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ART. I.—*Francis Bacon, of Verulam. Realistic Philosophy, and its Age.* By KUNO FISCHER. Translated from the German, by John Oxenford. London, 1857.

WE know of no better exposition of the merits and defects of the Baconian philosophy than this, and it is translated in a free, luminous, and philosophical style. We have no intention to criticise it, or even to sketch a summary of its contents; those who have a taste for the subject, and have not entirely mastered it, ought to read the book. The merits of the Inductive method are proved by the immense additions it has made to the physical sciences since it has been brought into distinct practice. Its defects, as it was limited by Bacon and understood by his followers, may be seen in its influence on the mental sciences as developed or degraded by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Bayle, Voltaire, Condillac, Holbach, Helvetius, and others of the materialist school.

The natural order of the acquisition of knowledge is, first, that of the phenomena of physical nature around us, and afterwards that of our mental nature; and Bacon fell so far into this order that he unduly fastened the intellect to the leading-strings of physical nature, and restricted all human knowledge to our external experience, and allowed to the mind no inhe-

more harm than good.—Let no one hastily talk of the good which he has received, but let him first make experiment of its reality, Eccles. v. 1.

GERLACH:—The Christian Church possesses this power of the keys, not in its outward capacity or organization, but in so far as the Spirit rules in it. Hence, whenever it is exercised as a merely outward law, without the Spirit, the Lord in His providence disowns these false pretensions of the visible Church.

HEUBNER:—In order to be decided, and to become our own faith, we must publicly profess it.—How little value attaches to the opinions of the age on great men!*—The independence of Christians of prevalent opinions.—Peter's confession not his faith only, but that of all disciples, John vi. 68.—Peter's confession the collective confession of the Apostles.—See what value Christ sets on this faith.—It is impossible for any man, even though he were an apostle, to impart faith to another. This is God's prerogative.

* [Not, *How much great men are influenced by the opinions of the age*, as the Edb. trsl., misled by the German *wie viel* (which must be understood *ironically*), reverses the meaning of the original, thus making Heubner contradict himself in the next sentence. Heubner alludes to the confused and contradictory opinions of the Jews concerning Christ, ver. 15, and then contrasts with them the firm conviction of faith in Peter, ver. 16. Great men, during their lifetime, meet with the very opposite judgments at the bar of ever-changing popular opinion, and they are not truly great unless they can rise above it and quietly pursue the path of duty, leaving the small matter of their own fame in the hands of a just God and of an appreciating posterity which will judge them by the fruits of their labour.—P. S.]

ART. V.—*The Freedom of the Will as a Basis of Human Responsibility and Government*; elucidated and maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian Theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading advocates. By D. D. WHEDON, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1864.

Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that Wills, a Creative First Cause. By ROWLAND G. HAZARD. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

THESE works agree in being occupied with some preliminary discussions in regard to the nature of the Will, Liberty, and Necessity, and then in being devoted mainly and avowedly to the refutation of Edwards's famous treatise on this subject. However successful or unsuccessful these attempts, they are

certainly renewed testimonies of the highest order to the mighty power and adamantine logic of that great work. Volumes upon volumes have been published against it by the acutest of its adversaries; yet they appear not to have demolished it so thoroughly but that the representative advocates of the contrary scheme regard themselves as called upon to do the work over again, in order that it may be done effectually; that the book, in short, may be so put down as to stay down. Within not far from a quarter of a century, besides numerous elaborate criticisms in the *Quarterlies*, through which so many of our ablest thinkers address the public, we call to mind no less than five solid volumes, wholly or chiefly in review of *Edwards on the Will*, and all, with one exception, adverse. Surely there must be some strength in a fortress which, having survived all other assaults from the Old world and the New, for nearly a century, followed by the fierce bombardment of Tappan and Bledsoe here, still abides to challenge the cautious sapping and mining of Hazard, along with the furious and desperate storming of Whedon.

In truth, these very assailants contribute to its tenacity of life, not merely by promoting its continued notoriety and fame, and bearing witness that it still exerts an influence and convictive force which require to be neutralized, but by furnishing evidence, more and more cumulative, of the futility of all replies to its fundamental positions and crucial arguments. This is none the less, but all the more so, notwithstanding any flaws which may be detected in some of the many lines of argument of which Edwards's inventive logical mind was so prolific, and the still greater infelicities of language which occasionally obscure or enfeeble his sharpest distinctions and reasonings with seeming ambiguity, or even contradiction. For, in spite of all this, the main pillars of his argument stand unmoved and impregnable. The blemishes to which we have referred, developed by a century of incessant and relentless criticism, no more impair their massive and unyielding solidity, than the seams, and clefts, and fissures of the rock impair the firmness and perpetuity of the everlasting mountains. And they are shown to be all the more moveless and impregnable by the manifest impotence and absurdity of the attacks of the

mightiest assailants. Let candid and thinking men, for example, study the answers which these volumes offer to Edwards's argument for the anterior certainty of volitions, from the divine foreknowledge and providence; from the case of God, angels, and glorified saints in heaven, and the irreclaimably obdurate in hell; and can he help feeling the weakness of the cause which is driven to such staggering efforts for its defence, or the strength of that fortress against which no stronger assault can be made? We think the real effect of such works, notwithstanding all their elaborate, boastful, and defiant plausibilities, is at length to work a conviction in honest minds—nay, in the minds of their warmest admirers—that there is something not easily overthrown in this great treatise of Edwards, and other cognate works of the great divines of the church, after all.

