselm, too, understood it well. But this is not the point just now. We call special attention to the extremely simple, and hence liable-to-be-disregarded, thought that we can conceive of a thing's existing, as well as of any attribute comprised in its concept. Not only so, but we *must* have that conception in our minds—in *intellectu*, as Anselm so often expresses it—before we can either believe or disbelieve that it exists *in re*. Before the fool could say, "There is no God," in a blameworthy way, and expressing his opinion, he must have known what it is

to be. (Of course we are aware that the words "*There is*" are supplied by the translators. They are implied by the terse Hebrew.)

To conceive that a substance with its attributes really exists, and to believe that it does, are two quite different mental acts. We cannot believe without first conceiving, but we may conceive without either believing or disbelieving. We conceive at will—at least, in very many cases; we believe under more or less constraint, and on evidence. The two mental states approach each other closely, like two curves which osculate, but do not cut. The line which separates conception and belief may be so fine that it has length only, without breadth or thickness; as two pieces of porcelain may be so neatly fused together and so nicely glazed that neither sight nor touch shall detect the seam, which, indeed, is detected by the difference in color of the pieces themselves.

We hold that this distinction is the key to the puzzle, and we select from Anselm's own statements of his argument that which appears to be the most puzzling. As above mentioned, it occurs in the second chapter of the *Prosologion*: "And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought (*cogitari*) cannot be in the understanding alone." That is, it cannot be a mere subjective conception, but there must be a corresponding objective reality. Why? "For even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought (*cogitari* again) to be also in reality (*in re*), which is greater." Will our readers please notice the employment of those innocent-looking, but slippery, words *cogito* and *sum*? *Cogito* may mean either to conceive or to believe. Let us stick to one of its meanings, and paraphrase the quotation: "For even if the conception of that than which a greater cannot be conceived, namely, the Deity, be a mere subjective conception, it, namely, the Deity, can be conceived of as actually existing, which is greater." The last clause, "which is greater," we take to mean that an actually-existent thing is greater than the subjective conception.

We now come into the kernel of Anselm's argument: "If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot

be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality."

To which we offer the following answer along the lines already indicated. For a thing to be in the understanding is a figurative expression, and means simply that we think of it, or conceive of it, in our minds. Thus we may conceive of something than which a greater cannot be conceived; as Anselm so often expresses it, we understand the words "that than which," etc. That something turns out to be God. We can understand the Westminster definition, or that of Sir Isaac Newton in the grand Scholium to his *Principia*, or any other of the accepted ones, or the Augustino-Anselmic one just given. We can do this without considering the question whether or not such a being exists. Next, we can conceive that he exists, or that he does not. As we please about this; only we cannot believe or disbelieve in his existence without the prior conception of that existence (or its negative, non-existence). Now, if this second step enlarges our previous conception, it shows merely that the previous conception lacked one additional element, viz., that of existence; in other words, we had thought what *God* means; but not what *is* signifies, when it does not indicate a definition, but affirms a positive, objective existence.

We cannot conceive of anything more on this line. A greater cannot be thought. We are at the end of conception. The next step is belief; and we can believe no more than we have conceived. Belief is absolutely limited by conception. Much as we admire the great abilities and worth of an Anselm, we cannot surrender the ultimate principles of all belief either here, or in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Belief may fall short of conception, but it cannot go beyond it. This is ultimate and axiomatic.

Another method may suit some readers better. Let us state the argument briefly thus: "A substance, than which a greater cannot be conceived, is greater than the conception of that substance. Therefore, the substance actually is." Answer: The premiss is a solecism. How can an actually existing substance be

greater, truly and literally greater, than a mere mental conception? A flower or its stem, greater than a thought in our minds? God, greater than a nonentity? A comparative term like greater can be used only of things of the same class. Again, by what legerdemain does the conclusion follow from the premiss? Finally, the verb *is* must not be used in different senses in the premiss and in the conclusion. In the conclusion it affirms real, objective existence. If it does so in the premiss, the real existence of the substance is taken for granted. But, as Coleridge says, that is the very point to be proven.

Let us apply the same method of reasoning to prove the existence of an independent principle of evil, as taught in the Zendavesta. Instead of *majus*, greater, write *pejus*, worse. "And certainly that than which a worse cannot be thought cannot be in the understanding alone." That is, cannot be a mere subjective conception. "For even if it is in the understanding alone, it can be thought to be also in reality, which is worse, etc. There exists, therefore, without doubt, something than which a worse cannot be thought, both in understanding and in reality." It is well that Zoroaster never thought of this argument for the Persian theosophy, for he would certainly have made some additional converts to his faith.

