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THE JUDAIC VISION OF THE HAPPY
KINGDOM.

AMONGST the ancient nations of the world, we recognise a very strongly marked line of mental demarcation. We do not allude to their different stages of culture, or to their respective phases of intellectual and moral development; these are characteristics which must necessarily distinguish all nations, whether ancient or modern. But if we take the typical kingdoms of the old world, and select for examination those countries which seem to occupy a contemporaneous standpoint in civilisation, we shall find that they are marked off from each other by a more subtle and a more inward boundary; they differ in that region in which they have placed *their ideal of happiness*. Some dwell perpetually in the past. Their paradise is limited to the Eden which once existed, and which remains as a memory of their ancestral glory. They pride themselves on their antiquity. They are not so eager to perpetuate their deeds in the present as to maintain their prestige in the past. They are proud of their long dynasties whose origin is lost in the mist of by-gone centuries, proud of the list of their kings which they can produce out of the book of history, proud of the semi-fabulous heroes whose feats of superhuman valour have appeared to connect their rise with the rising of the gods. It is out of their fancied strength that their deepest weakness has arisen; their pride is fixed on the things that have been, and therefore they have no interest in the things that are. China, India, Persia, Egypt are, in their national characteristics, but "dead seas of man." They are so because they have closed their eyes to the progressive life of humanity, because they have fixed their gaze rather on the origin of their being than on the source of their well-being, and have riveted, upon the mists of their antiquity, that look which should have been fastened on the aspirations for to-morrow, and on the wants of to-day.

But there is a second class of nations which reveals the opposite

it—in the person of the Master Himself. With ever-increasing force is our age realising the great truth, that, if Christianity is to be revived, it must be revived from the head and centre of its original vitality; that, if a spiritual reunion of the hearts of men is to be achieved, it must be attained by forming a circle around the love of the Son of Man. To the mind of this century, that has become clear which was clear to the mind of Paul at the distance of eighteen hundred years—that before men can come to the unity of the faith, they must constitute a membership of love in the spiritual body of Christ. It is to this growing conviction that we must attribute the religious eclecticism of our day. It is to this conviction that we trace the reiterated efforts after evangelical union, the search for an element changeless amid the mutable, the straining to reach some basis on which the hearts of men may be at one. The treading of life's rough places has revealed that the glory of the Lord is, after all, a personal glory; and in the recognition of this incarnate love, in the vision of this life of truth, in the sense of this moral, this spiritual presence, the hope begins to dawn that all flesh shall see it together.

GEORGE MATHESON.

PROFESSOR CALDERWOOD'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR CALDERWOOD has won for himself a high place in that bright succession of names which have made the Scottish philosophy, and given it a recognised power, especially among English-speaking peoples. No book, like that of Dr. M'Cosh on Scottish Philosophy, can appear after Dr. Calderwood shall have passed away, which will not give him and his works a conspicuous place. This will be the more evident, if we note some distinguishing features of this philosophy, and the great mission it has been called to fulfil in shaping the mental and conterminous sciences. These none the less constitute its true and abiding character, though instances have not been wanting among Scottish philosophical celebrities of its inadequate statement and defence, or of eccentric aberrations from it. Yet these have been only personal and idiosyncratic eddies in the stream, that have not availed to cause any permanent deflection of the grand current of Scottish philosophy, which has a well-understood meaning for the speculative world. Not to go into more minute specification of it, this philosophy has been distinguished for its sturdy maintenance of the following principles:—

1. A true dualism of mind and matter in the universe, and in the human constitution, against all monism at either of its opposite poles of idealism and materialism.
2. A real intuitive and immediate knowledge

CATHOLIC PRESBYTERIAN, March, 1880.]

of things, substances, and qualities, and not merely of ideas, images, or vicarious representations of realities. 3. That this immediate knowledge is one of self in its various states of consciousness, and of the non-ego in various conditions and relations. 4. That it includes various first truths or axioms, mathematical, metaphysical, and moral, which, though not in themselves matters of actual being, are laws which underlie and condition the phenomena of actual being to which they are applicable. 5. It has maintained the veracity of our faculties of knowledge, rightly exerted within their respective spheres, as against all speculatists who allege that it is the very normal working of our faculties to teach us the false for true—in short, that at the very root “our nature is a lie.” It has also insisted that our faculties are so endowed as to have within and without themselves the means of ultimately correcting any imperfections and fallacies into which they may incautiously slide. 6. It has maintained the reality of moral freedom, not exclusive of the wrong bias brought in by the fall; and the reality also of the intrinsic right or wrong of moral actions, in opposition to all forms of Utilitarianism or Hedonism. Hence, finally, the Scottish philosophy, through these very characteristics, has been, not derived directly from, but harmonious with the Scriptures and the evangelical system, at all points of mutual contact, thus being the direct opposite of all those one-sided systems,—sensuous, materialistic, or idealistic,—which are antagonistic to ethical and Scriptural truth.

