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ART. I.—*The Structure of the Old Testament.*

WE propose in this article to inquire into the structure of the Old Testament. This inquiry is of course a purely elementary one, and belongs at the very threshold of Old Testament studies. It is not, however, on that account without its importance; and it is hoped that even the present imperfect attempt at its presentation may not be altogether devoid of interest.

Two extreme and opposite errors must be avoided at the outset, either of which tends to the denial of the existence of any such structure as our inquiry presupposes, and so to make all investigation in this direction unmeaning and superfluous.

The first springs from too exclusive a view of the divinity and inspiration of the sacred writings, hastily concluding thence that all must possess a uniform character, and present an even and unvaried surface; that since the Bible is everywhere the revelation of God, there must be an equal amount of disclosure everywhere. The Scriptures thus viewed become simply a capacious reservoir of heavenly truth, into which successive communications from above were poured, with no other effect than that of raising the general level; the separate value of each new revelation consisting merely in the absolute addition thereby made to the sum of the whole. Anything like a nice articulation or careful arrangement and adjustment of its

ART. IV.—*First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.*  
By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1865.

*Illustrations of Universal Progress: A Series of Discussions.*  
By HERBERT SPENCER. With a Notice of Spencer's New System of Philosophy. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1865.

*The Principles of Psychology.* By HERBERT SPENCER. London: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans. 1855.

*Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1861.

*The Correlation and Conservation of Forces: A Series of Expositions* by Prof. Grove, Prof. Helmholtz, Dr. Mayer, Dr. Faraday, Prof. Liebig and Dr. Carpenter. With an Introduction and brief Biographical Notices of the Chief Promoters of the New Views. By EDWARD L. YOUMANS, M. D. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1865.

THE rank which Mr. Herbert Spencer has obtained among English thinkers, his fertility and pretensions as a philosophical author, the skilful and persistent efforts to give his works currency and influence in this country, the evident existence among us of a coterie of his admirers, who are seeking to insinuate his principles into our literature and science, our philosophy and religion, our education and politics, furnish ample reasons for an immediate and careful examination of the distinctive peculiarities of his system. To this work we now address ourselves, and invite the candid attention of our readers.

Perhaps the urgent occasion for this service will be more obvious, if we state how it happened that we were led to undertake it, while it will explain why the foregoing list of works includes one of which he is not the author. We refer, of course, to that on the "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," consisting of treatises by several eminent *savants*, collected and edited by Prof. Youmans, who reveals his own animus in giving the compilation to the public, (whatever may have been the intent of the several authors,) in a somewhat brilliant introductory essay. Having had our attention turned to this work,

both by its pregnant title, and the unstinted commendations of it in secular and religious journals, we were led to examine it. It is, as we have since found, mainly a collection of the treatises referred to by Spencer in the ninth chapter of his *First Principles*, in which he treats of the "Correlation and Equivalence of Forces." It has the benefit of Prof. Youmans's gloss or exegetical comment, for the purpose of rendering it an auxiliary and propædeutic to Spencer's philosophy. The main principle elucidated in these treatises is one of the latest and most beautiful discoveries of modern science. It is twofold. 1. That, in the normal course of things, force and matter are not annihilated or diminished. When they cease to exist in one form, they pass into another, as fuel in combustion into the ash, gases, and heat evolved. This is what is meant by the "Conservation of Force." 2. The various physical forces are so correlated as to be mutually convertible, or transformable into each other. For example, there is much which goes to show, not only that electricity, galvanism, and magnetism, are mutually convertible into each other, but all are convertible into heat, which in its turn is resolvable into motion. So far, we simply share in the delight and instruction afforded by so grand and comprehensive an induction. But there are exaggerations of these doctrines which involve materialism and atheism. A numerous class assert not only that the physical forces in nature are conserved, according to the good pleasure of God, but that they are in their nature indestructible: others still, that they cannot be created nor destroyed, increased nor diminished, by any power whatsoever. This is clear atheism. It exalts blind force and unconscious fate to the throne of the universe. What Mr. Spenceer's views of each of the points here presented are, we shall see in due time. Just now we have to do with the book edited by Prof. Youmans. And we must say, that some of the utterances of the physicists in this volume have a portentous look, whatever may have been the sense intended by the writers. Mayer styles this force "indestructible." Grove says: "In all phenomena, the more closely they are investigated, the more are we convinced that, humanly speaking, neither matter nor force *can* be created nor annihilated." P. 199. This would seem decisive enough. But as he immediately proceeds with

the following language, we are glad to think he must have had some meaning consistent with theism. "Causation is the will, creation the act of God." But aside from this saving clause, his language is, to say the least, ominous. Faraday presents it as a corollary from his doctrine of the conservation of force, that "none can vary in absolute amount; each must be definite at all times, whether for a particle or all the particles in the universe, and the sum also of the three forces (chemical, electrical, and of gravity) must be equally unchangeable." Pp. 379, 380. Liebig, in explaining Mayer's view, says, "that all these causes (forces), as far as relates to their quantity, possess the property of indestructibility, and as to that of their quality that of convertibility." P. 389. Dr. Carpenter, the celebrated physiologist, says: "Dr. Mayer first broadly announced in all its generality the great principle now known as that of 'conservation of force,' as a necessary deduction from two axioms or essential truths; *ex nihilo nil fit*, and *nil fit ad nihilum*, the validity of which no true philosopher would ever have theoretically questioned." P. 405. These writers may be theists. But such forms of statement and argument, put without qualifying adjuncts, are non-theistic, which is no better than atheistic. For what is the pertinency of these axioms, as accounting for and necessitating the conservation of force, in uninterrupted continuance, and unchanged amount, unless it be meant that nothing can be destroyed, and that neither force nor anything else can be created out of nothing? If all force, matter, being, are due to the creative fiat of God, and can be changed, increased, diminished, or destroyed at his pleasure, how can the above axioms be true, in any such sense as to prove the necessary, unbroken, and unchanged continuance of force? A force created and sustained by a personal Creator, during his good pleasure, is one thing—one which exists independently, and from the necessity of its own nature is incapable of creation, enlargement, diminution, or annihilation, is another. It is a virtual negation of theism. Whether the language we have objected to is merely unguarded, or whether its authors mean all it seems to imply, we are unable to say. But it will soon appear that the meaning of Mr. Spencer and others, who are utilizing their speculations and

discoveries in the interest of his philosophy, is beyond all doubt.

