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ARTICLE I.—*The Kingdom of Christ.**

THE art and mystery of our religious life consists in the exercise of faith. The faith which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, has, by its nature, a claim to supreme authority in man, and always tends, like the conscience among the moral faculties, towards entire predominance. It proposes, as the most excellent of possible attainments on earth, that we shall walk by faith and not by sight, and becomes in us the power and the desire to live as seeing Him who is invisible.

It is the chief design of the things that are seen to help us in conceiving and enjoying the things that are not seen. Our Lord Jesus Christ appeared in the flesh to aid us in realizing that he lives in the Spirit. The imaginative powers which blend themselves so readily with our religious faith, are stimulated to conceive more vividly what is behind a visible veil, than what is described, as in its nature invisible. The mercy-seat in the Jewish tabernacle, which was veiled from the people,

* The following article is an enlarged form of the discourse of the Rev. Dr. Yeomans, at the opening of the late General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia.

ART. II.—*Knowledge, Faith, and Feeling, in their Mutual Relations.*

THE reciprocal relations of faith and knowledge, and of both with love, or the various phases of Christian affection and feeling, have been subjects of frequent discussion and earnest controversy. The famous formulas, *crede ut intelligas*, and its responsive *intellige ut credas*, reveal the attitude of mediæval polemics, and show us for what the Anselms and Abelards waged a war, terminated by no enduring peace, but ever and anon revived. It is doubtless true that much of this controversy has been mere logomachy. But it has not been always or mainly so. And even if it were, this does not divest the subject of interest or importance. In the lightest view of the case, it is worth while to ascertain the precise point of misunderstanding; wherein lay the mistaken interpretation or application of terms, in order to prevent the repetition of useless conflicts. But generally in controversies which in one sense are word-fights, in another sense, the words themselves are things. They, at least, represent misconceptions of the real issue entertained by one or both the parties to the conflict; and none the less so, even if it shall turn out, in the end, upon the removal of these misconceptions, that the disputants are essentially agreed. The very nature of the subjects concerned renders the chief questions which arise regarding them momentous. Knowledge, Faith, Love—these lie at the very sources of life, and constitute the very essence of salvation. Their mutual relations cannot be misconceived without begetting a corresponding misconception of the nature of the things themselves. These questions are various. They run into and shape some of the highest issues in doctrinal, and practical, experimental, and casuistical theology. They figure largely in some of the great theological questions of the present time—both those which originate in transcendental sources, and those which come of the effort to solve the great problems of theology in the alembic of a plainer and coarser philosophy. All this will more fully and distinctly appear as we proceed, and will, we trust, prove the discussion on which we propose

to enter both needful and opportune. In its nature it must be largely psychological as well as scriptural, being in that region where theology interlocks with metaphysics and psychology. For knowledge, faith, love, are psychical states.

The first necessity in approaching this subject, is to clear up the issues involved by precise statements and definitions; or if we cannot do this at the threshold, to pursue our inquiries till we reach this result. When this is accomplished, it settles forthwith disputes that have caused interminable strife. Thus, for example, the counter-maxims already alluded to, which to the eye and ear are directly contradictory, and, of course, mutually destructive, are both consistent and true, if intelligence be differently understood, or rather, understood under different relations, in the two cases. *Intellige ut credas* is certainly true, if by intelligence be meant, first, an apprehension of what we believe, and, secondly, of the reasons or evidences on which we believe it. But it is not true if by intelligence be meant not merely a knowledge of what we believe and why we believe it, but, in addition, a comprehension of the object, truth, or proposition believed, in itself, or its points of contact and conciliation with other related truths. If this last were requisite to belief, the circle of our legitimate beliefs would be immensely narrowed—attenuated to almost nothing. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*. When we go beyond the evidence that things are, to that which explains *why* and *how* they are, there is indeed range for an illimitable enlargement of our knowledge, which is at once profitable and delightful. But it must all at length terminate in what is insoluble. Let us analyze and compare the elements of vegetable, animal, or spiritual being, as far as we may. We may thus vastly and usefully augment our knowledge. But we soon reach the end of our sounding line, where our utmost power of analysis is exhausted; and we can say only *that* things are so, but not *how* or *why* they are so.

On the other hand, *crede ut intelligas* is true, if reference be had to the kind of knowledge last named, the comprehension of what we believe; mistaken and delusive, because absurd and impossible, if reference be had to the sorts of knowledge previously specified—the apprehension of the thing believed,

and of the evidence on which we believe it. For it is plain that it is impossible to believe that of which we have no apprehension, and for the existence of which we see no evidence, probable or conclusive. Or if it were possible so to believe, such faith would be undeniable treason to our moral and intellectual nature. To speak of believing that of which we have no conception, and no show of evidence, is simply solecistical. It is only conceivable as a kind of mental suicide. But it is possible to believe upon sufficient evidence what we can apprehend, but cannot comprehend; or what involves elements or relations that we can neither understand nor explain. And not only so. There are many things of which the belief is a prerequisite and preparation for such an understanding or comprehension as we have now brought to view. The child must take upon trust, on the testimony of his parents and teachers, what he will understand as he tests or realizes its nature in experience. He is taught that industry, economy, education, and culture, are every way salutary and beneficial. He takes this upon trust. As he proceeds to realize these virtues in practice, he learns not only that, but how and why they are thus advantageous. He is taught the rules of grammar or arithmetic. He first adopts them on the authority of others. As he proceeds to practice according to them, he discerns more and more of their rationale.* As regards reli-

* In this sense the following from Hamilton is just and in point:

“I must, therefore, beg that you will, for the present, hypothetically believe—believe upon authority—what you cannot now adequately understand; but this only to the end that you may not hereafter be under the necessity of taking any conclusion upon trust. Nor is this temporary exaction of credit peculiar to philosophical education. In the order of nature belief always precedes knowledge—it is the condition of instruction. The child (as observed by Aristotle) must believe in order to learn.”—*Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics*. Pp. 31, 32.

