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ART. I.—*History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe.* By the Rev. W. E. H. LECKEY, M. A. In two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866.

*History of Rationalism; embracing a Survey of the Present State of Protestant Theology.* By the Rev. JOHN F. HURST, A. M. With Appendix of Literature. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

*Essays on the Supernatural in Christianity, with Special Reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School.* By Rev. GEORGE P. FISHER, M. A., Professor of Church History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

*The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost; or, Reason and Revelation.* By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866.

THE simultaneous appearance of these and other important works, for and against Rationalism, from such various quarters—sceptical, Papal, and orthodox evangelical—only proves how profoundly the mind of all parties in Christendom is agitated on the subject. These several parties, of course, take very different views in regard to it. The sceptics laud Rationalism

as the chief instrument of human progress, enlightenment, and civilization, the great emancipator of the race from superstition, bigotry, persecution—all forms of religious barbarism and reptile delusion. Such is the scope of Mr. Leckey's very able but one-sided work, which, under another title, breathes very much the spirit of Buckle's *History of Civilization*. On the other hand, the evangelical and orthodox deem Rationalism, just in proportion to the degree and continuance of it, destructive of Christianity and all the beneficent fruits which it has showered upon our race, and which go so far to prove the divinity of its origin. Such is the drift of Hurst's *History of Rationalism*, a work of great value, notwithstanding some unworthy thrusts at Calvinism; while Professor Fisher rather fortifies the great defences of supernaturalism, and makes the blows of its assailants to recoil upon themselves. Archbishop Manning, on the other hand, agrees with evangelical Protestants in denouncing Rationalism as the deadly foe of religion. But he differs from them in maintaining that the Romish hierarchy or church is the only barrier and defence against it; and that rationalists are not only they who infringe upon the normal and paramount authority of the word of God, but those who question the infallibility of the Romish church, and of the Pope, its head. It is difficult then to exaggerate the importance of Rationalism, and of correct apprehensions of its real character, tendency, and influence.

What then is Rationalism? One answer to this question is, that it is the illegitimate exaltation of human reason in those matters of religion which are the subject of Divine revelation. This, though intrinsically a true, is nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, but a partial and relative definition of it. That which, in the view of some, is an illegitimate, in the view of others, is a legitimate use of reason in the premises. The orthodox and evangelical denounce, as subversive of the due authority of the word of God, what latitudinarians and liberals assert to be only the righteous prerogative of reason, and our only shield against bigotry and superstition. To define Rationalism, then, as the illegitimate elevation of reason in religion determines nothing, except for those who adopt the lawful standard in regard to its use. All parties claim that

they favour the right use of reason in matters of revelation. But they differ as to what constitutes such use of it.

There is, however, one view or definition of Rationalism in which all parties pretty nearly coincide. According to this, Rationalism is that mode or system of thinking in religion which makes human reason the supreme standard or authority therein. It admits of nothing on the authority of revelation which does not receive the sanction or endorsement of human reason, not merely on the ground of being revealed, but as judged by the standards of this faculty, in its natural state. This definition is accepted and given by rationalists themselves. So Wegscheider, in his *Institutiones Dogmaticæ*, as quoted by Hurst, says that Rationalism teaches "that the subject matter of every supposed supernatural revelation is to be examined according to the ideas regarding religion and morality, which we have formed in the mind by the help of reason. . . . Whosoever, therefore, despising that supremacy of human reason, maintains that the authority of a revelation, said to have been communicated to certain men in a supernatural manner, is such that it must be obeyed by all means, without any doubt, that man takes away and overturns from the foundation the true nature and dignity of man," &c., &c. Staudlin, as quoted by the same author, describes Rationalism as the opinion "that reason has the highest authority and right of decision in matters of faith and morality, so that an edifice of faith and morals built on this foundation shall be called Rationalism." Leckey says of Rationalism: "Its central conception is the elevation of conscience into the supreme authority as the religious organ. . . . It revolves around the ideal of Christianity, and represents its spirit without its dogmatic system and its supernatural narratives. From both of these it unhesitatingly recoils, while deriving all its strength and nourishment from Christian ethics." Vol. i., pp. 181—4.

If this is the account given of Rationalism by its friends, others will scarcely question its accuracy, so far as it goes. The ascription of such prerogatives to human reason, in regard to the authority and content of revelation, is surely Rationalism, whatever may be true of less than this. Professor Hahn says: "As to Rationalism, this word was used in the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries by those who considered reason as the source and norm of faith." Bretschneider says the rationalists "allow that revelation *may* contain much out of the power of reason to explain, but say that it should assert nothing contrary to reason, but rather what may be proved by it. . . . They only mean the accepting those doctrines which they like, and which seem to them reasonable. . . . In practice they reject the positive doctrines of Christianity, (I mean especially the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, the Mediation and Intercession of our Lord, Original Sin, and Justification by Faith,) because they allege that these doctrines are contrary to reason."

The sum of all these definitions or representations of Rationalism is that, in some form or degree, it makes reason the supreme authority in religion, and paramount to the word of God, when the two come into conflict. Of this there are various degrees, ranging from the absolute renunciation of the word of God, and even the possibility of a supernatural revelation, to the rationalistic explaining away from one or more Christian doctrines those elements which, however scriptural, are unwelcome to the feelings, or inexplicable to the reason of the unbeliever. But perhaps rationalists may be reduced to three radical classes.

1. Those who deny either that it is possible, or that it is reasonable, for God so far to interfere with and counterwork the uniform laws of nature, as to make a supernatural revelation, or to attest it infallibly by miracles. Of course, such rationalists are simply infidels. They may hold to a something, mis-called inspiration. But it is only the inspiration of genius, of Homer, Plato, Bacon, Kant, and other great masters of our race. It imparts no infallible certainty or authority.

2. The second grade of Rationalism is that which admits a revelation in the Bible authenticated by miracles, but so mixed with human additions, and modified by the moulds of human expression through which it comes to us, that it is left to human reason to determine what portions of it are the word of God, and how far they are so, and how far they are human. This really makes reason the supreme judge and arbiter in religion. For it will only admit that to be from God which

accords with the judgments of reason. In this class fall Socinians and Unitarians, *et id genus omne*.

A third class admit the Scriptures to be the word of God, and the supreme and sufficient rule of faith and practice. But they qualify this recognition with various rationalistic conditions or explanations. Many say that the Bible is inspired as to its thoughts, but not as to its words, which opens the door to endless license in rejecting or explaining away whatever in it is disliked. Many say that nothing can be revealed in it which is above or contrary to the dictates of reason, conscience, or their instinctive feelings. Consequently they explain away whatever seems contrary or inexplicable to their reason, or repugnant to their feelings. This is of every shade, from Socinianism, through Arianism, Sabellianism, Pelagianism, Arminianism, to some forms of metaphysical and rationalizing Calvinism. Some are rationalistic on some points of scriptural doctrine, who are wholly free from such a bias in other matters. Some rationalize the Trinity into Sabellianism or Semi-Arianism, who have no difficulty with the Incarnation, or other high scriptural mysteries. Some twist the Incarnation out of its scriptural proportions, who have no trouble with other points. Others still fall to eviscerating the scriptural and church doctrines of Original Sin, Inability, Regeneration, Atonement, because they cannot construe them in a manner satisfactory to their intellects or sensibilities. Such is Rationalism. It is the exaltation of Reason to supreme authority in matters of Religion, an authority paramount to and overbearing revelation, or forcing the interpretation thereof into conformity to itself, when the two are in collision. This process in regard to any or all the doctrines of revelation, is, as far as it goes, rationalistic. The question arises, how far this is a lawful or normal use of reason in the premises. If it is not, then the first definition of Rationalism, as the illegitimate use of human reason in religion, which we let go for the time, as uncertain, is validated by the second, which is recognized as just by all parties.