Every one knows that we are very apt to believe that which we wish to be true. We turn our eyes away from the arguments against it, while the arguments for it are received without question. At all events, this is the least irrational method of procedure. The camera receives the impression; it is receptive, but it may be turned away from one object and directed full upon another. But there are cases in which we pass from conception to belief without any process of ratiocination. This occurs in the phenomenon of dreams—a part of our mental economy at which we never cease to wonder. The same thing takes place in insanity. A friend of mine who had been cured of an attack of insanity, told me that while he was in that condition he *believed everything he thought*. This is a well known part of the pathology of the mind.

Then there is the field of fiction, especially of the drama, in

which, under superior acting, the illusions are so remarkable. Actor and audience alike are under a spell; but the actor first, and then the audience. On such occasions there is a kind of double consciousness not always easy to maintain. Thus one of the most gifted of the English tragedians was quite dangerous in some of the sword combats of the stage; he lost sight of his own personality. Once, indeed, in the rôle of Richard III. he mounted his horse and rode through the streets of London in his royal apparel. We should never believe what we have conceived without just cause and reason.

Coleridge having alleged that "existence is no idea but a *fact*," Dr. Shedd says (I. 233): "This objection holds against the Cartesian form of argument, but not against the Anselmic. The idea of 'existence,' it is true, is one to which there may be no corresponding reality or fact. But the idea of 'necessary existence' is not."

So, too, on page 224, in stating Anselm's argument, "But such perfection as this implies *necessary* existence; and necessary existence implies *actual* existence; because if a thing must be, of course it is." See also p. 225. On all which we offer the following remarks: (1), This thought of the necessity of the divine existence was fully before Kant's mind and is commented on by him. It did not change his opinion at all.

Dr. Hodge, also, says (I. 205): "If this argument has any validity, it is unimportant. It is only saying that what must be, actually is." Dr. Hodge's argument here is an enthymeme, and omits the minor premiss. The full syllogism would be: whatever must be, is; God must be; therefore God is. The fallacy lies in the minor; no proof is given that God must be.

(2), When we speak of "necessity of existence" as "an attribute of being," we must not overlook the point that the "necessity" is an attribute of the "existence," not of the being, *i. e.*, the substance which underlies the attributes. A necessary *existence* is as much a fact, and not a mere idea, in Coleridge's sense of the terms, as a contingent existence is.

(3), While we apprehend that the distinction just made goes to the root of the subject, the following considerations may be more

satisfactory to some of our readers. The origination and the continuance of man's existence depend ultimately on the will of God. We express this by saying that man's existence is contingent; and as all sound Calvinistic thinkers hold, contingent does not mean uncertain. The existence of every man that now lives or ever has lived on the earth has been as certain from all eternity as the existence of God himself. But God never had any origination, and his existence at the present moment and its continuance into the future, do not depend on the will of any other being whatsoever.

This is the negative side of necessary existence. On the positive side, be it said with humility, yet, with conviction, that the wondrous Essence which we denominate God has strength to ENDURE; strength in and of himself. This strength inheres in the infinite Essence, and it cannot be diminished, much less annihilated, by any other force in the universe. It is, indeed, the foundation of all other forces uncreated or created. All the uncreated forces reside in God. The Son being the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person, made the world, made all things visible and invisible, and upholds all things by the word of his power. By him all things consist, *συνέστηκε*, stand together, are not dissolved, are a cosmos, and not a chaos. This self-sustained being possesses a necessary existence in the combination of the negative and the positive ideas just given. His existence does not depend upon the will of another, but is upheld by an infinite and persistent energy all his own. But in the order of thought, the essence must exist prior to its possession of any attribute, even of strength to endure. God said to Moses, I am he who is. So the LXX. and the Vulgate render the Hebrew. First, Jehovah, who is; then Elohim, who is strong. So profound are the thoughts which God hath concerning himself.

It will be observed that we reject the Augustinian notion of the divine existence as a *punctum stans*, an existence without succession. This view seems to have had a singular fascination for some great minds. Carlyle says, I think it is in his *Sartor Resartus*, "The curtain of yesterday rolls down; the curtain of to-

morrow rolls up; but yesterday and to-morrow both are." We quote from memory, and are far from sure that Carlyle really believed it. Kant, of course, must say that, "Neither yesterday, nor to-morrow, nor to-day ever is, except in human phantasy."

