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ART. I.—*Lectures on Moral Science.* Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., LL.D., President of Williams College; author of "Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity," etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862.

DR. HOPKINS first became known to us, and to that portion of the public with which we were then conversant, through an able article on Moral Science, published in one of our principal religious Quarterlies,* more than a quarter of a century ago. This article was of that marked character which at once drew attention to itself and its author, on the part of those interested in ethical, and ethico-theological discussions. In the circle of our acquaintance, it lifted the author, then young and previously unheard of, into decided prominence among the rising thinkers and guides of opinion on moral and religious questions. We well remember the light and inspiration we derived from it, as we were struggling through a chaos of youthful discussions on questions which then convulsed the

* We do not now certainly recollect which, nor have we at hand the means of ascertaining. Our impression is quite strong, however, that it was the *Biblical Repository*, then published at Andover, Massachusetts, and since merged in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

church, towards a stable foothold of truth, consistency, and faith. Especially do we recall with pleasure, the encouragement and aid it afforded us, in repelling the Epicurean and Utilitarian theories then so ingeniously and enthusiastically pressed upon us. In threading our "dim and perilous way," through the mazy sophistries of the astute advocates of these systems, to the doctrine that Right is a simple, original, and undefinable quality of virtuous action, which renders it obligatory and meritorious, and especially in contesting the authority of Paley—then the accepted text-book on Moral Philosophy in our American colleges—we not only hailed him as an ally, but still more, as one who promised to be a future guide.

The reasons why the distinguished author has since published little, if any thing, on these subjects, until the appearance of the present volume, he informs us, are mainly, his official labours, added to those involved in the publication of his volume on Christian Evidences, and some forty or fifty pamphlets. The force of these reasons, unfortunately, all conversant with such responsibilities can too well appreciate. It is to be regretted that he has been so long prevented from making those contributions to this queenly science, for which he has such high aptitudes. Owing to these avocations, he informs us that the course of Lectures contained in this volume have been delivered to successive classes substantially as they were first written in the year 1830; and that they received no revision until 1858. After a revision, which we judge amounts to a reconstruction, they were delivered before the Lowell Institute, in Boston, in the winter of 1861, and afterwards published. It was before the same Institute that the author delivered his Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, prior to their publication. If we are not mistaken, there is some foundation connected with this Institute for the support of frequent courses of Lectures on Apologetics and correlate topics. It is in connection with this delivery of these lectures in Boston, and their subsequent publication, that they have been recast, for the first time since their original preparation, in his early manhood, although they have been annually delivered to the successive college classes that have fallen under his instructions. This is the more significant, inasmuch as this

recasting has turned out to be no mere retouching to remove blemishes, strengthen weak points, and perfect his presentation of the same radical system, which his lectures had previously set forth. The alterations in them are so momentous and palpable, that he saw cause to commence this volume with an explanatory note to the graduates of Williams College, in which, besides other matters, he acknowledges this change of views in the following terms.

"When these Lectures were first written (in 1830,) the text-book here, and generally in our colleges, was Paley. Not agreeing with him, and failing fully to carry out the doctrine of ends, I adopted that of an ultimate right, as taught by Kant and Coleridge, making that the end. If, therefore, any of you still hold that view,—as doubtless many do,—it is not for me to say that you have not good authority for it, or to complain of you, if you object to that now taken.

"But whatever may be said of this central point, the Lectures have been much changed in other respects, and, as I hope, improved." P. 8.

It gives us pleasure to say, that this volume evinces a clear, profound, and independent thinker. It is equally free from transcendental platitudes, and from a grovelling sensism or positivism. His broad, calm, and judicial habit of mind saved him from that extravagance and recklessness of statement which so often distort and ruin a true doctrine by exaggeration, while it so tones down and qualifies any erroneous principles he advocates, as greatly to mitigate their evil influence. Still any important error in regard to the fundamental principles of morals must be of evil tendency, no matter how softened and guarded it may be.