We have adverted to the unfortunate effect of certain ambiguities and infelicities in Edwards's terminology. It will facilitate our work if we point out some of the more conspicuous and perplexing of them. It is proper to observe, however, that, for various reasons, the terms relating to this subject have an inherent ambiguity, against which few, if any writers, can fully guard by qualifying adjuncts; and further, that it is not strange that a century of the ablest friendly and adverse criticism should have detected imperfections of this sort, which the author, with all his marvellous keenness, overlooked. The most important instances of this sort which now occur to us, although not confined to him, were,

1. The ambiguous use of the word *will*. In his formal definition of it, Edwards makes it include, after the manner of the schoolmen and older writers, all the active or non-cognitive powers of the soul, comprehending not only the power of volition, but of sensibility, desire, and affection. But his argument impliedly or expressly takes will in the narrower sense in which modern writers usually take it, as the mere power of volition, or of carrying out, in choice and purpose, the prevailing desires and dispositions of the soul. With this latter sense of the word, his argument is clear, cogent, and unanswerable; with the former, it runs into confusion, and is open to abundant criticism.

2. The word *motive* is subject to similar embarrassment. Sometimes it denotes the inward desires which determine the

volition, sometimes the object of choice, sometimes both—“whatever excites the mind to choice.” The doctrine that the will is as the strongest motive, is true, if by motive be meant those inward states and activities of the mind which determine its choices. It is not true, if by motive be meant anything exterior to the mind, as some of the circuitous phraseology of Edwards and others, at times, suggests. To this circumstance many of the most plausible criticisms upon his work owe their power.

3. Another word is *necessity*. Edwards, in common with many others, adopts, or permits himself to use, this word, to denote the certainty of the connection between the choice or volition and the antecedent desire or inclination which prompts and determines it. This use of the word *necessity*, although often adopted by both parties in this controversy, so that the advocates of contingency or contrary choice insist in calling their opponents *Necessitarians*, and are allowed to do so without sufficient protest against it, is nevertheless improper and injurious. Define and explain as we will, words ever tend towards their natural and normal import in the minds of readers, and even of the writers themselves, who so explain and define them in a “non-natural sense.” While it is true, and shown by the irrefragable demonstration of Edwards, that there is the aforementioned certainty of volitions, and that it is consistent with their freedom, the word *necessity* constantly suggests the idea of an outward constraint or mechanical force incompatible with liberty. This word ought, therefore, to be banished from these discussions, and certainty should be substituted in its place, being the essential point in issue.

4. Another equivocal word in this controversy is *good*. The doctrine of Edwards and other writers is, that “the will is as the greatest apparent good.” Some restrict the word to denote happiness, or the means of happiness, in which case the maxim is not true. For men undeniably choose the right, and other objects, as well as happiness. But if *good* be used for what seems at the moment of choice most desirable, the maxim is true, and is abundantly demonstrated to be true, by Edwards, as well as by the most intimate consciousness of every free-agent.

5. Another term which, as used by Edwards and others, frequently causes misapprehension, is *self-determination*. What Edwards demonstrates is, that the will does not determine itself irrespective of the intellect, feelings, and desires. This is true. But it is equally true, that the will is not determined by forces *ab extra*. It is determined, or determines itself in its free actings, according to the desires of the mind. And since one view of the will given by Edwards is, that it is no separate agent, but only a faculty or activity of the mind, the "mind willing," it may be truly said that the will so defined, *i. e.*, the "mind willing" determines itself according to its own inclinations. In his crushing assaults upon the self-determination of the will independently of the antecedent state of the soul, he has not always sufficiently guarded against the interpretation of those, who charge him with wholly denying all self-determination of the soul, even according to its own pleasure, in volition.

These explanations and qualifications at once eliminate the most vulnerable parts of Edwards's work, and dispose of a large portion of the plausible reasonings against it, found in the present, and other attacks upon it. This remark applies particularly to Mr. Hazard's work, on which we will offer a few brief remarks, before touching Dr. Whedon's volume, which will occupy our chief attention.

Of Mr. Hazard's antecedents we know nothing. All our knowledge of him is through this carefully wrought volume, which shows him to be an earnest and candid thinker, not wanting in metaphysical acumen and speculative insight. He makes an occasional side utterance that ought not to be overlooked. He evidently has a tender side towards idealism and monism. Although "admitting for the purposes of argument the existence of matter as distinct from spirit," he says that "all the sensations which we attribute to matter are as fully accounted for by the hypothesis that they are the thought, the imagery of God, *directly* imparted, or made palpable to our finite minds, as by the hypothesis of a direct external substance in which he has moulded this thought and imagery." Pp. 5—8. "We do not even know that the movement of our own hand as a sequent of our volition is not a uniform mode of God's action, and not by our own direct agency." P. 365. Such declarations

show that the author is not wholly free from an idealistic and even pantheistic drift.

Again, he gives a strange definition of knowledge, in the following terms: "Of knowledge, obviously an important element in all intelligent cause, I will further remark, that I deem the term, in strict propriety, applicable only to those ideas, or perceptions of the mind, of which we entertain no doubt, and that it is applicable to such, even though they are not conformable to truth; for if we cannot say we know that of which we have no doubt, there is nothing to which we can apply the term and it is useless." P. 18. Again, "the knowledge of each individual as to what is morally right for him is infallible." P. 159.

We think that two great errors lurk, if they are not perfectly obvious, in these extracts. The one is, that men may *know what is untrue*. This subverts the nature and essence of knowledge, which consists in the cognition of what is, and not of unrealities. What has no existence is not knowable as existent. What is not a possible object of knowledge cannot be known. It may be a matter of belief, it may be a delusion, but it cannot be known. The view in question really obliterates the distinction between truth and error. Belief of the one is just as certainly knowledge as the other; but error is, in fact, only a form of ignorance. And surely ignorance and knowledge are not identical. Such a system, by depriving knowledge of the element of certainty, placing it on the same footing as error, really destroys all foundations, except those of scepticism, and these it lays firmly and immovably.