This system, which first received its most extended and recognised development in the writings of THOMAS REID, has borne the title of the Philosophy of Common Sense. There was a good ground for this, notwithstanding the appearance of seeming to identify philosophy with the common stock of rudimentary knowledge possessed by mankind. For it resulted in establishing the validity of the primitive and immediate cognitions of the human race, which other philosophies had undermined, but which form the first materials out of which alone any further progress in knowledge can be evolved. If the first beginnings of knowledge are unreal and delusive, everything built upon, or derived from them, must also be unreal and delusive. No chain can be stronger than any one of its separate links. If our knowledge begins with ideas, instead of things and realities, we can never get beyond ideas. If those first principles and axioms which regulate the thinking and action of men, whether they acknowledge them or not, are delusions—in a word, if the common-sense of mankind will not stand the sifting and testing of genuine philosophy—then no philosophical systems can bear thorough sifting and testing; thus we are landed in universal scepticism and nihilism. But while a true philosophy validates common-sense, properly understood, it must not be supposed that anything short of the highest philosophy is adequate to this office. If the Scottish philosophy has outgrown the title of the philosophy of common-sense, it has not outgrown the function of vindicating those primitive intuitions and cognitions of

(CATHOLIC PRESBYTERIAN, March, 1880.)

which it is constituted, howsoever and by whomsoever assailed. Of course, the modes of defence vary with the shifting modes of assault. These, again, depend on the chameleon phases of destructive speculation ; now idealistic, as in Berkeley, Ferrier, and the German transcendentalists ; now materialistic, as in Hobbes, Hartley, and current evolutionism ; now showing the meeting of both extremes in idealistic sensism, as in the case of Locke, who, deriving all ideas from sensation and reflection, nevertheless held that our first cognitions are of ideas rather than things, and that knowledge consists in the perceived agreement of ideas with their objects. (But if ideas only are immediately known, how can objects be so known as to be capable of comparison with them ?) This idealistic sensism is more explicitly indicated in J. S. Mill's analysis of matter and mind into permanent "possibilities of sensation," a view which differs little from Hume's resolution of all we know regarding them into a knowledge of a series of "impressions." Nor must it be overlooked, that many points, well taken by such philosophers as Reid in favour of fundamental truth, were, from the necessity of the case, at first confusedly, if not inconsistently, or, at all events, inadequately set forth by him. They required to be further defined by his collaborators and successors, in a gradual advance from obscure to clear, thence to distinct, thence to adequate representations. Of this, Hamilton's annotations on Reid, though abounding, as was his wont, in overdone criticism, afford ample proofs and illustrations. Hamilton was, in some respects, a mighty man, and has certainly won for himself an illustrious place in the galaxy of Scottish philosophers. Yet, while we do not go the length of some in disparaging him as "a greatly overrated man," it must be confessed, that it was not far from the close of his career that he reached the zenith of his fame and prestige as a philosopher, which for a while burst upon us with dazzling brilliance ; and that, under the sunlight of later criticism, his authority has, on the whole, been waning since his death. The vastness of his learning, the keenness of his criticism, the strength of his argument for the validity of our normal cognitions of self, not-self, and intuitive supersensual truths, still remain undisputed and indisputable. But the fragmentary character of his contributions to philosophy, his view of the relativity of knowledge, and the agnosticism which is the outcome of his philosophy of the conditioned, have greatly weakened the estimation in which his works are held.

This brings us to the point where Professor Calderwood's services to philosophy, and to religion at its points of contact with philosophy, begin. He first attracted public notice by his critique* of his illustrious teacher's *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, which maintained the impotence of the human mind to cognise the Absolute, the Infinite First Cause,

* "Philosophy of the Infinite : a Treatise on Man's Knowledge of the Infinite Being, in answer to Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel." By the Rev. Henry Calderwood, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Edinburgh. Third Edition. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1872.

