

THE
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY
AND
PRINCETON REVIEW.

NEW SERIES, No. 1.—JANUARY, 1872.

ART. I.—THE VARIABLE AND THE CONSTANT
IN CHRISTIAN APOLOGY.

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IN the modern, weakened sense of the word, the Church of Christ has no *apologies* to make. We apologize to no man for our faith, as though there was anything in it to excuse or extenuate. But like the “elect strangers scattered throughout Asia Minor,” to whom St. Peter addressed his 1st Epistle, we hold ourselves “ready for apology to every one that asketh of us an account of the hope that is in us.” The simple self-respect of an honest, rational believer, allows no less than this; our loyalty to our Lord may well add something to the readiness and earnestness of our vindication. For it is He that is called in question, rather than we, by the unbelieving world.

When Christ with his own lips charged his disciples, in clear view of the troubled days and scenes to which he pointed them, not to be anxious, not to prepare before hand their apology even for synagogues, magistrates, and kings, he justified the strange charge by the quieting assurance that a cause higher than their own should have an advocacy higher than their own. “The Holy Ghost shall teach you.” “I will give you a mouth and wisdom.” This was the first provision made for Christian apologies and apologists. And to the last day of the Church’s conflict with unbelief and error, it must fare ill with the defense and the defender of the faith that is not under the same teaching and endowment,—while

applause, because of such building work. When once alcoholic wines and strong drinks are swept away from every Christian side-board and table and social feast, what a mighty barrier will be set against the desolating flood of intemperance! And what an added emphasis will be given to the protest of the Church of God against the sin of drunkenness. O for the hour, God speed it, when every member of every Christian Church in all our land, in the spirit of a pervasive, abounding, all-embracing charity, shall say, "Wine maketh my brother to offend; stumblers by the alcoholic cup are on every side of me. Therefore I will drink no wine while the world standeth!"

ART. V.—TOTAL ABSTINENCE AND ITS SCRIPTURAL BASIS.

A Reply to the Strictures of the Rev. Herrick Johnson, D. D., upon the Princeton Review.

IT HAS of course been apparent to our readers that the preceding article, by our respected friend, Dr. Herrick Johnson, is mainly directed against a previous discussion of the wine question, and "Church Action on Temperance," in the October number of the *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*. We had cordially consented to publish Dr. Johnson's strictures upon it before we had seen them, and before any steps had been taken looking to the consolidation of that quarterly with the *American Presbyterian Review*. We none the less cordially insert these strictures now, although under the great disadvantage of placing them before a large body of readers who have never seen our original articles. We shall, therefore, be compelled to expand some parts of our reply more than would otherwise be necessary.

Want of space compels us barely to refer to some things which would justify fuller treatment. He tells us, "Dr. Atwater says, Jesus 'by drinking wine vindicated the liberty of his followers to use every creature of God as good and fit

for food.'” Dr. Atwater did not say this, but Dr. Isaac Jennings, of England, did, in his article in the revised Kitto’s Cyclopaedia, which we quoted for the purpose of proving that the wines of Scripture are fermented, with an express caveat that we did “not endorse every sentence of it,” although we deemed it conclusive for the end in view. We neither affirm nor deny this proposition, with reference to which, among others, the caveat was inserted.

Universally, we decline to be held responsible for those representations of our views by Dr. J., which are not given in our own words, indicated by quotation marks; e. g.: how groundless is the representation that we claimed, that “nearly all abstinence from intoxicating drinks in Christian society is practised out of respect to the mere scruples of weak brethren,” will yet appear. In other instances statements of our opinions in language not our own are far easier of assault than our own words. As much more so as his paraphrase of the Apostle [on the hypothesis that scriptural wines are fermented,] that “the bishops ordained to preach could go everywhere establishing churches, and drinking wine without let or hindrance, provided they did not get drunk!” is easier to assail than the simple salutary charge that they be not “given to wine.”

And is it not an exaggeration to speak of those who deny that the Bible makes wine-drinking, in the most sparing way, a sin or term of Christian communion, as teaching that it gives a “*wholesale* endorsement” of temperate drinking? For what is the force of “wholesale” added to “endorsement,” unless to indicate that it endorses all sorts of temperate drinking, at all times and places? And when he speaks of those Christians who drink wine at all, as “Christian wine-bibbers” and “wine-bibbing Christians,” does not this imply that they are great and excessive drinkers? and is it not simply a petition upon his servants of the—what shall we call it?—hurled at Christ by his foes?

And when he quotes the testimony of missionaries to the drunkenness in Bible lands, would it not make their testimony complete to add that almost, if not quite, without exception, they repudiate the doctrine of an unfermented wine in Scrip-

ture, and deplore all movements to put the temperance cause, or total abstinence, on such a platform ?

These exaggerations or one-sided statements, with others, are of course unintentional. But the closer the adherence of all parties to the exact truth, the better will it be for them and the cause of truth in the end. But we hasten to the main positions taken and issues raised by Dr. Johnson. He says: "The doctrine is stated in Romans xiv, and in 1 Cor. viii. Here we have the law of liberty in things indifferent, as regulated and limited by the law of conscience and the law of love. There is a law of liberty. The Apostle distinctly recognizes it, and in view of it he makes some frank and manly concessions. He says Christian liberty may be freely exercised with reference to all those things that have, in themselves considered, no permanent moral ground for their prohibition: in other words, things that are not in their essential character either right or wrong."