What then is the legitimate province of Reason with reference to the contents or averments of the word of God? To

this three generic answers are given, which, of course, are capable of manifold subdivisions.

The first is the rationalistic answer already presented, which gives human reason the prerogative of rejecting whatever declarations of Scripture do not accord with the natural feelings and judgments of the human mind.

The second is the Papal doctrine. According to this not only is Reason not permitted to exalt itself against Scripture, but it is not permitted to ascertain or judge what Scripture teaches. Its only function is to take the interpretations and decisions of the infallible church as to the mind of the Spirit written and unwritten, as these are declared by the Pope or by ecumenical councils. "All appeals to Scripture alone, or to Scripture and antiquity, whether by individuals or by local churches, are no more than appeals from the divine voice of the living church, and therefore essentially rationalistic."\*

The third is the orthodox and evangelical view, which maintains the plenary inspiration, infallible truth, and supreme authority of the sacred Scriptures, while it assigns to reason simply the function of ascertaining and bowing to their teachings. This does not exclude efforts to reconcile these teachings with each other, with knowledge from other sources, and with right reason, and to put them into the most rigid scientific system; always however upon this condition, that the indubitable testimony of Scripture is true, however inexplicable, and whatever else may be false.

This we hold to be the true view—the only one which can logically escape Rationalism and infidelity on the one hand, and Romanism on the other; which, indeed, can make the Bible a real rule of faith or guide of life.

Nevertheless this view, although palpably and undeniably true, is not without difficulties in the details of its application. Questions and problems arise at every point which task our insight, patience, and candour for their solution. These will appear as we go on to point out the particular functions of reason in ascertaining the meaning of the Scriptures.

1. It is obvious that human reason, in order to believe the

\* *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, by Archbishop Manning, p. 44.

truths of Scripture, must be able to discern their import. It is the eye which sees this light from heaven, these beams of the Sun of Righteousness. Without the bodily eye, the light of a thousand suns leaves us still in darkness. Without the eye of the soul, which is reason, it could not see the meaning of a Divine revelation speaking with all the clearness and self-evidence of axioms. But while there is a certain analogy between the outer and the inner eye, as the organs or receptivities respectively for taking in material and spiritual light, it is but partial. A difference soon appears. The eye of the body may open itself from a state of previous darkness upon all that the sun discloses of the material universe. It brings no contribution of light itself in order that it may be able to see the light of the sun and what it unveils. Not so with the eye of the soul as regards the light of revelation. In order to be capable of perceiving the ideas and truths therein set forth, it must itself be furnished with a certain stock of elementary ideas and truths, as the pre-condition thereof. How could the revelation of God's being, infinitude, truth, holiness, justice, goodness, be communicated to one who had no conception of the meaning of these things? How could the charge to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God, be received by one who had no conception of the meaning of these duties? How could the Scriptures so often reason with men, and summon them also to reason on these great matters, if they were void of all light, all ideas and truths of reason? Reason without any insight into such truths is no reason. It is at best but undeveloped, potential reason; not reason actualized. And it is only reason possessing the first ideas and truths of reason that is capable of being amplified and purified by revelation.

2. If a certain light of reason is requisite to receiving the light of revelation, the question arises, how far any revelation or interpretation of revelation can be received which is in conflict with the clear intuitions or evident deductions of reason: and how far we are authorized by forced interpretations to eliminate from Scripture its obvious meaning, if that meaning be opposed to our most confident judgments or earnest feelings. In answer to this it may be said generally, that revelation, while enlarging the sphere and correcting the errors of the

human understanding, incorporates into itself these first axioms of reason; or, in another view, engrafts its own teachings upon the truths thus already known to, and, indeed, themselves being constituent elements of, human reason. Revelation does not repudiate these, it does but enlarge, clarify, and perfect our understanding of them.

This is only saying that it does not destroy, it rather illuminates and perfects reason.

But, in thus instructing reason, two requisites are needed in reason itself, in order to be capable of such instruction. 1. That, as has been shown, it be capable of apprehending the matter taught, and 2, that it be capable of receiving or submitting to this teaching, in other words, that it be teachable. And in order to be teachable, it must recognize its own inferiority and insufficiency on all matters on which it is to be instructed by revelation. But how can this be, if reason sets itself up as judge of what alone is possible to be true, and therefore alone possible to be revealed even by infallible authority and omniscient wisdom. Plainly, so far as reason is invested with such prerogatives, revelation is irrelevant, solecistical and impossible. But how far is it so? In answer we say,

3. The only limits to the possibility or possible scope of a revelation from heaven, is that it cannot contradict known truths which have an incontestable certainty, whether from revelation itself, or the self-evident intuitions and axioms of reason, or the indubitable testimony of the senses. This is only saying that truth cannot contradict truth: that it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time; that God cannot teach, and we cannot believe that the same thing is and is not at the same moment. Such is the principle, about which, fairly understood, there can be no difference of opinion. This is the *judicium contradictionis*, which the most orthodox divines have recognized as being the necessary prerogative of reason in determining the possible contents of revelation. And this is the only prerogative which they do concede to it. While there can be no difference of opinion as to this principle in itself considered, there is the widest diversity as regards its application. And this difference runs through the whole range

of opinion from the most reverent faith to the most destructive rationalism. A just application of the principle is safe and salutary. A false application of it is ruinous to the full extent to which it is carried. The false and destructive rationalistic application of this principle lies in finding contradictions where there are only mysteries, and in treating what are merely apparent contradictions as if they were real. This will be seen as we proceed to examine the several classes of cases involved.

But first a word as to the distinction between a contradiction and a mystery, which Rationalism is always endeavouring to confound; *i. e.*, by straining mysteries into contradictions.

Now we have seen what a contradiction is. It is at once affirming and denying the same predicate of the same subject. Its formula is, A is B, A is not B; or more grossly, A is, A is not.

A mystery, on the other hand, is what we can in some sense apprehend, but cannot comprehend. We may know that it is, but not how or why it is. But what is meant by this? Why, simply that we cannot explain its points of contact and modes of agreement with other related truths. Such is the Trinity, the Incarnation, the origin of evil, the omnipresence of God, the principle of life and growth. But this is wholly different from contradiction which asserts directly and immediately that what is, is not. That children cannot see why an iron anchor should sink, and an iron ship should swim, why a feather should rise and stone fall; why one picture seen through glass should display only one surface, while two seen in a stereoscope display depth as well as surface, is no evidence that they are not so. And in the things of God, what are we but children and less than children? Now one great enormity of Rationalism lies in its constant attempt to turn mysteries into contradictions.

