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ART. I.—*Rational Psychology; or the Subjective Idea and Objective Law of All Intelligence.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. A new and revised edition. New York: Ivison, Phinney & Co. 1861.

A System of Moral Science. By the same. Third edition. Same publishers.

Empirical Psychology; or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness. By the same. Third edition. Same publishers.

Rational Cosmology; or the Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By the same. A new edition, with revisions and Notes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1859.

[The object of the following article is to present a brief outline of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. It has been prepared by one of his personal friends, who is a decided advocate of his system. To this its value, to the readers of this journal, is largely due. They must be glad to receive, from an able and accomplished writer, a view of this philosophy which is not liable to the charge either of misapprehension or perversion. The article, therefore, is not to be regarded as presenting the estimate of the *Princeton Review* of Dr. Hickok's system, but the light in which it is viewed by its adherents.]

ART. II.—*Remarks on the foregoing, and other recent Vindications of Dr. Hickok's Philosophy.*

THE preceding article, from one of the most distinguished supporters and representative expounders of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, we have cordially welcomed. We are glad to have, in a short compass, a clear exposition of that philosophy from an authorized source. It is something gained as the result of our strictures, that we have this system at length rendered to us in idiomatic and facile English, in a form, not only authentic, but as intelligible as the nature of the topics discussed allows. If it fails in its main object, this is not, in our judgment, so much the fault of the advocate, as of his cause. We think it confirms, instead of invalidating our past strictures.

This is not the only attempt to vindicate this philosophy, and parry the criticisms, more especially of this journal, upon it, which have been called forth more immediately by the review of the "New and Revised Edition of Dr. Hickok's Rational Psychology," published in our number for last October. That article, the present writer may be permitted to say, (as it came from another source, well known by all concerned, to be a distinguished divine in another branch of the church,) has been favoured with rare proofs of its extraordinary power. It is very seldom that any disquisition on abstruse philosophical questions commands such general attention from friend and foe, in our own and foreign countries. In this country, it not only received special attention in the usual notices which the religious weeklies give of the quarterlies, together with high encomiums from persons eminent in philosophy, to whom the author was wholly unknown, but it was read with keen interest and delight by a much larger number than usually give metaphysical articles a careful perusal. Beyond our own country, it was honoured with most laudatory notices, and was republished in Great Britain. But, beside all this, it broke the reticency which, so far as we know, Dr. Hickok has seen fit personally to preserve

in reference to previous criticisms. It brought forth operose rejoinders in the *American Theological Review*, one by Dr. Hickok himself in the April number, which had been preceded by one from his learned and accomplished coadjutor, Dr. Tayler Lewis, in the January number, and is now followed, in this journal, by the exposition already presented to our readers, from a hand which we have good reason to suppose Dr. Hickok would trust, as soon as any other, to discharge such an office. We refer to these unmistakeable proofs of the high power of that article, furnished as well by Dr. Hickok and his collaborators, as by manifold other demonstrations, for the purpose of showing that, whatever else he may see cause to do or not to do about it, he cannot afford to try to neutralize it by mere outbursts of irritation and contempt. Whatever he may accomplish in his search for the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence," or the necessary laws of world-building, he cannot afford such an attempt. To make it, is to confess that what is thus assailed cannot be refuted by argument. Whether Dr. Hickok has not placed himself in this predicament, we will shortly inquire. Meanwhile, we have a few words to offer in regard to the communication of our respected correspondent.

And first, we will premise some things, by way of clearing the *status questionis*, which are applicable in various degrees, not only to the article of our correspondent, but to those of Drs. Hickok and Lewis. The question is not, then, whether there are self-evident truths, above sense, which the mind has a faculty of seeing in their own light, intuitively, and without derivation by inference from any other truths. Nor is it, whether, especially in the mathematical, logical, and metaphysical, or what may be called in general the formal sciences, there are certain truths which are intuitively seen to be necessary, *i. e.*, such that their non-existence cannot be conceived without mental suicide. To deny them is to contradict reason and derationalize ourselves. It might be inferred from some parts of these rejoinders to our criticisms, that these truths were generally ignored or questioned, especially by the critics of Dr. Hickok's philosophy in this journal, and that Dr. Hickok had been called to the high office of reclaiming for them a due

acknowledgment and authority in philosophy. We need not say that all such implications, whether intentional or not, are quite gratuitous. Self-evident and necessary truths, together with the faculty for knowing them, are neither overlooked nor denied by philosophers in general, outside of the Sensuous and Positive sect, nor by this journal, nor especially, by the critics of Dr. Hickok in this journal. On the contrary, they are most strenuously affirmed in the principal notices of his works in our pages, as examination will abundantly show. There is no special philosophical mission for Dr. Hickok in this department. Whether he has not thrown all certainty of knowledge by our intuitions into doubt, is another and real question in this matter, on which we may have something to say; and, in reference to difficulties alleged in regard to which, his defenders will do well to say something, if they mean to escape the discredit of evading the true issues.