What words could more completely go the utmost length we have gone in stating the scriptural doctrine of Christian liberty in regard to things indifferent? Nor does he diverge from us when he further contends that we ought so to use this liberty that it shall not be a stumbling-block to those that are weak, nor hostile to edification. We have maintained the same. Still further, if we do not misread him, he appears to put the moderate use of wine among things indifferent. He tells us: "If we keep to a case rigidly analogous to that discussed by the Apostle, the statement of the doctrine of expediency in its application to the wine question would be, "Wine-drinking in itself neither commends us to God nor forfeits His favor. It is a thing indifferent. But there are brethren who think even the moderate use of wine a sin. To them, therefore it *is* a sin. If they drink wine at all their conscience will be defiled. Hence it is a sin for us to drink wine, even moderately, if we thus tempt them to sin. Let us therefore drink no wine while the world standeth, lest we make these brethren to offend.

"This is the exact application of the doctrine to the wine question. "Let it not be forgotten withal that he repeatedly speaks of the "very few who think it a sin to drink wine at all."

So far the agreement is complete. But Dr. Johnson goes on to ask if Dr. Atwater would have us believe that nearly all abstinence from intoxicating drinks in Christian society is practised on this ground." We have before called attention to the unjust implications of this question and his answer to it. He says: "over and over again he (Dr. Atwater) puts the case as if it were a question between weak brethren thinking it a sin to drink wine, etc." And is not this the way in which the Apostle puts it? And is it not the way too in which Dr. Johnson himself expounds the Apostle's meaning? And if "it seems like inexcusable trifling to ring the changes on the scruples of weak brethren," as Dr. Johnson tells us, has not he set us the example, at the same time following a still higher example, which it is a somewhat serious matter to charge with "inexcusable trifling?"

It is true that we found it necessary to evince and signalize the fact that the Apostle was dealing with the duties of enlightened towards weak brethren afflicted with groundless scrupulosities, because it was material to one important, not to say the chief, end of our discussion, viz: to prove that the reasoning of the deliverance of the O. S. Assembly, of '65, was inconclusive. This paper argued, or was understood to argue, that because the Apostle said, "when ye sin against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ," therefore the making, vending, or drinking of any intoxicant as a beverage, inasmuch as it may cause weak brethren to stumble, is a sin against Christ, and being a sin against Christ, is a just bar to church communion. We contended in refutation of this, that the sin against the brethren and against Christ, here indicated, was simply a wrong use of liberty, which was no proper subject of ecclesiastical discipline, however it might be amenable to the bar of God, and of fraternal argument and expostulation. And, in order to render our argument more decisive, we were obliged to show the particular sort of sin to which the Apostle had reference, viz: wounding weak and over scrupulous consciences, by doing things intrinsically indifferent and not sinful which they deemed sinful. This, however at times uncharitable, and in this sense a sin, could not be a

disciplinable offense: 1. from its own nature as within the sphere of liberty with respect to our fellow-men, and not in itself or all circumstances sinful; 2. because treated by the Apostle as a subject, not of discipline but of fraternal exhortations; 3. because in the present case drinking wine and eating meat were just precisely on the same footing, and surely none would contend that the latter was disciplinable. 4. Because "he that eateth not is expressly forbidden to judge him that eateth, for God hath received him." Romans, xiv, 3.

This, therefore, was conclusive proof that the argument of that paper aiming to prove the exercise of Christian liberty contrary to expediency, against which the Apostle exhorts, Romans, xiv; 1 Cor. viii., x, a sin in such a sense against Christ as to be a disciplinable offence, is unsound and inconclusive. The sin, in such cases, we insisted was against that class of obligations technically styled imperfect, not necessarily because defective before God, but because indeterminate or otherwise not enforceable by human tribunals. It was to this end that we dwelt on the precise form of the stumbling in the view of the Apostle, as having reference to the scrupulosities of weak brethren. But we did so by no means without giving due prominence to other ways of hindering the moral welfare of men by the uncharitable use of liberty, and often in the matter of wine-drinking, abstinence from which we approve, practise, and try to promote; but which we do not think may of right, in every form or degree of it be made a term of communion.

We now invite attention to Dr. Johnson's views of liberty in things indifferent and its relation to obligation, which strike us as extraordinary, and so wide of truth as to vitiate his whole argument. He speaks of what is a "matter of liberty" as "therefore shorn of every element of obligation." Again, "liberty and obligation cannot be harnessed together. Liberty has respect only to things indifferent. And a thing is indifferent concerning which it is a matter of indifference whether it be done or not. The moment it ceases to be that, it passes out of the domain of liberty into the domain of obligation, and from being a thing indifferent

becomes a duty or a sin. Conceding that wine-drinking is in itself a thing indifferent, it is no longer that when it puts a stumbling block or an occasion to fall in a brother's way. It is evil then; morally wrong, a sin. And to abstain is not the use of liberty but the imperative demand of moral obligation," etc., etc.