Having premised this much, we observe, what we suppose our author would not dissent from, that "the doctrine of an ultimate right," or ultimate moral excellence,* as the proper

* This is not, as some imagine, setting up any mere abstraction as an object of affection and devotion. Like all attributes, it may be viewed in the abstract or concrete. It is as embodied in action and character that moral excellence enkindles love—and this supremely and ultimately as it is traced to its first original and norm in the immutable perfection of the Divine Nature, or as our author would prefer, and we do not object, to say, Character. From this it will

"end" of man, which he is bound to pursue, is not peculiar to Kant and Coleridge. For substance, and in some form, it is the doctrine of nearly all who do not accept directly or indirectly the Epicurean or Utilitarian theory of virtue, on the one hand, or found it in the mere will, irrespective of the moral perfection of God, on the other.

We observe, still further, that this is, as Dr. Hopkins justly indicates, the "central point" in a system of ethics. To this feature of his book, to the doctrine he has honoured with a life-long advocacy, and to what he has here substituted for it, he has, as we have seen, very properly invited special attention. What he has thus signalized shall receive our first attention. For ourselves, we hold and are satisfied with the doctrine that right and wrong are intrinsic qualities of moral actions; qualities which involve an immediate obligation to do or to avoid them, together with an intrinsic merit or demerit, a good or ill desert. Hence, that this right is the paramount "end" or object to be aimed at in action; that all other characteristics, consequences, and incidents of action are insignificant in comparison with this, and are to be subordinated, yea, if need be, sacrificed to it. This doctrine, that right or moral goodness is an intrinsic quality of virtuous action, creating an instant, imperative, and inevitable obligation to perform it, we understand the author to have maintained and taught through his whole public life up to a recent period. He has now espoused in its stead, the theory propounded in this volume. What is it? And what are its claims to supersede that, in lieu of which, it has been commended to public acceptance by whatever of argumentative ingenuity and tact the author can command? To these questions we now briefly address ourselves, and invite the attention of our readers.

Much that the author advances, with great earnestness and force, in connection with or in support of his peculiar view, we cordially accept, or do not care to controvert. It is just as consistent with the doctrine formerly held and now rejected by

easily follow that the will of God is the rule of right which we are bound to obey. But unless man had the original idea of right as that which he is bound to do, how could he be sensible that to obey the divine will is right and obligatory?

him, as with that which he now so ardently embraces in its stead. His whole doctrine of ends, in regard to which he says many things profound, beautiful, and true, is just as consistent with making intrinsic right or moral good, as enjoyment of whatever grade, the supreme and ultimate end of action. "Has man," says Dr. Hopkins, "again, an æsthetic, a rational, a moral, a religious nature? There is from the activity of each of these, a corresponding good. It is clear, then, that the whole good of man would arise from a combination in the highest possible degree of all these forms of good: also, that *the highest good would be from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object.*" P. 53. The italics are the author's. It is certainly true that the "highest good" of a man is moral rectitude, and this is "from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object"—Infinite Excellence. So all that our author says of the subordination of ends in the gradations of being; how each lower is conditional for the next higher, and appropriated by it, through the ascending series of mechanical, chemical, vegetable, animal, rational, and moral action, in which last all below culminate, is for the most part well said. It is, however, quite as appropriate to the scheme he has abandoned as to that which he has taken up.

The key to the author's new system is given in the following passage:

"If we suppose enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness, to be wholly withdrawn from the universe, we should feel, whatever form of activity there might be, that its value was gone. It would be a vast machine, producing nothing. But if we suppose the highest possible blessedness of God and of his universe secured, we are satisfied. It must surely be difficult to satisfy those who cannot find an adequate end and good in their own highest blessedness, and in the highest blessedness of God and his universe." P. 54. This is the final result of his reasonings in regard to the supreme end which men ought to seek. It is "enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness," of the subject himself, of God, and of the universe. Those who are not satisfied with such an end, it is broadly hinted, can be satisfied with nothing. This alone has "value." Whatever value other

objects possess, arises simply from their being a means to this. For otherwise, "we should feel . . . that its value was gone." And, on the next page, he tells us, "if there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing that ought to be either chosen or done." That is, from his previous account of value, nothing "ought to be either chosen or done" which is not a happiness or a means of happiness; and it is to be done or chosen only because it is so.

Having thus exhibited happiness as the end to be sought, in answer to the first of the three questions, "what ought to be done? why ought it to be done? and how ought it to be done?" he answers the second, "because of the intrinsic worth and excellency of that end." "Man and all moral beings are capable, as such, of a high and holy blessedness which can be compared with nothing else, . . . but has, in itself, an infinite worth."