A like fatal exaggeration discloses itself in regard to the doctrine of the mutual convertibility or transformableness of the physical forces. Precisely how much Dr. Carpenter himself means, we will not undertake to say, without a fuller examination of his writings than we have yet been able to give. But as interpreted and applied by Prof. Youmans, in support of the latter's theory, he is exhibited as maintaining the mutual convertibility, equivalence, and virtual identity, not only of the physical forces with each other, but also of the vital forces with the physical, reducing them all alike to heat; also with the psychical and the spiritual: thus materializing spirit, or spiritualizing matter; in either alternative, especially when coupled with the preceding doctrine of the indestructibleness and immutability of matter and force, reducing all to a materialistic monism and fatalism. Dr. Carpenter reduces the vital forces, vegetable and animal, to heat; and through the nervous and cerebral organism he suggests the convertibility of the psychical and mental forces with the vital.

The editor of the work containing the essays from which we have quoted, says: "Will-power is therefore correlated with nerve-power in the same manner as the latter with muscular power." Dr. Carpenter well observes: "It is difficult to see that the dynamical agency which we term will is more removed from the nerve-force on the one hand, than nerve-force is removed from motor-force on the other. Each, in giving origin to the next, is itself expended or ceases to exist *as such*, and each bears, in its own intensity, a precise relation to its antecedent and consequent." Prof. Youmans begins his comment on this by saying: "We have here only space briefly to trace the principle in its application to sensations, motions, and intellectual operations." Pp. 32, 33. He then proceeds in beautiful and eloquent style to work up this principle into the service of his favourite philosophy, arguing that the moral and mental forces of society are indestructible and immutable in quantity, convertible in quality, making their interchanges according to certain immutable laws, without variation of amount; so that their operation can certainly be calculated and foreseen. Thus

he makes the speculations and discoveries of some physicists on the correlation and conservation of forces, a germ out of which he goes on to develop the materialistic sociology of the philosophy we are about to examine. This will sufficiently appear from the following quotations.

Prof. Youmans says: "Thus qualified, the proofs of the correlation of the nervous and mental forces with the physical, are as clear and decisive as those for the physical forces alone." P. 32.

"The physical agencies acting upon inanimate objects in the external world, change their form and state, and we regard these changes as transformed manifestations of the forces in action. . . . Now, the living system is acted upon by the same agencies and under the same law. Impressions made upon the organs of sense give rise to sensations, and we have the same warrant in this, as in the former case, for regarding the effects as transformations of the forces in action." P. 33.

"The intellectual operations are also directly correlated with physical activities. As in the inorganic world we know nothing of forces except as exhibited by matter, so in the higher intellectual realm we know nothing of mind-force except through its material manifestation. Mental operations are dependent upon material changes in the nervous system; and it may be regarded as a fundamental physiological principle, that 'no idea or feeling can arise, save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it.' The directness of this dependence is proved by the fact that any disturbance of the train of cerebral transformations disturbs mentality, while the arrest destroys it. . . . The degree of mentality is also dependent upon the phosphatic constituents of the nervous system." Pp. 34, 35.

"How this metamorphosis takes place—*how a force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of consciousness*—how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain, to give rise to emotion, these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. *But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformation of physical forces into each other.*" P. 36.

“The condition of humanity, and the progress of civilization, are direct resultants of the forces by which men are controlled. What we term the moral order of society, implies a strict regularity in the action of those forces. Modern statistics disclose a remarkable constancy in the moral activities manifested in communities of men. Crimes, and even the modes of crime, have been observed to occur with a uniformity which admits of their prediction. Each period, therefore, may be said to have its definite amount of morality and justice. . . . So with society: the measured action of its forces gives rise to a fixed amount of morality and liberty in each age; but that amount increases with social evolutions.” P. 38.

This, if we understand it, involves the exclusion of all those causes of variation in the moral condition of society arising from the free-will of man, and the sovereign providence and free supernatural grace of God. It makes the moral state of men the fixed and changeless result of unalterable physical forces and laws. It is essentially materialism, and has the virus, however its authors and abettors may disclaim the form, of the Positive Philosophy of Comte. The startling principles thus propounded or foreshadowed in this volume, it may well be surmised awakened our profoundest concern and amazement. Desiring thoroughly to understand them, the following extract from Prof. Youmans's introduction will show how it became necessary to examine “Herbert Spencer's New System of Philosophy,” in order to know thoroughly the system here advocated, and thus find the tree of which this is one of the earliest blossoms. This is but a specimen of the endorsements and laudations of his system which greet us from various quarters. They not only challenge, they render imperative, a rigid exposition of its character and pretensions. To this we shall now confine ourselves. His acuteness as a philosophical thinker; his encyclopediac knowledge of physical science; his cleverness and instructiveness as a writer on a great variety of collateral subjects, educational, economical, social, and political, we have before observed, and still fully appreciate. All this could be said of David Hume and Auguste Comte. And of all three it can be said with nearly equal truth, that although they cannot utterly ignore, yet they write very much

as able writers would, who were doing their best to ignore the moral and religious obligations of man, which take their rise in conscience and a personal God.