That there must be some flaw about this reasoning is demonstrable *a priori*. For, as we have seen, Dr. Johnson maintains that there are some things in which we have liberty. But are they therefore out of the domain of obligation? By no manner of means. Nothing that a moral agent does is severed from obligation to God. In immediate connection with the subject of liberty, the Apostle charges, "whether, therefore, ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." This generally. Then specially in regard to liberty itself. "For brethren ye have been called unto liberty; only use not your liberty as an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another." Gal. v. 13. In like manner Peter, says: "as free, and not using your liberty as a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God." 1 Peter, ii, 16. There must be some sense then in which liberty and obligation are mutually compatible, and may be "harnessed together." What is it? Surely we do not need to recall the trite proverb that "liberty is not licentiousness." Liberty may exist in some respects, or in relation to some persons, without being a license to act in every sort of way toward every sort of person. Concerning things indifferent we may be free with respect to our fellow-men to judge for ourselves and to follow our own judgment, and not theirs, as to what duty requires of us in regard to them, without being justly subject to their condemnatory judgments, or excision from church privileges therefor. But this liberty may be and is none the less "harnessed" to the obligation to God to use it honestly and fairly in forming our judgments, and in promoting the true welfare of ourselves and others and the glory of God. Herein one man's judgment is not a law or a yoke for another. Each one must give an account of himself to God. The amount of

money a father would give to his son is in itself a thing indifferent. It depends upon and varies with circumstances, with the temper, aptitudes and susceptibilities of the son, the resources of the father, and other matters innumerable. The duty of the father varies with circumstances, and must depend on his estimate of those circumstances. There is no other possible rule of duty. He may misjudge, still it is his province to judge in the case. He may be unduly swayed by parental fondness, and fail to use the candor he ought. For this he is responsible to God. But no man has a right to usurp his prerogative or to make his own judgment the measure and law of his neighbor's. At times Dr. Johnson seems to come upon this ground. He says immediately after the words last quoted from him: "But is not every man at liberty to judge of the circumstances? Certainly. And must he not act according to his own conscience? Certainly. And must he not to his own Master stand or fall? Certainly." Has he not conceded the whole here? Seemingly. But he attempts to neutralize the concession as follows: "But a man with a blinded judgment and a perverted conscience may be guilty of sin before God notwithstanding these things. These questions do not affect the question of obligation, and the liberty they imply and involve is not the liberty of things indifferent. It is just the liberty that Paul exercised when in conscience he verily thought he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth. It is the circumstances that make the imperative duty, not a man's view of them. His judgment of the case will affect his action, but it does not affect his obligation."

Here we have some inadequate statements on most perplexed questions of morals. If a man's view of his circumstances does not "affect his obligation" what can? This is not the question of his responsibility for his moral judgments. That is undoubted. But having those judgments, can he innocently do what in his judgment he verily believes he ought not to do? He may indeed be in a sad dilemma. In regard to what is of intrinsic obligation *per se*, his judgment cannot make it otherwise. If he judges the persecu-

tion of Christ and his Church right, that does not make it so, or otherwise than a sin. Yet if he judges that he ought to do it, not to do it is to violate his conscience, and so sin and contract guilt. Do what he will, a man with a conscience perverted in regard to things intrinsically right or wrong must sin intentionally or ignorantly. But it is preposterous to say that his view does not "affect his obligation" in any way. The root of his sin was doubtless in forming the false moral judgment. But the Bible everywhere makes a clear and broad distinction between the same sin committed ignorantly, or done deliberately and presumptuously. Its nature as sin is not destroyed in either case. But its aggravation and demerit are very greatly modified thereby. For does not the Apostle say in respect to the very things he verily thought he ought to do against the name of Jesus of Nazareth—I was "a blasphemer and persecutor and injurious; but I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly and in unbelief? And was it not the grandest outburst of moral sublimity the world has ever seen, when our Lord prayed for his crucifiers committing the crime of the ages, "Father forgive them for they know not what they do?" And is it not going too far to say, that although one's views of duty cannot annul it, they "do not affect his obligation?"

All this, be it observed, holds good of actions not indifferent, but in themselves morally right or wrong. But it does not, nevertheless, in such cases, go the length of taking such sins beyond the scope of Church discipline. If a man thinks it right to persecute or crucify the Lord of glory, or his people, to blaspheme or profane the name of God, to withhold faith, love, reverence, obedience, worship from Him, to perpetrate fraud, extortion, oppression, lying, to indulge in drunkenness or licentiousness, etc., this does not make it so. Moreover, such a depraved moral judgment, if persisted in, is clear evidence of a want of piety, and therefore obnoxious to the censures of the Church to the extent, if need be, of banishment from the communion of saints.

But for reasons already shown, and yet to appear, we apprehend that all this is largely otherwise with respect to mis-

judgments in regard to acts in themselves morally indifferent, and whose moral tendency depends on circumstances. It is seldom that an enduring misjudgment or mistaken estimate of circumstances in themselves, and their effect on the moral bearing of actions indifferent, is unmistakable proof of such moral depravity as is incompatible with real piety, or as warrants church discipline or excommunication. And this is because these circumstances and their consequences are so uncertain or variable, or vast beyond the possibility of full human comprehension and infallible calculation, that no man can make his own estimate of them the binding standard for the judgment of others, and denounce, excommunicate or ostracize them if they do not see with his eyes, or through his glasses; if, in short, they see and attach weight to circumstances which he overlooks or underrates, or *vice versa*. Take the most familiar examples—say, the amount of pocket-money which a parent may of right give his son. In whatever sense “it is the circumstances that make the imperative duty, and not a man’s view of them,” yet is not he to form the best view he can, in the best light he can get, and to act upon it, without being compelled to adopt and conform to the contrary views of others, on pain of being condemned, mulcted, or excommunicated by them as a heathen man and a publican?