This is all the more conspicuous, as we see the author carrying out this principle into the sphere of ethics, theoretical and applied. He says, "the knowledge of each individual as to what he thinks right, is for him *infallible*." This we understand to erect each man's conscience or moral judgment into an infallible rule or standard of righteousness, no matter how perverted or defiled that conscience may be. This is among the most mischievous and superficial popular fallacies. No errors of moral judgment are excusable, or can excuse crimes committed in conformity to them. A woe is upon them who call good evil, and evil good; who put light for darkness, and darkness for light. Does the fact that Paul "verily

thought he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth"—that many think they "do God service" in persecuting his people—justify these crimes, or are such moral judgments "infallible" or excusable? Such a view obliterates all moral distinctions, all immutable righteousness, together with the supreme authority of God and his word. It is doubtless true that a man sins if he disobeys his conscience; but it is also true that he sins in doing what is wrong, even though it be enjoined or approved by conscience. A man whose conscience is misguided, is in a fearful dilemma. If he obeys his conscience, he sins, for he does what is wrong in itself; and a bad conscience can never make wrong right. His intention is good, but his act is evil. On the other hand, if he violate his conscience, he does what he believes wrong. His intention is therefore evil, though his act, aside of such intention, be good. An act, to be good in every aspect of it, must be good as to matter and form—good in itself, and good in the intent of the doer; and no delusion or blindness of conscience can make good evil, or evil good. The true solution of the difficulty is, that it is every man's duty to enlighten his conscience, as he may, by the candid and earnest use of the means within his reach; to know the right, and to do it. This he may do if he will. For, "if any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

With regard to Mr. Hazard's arguments about the will, and Edwards's Inquiry concerning it, we think they are almost entirely obviated, or shown to be irrelevant, by the explanations we have attempted, and a due estimate of the ambiguities and infelicities of language we have endeavoured to point out. The point in issue is, whether the will acts contingently, fortuitously, and independently of the antecedent states and activities—the views, preferences, and inclinations of the soul—or under their influence; whether the mind determines its volitions in accordance with them, or uninfluenced by them; and whether antecedent certainty of volitions, thus arising from the previous bias of the mind, consists with their freedom and responsibility? To this latter question, Edwards, Calvin, Augustine, and their followers say, yes. Their adversaries say,

no. This is the simple issue, however it may have been sometimes obscured or misstated.

Now, on this issue, Mr. Hazard, notwithstanding so many of his excerpts from Edwards, which he dexterously manipulates into targets easy to hit and shatter, really supports the former side—the side of those he evidently deems his adversaries, whatever counter doctrines and implications he may casually put forth. And this is true, not in the same sense as it is true of Dr. Whedon and other controvertists of that side, that they occasionally acknowledge the truth they assail, either inadvertently or by constraint. It is the main doctrine of his book. Its counter utterances are the exceptional ones. Mr. Hazard, however, appears to suppose that this doctrine, that the mind controls its own volitions according to its previous judgment and preference, (or as he, by an extraordinary misnomer, calls this antecedent of volition, *choice*, which is no other than volition itself,) establishes contrary choice in the sense denied by the Edwardean or Augustinian school. In our view, on the other hand, it utterly overthrows this dogma. But first, of the proof that he maintains as we allege, and then for its consequences.

First, he asserts not that the “WILL, but that the mind, the active being, determines its own volition, and that it does this by means of its knowledge; and further, that the choice which it is admitted in most, if not in all cases, precedes the effort, or act of will, is not, as Edwards asserts, itself an act of will, but is the knowledge of the mind that one thing is superior to another, or suits us better than other things; this knowledge being always a simple mental perception, to which previous effort may or may not have been requisite; and that every act of the will is a beginning of a new action, independent of all previous actions—which, *of themselves*, nowise affect or influence the new action, though the *knowledge acquired* in or by such previous actions, being used by the mind to direct this new action, may be to it the reason of its acting, or of the manner of its acting; and that in the use of such knowledge to direct or adapt its action to the occasion, or to its want,” &c. Pp. 233–4.

Here, it will be observed, that the mind determines its own

volition "by means of its knowledge," which knowledge is "choice:" a perception that "one thing is superior to another, or suits us better than other things;" that the use of such knowledge is to "direct" volition, and "adapt it to its wants." How could it be more clearly stated that volition is directed, made certain by the antecedent apprehensions, preferences, or in his queer phrase, "choice" of the mind? And is this any the less so, though it is said in the same breath, that "every act of the will" is the "beginning of a new action independent of all previous actions?"

Mr. Hazard speaks of "adapting" the volition to the "want" of the soul. "Want" figures largely, but none too largely, in his system. He says, "Intelligence in acting, then, must have an object. The object of its action must be an effect which it *wants* to produce. The mind acting intelligently, will not make an effort or will to produce an effect which it does not *want* to produce. Every volition, then, must arise from the feeling or perception of some want bodily or mental; otherwise there is no object of action." P. 53. "Its want furnishing an object of action, and its knowledge enabling it to determine *what* action, are all that distinguish the mind from unintelligent cause or force. . . . The want does not, generally, arise from a volition. We may want, we do want, without effort to want. The mind could not begin its action by willing a want, unless there were first a *want* of that want." Pp. 56, 57.