CATHOLIC PRESBYTERIAN, March, 1880.]

the Unconditioned. This is simply equivalent to saying that man cannot know God. Like his views on the relativity of knowledge, it was a part of that net of Kantian subtleties which partially overpowered him in his very effort to vanquish them. The abyss of antinomies and contradictions, or, at best, agnosticism, in which all objective knowledge was plunged by Kant, engulfed all possible knowledge of the Infinite, and hence all logical possibility of religion. From this speculative extinction he tried to reclaim them by the Practical Reason, with its moral imperatives, its categorical assertion of Freewill, God, Immortality, Accountability. So Hamilton thought to recover by Faith what he affirmed was lost to knowledge,—as if that could be an object of Faith which could in no sense be brought within the grasp of cognition, thought, apprehension, or conception,—as if we could believe that of which we can have no idea or evidence. It is greatly to the credit of Professor Calderwood that, with all due deference to his illustrious master, who about this time had become widely accepted as the oracle in philosophy, he lifted up the standard against these destructive doctrines so authoritatively set forth by him. And he did it in such a way as to command the ear of that great body who had been startled, offended, or overborne by Hamilton's paradoxical dogmas. He was honoured with a reply from Hamilton himself.

This was all the more to his credit as this Agnosticism claimed to lay a better and deeper foundation for religion, by curbing the arrogant pretensions of reason to know and comprehend God—thus forestalling a destructive Rationalism, and clearing the way for Faith to hold what eludes Reason. Its first seeming aspect was that of humble and reverent faith receiving the great mysteries of religion, and disowning the assumptions of an arrogant rationalism which set itself against them.

Dean Mansel elaborated this idea of his great master in his Bampton Lectures, entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought," now famous, not chiefly for their dialectical astuteness, of which they were a marvel, but for the transient welcome, followed by permanent distrust, with which the treatise was received by the philosophico-religious world. It is astonishing how it was for the moment hailed by many divines as undermining the very basis of Rationalism, and laying broad and deep the foundations of faith. A second thought quickly demonstrated the futility of rearing faith on the ruins of knowledge, or of saving the great verities of religion by first making them unknowable. The agnostics of Materialism have been quick to fortify themselves behind the transcendental agnosticism of Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel. It is to the signal honour of Dr. Calderwood that he so soon came to the forefront in exposing an error so deadly, and all the more so that it was put forward by truly believing men, in what they supposed the interest of faith and piety. His work on this subject has already reached the third edition, which is much enlarged from the first, and critically examines Mansel's, as well as Hamilton's, agnostic reasonings. While it is characterised by marked

[CATHOLIC PREBYTERIAN, March, 1880.]

ability and thoroughness, we think a fuller clearing up of the distinction between knowledge and faith is still a desideratum, although Dr. Calderwood has done much to elucidate the subject. Nor are we quite sure that his later analysis of time and space is better than that which he has given up. But on the whole, we assign a high rank to this contribution to philosophy.

The next book by Dr. Calderwood which has fallen in our way is his "Handbook of Moral Philosophy."* In this he does excellent service in overturning the Utilitarian theory of morals, and in establishing Intuitionism on the doctrine of an intrinsic rightness of moral action, immediately discerned, as to its first elements and principles, by the conscience. In order to plant his argument more firmly and deeply, he contends with great ability and fulness against the whole sensational theory of the origin of our *a priori* and supersensuous knowledge. We cannot fully agree with him in regard to the unerring character of conscience in our present lapsed state. But the explanations he has made, in an appendix to later editions, show that he recognises the commonly accepted facts as to the need for the education and enlightenment of the moral faculty. A felt want in this admirable manual is a more copious treatment of applied ethics. It is, however, of great importance, not simply as an ethical treatise, but as an auxiliary to the maintenance of pure Christian doctrine. It is impossible to hold to the doctrine of a true vicarious expiation of sin, and to high standards of Christian life and morals, on the basis of Utilitarianism and Hedonism.

Omitting many valuable contributions made by Professor Calderwood to sound philosophy in Reviews, only some of which have fallen under our notice, we come to that which is the immediate occasion of this article—his last, and, in some respects, his greatest work, entitled "The Relation of Mind and Brain," published within the past year.† As its title indicates, it is directed to the defence of truth vital to ethics and religion at the points most imperilled in our day. It exposes, in a very calm, painstaking, and candid manner, the groundlessness of the attempt to resolve mind into brain, and to identify it with matter. It is exceedingly important to the non-professional student and others interested in this subject, who are unversed in anatomy and physiology, and on account of the great and valuable information which it gives concerning the brain and nervous organisation in man and in animals, in nearest cerebral and psychological kinship with him. For this purpose the book is enriched with more than forty admirable pictorial illustrations. These not only show the comparative anatomy and physiology of the subject, but the relation of various conditions of the brain in man and the lower animals to certain psychological phenomena. The author has bestowed

* "Handbook of Moral Philosophy." By Henry Calderwood, LL.D. Fourth Edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1875.

† "The Relations of Mind and Brain." By Henry Calderwood, LL.D. London: Macmillan & Co. 1879.