Take the matter of extravagant dress of wife and daughters. The tremendous domestic and social evils to which such prevailing extravagances gives rise are beyond question. Suppose that, in order to withstand it by a countervailing example, a wealthy parent determines that the ladies of his family shall dress with great plainness and economy, putting in place of all outward adorning the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, so precious in the sight of God. Suppose, however, another, equally opulent and exemplary in other things, judges that extreme plainness and cheapness of dress is unjust to the ladies of his family, that it impairs their social standing, influence, opportunities, prospects, usefulness, and that he therefore cannot rightly enforce it? Is either of these to set up himself, or his own judgment of these circumstances as a compulsory standard and measure for the other? to adjudge and deal with him as a sinner, a heathen, and a publican therefore?

Or is the Church to do it for him? And is this the divine way of meeting these evils?

Apply this test even to the moderate use of wine as a beverage. It seems to be perfectly clear to Dr. Johnson, if we may judge from the whole scope of his reasoning, that nobody can innocently believe that any such use of it in any quantity or circumstances is otherwise than productive of evil and evil only; and therefore that, however "it may be in itself a thing indifferent, it is no longer that," since "it puts a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in a brother's way." And he deems this so evident, now and in all ages, from the evil effects of it in inducing intemperance, that it is impossible that the Scriptures could have given it any degree of allowance, or that the wine there not forbidden could have been fermented and intoxicating; or that men can innocently fail to see all this, and to practise total abstinence from it accordingly. We do not see how, according to Dr. J.'s reasoning, wine-drinking can ever be, or have been, in the category of things indifferent, or therefore how it can pass out, as he alleges, of a category in which it has never been. For does he not rightly describe things indifferent "as those things which have, in themselves considered, no permanent moral ground for their prohibition; in other words, things are not in their essential nature either right or wrong?" But do not his claim and argument suppose that wine-drinking has a permanent moral ground for its prohibition, and is therefore outside of the things indifferent, to which he acknowledges that liberty pertains?

And is not the simple contradictory of this, with its logical consequences, what we have maintained, and what has called Dr. Johnson into the field in opposition to us, and what it is the obvious aim of all his lines of argument to overthrow?

At all events he would have us understand that, whether *per se* indifferent or not, wine-drinking, in all ages, is so obviously fraught with moral evil in its consequences, that it is a sin to practice it, and that ignorance of that sinfulness is inexcusable. And he stoutly argues not only that this is so now, but was just as much so in Christ's day. Now here we take

issue with him. While ourselves personally convinced, and acting on the conviction that it is now and here for the best interests of the Church and the world to practice abstinence, we deny that we have a right to act on the hypothesis that all the circumstances and all their consequences are so completely and infallibly before us, and so manifest to all other candid minds, that they may not, without moral fault, view the subject in another light. We have seen the time when the most devoted promoters of Temperance were honestly of opinion that the general use in moderation of fermented drinks was, in the existing state of mankind, the strongest barrier against the prevalent use of stronger stimulants, and the fearful drunkenness induced by drugged and distilled liquors. We have now in our mind a distinguished living divine of great eloquence, zeal, and pastoral efficiency, who has honestly believed and acted on the belief that the free production and use of pure native wines form the strongest barrier against the flood of intemperance sure to come in from stronger and more dangerous liquors, unless thus kept out. Large numbers of as pure and intelligent Christians as the world contains believe, first that the water on the continent of Europe is such as to render the common use of light wines a needful hygienic substitute for it, and they further believe that the common use of such wines in wine-producing countries leads to less drunkenness than exist, in countries comparatively destitute of them.

Very recently we saw a notice of a new book arguing that narcotic and alcoholic stimulants, up to a certain point, are beneficial to the vital functions, beyond that point injurious and destructive. Without giving an opinion on the subject Mr. Beecher's paper, the *Christian Union*, commended the matter to our careful consideration. We do not endorse these opinions. But as long as they are held by multitudes in Christendom as intelligent and virtuous as ourselves, and largely sanctioned by the advice and practice of physicians of undoubted repute, is it not infatuation or something worse, to make our own judgments to the contrary the criterion of the rectitude of those who differ from us in the premises,

and of their title to Christian fellowship and Church privileges? And must not this be all the more and unanswerably so, if such are fortified in their judgment by what they believe and the Christian world has heretofore believed, and now, a small fragment excepted, believes to have been the example of Christ and the teaching of his word?