4. Let us look at the application of these principles to the seeming or alleged contradictions of the Scriptures themselves. These are such as that God repents and does not repent, that he does not tempt any man, and yet did tempt Abraham, that he is not willing that any should perish, and yet does will that the rejecters of Christ shall go away into everlasting punish-

ment; that there is but one God, and yet there is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, each of whom is God; then in the sphere of soterology, that men are justified by faith alone, and that they are not justified by faith without works; that when they are weak they are strong; sorrowful yet always rejoicing. This catalogue of contradictions in sound but not in sense found in Scripture, might be indefinitely extended, but it is quite unnecessary. These amply suffice to illustrate our meaning.

Now many have made these and like seeming contradictions a ground of impeaching the inspiration and infallible authority of the Scriptures. They have said, writings so full of contradictions if not of other palpable errors, could not be from God. They must be myths or deliberate impostures. But we need not detain our readers to explain how all these several contradictions in sound are not contradictions in sense.

A much larger class make this false application of the principle of contradiction to particular doctrines in detail, without bringing it to bear against the Bible as a whole. Socinians bring these alleged contradictions of Scripture with itself, or with truths otherwise known, to batter down nearly every distinctive doctrine of the Christian system. Thus they say that God cannot be three and one, because it is a contradiction, to which, of course, the familiar answer is that the Godhead is one as to substance, three as to persons—a trinity or tri-unity which involves no contradiction, however inexplicable the mystery. So of the Incarnation. It is said to be a contradiction that the same person should be both God and man; some hence arguing away his humanity, others his divinity, others still maintaining a hybrid theanthropic *tertium quid* neither human nor divine—all alike corrupting the great mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh, which, however inexplicable, is clearly set forth in Scripture, and is no contradiction, viz., that Christ is both God and man, two natures in one person forever.

So of faith and works; not merely Socinians, but, to some extent, Arminians, Romanists, and ritualists generally, say that what James says of the insufficiency of faith without works, and what the Scriptures uniformly teach of the absolute

necessity of good works and holy living to salvation, contradict the doctrine of exclusive justification by faith in the alone merits of Christ. Whereas, the meaning of Scripture nowhere teaches otherwise than that genuine faith in Christ alone justifies; it only teaches that if faith alone justifies, it is not such faith as is alone, or that a faith without works is dead, no real faith. Other doctrines, such as regeneration, atonement, original sin, are subjected to similar attacks, but we reserve the consideration of them, because they are more strenuously assailed from the side of alleged contradiction to the self-evident truths of reason. It is only necessary to say to all who admit the Divine inspiration and authority of the Scriptures, that all the alleged contradictions and discrepancies between different portions of the sacred volume disappear when they are duly understood, and in such wise, as in no manner to impair, but more fully to establish the complete credibility and authority of the whole and the parts. Its averments do not mutually subvert, but elucidate and confirm each other. And hence it follows,

5. That if there be apparent contradictions in Scripture which are not real, and which, however plausibly urged against catholic Christianity, are found to be wholly unsubstantial, then the same is quite as likely to be true of apparent contradictions between Scripture or scriptural doctrines and the most evident testimonies of sense or reason; in short of all our natural faculties intuitive and deductive. What witness against any truths of revelation can be stronger than revelation itself? Yet we have found that such contradictions in word and sound exist in Scripture, which, when properly understood, are no real contradictions. Is not this then much more likely to prove true of any apparent contradiction between the clear, obvious, manifoldly repeated teachings of Scripture on any subject, and some obvious fact or maxim known through our natural intelligence? And if so, ought we not to be slow to conclude that the apparent contradiction is real, believing that in some way and time it must and will be so explained as to disappear; at all events, that there is a solution of the apparent contradiction which, though undiscoverable by us, is clear to the Omniscient mind? A strong example is furnished in the command to

Abraham to slay his son Isaac. Will our moral nature, either in its judgments or feelings, sanction the propriety and rectitude of that command, otherwise than as faith overrules their spontaneous impulses, and asserts that whatever God does is right, whether we can reconcile it with our standards and ideas of right or not? Yet will it do, will any one dare to expunge or contradict this part of the sacred history, because we know not how to explain it into harmony with our moral intuitions? It is true, and it is right, even if we cannot see *how* it is so by our reason, but only *that* it is so by our faith.

It is indeed true that a book which on the whole enjoins immoralities and fosters wickedness cannot be from God who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity; and the obvious scope of the revelations and requirements of the Bible is to promote that holiness which is one evidence of its divine origin. But this is perfectly consistent with the fact that we may not be able at once, or even in this life, to see all the ways of contact and conciliation between all points of that revealed truth which sanctifies, and other truths natural and revealed, moral and physical. The presumption, nay the certainty, that such revealed truth can be reconciled with all other truth, even if we do not know how, is strong enough to forbid its rejection. If we cannot reconcile the conflict with other truths, it may be that others can; it is certain that God can. To admit that men are at liberty to reject what scriptural doctrines they see not how to reconcile with other known truths, under the plea that they involve contradictions, would be most fatal to all faith. It would legitimate the most destructive scepticism and rationalism. This may easily be made apparent.

Thus, if we take the simple elementary doctrines of God's decrees and man's free-agency, they are both true and self-consistent, though multitudes have been unable to construe to themselves the way or even possibility of their agreement. Every man knows that he is free. And yet it is clearly taught that all his actions and all events are foreordained. Some see how such antecedent certainty no way conflicts with the freedom of action. But suppose any cannot see it. Are they therefore at liberty to reject, as so many Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians have done, the decrees of God in order to spare

man's free-agency, or, with fatalists and hyper-calvinists, to destroy free-agency in order to preserve decrees?

Then comes Original Sin. There is no possible aspect in which this can be viewed in which it does not involve mystery, or something difficult of reconciliation with some known truths; in this respect sharing the difficulties of the origin of evil, at once the most undeniable and inexplicable of all facts. But will it do for men to take the liberty of denying that the race fell in the fall of Adam, and in judgment for his sin while standing on probation for them? If many find it hard to see the equity of this scriptural account of our fallen state, do not manifold greater difficulties burden every other theory? So of native pollution and guilt; they have their difficulties. But are not the pangs and death suffered by our race from the first, unspeakably greater difficulties on the supposition of their freedom from sin? And how are they salvable in Christ, if they are not sinful and lost?