Nor is the question, what Dr. Hickok meant to do. That he intended and endeavoured to correct the obliquities of Kant, to establish a real external world, a valid ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology, may be well enough admitted. Certainly we have not denied it. Nor have we questioned his piety, nor the devoutness and sublimity of some of his religious and philosophico-religious meditations. But whether, in making his great attempt, he has not undermined what he sought to establish, and laid down principles logically subversive of all foundations, is another question. To that we have addressed ourselves. And to the difficulties expressed by some of the ablest thinkers on this point, his apologists will do well to address themselves. Dr. Hickok and his friends must not be too sensitive when we trace his system to pantheistic consequences. He does not hesitate to denounce modern philosophy, especially the prevalent religious philosophy, as "pantheistic."

Nor is the question, it is almost trivial to say, whether God acts according to perfect wisdom in the creation of the worlds, or whether rational beings can trace the signatures of his wisdom in his works. Those who read the vindications of Dr. Hickok's philosophy now under review, can judge whether there is not abundant occasion for this remark, and whether much is not advanced in some of them, as if he were especially commis-

sioned to maintain this truth, as being forgotten or impugned by his critics or others. The whole cosmical question raised by Dr. Hickok is a very different one. It is whether the mind of man can know *a priori*, not merely some necessary truths or laws, such as we have already indicated; but that the only possible way in which God can produce matter is by his own antagonistic activities; whether such activities in counteraction being once given, the human reason can see *a priori* that they *must* operate so as to produce all and singular the forms and properties of matter organic and inorganic, mechanical, chemical, vegetable, animal, which now exist; that hence, God was shut up (not by the moral necessity of acting wisely in freedom, but by a physical and fatalistic impossibility of acting in any other way, whatever his wisdom might dictate) to the single alternative of creating what he has, or as he has, or not creating at all. This is what the vindicators of Dr. Hickok's philosophy are called to defend; not that God acts wisely, and that we can see manifold traces of his wisdom, which who denies? And until some stronger defence of it appears than has yet come to light, we shall still reiterate our reprobation of such an attempt by mortal man; however able and ingenious, it is none the less perilous and presumptuous.

Turning now to the positive issues made by our correspondent, he says: "Scepticism, according to Dr. Hickok, is the necessary result of every system of thought which confines the work of the intellect to its judgments and inferences." "That this scepticism is inherent in all processes of the merely judging or inferring intellect, Dr. Hickok finds evidence in the nature of the process itself." This is extraordinary language. First, it apparently confounds judgment and inference, as if they were mental processes equivalent and co-extensive. It is true that every inference is a judgment; but it is not true that every judgment is an inference, which is a judgment derived from another judgment. Judgments then are of two kinds—intuitive, and inferential or discursive. But these two kinds of judgments include all possible cognitions, and grasp the *omne scibile*. Every mental affirmation is a judgment. How can anything be known except by a mental affirmation that it is, or that it is thus and so? If then scepticism is the "neces-

sary result" of intellectual operations in the form of judgments and inferences, where are we? Can we escape it? Can Dr. Hickok rescue us from it, even by the exercise of the almost divine prerogatives he ascribes to the reason? for can reason, or any other faculty, know aright with certainty, otherwise than by judgments, however intuitive, self-evident, and necessary those judgments may be? Is self-affirmation less a judgment than any other kind of affirmation?