We will let Prof. Youmans introduce Mr. Spencer to our readers in the following extract:

“A further aspect of the subject remains still to be noticed. Mr. Herbert Spencer has the honour of crowning this sublime inquiry by showing that the law of the conservation, or as he prefers to term it, the ‘Persistence of Force,’ as it is the underlying principle of all being, is also the fundamental truth of all philosophy. With masterly analytic skill he has shown that this principle, of which the human mind has just become fully conscious, is itself the profoundest law of the human mind, the deepest foundation of consciousness. He has demonstrated that the law of the Persistence of Force, of which the most piercing intellects of past times had but partial and unsatisfying glimpses, and which the latest scientific research has disclosed as a great principle of nature, has a yet more transcendent character; is, in fact, an *a priori* truth of the highest order—a truth which is necessarily involved in our mental organization; which is broader than any possible induction, and of higher validity than any other truth whatever. This principle, which is at once the highest result of scientific investigation and metaphysical analysis, Mr. Spencer has made the basis of his new and comprehensive System of Philosophy; and in the first work of the series, entitled ‘First Principles,’ he has developed the doctrine in its broadest, philosophic aspects.” P. 29.\*

Our first and chief business then is with Mr. Spencer’s book

\* In the first, and as yet, only number of the *Social Science Review*, we notice an article on Herbert Spencer, consisting chiefly of blind and turgid laudation. The writer says: “We cannot commend Mr. Youmans too highly for introducing this philosopher and publicist to American readers;” and speaks of him as the author of the introduction to the published volume of Spencer’s Essays. The reviewer says, that from one of “Spencer’s works will date modern social science,” and assigns as one reason for the slow acceptance of his principles, that “he attacked the fetichisms of theology, and churchmen felt insecure in their livings.” These passages afford a sample of the tone of this new journal, which is another effort of the “New Philosophy” to establish and propagate itself among us.

of "First Principles," in which he in form announces and defends the primordial elements of his system. We may refer to his other volumes occasionally for fuller explanation.

Having taught us that, before the dispersion of our race, it had no "language sufficiently organized to express religious ideas," (p. 14,) and that the religious susceptibility in man "arose by a process of evolution," and not "from an act of special creation," (pp. 15, 17,) he tells us:

"Respecting the origin of the universe, three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created by external agency." P. 30. That is, the possible suppositions are Atheism, Pantheism, or Theism. In regard to the first he argues: "Self-existence, therefore, necessarily means existence without a beginning; and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past-time, implies the conception of infinite past-time which is an impossibility. To this let us add that, even were self-existence conceivable, it would not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe." P. 31. It scarcely needs to be stated that, if this argument is valid against Atheism, it is *a fortiori* conclusive against Theism. And this the author strenuously urges in the following terms: "As was proved at the outset of the argument, self-existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this holds true whatever the nature of the object of which it is predicated. Whoever agrees that the atheistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit that the theistic hypothesis is untenable, if it contains the same impossible idea." P. 35. Pantheism, of course, shares the same fate. It is "incapable of being represented in thought. . . . We cannot form any idea of a potential existence of the universe as distinguished from its actual existence. If represented in thought at all, potential existence must be represented as *something*, that is an actual existence; to suppose that it can be represented as nothing involves two absurdities, that nothing is more than a negation and can be positively represented in thought, and that one nothing is distinguished from

all other nothings by its power to develope into something. Nor is this all. We have no state of consciousness answering to the words—an inherent necessity by which potential existence becomes actual existence." P. 32. In regard to Theism again, the author says: "Even supposing that the genesis of the universe could really be represented in thought as the result of an external agency, the mystery would be as great as ever; for there would still arise the question, how came the external agency? . . . It commits us to an infinite series of such agencies, and then leaves us where we were." P. 35.

Here is some show of impartiality, and even liberality, in the author's destructive processes. Doubtless he and his abettors will answer the complaint that he destroys Theism, with the reply that he makes equal havoc with Atheism and Pantheism. We do not, however, accept this placebo. It is cold comfort for the loss of our God, to be told that we ought not to grieve or murmur, for he has also made an end of Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, of heathen polytheism and savage fetichism. If a man denies our rationality and immortality, it is no compensation for this to be told that he also denies it to the brutes, and trees, and stones. The whole question is, are we rational and immortal? If that is denied all is lost. So here the question is: is there one Living Personal God, the Creator and Upholder of all things? If this is denied all is lost. It matters not what else may then be established or overthrown. Besides, the author here attempts an inherent impossibility, an outright contradiction. To say that Theism and Atheism are alike inconceivable and absurd is itself a direct contradiction and unmitigated absurdity. To overthrow Theism is to establish non-Theism, which is Atheism, neither more nor less. To say that both are alike absurd, is itself the climax of absurdity.

But, perhaps, Mr. Spencer has thus taken from us our God only more fully to restore Him. Perhaps he has destroyed the foundations of our faith only more solidly to rebuild them, as destructives are so apt to pretend and claim they do. Perhaps he adopts the famous solution of Hamilton and Mansel in regard to the Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause; that although they and the negation of them are alike inconceivable, yet,

since, of two contradictories, one must be true, and the other false, we may and must accept as true that which is demanded by our intuitive convictions and our moral nature. Does Mr. Spencer in like manner say that, although Theism and Atheism are alike inconceivable and absurd, yet, as contradictories, one or the other must be true, and that we can and must choose that alternative of a Personal God which our deepest instincts and our highest reason alike demand? Let us see; although at best, for reasons before given in this journal, this is a most unstable foundation for Theism and Faith.\*

Mr. Spencer does indeed impress Hamilton and Mansel into his service, so far as he can make them auxiliary to his destructive processes. And we should think Mr. Mansel's eyes would be opened to the essentially destructive character of his and Hamilton's positions on these subjects, as experience shows how much more readily they can be wielded in the service of scepticism than of faith. Mr. Spencer eagerly seizes upon and transfers to his pages the gist of their arguments to prove that all knowledge is relative, and not of things themselves, and that the knowledge of God is impossible, because it involves all the inconceivabilities and contradictions alleged by this school to pertain to the conception of the Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause. These alleged inconceivabilities and contradictions are substantially Kant's celebrated Antinomies, distilled through the alembic of Hamilton's, and then clarified by Mansel's, thinking. But while he thus utilizes in the interest of his own scheme the destructive part of their speculations, it must be confessed that he is more logically consistent than they. He does not attempt to reclaim by faith the ideas which he had shown to be incogitable contradictions and absurdities, and therefore impossible to be believed, because impossible to be apprehended. But he endeavours to find a vague and indefinite residuum which the mind does have an indefinite consciousness of, and which is thus a matter of positive apprehension and belief. This indefinable something, to which we may not ascribe any distinct attributes, is the underlying prin-

\* See articles, "Reason and Faith," October 1860, and "Can God be Known," January 1864.

ciple of all religion and all science, and the basis of their reconciliation.