So far as concerns the kind of enjoyment which is thus made to constitute the supreme end of moral action, and ground of its obligation, we may yet have something to say. How much is meant by this blessedness being "high and holy," taken in connection with other affirmations and negations of this treatise, remains to be estimated. The point now to be noted is, that enjoyment is made the exclusive end of virtuous action, and the ground of its obligation.

"Used as nouns," says Dr. Hopkins, "good expresses some form of enjoyment; right is defined to mean 'conformity to the perfect standard, rectitude, straightness,' that is, conduct adapted to attain the true end." Pp. 208, 209. "It is an objection to the system that makes right ultimate, that, as based on a mere abstraction, it furnishes no object to the affections, and moves us through its imperative by constraining and driving, rather than by attracting us. In our conception of a perfect being, the law is not known as an outward and constraining force, but there is a coincidence of inclination and of will by which perfect obedience becomes perfect freedom. Love is free and directly from a view of its object; but love is the fulfilling of the law." P. 224.

Whatever this may be worth as argument, there is no doubt that it is good as evidence of what the author now maintains

and what he repudiates. "Good" is defined to be, "some form of enjoyment." This is the "ultimate" end. Right is not "ultimate," but a means "adapted to attain the true end." In short, the only good is enjoyment, and right is such only as a means to it. As to the objection against "making right ultimate, that, as based on a mere abstraction, it furnishes no object to the affections," &c., it seems to us wholly gratuitous. Like all other qualities or predicables, it may be viewed in the abstract or concrete. The same is true of happiness or enjoyment. These are abstractions, and exist only as mental notions, except as they have actual and concrete existence in beings or persons that are happy and joyful. So of goodness or the good. Abstractly they represent a general notion. Concretely they are realized in good objects, actions, or persons. When Cousin treats of the "True, the Beautiful, and the Good," what are these but abstractions until realized concretely in true propositions, beautiful objects, good actions and persons? Now, will it be seriously alleged that rectitude in character and conduct, moral excellence in actions and persons, especially in saints, angels, and God, "furnishes no object to the affections" of a virtuous man, irrespective of, or over and above the happiness it may bring with or after itself? And really, is it to be assumed without proof, that such objects can move us only by "constraining and driving" us, or that, in obeying the law of right, considered as ultimate and supreme, "perfect obedience may not become perfect freedom?" It is an old and glorious formula, that "on the highest point of moral elevation, freedom and necessity coincide." May not the love of righteousness, like the love of knowledge, or beauty, or even happiness, be so perfect, that to pursue or conform to them shall be no way servile or constrained, but free and spontaneous?

It deserves remark here, that our author, in common with other advocates of this scheme, puts it in plausible contrast with the opposite, by the constant assumption that enjoyment is the only good. This is a continual source of confusion in his discussions. The real issue is, whether right is not in itself good, and not merely so, but whether it is not the ultimate and supreme good; in subordination to which enjoyment

and every good should be pursued; nay, must be pursued, if we would not utterly forfeit and make shipwreck of them. To assume, as this class of writers are so fond of doing, that happiness alone is good, is simply to beg the question. Thus our author says:

"The distinctions above made will enable us to account, in part, for the confusion there has been in our moral philosophy, and particularly for the prominence given to right, and *the* right, as distinguished from the good." P. 218. We know of none who thus make prominent the "right" in distinction from the "good"; but the highest class of ethical writers, according to our estimate, do broadly distinguish it from happiness, or enjoyment, making the former the substance which the latter follows as a shadow, the health of which the latter constitutes the buoyant sensations.

We think it has been sufficiently shown that the author adopts the Utilitarian in place of the Intrinsic theory of virtue. By Utilitarianism we understand that theory which denies that right actions are such intrinsically and as ultimate, or any further than as they are means to enjoyment—while this latter characteristic is what alone renders any actions right. The "enjoyment" required to be sought in this scheme is variously stated by different writers. It may be not merely our own, but that of others, or of the sentient, or of the moral universe. This may relieve the scheme of the grossness of Epicureanism. Still it is none the less Utilitarianism, making virtuous conduct not a good in itself, but a mere means to a good beyond itself, indeed to the only good—happiness. It does not alter the essential nature of it to say that the enjoyment is in the virtuous action itself. It is for those who advocate this scheme to show why, if enjoyment be the only good, it is not each one's concern to get as much of it, and as fast, as he can—*i. e.*, to make his own happiness his exclusive end. Is it replied, that he cannot secure his own highest happiness without seeking that of others? This alters not the principle. Even so, he will seek the happiness of others as a means to his own. This amounts simply to the celebrated definition of virtue given by Paley—"Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." "According