But let us attribute all this to some inexplicable confusion of ideas or terms which limits judgments to inferences. Let us assume that it is the object of the writer to maintain, as some passages would seem to imply, that we must have some faculty for judgments self-affirmed, and for grasping self-evident truths, which shine in their own light, without dependence on other truths for their proof. If so, we say again, this is nothing peculiar to Dr. Hickok, nor questioned nor ignored by his critics. But, what is of more moment, he subverts the authority of such self-evident, ultimate truths, in his very argument for their necessity. For, in reference to these ultimate convictions, which we are so made that we cannot but trust them, whether in relation to objects of, or above, sense, he treats it as a fair question on the part of the sceptic, "How do we know that we are not so made that we must believe a lie?"—as a question, moreover, that cannot be fairly answered, until Dr. Hickok leads us up to the faculty of reason, "whose province it is to behold the truth by an immediate insight, and in its absolute and self-affirming ground." But how does this help us? Is not the same question just as fair at this point, "How do we know that we are not so made as to believe a lie?" If the question is in place at all, it is in place here. The reason then must find some means of testing itself, as well as other faculties. It must be able to "look around and through itself and its objects," in order to test their reality and validity. And to do this, Dr. Hickok finds it necessary to master the "subjective idea and objective law of all intelligence." This is the explicative title of his *Rational Psychology*. To this it has been objected, that such an attempt must be abortive and suicidal. Reason, which tries all the other faculties, must be tried by itself, before it can be found and validated. It is its own

judge. Its affirmations are either valid or invalid, in themselves. If the former, it needs no testing. If the latter, it is an incompetent trier. The trier, it seems, needs trying. But he can only be tried by himself, and tried and tried, until he is tried out of being, certainly out of all authority. In short, if we are not permitted to know that our intuitions are trustworthy; if we must believe that it may be that "the root of our nature is a lie," and that consciousness "is a liar from the beginning," the foundations of all knowledge are subverted, and unmitigated scepticism is in the ascendant.

It is immaterial to us what terminology is employed to distinguish the Intuitive from the Discursive faculty. If any choose to follow the German distinction, to some extent naturalized among us, through the influence of Coleridge and others, by which Reason is appropriated exclusively to denote the Intuitive, and Understanding the Discursive power, we shall not take the trouble to contend with them. But whether Reason, in the language of our correspondent, "has a standard by which it can measure all things which come within its apprehension, and determine whether they be reasonable or not," (pp. 373-4) is another question. Here we have joined issue with Dr. Hickok. We hold that there is much that we can apprehend, but never can comprehend, *i. e.*, measure by the standard of our own reason, in the realms of Creation, Providence, and Redemption. Any other view is intolerably rationalistic, and hostile to faith, humility, and reverence. Still loftier exhibitions of the prerogative of Reason, crop out in the writings of Drs. Lewis and Hickok.

But it is, it is alleged, one of the great aims and achievements of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, to validate our cognition of an external world, left doubtful, it seems, until established by his *a priori* demonstrations through the reason. All that we can know by the senses, it appears, "is the presence of certain affections which certain bodies have produced; and thus all that we can derive by *inference* from the senses, is, that the body which caused the affection *has* force." This is, for substance, the account which all these writers give of the cognition of external objects through the senses. All that we know immediately, say they, is certain affections or impressions in

our own sensibility. But these are clearly subjective. All that we know of any objective reality is by inference from these subjective sensations. On this hypothesis, Dr. Hickok's *Rational Psychology* proceeds, asserting the necessity, and making the attempt, to compass, by *a priori* demonstrations, what the senses themselves can never reach—a real and certain outer world. This ignores or denies the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter, so long emphasised by the soundest philosophers as true in itself, and vital to a valid doctrine of external perception, while it has been almost universally impugned or confounded by Sceptics, Idealists, and Materialists.

The Primary qualities are those which are inherent in body as space-filling substance, *i. e.*, as having extension and solidity. These are known immediately, especially by the touch and muscular energy, as objective and inherent in the body, and not as any mere subjective affections of our own organism. As has been unanswerably demonstrated, we have through these senses as decisive a conviction of an external non-ego as of an ego, and that the evidence for one is as strong as for the other. If consciousness is not to be trusted in the one case, neither is it in the other. The foundations of all knowledge and faith are subverted, and the blankest scepticism supervenes.