CATHOLIC PRESBYTERIAN, March, 1880.]

very patient and abundant labour upon this part of the subject, and verified his conclusions by personal examination, the results of which are confirmed by the very highest specialists and experts in the ganglionic and cerebral departments. The book is rich in authenticated cases of abnormal mental action, and of both normal and abnormal phenomena, showing interdependence in the mutual activities of mind and brain. Here it contains much that is instructive and fascinating to the average as well as the philosophical reader. As the result of all, he shows, beyond all plausible or serious question, that no mere action of the brain or nerves will account for "these three outstanding facts—intelligent use of sensibility (including the different forms of it belonging to the special senses); intelligent direction of motor activity; and intelligent use of a power of recollection," in which "we have the distinguishing features of the early stage of human life. We see in these the immense superiority of the child over all the lower orders of animate existence. The distinction consists in this, that the child's life is a personal life. From the first, he thinks and speaks of self as the centre of a circumference of knowledge and activity" (pp. 442-3). He next traces this superiority in the gift of intelligent speech, the articulate voice of Reason, and well says, "There is no need to linger at this point for comparison with animals. The higher significance of this personal life appears when next we contemplate the self-regulated life of man in all its leading phases" (pp. 443-4).

Nor, in the view of our author, does any brain-power, or energy of matter, account for the three great departments of intellectual activity :

1. "The understanding of things around us; 'scientific inquiry,' wherein all men, more or less, are led 'to compare, to discriminate, to classify, to generalise'" (pp. 445).

2. "The regulation of personal life itself . . . by the imperative implied in moral law, as the supreme law of life. The greatness of human life appears in the degree in which moral law holds sway over it, and spreads from it an influence which encourages and helps others in the attainment of similar excellence" (pp. 445-6).

3. "That which seeks an explanation of the universe as a whole, and a view of the responsibility and destiny of the rational being, in accordance with the recognised superiority of moral life. . . . The rational nature which seeks it can find it only in an Absolute Being, of infinite intelligence, and absolute moral excellence."

"This vast range of intellectual activity must either be brought within the compass of the recognised functions of brain, or it must be acknowledged, as beyond dispute, that there belongs to man a nature of higher and nobler type, which we designate Mind. The most advanced results of physiological science afford us no philosophy of these facts; whereas the results of psychological inquiry imply the possession of a nature higher than the physical" (pp. 446-7).

While the author thus establishes the existence of a substance or agent which exercises functions possible only to an immaterial agent, it deserves remark that he also establishes such relations between the

action of Mind and Brain, as harmonise with the Scriptural representations of the relation of the "flesh" and "body" to our spiritual states. The former term is used to indicate a depraved state, because, instead of keeping in due subordination to spirit, including reason and conscience, it usurps dominion over them. So the flesh with its affections and lusts gets the mastery, and engenders the disordered and senseless condition of our moral natures. Nor can we question that a due rectification of the body is requisite to complete sanctification, according to the apostle's representation that the whole "spirit, and soul, and body" are involved in the entire sanctification and blamelessness of the one indivisible person (1 Thess. v. 23). As Principal Dawson has well observed (*Princeton Review*, Nov., 1879, p. 603), recent Materialism, in its efforts to overthrow religion and the Bible, by attempts to discover mentality in matter, has unwittingly done much to illustrate the implication of the flesh and body with our moral corruption and renovation, while it furnishes no countenance to the heresy of the intrinsic evil of matter. Professor Calderwood's book throws much light on this subject. Indeed, if we are to accept, as correct, the trichotomy of human nature,—which *primâ facie* seems intimated in the Scripture just referred to, and has been so earnestly maintained by able men, according to which, man has a *σῶμα* or bodily organism, a *ψυχὴ* or animal life and intelligence, and a *πνεῦμα* or rational and moral nature which lifts him above the mere animal to an alliance with or similitude to God,—he would find much in the results of recent scientific investigations by Materialists and their critics to accord with this view. We have, on the whole, inclined to the position of the dichotomists. We are not, however, immovable in it, if adequate evidence appear against it. But into this subject we cannot now enter.

LYMAN H. ATWATER.

EARLY BRITISH CHURCH—THE ARTHURIAN LEGENDS.

THE story of Arthur, Prince or King in ancient Britain, is unique in modern literature. It runs through the song, the romance, the epic of the last thirteen hundred years, reaching its most perfect form in the "Idylls of the King." Among the first to be sung or said, it was also among the first to be printed. To many it is the story of a shadow; to others it has substance as well as suggestion. I propose to make a section of ancient British life, and try to set forth the circumstances in which it rose like a spring from the rock. That section will reveal the thought and life of the early British Church in its maturity, but on the eve of its decline in the South, though it was then to have a vigorous life in the North and elsewhere.