to which definition," says the late Dr. Archibald Alexander, very justly, "the good of mankind is the object, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue. If the question be asked, why we should seek the good of mankind, the answer is, from a regard to our everlasting happiness; and if the question be, why we should make the will of God the rule of our conduct, the answer must be the same; so that virtue is really resolved into a regard to our own happiness." *Alexander's Moral Science*, pp. 162–3.

We deeply regret our author's new position on this subject—and all the more, because the weight of his authority has heretofore been on the opposite side. We do not deem it necessary now to reiterate the arguments, which have been so abundantly arrayed against this doctrine on our pages. It is, however, requisite to any adequate critique on the volume in question, that some collateral points receive a passing notice.

There are many passages in this volume, as in all arguments we have ever seen in behalf of the fore-mentioned doctrine, that in sound, at least, if not in design, declare the contrary. The following is a specimen.

"Do we then say, to close this discussion in the terms with which we started,—do we say that the end for man is happiness? No. The good here, the highest good, is from the normal activity of the moral powers. As such, that activity is obedience to the law of God, however revealed. It is all that can be commanded or directly willed, or that can be approved or honoured. It is virtue; it is holiness. Do we then say that virtue or holiness is the end for man? No; for in this holiness there is a blessedness wholly distinctive and peculiar, higher, purer, nobler than any other; a blessedness like that of God himself, and as inseparable from holiness as light is from the sun. Not then, in happiness without holiness do we say is the true end for man, for without that the happiness would not be; not in holiness without happiness, for without that the holiness could not be and be holiness, any more than the sun could be the sun without its light. But we do say that the true end for man is HOLY HAPPINESS, that is, BLESSEDNESS." Pp. 195–6.

To most of this we say, amen, in our sense of the language

employed. So far as this and similar passages in the book appear to intimate a doctrine different from that which we have before elicited from its pages, we should rejoice to believe that they expressed the author's real theory, and that as to all seemingly contrary passages, he had been unfortunate in expressing, or we, in interpreting his meaning. We need hardly say how much such a solution of the case would delight us. But we are bound, if possible, to interpret every writer consistently with himself. And we must remember that, in this case, the doctrine of an "ultimate" right is professedly abandoned. Again, if by "virtue" and "holiness," in the above extract and other similar passages, be meant any thing distinguishable from the highest happiness and the means thereof; if by holiness be meant a distinct and superior quality or standard, to which all happiness must be subordinate and comformable in order to be lawful, then we have a clear denial of the author's cardinal principle, and an espousal of that which he has abandoned. But this he does not mean. The reason he offers for not placing man's end in happiness, is simply that without the holiness "the happiness would not be." The holiness is requisite, therefore, simply as an indispensable means to happiness. And this, we apprehend, is just the clew to the meaning of the entire passage, which is susceptible of this exegesis, and so harmonizes with itself and the residue of his work. It is true, saving the exceptions that arise from the abnormities of our present fallen state, that holiness is inseparable from blessedness, as the sun from its radiance, or the rose from its fragrance. It is none the less true that, though these several objects are inseparable, they are not identical. One is antecedent to and causative of the other. One is supreme, and the other subordinate. The rose does not come of the fragrance, nor the sun from its radiance, but *vice versa*. So holiness is not born of happiness, but happiness comes of holiness. The former is primary. The latter secondary and subordinate. It is of the gravest moment that these two be neither inverted nor confounded. The conception of happiness, or of the means thereto, even in the acts of free-agents, might be given without affording the first scintilla of an idea of virtue or moral goodness. This is simple, original, ultimate, indecomposable.