How could language more explicitly enunciate the doctrine that the acts of the will are guided by our desires or wants, and the dictates of intelligence, as to the best means of gratifying them? Nay, it is plainly and rightly taught that volitions without such stimulus and guidance are impossible. Indeed, one of the author's definitions of will is, "the mode in which intelligence exerts its power." P. 249. "The mind directs its act of will by means of its knowledge, in which act being thus self-directed, it acts freely." Pp. 402, 403. It would be difficult, in briefer terms, to state the truth, that freedom in volition supposes it directed and made certain by the antecedent apprehensions and desires of the mind. This involves the whole for which the class whom they style Necessitarians contend. All Mr. Hazard's reasonings in regard to the formulas of

Edwards, that "the will is as the greatest apparent good," as the "last dictate of the understanding," as the inclination, preference, desire, &c., end in proving that the acts of will are determined by the mind through its wants and intelligence, and not by forces *ab extra*. This is well enough in its place, but, with regard to the question at issue, it is *ignoratio elenchi*. The thing to be proved is, not that the mind determines its volitions; but that it does not determine them in virtue of, and in accordance with, its antecedent states. Just the opposite of this is what Mr. Hazard proves, and his whole analysis of the will requires—although he appears at times to think, that proving the mind's direction of its own volitions proves the power of contrary choice, in opposition to that to which the will is freely guided by the intelligence and wants of the soul. Yet he says, "if there be of *necessity* a connection between this decision and effort, this only proves that the mind is of necessity free in such effort; and to assert the contrary, is again like saying that freedom is not free because it is of *necessity* free." P. 382. Thus it appears that even necessity may connect the act of will with the previous judgment or "decision" of the mind, without impairing its freedom.

But this is still more clearly and decisively brought out by the author in reference to the divine actions and volitions. "I have already alluded to the fact, that this uniformity of the action of Supreme Intelligence, as observed in many cases, may arise in part from the perfect wisdom by which it determines its acts without the necessity of experiment. The same remark applies in some degree to the action of finite will, which, with finite wisdom, knowing or ascertaining by experience or otherwise the best modes in certain cases, will adopt them whenever such cases arise; and this gives some appearance of reason for the application of the law of uniformity and necessity in cause and effect to the mind." P. 378. This is a sufficiently emphatic testimony, that the certain and uniform direction of volitions, in accordance with an antecedent state of mind, no way militates against their freedom and moral quality.

Yet, notwithstanding these declarations of the formal doctrine of the book, the author is so possessed with the doctrine of contrary or contingent volition, and with the conviction that

he has unanswerably proved it, that he gives up the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, which he has the candour (unusual with this class of writers,) to concede and evince is undermined by such a theory of the will. To this we shall again recur. Meanwhile we pass to the work of Dr. Whedon, who is now, we believe, acknowledged *primus inter pares* among the expounders and champions of Methodism in our country.

His book contains one of the most ardent and searching discussions of the subject that have yet appeared. Bold, adventurous, inventive, eager, he threads every argument of his adversaries, presses on with burning zeal, and stops not till he appears to himself to have demolished all opposing theories, and completely worsted their supporters. Dr. Whedon is in his way a strong man. He betrays a force of intellect, an earnestness of conviction, and energy of will, which eminently fit him to lead other minds, and quite explain his polemical primacy in his communion. Amid much that is crude, he is never tame, feeble, or timid. He moves with a great momentum, which, indeed, is all the more crushing to himself when, with equal blindness and boldness, he dashes against the everlasting rock. He deals sledge-hammer blows, and, alas! too often with a fatal recoil upon himself. He is so radical and destructive in his principles, that he is altogether suicidal.

Before presenting to our readers the proofs and illustrations of these characteristics, as shown in his arguments, we feel called upon to notice some exhibitions of them in his language. We do not remember any respectable book, for a long time, so deformed with barbarisms of obsolete and new-coined words, whose inherent ugliness is not palliated by any valid plea of necessity. We have no taste for word-criticism, much less would we make a man an offender for a word, however illegitimate, if it be a solitary or nearly solitary instance. We accord the fullest liberty of introducing new terms, whether derivatives of our own, or importations from a foreign tongue, to more fully articulate new phases of thought, of which a correspondent growth of language is the mysterious but normal exponent. But on none of these grounds can we sanction the introduction of such terrific vocables as *volitivity*, *impressibilities*, *free-willer*, *unisubstanceism*, *impellency*, *non-differentiation*, *begin-*

ningless, volitionate, freedomism, freedomistic, mustness, exceptionlessly, necessitarianly, uniformitarian, alternativity, uncompulsorily, adamantinized, unimpededly, and much more the like.

The radical principle of this book is, that freedom of the will is the power to choose either way, in such a sense as to preclude any previous "fixing" of the choice, or securing or making it certain that it shall be in one direction rather than the other. The author denounces all antecedent "fixation" of choice, so as to render it certain to the exclusion of the contrary, as incompatible with liberty, and involving a necessity subversive of freedom and responsibility. Edwards's definition of liberty, as the power of doing as we please, he utterly scouts and derides. P. 28.

"A man may do as he pleases and yet not be free, both because his antecedent *please* is necessitated, and because he is limited and circumscribed to the course with which he is pleased. Power both *pro* and *contra*, power to the thing and from the thing is requisite for the liberty of a free agent. Power, then, to the volition and from the volition, and to a reverse volition must exist, or the agent is not free in the volition. It is an error to call an agent volitionally free, unless he has power for either one of two or more volitions." Pp. 34-5. If we "put forth a volition which is under necessitation to be what it is from previous volition, responsible freedom ceases. . . . The same necessitative result follows if we suppose the volition is *as* some fixed antecedent, whether such antecedent be a 'choice,' an 'inclination,' a 'wish,' or a 'please.' For if each and every antecedent in the series, however long the series be, is fixed by its predecessor and fixes its successor, the whole train is necessitated, and the putting forth of the last volition, the one in question is anteriorly fixed. And a volition whose putting forth is anteriorly fixed to a unitary result is not free." P. 36.