The Secondary qualities, on the other hand, into which this school resolve the Primary, are mere powers of producing conscious affections in our organism, occult in themselves, and unrealized until they interact with our organs, and evince their effects in the affections they thus produce. Of this sort are the odorous, sonorous, sapid, and, within certain limits, the visible qualities of bodies. The immediate knowledge thus given, (with a possible qualification in regard to sight,) is wholly subjective, limited to our own sensations. Consequently, if all the qualities of matter are secondary, it is impossible for us ever to gain a knowledge of it. Immediate knowledge of it is impossible; and by what conceivable process can we know it, unless immediately? Is it said that we can refer these subjective affections to it as their cause? But how is this possible, unless it be first known immediately, through its primary qualities? That we always, in our waking moments, do thus

immediately know external body, or substance having extension and solidity distinct from ourselves, is undeniable. The earth on which we stand, or the chair in which we sit, is ever known immediately and intuitively as a somewhat extended, solid, and other than ourselves. Knowing thus the existence of external objects by their primary qualities, we can attribute the secondary qualities to them by inference; because, whenever they are present, given "affections" are produced within us; *e. g.*, the sensation of sweetness on the presence of the rose, of a certain sound on the striking of a bell. But, unless bodies were first cognized immediately, by their primary qualities, they could never be known through the secondary—not even by any *a priori* demonstration, such as Dr. Hickok attempts. Such demonstration may show us the possibility that body may be—it never can prove that body is. Body can be known as existent only through the senses. If not proved to exist thus, then it cannot be proved to exist at all. How does our correspondent reach it? How does he show that we "know the perceived object is separate from the perceiving mind?" Our readers have doubtless noticed his answer on page 377. His criterion is that while many objects which the mind perceives are its own subjective exercises, those "which come and go quite independent of the mind, and which it cannot change, either as to the time or manner of their appearance, evidently have an agency, and thus a being of their own, separate from the mind which perceives them."

We are afraid that this criterion of externality, said to be furnished by the reason to make up for the incertitude and insufficiency of sense, will not stand. How is it with the aches and pains and pleasures, resulting from morbid or healthful conditions of the body, the alternate heat and cold induced by fever—the uncontrollable and immedicable anguish of the hypochondriac? Do not they, and much else which it is needless to specify, "come and go quite independently of the mind"? This mode of founding perception on the *a priori* demonstrations of the reason, after invalidating the certainty of it, in its own normal acts through its appropriate and God-given organs, is, and must be, a failure. It overthrows all certain evidence of an external world, and leaves the field

clear for idealism and scepticism—and this none the less, however contrary may have been the intent of the author.*

And this is all the more so, in view of the analysis of the inferences from our subjective affections as to their external causes, offered by Dr. Hickok's philosophy, to which we have before adverted. "All that we can derive, by *inference*, from the senses is, that the body which has caused the affection has force." "Matter can be nothing but force." We ask, first, on this theory, how do we know the existence of any "body" or "matter" whatsoever? We know or infer "force," it seems, operating somehow and from somewhere, upon us. But do we, or can we, know any particular body from which such force proceeds? How do we know that this force may not be the activity of some spirit? This question, however, is more than needless, when addressed to advocates of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. For the very core, the *punctum saliens* of this philosophy is, not only that matter is force and can be nothing else, that there can be no substance supporting and underlying this force, which is not itself force,† but this force is and must be the action of a spirit, even the Infinite and Eternal Spirit. Says our correspondent :

"But what is force? Dr. Hickok answers that it is action and re-action. This, he claims, will fill its whole conception. But if this be true, the origin of force, and mode of

* The following logical development into Nihilism of such germinant premises we copy from Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 129.

"The sum total is this. There is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know nothing and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are; they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition: that consist in the fact of the image of the images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images: nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream; into a dream made up of only a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination—is the dream of that dream."

† See page 381. We leave to others the task of reconciling this with what is said of substance on page 377.

its origination, are at once revealed. For whence can action come but from spirit, to which activity purely and essentially belongs. Spirit, therefore, must be older than matter and its author. But not every spirit—not the finite can create. They are already limited. Only the Absolute Spirit can make his act re-act upon itself, and thus produce a force which is truly his creation." Pp. 381, 382.

This is precisely what we have charged upon Dr. Hickok's philosophy; that it really resolves matter into a mere act of God; and denies it to be an enduring product of such action, which is yet distinct from it: that it is thus, with regard to matter or the physical world, inevitably pantheistic. Moreover, we have said that we see no necessity for resolving matter into mere divine acts which is not equally urgent with reference to spirit. Thus absolute Pantheism emerges. The main premise of this argument is reaffirmed by our correspondent. We have seen no serious attempt to invalidate the reasoning and conclusion from it.

