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see index p. 158
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ART. I.—*The Logical Relations of Religion and Natural Science.*

PHYSICAL science, at the present day, investigates phenomena simply as they are in themselves. This, if not positively atheistic, must be of dangerous tendency. Whatever deliberately omits God from the universe, is closely allied to that which denies him.

We cannot thoroughly investigate nature without asking for the origin and source of all things. Science undertakes to solve questions which compel either the acknowledgment of God, or the assertion of open atheism, or else a resort to that concealed atheism which quietly sets God aside without directly denying his existence. When, for example, a philosopher says that certain causes produced the present state of our earth, he is bound to answer the question, Did those causes arise from the will of an infinitely wise Creator? For, if the creating agency of Jehovah is admitted, we thus bring into scientific research an element which cannot be adequately comprehended except by an intellect equal to that of Deity. All physical theories must be exceedingly controlled and limited by the admission of such an element. That which to us seems impro-

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ART. IV.—*The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively considered*. By the Rev. JAMES MCCOSH, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, author of "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Limits of Religious Thought Examined. In Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, in the year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. First American, from the third London edition. With the Notes translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The Province of Reason: A Criticism of the Bampton Lecture on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By JOHN YOUNG, LL. D., Edin., author of "The Christ of History," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Philosophy of the Infinite; with Special Reference to the Theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. By HENRY CALDERWOOD. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1854.

WE prefix the title "Reason and Faith" to this article, not because we propose to enter upon an exhaustive, or even formal, discussion of the subject, but because it is a prominent topic in all, and the chief subject treated in a part, of the books whose titles are given above, which we thus bring before our readers for comment and criticism. If it is the avowed and chief subject of two of these works, it is also largely and ably handled, either directly, or in the discussion of questions fundamental to the solution of it, in the other two. Not only does the question as to the general relation of Faith to Reason thus constitute the *commune vinculum* between these treatises, but more specifically, the discussion, to a greater or less extent, of this relation as affected by the philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned, and the various modes of speculating about the Infinite, the Absolute, the Eternal, and the Uncreated, that were initiated by Kant, and have made themselves felt as forces in shaping the current of philosophic and theologic speculation until now. They had, however, long ruled in Ger-

many before they were insinuated into the French mind through the fascinating lectures and publications of Cousin. Still more recently have they penetrated the Anglo-Saxon mind. But they have now become a formidable power in some of the high-places of Britain and America. As they wane in the country of their birth and early triumph, they wax in force and obtrusiveness in these countries of their later adoption. The problems and issues which this type of thinking raises, confront us on every hand. It impregnates very much of our current literature, philosophy, and divinity. The infection is in all grades of potency. We have simple and unmitigated Transcendentalism, the blankest Pantheism, theoretical and practical, running out, as in the school of Emerson, into the most shameless and articulate scheme of fatalistic licentiousness. We have transcendental mysticism and transcendental rationalism. We have decoctions of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in histories, essays, reviews, original and translated, native and imported. We have Rational Psychologies, Cosmologies, and Theologies, proving not merely how God has made, or even ought to make, but how he *must* make the universe, if he make it at all. We have theologies which identify God man and nature, and make Christ, or the Incarnation, the mere incoming of a theanthropic life into humanity, to bring it back to the depths of the Absolute Deity, of which it is the effluence—a life, according to some, permeating and recovering the entire race, or humanity as such—according to others, husbanded in the external and organic church, and distributed through the sacraments and other outward ceremonies, only to such as receive these ritualistic administrations at the hands of duty authorized hierophants. Others, again, show the bias which their thinking and writing have received from these sources, in their antagonism to this philosophy and its fruits. They are known chiefly as polemics against it, some assailing it with intelligence as to its nature, its truths, and its errors, while they attack the latter with well-chosen and well-directed weapons; others dashing at it blindly, and making havoc alike with friend and foe, truth and error.

We have blind giants, who appear to regard it as their mission to hurl bomb-shells somewhere, as a demonstration against

Transcendental heresies, whether these hit the foe, or fall and explode with destructive effect in their own or a friendly camp. Worst of all, some of the mightiest men who have undertaken to grapple with this Kantian philosophy and its monstrous progeny, and have flattered themselves and others that they have vanquished it, give unequivocal signs of being in a mournful degree mastered by it. They have caught somewhat of the distemper in the attempt to cure it. They seem, scarcely knowing it, to be striving to inoculate philosophy and theology with the virus, for the purpose of fortifying them against it; as will yet more fully appear.