As is not unnatural, on this scheme, the author makes no note, that we observe, of the old ethical distinction between actions good, bad, and indifferent. This distinction, in our view, is fundamental. Without it, discussions in ethics and casuistry must run into inextricable mazes. According to this, one class of actions is intrinsically right or good, and, therefore, in their own nature, and for ever, obligatory. Such are the love and worship of God, truth, justice, and good-will towards men. What is intrinsically evil ought to be shunned, as profaneness, blasphemy, falsehood, extortion, fraud, injustice. Actions indifferent are so named, because they have in themselves no moral character. They are not *per se* either good or evil. They are to be performed or avoided, as, in given circumstances, they are judged to tend to good or evil. In itself it is indifferent what be a person's style of dress or equipage. But if he indulges in a style too expensive for his means, for the safety of his creditors, or for making prudent provision for his family, or for the training of his children to due habits of industry and economy, such a course is clearly culpable. So a style that avoids these evils, and promotes the well-being in virtue and happiness of all affected by it, is clearly binding. Now, on the theory that happiness is the supreme end of virtuous choice, and that there is no intrinsic ultimate right, all other choices and actions become in themselves indifferent. They impose an obligation on us to do or shun them, only as they are seen to forward or hinder this great end. And, therefore, all actions, except this great "generic choice," fall within the domain of expediency, which is applicable solely to things in themselves adiaphorous. The language of Dr. Hopkins is coincident with this view. "If the end chosen be the true supreme end of man, then any means in themselves adapted to attain that end will be right. This is not the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, but implies the fact that this is such an end as can be obtained only by sanctified means." P. 235. Yes, and that these means are thus "sanctified" by being conducive to this end. It is this, so far as we can see, or nothing. On the previous page, he says, "Whatever is useful or expedient must be so, with reference to some end. Hence, utility and expediency always imply an end pre-

viously chosen. Here nothing will be chosen for its own sake, and all questions must respect the choice, not of ends, but of conditions and means." We take it that while virtuous and holy actions are means of final blessedness, yet that they are right and good in themselves, and ought to be chosen for their "own sake," whether any consequences to our own blessedness were supposed to flow therefrom or not.

Speaking of the choice of a profession by young men, the author says:

"The question here, it is often supposed, is to be determined by conscience; but, if the previous question, (the choice of a supreme end,) has been fully settled, conscience has, in strictness, nothing to do with it. The simple question will be, in the one case, how we can do the greatest amount of good, and in the other, how we can best subserve our own private ends." P. 218.

We do not suppose that the author would really have us to understand that conscience has no office to discharge in deciding on one's profession. This is not even a necessary deduction from his own theory, unless it be assumed to vacate the office of conscience altogether, which is far enough from being his view. Certainly, conscience enters into every responsible act of life, and eminently into the decision of all questions which determine life's sphere and occupation. The above language serves simply to illustrate how extremely artificial the author's theory is. So entirely is enjoyment of self and other beings the only good, the supreme end of moral action, that, in strictness, conscience is concerned only with the choice or rejection of this. All other actions are so purely indifferent in themselves, and so wholly dependent on their relation to this end for their moral quality, that "conscience has in strictness nothing to do with it."* Will not a system that leads to the use of such phraseology bear criticism and revision? Is not this attempt to reduce the whole sphere of conscience, to some single action, or kind of action, an excessive straining after a simplicity that is worse than useless?

* To the same effect the author says, page 211, "Conscience affirms obligation solely in view of the choice of ends, especially of the supreme end, *and not of means, except as they are conducive to that end.*"

We turn from all these attempts to analyze right, or moral quality, into the means of a good beyond itself, to a strong presentation of the true doctrine. We trust all appearances of another system are transient oscillations which will ultimately settle into this as a fixed view, not only for the past but the future. We think a large part of the reasonings and representations of this book are such as harmonize with the scheme which the author so long held. The new theory which he intermixes with them is like the clay mixed with the iron.

"Of the moral quality itself, which conscience presupposes, our notion is simple, as of colour or extension. We perceive it immediately as belonging to certain states of mind, as selfishness, envy, malignity, on the one hand, and benevolence, generosity, and kindness, on the other. Relations may be needed to evolve the acts, but it is from no perception of them. It is from no sense, but is an immediate knowledge, by the spirit, of the quality of its own states and acts. We know a moral act as moral, precisely as we know an intellectual act as intellectual. We know an intellectual act to be intellectual because it is an act of the intellect; and what an act of the intellect is, and that it is intellectual, every being having an intellect must know intuitively on the exercise of his intellect, and he could know it in no other way. It is in the same way that a moral act presupposes a moral constitution, and is known to have moral quality." P. 176. Still further:

"If it be still asked why a man ought to seek an end which has this intrinsic worth, the reply is, that this idea of obligation or *oughtness* is a simple idea, and, therefore, that we can only state the occasion in which it arises. Of its presence, in connection with the choice of this end, we can give no account, except that such is our constitution." P. 55.