Dr. Hickok, according to our correspondent, argues the possibility of a connection between mind and matter, and so of a knowledge of the latter by the former, because spirit is essentially self-active, while matter is divine action and reaction, *i. e.*, force; and so can be the work (*i. e.*, act) of spirit. This explanation itself needs explaining. Is not the power of knowing at all an ultimate self-evident fact, so plain that nothing can be plainer by which to explain it? And does not this theory explain all matter into a mere act of spirit, *i. e.*, virtually spiritualize it? This attempt to explain how mind can know matter, is impracticable and absurd. Many of the old metaphysicians assumed the impossibility of an immediate knowledge of matter, because, as they said, the two were separated from each other by "the whole diameter of being." Hence they devised theories of mediate perception, through representative images, species, &c. to bridge over the chasm—all which logically issued in idealism. Dr. Hickok tries to overpass it, by resolving matter into an act of spirit, and therefore intelligible to spirit. But really, is it easier to explain how we can cognize an act of spirit, than solid and extended substance, which is other than a spiritual act? Is not either

sort of cognition ultimate and simple, and incapable of analysis or explication into simpler elements? And is it any desirable achievement in philosophy to attempt to solve the insoluble, and develope, in the solution, the germs of idealism and pantheism?

As to the claim, that no process is scientific which explains phenomena and facts by reference to broader facts, or laws of higher generality, that as yet have no explanation but the creative will of God; or which falls short of an ultimate explanation by necessary laws; this virtually takes out of the realm of philosophy everything but the formal sciences of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics—which *per se* give no content of actual existence; and except such portions of the material sciences as are found *empirically* to furnish any conditions to which mathematical, or logical, or metaphysical principles are applicable. It is to deny that inductive science proper is science. For our part, we deem that process scientific which refers facts and phenomena to laws, and laws of less to those of greater generality. If the only explanation of such laws be the creative will of Infinite Wisdom, whose ways are unsearchable, this does not destroy the scientific character of the process, however any may stigmatize it as introducing a “deity (*ex machina*),” or as “enlarging the field of our ignorance.” This last is the least of our troubles. In one sense, this is the end of all true philosophy. Dr. Hickok and his philosophical friends will do well to “enlarge the field of their” acknowledged “ignorance” in matters too high, alike for us, for them, and for mortal man. No knowledge is more edifying than the knowledge of our own ignorance, or of the necessary limits of our knowledge. Quite enough of modern philosophical speculation has been too long in its sophomoric stage. “Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.” 1 Cor. iii. 18.

The Articles of Drs. Hickok and Lewis.

As has been already implied, many of the more significant points in these articles have been sufficiently ventilated in the preceding comments. They have, however, each some idiosyn-

cratic features, from which the contribution of our correspondent is happily exempt, and which demand a little notice. We will first summarily bring to view some leading doctrines of Dr. Hickok's philosophy, against which our review of his *Rational Psychology*, in our No. for October last, was directed. And, since the allegations and arguments of that article were sufficiently telling, to bring him and his coadjutor out in essays designed to parry them, we will very briefly indicate the way in which they have done the work essayed, and the conclusion to which we are thus inevitably driven.

Dr. Hickok begins with denying all immediate perceptions of outward things, and with denying the universal testimony of consciousness for such a perception. He holds that the mind is conscious only of its own sensations, which are wholly mental. "*The whole process,*" he declares, "*is a thinking in judgments discursively, and not a perceiving of objects intuitively.*" (*Empirical Psychology*, p. 130.) We are conscious of a sensation; but sense cannot tell whence it comes, nor reach an outer world. The mind first *judges* that the sensation has an outward cause. Secondly, it *judges* that that cause is material. Thirdly, the mind forms an image of that outward cause, of which no form or resemblance has reached the mind from without. Fourthly, the mind judges that the mental image is *like* the outward object. But, plainly, a judgment of resemblance cannot be formed unless the mind first knows the object resembled. On Dr. Hickok's scheme, we can never know an outward object, unless we know it before we know it; which is impossible and absurd. He therefore gives an idea of All Intelligence in which all intelligence is impossible.

But while he denies all immediate perception of outward things, he fully admits that the denial is contrary to the necessary convictions of consciousness in all mankind. He maintains that the demonstration of reason is full, sound, and clear; that all such immediate knowledge of outward things in consciousness is impossible. "And now," he demands, "where are we, as intelligent beings? Consciousness contradicts reason; the reason belies consciousness"—"they openly and flatly contradict each other." "The nature of man as intelligent stands out a self-contradiction." "All ground for knowledge

in any way is self-annihilated. The truth of our intellectual nature is falsehood, and there remains nothing other than to doubt universally."