To us the onward march of the deity through the ages is like Goethe's sublime description of the sun, in the prologue to *Faust*, moving forward "with thunder-step," *mit donnergang*, an expression which Bayard Taylor says had been used before, but which Goethe employs with rare felicity.

To vary the illustration slightly: The sun is where it is at any instant, because it was at the contiguous point the moment before; and it will occupy the position of the next instant because it is now in the precedent position. So God is, because he was; he shall be, because he is. We are sure that by an instinct which has its counterpart in our nature, he, too, desires "to live, to labor, and to create"; but whether there is any conation, any conscious effort to endure, is a mystery beyond our ken. There is none in our own case, for we are upheld by him. But how is it with the divine essence? This is a problem over which a finite spirit can only linger and muse, as Augustine was so wont to do in the presence of the supreme mysteries of life and being.

The conception of this glorious being is greater than that of any being sustained in existence by him. To use Anselm's favorite phrase, it is the conception of that than which a greater cannot be thought. But does this conception found a belief? Is it like the conception of infinite space, which immediately and irresistibly awakens in us the belief that space is unlimited?

We answer, By no means. If it were, our belief in God's existence would be an intuition. It would not admit of argument. How could we prove what is intuitively true? If this sublime truth is axiomatic, why adduce an ontological argument for it?

We are aware that some thinkers incline to the view that we know the existence of the eternal one by a God-consciousness, a *Gottesbewusstseyn*. Be their contention right or wrong, Anselm attempts not to *intuit*, but to *prove*. He has given to mankind an ontological *argument*; and only as such can we treat it.

Let it be conceded, then, that inherent strength to endure is an element of our concept of a deity; that it is not a fact (we know no better word), but is an attribute of the infinite essence whose existence is under discussion; and that we can *conceive* that a divine essence, clad with this almighty power, endures; are we thereby authorized to infer that it actually is? We answer, No! For to do so would be to make the perilous mistake of substituting a belief for a conception. We must have a reason for every inferential belief. Our conceiving a thing to be true is no reason for our believing it to be true. That is the illusory process of dreams and of insanity.

There is a manifest slip in Dr. Shedd's argumentation here. He says: "The *idea* of necessary existence implies the *idea* of actual existence." Yes, it may imply the *idea* of it, but it does not imply the fact. The idea of an absolutely perfect being may contain, as an element of the concept, the idea of necessary existence; and this again may imply the *idea* of actual existence, but it does not prove the absolute existence itself.

HOW ANSELM CAME TO DEVISE THIS ARGUMENT.

First of all, he was fitted to excogitate it by a native subtlety of intellect not often surpassed in the church. This was whetted up by a long course of dialectics until it took on what may be termed a wire-edge, the penalty which such men under such a training have so often had to pay.

Then, as he modestly states in the introductions to the *Prosologion*, the *Monologion*, and the *Cur Deus Homo*, he was importuned by the brethren to write out his views on various points in divinity. The *Prosologion* especially seems to have stuck to his mind like a burr, like a chess or mathematical problem. "On a certain occasion, when Anselm was profoundly reflecting how everything that belongs to the doctrine concerning God, his essence, and his attributes, might be summed up and comprehended in one brief argument, the thought haunted him everywhere, so that he could neither eat nor sleep quietly. Even his devotions at matins, and other seasons of church worship, were thereby disturbed. Already he was on the point of repelling all these

thoughts as a temptation of Satan. But the more he struggled against them the more importunately they thronged in upon his mind. And one night, during the celebration of vigils, his thoughts all at once became clear, his heart swelled with delight, and he immediately recorded the train of reflection which had given him this high satisfaction, and this was the origin of his *Prosologion*." (Neander IV., 368.)

To this must be added a slight tendency to enthusiasm. On the same page Neander relates that while Anselm was prior in the monastery of Bec, he awoke one morning before matins, and was absorbed in thinking how the prophets had viewed the past and the future at once as something present. "With his eyes fixed on the ground he saw, directly through the wall, the monks, whose allotted business it was, passing about in the church, going up to the altar, putting everything in order for the mass, lighting the candles, and at length one of them ringing the bell to awaken the rest."