“Every religion,” says our author, “may be defined as an *a priori* theory of the Universe. . . . Be it in the rudest fetichism, which assumes a separate personality behind every phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these personalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, in which they are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, in which the generalized personality becomes one with the phenomena, we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed to render the universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of all religion—even positive Atheism—comes within the definition; for it, too, in asserting the self-existence of space, matter and motion, which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an *a priori* theory, from which it holds the facts to be deducible. . . . Here then is an element which all creeds have in common. Religions diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world, with all it contains and all that surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity. Thus we come in sight of that which we seek. . . . This is the vital element in all religions.” Pp. 43-4.

What all this will come to, must be as plain to our readers as that “coming events cast their shadows before.” The residuum left as “the vital element of all religions,” is what is common to Fetichism, Polytheism, Monotheism, and Atheism. What remains after being passed through these successive filters must be an exceedingly thin, dead abstraction—a ghost of a shadow—naively styled by the author a “mystery ever pressing for interpretation.” “The analysis,” says he, “of every possible hypothesis, proves not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. . . . If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the Power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.” P. 46.

“Inscrutable Power,” as the ground or cause of all phe-

nomena, is the "ultimate religious idea," and the only religious idea reached and recognized as legitimate, or supported by due evidence, in this new philosophy. The author next proceeds to discuss "ultimate scientific ideas," and to detect this as the great underlying truth of all science, viz., that whatever science may discover or establish, it still postulates, and must ever postulate an unknown something beyond, to account for what it does know. Thus religion and science are reconciled, and meet on this common ground of an ultimate "Inscrutable Power." He analyzes what he deems the possible conceptions of space, time, matter, motion, force, mind, consciousness. He accumulates and parades all the puzzles which the ingenuity of metaphysicians and sophists has conjured up on these subjects, to prove not only that they are "wholly incomprehensible," but that "the immediate knowledge which we seem to have of them, proves, when examined, to be total ignorance." P. 50. "Frame what suppositions we may, we find, on tracing out their implications, that they leave us nothing but a choice between opposite absurdities." P. 54. "The exercise of force is altogether unintelligible," and necessitates a "conclusion positively unthinkable." P. 60. In regard to consciousness, "the perplexity is like that presented by the relations of motion and rest. As we found it impossible really to conceive rest becoming motion, or motion becoming rest, so here we find it impossible really to conceive either the beginning or ending of those changes which constitute consciousness." P. 63. So of self-consciousness. "If it is the true self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of? Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one—in which subject and object are identified—and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation of both." P. 65. "Objective and subjective things he thus finds to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma." Pp. 66-7. "If, respecting the origin and nature of things, we make some assumption, we find that, through an inexorable logic, it inevitably commits us to alternate impossibilities of thought; and this holds true of every assumption that can be imagined." P. 69. So science is

forced to the same ultimatum as religion, an undefinable, inconceivable somewhat, underlying all those phenomena which she seeks to explain, and which are but seemings of an unknowable reality that bristle into multitudinous contradictions and unthinkable nonsense, the moment we attempt to bring them within the mind's grasp. "Clearly as we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves, on examination, to be utterly irreconcilable with itself. *Ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out to be merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it.*" P. 68.

This negative result reached *a posteriori*, the author undertakes to demonstrate *a priori*; and, for this purpose, employs the powerful lever provided by Hamilton's and Mansel's arguments to prove the necessary relativity of all knowledge. He quotes these authors at great length in this behalf. So far as, by the relative quality of our knowledge, these writers mean merely that whatever we know must be so in relation with our faculties as to be cognizable by them, this is a mere truism which needs no defence, and calls for no outlay of argument to support it. But this relativity of knowledge is perfectly consistent with a true and genuine knowledge of things as they really are. Not necessarily that we know all pertaining to them. Much remains unknown by the most accomplished botanist about the merest blade of grass. But what in the due use of our faculties we do know, we know truly. Otherwise we do not know it at all. Not to know truly is not to know at all. Now the peculiarity of the relativity of knowledge contended for by these writers is, that we know not things in themselves and as they really are, but only in their relations either to one another or to our faculties, which may be fitted to misconceive them. So we have no reliable knowledge. What, however, Hamilton and Mansel thus wrest from knowledge, they think to reclaim by faith, as if it were possible to believe what can only be conceived as a conglomerate of contradictions and absurdities. Spencer allows nothing to faith which he refuses to the intellect. But he saves, or tries to save from the wreck of intellectual cogitables, the solitary fragment of an "Inscrutable Power," which is the basis of conciliation between science and religion. "In the very asser-

tion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a non-relative. . . . Unless a real non-relative or absolute be postulated, the relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of actuality lying behind appearances; and how from this impossibility results an indestructible belief in that actuality." Pp. 96-7. "So we arrive at the point where religion and science coalesce." P. 99.

Before proceeding to show from Mr. Spencer's more articulate statements, that this absolute which he saves or extracts from the wreck of all our knowledge, is the absolute alternately of Pantheism and Atheism, we wish to say a word more in regard to this doctrine, that we have no knowledge of realities, or of aught but appearances or relations which are unrealities. Says our author, "each attempt to conceive real existence ends in intellectual suicide." P. 100. It would be hard to imagine a more groundless and fatal principle. It is in utter contradiction to the normal and unperverted consciousness of the human race. It is itself absolute "intellectual suicide." If the intellect knows no reality, no real thing, it knows nothing. Nothing remains but absolute scepticism. We shall not repeat our exposure of the transcendental subtleties, quirks, and sophisms levelled against the possible knowledge of God and reality, which has been given in former numbers. These are here impressed into the service of what we shall find to be a sublimated Sensism and Materialism. It all amounts to a "system of sublime transcendental nullism." It is no new device. Atheists and sceptics of old understood it. One of the page-headings of *Cudworth's Intellectual System* is in these words: "*All Knowledge to Atheists Phantastical and Relative.*" It is a convenient device for reasoning out of conceivability and possibility all truth and all being—or rather for turning them into a shapeless, plastic mass, on which the speculatist may stamp as little as he pleases, sweeping away all else. What inscription our author puts upon, and what he erases from this formless abstraction, we will now ascertain.