Take another case—tobacco. Long experience and wide observation have convinced us that the vast majority who use it had far better never have tasted it, that none are the better for it, and that its universal disuse would be greatly for the physical, moral and intellectual benefit of mankind, nay, that it increases the tendency to intemperate drinking, although an occasional octogenarian, and even centenarian quietly and harmlessly smokes his pipe. And personally we feel conscience-bound to abstain from it, as well for example's sake, and right influence on the young, as for other reasons. But is this one of those cases, in which we can make our judgment the standard for measuring the capacity, honesty, candor, piety, or title to Church privileges of those who see the matter differently? Dancing, especially in some of its forms, falls into the same predicament. And how many other things?

Dr. Johnson's last exception to our reasoning is, that it "proceeds upon the assumption that all the wine of Scripture allowed and enjoined of God as to its temperate use, and made and drank by Christ, was intoxicating, if used in excess." Upon which we observe: 1. that we have not said that any wine is "*enjoined* of God as to its temperate use." 2. If Dr. Johnson should merely prove the contradictory of the proposition that "*all the wines of scripture allowed,*" etc., are intoxicating, it would not disturb our main assertion. To do this he must show that *no* wine so allowed was intoxicating. 3. We did not build on a mere "assumption." We brought proofs and arguments extending from 20 to 30 pages, exegetical, historical, and philological, that the wines allowed in Scripture were fermented and intoxicating. Until he makes at least some attempt to parry these, which we personally know have carried to many minds the force of demonstration, it is somewhat premature to characterize this position of ours as an "assumption."

As Dr. Johnson has not refuted, or attempted or professed to refute these proofs we gave, that the wine of Scripture is wine ("fermented" wine is a pleonasm outside of *the usus loquendi brought in by* a few recent *ex professo* temperance exegetes) that could intoxicate, if taken in excess, we deem his whole effort to show *a priori* that it could not be so, because of the drunkenness which he contends prevails in all wine-drinking countries, irrelevant. If, upon all sound and recognized principles of interpretation, the language of the Scriptures tolerates any use of what could intoxicate in excess as a beverage, then it is altogether an *ignoratio elenchi* to argue the *a priori* impossibility of their permitting such use of it. This is simply the method of rationalistic and destructive exegesis. Once allow this method of procedure to over-ride the plain meaning of Scripture, and insist that it must conform to men's antecedent ideas of what is right and proper, and we set in motion the battering-rams of rationalism against The Fall, Original Sin, The Corruption of Nature, The Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Spiritual Regeneration, Judgment, Eternal Perdition; in short, against Evangelical Religion, nay the Bible itself. By this route Channing easily reached his famous "central gallows of the universe" as the fit description of the cross. A very little reflection will convince any sober and competent thinker that "man is more inexplicable without original sin, than original sin is inexplicable to man" and that both are, on many sides, alike inexplicable; that the Bible and Providence and Nature teem with things which, though unfathomable by human reason, it is far more reasonable to accept than reject; that if we are to accept nothing which we cannot explain or comprehend, we must discard the Bible, Providence and Nature, nay the God of the Bible, Providence and Nature. All minor baffling questions are lost in the great problem of the origin and permission of sin and misery, which who can solve? Suppose Dr. Johnson to get rid of the scriptural allowance of temperate wine-drinking and its logical consequences, how is he to get rid of or get over or around the fact that God has so made the laws of Nature that grapes will not only grow, but their juice expressed will

ferment into a beverage delicious and exhilarating to man, which by his abuse tempts him into drunkenness on the enormous scale he has so graphically depicted? How in reference to his so making the earth as to be productive of tobacco, and man's tastes and propensities about it what they are? Nay, let him explain why the first breath of the newborn babe, that has known neither good nor evil, is a wail of anguish! Let us beware of arguments against the possibility of the Bible's asserting what baffles or confounds us, which cannot stop there, and which, if consistently followed out, go back upon every distinctive doctrine of Christianity, and cannot stop short of universalism, infidelity, atheism.

But Dr. Johnson contends that if our exegesis be correct, "to plead for abstinence on the ground of expediency is a farce." He quite ridicules the claim that there is any special reason for it in the abounding drunkenness and the baleful effects of distilled and adulterated liquors in our day. This may be his view. If so we are sorry. But we do not make our judgment a measure of his, or a warrant for condemning him. We are glad that so many see the matter differently, and do not find it necessary to strain the exegesis of Scripture so as to worm out of it the "figment of an unintoxicating wine," in order to find a good ground of abstinence.

He, however, says, "that basis (of expediency) is undermined and taken from beneath our feet when from one end to the other of the word of God it is held there is a divine warrant for the use of wine in moderation. If this be true there is no ground for us to stand on. About the conscience of no wine-drinker who believes it to be true, can we ever get the grappling-irons of obligation by Paul's exposition of the doctrine of expediency. We have tried and have failed because an isolated passage of *modern application* cannot be made in the estimation of any man to outweigh the whole balance of Scripture; because a plea for abstinence on the ground of expediency loses all its force when met by an opposing plea of divine precept and divine example. We say it again, therefore, fearless of sustainable contradiction, that if Christ and the Bible are so on the side of the use of intoxicating wine within the limits of sobriety as it is held they are by those

who say that wine is not wine unless intoxicating, then the doctrine of expediency in its application to the wine question is not worth a puff of empty air."