Again, there is the doctrine of Atonement, or of the expiation of sin through the sufferings and death of Christ in the sinner's room and stead. How many insist that this is contradictory to that primitive moral axiom that it cannot be right that the innocent should suffer the punishment of the guilty. Now we know the singular and unapproachable combination of circumstances that take this unique case beyond the reach of this axiom, such as the infinite worth, high prerogative, and sovereign consent of the adorable Sufferer. But suppose we did not see this, or were unable to comprehend its force, are we therefore at liberty to presume there is no solution of the difficulty, even in the Omniscient mind, and to follow the Socinians and Humanitarians in discarding this fundamental doctrine of Christianity, so manifoldly taught in the Bible as the only foundation of the sinner's hope, and of the religion of the Bible itself? Or are we at liberty, like some who stop short of this extreme, and retain the idea of some indirect and constructive substitution of Christ suffering for the merited punishment of the redeemed sinner, to say that these sufferings were not penal in lieu of our punishment, when the Scripture so manifoldly represents him as bearing our sins, the chastisement of our peace, and becoming sin, a curse, and a sacrifice for us?

Especially, if a closer, and deeper examination will prove that the obvious meaning of Scripture is in truer accord with the profoundest intuitions and feelings of the human soul, when oppressed with a sense of sin, than any scheme of atonement which requires a more forced and non-natural exposition of the Scriptures?

Now let us pass to another great doctrine—Inability—viz., the doctrine so explicitly and variously taught in Scripture, asserted in the creeds and devotional literature of Christendom, affirmed by all Christians on their knees before God, that without Divine grace we are unable to keep the law, obey the gospel, and lead holy lives. It is said that this contradicts the intuitive maxim, that obligation cannot exceed our power; or that we cannot be obliged or rightly required to do or be what we have no power to do or be. Because of this apparent inconsistency, are we therefore at liberty to presume there can be no reconciliation between the two, or that we so fully apprehend the true and full meaning of these supposed contradictions, as to know that they must be really such, past all possibility of being harmonized, and that hence we must follow the Arminians, Pelagians, and so many in this country who disown these titles, in denying a real inability, and asserting some form of plenary ability? By no manner of means. Scripture and Christian experience in its favour are quite enough to prove that it must harmonize with all other truths, whether we can see how or not.

But a little closer examination will show us that a true understanding of the maxim that obligation is commensurate with ability, does not conflict with the scriptural doctrine of inability. For this inability is our sin; the strength and dominion of sinful lusts and passions. But surely sin cannot be excusable in proportion to its strength and mastery. Nor is it any part of the import of the axiom in question that we are under no obligation to put away sin, because it has dominion over us. The maxim in question only excuses from outward acts which we are physically powerless to perform, and from those inward acts and states for which we are disabled by other causes than our sin. The alleged contradiction, therefore, is wholly imaginary.

The same is true of a like plea for rejecting inability, on the ground of its apparent conflict with the popular axiom, that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, a maxim claimed to be at variance not only with inability, but with original sin, and divine regeneration. Hence large classes have in various degrees repudiated or pared down these doctrines. But this maxim properly understood, in its sense as well as its sound, does not contradict any or all of these great doctrines. When it is used by the people it is meant either with reference to outward acts, in which sense it is strictly true in the narrowest sense of the word *will*, as the mere power of volition; or the word *will* and its adjective *voluntary* are taken in the broad sense in which it was formerly used, for all the non-cognitive powers of the mind, together with the exercises and states thereof—*i. e.*, as embracing desires, feelings, and dispositions with regard to moral objects. In this sense also it is strictly true. In one or the other of the above senses is the maxim used when asserted as an axiom; and in neither of them does it conflict with the great doctrines which it is claimed to contradict.

Now suppose we admit the principle that we are at liberty to reject every doctrine fully set forth in Scripture because of some show of antagonism between it and what we count as self-evident principles, how readily will every cardinal doctrine of Christianity be swept away, not because of any real contradiction, but because of a seeming conflict arising from crude and undefined conceptions of them or either of them? The examples already adduced show how few landmarks of the Christian faith could stand before such hermeneutics.

One source of difficulty in this matter is the great doubt or uncertainty as to what are and what are not self-evident principles, and, when this is determined, what is a proper statement or exact expression of them. Plain as it might seem that self-evident principles are self-evidencing, and therefore past all dispute, it is no less certain that they have been the subjects of constant controversy among metaphysicians. Locke's assault on innate ideas was but an attempt to disprove the existence of supersensual intuitive truths, such as the first axioms in morals and metaphysics. Dr. Thomas Brown cau-

tions us against a tendency to the undue multiplication of first truths, beyond the very fewest which alone are such, observing that disputants are tempted to this, both from their indolence which inclines to the easy resort of self-affirmation when the labour of proof is needed, and from that partizan zeal which is inclined to exalt the dogmas of their own clique or clan to the dignity and authority of axioms and first truths: a propensity noticed by an old father, who tells us, *Unaquæque gens illud legem naturæ putat quod didicit.*

Hence the most eminent metaphysicians have come to devote great attention to elaborating the tests and criteria of intuitive truths. Hamilton gave some of his best efforts to this work. McCosh has recently published a volume on the "Intuitions of the Human Mind," of which valuable discussion on this subject constitutes a leading part. We cannot here go into this subject at any length. We will only state three criteria of intuitive truths which they have reached, viz., self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity, or universal acceptance; to which Hamilton adds simplicity or incomprehensibility, *i. e.*, the impossibility of being resolved into, or comprehended under aught that is more simple or ultimate. To develop this matter at large would require an independent article, indeed, many of them. Men are very apt to think that self-evident which is only very evident and dear to themselves. It is so evident to Unitarians and other latitudinarians, that they think and pronounce it self-evident, that for God to inflict on his sinless Son the sufferings due to penitent sinners, is the climax of absurdity. But quite the contrary is evident to the Christian world, who joyfully accept this glorious truth, in the belief of which

"The saints of all ages in harmony meet."

But not only does it require careful inquiry to determine what are these first truths and axioms, but also to fix the proper statement of them. It is generally, and justly, accepted as a first or self-evident truth that every event must have a cause. But a common and inadvertent mode of stating this truth was, that every *thing* (or being) must have a cause—a very different proposition, and leading to far different consequences. If every thing or being must have a cause, then God

must have a cause, or be created, which is Atheism. Like examples of the misapprehension, or misstatement, or misapplication of intuitive principles we have already seen, in reference to the equation of ability and responsibility, the punishment of the innocent instead of the guilty, the impossibility of three being one, etc.

While therefore the *judicium contradictionis* is a sound principle rightly applied, yet the perversion or misapplication of it runs into the most destructive Rationalism—1. even with respect to seeming contradictions between different portions of the language of Scripture; and 2. between these and the self-evident truths of reason which shine in their own light. And if this be so in these cases, much more must it be so in reference to any supposed contradiction between the obvious and didactic meaning of Scripture, and the conclusions reached by a course of reasoning physical or metaphysical, in which we are notoriously liable to err. It is far safer to presume there is some undetected flaw in our reasoning, than in the obvious meaning of the word of God, as shown in its literal and figurative statements, its implications, and the whole analogy of faith. Rationalism appears when mysteries are rejected either simply because they are mysteries, or because they are treated as contradictions when they are only inexplicable.