To this statement of the problem, and to Dr. Hickok's mode of solving it, we brought an array of objections, which wrought wide conviction, and Dr. Hickok has deemed himself called to answer in the *American Theological Review*.

And what does he respond? Of all the adverse reviews he affirms that "it is most pitifully and painfully manifest that their authors were utterly incompetent to enter into the method or the meaning of the works;" and their objections are "but sorry blunders of their own ignorance;" and especially that the review in our October number "manifests throughout that the writer of it has an entire want of discernment of the philosophical distinctions between the phenomena and things in themselves, the being and the becoming:" that it is "uninstructed criticism;" and then "the most lamentable part of the matter is, that very extensively the ductile minds of coming labourers are passing on to their responsible life-mission under the like negative instructions and positive perversions." Dr. Hickok affirms that "the speculation pursued in the *Psychology* is often misconceived," but "more often entirely beyond the apprehension" of the reviewer. He admits that the only practicable answer would be to point out the items in which the *Psychology* has been misunderstood or misrepresented; but for this he says "there is not sufficient inducement;" and he makes no attempt to specify a solitary particular in which his works have been misrepresented or misunderstood, nor does he attempt in any way to meet a solitary position or objection of the reviewer. Manifestly much disturbed, and feeling the necessity of some answer, he avoids all particulars, waives all specifications, and contents himself with general declarations of the ignorance and incompetence of the reviewer; who, he says, may suppose his mistakes "to be the fault of the work itself in its obscure thinking and expression, but surely," adds Dr. Hickok, "if it were too obscure for his apprehension, he was not bound to study it, nor to review it; certainly was not bound to review it till he had intelligently studied it." Has Dr. Hickok, then, attained such a position in the philosophical world, that he

may thus, *ex cathedra*, dispose of all arguments and objections against his philosophy, by simply alleging the ignorance and incompetence of those who make them, and that too, without deigning to specify a solitary point in which that error or incompetence appears? Are we to suppose that Dr. Hickok really fancies himself to have attained this high distinction and prerogative in philosophy, so that he may allege ignorance and perversions, by wholesale, with no attempt to specify the least particular? or is it more reasonable and more charitable to conclude that he was driven to assume this magisterial and supercilious attitude from the consciousness that no other reply could be given?

After giving an outline of the common history of ancient philosophy, Dr. Hickok earnestly maintains that all modern philosophy but his own, is Atheistic or Pantheistic; that even our theology, on the principles received from Edwards, denies all freedom and proper responsibility to man, and, in its philosophic principles, ignores and rejects the God which its faith blindly assumes; so that in future conflicts the victory must be with the followers of Compté, and not with our theology. This is truly a sad case, with nothing to relieve it but the philosophy of Dr. Hickok, which our theologians find it so hard to understand, and which, when they misconceive it, Dr. Hickok will not condescend to explain, nor to tell where the misunderstanding lies. This atheism and pantheism in principle, which, it is alleged, now underlie all our theology, Dr. Hickok says, "in the fullest meaning and closest application is the prevalent philosophy."* Without the aid of his

* The very slender pretext on which Dr. Hickok brings this charge against our current Christian philosophy is, that it defines freedom to be the power of doing "as the being pleases."—*Amer. Theol. Review* for April, p. 216. This, he contends, fetters liberty, or substitutes for it a causal necessity which is destructive of it. Without stopping to inquire how pertinent all this is to any issue that has been raised in this controversy, we ask, where it puts Dr. Hickok's system? Says our correspondent, "Dr. Hickok evidently does not think it irreverent to speak of the Deity as controlled by principles." "He is and *must* be eternally so controlled." Now he is thus controlled, agreeably, or contrary to, his own pleasure. There is no escape from this alternative, unless in an unconscious pantheistic absolute. If the former, then Dr. Hickok's system is in precisely the same plight as the prevalent Christian philosophy. He is, on his own showing, a Pantheist. On the latter hypothesis,

Rational Psychology, which the reviewer, "in his blindness," has been "holding up to misguided derision and reproach," and which constitutes "the very defences and support of" our "creed"—without adopting this very Rational Psychology, he holds that our adoption of this creed can be "*nothing but unreasoning credulity.*" Alas for the Christian world, that till Dr. Hickok arose, their belief in God and Christ, and in all the doctrines which constitute the "creed" of the Church, was "nothing but an unreasoning credulity!"