So we have in this end of the nineteenth century men who avow that they have had one or more personal interviews with Christ in his glorified body, not to mention numbers who credit the vagaries of Swedenborg. Even some ministers need more knowledge of the pathology of the mind, particularly as it is affected by states of the nervous system. Anselm fasted much, meditated much, was wearied at times, doubtless; he himself says: "On a certain day, therefore, when by vehemently resisting its importunity, I was *wearied* in the very conflict of (my) thoughts, that of which I had despaired [viz., the ontological argument] so offered itself that I earnestly embraced the thoughts which I was solicitously repelling." We may learn much from the mistakes of great men, not in order to vaunt ourselves against their strength, but to guard ourselves against their weakness.

OTHER VIEWS OF ANSELM.

These must be stated briefly. He teaches that earth is to be the future abode of the saints. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I., 18.) That the seats of the fallen angels shall be refilled from the human race. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I., 17.) That the whole human nature

was in our first parents, and that it all was vanquished in them. (I., 18.) That the sinner's inability does not excuse him. (I., 24.) That the active obedience of Christ was not a part of his atoning work; that he atoned by his sufferings only. That the human nature in Christ was omniscient. (II., 13.) That the Virgin Mary was not originally sinless. "That Virgin of whom was assumed that Man of whom we are speaking was of those who before his birth were cleansed by him from sins, and in that same purity of hers was he assumed of her." (*Virgo autem illa, de qua ille homo assumptus est de quo loquimur, fuit de illis qui ante natiuitatem ejus per eum mundati sunt a peccatis, et in ejus ipsa munditia de illa assumptus est.*—II., 16.) That she became sinless through faith prior to the conception of Christ. (*De Conceptu Virginali*, xv.) Still more clearly in *Cur Deus Homo*, xvi., Boso asks: "How, from the sinful mass, that is, from the human race, which was all infected with sin, God assumed humanity, as though unleavened were taken from fermented dough? For, granted that the conception of that Man himself is pure, and free from the sin of carnal delight, yet the Virgin herself, from whom he assumed humanity, was 'shapen in wickedness,' and 'in sin did her mother conceive her,' and she was born in original sin, since she herself sinned in Adam, in whom all have sinned." Again, the Virgin never could have been sinless, "except by believing in *his* true death." (Chap. xvii.) Anselm teaches, however, that Mary excels all other creatures, human or superhuman. He addresses a long prayer to her: "Intercede, therefore, most pure lady, that it may be effected for us, because our God, of thy most chaste womb being made Man, came among men." (Intercede, ergo, domina purissima, etc.—*De Excellentia Beatæ Virginis Mariæ*, xii.) From all which we learn that Anselm's Mariolatry, though objectionable, had not reached the superfluity of naughtiness of *Pio Nono* and the nineteenth century. The oft-recurring phrase, "Mother of God," is not scriptural, but can be borne by Protestant ears as a protest against Nestorianism. We still sing,

"God, the mighty Maker, died,"

holding, of course, that the death of our Lord appertained solely to his manhood.

Anselm held that infants dying unbaptized were condemned (*damnari*). This is lamentable, but we see no way to escape the conviction that he held this frightful tenet. At the beginning of each of his treatises there is a list of the headings of the particular treatise; and these seem to have been prefixed by another hand. Thus, at the beginning of the treatise *De Conceptu Virginali et Peccato Originali* we find *Incipiunt capitula in librum beati Anselmi ordinis sancti benedicti*, etc. The twenty-sixth heading is: *Contra illos qui putant infantes non debere damnari*. When we come to the twenty-sixth chapter, we find the singular misprint, *Contra illos qui non putant*, etc., which flatly contradicts the previous heading. We wondered whether Anselm's remarkable goodness of heart had not lifted him above the old traditions of the Latin church; but the body of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth chapters leaves no room for doubt. For instance, he answers the objector: "Infantes debere damnari qui sine baptismo moriunt ob solam injusticiam, quam dixi, non vult accipere"; that is, who is not willing to admit that infants dying unbaptized ought to be condemned. He illustrates by a supposed case of a man and his wife, who had attained to some great dignity and possession, by no merit of their own, but by grace alone, who had then inexcusably committed a grievous crime, and had been reduced to slavery on account of it; their sons, born in that condemnation, ought to be subjected to the same slavery, and not to the benefits which their parents had justly lost. (Chap. xxvi.)

What Anselm meant by the word *damno* we may infer from the following extract: "*Denique omnis homo aut salvatur aut damnatur; omnis homo qui salvatur, ad regnum cœlorum admittitur; et omnis qui damnatur, ab eo excluditur.*" Further quotations might be made, but they are unnecessary.