There can be no mistake as to the meaning of all this. If the volition be previously fixed and made certain, and the non-existence of the contrary insured by any antecedent whatever, be it outward or inward, even by the will, choice, inclination, wish, pleasure of the soul, this destroys its freedom and ac-

countability. And that there may be no possible chance for misconstruction here, he puts it in a great variety of forms. He tells us:—"The fact that the will is drawn or secretly attracted, so that the volition goes forth eagerly and of itself, as the soul does of itself by its own spontaneous power go after happiness, renders the necessity none the less absolute. Around the faculties of the soul a circumvallating line of causation is still thereby none the less drawn because it is delicately drawn and finely shaded. The resisting power at the spring of the will may be as completely annihilated by a seduction or fascination as by a rude impulsion. Causation securing effect, which Edwards maintains must rule at every infinitesimal point to secure us from atheism, as truly secures this so-called *free* forthgoing of the soul as the steam-power secures the movement of the car. No fine word-painting will change this necessity to freedom." Pp. 30-1.

No language could more plainly declare, that *whatever* secures a given volition, to the exclusion of the contrary, destroys its freedom. The choice being as *certainly* secured as the movement of a car by a locomotive, is no more free than the movement of that car. Any "seduction" or "fascination" which obtains such mastery as to render certain the free choices of the will, destroys their freedom and their merit or demerit. Even the grace of God, with irresistible sweetness drawing us, that we should run after God, according to this, destroys our freedom. Hence the phrase, "To secure the certainty of a free act, is absurd, because contradictory." P. 227. "Is a previously decreed volition any more responsible than a previously decreed intellection or muscular spasmodic action? . . . God may as well secure my damnation without anything voluntary, as secure it by securing the voluntary. Securing my volition in order that he may secure my voluntary sin and consequent condemnation, is about the poorest piece of sneaking despotism that one could attribute to an omnipotent evil." P. 210.

If all this, and a vast deal more of the same sort in this book be so, then there is no security for the continued fealty of a single saint on earth or in heaven for another hour. And not only so, there is no certainty that God, or angels, or glorified

men, will not swerve from purity, "make a hell of heaven," and devastate the moral universe!

Indeed, the author puts the premise for this dread conclusion in such strong and explicit terms, as amount almost to the direct assertion of it, in the following, as well as other passages.

"Freedom is as much contradicted by a law of Invariability, that is, a law by which all will does obey the strongest motive, even though able to do otherwise, as by a law of Causation. If the invariability be formulated as an anterior fact, strictly absolute and universal, pervading all actual and possible cases, then, by the law of Contradiction, the counter exception becomes impossible. Thus it is claimed by some thinkers that though *the Will possesses power for choice* against the strongest motives, yet that choice *will never be used*. If that *never* is an invariability, as truly in itself universal as the law of causation, the usance of the power of counter choice is impossible. It is incompatible with an absolute universal contradictory fact, and *cannot* take place,—and that the reverse of which cannot be, is a *necessity*. A power which cannot be used, a power which is not in the power of the agent for act, is no adequate power in the agent at all. It exists in words only, and can be no satisfactory basis of responsibility." Pp. 38, 39.

By no possible torture can this and much more the like, be strained into consistency with the certainly immutable holiness of God, the future stability of the angels and saints in heaven, or the perpetual impiety of devils and lost men in hell. And what shall be thought of that scheme which must be false, unless heaven may apostatize and hell be converted? Other portentous consequences of it are too obvious, and have been made too prominent in discussions upon this subject, to be overlooked, even by Dr. Whedon himself. It is clearly incompatible with the foreknowledge and providence of God. It enthrones contingency or chance. It overthrows original righteousness, original sin, and efficacious grace. The reasonings by which it is supported, applied to undeniable facts, tend towards Universalism, and, as we shall see, are pushed by the author himself full far in that direction. Indeed, it subverts and utterly vacates freedom itself. For the idea that a choice should be free, and at the same time contrary to the pleasure of the agent, is a contradiction,

utterly opposite to all normal consciousness, and wholly inconceivable. And if a free choice be according to our pleasure, then it will be such as that pleasure prompts, and no other—free as to the manner, free in choosing as we please, and, therefore, certain as to the event. This is the undeniable fact with regard to all the most perfect free agents in existence. This doctrine, therefore, maintained professedly in the interest of freedom, in reality subverts it. Let us notice some of the ways in which Dr. Whedon deals with such objections to his scheme.

A careful examination of his book will show,

1. That he wavers in the maintenance of his great principle already brought to view, and, at times, apparently gives it up.
2. That he appears at times to accept, and at times to disown many of the logical consequences we have just attributed to it.
3. That consequently his reasonings in support of these shifting positions are often confused and contradictory.

1. In regard to his great principle that the rendering of choices certain or invariable by any antecedent ground or influence, destroys freedom and responsibility, the following are among the passages that evince the difficulty of firmly adhering to a doctrine so monstrous.

“HABITS are uniformities of action which may be said to *grow upon us* by repetition. They are uniformities of *volition*, too: and they are often performed with so little deliberation as to bear a resemblance to instinct. *Positively*, habit arises by the influence of the same recurring motives for the which Will will act. Those motives are brought up by the laws of intellectual association of time, place, objects and causation. Natural impulses seem to spring up in the being, physical and psychical, suggesting the usual volition. Meantime, *negatively*, counter-motive and counter-thought are gradually more perfectly and constantly excluded. No other than the given way is imagined or enters the mind. And thus the volitions move, as in a passage way walled upon either side. The wall is an amalgam of blending freedom and necessity.” P. 168.

Again: “The motive may be so permanent and strong as to create a firm reliability that the subordinate volitions will accord. Indirectly, the counter motives may be excluded, so as to leave the mind completely shut up to the positive motive,

and a necessitation be superinduced. Men, thus, may be so absorbed in their plans as to cease to be free alternative agents; but they seldom or never thereby lose their responsibility." P. 169.

And yet again: "So largely and effectively do the dispositions, the habits, and the standard purposes influence the volitions, both by position and impulse, and by excluding counter courses from the view, that the agent, however intrinsically and by nature *free*, is, to a great extent, objectively unfree." P. 170.