Before proceeding to Mr. Mansel's great work, and the vigorous answer to it by Dr. Young, which will form the central topic of the observations we are about to offer, we wish briefly to characterize the treatise of Dr. McCosh. Some of its more particular statements relative to the great questions handled in Mr. Mansel's work, we hope to bring before our readers, when we come to the heart of our discussion.

Dr. McCosh has won high rank among the Christian philosophers of our day by the works he has already published. His treatise on "The Divine Government, Physical and Moral," introduced him most favourably and widely to the notice of cultivated and thinking men in both hemispheres. His next work on "Typical Forms," &c. was welcomed by a narrower circle, because more scientific and technical. At the same time it was recognized as a valuable contribution to apologetics, and a confirmation of the author's high rank as a thinker. We rate the present work above either of its predecessors, alike as regards the ability it manifests, the difficulty of the questions elucidated, and the importance of the solutions, direct and indirect, which he offers to some of the great issues which now enlist the mind of the church. His works have the merit of speaking to living questions and meeting an existing desideratum. They touch apologetic theology at that point in which, for the time being, the enemies of the gospel are most successful in perplexing and annoying its friends. They deal with it, as it is impugned, obscured, or endangered by the scientists, metaphysicians, rationalists, and mystics of our day—in short, by whatever constitutes the prevalent "philosophy falsely so

called." They repel not merely those who assail Christianity in name, and deny the divinity of the Scriptures, but those who, under the name and guise of Christians, virtually emasculate or annihilate it, for the purpose of bringing it into accord with the supposed demands of reason, spontaneous or reflective, scientific or philosophic. He has the merit of meeting the exact issue, of facing instead of shirking the difficult problems which are either intrinsic to philosophy, or which emerge in the attempt to conciliate it with religion. In short, Dr. McCosh's great specialty is metaphysics, including the metaphysics of physical science, and these especially as related to Christianity; and in our opinion he has cultivated it with signal success. We do not indeed class him with Hamilton, or even with Mansel, as to the order of his mind. We miss the gigantic intellectual energy, the immense learning, the mighty momentum of the former. But then we miss his vehement prejudices, his frequent one-sidedness, showing itself occasionally in the emphatic contradiction of what he had as emphatically affirmed,* and above all, his entanglement in that net-work of Kantean relativities, and antinomies, which he seemed, now to tear into shreds, and now to bind more tightly about him in the very effort to burst it—a giant brushing away these monstrous fictions, like so many puny reptiles, by the mere sporting or effortless play of his powers, and anon charmed, spell-bound and, in a sort, paralyzed by them. We miss also in McCosh the preëminent scholarly culture, the choice philosophic learning, the severely classic style, and the dialectic keenness of Mansel. But we are also glad to miss what is a heavy drawback to these high qualities—that enslavement to certain logical quibbles or fictions concerning the Absolute and Infinite, which figure so largely in the new philosophy of the conditioned, and which are treated by him as first truths that must be allowed to dominate over reason and faith, philosophy and theology.

But if less vigorous and brilliant than either the master or disciple, who, in spite of their faults, stand at the head of late writers on philosophy in the English tongue, he has merits

* See, for one instance, Hamilton's Lectures, pp. 223—256, in the first of which it is maintained that there is, in the second, that there cannot be, consciousness without memory.

which more than compensate for this sort of inferiority. There is a certain quick discernment of truth and error, good and evil; of the weak side of splendid and imposing philosophic systems; of the friendly or hostile bearing of metaphysical dogmas, or arguments upon scriptural and evangelical truth; a facile and felicitous exposure of the fallacies and sophistries which lend them plausibility; a ready perception, and happy setting forth of the harmony between the light of Nature and Revelation, and all this with reference to living issues, which impart great value to his writings, especially his latest work. If he does not rank among the foremost as a discoverer or originator of new opinions, he has few peers in power to detect and expose the chaff and the wheat, to separate, and help others to separate, the precious from the vile. Others may be more inventive, ingenious, and eloquent, as advocates. Dr. McCosh shows rather the qualities of a judge, whose "senses are exercised to discern between good and evil." Like the magnet cast into a heap of sand and iron-filings, it spontaneously picks up the true metal, and rejects the worthless dirt. It is this sound, sensible, judicial quality of mind that renders him a sober and safe thinker, and communicates to his works a healthy tone, and salutary influence. In this view, their wide popularity is both deserved and explained.