To which we rejoin: 1. That the first question is, What do the Scriptures actually teach about wine, not how much, by Dr. J.'s logic, is the doctrine of expediency worth on the basis of such teaching? Let us have the truth, expediency or no expediency. 2. It is not true that this doctrine of expediency is founded on a single passage of modern application. The apostle discusses it at length in several chapters, and as touching us whether we eat or drink or whatsoever we do. 3. Nor is its first special application to wine-drinking modern. It is as old as the Epistle to the Romans. 4. Nor is it neutralized by any "opposing plea of Divine precept and example," although the wines made and drunk by Christ were fermented, any more than the expediency of abstaining from meats, or not doing *anything* whereby a brother stumbleth, is neutralized because Christ ate meat, and did many other things in some circumstances not likely to produce these effects, which he would not do in other circumstances likely to produce them. 5. Dr. Johnson has been singularly unfortunate in being unable to reach any man's conscience who does not believe the wines of Scripture unintoxicating, through Paul's exposition of expediency. Probably his failure is due to his lack of faith in such cases. We have had the pleasure of seeing thousands who would scout his doctrine about the Scripture wines, abstaining from them on the score of expediency. The Scriptural analysis of the expediency of abstinence in some circumstances is not "outweighed by," for it is not inconsistent with the lawfulness of its use in other circumstances. 6. The "modern application" of our undoubted Scriptural doctrine as an undoubtedly just ground of abstinence from wine will, in our judgment, prove a far safer and more durable basis for the temperance reform than a "modern" interpretation of Scripture, which has but a minimum of adherents, and is wholly incompatible with the unquestionable averments and implications of Scripture itself.

But Dr. Johnson is the last man to disparage this single passage of Scripture with its "modern application," as a per-

suasive to total abstinence. For he not only gives it the greatest emphasis, but over and over again makes it the hinge-point of his argument. Nay more, he paraphrases it so as to express a stringent meaning not belonging to it. For does he not represent that "Paul declared it morally obligatory not to drink wine for the sake of a stumbling brother," and that "It is a violation of the law of love and a sin against Christ to drink wine or anything whereby a brother stumbleth?" Be it remembered that what Paul said of drinking wine, he said of eating meat. Did Paul here mean to condemn all eating of meat, or all drinking of wine, in any circumstances, as a sin against Christ? And is not the above paraphrase meant to signify that Paul pronounced it universally a sin? If not, how does it sustain Dr. J.'s position?

Most of what Dr. J. says, to show that the vast intemperance now induced by the copious supplies of distilled and adulterated liquors, constitute no special reason for abstinence not existing in Christ's time, is either groundless or irrelevant. Does he or anybody else, unless urged by the exigencies of a case to be made out, think it a fair rendering of our meaning, or inference from, or retort upon it, to twist it into this form? "If drunkenness is to great and dreadful excess, and hundreds and thousands are guilty of the sin and crime of it, then the law of love says abstain. If drunkenness prevails to a less degree, and only thousands and tens of thousands are stumbling into the sin of it, then the law of love has no application!" We are quite willing to let such arguing as this speak for itself, exclamation points and all. We certainly know that most minds are so constituted, including the vast body of promoters and exemplars of total abstinence, as to find the motives to abstinence increased in proportion to the prevalence of drunkenness and the abundance of the most acrid, violent and adulterated intoxicants, especially when so largely simulating and labelled wine. And does not Dr. J. himself admit that "distilled and drugged liquors, and our colder climate, may give intemperance here worse features and more wide-spread evils, and possibly a greater number of victims, than intemperance has in the lands of the Bible?"

Is it, then, no special reason for efforts to repress drunkenness? Does he not admit that a point may be reached "where sobriety and moderation should be so universally the rule, that there would be little likelihood of occasioning a brother to stumble by the use of wine?" How does he know that it may not have been so among the Jews when Christ made and drank wine? How does he know that a self-righteous asceticism, like a self-righteous exclusiveness or intolerance, may not have been a more prevailing moral evil at that time than intemperance, and that for this reason, *inter alia*, our Adorable Lord may have been pleased to come eating and drinking the meats and drinks set before him, and associating with the unworthy and immoral, although thus incurring the reproach of being a "glutton and wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners?" Does it hence follow that there could be no occasions when Christ saw it, or candid men may see it, their duty to fast, or to abstain from intoxicants, or to refuse, and exhort others, especially the young, to refuse the companionship and intimacy of the immoral? Did not Paul, who on one occasion charged Timothy to take a little wine, and again that bishops be not given to wine, on another say, that he would drink no wine and eat no meat if it cause a brother to offend? Was he not governed by circumstances, and his view of the circumstances, and does he not permit and require others to be so likewise, in deciding whether to abstain or not?

And if he judged it wise and expedient now to charge the taking of a little wine, or not to be given to much wine, and now to abstain on account of the scruples of weak brethren, how does it appear that he might not have seen fit to abstain and exhort to abstinence in the midst of abounding drunkenness induced by distilled and adulterated liquors, out of love to men exposed to such temptation? Or that he would not, in circumstances otherwise similar, sometimes refuse to abstain, as holy men have sometimes refused to abstain, if such abstinence were erected by influential parties into a test of righteousness or term of communion. And who now is authorized to go and say to every one who tastes wine, "you are a sinner and ought to be an excom-

municate, because you do not see that such an act involves a guilty complicity with the promotion of drunkenness, and is clearly an offence against God and man?"