Still further: "Thus, if we have rightly traced the process, is constituted CHARACTER. Upon a basis of corporeal, physiological, and mental nature, are overlaid a primary superstructure of dispositions blending the native and the volitional, and a secondary formation of generic purposes wholly volitional, and formed by repetition into a tertiary of habits; and thus we have in his mingled constitution of necessitation and freedom an agent prepared for his daily free, responsible action." P. 171.

Once more: "But of the sin which appropriates the sin of our nature, our axiomatic principles require us to affirm that it is *free and avoidable*; yet, *back of that freedom*, we admit that there is a NECESSITY that insures that, sooner or later, *the free act of appropriation will be made*. It is in this fact that the freedom and the universality of this fall are found to be reconciled." P. 339.

Conclusive as are these passages to the effect that volitions may be rendered antecedently certain and uniform, without impairing their freedom and responsibility; conclusive, therefore, against the main doctrine of the book, we cannot forbear a single other quotation:—"A CHARACTER may be formed with a mind so wholly circumscribed within a circle of sensual feelings and conceptions, selfish and corrupt maxims, sordid purposes and habits, that the complete inventory of the thoughts is depraved, and no honourable or truly ethical volition is within the catalogue of possibilities. Of *such* a character it may be said, without our being obliged to define whether it be a case of necessity or reliable certainty, that he *cannot* will nobly or rightly." P. 172.

What language could more decidedly express a complete surrendry of the author's distinctive doctrine? He goes further than the bulk of his adversaries, who only contend for a "reliable certainty" in choice, as flowing from the antecedent states of the mind. Any "necessity" beyond such certainty they disown, while in the extracts preceding, our author appears to maintain it. At all events he admits, at the least, such certainty, and calls it necessity. What, then, does all his vehement denunciation, with which this volume is freighted, amount to? Why should he, with such stupendous labour, erect this huge fabric, only to strike it down with a few strokes of his pen? Much more of the same essential force might be taken from his discussion of the power of motives, and elsewhere; but it is needless. It hardly helps his case, however, to tell us, that "for a volition to arise from the influence of motives, is not the same as to be the effect of motives." P. 159. A cause resting on such a distinction is not less thin and tenuous than the distinction itself. Does he not more than affirm, in these quotations, what he elsewhere so strenuously combats when put forth by his opponents, viz., freedom in the manner and quality of some actions, along with certainty, and even necessity, as to the event? Also, that the "direction" of choice, under given outward motives, is determined not by the bare natural faculty, but by the moral state"? Do not these passages abundantly teach that choice may be free and responsible, without the "property of choosing the exact contrary of what, in the whole, appears most eligible and desirable?"*

* Perhaps we ought not to leave unnoticed here a small bit of small criticism on ourselves, in the following terms:—"With a crude philosophy the Princeton Essayist, like other necessitarians, assumes that the mind must be completely occupied with one 'bias,' which excludes all coexistent contrarities. "Will any one pretend that it is conscious of a power to choose contrariwise, its ruling inclination or pleasure being and continuing to choose as it has chosen?" P. 254. "What is meant by a ruling inclination's choosing, or a pleasure's choosing, we pretend not to say." Pp. 373-4. Really, does Dr. Whedon need to be told, what is so obvious to all but captious critics, that the mind's inclination and pleasure to choose, import simply the mind inclined or pleased to choose?—that it makes choosing an act of the mind, according to its inclination or pleasure, and not an act of the pleasure or inclination

Dr. Whedon, in these extracts, has certainly shown how, in the lowest phase of character, freedom—and what he calls necessity—blend. In the following, among others, he quite soars to the grand Augustinian formula, that “on the highest point of moral elevation, freedom and necessity coincide.”

“We may suppose a free being born under conditions of free moral self-development, to be self-wrought to a state of high perfection. So has he trained his own nature by dropping all evil indulgences, that all evil propensities are lost; and so has he formed his taste to good, that none but motives of good can reach him. His habits are so perfected thereby that temptation ceases. He does right without effort, and ultimately *can no more do wrong than I can enjoy the central heat of a fiery furnace. The merit of virtue does not cease when its power is so perfect that its contest is over. Admitting the agent to be now necessarily right, his effortless virtue is none the less meritorious because it has become spontaneous.* The merit of his virtue does not cease as soon as he has perfected it.” Pp. 329–30.

We have italicised these last few sentences, because they are so momentous, and so clearly concede the great principles of the Augustinian psychology, which this book is written especially to overthrow. Generally, the italics and capitals found in our quotations are the author’s.

II. We now call attention to some of Dr. Whedon’s admissions, more or less explicit, of the consequences which, in our view, result from his theory.

In regard to the possibility of a lapse from holiness on the part of God, Dr. Whedon uses the following language:—“The rectitude of God’s actions is what we may call perfectly probable, and certain, *practically* reliable as any physical necessity, without admitting that the nexus is the same or equally irreversible, and strictly admitting the power of contrary choice.” P. 314. Deliver us from modes of thinking which can describe the rectitude of the divine acts as PROBABLE, even though it be enough so to be “*practically reliable;*” but not “*equally irreversible*” with the nexus between physical cause and effect,

abstractly, or otherwise than as the mind acts according to them? That we have assumed what he here ascribes to us, is an entirely gratuitous assumption of Dr. Whedon.

nay, wholly at the mercy of a strict power of contrary choice! Is it on such a foundation that our faith in God's immutable perfection rests? Is a probability, a mere practical reliability, which is less irreversible by the power of contrary choice than the causal connection between the law of gravity and the falling of an apple—that anchor of the soul which is furnished by the oath and promise of Him for whom it is “impossible to lie” (Heb. vi. 18), and who cannot “deny himself”? 2 Tim. ii. 13.