In a like spirit Coleridge castigates the contrary temper in the following caustic phrase:—“Instead of storing the memory during the period when the memory is the predominant faculty, with facts for the after-exercise of the judgment; and instead of awakening by the noblest models the fond and unmixed LOVE and ADMIRATION, which is the natural and graceful temper of early youth; *these* nurselings of improved pedagogy are taught to dispute and decide; to suspect all but their own and their lecturer's wisdom; and to hold nothing sacred from contempt but their own contemptible arrogance.”—*Biographia Literaria*, Chap. i.

gion, the precept, "believe in order to understand," is, in the sense now under consideration, still more emphatically true. We must believe in order to experience, or experimentally understand, the power of faith. Who can understand how the "joy and peace in believing" arise, otherwise than by first believing? Who can "taste that the Lord is gracious," without first believing in his grace? We learn how Christ "is the power of God and the wisdom of God" unto salvation, by trusting the testimony of God that he is such, and casting ourselves on him accordingly. We can only "know the things that are freely given us of God," in their true beauty and excellency, as we first accept and appropriate them by faith. There is a high sense in which we can know what Christianity is only by trying it. Says Christ, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." This is all the more so, as faith realizes the fulfilment of the promise of Divine illumination. "What man is he that feareth the Lord? Him shall he teach in the way that he shall choose." "The meek will he guide in judgment." Christ says, "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls." This clearly implies that the true way to learn the lessons which he teaches, and obtain a serene and satisfying insight into Divine things, is to take his teachings entirely upon trust, and subjugate to them our own minds, with all their conflicting judgments and predilections. So much is confirmed by all experience. Faith in Christ is the preliminary condition of all true insight into the saving power of his cross. While it is impossible, indeed, to believe on him without some apprehension of his person and offices, and without evidence that "God hath set him forth to declare his righteousness," it is also impossible, in the highest sense, "to know in whom we have believed," without first believing on him. As faith is the "evidence of things not seen," the "victory that overcometh the world," as it "worketh by love," and "purifieth the heart," so without faith it is impossible adequately to know those things which are dependent or consequent upon faith. That word "which works energeti-

cally in them that believe," will of course be understood by them as it cannot be by unbelievers.

Thus, in showing that the supposed contradiction between these two aphorisms is one of sound and not of sense; and that each is true with reference to different aspects of our intelligence, we have made some progress towards clearing up our main inquiry;—the relation of knowledge to faith. Knowledge in one degree or kind precedes and conditions faith. In another, it is preceded and conditioned by faith.

But it is obvious, that a thorough survey of this subject requires a determination of the psychological nature of knowledge and faith, and of their points of similitude and difference. For when the Scriptures speak of faith, knowledge, and love, they refer to certain recognized states of consciousness. Else they would be unmeaning.

This opens the following inquiries: 1. What is knowledge? 2. Is faith a form of knowledge, or a mere feeling? If the former, how does it differ from other modes of knowing? If it be a feeling, how does it differ from other modes of feeling? And whichever it may be, how is it related to previous and subsequent knowledge and feeling?

As to knowledge, it denotes a state of mind, in one sense, nearly or quite simple and irreducible; almost incapable of being made plainer by any definition. Still something may be said in this behalf. It is, like feeling, an act of mind or state of consciousness. This gives us its genus. Its differentia is, that, unlike feeling, it carries the mind to some determinate object, within or without us, beyond itself—*i. e.*, beyond such mere act or state of consciousness. Thus, if I know anything, it is some object beyond the mere act of knowing. If I feel either pleasure or pain, such pleasure or pain consists in the feeling itself. All feeling, as that of touch or taste, which carries the mind to the object touched or tasted, involves an element of cognition beside. This does not differ from Hamilton's statement, "by knowledge is understood the mere possession of truths." This possession, however, may be twofold; either the actual apprehension of them in present consciousness, or the possession of them among the latent treasures of memory, in such wise that they are ready to be evoked into conscious-

ness as occasion may require. Another definition or rather synonym of knowledge is judgment. All knowledge involves a judgment, either primitive or logical. As has often been remarked by psychologists, judgment enters into every act of cognition, and, in a less rigid sense, of all consciousness, which is that property of every mental exercise or state by which we know that it occurs. Now we cannot know, without judging that the thing known is, and that its contradictory is not. That which is known indeed, may be only the mental act itself—*i. e.*, it may be mere feeling. Still, if known, it is judged to exist. Logical judgment differs from this primitive judgment which enters into every act of mind, not in its essential nature, but in being more complex and artificial—*i. e.*, the affirmation of the agreement or disagreement of two conceptions, one of which, at least, is formed by abstraction and generalization.

“Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either problematical, assertive, or demonstrable; or, in other words, the results of Opinion, of Belief, or of Science.

“The problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor objectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly represents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of certainty; and what was held as a mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circumstances, historical facts about which there is doubtful testimony, we can but form a problematical judgment, and must admit the probability of error at the moment of making our decision.

“The assertive judgment is one of which we are fully persuaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief, that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is, therefore, subjectively, but not objectively, certain. It commends

itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise.