On this painful subject the writer has reached the following conclusions, which are offered for the consideration of his brethren:

The doctrine of the perdition of infants dying without baptism is a poisonous plant that sprang up from the foul soil of Ritualism before Augustine's day. The early Pelagians, too, were pressed by those Scriptures which affirm the necessity of baptism. Pelagius taught that infants were born *in puris naturalibus*, with-

out any taint of sin. But if they died unbaptized, what became of them? To this he made his famous answer, "*Quo non eant, scio; quo eant, nescio.*" Whither they do not go, I know; whither they do go, I know not.

It was natural to invent some sort of *Limbus Infantum*, an intermediate place or state between hell and heaven, and this is possibly what Celestius intended by what he said on the subject. Augustine himself at one time inclined to a similar opinion; but finally at the Council of Carthage, in 418 A. D., the North African Church, with his concurrence, condemned the doctrine of an intermediate state for unbaptized children, and "according to the doctrine of this council, the eternal perdition of all unbaptized infants was expressly affirmed." (*Neander's Church History*, II., 669.) Augustine's vast intellect reminds one of a broad principality, which contains noble mountains, fertile plains, and miasmatic morasses. The draining and clearing up of these pestilential swamps has been the work of the very best theologians of the church since the Bishop of Hippo fell on sleep.

The Romish church, however, turned aside to semi-Pelagianism and retained ritualism. Hence we find in their authorized formularies such statements as these: "*Si quis dixerit, baptismum liberum esse, hoc est non necessarium ad salutem; anathema sit.*" (Council of Trent, Sessio VII., Art. 5. Streitwolf's Collection.) "*Cum itaque per Adæ peccatum pueri ex origine noxam contraxerint, multo magis per Christum dominum possunt gratiam, et justitiam consequi, ut regnent in vita: quod quidem sine baptismo fieri nullo modo potest.*" (Roman Catechism, Chap. II. De Baptismo, Quaestio 26.) See also Quaes. 31: What is the chief effect of baptism? and 2, 33, 35, etc., as confirmatory in general.

How fully Romish theologians accept these teachings, and whether they attempt to explain them away by any subtillies, we are not able to say.

It is a singular corroboration of the preceding view of the case that individuals in this nineteenth century severely condemning Rome, but stoutly maintaining that sin is (ordinarily) forgiven only in baptism by immersion, have closed the gates of heaven to

the non-immersed. Nothing is more remorseless and intolerant than ritualism. The Calvinistic theology provides the only way by which infants can be saved. Pelagianism teaches that they do not need salvation, and of course that they are not saved at all. If they *are* saved, it must be by God's electing grace, and the Holy Ghost acting when and as he will. As to the coarse and revolting calumny that we hold "that there are infants in hell not a span long," our church will do well if it shall stamp it out by the end of the twentieth century.

The following tenets of Anselm will be more acceptable to our readers: That foreknowledge and predestination are consistent with free-agency; that the satisfaction of Christ is of infinite merit; that this satisfaction was rendered to God and not paid to the devil. It has been boldly and repeatedly affirmed in Kentucky, and, we suppose, elsewhere, that Anselm was the first theologian who ever taught the last-mentioned doctrine, while all who preceded him held that the price of our pardon was paid to the devil!

Now it is well known that this detestable doctrine had its adherents especially among the early Greek fathers. Sometimes it would seem to have been held along with sounder views notwithstanding the incongruity. But Hagenbach and Shedd in their histories of doctrines give ample illustrations of the Anselmian view centuries before Anselm was born. Thus Gregory of Nazianzum (328-389 A. D): "I would ask to whom was it [the ransom] paid in this case? And for what reason? Perhaps to Satan himself? But *φεν τῆς ὑβρεως* [*i. e.*, shame on such insolence]. For in that case the robber had not only received *from* God, but received God himself (in Christ) as a ransom and an exceedingly great recompense of his tyranny."

He teaches, however, that the Father did not "demand or need" the ransom, but received it "on account of the divine economy." (Hagenbach I. 377-'8; Shedd I. 245.) Dr. Shedd gives the words of Athanasius much more fully than Hagenbach does. "Christ as a man endured death for us, inasmuch as he offered himself for that purpose *to the Father*." "Desiring to annul our death, he took on himself a body from the Virgin Mary, that by offering this *unto the Father* a sacrifice for all, he might deliver us all."