If all this be true of the points of contact between the obvious and repeated testimonies of Scripture, and whatever may seem in conflict with them, whether on its own pages, in the self-evident intuitions or the logical deductions of reason, in short, in the entire realms of theology, metaphysics, and psychology, what are we to say of similar apparent contradictions between the obvious meaning of scriptures and facts known, or conceived to be known, in regard to the material world, immediately by the senses, or mediately through the investigations, experiments, the inductive generalizations, and deductive reasonings of physical science?

The relations of physical science and religion are not without their share of perplexity. Many crude generalities have currency, which, if true in some sense, are not true in every sense, and for all purposes for which they are employed. It is truly said that the Bible does not aim or claim to teach physical

science. It is equally true that it teaches the facts out of which the science of theology is constructed, but does not in the strictest sense give the science, or scientific form of those facts. That is, it does not give the science in addition to the facts of theology. And it is further true that it does not teach falsehoods, whether in physics or metaphysics, whether in a scientific or unscientific form. Any facts taught by the infallible authority of God are facts, whether physical or psychological, whether they relate to stopping the sun in its course, walking on the sea, rending the rocks, raising the dead, or regenerating the soul. And these facts should be allowed and estimated at their real value by all truly scientific minds, as well as other facts discerned by our natural faculties.

It is often urged that the sacred writers speak of the sun's rising, as if herein they taught what science has disproved. But what is taught by this language? Just what is taught now by it, that the position of the sun relatively to the earth becomes elevated, but not which of the two bodies actually moves away from the other. No language is used in regard to the sun's rising in Scripture which is not just as freely used now, in full view of the sun being fixed, and the earth being in motion. In short, no language is used which is not, in its real significance, congruous with the ascertained facts of science. When we say that the shore recedes as the vessel we are in moves away from it, every one understands this merely as asserting that the distance between us and the shore increases, but not that the shore literally moves. The same principle applies to the sun's rising.

Now let us consider how some other alleged indisputable facts in the physical sphere are cited as contradictions of scriptural declarations or cardinal Christian doctrines. It has been said that the resurrection of the body which dies is impossible, because some of the materials of which it is composed go to form different human bodies as they are at death. Battle-fields are fertilized with human bodies, which thus form plants to become the food of other bodies. How then can the same bodies be raised again? This would be in point, if the identity of our own bodies now consisted in absolute continued sameness of all their particles. But it does not. They are

undergoing constant change of these, and change them entirely in seven years, without losing their identity.

Some scientists claim that the evidence of our race being composed of distinct species, is too strong to consist with the truth of the scriptural account of the descent of mankind from a single pair,—a fact which runs through the whole scriptural system of anthropology and soterology. Are we, therefore, to surrender the great doctrines of the unity of our race, its fall in the fall of the first Adam, and redemption by the second Adam? Is it possible that Agassiz, or any one else, can find any proofs about the origin of species subversive of this great truth? In point of fact, the most rigorous analysis of the criteria of species goes to indicate that our race constitute one species. But suppose it were otherwise,—that many things are as we should expect them to be, if mankind were several species. What then? Can they be decisive enough to overthrow the word of God? or to require its plain averments and implications to be frittered away?

We may pass all reference to the cosmogony of Genesis, and the discoveries of geology. It is enough that, conceding the utmost in regard to its facts, the Bible gives but a single detailed narrative on the genesis of the worlds, and that at most it only requires that day and night should have a breadth of signification which they often bear in Scripture and common speech, to effect a perfect conciliation between science and Scripture on this subject. But seriously, will it be pretended that evidence decisive enough has been obtained against any clear, repeated, manifoldly stated, and implied testimonies of Scripture, to require wrenching and violence of interpretation?

The whole department of miracles is within the domain of physics. That is to say, it has to do with the production of phenomena cognizable by the senses, and dependent on such cognition for their efficacy; and they are not in apparent harmony with the laws of nature, discovered by physical science. They involve the direct suspension, or interruption, or counteraction of those laws—*i. e.*, by whatever name we may choose to call it, such an intervention of special supernatural power as prevents their ordinary normal effects. Now it is the fashion of sceptical scientists, and scientific sceptics, to

assume the impossibility of any interruption of the laws of nature or of their uniform working. Many of them assume the a-priori impossibility of such supernatural interposition. Others assume that the uniformity of the laws of nature, past all possibility of interruption, in itself or its manifestations, by any special divine interposition, has been proved by the simple fact that we now find them to be invariable. This is one cardinal principle of Positivism, and of all who imbibe its spirit. It of course rules out all miracle, revelation, supernatural grace, to say nothing of special providence. It is therefore the doctrine of Atheists. But it is the doctrine of many who would resent the charge of Atheism, nay, of many who claim to be Christians. Whole treatises, most extended and elaborate, are now given to the public by such writers as Baden Powell, Leckey, and Draper; the key-note of which is, that society advances in proportion as it gets rid of belief in the supernatural. Says Draper, "is not momentary intervention altogether derogatory to the thorough and absolute sovereignty of God." "The process of attaining correct views of nature has been marked by a continual decline of the mysterious and supernatural." This is the whole drift of Leckey's book on Rationalism. These writers lump together the Christian miracles, supernatural grace, demonology, witchcraft, the lying wonders of impostors, praying for propitious weather and for health, in one category of preposterous delusion, which the growing knowledge of the invariability of nature's laws will dissipate.

Now here these sceptical scientists claim to have discovered a fact or law which is utterly contradictory to Christianity and all supernatural religion. What then? And are we to concede it? By no manner of means. The answer to it all is the existence of a Personal God, who can make and unmake; who can do his whole pleasure in establishing, continuing, or arresting any mode or law of nature's working, if adequate reasons therefor exist. To authenticate his own revelation, and redeem sinners, is a sufficient reason for such special interposition. It is only the lowest deep of stolid scepticism that is unable to see the resplendent proofs of a Personal God; of his power to interpose for the control and disposal of his own universe at his pleasure; of the fitness of such intervention for the salvation

of the lost; of his actual interposition as evinced in the self-evident divinity of his own word, and the incarnation and sacrifice of his own Son therein recorded. We confess that there is no class of writers and thinkers of whom we can think with less respect or even patience. We have just about as much respect for their claims to superior insight, because they are blind to the evidence and even possibility of a personal reigning God, of miracles, revelation, and redemption, as we should have for the pretence of a bat to see better than other animals because it cannot see daylight. The slave in the hut, with one glimpse of Christ, knows more and better than all this shallow and one-sided dogmatism. The least of Christ's little ones has an unspeakably greater breadth and depth of insight than is dreamt of in such philosophy.