“The demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and objectively true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathematical axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theorems of mathematics and the laws of physical science.”—*Thompson's Laws of Thought*, pp. 280-1.*

In regard to this, it may be observed at the threshold, that it is clear, and that under the second head it accurately describes a large part, at least, of the phenomena which we are wont to class under faith or belief. Nor does it conflict with, for it includes a very common definition of faith, viz. that it is assent to a proposition upon the testimony of others; and that Christian faith is the acceptance of the declarations of the Bible upon the testimony of God its author. We mean to say, as will yet more fully be shown, that so far as belief in general, and Christian faith in particular, have the character thus ascribed to them, they do not contradict but coincide with the definition of belief under consideration. The only difference is, that this definition is somewhat broader, including not only such convictions as are produced by the testimony of other persons, but some likewise begotten by certain other kinds of proof. And if the matter be narrowly scanned, it may be questioned if we do not need this breadth of definition in order to provide for all the phenomena connected with religious belief and Christian faith. For, 1. The foundation of the theist's belief—surely that of the heathen theist as distinguished from the atheist—is not testimony but the works of nature. Rom. ii. 20. 2. While belief in the divinity of the Bible, or Christianity, is, as will more fully appear, assent to the testimony of God, evinced by various proofs, external and internal, to be his testimony, yet the preliminary condition of such assent is a sufficiently fair appreciation of these proofs, that it is God who speaks in the Holy Word. All experience confirms the declaration of Christ, that they who “hate the light” of these proofs can “refuse to

* Hamilton states the distinction more tersely but less completely, thus:—

“A proposition is called *Assertory* when it enounces what is known as actual; *Problematic* when it enounces what is known as possible; *Apodictic* or *Demonstrative* when it enounces what is known as necessary.”—*Logic*, p. 183.

come" to it; *i. e.*, it is not of such a nature as can compel their belief. Nor are these evidences, especially the internal, all of the nature of testimony by other persons. 3. Although saving faith is begotten by the "witness of the Spirit," unveiling the beauty and glory of divine things, yet the psychological experience in the case is not of hearing or recognizing the testimony of another, but of a spiritual intuition or beholding of the "glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." To this unbelievers or those in a different moral state are blind. But of this more, as we proceed.

It is further to be observed that in this, as in other similar cases, instances often occur in which it is difficult to make a rigid application of these distinctions and definitions. All classifications of phenomena in every department, physical and metaphysical, encounter instances so dubious, in which the characteristics of one class so shade off into those of another, that it is difficult to assign them to either species. If we compare the most perfect crystalline inorganic formations with the lowest lichens, or the sensitive plant among vegetables, with the polyp among animals, the bearing of this remark will be manifest. There are mental judgments which, to one man are essentially apodictic, which he is compelled to believe, whatever be his disposition, but which cannot be forced upon the belief of others. To others they, if accepted, are matters of faith. They will accept or reject them according to their disposition, confidence in testimony, &c. Such is the fact in regard to our own states of consciousness, our inward thoughts, pains, and pleasures. Such is the fact in regard to any sensible object or phenomenon which any observers have witnessed, but which has vanished, so that they cannot bring it within the sense-perception of others, or evince it to them by anything more decisive than their own testimony, which these others may believe or disbelieve—*e. g.*, the miracles of Christ and his apostles. On the other hand, whatever can be brought under the cognizance of the senses; all intuitive, self-evident, and necessary truths, mathematical, metaphysical, and moral; all necessary and unquestionable deductions from these, like the theorems of mathematics or the demonstrated laws of nature, are known by demonstrative judgments; which

compel the assent of all sane minds that can be made to understand them and their proofs. If there are any judgments more compulsory than belief proper, and independent of the disposition of the mind, these are of that order. Again, although in loose popular usage, *belief* is sometimes used in the sense of *opinion*, which is undoubtedly an uncertain or problematical judgment of its holder, yet it means more than this, even a full persuasion, when employed with anything like philosophical or theological accuracy. We shall yet inquire more fully how far all this harmonizes with the scriptural presentation of faith in its psychological aspects. But it is very clear that, according to this view, knowledge constitutes its root and essence, and furnishes its ground and limits.

Meanwhile, we will bring to view another analysis of the relations of faith and knowledge, offered by an author of deservedly high repute. Says McCosh:

“Philosophers have drawn the distinction between presentative and representative knowledge. In the former, the object is present at the time,—we perceive it, we feel it, we are conscious of it as now and here and under our inspection. In representative knowledge, there is an object now present representing an absent object. Thus, I may have an image or conception of Venice, with its decaying beauty, and this is now present and under the eye of consciousness; but it represents something absent and distant, of the existence of which I am at the same time convinced. When I was actually in Venice, and gazed on its churches and palaces rising out of the waters, there would be no propriety in saying that I believed in the existence of the city,—the correct phrase is, that I know it to exist. I know too that at this moment I have an idea of Venice; but as Venice itself is not before me, the proper expression of my conviction is, that I believe in its existence. According to this account we are said to know ourselves, and the objects presented to the senses and the representations (always, however, as presentations) in the mind, but to believe in the objects which we have seen in time past, but which are not now present, and in objects which we have never seen, and very specially in objects which we can never fully know, such as an Infinite God. The mind seems to begin not with faith, but with cognition. It sets out

with the knowledge of an external object presented to it, and with a knowledge of self contemplating that object. I cannot then agree with those who maintain that faith—I mean natural faith—must precede knowledge. I hold that knowledge, psychologically considered, appears first, and then faith.”—*Intuitions of the Mind*, pp. 197–8.

This theory agrees with the preceding in making a faith a form of knowledge. It roots and grounds it in knowledge, and limits it by knowledge. It also supplements that theory by making faith a knowledge of absent objects. But some of our representative knowledge, *i. e.*, our knowledge of absent objects, may be not only as sure to ourselves but as capable of demonstration to others as that of present objects. To go no further, if we take the self-evident axioms, and necessary deductions from them, of mathematics, logic, metaphysics, morals, and the established laws of physical science, are they not sure, and capable of being so put, as to enforce the assent of all sane minds that can be made to understand them and their proofs? That no two straight lines can enclose a space, that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle, are not these demonstratively true of all straight lines and semicircles, whether now present to us or not—all past, present, future, and possible straight lines? That every event must have a cause, that time and space are illimitable, that acts of ingratitude are base, and of self-sacrifice for the public good laudable, all these predicates are judged by an irresistible mental necessity, to be true of their respective subjects, although those subjects are just as necessarily absent from us. The author's criterion is therefore too broad. It includes other judgments besides beliefs. If there be any certain knowledge which is not distinctively belief, the foregoing judgments are surely of that character. And what less can be said of the great astronomical laws, and the eclipses thence predicted, for those who understand them and their grounds? Doubtless this view was suggested by the scriptural representations which contrast faith with vision, and will be presently considered. That the Bible represents saving faith as pertaining to objects not of themselves immediately present to sense, or evident to reason, is conceded. But whether it represents all knowledge of

objects not immediately present to the mind as faith, is another question.