Dr. Whedon says further: “God is holy in that he chooses to make his own happiness in eternal Right. Whether he could not make himself equally happy in Wrong, is more than we can say.” P. 316. Again: “And how knows a finite insect, like us, that in the course of ages the motives in the universe may not prove strongest for a divine apostasy to evil?” P. 317. The saints in all generations, from the babe in Christ to the “great Apostle,” know full well the utter and eternal impossibility of these dread contingencies. Otherwise, how could their “hearts be fixed, trusting in the Lord,” even as “Mount Zion, that shall never be moved”?

Dr. Whedon excludes the acts of men and angels from the sphere of God's purposes and providence. He says: “The Divine plan, as embraced in God's predetermination, is a scheme strictly embracing only the Divine actions.” P. 293. Such a position needs no comment here. It of course follows inevitably, that if the actions of creatures are outside of God's plan and purpose, they are outside of his foreknowledge. Indeed, the utter inconsistency of this scheme with the foreknowledge of God is so obvious and demonstrable, that it rarely fails to loom up in discussions on this subject. The argument is simple and conclusive. If God has eternally foreknown the actions of free-agents, then there has been an eternal antecedent certainty what they will be. And this antecedent certainty was inconsistent with their being otherwise. There is no evading this. And if so, such antecedent certainty is compatible with freedom. It is of no avail to say that foreknowledge does not, determine or make certain the action. If it does not make, it *proves* them certain eternal ages before their occurrence. For what is not in itself certain cannot be an

object of certain knowledge. This, of course, proves a Divine purpose or decree that they shall come to pass. For there is no conceivable ground, before their occurrence, of these actions passing out of the category of things possible to be, into those things that shall be—that is, from mere possibility to positive futurity—but the Divine purpose. But not to dwell upon this, whether it be true or not, the above argument for the absolute unfrustrable antecedent certainty of volitions abides impregnable. And among the most remarkable confirmations of the stringency of this argument, are the efforts of adversaries to parry it—especially those contained in the two volumes under review.

Dr. Whedon begins by telling us that “God’s foreordination must be viewed as being preceded by his foreknowledge.” P. 266. There is no precedence of either, both being alike co-eternal. But that a determination should be known before it is from some source determined—*i. e.*, fixed what it shall be—is a simple contradiction. Dr. Whedon tells us again and again, that “the freedom of an act is not affected by its being an object of foreknowledge.” Of course not. But what does this prove? Nothing, surely, except that Dr. Whedon is mistaken in his idea of freedom as inconsistent with any antecedent fixing, and consequent certainty of the choice, to the exclusion of the contrary.

Says our author: “If that agent in a given case be able to will either of several ways, *there is no need of a present causation to make it certain which he will do.* The agent, by his act in the future, makes all the certainty there now is. It is by and from that act solely thus put forth that the present *will be* of the act exists. He will put forth his act unsecured by any present inalternative making or securement. Whichever act he puts forth it is true that he *will put forth*; and that now unmade *will put forth* is all the certainty there is. It is by that putting forth solely, that the present *will be* is true. All the certainty there is, that is, all the *will be* about it, depends upon, and arises solely from the act of the free agent himself. It is simply the uncaused will be of an act which can otherwise be. Certainty, therefore, is not a previously made, caused, or manufactured thing.” P. 282. This is a total denial that out

of several acts possible to be, that one which is certain to occur, and is foreknown as certain to occur, has any certainty not created by the act itself; of course, any certainty anterior to the act, and, therefore, any possibility of being foreknown. This effectually subverts the Divine foreknowledge. It is quite in keeping to tell us on the same page, that "no argument can be drawn from the prophecies of holy Scriptures, to prove the predetermination of human actions." We are hardly surprised after this to be told that, while foreknowledge must know the right fact, it is unnecessary that "the fact should accord with the foreknowledge," p. 283; or that Dr. Whedon should "deny that between the foreknowledge and the agent-power the connection is necessary or indissoluble," p. 284; or that foreknowledge "can be true in full consistency with the existence of a power to make it false," p. 285; or finally, that "God's foreknowledge neither makes the event necessary nor *proves* it so." P. 288. We have had enough of Dr. Whedon's dissolving views on this subject. We now turn to Mr. Hazard's more logical and manly course—in admitting the inexorable consequences of his doctrine, and giving up the Divine Omniscience. He says:

"An event foreknown by infallible prescience must be as certain in the future as if known by infallible memory in the past, and to say that God foreknows an event, which depends on the action of an agent, which acting without his control, may, of itself, freely and independently produce any one of several different results, or none at all, involves a contradiction. I am disposed to yield to the argument of Edwards all the benefit of any doubt on these points; . . . to admit that what is certainly foreknown by Omniscience must certainly happen, and that, if God foreknows the volitions of men, then they cannot will freely. . . . though God having the *power to determine could* foreknow all events, he may forego the exercise of such power, and neither control nor know the particular events which are thus left to be determined by the action of the human mind." Pp. 385, 386. Of course, when we assent to the argument that foreknowledge is inconsistent with freedom, it is only in their false meaning of the word freedom as a

something incompatible with previous certainty. And this remark applies to analogous quotations from Dr. Whedon.

Mr. Hazard, however, gives up the Omniscience of God in behalf of his superficial conception of freedom, only to entangle himself in still more formidable difficulties in regard to God's providence and government of a universe, the most momentous events and highest actions in which are wholly unforeseen. We cannot follow him here. Surely none can study his toilsome and futile attempts to meet these difficulties, without being more firmly convinced of that great truth, the rejection of which involves plunge upon plunge, from deep to deep, till, beneath the lowest, they reach a lower still, in this abyss of absurdities.