What conclusions then do we reach respecting the oppositions of science, whether truly or falsely so called, to religion? That science is to be fettered in its search after truth, or that its indubitably established facts are not to be recognized by Christian believers, or that the word of Divine truth can contradict any truth certainly ascertained by sense, reason, science or philosophy? Not at all. Let science be untrammelled in its investigations, and go wherever evidence leads it. But then let it be candid enough to look at all the evidence, from every source, and weigh it impartially. Let it not shut out valid testimony by a-priori assertions of its incredibility. Let it take the evidence of testimony, as well as the senses. Suppose that some geologic inductions require that the Danube or the Nile, at their mouths, should have trended in one direction three thousand years ago, and reliable historical testimony and monuments prove that they trended in another; is this latter source of knowledge to be ignored or contemned? Suppose that any physicist judges from an examination of the fauna and flora of different zones, that our race sprung from different pairs and is made up of different species, is the evidence of its original unity derived from ethnology, comparative philology, and scriptural history, to be discarded? They are to be free to learn all about the sciences which their senses, aided by observation, experiment, and inductive reasoning, can tell them. They are bound equally to see that the Bible is the word of God, to

believe its testimonies, to weigh well their bearing on these subjects, and give them their due significance. And if two interpretations of some ascertained phenomena are possible, one consistent, the other inconsistent with the obvious meaning of the sacred word, they are bound a thousand times over to give the preference to the former. And they are bound to wait long and ponder well, and be sure of their facts, before they come to the conclusion to wrest Scripture from its natural meaning to a forced construction in accommodation to their views, lest they wrest it to their own destruction. Numerous scientists now tell us there is evidence not merely of the invariability of nature's laws, of the correlation of forces, and the conversion of matter from one form into another, but that matter is alike incapable of destruction or creation, and that all interruption of natural laws, all miracles and supernatural agencies, are impossible. Now this is in blank contradiction to the Scriptures, and even to the possibility of revelation. Are these scientists at liberty to fix their opinions on such subjects, ignoring the evidences of the divinity and infallibility of the Scriptures, and the proof these afford of the creation and destructibility of matter, and of supernatural intervention in the work of grace and salvation? Is not this like shutting our eyes to the sun, in order to clarify our vision and brighten our light? Like boasting of deeper and broader insight because we look at subjects with one eye, and that in the back of the head?

And now what constitutes a truly reliable and judicial habit of mind on these issues between, we do not say science, but some scientists, and the teachings of Scripture, the tenets of the Christian faith? Is it a state which ignores, or is blind, or indifferent to revelation, its evidences, averments, and cardinal truths? This cannot be. We might as well say it is requisite to a judicial condition of mind in metaphysics to ignore the primary intuitions of sense or reason, or in a disputed question of law to set aside or be indifferent to the first principles of jurisprudence. Such an attempt is absurd, irrational, impracticable. It is like putting out our eyes in order to see, discarding the first elements of reason in order to be rational, the most reliable sources of proof in order to an impartial judgment.

Neither are we to ignore any facts clearly proved by the testimony of our senses, of other reliable witnesses, of authentic history, or of clear deduction therefrom. These we are to weigh well in connection with all the assertions of Scripture. But we are not to conclude, in case of any apparent disagreement, that the inspired witnesses are of course mistaken, or probably so. We are to revise our evidence from natural sources, and see that there is no mistake, or reasonable possibility of mistake, either in the testimony so given, or our estimates of, and deductions from it. If finally it appears that somewhat is incontrovertibly established contrary to a more obvious and accepted interpretation of any portion of Scripture, then let this interpretation be revised, with all other evidence on the subject, and an adjustment or reconciliation sought consistent with all the evidence; but let it be propounded as only problematic and tentative, until due evidence fully confirms it. There is a true and a false prejudice on these and other subjects. We cannot, being Christians, scientists, or even rational beings, come to the fair investigation and adjudication of any subjects without such prejudgments, or prejudices, as are involved in our most intimate and well-founded beliefs or convictions as Christians, scientists, or rational beings. These may be of greater or less strength, according to the evidence on which they are founded; and may yield with greater or less difficulty according to the respective amounts of previous evidence for, and subsequent evidence against them. Such prejudice is involved in true candour and fairness. That prejudice which is without evidence, or against evidence, or which weds the soul to any consistency inconsistent with supreme fealty to truth, is alone to be condemned and abjured.

It is often said that we must meet sceptics, or sceptical scientists, on their own ground. If there is a sense in which this is true, there is certainly a sense in which it is false. If Christians are required to meet sceptics on their own ground, much more are the latter bound to meet Christians on their own ground. Whether and how far we ought to meet sceptics of any class on their own ground, depends entirely on how far that ground is tenable and gives either party a safe foothold

or resting-place. We are to meet them on ground of truth, not of falsehood: we are to abide by this truth and call on them to abide by it, by whatever evidence supported, whether natural or revealed. And whichever party refuses this issue does so at its peril. We will not meet sceptics or others on their own ground, in any sense which requires us to leave the rock and fortress of truth, and go down to be swamped in the ditches and quicksands of falsehood and delusion. When it is demanded of us that we meet any parties on such ground, we most respectfully but decidedly decline, and beg to be excused. If all that is meant by such language is that false science and philosophy ought to be met by true science and philosophy, we grant it. This is consistent with all that we have been maintaining; indeed is what we have been maintaining. But we mean by this simply that so far as scepticism brings false, or misapplies true, philosophy to assail Christian truth, we are called on, as far as practicable, to show the falsity or misapplication of the principle in question, from the scientific or rational stand-point. If the development theory, or the doctrine of the impossibility of supernatural intervention be urged on scientific grounds, let us endeavour to show them false on scientific grounds. But suppose that we fail to convince our sceptical adversary, either because he is too uncandid and bigoted to appreciate the evidence, or refuses to place himself upon any reasonable ground which will afford a premise in argument; or even because as yet it is out of our power to master the reasonings and allegations urged on the scientific side so as to be able to silence our adversaries; are we to confine ourselves to this ground which the sceptic has chosen for himself? are we to surrender to him on his own ground, instead of retaining our high vantage ground of faith in God and his word and its infallible testimonies, knowing that it must be true, and whatever is opposed to it must be false? If clearly shown false now by the light of heaven, we can well afford to wait until it is shown to be such by other light. This light of heaven the sceptic is bound to see and follow. If he refuses to come upon ground where he can see and follow it, if he hates the light, and refuses to come to the light, so much the worse for him. This is his condemnation, that light has come

into the world, and he has loved darkness rather than light. In this aspect we cannot consent to meet upon their own ground those who so darken their souls that for them the light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehendeth it not. Let God be true, but every man a liar.

Let us now briefly consider the function of reason in constructing the science of theology, or in harmonizing the truths of revelation with one another, and with related truths—in other words, the relation of philosophy to theology.

While many crude and inconsiderate views are constantly put forth on this subject, often with an air of incontestable authority, we think the main principles regarding it need only to be stated, to command the assent of Christian believers.