Another theory of faith which has been widely prevalent, resolves it into mere feeling, unreasoning, if not antagonistic to reason. This is the theory of mystics and transcendentalists, or of those who are both at once, as well as of other philosophers and religionists. Kant sought to escape from the self-annihilating contradictions into which, with prodigious subtlety, he conducted the speculative reason, in the practical reason or conscience, which compelled faith in what, to the speculative intellect, were contradictions and absurdities. The sufficient refutation of this view is, that faith in contradictions and absurdities is impossible. We may, indeed, be convinced that what appears to us contradictory is not so, because God affirms its truth. This may assure us that there is some solution or removal of the seeming contradiction unknown to us. As illustrations we have the Trinity and Incarnation. Either of these may seem to involve contradictions to one who tries to explicate them, before he has mastered the definitions and distinctions which clear them, not of mystery, but of absurdity. But the reverent Christian who sees them manifestly taught in the Bible, will not, therefore, like the Socinian, reject them. He will, on the contrary, believe that some solution, which he has not yet discovered, will clear the contradiction.

As a consequence of this theory of the great father of modern German transcendentalism, the prevailing doctrine of the more orthodox of that school has been, that faith is a mere sentiment or feeling. They transfer it from the cognitive to the emotional department of the mind. "Jacobi admitted, far too readily, to Kant and Fichte, that speculation and philosophy led to scepticism, but he fell back on faith, (*Glaube*), or sentiment, (*Gefühl*), which he represented as a revelation, (*Offenbarung*)." * This favourite opinion of mystics and mystico-transcendentalists, has figured largely among all that class of dreamy pantheistic divines of whom Schleiermacher is the chief representative, and who substitute a "god-consciousness," for the objective knowledge of the

* McCosh on Intuitions, page 200.

One living and true God. Among philosophers none have more positively and determinately resolved belief or faith into pure feeling than Sir William Hamilton, who in many respects was far enough from Transcendentalism. He says:

“Knowledge and belief differ, not only in degree, but in kind. Knowledge is certainty founded on intuition. Belief is a certainty founded on feeling. The one is perspicuous and objective. The other is obscure and subjective.” “In common language the word *belief* is often used to denote an inferior degree of certainty. We may, however, be equally certain of what we believe as of what we know; and it has, not without ground, been maintained by many philosophers, that the certainty of all knowledge is, in its ultimate analysis, resolved into a certainty of belief.” *Lectures on Logic*, p. 383.

While these representations define belief or faith to be mere feeling, and resolve all our knowledge into this belief, *i. e.* into such mere feeling, it must be confessed that Hamilton elsewhere explains away this doctrine, and, either purposely or inadvertently, annihilates it. Thus, a little further on, he says:

“But, on the other hand, the manifestation of this belief necessarily involves knowledge; for we cannot believe without some consciousness or knowledge of the belief, and consequently without some consciousness or knowledge of the object of the belief. Now the immediate consciousness of an object is called an *intuition*—an *insight*. It is thus impossible to separate belief and knowledge—feeling and intuition. They each suppose the other.” *Id.* p. 385.

This proves belief to be a cognitive act, not a mere sentiment or feeling,—nay, not of necessity to involve any exercise of sensibility. Whether it excites feeling, is determined by the nature of its object. Does this address the esthetic or sensitive faculty? If we believe that the durability of wood is proportioned to the slowness of its growth, how far will such a belief stir the sensibilities? On the other hand, much less does all knowledge, as distinguished from belief, originate in feeling, or cause, or in any manner imply feeling. What feeling originates or is caused by the

truth that five times five are twenty-five, or that the whole is greater than a part? Withal, feeling does not necessarily imply a knowledge or a consciousness of anything beside itself, and of the conscious subject of it. The like contradiction of first founding faith on knowledge, and then tracing knowledge back to faith as its root, appears in the following passage. He says very truly: "We are not compelled by a blind impulse to believe in an external world, as in an unknown something: on the contrary, we believe it to exist only because we are immediately cognizant of it as existing." But then, contrariwise, he goes on as follows: "If asked, indeed, how we know that we know it?—how we know that what we apprehend in sensible perception is, as consciousness assures us, an object external, extended, and numerically different from the conscious subject? how we know that this object is not a mere mode of mind illusively presented to us as a mode of matter?—then, indeed, we must reply that we do not, in propriety, know that what we are compelled to perceive as not-self is not a perception of self, and that we can only, on reflection, believe such to be the case, in reliance on the original necessity of so believing imposed on us by our nature." *Hamilton's Reid*, p. 750. This again founds knowledge on belief, i. e. as defined by the author, on feeling.

In another place Hamilton appears to present the germ of McCosh's theory. "Properly speaking, however, we know only the actual and present, and all real knowledge is an immediate knowledge. What is said to be mediately known, is in truth not known to be, but only believed to be; for its existence is only an inference resting on the belief, that the mental modification truly represents what is itself beyond the sphere of knowledge." *Lectures on Metaphysics*, p. 152.