Although, in his view, religion has the merit, in all its forms, of ever having discerned and insisted on this "ultimate verity," it has fulfilled this office very imperfectly. Pp. 99, 100. "Religion has ever been more or less irreligious, and it continues to be partially irreligious even now. In the first place, as implied above, it has *professed to have some knowledge* of that which transcends knowledge; and has so contradicted its own teachings. While with one breath it has asserted that the course of all things passes understanding, it has, with the next breath, asserted that the cause of all things *possesses such or such attributes*—can be in so far understood. In the second place, while, in great part sincere in its fealty to the great truth it has had to uphold, it has often been insincere, and consequently irreligious, in maintaining the untenable doctrines by which it has obscured this great truth. *Each assertion respecting the nature, acts, or motives of that power* which the universe manifests to us, has been repeatedly called in question and proved to be inconsistent with itself or with accompanying assertions." Pp. 100–1. Our readers will observe that it is here asserted that the ascription to God of "attributes, nature, acts, or motives," is irreligious. What then is left for faith or worship? What shall the Christian say, when asked "where is thy God?" And what will this new philosophy teach us next? "As fast as experience proves that certain familiar changes always happen in the same sequence, then begins to fade from the mind the conception of a variable personality, to whose variable will they were before ascribed." P. 102. In opposition to Mr. Mansel, who, after having argued it all to be inconceivable, says: "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe He is infinite," Mr. Spencer presses their common doctrine in the premises to a more unrelenting logical issue. He says:

"That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. . . . This, which to many will seem an essentially irreligious position, is an essentially religious one; nay, is *the* religious one, to which, as already shown, all others are but approximations. In the estimate it forms of the ultimate cause, it does not fall

short of the alternative position, but exceeds it. Those who espouse this alternative position make the erroneous assumption that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality, whereas the choice is between personality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion? It is true we are utterly unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. . . . And may we not, therefore, rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations, but degradations?" Pp. 108-9.

It is scarcely necessary to pronounce this pure, bold, blank Atheism with regard to the Supreme Being, and sceptical nihilism with regard to all else. The author well says, "an immense majority will refuse, with more or less of indignation, a belief seeming to them so shadowy and indefinite." He, however, endeavours to comfort all parties, in that the creeds that are bad, as measured by an absolute standard, are good as measured by a relative standard. "Though from higher perceptions they hide the abstract verity within them, yet to lower perceptions they render this verity more appreciable than it would otherwise be." P. 121. Or, as he elsewhere states it, "the religious creeds through which mankind successively pass, are, during the eras in which they are severally held, the best that could be held; and that this is true, not only of the latest and most refined creeds, but of all, even the earliest and most gross. Those who regard men's faiths as given to them from without . . . will think this a very shocking opinion." *Illustrations of Progress*. Pp. 440-1. No doubt; and not less shocking the statements following, such as that "it is well for the savage man to have a savage god." It is an obvious corollary from this that when "the unknown cause produces in him (the author) a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act that belief." P. 123. This is a necessary consequence of the reign of a blind, impersonal Power, of whose movements all things, including beliefs and opinions, are the necessary and fatalistic results. It undermines responsibility

for opinions not only, but all other responsibility, as will soon more fully appear.

The atheistic character of this new philosophy is clear enough. It will soon be made equally clear that its Atheism runs now into Pantheism, now into Materialism. His theory to account for the universe is that of "evolution," an unlimited application of the development hypothesis. All forms of being are evolved from the "persistence of force." They are but phenomena of pure force persisting, and necessarily developed by its persistence. This scheme, of course, substantially takes in the developments of the higher animals from the lower, and of man from the ape, in its universal sweep, even as the ocean absorbs the rivers. Mr. Spencer repeatedly commends Darwin and Huxley. Approaching his own distinctive doctrine, he says:

"The series of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure. . . . This is the history of all organisms whatever. It is settled beyond dispute that organic evolution consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Now I propose, in the first place, to show that this law of organic evolution is the law of all evolution. Whether it be in the development of the earth, in the development of life upon its surface, in the development of society, of government, of manufactures, of commerce, of language, literature, science, art, this same advance from the simple to the complex holds through successive differentiations, holds uniformly. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which evolution essentially consists." Pp. 148-9.

That this is true of literal organisms, of course, is admitted. That it is also some approximation to truth in the whole physical and cosmical sphere, may also be admitted. That it applies to a considerable class of social phenomena within the domain of man's free will, such as division of labour in its causes and effects, is also undoubted. But in the higher moral and spiritual realms the reverse can easily be shown to be true.