There is to us more precious truth in these passages than in all the wire-drawn subtleties by which the author supports the theory we have been considering. This is none the less so, notwithstanding his endeavour to reconcile it with his theory, in the terms following: "He (man) ought to choose his own well-being rather than the contrary; but he ought to choose it, not simply because he ought, but because it *is* well-being. If there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing

that ought to be either chosen or done." If it be meant here that "well-being" is constituted by happiness as its only element, or that happiness is the only "valuable" thing—this we deny. There is, superior to this, moral good or right, involving "obligation or *oughtness*,"—simple in its nature, and requiring absolute subordination and conformity to itself as the condition, or rather the essence, of well-being. Does any one ask, why he ought to pursue his own well-being? It is all one to answer, because it is right, because he ought, to seek it. The question is settled when to pursue his well-being is seen to be right; for "ought" is but the correlative of right. What is right ought to be done. Right and ought are both simple and ultimate. If it be asked, why the pursuit of our well-being is right, the question is irrelevant. Right is a simple quality of such action, and seen intuitively, or not at all. If any one asks why it is right to tell the truth, to love goodness, to do justice, we cannot explain to him. In regard to simple moral actions, in themselves, good or bad,—if their moral quality is not self-evident, it cannot be made evident by any amount of arguing or explanation. The instances of difficulty and perplexity, as to what is right, either concern things indifferent in the sphere of expediency, or complex cases, in which the moral element is so complicated with extraneous adjuncts, that it is hard to disentangle it. It is clearly a duty, resting on its own evidence, for parents to seek the welfare of their children. But it might be a matter of great difficulty to determine, in some cases, whether their welfare would be best promoted by a liberal education or a trade. As to the ultimate source and standard of morality, the soundest ethicists and theologians find it in the immutable rectitude and perfection of the Divine Nature. They have objected to founding it in any fitness of things out of God, and thus over him. This militates against his supremacy. They have objected to founding it in *mere* will, even the will of God, because, as mere will, unguided by rectitude, it might make and unmake moral distinctions, turning good into evil, and evil into good. Both these perilous extremes are avoided, by founding it in the immutable goodness and perfection of the nature of God, to which his will freely and evermore conforms. Dr.

Hopkins objects to this, mainly, so far as we can see, in consequence of a rigid adherence to the German or Coleridgian definition of the words nature and supernatural. According to this, nature denotes whatever is necessitated in its action, by being subject to the law of physical cause and effect, and outside the sphere of freedom. The latter denotes whatever is brought to pass by will. Hence, he seems to detect something, in the attribution of a nature to God, inconsistent with his freedom. This appears to be implied in such language, as the following: "It may be, however, that the nature of God is nothing distinct from his personality, and that so he is wholly supernatural. It may be, that the terms nature and natural, used, as they commonly are, to denote something fixed, stated, uniform, and not made so by will, are without meaning when applied to God." P. 239. This definition and mode of contrasting nature and the supernatural is wholly arbitrary, and introduces, in ways which we cannot now stop to specify, utter confusion into all discussions on the great subject of supranaturalism. The nature of any being is that principle which leads it to develop and act, in some given way, rather than any other, and this, according to its kind; if a free, responsible being, in free action; if an involuntary agent, by a physical necessity. It is the nature of saints, angels, and God, to act freely, and, at the same time, righteously. There is, therefore, no reason for such a contrast of nature and character, and for the denial of any nature to God, as the following language imports. In the accepted sense of the word, nature, in this connection, is character. "What we need is, simply a person; and it is a mere abuse of language to convert that constitution of the divine Being, by which he is a person and capable of natural freedom, into a nature, the very idea of which excludes freedom. But if this be so, then, as in our search backwards for the origin of being, the ultimate fact is the *being* of God; so, in our search backwards for the origin of moral distinctions, we shall find, not any nature of things, not any nature of God, not any necessary and eternal principles, but simply the *character* of God." P. 240.