Notwithstanding such inconsistencies and contradictions, there can be no doubt that his characteristic and professed doctrine was that belief is a feeling, and that knowledge has its root in such feeling. And it is equally clear that he has himself unwittingly furnished the decisive refutation of this theory. He has shown that belief without knowledge for its ground, and in some sense limit, is an impossibility. It is obvious that Hamilton, and the writers he represents,

were betrayed into this error in two ways. First, all our knowledge originates in the intuition of self-evident objects, facts, or truths, which are seen in their own light, and cannot be established by any outside proof or discursive reasonings. If then we inquire on what ground we accept this self-evidence as genuine, of course we cannot validate it by any extraneous proof. One answer is, we know it to be so; another, we feel it to be so. The former is obviously the true one. We cognize self-evident truths by an act of intuitive insight. It is primarily a cognitive, not a mere sensitive act. So Hamilton is obliged to confess. "We believe it (the external object) to exist because we are immediately cognizant of it as existing." Nevertheless he forthwith advances the contrary, which is his real characteristic doctrine. Accordingly, in answering the question, how do we know the self-evidence of intuitive truths to be genuine? he says it is because we feel it to be so. He says:

"But what is given as an ultimate and incomprehensible principle of knowledge is given as a fact, the existence of which we must admit, but the reasons of whose existence we cannot know, we cannot understand. But such an admission as it is not a knowledge must be a belief; and thus it is that, according to Aristotle, all our knowledge is, in its root, a blind, a passive faith; in other words, a feeling." *Lectures on Logic*, p. 384.

The mistake here lies in resolving intuitive knowledge into feeling. That is none the less a cognition which is an intuition. On the contrary, intuition, as it is the ultimate, is also, in some aspects, the highest form of cognition. The Divine omniscience is one eternal all-inclusive intuition. Indeed, the absurdity of resolving all faith into mere blind, passive feeling, and all knowledge into such faith, is too evident to require argument.

The second reason why Hamilton resolved faith into feeling, is found in his doctrine, that the Infinite and Unconditioned cannot be made objects of finite thought or apprehension. Hence, if brought before the human mind at all, it must be by faith, and, in consistency, this faith must be a feeling, not a cognition. After teaching us that "the knowledge of

nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy," it is, of course, only consistent to tell us, that "by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in our very inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." It is obvious that this faith must be a feeling. For it is required to supplement our cognitive impotency; our "inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite." This theory has been rigidly applied to Christian doctrine by his accomplished editor and disciple, Mr. Mansell. He thus gets rid of the difficulties of Christianity, by arguing its object-matter to be beyond the reach of human thought or knowledge, and handing the whole over to faith. We do not propose to add to the comments on this work, which we offered in the article on *Reason and Faith*, in our No. for October, 1860. But as this theory supposes faith or belief to consist in feeling, we shall, in refuting the latter, incidentally refute the former.

While this philosophical theory is quite accordant with the views of mystics and fanatics who found religion in mere feeling, impulse, alleged inspiration, or other subjective feelings, unrestrained by any objective revelation, and often, by the fundamental laws of human intelligence, it is as clearly inconsistent with an intelligent scriptural faith. There is, however, a metaphysical analysis of saving as distinguished from historical faith, which has been somewhat current in this country, containing a similar element and tending to the same issue. We refer to that theory which makes love, added to historical or mere speculative faith, the cause of saving faith, instead of making saving faith the root of love. This would seem to resolve all that is peculiar to saving faith into mere blind feeling or affection, instead of making Christian feeling the fruit of the believing reception of the truth which excites it. According to this, love works by faith, not faith by love. This theory has not usually been associated with mystical or fanatical tendencies. It is rather born of the notion that all moral states lie exclusively in the will or feelings, to the exclusion of the cognitive powers. Consequently, as faith is a moral state, it must be remanded exclusively to the will or sensibility. The

truth is, however, that the mind is one and indivisible. All its faculties, intellective, sensitive, and voluntary, partake of its depravity and its rectitude. The feelings are evoked by the views of the intellect; and they in turn determine the choices of the will. The mind and conscience may be defiled as well as the feelings and will. In things moral and spiritual the cognitive, sensitive, and optative faculties are all mutually implicated. To call good evil, or evil good, to refuse to believe the gospel, to esteem the preaching of the cross foolishness, incur the severest condemnation. "To behold the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," to "know the things that are freely given us of God," is the effect of divine illumination and saving grace.

As we have observed, this theory has affinities rather with a superficial metaphysical scheme than with mysticism or fanaticism. It is, of course, in favour with that rationalistic or pelagianizing school, which maintains the plenary ability of the unregenerate for self-conversion, and therefore seats all moral character in a self-determining will. It is not, however, confined to these. It has been held by many quite orthodox divines.

One great objection to it lies in the fact, that it deranges the whole order and method of preaching the gospel. Supposing faith to be the consequent of love, it hinders or prevents the free offer of the gospel to sinners as such. It implies that no one has a warrant to trust Christ till he finds love, repentance, right feeling of some sort in his soul. It does not permit him to come as a sinner destitute of all goodness, and "believe on him that justifieth the ungodly" that his faith may be counted for righteousness.—Rom. iv. 5. He cannot come to Christ to be saved, till he finds evidence that he is in a state of salvation. This enthrals him under the spirit of bondage, and deprives him of the spirit of adoption, the glorious liberty of the sons of God. Great injury has arisen from this style of preaching, which withholds from famishing souls and wounded spirits so much of what makes the gospel the "power of God unto salvation." Many are thus held for years crushed and paralyzed under a yoke of bondage, who should be rejoicing in the liberty wherewith Christ maketh free:—buoyant, glad, thrifty Christians. Of course, faith is inseparable from love, and love from

faith. They are contemporaneous. But they have a natural order with reference to each other. The sun and its radiance are contemporaneous. But there is an order. This order is inverted and the whole matter confused and deranged, if we say the radiance is the antecedent or cause of the sun, or the stream of the fountain. The immediate and simultaneous effect of receiving Christ by faith is, reconciliation, peace, love, joy, hope, all the fruits of the Spirit. We go to Christ, in short, that we may have life. We do not first get life in order to have a warrant to go to Christ. These things may be judged, by some of greater, by others, of less moment. But by those of most profound and joyous piety, and by the most competent guides of distressed and inquiring souls, they have been counted of cardinal interest and importance. Thus alone can the believing sinner make his own those precious lines :

“Just as I am—without one plea,
But that thy blood was shed for me,
And that thou bidd’st me come to thee,
I come, O Lamb of God, I come.”