The very title of his book, although certainly not striking for euphony or terseness, discovers what is far better, the happy tact for discerning a work, that needed to be done, and appreciating its relative and intrinsic importance. "The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated," has long been a great desideratum with reference to some of the chief issues which agitate christendom. And yet, on a superficial glance, the very phrase savours of a solecism. For the very *differentia* of a truth known by intuition is, that it is not reached by induction, but *a priori*—i. e., known prior to, and independently of, such induction, which is an eminently discursive mental process, going from a long observation and comparison of individual instances, to the evolution of a general law. The idea of proving the illimitableness of space or time, the propositions of geometry, or that we ought to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, by

induction, or inductive generalization, is simply absurd. This is not what is meant by the inductive investigation of our intellectual intuitions. Induction is not here employed as another or rival method of knowing the same things which we know by intuition. It is not a cöordinate source of knowledge. It is rather a means of learning what our intuitions really are and what they actually contain, what precisely is the amount of their self-affirmations and immediate beholdings. Thus, that space is illimitable, that every event must have a cause, that justice ought to be done, that all qualities must belong to a substance—these are truths which are intuitively seen in their own light. They are not only not dependent for confirmation upon experience, but they are incapable of being proved by any amount of experience. For they affirm what is true, not only in, but beyond all actual experience; nay, all supposable or possible experience. They, of course, are not obtained by inductive observation and generalization, which have place only within the sphere of experience, and with reference to matters known exclusively by experience. *But then it is a matter of experience, a fact or phenomenon of our consciousness, that we have these intuitions which discern and affirm truths beyond experience, and a priori.* It is, therefore, a fair field of inductive inquiry, to ascertain what are the intuitions which manifest themselves in our conscious experience, how they arise, what are their circumstances and surroundings, what is their precise import, what are the criteria which test them, and whether the formulas which are commonly employed to express them, declare their content fully and exactly, neither more nor less. Thus the intuition of causality is sometimes enunciated in this wise: "everything must have a cause." But its true statement is, "every *event* must have a cause." The difference is vast—as great as that produced by the insertion or omission of a Greek letter in the Athanasian controversy. On the former statement, we require an infinite regress of causes without finding any First Cause. On the latter, a First Cause is inevitably postulated. Our intuition of the Infinite is that it is illimitable, and that the object of which infinitude is predicated, admits of no increase of degree. This is one thing. The dogma of the advocates of

the philosophy of the conditioned, developed from Kant's antinomies, that the infinite is that which includes in itself all actual and all possible existence; that therefore an infinite God is incompatible with finite or created beings; that creation is impossible, and pantheism the only possibility conceivable by the human intellect, is a very different thing. Men are exceedingly apt to take partial views of things, and unconsciously shut their eyes to whatever does not accord with their own likes and prejudices, and to exalt the tenets of their own clan, party or sect, or their own pet conceits and logical quibbles, to the dignity of intuitive truths, about which they are impatient of all doubt and controversy. *Unaquaque gens id legem naturae putat quod didicit.* On the other hand, fierce partizans will often deny even intuitive truths which militate against their favourite dogmas. Besides all this, there are not wanting those who, pleading a *quasi*, if not real, sanction from Locke, deny all intuitive truths; assert that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, without any original ideas or first principles, potential or actual, and that its only resource for general truths is by induction from the facts of its outward and inward experience. For the elucidation of such questions, and the settlement of such controversies, the inductive investigation of our intuitions is indispensable. And to this work, Dr. McCosh has addressed himself with signal success.

A chief point which he emphasizes is the manner in which our intuitions first operate and display themselves. They always first perceive the truths they discern, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, as qualities of individual objects or actions. These are afterwards, having been observed in connection with a number of such individual things, generalized and formalized into abstract propositions or principles, whose truth the mind sees intuitively as soon as they are stated. That no two straight lines can enclose a space, that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same moment, that worship is right and blasphemy wicked, this and all else the like is first seen concretely in individual cases. The observation of these qualities in such instances suggests and induces the statement of the universal abstract principle, which is seen to be true as soon as stated, by its own self-evidencing light.

Space and time indeed are *sui generis*. Body perceived in space, and events in time, may first direct the attention of the mind to them. But when once turned towards them, it intuitively knows them to be boundless, and incapable of being conceived as non-existent. In this illimitable and necessary character, time and space of course are not first seen concretely in any object or event, but in their own immensity as the receptivities of all existence.