Not any nature of God, or necessary and eternal principles, we too, say, inconsistent with freedom; but such as give, what

Dr. Hopkins says of the character of God, "that moral certainty which accompanies the highest freedom."

While we thus see no cause for our author's repugnance to the more common orthodox phraseology on this subject, we are glad to record the conclusion of his reasoning thereon, which happily expresses our own view, and affords still further proof that his dissent from it is more verbal than substantial.

"If we accept what has now been said, it will follow, as moral distinctions have their origin in God as a person, as his character is the standard of goodness, and his will is the expression of his character, that his will, however made known, must be the ultimate rule of moral action; it must be that to which conscience will respond, not simply as will, but as the will of *God;* it was made to respond to his will, because that is the expression of his *character;* and his character, as combining benevolence and rectitude, is the perfection and standard of moral excellence.

"As we, then, find in the being of God the origin of all other beings, so that, without him there could be no other; so do we find in the character of God, and in his will as expressing that character, all that is ultimate in moral distinctions; and without that will and character, these distinctions could not be. Thus do all our speculations lead us to God, not merely as the foundation of being, but of excellence, and as the Head and Governor of the moral universe." P. 241.

All human wisdom is worse than folly, which does not culminate in lifting us to this primal source of light and truth, holiness and blessedness.

In his seventh Lecture the author gives an excellent analysis of personality, as a preparation for the analysis of conscience. It has been common to make intelligence and will the criterion and constitutive elements of personality. There is, of course, no personality where these are wanting. But the brutes have a species of intelligence and a will correspondent to it. It is requisite not only that there be intelligence, but intelligence of a peculiar order to constitute a person. There must be reason which the brutes have not, which gives us intuitive and supersensual truths. And, as our author well shows, there must not only be reason, but "moral reason." We might have an

organ for mathematical, metaphysical, and esthetic ideas and truths. These alone would not make us cognizant of moral truths, and therefore not persons. For what sort of a person is a being without a moral nature? Hence, the moral reason is requisite, which is the source of the primitive moral ideas and judgments. Without this sort of rationality there could be no conscience, no accountability, and so no personality. For what sort of a person is a being void of accountability? So, in the words of our author, "the three characteristics of a person are, that he is rational, free, moral. To me it seems that the moral ideas that are given by the reason, in the light of which we choose and act, through which, indeed, the will is a rational instead of a brute will, are quite as necessary to personality as the power of choosing and acting, and that both are indispensable." P. 164. If the "moral ideas" are thus given, are they not original and ultimate? What need, then, of that artificial analysis of them, as derivatives in some sort from happiness, for which some are so zealous?

Although Dr. Hopkins frequently seems to resolve character into "governing preference, or purpose," a favourite phrase of the late Dr. Taylor, yet, taken with the following explanations, it is relieved of most of the objectionable associations which past controversy has linked with it.

"That the above may not seem to be opposed to our consciousness, it may be well to state that in choosing a supreme end it is not necessary that we should know or choose it abstractly and formally, but simply that our individual and specific choices should involve it, and be instances under it. So it is that we know and act under the principle of causation, and so under mathematical axioms. . . . . In thus choosing a supreme end, if that end be the good of others, we reach the highest significance of the word love. This is an act *both of the affections and the will*, and carries every faculty and choice of the soul along with it. It lies back of specific choices and volitions, and determines character, springing from a synthesis of the rational sensibility and the will, it is the highest product of our highest powers—the consummate flower of our existence." P. 168.

A character springing not from will solely, but from the

"synthesis of the rational sensibility and will," implicated therefore with the cognitive and emotive faculties; and this so back of consciousness, that we do not "know or choose it abstractly and formally," "but simply that our specific choices should involve it," is a very close approximation to all that is involved in the scriptural representations of the character of man, by nature, and by regeneration. This involves the will, the affections, feelings, and understanding. And it further involves dispositions lying back of, and manifesting themselves in all specific conscious choices and desires.

The author is still more explicit, on one point at least, in the following passages.