The Logos "saw how inadmissible (*ἀτοπον*, out of place) it would be for sin to escape *the law, except through a fulfilment and satisfaction of the law.*" Of this and other passages Dr. Shedd says, "This is the strongest possible statement of the doctrine of penal satisfaction. . . . He joins on upon the biblical idea of a sacrifice to satisfy offended law and justice, with as much clearness and energy as any theologian previous to the time of Anselm." And yet Athanasius died in 373, *i. e.*, six hundred and sixty years before Anselm was born. So idle and frivolous is the assertion that Anselm was the first to teach that the sacrifice of Christ was not offered to Satan.

As illustrative of the astounding vitality of error, it may be mentioned that Barton W. Stone, the well-known leader of the "New Lights" in Kentucky, revived this hideous doctrine in his discussion with that very gifted man, Dr. John P. Campbell. Commenting on Hebrews ii. 14, Stone said, "Here we see that the devil had the power of death, and he got the price, which was the death of Christ." "What," cried Dr. Campbell, "What! was the blood, the 'precious blood' of Christ given to a foul, abominable fiend? was God so deeply indebted to the prince of hell, that the richest blood in the universe must flow out in payment? Was the supreme being so weak, so devoid of resource, so thwarted and baffled in his measures, as to be obliged to compound with a poor, damned rebel, who is reserved in chains of darkness to the judgment of the great day, and pay him such a price for the ransom of sinners? Was the Almighty Father so merciless, so lost to tenderness, as to deliver up his own, *his only Son*, to glut the malice of a blood-thirsty demon? Was the innocent Lamb of God made a victim, and immolated upon the altar of hell to appease the wrath of the devil? O sacred God! how low is thy power reduced, how is thy character stigmatized, how is thy glory tarnished by such a doctrine! What a *libel* on TRUTH and the cross! Its worst enemies could wish no more to render it contemptible. No feature of infamy could be imposed on Christianity that would make it more disgusting, more shocking, more repulsive, than the hideous one we now contemplate." (Davidson's *Hist. Pr. Ch. Ky.*)

This was in 1806; and it is truly wonderful that in less than a century and a quarter from the time when Daniel Boone settled in the "Dark and Bloody Ground" of Kan-tuck-kee, this detestable vagary of the early Greek fathers should be advocated on two widely separate occasions and in the most public way. The war-whoop of hostile tribes of Indians fighting for the use of the thickly-wooded hunting grounds south of the Ohio had scarcely died away, until a voice was heard advocating the just right of the devil to the most stupendous sacrifice in the universe; and seventy-five or eighty years later it was echoed with defiance in churches and court-houses. So false to history is it that "Error dies amid her worshippers."

Anselm being a personal disciple of Lanfranc, the great antagonist of Berengarius, would naturally uphold the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist. We have found only brief intimations of this—brief but sufficient. Yet he denies that our senses ever, properly speaking, deceive us. His chief illustration is drawn from looking through colored glass; red, for instance. The *exterior* sense reports truly; the *interior* sense may be deceived.

In the *Dialogue on Free Will* he maintains, (1), "That the power of sinning does not pertain to freedom of will." His meaning is, of course, that God and the elect angels are free and yet cannot sin. (2), "That nevertheless man and angel have sinned through this power and free will; and although they have been able to serve sin, sin has not, however, been able to rule over them." (3), He explains "How, after they made themselves the servants of sin, they had free will; and what free will is." (10), "That the sinner is a servant of sin, and that it is a greater miracle when God restores that rectitude to one forsaking (it), than when he restores life to a dead man." (11), "That that servitude does not take away freedom of will." (13), "That the power of preserving rectitude of will on account of the rectitude itself, is a perfect definition of free will."

On the difficult topic of imputation, Anselm teaches, (1), That sin is the lack of the righteousness due to God. (2), That all Adam's descendants, except Christ, were in Adam seminally. In-

fants were in him causally and naturally [*i. e.*, as to cause and nature], as in a seed. They were in themselves personally [as to person]. "In him they were not others (*alii*), but from him; in themselves, they were other (*alii*) than he. In him they were he; in themselves, they are themselves. They were therefore in him, but [they were] not themselves when they themselves not yet were." This purposely close translation will give an idea of Anselm's metaphysical style. He denies that being (existing) in Adam is nothing, and not to be named being. (3), With the Vulgate he translates Rom. v. 11, ἔφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, *in whom* all sinned. (4), The sin and the ills (*mala*) of Adam descend to infants. There is a sin by nature and a sin by person. As the personal passes over into the nature [referring to Adam's first transgression], so the natural passes over to persons [*i. e.*, from Adam's nature] to the persons of his children. Human nature sinned in Adam, and lost original righteousness. This want of righteousness (*nuditas justitiæ*) merits condemnation (*damnationem*). Adam's offspring are condemned for their own sin, not for Adam's. When Adam sinned, human nature sinned. When an infant is condemned for original sin, he is condemned not for Adam's sin, but for his own. For if he had not his own sin, he would not be condemned. But the infant has not sinned after the likeness of Adam's prevarication; *i. e.*, not so grievously as Adam, and hence his condemnation is not so severe. Baptism blots out (*delet*) all pre-baptismal sin in adults or infants.