Dr. McCosh shows that there are three aspects in which these intuitions manifest themselves. First, they appear as regulative principles, whether they are distinctly apprehended by the mind swayed by them or not. Secondly, they are to be regarded as facts of consciousness in all mental phenomena which betray their presence. Thirdly, they are to be viewed as objective general truths, which represent what is involved in the concrete instances in which they appear, in an abstract and universal form, and which, as thus formalized, are intuitively seen to be true. These intuitions appear as regulative forces in the case of those who have never consciously recognized them, or who even deny them. The peasant who has never thought of free-agency, and the fatalist who denies it, both alike show that they are controlled by a conviction of it, in estimating their own responsibility and that of others. Others may have never presented to themselves the proposition, that moral good and evil are such intrinsically, and that there is an ineffaceable difference between them. They may be even Epicureans or Utilitarians in theory. But they will make it manifest that their moral judgments are often regulated, in spite of their theories, by the intuitive conviction that some acts are right and others wrong in their own nature. So in regard to idealists. Their conduct is regulated by the conviction that there are real external non-egoistic substances. The idealist clergyman, whose horse was stolen, was no wise comforted by being informed that he still possessed the idea of his horse.

Another point on which Dr. McCosh well and strenuously insists, is that the genuine intuitions of the mind apprehend realities, not mere fictions of the imagination, not a mere ideal colouring or shape which the mind throws out from itself. Thus, if we discern the quality of moral goodness, or moral

evil in actions, these are real objective qualities of those actions, not mere subjective shadows projected upon them from our minds—unless their action be morbid and abnormal. Space and time, the nexus of events with causes, and of qualities with substance, are objective realities, not mere subjective forms of thought. This principle we deem of the first importance, as it is maintained by our author, in regard to the intuition both of external objects through the senses, and of supersensual truths. It in reality closes the crevasse opened by Kant, through which Transcendentalism breaks out, levelling all embankments, burying common-sense, sound philosophy, and pure religion under its devastating flood—and which still, as we shall see, sends out its empoisoned currents to mingle with and vitiate Christian philosophy and theology. The beginning of all this sublimated folly of those who professing to be wise become fools, lies just here—in resolving objective truths and realities into mere subjective impressions or forms of thinking.

The criterion of these intuitive truths Dr. McCosh finds to be three—self-evidence, necessity, catholicity. Herein he substantially follows Hamilton, who also adds to these, simplicity and incomprehensibility. If a truth be compound and not simple, then it is not intuitive, but deduced from the conceptions or judgments of which it is compounded. And the same is true, if it be comprehensible, i. e. referrible to and explicable by other truths on which it is dependent. As to self-evidence, this criterion is self-evident. As to catholicity, that is, being confined to no nation, sect, or party, but showing themselves in all healthy and developed minds, this is an obvious characteristic of intuitive truth. As to necessity, this is of two kinds. 1. As denoting that, the contrary of which is inconceivable. 2. That which the mind cannot help regarding as self-evident as soon as presented to it, although the contrary is not inconceivable. Of the former sort of strict and literal necessity, the proposition that of two contradictories one must, and both cannot be true, is a specimen. Of the latter sort of relative necessity, the proposition that our normal consciousness is a true, and not a lying witness, and that its results are knowledge, and not imposture, is a specimen. It cannot be questioned that the foregoing are real and sufficient criteria of intuitive truths.

All this, and much more the like, is ably put, argued, and applied by our author to some of the great questions which hinge thereupon. Nor is it necessary that we say more by way of evincing what we have indicated as the sound and healthy character of the author's mind, especially as shown in this volume. Of course, he is not always equally forcible and felicitous. We find ourselves at times tried by a certain diffuse style and fragmentary method, where we look for a more compact and continuous evolution of the subject in hand. At first, in speaking of the will, he uses certain phrases which look like asserting the Pelagian theory of contrary choice. As we proceed, however, we find that he maintains a causation of the acts of will, only that this causation is not physical, but moral, and congruous with freedom of choice. This is the truth. It is all that most of those, whom the author seems to think himself opposing, claim. We observe at times a confused mode of statement in regard to necessary truths, as if they were dependent on induction for proof. At other times, however, he defines with great clearness and exactness the distinction between inductive and necessary truths. We now take leave of this important work, except as we may have occasion to quote from it, in dealing with Mr. Mansel, to whose great book on the "Limits of Religious Thought," we now turn.

This book is designed as an antidote, primarily to Rationalism; secondarily and incidentally, to what he calls Dogmatism. These respectively he thus defines: "Theological dogmatism is thus an application of reason to the support and defence of pre-existing statements of Scripture. Rationalism, on the other hand, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the independent conclusions of the natural reason, and to be rejected where that adaptation cannot conveniently be made. By *Rationalism*, without intending to limit the name to any single school or period in theological controversy, I mean generally to designate that system whose final test of truth is placed in the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition, by whatever previous process these faculties may have been raised to their assumed dignity as arbitrators. The Rationalist, as

such, is not bound to maintain that a Divine revelation of religious truth is impossible, nor even to deny that it has been actually given." "And," adds Mr. Mansel, "he claims for himself and his age the privilege of accepting or rejecting any given revelation, wholly or in part, according as it does or does not satisfy the conditions of some higher criterion to be supplied by the human consciousness." Pp. 47, 48.