This blindness of the Christian world Dr. Hickok charges to the antinomy of using the logical understanding instead of the reason. Is it not possible that Dr. Hickok has mistaken the prevalent philosophy, and that other men have, and use the reason as well as himself? He has certainly mistaken and misrepresented our review of October last on this point. He says of the reviewer, "To him all objects are just what and just as the senses give to us, and all investigation of them can attain to nothing other than that which the logical faculty can make out of them."

Now why does Dr. Hickok use such language? He had the review before him, expressly and emphatically affirming the contrary, in these words: "We fully admit that man is rational. He is able to discern in objects of sense more than sense reveals, and what can be yielded by no mere analysis of the object of sense. He can discern wisdom, thought, beneficence; and know spirit, not in its substance, nor as having properties in common with matter. In design he sees a designer—not contained in the thing designed—a creator '*understood*'—not contained—yet 'clearly seen' from the things that are made."

Dr. Hickok may comfort himself in this matter; he has not only made this very strange mistake concerning his reviewer, but the prevalent philosophy, from the times of Reid, Buffier, Beattie, Edwards, and even before—the "prevalent philosophy"

it is still worse for him; for then God is controlled by principles of eternal necessity, against his own choice and pleasure. He is bound in chains of adamant fate, or of a blind, insensate law of pantheistic development. This attempt, therefore, to divert attention from the crushing objections to his own philosophy, instead of answering them, is not only weak, it is suicidal.

of all Christendom, as well as of the mathematicians, has been entirely familiar with the intuitions of reason beyond those of sense.

But let us notice for a moment the reply of Professor Lewis. Dr. Hickok very properly questioned the reason itself, when he allowed reason to question sense and consciousness. He refused to *assume* the possibility of such a faculty as reason, but began by admitting "a drawn battle" between reason and consciousness, and then by inquiring "which, or whether either, be true." Professor Lewis begins with an entirely different sort of philosophy. He not only assumes that reason is infallible, but that it is not a human or created "faculty,"—is eternal, truly divine, bringing with it "*a priori* knowledge," "ideas that lie in the soul ready for use," and that "come with it from that supernatural and *pre-existent* sphere, in which the human spirit, so far as it is rational, had its supernal origin. Though physically, sentiently, individually, born in time, it shares in the universal reason, and breathes the higher life of the eternal and uncreated world." By the "universal reason" he can mean, in this connection, none other than the eternal wisdom of God. If man's reason is thus *divine*, it shares in the Godhead. Professor Lewis adds, "To know God at all, implies a *divine* faculty." He speaks of "*divine* reason," and "*divine* thoughts" in man; and of our having lost or misused the "light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." What can this mean, unless that reason in man is the *Logos* which was incarnate in Christ, and by which every man possessed of reason, is, so far, God manifest in the flesh?*

The scheme of Professor Lewis, therefore, differs fundamentally from that of Dr. Hickok, in that while Dr. Hickok begins by doubting the existence and the possibility of reason, Professor Lewis not only assumes such a faculty, but assumes that it is eternal and truly divine, and comes furnished with *a priori* knowledge from its *pre-existent* sphere. If we admit the assumption of Professor Lewis, it does not follow that Dr.

* Dr. Hickok at times uses language on this subject scarcely less qualified. "Reason," he says, "can be conceived no otherwise than as a verity which fills eternity and immensity!"—*Rational Cosmology*, p. 85.

Hickok can establish the being and validity of a faculty of reason, and reach an outer world, when he has once removed from under him every ground and possibility of certain knowledge, by declaring the falsity of consciousness, and the doubtfulness, and perhaps the impossibility of reason itself.

What the doctrine of the Trinity can have to do with the question at issue, unless, perhaps, it may be to show that Dr. Hickok's *a priori* knowledge of the Incarnation and Redemption is valid, it is hard to tell. But Professor Lewis does not omit to give us his own views of the Trinity. He tells us that the only ground "on which a true Trinitarianism can be long maintained," is that which regards the Trinity as consisting in the Father and two of his attributes, "one the Wisdom, and another the Love of the Father." This is not the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Professor Lewis defends Idealism, cites an "old Gipsej" as a true philosopher, because he doubted the existence both of the world and of himself. But the defence of idealism is no defence of Dr. Hickok's philosophy. Dr. Hickok, so far from being an idealist, gives, or attempts to give, an ontological demonstration against idealism; while Professor Lewis not only lingers still in company with the "old Gipsej," but quotes Scripture to prove that the objects of sense are—not merely transient and changing—but that they have no real existence; while all things that are real are "above the world of sense for evermore." If, therefore, Professor Lewis believes the Bible as he interprets it, then where is it?