The foregoing analysis brings us to the definition of faith as a generic psychological state, which makes it an assertory judgment, *i. e.*, subjectively, but not objectively certain; certain to the believer, but not capable of having its certainty so demonstrated as to compel the assent of others of a different disposition, or in a different moral state. It lies midway between a mere opinion or problematical judgment, which is often styled an inferior belief, and an apodictic judgment which can be so demonstrated as to compel the assent of all who have not abnegated their own intellects. The specific difference which constitutes different sorts of faith, is found in the distinctive objects which it embraces. Thus religious faith is that which believes religious truths, including at least faith in one or more superior beings, on whom we are dependent, and to whom we are amenable. Christian faith is belief of the truths of Christianity as these are contained in the books of the Old and New Testament; more specifically, it is obedience to the command “Believe the gospel;” Mark i. 15: more definitely still, “Believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God;” Acts viii. 37: and still fur-

ther developed, it is "faith of the Son of God, who loved us and gave himself for us." Gal. ii. 20.

But in each and all of these and other scriptural representations of it, it has the attributes of an assertory judgment, as already defined. It is a judgment which the believer knows to be true for himself, and for others similarly disposed, but which he cannot so demonstrate as to compel the assent of those whose tastes, passions, and sympathies are averse to it. That this is the nature of scriptural faith, psychologically considered, and of each higher as distinguished from each lower grade of it, appears from the following considerations.

1. It is commanded on pain of eternal perdition. This implies, first, that the truths which we are commanded to believe are supported by evidence which must convince every candid mind, and be discerned by every spiritually enlightened eye, *i. e.* by every mind freed from the bedimning vapours of sinful passion. If this belief is commanded on such pains and penalties, then the evidence is such as to render man inexcusable for not exercising it. It implies, secondly, that this evidence is such that men may be culpably blind to it, and fail to recognize or appreciate it;—that it depends on their moral state whether they will duly note and be governed by it. On these grounds, the evidence of moral and religious truth is called moral evidence, else why is belief in it commanded? Is it a fit matter of command, to believe that we exist, or that we think and feel and will, or that other men exist, or that an equilateral triangle is equiangular?

2. It is explicitly taught that this conviction or belief of Christian truth depends on our moral state. "Those who will do the will of God shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4. "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." 1 Cor. ii. 14. "He that believeth on Him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already,

because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men have loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved." John iii. 18, 19, 20.

3. Faith is the gift of God. It is a scriptural object of prayer that God would increase our faith, help our unbelief, and open the eyes of our understanding to discern wondrous things out of his law. Now the gracious work of the Spirit in the soul of man does not consist in imparting new faculties within, or objective truths without us; but in changing the interior moral state of the soul, so that it goes forth in new views, feelings, and purposes, towards the objects revealed to it in God's word.

4. The contrast between faith and sight, presented 2 Cor. v. 7; Heb. xi. 1, and elsewhere, points to the same conclusion. These passages have been interpreted by some to lend countenance to a theory already noticed, that faith denotes the conviction we have, in every instance, of things absent, knowledge, of things present to the mind. We have already shown that this distinction does not universally hold. We think that in these passages sight is used for our natural faculty of demonstrative or unquestionable knowledge, whether through sense or reason.* It is thus contrasted with what is made known to us exclusively by the testimony of God, and becomes reality to us when we believe that testimony, and only as we believe it. Faith receives that as true, on the testimony of God, of which unaided sense and reason cannot discern either that it is, or how it is. So faith is to the believer the "ἐλεγχος"

* It is proper to add, that while this passage asserts one great property of faith, it is not intended as a formal and exhaustive definition of it. It asserts that faith is the "ἐλεγχος of things not seen." This is one property of it, but whether of it alone, or its only property, is not said. So hope is elsewhere declared to respect things which we see not. But it is not said that hope alone does this.

"Unde etiam apparet, longi falli eos, qui justam fidei definitionem hic poni existant; Neque enim hic de tota fidei natura disserit Apostolus, sed partem elegit suo instituto congruentem, nempe quod patientia semper conjuncta sit."—*Calvin's Commentary on Heb. xi. 1.*

of things not demonstrable by sense or reason. But while this testimony "is sure to all the seed," it is just that which men, "after their hardness and impenitent heart," often fail to apprehend, as to its author, its import, its infallibility, its obligation, its application. By sin and unbelief their "eyes are holden that they should not see him." They are "slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken." "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." It is "believing God" that constitutes the formal quality of scriptural faith. "By faith Noah, being warned of God of things not seen as yet, being moved with fear, prepared an ark to the saving of his house." Faith here is crediting the testimony of God in regard to matters beyond the reach of sense or reason. "These all died in the faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them." Here faith is simply believing on the strength of the Divine promises, what otherwise must have been unknown, while others, in a different moral state, were not "persuaded of them." On the other hand, faith may be aided by sense and reason in believing, what others favoured with like testimony may reject. Christ said to Thomas, "Because thou hast seen me thou hast believed; blessed are they which have not seen me and believed." John xx. 29. Such passages show that "sight," in one sense of it, is involved in faith. Faith sees *what* things are believed in, although it "sees them afar off." It sees the evidence on which we believe them, whether that evidence be addressed to the senses, as in the case of Thomas, and the beholders of miracles; or to the reason purely, as where the matter and manner of the word or testimony bears a Divine imprint, and an evidence of Divinity more unmistakeable than the "heavens which declare his glory." There is a sense in which what is believed must be seen, that is, apprehended, even if, in another aspect, it be invisible. "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Rom. i. 20. "By faith he forsook Egypt, not fearing the wrath of the king: for he endured, *as seeing him who is invisible.*" Heb. xi. 27. We "look at