"There are those who suppose that the affections and passions are drawn from us by a fixed law, as electricity flashes from one cloud to another, and that we are therefore not responsible for them. *But the voice of mankind is that men are responsible for their feelings through the whole range of the emotive nature, as well as for their actions.* . . . They judge that men can govern their passions, not only by restraining those external acts to which passion would excite them, but also by moderating and subduing the feeling itself. This is correct. Men are responsible not only for the feelings they have, but also for not having the feelings they lack; and yet no man can, by any direct act of the will, cause any one feeling, affection, or passion to exist." Pp. 147–8.

There is much precious truth here expressed, which underlies some vital doctrinal and experimental principles of the gospel. We have no time to point out its bearings in detail. They must be obvious to our readers. Nor is it any part of our concern to point out their harmony or discrepancy with what is elsewhere said in the way of denying moral character and responsibility to all the spontaneous exercises of the soul, and confining them exclusively to acts of the will. We rather join our testimony to his, that "this doctrine that we are responsible for the affections, and particularly for the natural affections, has special need of enforcement at the present time." Pp. 151–2.

While our author vindicates the doctrine of our responsibility for the feelings and affections, on the ground that they

are "controlled through the power of attention," *i. e.*, to such objects as will excite those which are right, and while this is largely true of some of them, it can be admitted, as we presume our author holds, only in a very qualified sense in regard to others. The unregenerate man cannot command holy feelings and affections into being, merely by fixing his attention on God and Christ. This, indeed, is necessary and salutary. But, unless God's Spirit takes the scales from the eyes, and the hardness from the heart, Christ will still be a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, having no form nor comeliness that they should desire him. We think all Christians have the witness of this in their own experience. We know that some theologians have maintained the contrary, in order to enforce a harmony between facts and their own theories of accountability. But they utter another theology on their knees. One of the most telling of the many pregnant evangelical passages of Coleridge, which form no insignificant counterpoise to the bald rationalism and transcendentalism in which he elsewhere abounds, is the following:

"Often have I heard it said by advocates for the Socinian scheme—True! we are all sinners; but even in the Old Testament God has promised Forgiveness on Repentance. One of the Fathers, (I forget which) supplies the retort—True! God has promised Pardon on Penitence; but where has he promised Penitence on Sin? He that repenteth shall be forgiven; but where is it said, he that sinneth shall repent? But Repentance, perhaps, the Repentance required in Scripture, *the Passing into a new mind*, into a new and contrary Principle of action, this METANOIA is in the Sinner's own power?—at his own liking? He has but to open his eyes to the Sin, and the Tears are at hand to wash it away! Verily, the exploded Tenet of *Transubstantiation* is scarcely at greater variance with the common sense and experience of mankind, or borders more closely on a contradiction in terms, than this volunteer *Transmentation*, this Self-change, as the easy means of Self-salvation."—*Aids to Reflection*, Burlington edition, pp. 82–3.

We should be glad to follow our author through many other points, in which he seldom fails to show ability and give valuable instruction. This is especially true of his practical reflec-

tions, which are interspersed with his reasonings, and of his closing lecture, in which he presents, with great felicity and force, the argument for the immateriality and immortality of the soul. We regret that the recent change in the author's view of the fundamental question in morals engrafted upon modes of thought induced by a life-long espousal of what we deem the true system, mars a work, in so many respects, of eminent merit.

ART. II.—*The Liberties of the Gallican Church.*

THE eloquent apologist for the Papal Church, in his skilful delineation of the Variations of the Protestants, has made much of the contrast between the incongruous practice and conflicting doctrines held by the numerous branches of the Church of the Reformation, and the unity which, according to him, is the characteristic feature of the mother church. Uniform in its devotion to a single form of belief, and admitting only slight deviations in the prescribed ritual of even the most distant provinces, it is presented to our view as the embodiment of a universal religion, whose consistency is unerring demonstration that it possesses the very truth of Christianity. Other churches or sects pervert and distort particular doctrines, at the mere dictate of their caprice or unhealthy imagination; this alone is inflexible in its teachings, continuing, from age to age and in every land, to inculcate the same creed, and to enforce the same obedience. Whatever impression this lofty boast may make upon the ignorant, whose minds are easily dazzled with the contemplation of the pomp of this religion of the senses, it will be viewed with incredulity by every one who has made himself familiar with the history of the Papacy itself, and can consequently trace the gradual development of the system from its humble commencement. He will note the successive accretions which centuries have added to the doctrines of earlier ages. He will easily detect the introduction of new claims, put forth