As men rise in the scale of being and society advances, they go from a more heterogeneous to a more homogeneous state. We are aware that this new philosophy ignores Christianity, and, indeed, all of religion but the name. But we do not. And even in the lower spheres, as a mere intellectual being, the more society advances, the more do education and intelligence pervade the masses, and make the lower classes homogeneous with the higher. The same is true of political rights and franchises. The more society advances, the more does bondage disappear, and the more fully are the humblest classes put on a political equality with the highest. The greater the progress of material improvement, of machinery, of inventions for making animals and the inanimate forces of nature do the work of man, the more perfectly do all classes share in the comforts and luxuries thus produced. The same locomotive that draws the rich draws the poor. As some one has said, "the locomotive is a great democrat." The same spinning-jennies and power-looms that weave for one class weave for another. Not only does this tendency appear among the different classes of the same nation, but between different nations. Commerce, by its exchanges, makes the nations partakers of each other's wealth. It makes the discoveries and progress of one nation the common property of all. The steam-engine, the telegraph, the railway, are rapidly spreading over the whole earth. Even civilization, then, tends towards increasing homogeneity in our race. The instinct of the masses, as if in rude mimicry of the brotherhood of the gospel, articulates its aspirations in the watchwords—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. All this reaches its full and genuine realization in proportion as morality and religion, especially the glorious gospel, pervade the nations and mould society. In degree as men are wicked and selfish, they are discordant, belligerent, heterogeneous. In so far as they become pure and good, they become congenial, harmonious, "homogeneous." But in Christ "all are brethren." "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ." Gal. iii. 28. Here we find the true homogeneity, in the one holy catholic church, not in any single outward organization, but in the "communion of saints," who love

the Lord Jesus Christ and will live and reign with him for ever. So far as this religion prevails it unifies mankind, making them one body, with one spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all. All "persistence of force," among men uncontrolled by this, it is granted and insisted, tends to the heterogeneous, to discord, confusion, and every evil work.

But without stopping longer on this question, let us see whither our author carries it, or it carries him. Having settled it, that evolution, from the simple to the complex, is the method by which all things come into being, he proceeds to inquire what this process involves. Having told us it is "probable that every species of organic form up to the most complex, has arisen out of the simplest, through the accumulation of modifications upon modifications, just as every individual organic form arises," (p. 184,) he at length comes to say, that "manifestly this community of result implies community of causation. . . . Determining evolution of every kind—astronomic, geologic, organic, ethnologic, social, economic, artistic, &c.—they must be concerned with something common to all these; and to see what these possess in common will be the best method of guiding ourselves to the desired solution. The only obvious respect in which all kinds of evolution are alike, is, that they are modes of change. . . . We narrow the field of inquiry by recognizing the change in which evolution consists as *a change in the arrangement of parts*: of course using the word *parts* in its most extended sense, as signifying both units and masses of such units." Pp. 219—221.

Having reached this point, the author proceeds directly to the goal of which he is in quest by the following steps:—"Evidently the problem, as thus expressed, brings us face to face with the ultimate elements of phenomena in general. It is impossible to account for a certain change in the arrangement of the parts of any mass without involving, first, the *matter* which makes up the parts thus rearranged, next the *motion* exhibited during the rearrangement, and then the *force* producing this motion. The problem is a dynamical one; and there can be no truly scientific solution of it, save one given

in terms of matter, motion and force—terms in which all other dynamical problems are expressed and solved.

“The proposal thus to study the question from a purely physical point of view, will, most likely, notwithstanding what has been said in the first part of this work, raise in some minds either alarm or prejudice. Having throughout life constantly heard the charge of materialism,” &c., . . . “men who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with matter the contemptuous epithets ‘gross’ and ‘brute,’ may naturally enough feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of life, of mind, and of society, to a level with those which they think so degraded. . . . The course proposed does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called lower.” Pp. 221–2.

Although the author, in the immediate context and at the close of the book, contends that his “implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic,” he avowedly, and, at all events, most undeniably confounds and identifies matter and mind as at bottom one. This is enough. He denies, in what we have quoted, the dualism both between mind and matter, and (as we shall soon more fully see) between Creator and creatures. He must therefore be either an Idealist or Materialist. The former he is not, for he not only speaks of the “insanities of idealism,” p. 225, but all his modes of thought and expression in regard to mental phenomena are in terms of “matter, motion, force.” The mind is treated like matter, as divisible, which no spirit is or can be. The evidence is therefore cumulative and irresistible that he makes physical and psychical forces convertible, and holds the latter to be evolved from the former. This is unadulterated Materialism, which, indeed, in the language already quoted, the author much more decidedly professes and apologizes for, than disclaims.

Having thus virtually reduced all things to matter, motion, force, his next step is to define reality as “nothing more than persistence in consciousness.” P. 227. Another signal instance of the facility for running into idealism, which so often appears in Materialists, and in the sensuous school. To resolve all reality into “persistence in consciousness,” is to resolve all

things into modes of mind, which is idealism. Language can be found abundantly in Locke's great effort to trace the origin of all our knowledge to the senses, implying that the things immediately cognized through the senses are but ideas of the mind; while Hume tries to resolve all things material and immaterial into ideas and impressions. No wonder that in such modes of thought Berkeley saw a sure foundation for his Idealism. And if matter and mind are essentially one, according to our author's system, although that unity of essence be material, it is not strange that he should set forth reality in terms of mind as well as of matter.

He next proceeds to analyze our conceptions of space, time, matter, motion, force. Along with the usual platitudes about knowledge being relative, and of "relative realities," he goes on to resolve all these ideas into force, or effects and derivatives of force. "Forces standing in certain correlations, form the whole content of our idea of matter." P. 233. This being so, and our ideas of space being first suggested in connection with matter or extended substance, "the experiences from which the consciousness of space arises are experiences of force. . . . Concerning time, relative and absolute, a parallel argument leads to parallel conclusions." P. 231. Motion "involves the conceptions of space, of time, and of matter. . . . And since, as we have seen, these are severally elaborated from experiences of force, as given in certain correlations, it follows that from a further synthesis of such experiences the idea of motion is also elaborated. . . . We come down, then, finally, to force, as the ultimate of ultimates. . . . Thus all other modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of force, but experiences of force are not derivable from anything else." Pp. 233-5.

He then undertakes to show that this "ultimate of ultimates" in the form of matter and motion, can neither be created nor destroyed. Here, and in what will immediately follow, we enter the region of the affinities of the work on the "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," already noticed, with our author's system. He says: "if we analyze early superstitions, or that faith in magic which was general in later times, and even still survives among the uncultured, we find one of its

postulates to be, that by some potent spell matter can be called out of non-entity, and can be made non-existent. . . . We have learnt that relatively to our consciousness, matter never either comes into existence nor ceases to exist. . . . The total quantity of matter in the universe cannot really be conceived as diminished, any more than it can be conceived as increased. . . . It is impossible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming something—the reason, namely, that nothing can become an object of consciousness. The annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable; and its indestructibility thus becomes an *a priori* cognition of the highest order. . . . By the indestructibility of matter, we really mean the indestructibility of the *force* with which matter affects us.” Pp. 238—45.