In regard to the matter of theology, so far as derived from revelation, the principle or ground of our acceptance of it must be the word of God, and not reason. We receive it because God affirms it; not because, aside of this testimony, it is evident either to sense or reason, or any mere faculty of natural intelligence. "Faith is the evidence (*ελεγχος*, persuasion) of things not seen." "We walk by faith and not by sight." In regard to the great facts of Christian theology, then, they are made known and proved to us by the word of God, not by any mere unaided natural faculty. Certainly this must be true of the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, of Original Sin, Divine Regeneration, Predestination, the Election and Conservation of the Saints, the Church and Sacraments, Judgment, Heaven, and Hell. The truth in regard to these great themes comes from the word of God, and no way from human reason, which can discover no more than our experienced need of them. So all true believers receive it, "not as the word of man, but (as it is in truth) the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe." 1 Thess. ii. 13. It may indeed happen that the human faculties, rightly used, can see things to be true which are asserted in the Scriptures. It may see the fallen and degraded state of our race, the unity of God, the fitness of retribution. But even these are none the less attested to us by revelation, although not entirely hidden from natural reason. In reality, however, the human intellect, in matters of religion, is so dimmed by sin that, aside of the light

of Scripture, and often even in defiance of that light, these truths are very feebly and inadequately seen. The heathen everywhere turn the plainest truths of God into a lie, and change the glory of the incorruptible God into an image of corruptible man. Even so essential a truth as immortality loses its evidence to the sin-darkened reason, until Jesus Christ brings life and immortality to light. When revelation reaffirms and restores these truths, which, though the natural inheritance of reason, have been squandered and lost through sin, reason is very apt to ignore its obligations to revelation for them, and to boast of its own sufficiency in regard to them. We can only see the extent of our obligations to revelation when we see that great mass of moral and religious truths which are the common property of christendom, and lost to heathendom. In the truest sense, therefore, for fallen man, revelation, not reason, is the source and norm of all these, as well as of the more distinctive Christian mysteries. The primary knowledge of these truths is not due to reason, science, or philosophy, but to revelation. Yet they are given us in Scripture, not in any scientific or systematized form, but only as individual facts. The sanctified human mind, however, by the necessity of its nature, and for most important purposes, is constrained to attempt the scientific arrangement and comprehension of these facts. In other words, it strives, from its very constitution, to discover the harmony of these with each other, and with other known truths. It seeks to reach apprehensions, statements, definitions of these and correlate truths, whereby such harmony will be attained, and all appearances of discrepancy or contradiction removed. Hence result formal statements, definitions, systems of theology, didactic and polemic. To this the human mind, regenerate and unregenerate, tends by its own inherent impulses. This is the strongest evidence that it has a mission from God to undertake this work. It has also an express commission from revelation itself to "compare spiritual things with spiritual," and to prophecy according to the proportion of faith. But comparison is the fundamental element in the process of reasoning and systematizing; and to go according to the proportion or analogy of faith, is to interpret Scripture by Scripture, truth by truth, one part in harmony with another,

and each with all. This process is indispensable, not only to answer the innate craving for logical consistency in the human intellect, but also to the exposition, maintenance, and defence of Christian truth, whether in teaching it to friends or parrying the assaults of adversaries. It is needless to show how a series of truths, concatenated not merely in an orderly arrangement, but in their relations of mutual interdependence, consistency, and unity, can be better taught, and more readily defended, than if left a mass of apparent unresolved antagonisms or contradictions, or of disjointed isolated facts, without any perceived principle of unity.

Not only so—not only does the Christian intellect strive so to discern and set forth the harmony of Christianity with itself and correlate truth, as to furnish no weapon which its adversaries may turn against it. The mind of the church further essays to wrest from its enemies the weapons of their own forging. It seeks to show that the objections urged are invalid—and this even on rational or philosophic grounds. It does not, indeed, found faith on anything short of the testimony of God, nor on its success in refuting the objections of adversaries from the rational or philosophic side. But it strives to show that, simply as rational arguments, they are either false, irrelevant, or inconclusive. To this extent, and in ways which have been already illustrated, the theologian and the Christian apologist meet adversaries on their own ground. And still further, in regard to truths which are alike affirmed by revelation and by reason, it endeavours to convince those who will not hear the former, by rational proofs. Thus to those who deny the sin and ruin of the race asserted in the Scriptures, it will endeavour to prove them by incontestable facts.

Hence in all ages, among all parties in the church, except mystics and heretics, there has been a constant effort to formulate and systematize the doctrines of the Bible in creeds and confessions.

And this is not only a necessary measure of defence against heresy, but also against mysticism, which heretics are so fond of making their shield. Mysticism is a distempered form of religion. It may be the result of good or evil tendencies,

according as it supervenes on what was previously below or above it. If it supervene upon dead formalism, supplanting it by a living, though somewhat distempered piety, it of course represents a salutary, because an upward tendency. If it come in the place of intelligent piety moulded by the doctrines of the Bible, with pretensions to supplant and improve upon that style of religion, it is, of course, morbid and pernicious. It is often made pretext for disparaging orthodoxy and intelligent evangelical piety. By mysticism is meant that idea of Christianity which founds it on feeling, or represents it as a life and not a doctrine, nor formed and bounded by a doctrine. Now it is true that Christian piety is a life, a life which includes feeling, but this life is inspired and guided by the truth as it is in Jesus, the doctrine which is according to godliness; this feeling is such as arises from the knowledge and belief of the everlasting gospel. Otherwise, whatever else it may be, it is not Christian piety. Mere feeling uninformed by Christian truth is not Christian feeling, and in proportion as it lacks the guidance and inspiration of such truth, it degenerates into fanaticism, superstition, or mere fleshly excitement, which soon sinks into absolute stupefaction and irreligion. Mysticism divorces religion from the intellect. But no religion can be genuine or scriptural which thus separates itself from knowledge. Christianity interpenetrates and exalts every part of our nature, especially the intellect or regal faculty, that which was designed to regulate feeling, which, if not thus regulated, must needs degenerate into mere irrational sensibility, irreligious, fanatical, or superstitious. This is eternal life to *know* God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Knowledge and piety can no more be separated than solidity and extension, life and breath.

But no reason is competent for this task which is not a Christian or regenerate reason—a reason purged of the blindness and darkness of sin, which, yielding to the supreme authority of the word of God, surrenders all preconceived opinions and predilections in conflict with it. This is the primary doctrine assumed by reason in all its legitimate efforts to systematize Christian doctrine, construct a science of Christian theology, and reconcile it with all related truths. No

philosophy can be an impartial judge between the great truths of Christianity and the "oppositions of science," which is uncertain or wavering, or indifferent in regard to those truths. We might as well prepare to judge impartially between the claims of the sun and of the earth to be the centre of the planetary system, by shutting out the light of the sun, as to qualify ourselves for an impartial judgment between the Scripture and oppositions to it, by closing our eyes to the light of the word. That mind, whether philosophic or theologic, alone is in a state of judicial candour regarding these questions, which has the candour to see and feel, at the very outset, that God is true though every man be a liar—that his word is the sure and supreme oracle.

"This is the judge that ends the strife  
When wit and reason fail."

No mind can be in an impartial or judicial state in regard to truths of revelation and antagonistic errors, so long as it rejects or ignores Scripture, and God speaking therein as the supreme judge or arbiter of the controversy. This is the doctrine of Protestant orthodoxy as set forth by its divines and symbols. Says our own Confession of Faith:

"The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself. And therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.