We cannot conclude without touching a single other topic. We said that the reasonings employed in support of the doctrine of these volumes point logically towards Universalism, and that Dr. Whedon pushes them full far in that direction. This is a grave allegation. We will briefly give our reasons for it.

The doctrine of these volumes is simply that the previous fixation, or securing the certainty and invariability of volitions by any antecedents whatever, destroys freedom, responsibility, merit and demerit. But it is undeniable, and is, as we have seen, freely admitted by Dr. Whedon, that such certainty and invariability of sinful choices in mankind are established from the beginning of their moral agency, at least until regeneration, by their antecedent state. What is the inevitable consequence of such premises? Why, surely, that men are neither culpable nor punishable for their sins, and will not suffer on account of them. Hence salvation is a matter of justice. The atonement is uncalled for and needless, or if it be on any account needful, it is a simple discharge of justice to injured man, rather than a vicarious satisfaction of the demands of Divine justice upon the pardoned sinner. Says Dr. Whedon, p. 341, "Without losing its intrinsic character of stupendous grace, the atonement becomes a justice—a theodice. It blends in with the terrible elements of our fallen state, and forms an average probational dispensation, in which the Divine Administration appears not merely absolutely just, but practically equitable, and mercifully reasonable to our human reason. . . .

And thus we see that without the Redeemer no equitable system of probation for fallen man is a possibility." This surely makes the atonement, whatever of grace it may contain, a matter of justice to mankind. But let us look further into the author's applications of his principle.

He says, "Although there is not a perfect equation of the means and advantages among all mankind, yet it may be affirmed that *no man is condemned to everlasting death who has not enjoyed FULL MEANS and OPPORTUNITY for salvation, and has (not?) wilfully rejected them by persevering in a course of conscious sin.*" P. 345. Thus, by a single dash of the pen, he acquits and shields from perdition all the heathen whose enormities Paul so graphically depicts (Rom. i.), declaring them "without excuse," and that "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness." For all this, it remains infallibly true, that the "wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God."

Our author then proceeds to put the most degraded and abandoned part of Christendom on the footing of those who die in infancy, as to their prospects of salvation, in the following manner:

"Within the bosom of Christendom there is an immense class adult in years, but apparently entitled to the moral immunity of infancy; geographically Christian, but with as little access to a true Christianity as the most distant heathenism. Heathenism in Christendom!... In the dregs of our large cities it is impossible to say what numbers there are whom we can hardly decide whether they are to be assigned to the infant or idiot dispensation, or to heathendom. Each man is, in a degree, by himself a dispensation. But what is the ultimate destiny? Precisely the same, we reply, with that of the infant." Pp. 346-7. "The application of the same liberality of interpretation which would save the visible church in Christendom, would save the invisible church in heathendom. He is a saved heathen who lives as nearly up to the light he has as does the Christian, who is finally saved to the light he has."

"Truly that severity of Christian judgment, with which

many judge the unfavoured peoples, would leave us little hope of the Christian church." Pp. 350-1.

"Bold assertions in missionary speeches and sermons, that all the world without the pale of Christendom is damned in mass, never quicken the pulse of missionary zeal. On the contrary, they ever roll a cold reaction upon every feeling heart and every rational mind. Our better natures revolt, and, alas! a gush of scepticism is but too apt in consequence to rise in the public mind." P. 357. All this could quite as plausibly be said of the doctrine of eternal punishment—indeed of the very sufferings and woes that shroud the earth—and of the very permission of sin and suffering itself. Quite as plausible and stirring an appeal could be made to the merely human sensibilities, as to the consistency of these undeniable facts with the righteousness and benevolence of God. But whither does all such declamation logically tend? Clearly in the direction of Universalism, of Infidelity, of Atheism. And what strength the missionary cause will have, if the heathen are believed by the Christian community to be as really in a state of salvation, without the gospel, as with it, may be learned from the missionary operations of Unitarians and Universalists.

We have now shown what we meant, in saying that the reasoning of this book tended towards Universalism, and are pressed full far by the author in that direction. With this we bring to a close the few criticisms for which we have time, out of the many that these works, especially that of Dr. Whedon, invite. Its superficial plausibility, its vaunting and supercilious tone, its pretensions to philosophic depth and subtlety, enlisted in support of a loose latitudinarianism, have very naturally secured for it laudations enough to challenge a close examination. It is due, therefore, to the cause of God and truth to call attention to some of its weaker and more dangerous points. In doing this, we have perhaps treated our readers more largely to extracts from the author, than to our own comments upon them, both because we have desired to do full justice to him in letting him speak for himself, and because we fully believe Dr. Johnson's saying, "No man was ever written down except by himself." We have no fear of the result of these periodical attacks upon that view of the freedom

of the will, which, in our judgment, alone corresponds with consciousness, with all fact, with the representations of Scripture, and the great articles of the Christian faith, as shown in its standard symbols. A system which teaches that volition is not voluntary,* and its supporters cannot uphold without contradicting it, which involves either the possibility of future apostasy in heaven, or the denial that God, holy angels, and glorified saints are free agents; which, to be consistent, must deny either the universal apostasy of our race, or the sin and guilt thereof; which staggers in regard to the foreknowledge of God, vacates his decrees, and militates against the possibility of his universal Providence; whose broad liberalism makes such alarming strides in the path which terminates in universal salvation; will gain nothing by challenging renewed attention to its deformities. The foundation standeth sure. The Lord still reigns. He doeth all things after the counsel of his own will. His throne is for ever and ever. It is impossible for him to lie. His counsel shall stand. Therefore his saints surely and for ever trust him.

“In heaven and earth, and air and seas,
He executes his firm decrees,
And by his saints it stands confest
That what he does is ever best.”

* “Both the elder and the younger Edwards, as well as jubilant Dr. Pond, were guilty of the oversight of calling volition a voluntary act.”—*Whedon*, p. 78. See also p. 22.