things not seen." 2 Cor. iv. 18. Thus faith has its roots in knowledge. It always implies knowledge. In a certain sense, it cannot go beyond cognition. Even if what is believed be invisible, it must still in some sort be brought within the sphere of vision, *i. e.*, of conception, so far as it is an object of possible belief. The same is also true of the evidence which induces belief in its existence. And this evidence is such that while it avails to produce a judgment subjectively sure to the believer, it cannot be so set forth, as, like a theorem in mathematics, or a law of physics, or an object of sense, to constrain the assent of those morally indisposed to receive it.*

This view of faith as an assertory judgment, is still more decisively borne out in reference to that evangelical and saving faith, which is the first motion and constant spring of spiritual life in the soul. The faith of the theist as against the atheist, is an assertory judgment; because that there are atheists unconvinced by the evidence of the being of God, we have as strong proof as that there are men who hold other fundamental errors. The same is true of faith in the Bible

* "*Inevidentia* quæ tribuitur fidei non excludit omnem notitiam, sed tantum eam, quæ nititur medio scientifico, id est, sensu aut evidente ratione a natura rei petita. Dicitur *habitus inevidens* non ad negationem omnis notitiæ, sed ad remotionem notitiæ, quæ fit per rationem philosophicam, cum nitatur testimonio et auctoritate loquentis. Excludit ergo notitiam luminis naturalis, non supernaturalis revelationis; Excludit scientiam philosophia dictum, quæ opponitur opinioni, sed non populariter, ut opponitur ignorantia."—*Turretin, De Voc. et Fide*, Quæst. IX. In the same chapter he offers five reasons to prove "in fide includi notitiam."

The foregoing clearly limits the "sight" which the Scripture contrasts with faith, to that knowledge or insight which comes by sense and reason, while faith obtains its light from supernatural testimony and revelation. And it places faith midway between mere opinion on the one hand, and scientifically demonstrable judgments on the other. In a like spirit, he says, (Quæst. VIII. 6.) "Ut vero Philosophi tres gradus perfectionis in assensu observant, *firmitatem* scilicet, *certitudinem*, et *evidentiam*; *Firmitas*, ut sit sine hæsitatione, *certitudo*; ut certo et solido nitatur fundamento. *Evidentia*, ut non nitatur testimonio alieno, sed vel ex sensu vel ratione probatur, ut in scientia; fidei assensus habet quidem firmitatem, et certitudinem, quia Verbo divino et infallibili nititur, sed non evidentiam, quia nititur testimonio, non ratione, quod Apostolus notat, Heb. xi. 1." Here faith is a firm and well grounded persuasion, founded on Divine testimony, and midway between an opinion and an apodictic judgment.

as contrasted with infidelity. The same is true of those who believing the Bible to be from God, discern and believe the essential truths declared in it, as against rationalists and sceptics, who eviscerate it of its vital contents, and make shipwreck of the faith of God's elect. But saving faith, as distinguished from the faith of devils; living, in contrast to a dead faith, is eminently an assertory judgment. This faith by which the just live, arises from discerning the Divine excellency, beauty, glory, of the word and truth of God, and especially of the person and offices of Christ as our Saviour. "God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Thus the soul beholds and delights in that infinite beauty and comeliness of Christ, which are hidden from the unbeliever. This is that spiritual discernment, that esthetic apprehension, which cognizes far more important points than all mere speculative orthodoxy without it. Mere orthodox belief, though unspeakably important, without this, is but dry bones without the living flesh, body without soul. This spiritual discernment of the things that are freely given us of God, commands the heart, and enlists the affections. Here we reach the point of sure contact between the cognitive and emotional—those moral esthetic apprehensions which always enlist and determine the feelings; which taste that the Lord is gracious. This shows how it is that "with the heart man believeth unto righteousness." True faith at once brings the heart to Christ, to embrace, trust, love, and serve him. So faith purifies the heart, while it overcomes the world. This fact that saving faith is such a belief as instantaneously begets right feeling, has undoubtedly betrayed some, who have not carefully examined the matter, into the two theories which we have already considered, either that faith is the fruit of love, or that it consists in mere blind feeling. That it underlies and immediately gives rise to true Christian love and right feeling is undeniable. That it results from them would imply the reversal of the normal order of mental exercises, as shown by experience and by scriptural representations. We will not, however, expatiate on this point beyond

what we have already advanced. We merely signalize the fact, that by this analysis, saving faith, not only as far as it agrees with, but as distinguished from other kinds and grades of faith, is an assertory judgment, sure to the believer on the surest possible grounds, as

“He sees what wisdom, power, and love,
Shine in our dying Lord,”

while he cannot compel the assent of those who have a “vail upon their hearts,” which blinds them to all this,—all in Christ which attracts the heart to him as chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely, is to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness.*

To this it may be objected, that faith is represented in the Scripture as a thing of degrees; that they speak of a weak, a strong, an assured faith; consequently that there is a faith short of an inward certainty of the things believed in. We answer, first, that still the characteristic of normal faith, as shown by the scriptural writers, is certainty as to the things believed. “I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him.” 2 Tim. i. 12. “I am persuaded that neither angels, &c.” Rom. ix. “For we know that if our earthly house of this

* “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee: Wherefore I repent and abhor myself in dust and ashes.” Job xlii. 5, 6.