FINAL IMPRESSIONS.

We have aimed to give our readers the facts, and they can form their own judgments. The general impressions to which the study of Anselm and his times has conducted the writer are the following:

1. Anselm suggests to us not so much the miner as the smelter. He does not so much dig out the ore as reduce it. Where he essayed strictly original work, as in his Ontological Argument, he was led astray by his very acumen. This was said to have occurred in the case of perhaps the ablest judge that we have ever known personally, a man not unlike Anselm in acuteness, in men-

tal activity, and in prolonged meditation. He was not to any great extent a maker of law, but was for many years a judge of law, and it was said, in an address at his funeral by an able lawyer who knew him well: "His great mind sometimes led him astray." But we must remember that Lord Bacon rejected the Copernican theory; so did Tycho Brahe, for want of a telescope. Napier, the famous Scotch mathematician, is thought to have had some leanings toward a belief in the black art. The wonderfully sound-headed John Calvin devised a vagary touching the Eucharist. Nearly all the great thinkers have gone astray on something,—the men who shall be remembered when our words, works, and names shall be forgotten on the earth.

The judicial and eminently conservative mind of Anselm clung to the Trinity, and the christology of the early Greek church, to the anthropology of Augustine, and, indeed, we believe, to his eschatology; to the Latin father's views on predestination and grace, in the midst of a general backsliding toward semi-Pelagianism; to the early heresy of baptismal regeneration; to the later, yet, alas! too early, heresy of transubstantiation; and to the superior holiness of the monastic state. It is in soteriology that his crucible burnt away all the dross of unsound doctrine, until the gold came out pure and beautiful.

2. We find in Anselm the union of the devout, the metaphysical and the humanly tender and lovely. Rare and charming combination! It is not strange that at Bec and at Canterbury, in France and in England, all men loved the Italian monk. His mother, Ermenberga, like a second Monica, had "studied to imbue with piety the heart of the child who was to become the Augustine" of the eleventh century. A dreamy, contemplative boy, who fancied that the dome of the sky, as it rested on the summits of the Graian Alps round about his native Aosta, was heaven itself. Eadmer, the monk of Canterbury, is so devoted to him in his later life that he forsakes all and follows Anselm into exile. Gaunilo, who answers, and, we think, really overthrows, the *Pro-sologion*, still speaks of "the other things [besides the Ontological Argument] described in this little book with so much truth, clearness, and splendor," as "useful, and fragrant with the odor

of pious and holy feeling." Neander is captivated by his goodness and sweetness, and is for dealing gently with an argument which he is compelled to pronounce illogical.

In the brief sketch of his life prefixed to the English translation of the *Cur Deus Homo* we read: "Gradually his strength failed; he felt no pain; only would have liked to live till he had solved a question he was thinking of, as to the origin of the soul. On the Tuesday in Holy Week, 1109, he was seen to be dying; they read him the gospel for the day; on the Wednesday, as day was breaking, he passed away, April 21, 1109. He was buried in the minster at Canterbury, of which he had been nominally, sixteen years, archbishop; much of the time an impoverished, wandering exile." Neander says: "He died reconciled with all his enemies, and bestowing his blessing on all with his expiring breath."

3. Theology is a science, a body of true, orderly, and co-related knowledge. Like the sciences of the heavens above us, and of the atmosphere about us, and of the earth and its waters beneath us, theology has grown, and will yet grow. The best way to understand the steam-engine is to begin with the Marquis of Worcester, and to come down the years by way of Papin, Savary, Newcomen, and Watt; and the telegraph, from the Chinese, by way of Oersted and Ampere, and Henry and Morse. So of all other human sciences; and why not so of theology?