Professor Lewis maintains with much warmth that Idealism has had pious advocates, as pious as the advocates of any opposite scheme. Be it so; that does not affect the question whether Dr. Hickok's scheme is rational and true, or whether it is self-destructive—and whether every scheme *must* not be self-destructive, which begins by doubting all our faculties, and by attempting to prove everything; thus requiring proof of the proof, and then proof of the proof of the proof, and so on for ever.

Professor Lewis denies that consciousness gives any testimony at all concerning an outer world: Dr. Hickok affirms that the testimony of consciousness in all men is for an imme-

diate knowledge in consciousness of an outer world, but that its testimony is false or unreliable.

Suppose the insinuations of Professor Lewis against the manner and motive of the reviewer were all true; suppose the reviewer had, "for a certain purpose," got "under the wing of Princeton," while his "vocabulary makes it easy to determine his theological origin;" suppose he really did believe, as Professor Lewis insinuates, in the "power of contrary choice;" suppose he had really set forth "a great deal of pious nonsense," and held, as Professor Lewis represents him, that "if God should command us to hate one another, then malevolence would be right instead of love, deceit would be holy, instead of truth," (although the reviewer said nothing of the kind, nor anything from which anything of the kind could be gathered by any inference, however remote; but the representation of Professor Lewis is purely gratuitous, without the slightest foundation of any kind)—suppose the reviewer had held all this—would it have weighed at all on the questions at issue—whether Dr. Hickok's *Rational Psychology* really labours under the objections which are alleged, and which, if sustained, entirely invalidate the whole scheme? In every case Professor Lewis and Dr. Hickok evade the true issue. They make no attempt to meet or to invalidate the positions of the reviewer, nor to show that they are inconclusive. They had every inducement and every opportunity to show this; would they have utterly failed even to make the attempt, would they have confined themselves to other issues of their own making, and have dealt so profusely in insinuations and inuendoes, and resorted to allegations of ignorance and incompetence, had they not been conscious that their cause admitted no better defence?

How are the formidable allegations which roused Dr. Hickok and his friends from their silence, met by platitudes, however learned or lofty, on irrelevant issues, or by a volley of contemptuous and acrimonious epithets? Dr. Hickok, in his poorly concealed acerbity, denounces the review as "*argumentum ab ignorantia ad ignorantiam*," without doing the favour to point out and prove the instances of alleged ignorance. We can afford to be more liberal towards him, and enlighten him somewhat as to the nature of the ignorance displayed in his

vindication. It is, as we have shown, deformed throughout by that most fatal of fallacies, irrelevant conclusion,—IGNORATIO ELENCHI.

ART. III.—*Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Opera Omnia*; Tomis XI. comprehensa; a Theologis Lovaniensibus, Opera Manuscriptorum Codicum ab innumeris mendis expurgata, et eruditis ubique Censuris illustrata. Lugduni: Sumptibus Joannis Rudisson. Cum permissu Superiorum. MDCLXIV.

FROM the latter part of the third century to the former part of the fifth, there was a gradual but manifest decay of vital godliness. And although, during this period, God had tried his church both by judgments and mercies—first, in the terrible fires of the Diocletian persecution, and secondly, by the happy revolution under Constantine—still, the growing evil had not been effectually cured, or scarcely arrested. The declension continued and increased; dead forms and unprofitable disputes were substituted for piety and godliness; and it became painfully evident that true spiritual religion must ere long disappear, unless God should interpose by his Spirit, and revive his work. But at this critical juncture, God did graciously interpose, his work was revived, and spiritual religion again flourished, at least in one part of the Roman empire. The principal instrument in this precious awakening—the results of which continue even to our own times—was the celebrated Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. Let us pause for an hour, and consider the life, character, works, and end of this great and good man.*

Augustine, bishop of Hippo, (now Bona, in Northern Africa,) was born at Tagasta, a city of Numidia, A. D. 354. His father, Patricius, though nominally a catechumen, was no better than a heathen, until near the close of life. His mother,

* A brief sketch of the Life of Augustine was written soon after his death, by Possidonius, Bishop of Calama. A more extended biography was written by Cornelius Lancillatus Belga, an Augustinian eremite. Both these memoirs are contained in the first volume of the works before us.