As Dr. J. has defended his views respecting unfermented wine in Scripture, not by any actual exegesis, but by addressing considerations of *a priori* probability, we will call attention to some general facts not hitherto adduced by us which we think conclusive to the contrary.

1. It is nothing to the purpose for our grape-juice brethren to dwell on minima. *De minimus lex non curat*. It is of no avail that our friends weary themselves and their readers with toilsome efforts to prove that the ancients had some process or processes for boiling grape-juice to a syrup before fermentation, till they can show that this syrup was commonly understood by the term wine; or that Pliny or other authors gave some recipes for preserving grape-juice awhile unfermented, until they can prove that it was extensively employed to produce the drink of common use known as wine: or to refer to passages about new wine, or pressing the juice of grapes into a cup to be drunk, which at most proves no more that wine meant an unfermented drink than similar phrase about new cider proves that when we speak of cider, or cider-drinkers, we refer to the unfermented juice of the apple: or when the Californians speak of the "wine-crop" of the year, they mean by "wine" unfermented grape-juice. These minutiae of exegesis are of no avail till they prove that the *olivos* of the New Testament and the *vinum* of the Latin so commonly meant an unfermented syrup or liquid, that, without further specification, the deacons and the aged women and bishops must have understood Paul to have been charging them against much indulgence in sweetened-water or harmless grape-juice: and Timothy must have understood him to counsel himself to take a little—what? instead of water to help digestion in his old age. So likewise of the wine made and used by Christ. Can this be done, or even pretended, with any show of plausibility? Let the following testimonies, with many more, answer: and they might be multiplied to any extent.

To begin with the Roman writers, Pliny tells us, that "the passage of *must* into *wine*" is expressed by the term *fervere* (to ferment.) "*Sic appellat musti in vina transitum.*" What words can show more clearly that Pliny understood by *wine* something different from the unfermented juice of the grape?

Columella says, "Before you take the *must* from the vat, fumigate the vessels with rosemary, laurel or myrtle; and fill the vessels full, that in *fermenting* the wine may purge itself well." ". . . ut in *effervesendo* vinum se bene purgat."

Varro says, "That the *must* that is put into a dolium, in order that we may have *wine*, should not be drawn while it is *fermenting*, and has not yet *advanced so far as to be converted into wine.*"

Can it admit of a doubt, that by *vinum*, the Latin term for wine, Pliny, Columella, and Varro meant the fermented juice of the grape? and only the fermented? Yet these are authorities mainly relied on in support of the contrary position.

Let us next inquire what the Greeks understood by *oinos*, their term for wine. The poet Alexis indicates the true import of *oinos*, when he observes, that in a certain respect man much resembles wine, as both new wine and man must needs pass through a process of fermentation.

Democritus, a Greek writer much commended by Columella, and quoted by Varro, Pliny and Palladius, and who was born 460 years B. C., gives the following directions respecting the management of wines, in cases where the grapes have been much exposed to the rain: "If the *must* be ascertained to be too weak, when the *wine* (*oinos*) has been lodged in the *pithoi*, and has undergone the *first fermentation*, let us immediately transfer it to other vessels," &c.

Observe here, that before the fermentation, the juice of the grape is called *must*; after the fermentation, *wine*.

These directions are general, not having reference to any particular kind of wine; and they show that among the Greeks, as well as among the Romans, the term correspond-

ing to our term *wine* was employed to denote the fermented juice of the grape, and not the unfermented.

Says Clemens Alexandrinus, near the end of the second century, "With propriety, therefore, does the Divine Teacher, anxious for our salvation, in the strongest terms announce the prohibition, 'Drink not to drunkenness.'" Again, "How do you suppose our Lord drank when on our account he was made man? So shamelessly as we? Did he not do it becomingly? Decorously? With consideration? Ye know well he also partook of wine; for even he also was a man; and he blessed the wine, saying, 'Take, drink, this is my blood' . . . and that it was wine which he blessed, he shows again, saying to his disciples, 'I will not drink of the fruit of this vine until I drink it with you in the kingdom of my Father.'" Really is this longer an open question?

II. In the words of a friend, "The *grand* consideration which annihilates the entire grape-juice claim is this: that in all the ancient writings, including the Bible, while drunkenness is constantly spoken of, and temperance and intemperance, abstinence and moderation and excess, constantly treated of, in all the ages, it is *never once* intimated—'You can escape all these evils if you will use the RIGHT KIND of wine!'" This is *the* argument which is unanswerable. Plato, in all his writing about Socrates (Symposium and the Laws), and in all his discussion of drunkenness and of Lacedæmonian strictness, never intimates that Socrates or any other wise man ever had a wine which would not cause drunkenness! Seneca never intimates it. Athenæus, in all his amusing book, although he treats of the praises of temperance, and speaks of particular men who were abstemious, never hints one word of an unintoxicating wine.

"And when you come to Clement of Alexandria, and Chrysostom, in all their earnest cautions against excess and intemperance they never have a word to say about a wine which Christians could drink without danger!!! Now all this is unaccountable on the supposition that there was a widely-used and well-known wine which conscientious men were

using as their kind of wine, which had no fermentation and no tendency to intoxication.”