Men of old time were warmed and lighted by the sun and guided by the stars; they breathed the air and viewed the rainbow with delight; they were nourished by the wheaten loaf and the flesh of kids and kine. But we certainly know more of the natural sciences than the patriarchs did. And the Westminster Assembly was far in advance of Anselm, as he was in advance of Origen. The Westminster men had on their side the slow, but relentless, logic of time. We cannot understand them except by first understanding those who went before them. We must use Anselm, as a climber of the Alps would use a Swiss chalêt half way up the mountain side, as a place of rest and refreshment, and of noble glimpses of the far distance, in the cool of the morning, while night and mist still slumber in the valleys. But after

the foregoing resumé of Anselm's opinions, every true Protestant and especially every true Presbyterian must feel that the Reformation was a necessity. It was an absolute need of the church; and this is apprehended most clearly by those who read Anselm's own words. For invaluable as are Hagenbach's and Shedd's histories of Christian doctrine, and various systems of theology and histories of philosophy, nothing quite takes the place of the original works of the old masters; which leads to a parting word on old books. It was a standing joke on Dr. Landis, behind his brawny back, of course, that he cared nothing for any book that was less than a thousand years old. Possibly he may have made a fetich of the archaic and the antique. If so,

"The love he bore to learning was in fault."

A slight flavor of this, or a fondness for an Elzevir edition, might surely be pardoned in so eminent a scholar. But if we desire to comprehend the science of theology, the old books are indispensable in their place, just as Wallis's *Arithmetic of Infinites* and Newton's *Opuscula* (both of which Dr. Landis had picked up somewhere) are to a student of mathematics.

Neander calls attention to the fact that from and after Anselm there was a divergence in theological methods. Bernard, of Clairvaux, took the mystico-practical direction, and the brilliant, but erratic Abelard, the dialectic. It is, however, much more important to observe that Anselm occupied the point from which the Reformed and the Romish theologies diverge; the Reformed, of all the Protestant communions, holding most firmly and most fully the truth which he taught, and the Romish church not only falling away toward semi-Pelagianism, but pushing his ritualism, mariolatry, and submission to the papacy to the extreme types of our present day. Calling the Reformed the right wing and the Papists the left, other systems of doctrine occupy intermediate grounds. So that we have in theology a *quasi* reproduction of the deltas of the Nile and the Mississippi in physical geography; nor will it be easy to get a broader and more comprehensive view of theological science than by watching its development from the system and from the times of Anselm.

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Richmond, Ky.

NOTE.—If there are three other copies of our edition of Anselm's works in the world, we should be pleased to hear from their holders. They may be interested in this note.

Allibone, in his *Dictionary of Authors*, gives the date of the first edition as MCCCCLXXXI (1491). To another edition, he says, neither date nor place of publication is assigned on the title-page. It contains two treatises, *De Miseria Hominis* and *De Excellentia Virginis Marie*, which are not in the edition of 1491. Both of these are in the Landis copy. In fact Allibone's description fits it very closely, except that he styles it a folio. The Landis copy measures $10\frac{3}{4}$ inches by $7\frac{1}{2}$. Each page has two columns, each $7\frac{1}{2}$ by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches. Should not this be considered a quarto? Let antiquaries decide, *quorum non magna pars sumus*. That the volume is very ancient and probably older than 1491 is favored by two or three considerations. It seems to have been printed directly, uncritically and without emendation, from a manuscript copy. We have detected at least two manifest blunders, one of which is corrected in a nineteenth century edition of the *Cur Deus Homo*. The printers had not learned that the multiplied and often perplexing abbreviations of the old MSS. were no longer necessary. The illuminations in red and blue ink or paint are profuse. For the important headings vacant squares were left for ornamental initials; vacant, except that about the middle of each square the desired letter was printed of small size in black ink, evidently as a guide to the illuminator. The spelling is archaic, as *nichil* for *nihil*; *Aphrica* for *Africa*, *Prosologion* for *Proslogion*. The genitive singulars in *æ* uniformly omit the *a*; thus we have *Marie*. If the final *e* here is pronounced like our *a* in *mate*, as the French *e* so often is, it may give us a hint as to how the Norman French sounded the diphthong *æ*. Some of the broad portions of the illuminated capitals have a glistening stripe down the middle. It has been thought that this was done with salts of gold or silver.

These things smack of antiquity. But it may be more satisfactory to state that the editor always calls Anselm, *Beatus*. According to the old custom of the Romish church, a man was declared *Beatus* before he was declared *Sanctus*. Now Anselm

was canonized, or officially made a saint, in 1494. Hence Dr. Landis may have been right in assigning the date of 1490 to the printing of his treasured copy.

All our readers are forbidden to peruse this note, except the holders of the three copies, and such other honest gentlemen as have felt the magical touch of vellum.