In the chapter following he applies a like analysis to motion, urging that it is absurd “to think of motion as either being created or annihilated.” P. 248. So he arrives at his great doctrine of the “Persistence of Force.” The origin of this phrase he thus explains. “Some two years ago, I expressed to my friend Professor Huxley, my dissatisfaction with the current expression—“Conservation of Force;” assigning as reasons, first, that the word “conservation” implies a conserver and an act of conserving; and second, that it does not imply the existence of the force before that particular manifestation with which we commence. In place of “conservation,” Professor Huxley suggested *persistence*. This entirely meets the first of the two objections.” P. 250. What studious care to eliminate everything suggestive of a personal God! The chapter concludes with a passage quoted with admiring approval by Professor Youmans, and ending as follows. “The sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it, is thus the Persistence of Force. This being the basis of experience, must be the basis of any scientific organization of experience. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down: and on this an ultimate analysis must build up.” P. 258. This “persistence of force,” then, without intelligence, will, personality, is the “sole truth” that he gives us as the Head-spring of Being, the Fountain of Life, the Sustainer and Disposer of all

things, from the blind working of which all beings take their forms, relations, adjustments, properties, and workings. We have found that the author attributes belief in creation to superstition. But the credulity of believing the most reptile superstition is superlative wisdom in comparison with this. Verily, "the fool hath said in his heart there is no God."

He next treats of the "Correlation and Equivalence of Forces:" the former of these words indicating that the different kinds are mutually convertible, and the latter that they are mutual equivalents in nature and amount. Of course he here makes the most of whatever the scientists have discovered or maintained in regard to the continuance and mutual convertibility of physical forces. Tracing this through the ascending series of forces, and striving to show the successive transformations of the physical into the chemical, of these into the vital, and of the vegetable into the animal, he tells us, "many will be alarmed by the assertion that the forces which we distinguish as mental, come within the same generalization. Yet there is no alternative but to make this assertion. . . . We must regard the sensations which such agencies, (pressure, motion, sound, light, &c.,) produce in us, as new forms of the agencies producing them. Any hesitation to admit that, between the physical forces and the sensations, there exists a correlation like that between the physical forces themselves, must disappear on remembering how the one correlation, like the other, is not qualitative only but quantitative." P. 275. "The forces called vital which we have seen to be correlates of the forces called physical, are the immediate sources of these thoughts and feelings; and are expended in producing them." P. 278. "Various classes of facts thus unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds among the physical forces, holds equally between them and the mental forces. . . . How the metamorphosis takes place—*how a force existing as motion, heat or light, can become a mode of consciousness*. . . . These are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformations of physical forces into each other." Pp. 280-1. The same principle is applied, of course, to the social forces which result from the combined operation of the physical, vital, and mental.

The main point here to be marked is, the identification of mental and material forces—that materialism which in the author's writings shows great "persistence of force." All the plausibility of his reasonings on this subject arises from the mysterious and reciprocal influence of mind and body, and the phenomena thence arising, especially as related to our cognition of externals. But why do not sensations arise in a log when struck with rays of light and heat? What is there in any physical force striking or pressing us analogous to our consciousness or sensations thence arising? If we see the stars through a telescope, does the telescope therefore see? Really, is it meant to teach us that heat, light, and motion are the equivalents not only of sensation, but of reason, conscience and will, and transformable into them? Out upon such reptile philosophy, which, under pretence of elevating matter, sinks rational and immortal man to the grade of the brute, the stock, and the stone. The next stage logically, in this progress downward, would be for him to idolize them, so closely do the extremes of scepticism and superstition meet.

It is scarcely necessary, after all this, to quote the author's explicit and avowed "adhesion to the development hypothesis" as against creation, stigmatized as a "Hebrew idea" and "myth," (*Psychology*, pp. 577—9, *Illustrations of Progress*, chap. ix.); his assertion that there are intelligent acts without consciousness, (*Psychology*, p. 501); that modes of consciousness subjectively are modes of force objectively, (*First Principles*, p. 465); that "the common notion that there is a line of demarcation between reason and instinct has no foundation whatever in fact," (*Psyc.* p. 572); that there is a series of insensible steps by which brute rationality may pass into human rationality, (*Id.* p. 573); that the *ego* is but a "state of consciousness," (*Id.* 618), and that the "notion of free-will" is a "subjective illusion," (*Id.* p. 619); and finally, that in treating professedly of moral education, he avowedly ignores the moral element, scouting it as "the transcendental distinction between right and wrong, about which wise men know so little and children nothing." (*Education*, p. 217.)

This system, making the universe, as it does, an evolution of absolute force or inscrutable power, instead of a creation by a

Personal God, contains the essence of Pantheism, or, more strictly, Monism, that all is one and one is all. We have Pantheism where we have the evolution of man and nature from an absolute impersonal power, of which they are the manifestations and outworkings. This is, for substance, the new philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Its Atheism and Materialism are not incompatible with this, and if they were, it is his concern, not ours, to explain the contradiction. Monism and Pantheism are but forms of Atheism, of denying a Personal and Holy God. And as to Materialism, there is the pan-materalismus of Epicurus, as well as the pan-logismus of Hegel, and the pan-theismus of Spinoza. We look in vain for any virus in Atheism, Pantheism, Materialism, and Fatalism, which these works do not contain.