Many theologians correctly designate the effect of this spiritual illumination as a spiritual taste, who yet produce more or less confusion from an imperfect analysis of the nature of taste. They sometimes represent it as primarily a faculty of feeling, and then of a peculiar cognition begotten by that feeling; whereas, it is a faculty of that peculiar sort of cognition which always awakens correspondent feeling. Hence they sometimes describe it as a sensitive faculty. It is such, but not exclusively. But they do not discourse upon it long without implying, or distinctly articulating the view which we have presented. Thus, Edwards often describes it as a “sense or taste of the moral beauty of divine things, so that no knowledge can be called spiritual any further than it arises from, and has this in it.” But, consistently or not, he soon tells us that it “primarily and most essentially lies in beholding the holy beauty of divine things.” It is “the sense of the heart wherein the mind not only speculates and beholds, but relishes and feels.” *Treatise on Religious Affections*, Book IV. These latter representations are sufficiently accurate and explicit.

tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." 2 Cor. v. 1. "But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." 1 John ii. 20.* Secondly, that in us which weakens this certain belief of divine things is not faith, but unbelief antagonizing with it, and impeding its exercise. "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief." Mark ix. 24. Any uncertainty of faith, therefore, is the effect of remaining unbelief hindering or smothering its normal exercise. Hence, thirdly, a distinction must be taken between the principle of faith and its exercises. It is a well established truth that gracious principles may and do often exist whose normal and well-developed exercises are temporarily checked or repressed. Fourthly, faith may grow as knowledge increases, bringing either new objects to view, or fuller apprehensions of those already known, or new proofs, or stronger views of evidences which were before sufficiently decisive to free the mind of all incertitude. And, finally, a distinction is to be taken between the objects which faith embraces and trusts, and the believer's consciousness of his own good estate. This he often fails of through a misguided reflex introspection. He may be, and often is, sure of the all-sufficient efficacy of Christ's grace, blood, and righteousness, and of the truth of God in the promises and offers of it. He may truly cast himself upon it; and yet he may be more or less uncertain whether he has thus really and truly believed. Now the former, *i. e.* sure belief of the truth and promise of God in his word, is faith. Conviction of his own good estate, faith in the genuineness of his own faith, is another and consequential thing, the result of a reflex process which the true believer is often slow and long in reaching; especially if he be under spiritual guides who, in these matters, are, as so often happens, "unskilful in the word of righteousness."

* "By this faith, a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word, for the authority of God speaking therein." *Confession of Faith*, Chap. xiv. 2.

"Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness, by and with the word, in our hearts." *Id.* i. 5.

From the foregoing discussion it appears,

1. That belief in general is a judgment of the mind, differing from opinion in being subjectively certain to the believer, and from demonstrative judgments, in being incapable of such proof as to compel the assent of minds not similarly disposed.

2. That belief is a cognitive act founded in knowledge, and dependent upon it for its being and extent.

3. That Christian faith, in its various grades and kinds, differs from other beliefs, in the nature of the objects believed, and the evidence on which they are believed,—the former being the truth of God, the latter the testimony of God. It cannot outrun the objects presented to the mind for belief, or the evidence by which it apprehends them to be proved. “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?” Rom. x. 14.

4. Hence that theory which maintains that God, as infinite, absolute, and first cause, can in no sense be brought within the mind’s thought or conception, and must therefore be remanded to faith, is untenable. Such faith is a psychological impossibility. It is impossible to believe that of which we can form no conception. We may believe what is incomprehensible, but not what is self-contradictory. But when we believe the incomprehensible, we conceive of it as such, and as presenting a somewhat knowable as a base of the incomprehensible.

5. Therefore Christian faith as a cognitive act requires an external, objective, authoritative revelation, which shall furnish it the requisite objects, guidance, and limitation.

6. No mere feelings or intuitions, or other inward states, constitute a revelation. Whatever in religion is not conformed to the external word of God, is spurious. We must prove all things, and hold fast that which is good. “To the law and the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.” Isaiah viii. 20.

7. Therefore spiritual illumination is not a revelation of new truths, but an enlightening of the eyes of the mind to discern the divine truth, beauty, and glory of what is revealed in Scripture. By that word all claims to spiritual light, inspiration, by special intuition, exaltation, or endowments of any sort, are to be tested. “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God.” 1 John iii. 1. “If there come any

unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not in your house, neither bid him God speed." 2 John 10.

8. No error can be more profound than that of intuitionists, rationalists, transcendentalists, and mystics, who place doctrine, or, as they sometimes name it, dogma, in opposition to spirit. That spirit alone is a Christian spirit, which believes, loves, and obeys the "doctrine of Christ," which is according to godliness. They alone build upon a rock who hear Christ's words and do them. All others build upon the sand and will reel to destruction. His sheep hear his voice and no other. A stranger they will not follow.

ART. III.—*The Subjects of Baptism.*

THE mode of baptism was considered in a former article. The object aimed at was to present the subject in a clear and simple light, which might render it perfectly plain to the common reader. How far this end has been reached, must be left of course for others to judge. The question now to occupy our attention is, who are the proper subjects of baptism?

It is universally admitted that this rite may be properly administered to adult believers, if they have not been previously baptized. On this point, therefore, as there is no difference of opinion, we shall consume no time with discussion. But are believers the only persons to whom it may be administered? To this our Baptist brethren reply in the affirmative; we, on the other hand, with the great mass of Christendom, in the negative. We believe that the infants of such as are members of the visible church are to be baptized, the Lord having made it both their privilege and their duty to consecrate their offspring to him in the use of this ordinance. In defence and confirmation of this belief, the most of what we desire to say may be appropriately arranged under three distinct arguments, each having force in itself, and when combined, forming an arch that cannot be broken or swept away by our opponents. They