We heartily approve of total abstinence in present circumstances on the ground of expediency, and are ready on this ground, and no other, to do what we may by precept, example and persuasion, to promote it, as a means of withstanding intemperance. We are in favor of stringent legislation in restraint and prohibition of whatever trade in intoxicating liquors seduces men to intemperance, to such extent as public opinion will allow to be put into execution. And we are in cordial sympathy with those deliverances of our Assemblies which take such ground. Of course we cannot favor those which are of a contrary sort.

But we feel unalterably bound to resist the propagation of the following principles, and especially the attempt to embody them in Church deliverances or Church action.

1. That any and all making or use as a beverage of any liquor that taken in excess can intoxicate, is a sin either in the light of Scripture or of enlightened conscience.

2. That abstinence from all making, vending, or using such drinks, in whatever circumstances, may rightly be made a term of Church communion or privileges.

3. That temperate drinking is as bad as, or worse, than drunkenness.

4. That the wine whose temperate use is not forbidden by the Word of God is not fermented or intoxicating: that the Bible sets forth two beverages, both indiscriminately named wine, one being, while the other was not, fermented and intoxicating; and that it condemns all use of the former, and permits only the latter, even in moderation.

5. That unless this be admitted there is no valid ground for advocating total abstinence, and that the whole cause of Temperance, as implicated with such abstinence, stands or falls with this dogma.

We quite agree with Dr. Johnson, that those who think the questions here involved are light and trifling, only exhibit a superficial “flippancy.” No questions, whether practical or theoretical, are of profounder moment, or can awaken intenser earnestness on the part of those who comprehend their reach.

In the first place, it seems to us the height of fatuity to risk the Temperance cause on such a basis. We do not think, for reasons given in this and previous articles, the notion of two kinds of wine in Scripture, one intoxicating and the other not, the latter alone being tolerated in any use of it as a beverage, or made and drunk by Christ, or used by him at his Supper, sustained by any colorable show of evidence. We do not think such an exegesis would ever have been devised, except to meet the supposed exigencies of the cause of Temperance. It does not seem possible to us that it should ever carry more than the smallest fragment of the Christian Church. When such radical progressives as Henry Ward Beecher publicly pronounce against the doctrine that the wine made by our Lord was not fermented;* when the American Tract Society, representing the various evangelical denominations, is publishing books prepared by eminent scholars, which declare that the wine of Scripture was "the fermented juice of the grape, was a common article of manufacture and use among the Ancient Hebrews, as is attested by numerous passages of Scripture," that the "juice of the grape boiled down to a thick molasses" and sometimes called "honey of grapes," was in use in ancient times, as it is now throughout the East, but it is never called wine;† how can a good cause be successfully prosecuted, by making the opposite view its cornerstone, and denouncing as obstacles or foes to temperance those who cannot adopt this platform?

Again, we believe that the doctrine that wine-making or drinking as a beverage is in all cases an immorality or a sin, does directly and by necessary consequence reflect upon and impeach the morality of the Scriptures and of Christ. This is fatal to faith, temperance, all morals, everything. To say that this comes of our exegesis, not Dr. J.'s, impresses us as much as if one should, *mutatis mutandis*, say of the destructive effect of a denial of the Incarnation, "this comes of your exegesis, not mine."

Still further, while all intoxication and intemperance should

* See his *Life of Christ* on the Miracle at Cana.

† *Sacred Geographies and Antiquities*, by E. P. Barrows, late Exegetical Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Published by the American Tract Society.

exclude, we do not believe that the attempt to exclude from Church privileges all who in any way or degree make or drink anything which, taken in excess, can intoxicate, can be made without usurping Christ's prerogative, excluding those he has received, and splitting the Church in fragments.

Finally, we are utterly opposed to the principles in question because we think, for reasons already set forth, they contain the elements of a destructive rationalism, which, if successfully carried out here, will sooner or later be pushed much further, until it is brought to undermine the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Shall we be deterred from maintaining this truth because the reproach is hurled at us, "of putting up Biblical buttresses and building Biblical bulwarks to support and defend a custom whose chief patrons make their haunts roar with responding applause?" Not till we shrink from bearing the reproach of Christ—not till we are afraid to proclaim salvation by grace, because some will "continue in sin that grace may abound;" "the liberty wherewith Christ maketh free," because some make it "an occasion to flesh;" to oppose the doctrine once advanced by the ultra-ists of a metaphysical theology, that the true convert "must be willing to be damned for the glory of God," because in that case, too, such "haunts roar with responding applause."

ART. VI.—PARIS UNDER THE COMMUNE.*
THE EIGHTEENTH OF MARCH.

By EDMOND DE PRESSENSÉ, PARIS.

The insurrection of the eighteenth of March is full of cruel but salutary lessons, which should not be forgotten. It has torn away the last disguises from the actual condition of French society. As a malady reveals the hidden disease of a constitution, so a crisis brings to the surface a deep-seated evil, which was waiting only for an opportunity to break out. To any one who has closely kept pace with our moral history for the last twenty years, and has taken note of the passions brooding among the masses of the people, there is nothing as-

Translated and abridged from the *Revue des deux Mondes*, by C. W. Woolsey, A. M.