Professor Henry, who has beautifully illustrated the conservation and correlation of forces in the physical sphere, finds in it evidence of the presence and agency of God in all the realms of life. In an able paper on this subject in the *American Journal of Science*, for July 1860, he says: "*Vitality* thus viewed gives startling evidence of the immediate presence of a direct, divine, and spiritual essence, operating with the ordinary forces of nature, but being in itself entirely distinct from them." P. 33. "This view of the nature of body is the furthest removed from Materialism; - it requires a separate thinking principle." P. 41. Doubtless some, if not most of the writers on the mutual transformableness and continuance of the physical forces, whom Mr. Spencer and Prof. Youmans are seeking to impress into the service of the New Philosophy, would concur with Prof. Henry in this matter. If so, they ought not to have uttered an uncertain sound, or left their opinions to be matters of conjecture. Their zeal for God should have prompted them, as it did him, to guard this point against all misconstruction, cavil, or perversion. In regard to a personal God and creation, we understand Mr. Spencer to concede that the great majority of scientists are against him.

And it is quite refreshing to find the prince of naturalists and zoölogists earnestly and eloquently protesting against this whole development or evolution theory, in relation to the kingdom of life, as wholly unsupported by facts, and of pernicious

tendency. Says Agassiz: "Had Mr. Darwin, or his followers, furnished a single fact to show that individuals change in the course of time, in such a manner as to produce at last species different from those known before, the state of the case might be different. But it stands recorded now as before, that the animals known to the ancients are still in existence, exhibiting to this day the characters they exhibited of old. . . . Until the facts of nature are shown to have been mistaken by those who have collected them, and that they have a different meaning from that now generally assigned to them, I shall therefore consider the transmutation theory as a scientific mistake; untrue in its facts, unscientific in its methods, and mischievous in its tendency." *Id.* 144-54. "Though I know those who hold it to be very unscientific to believe that thinking is not something inherent in matter, and that there is an essential difference between inorganic and living and thinking beings, I shall not be prevented by any such pretensions of a false philosophy from expressing my conviction, that so long as it cannot be shown that matter or physical forces do actually reason, the manifestation of thought is evidence of the existence of a thinking being, as the author of such thought, and I shall look upon an intelligent and intelligible connection between the facts of nature as direct proof of the existence of a thinking God." *Id.* March, 1858. P. 204.

These few words from these great masters in science contain more precious truth than all Mr. Herbert Spencer's toilsome and voluminous works. We do not underrate nor depreciate the extent of his knowledge and research, the keenness and astuteness of his mind, his ingenuity and tact as a writer, or the originality and value of his articles within a certain sphere—the sphere of matter and sense—the sphere that remains after obliterating the moral ideas, the spiritual, immortal, and accountable nature of man, and a personal, holy, and reigning God, from the universe. But this void fatally vitiates the whole. It is as if one should describe the solar system without the sun, the body without a soul or a head, the earth without its fauna and flora, sociology without government. However shrewd and useful, therefore, may be many of his writings on some branches, yet this is more than balanced by tearing them

from their living root. Thus, in his famous educational article entitled "What knowledge is of most worth?" which was not only endorsed, but republished in one of our New York dailies, which numbers its readers by the hundred thousand, Physical Science is put foremost. All that comes into competition with it is disparaged; supersensual, spiritual, scriptural knowledge is ignored; while the science commended is pronounced "antagonistic to the superstitions that pass under the name of religion." All that can be said in praise of Spencer's miscellaneous writings, can be said in praise not only of those of Hume, Comte, Malthus, but in a far higher degree of Mill, who is a mightier man than our author. He, near the close of his *Logic*, avows his adhesion to the radical and destructive principles of the Positive Philosophy of Comte. Mr. Spencer took pains to write a letter to the *New Englander*, in which he had been styled a positivist, denying the imputation. That some of his methods are not precisely the same as Comte's, we are aware. But as to the whole animus, scope, and results of his system, with regard to the immaterial, the moral and divine—Religion and Christianity—let him choose between them who will. We submit to our readers whether the choice is worth the trouble of making.

It is a portentous fact, which the friends of Christianity, and indeed of religion and morality, cannot afford to ignore or neglect, that sceptical and destructive opinions are just now having a formidable development in Great Britain, whence they, of course, migrate more freely to this country than from the continent. Aside of the church, a positive and semi-positive school, with their allies, under the lead of such men as Huxley, Darwin, Spencer, and Mill, appear to be assailing the fundamental, moral, and religious convictions of men from the scientific side, with weapons claimed to be forged in the laboratories of physical science. The absolute atheism or religious nihilism to which they go, has been sufficiently pointed out. Another class enter upon the same destructive work from the ideal and transcendental side, following their German masters. Mr. Morell seems to have been oscillating to and fro from one to the other. We have not seen his "Introduction to the Study of Mental Philosophy on the Inductive Method;" but, from

some extracts in an able Review of it by Professor Noah Porter of Yale College, in the *American Presbyterian and Theological Review* for April, 1864, we judge that he is now leaning to the sensuous school. From the alleged correlation between physical forces, he argues "that a similar correlation exists between vital energy, nervous energy, and mental energy;" "that the vital forces and the mind forces are one and the same at the root," etc., etc. This seems just now the newest and most fashionable drift of destructive thinking. Both currents form a confluence in the *Westminster Review*, and in the party of Destructives in the Established Church. These, with the growth of Romish tenets and practices in the Establishment, and of the Romish Church out of it, form an antagonistic yet combined and fearful host arrayed against the faith once delivered to the saints, the truth as it is in Jesus. The signs are manifold that this thing is not done in a corner, but that the assault upon the fundamentals of faith will be transferred from the old world to the new, and rage from within as well as without the pale of the church. Those set for the defence of the gospel must therefore gird on their armor. They must watch, detect, expose, confront and overpower their foe. Valiant for the truth, speaking it in love, strengthened by Him who is the Truth, they shall conquer. When the enemy comes in like a flood, the Spirit of the Lord shall lift up a standard against him. It is a giant with which we have to wrestle—but a blind giant after all—blind to the intuitions of our nobler and immortal nature, to the soul, God, and immortality: "a Cyclops with one eye, and that in the back of its head," and giving us the "ouran-outang theology of the origin of the human race in place of the Book of Genesis." Let us pierce with the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, this

Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum,

and we need not fear the issue. We shall be more than conquerors through Him that hath loved us.