"The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture." (Chap. I. 9-10.)

This brings us to the Papal Doctrine on this subject, to which we have already referred, that the infallible and only authorized interpreter of Scripture is the church, speaking through the pope, or ecumenical councils, or the perpetual and universal faith of all her members; that our simple duty is to accept the interpretations of Scripture and decisions of Christian doctrine given forth through these organs; and that all

private judgment as to its meaning is Rationalism. Such we have already seen to be the doctrine propounded by Archbishop Manning. We can go with him in the following statement, which we think contains all the truth reached in his argument: "Though there is no revealed pledge of infallibility to the saints as such, yet the consent of the saints is a high test of what is the mind and illumination of the Spirit of Truth." P. 97. Less than this we cannot concede to the doctrines accepted *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*, without coming near to a confession that revelation is a failure. While this is so, and genuine catholic doctrine carries a strong presumption of truth, which should have great weight in our interpretations of Scripture, still, the proper objective ground of faith is the testimony of God uttered in and through the Scriptures, and apprehended by the believer. Of course, this involves a judgment on his part as to what the Scripture thus utters and propounds to his faith. But, says the Romanist, this is incompetent and forbidden to him. He cannot and ought not to interpret Scripture for himself. He should take the interpretation and judgments of the infallible church—the decrees of popes and councils, without question or criticism. This is the only alternative to the supremacy of reason, *i. e.*, to Rationalism in matters of religion. Says Manning:

"There can be ultimately no intermediate between the Divine mind declaring itself through an organ of its own creation, or the human mind judging for itself upon the evidence and contents of revelation. There is or there is not a Divine perpetual Teacher in the midst of us. The human reason must be either the disciple or the critic of revelation." P. 85.

"The reason or private judgment of individuals exercised critically upon history, philosophy, theology, Scripture, and revelation, inasmuch as it is the most human, is also the most fallible and uncertain of all principles of faith, and cannot in truth be rightly described to be such. Yet this is ultimately all that remains to those who reject the infallibility of the living church." To all this the obvious answer is:

1. It disguises and misstates the real issue. It confounds judging what the Scriptures mean in view of a fair estimate of the force of language, laws of construction, and the circum-

stances in which they were written, and receiving that meaning, so obtained, as the truth of God, with sitting in judgment on the contents of revelation thus duly ascertained, in order to receive or reject them as they do or do not conform to human reason. The former is legitimate and necessary, and consistent with the absolute subjection of reason to Scripture, with taking the yoke and learning of Christ. The latter exalts reason above the authority of the word of God, and is Rationalism. To say, as Archbishop Manning does, that "reason must be either the disciple or critic of revelation," is to "palter in a double sense" of the word critic. One may be a critic of revelation so far as is necessary to ascertain its meaning, in order that he may be its disciple. This, so far from being inconsistent with discipleship, it is necessary to it. This is not being a critic in such a sense as to subordinate revelation in any manner to the behests of his own reason.

2. The Romish doctrine is plainly at direct variance with the Scriptures, which require us to search the Scriptures because they testify of Christ, and commend the Bereans for so doing, and for testing the preachers they heard thereby. So Timothy is commended for having known from childhood the Holy Scriptures, which are declared "able to make wise to salvation," and all of them to be "given by inspiration of God, and profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." 2 Tim. iii. 15—17. The summons is, "to the law and the testimony; if they speak not according to this word it is because there is no light in them."

3. We do not escape the necessity of judging, even if we are to take the interpretation of Scripture blindly from an infallible pope or church. It is just as necessary for the disciple to interpret and judge of the meaning of the utterances of pontiffs and councils as of the Scriptures themselves. The necessity of judgment on the part of the Christian is not superseded by the voice of the living teacher or infallible interpreter. Such a teacher can only say, "I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what I say." "He that is spiritual judgeth all things."

4. How shall men know the infallible church and pontiff,

and distinguish them from impostors claiming their prerogatives? Where can they find the marks or criteria of these infallible organs of the Divine mind and will? Is it said we find these marks in the Scriptures? Saying nothing of the old vicious circle of proving the church by the Scriptures, and the Scriptures by the church, it is enough that the Scriptures require us to try by scriptural standards the pretensions of all claiming to be heard as Christian teachers or oracles. We are charged to beware of false prophets, who come in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves, and to know them by their fruits. We are commanded to believe not every spirit, but to try the spirits whether they be of God. Those are commended who try them that say they are apostles and are not, and find them liars. Nay, we are charged to give no heed to wonder-workers who successfully simulate real miracles, if they attempt to use these lying wonders to seduce us from the religion of God and his word. Deut. xiii. 1—5. So far then from testing the Scriptures by infallible living teachers, we must test the claims of all teachers by the infallible Scriptures.

Finally, believers as such, and not any infallible pope or council for them, have the promise of Divine guidance in the saving apprehension of the truths essential to salvation. "If any man will do his will," says Christ, "he shall know of the doctrine whether it be from God, or whether I speak of myself." John vii. 17. "Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God." "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." Dr. Manning and other papal writers seek to evade the force of these and similar passages, by pressing into bold relief the great differences and controversies among those who call themselves Christians. How can these passages refer to private Christians, and how can they be divinely guided, if they are perpetually disputing and contradicting each other? To which the simple answer is; 1. These promises are made to real, not merely nominal or professing Christians. 2. They refer to "all things essential to salvation," not all matters of dispute in religion. 3. The controversies among real Christians are often more verbal than real, or relate to things which, if important,

are non-essential, to the outposts rather than the citadel of the Christian faith; to the speculative rather than the experimental side of Christianity. 4. The Papists are exposed to objections similar in kind, if not in degree. They do not pretend that the pope or the church is infallible in all things, or in things unimportant to salvation. They cannot deny that controversies have prevailed amongst their own divines and schools; they admit that it is only by degrees, and through the developments of successive controversies, that the pope and councils have been enabled accurately to articulate and formulate one doctrine after another. Their argument, therefore, from the controversies among Protestants, for the necessity of an infallible and oracular interpreter of Scriptures, proves too much. It recoils upon themselves with suicidal force. It brings us back to scripture for the interpretation of scripture, which we reach by comparing (*συγκρινοντες*) spiritual things with spiritual.

“God is his own interpreter,  
And he will make it plain.”

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ART. II.—*Normal Schools, and other Institutions and Agencies for the Professional Education of Teachers.* By HENRY BARNARD, D. D. 2 vols., 8vo. Case, Tiffany & Co., Hartford.

THE term Normal School is an unfortunate misnomer, and its general adoption has led to much confusion of ideas. The word “Normal,” from the Latin *norma*, a rule or pattern to work by, does not differ essentially from “Model.” A Normal School, according to the meaning of the word, would be a pattern school, an institution which could be held up for imitation, to be copied by other schools of the same grade. But this meaning of the word is not what we mean by the thing. When we mean a school to be copied or imitated, we call it a Model School. Here the name and the thing agree. The name explains the thing. It is very different when we speak