This is a good definition of Rationalism. And the author has well ascribed to it a tendency to diminish, dilute, and destroy all the distinctive doctrines, the very substance of Christianity. As to Dogmatism, which he farther explains as being an attempt to exhibit the unsystematized statements of Scripture, "as supported by reasonable grounds, and connected into a scientific whole," he claims that its perils are of an opposite kind. It tends to add human opinions to the body of revealed doctrine, and to weaken the authority of this doctrine by resting it on mere rational considerations, and substituting human for divine authority. As to this, we only observe, 1. That this is an unusual application of the word dogmatism, and fitted, if not designed, to cast gratuitous odium upon the systematic statement and defence of scriptural doctrine. 2. That it is the proud abuse and overstraining, not the use, of efforts to methodize and harmonize Christian doctrine that beget unscriptural additions to it. 3. That the effort to show that a doctrine or system is accordant with right reason, or not repugnant to it, at various points and in various aspects, is by no means inconsistent with founding it on Scripture. Nor does it lessen the authority of Scripture, when its statements are shown not to be repugnant to reason, or to have a response and witness in the conscience of men. It is only when the reason of men usurps the prerogative of the Infinite Mind, and denies that to be true which God affirms, or when it soars to meddle with things too high for it, utterly beyond its grasp, as in pronouncing against the possibility of the Trinity and Incarnation, that it becomes pernicious and destructive. This, however, if Dogmatism, is, in a far higher degree, Rationalism. Of this, more hereafter. These few provisional words have been said here, because we do not wish to encumber our progress by any further discussion of Dogmatism.

For these foes of Christianity, the one really portentous, the other, in its legitimate use, imaginary, the author thinks he has discovered a sovereign antidote, which it is the object of this volume to set forth. The principle which solves the whole difficulty, is thus stated and italicized, by himself: "*The primary and proper object of criticism is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its relation to Religion.*" P. 61. If it can thus be shown, that the human mind is wholly incompetent, in virtue of its own laws, to make the Infinite an object of thought without running itself into contradictions, then it follows that it is wholly incompetent to criticise a revelation from God upon matters pertaining to God. The Rationalist is caught in the entanglements which he weaves for the orthodox believer. "If it can be shown that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are both the same; that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and, from the nature of the case, must occur, the chief foundation of religious Rationalism is cut away from under it." P. 64. Our author then proceeds, in the second and third lectures, to demonstrate the necessary incapacity of the human mind to make the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite—i. e., God, (see pages 28, 29, foot-note,) an object of thought or knowledge. Of course, everything here depends on what is meant by thought and knowledge. If he means the full comprehension and perfect knowledge of God, of course none will dispute with him. But if he means a partial knowledge, yet a knowledge true, although partial, then all christendom will protest against it, except that superstitious antichrist which teaches that "ignorance is the mother of devotion." What he means, will appear more fully as we examine his proofs in support of his position. He says:

"There are three terms familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, Absolute, and as Infinite. By the *First Cause* is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being. By the Infi-

nite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that, than which a greater is inconceivable; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity.

“The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of an infinite number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded in a third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others. Even if it be granted, which is not the case, that such a partial infinite may without contradiction be conceived, still it will have a relative infinity only, and be altogether incompatible with the idea of the Absolute. The line limited in breadth, is thereby necessarily related to the space that limits it: the intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes, coexists with others which are thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness. The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as Absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. ‘What kind of an Absolute Being is that,’ says Hegel, ‘which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?’ We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation; but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception required. That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible, modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. Indeed it is obvious that the entire distinction between the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an unrealized possibility is necessarily a relation and a limit. The scholastic saying, *Deus est actus purus*, ridiculed as it has been by modern critics, is in truth but the expression,

in technical language, of the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and later times.

“But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be mere appearance, and merges all real existence in the cause. The validity of this alternative will be examined presently.

“Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. . . .

“The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself.

“Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.” Pp. 75—79.

“The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from an original warp and woof:—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coëxistence of the infinite and the finite, and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infinite.” Pp. 81, 82.

It was hardly necessary for the author to go on and demonstrate that Pantheism and Atheism afford no relief, but are capable of being easily run out into similar antilogies, and of shattering reason against itself in its very effort to apprehend them. Indeed, what is not capable of this treatment, if there be any substance or validity in this sort of logical legerdemain, which can be practised with equal facility upon any object, finite or infinite, and reel off an equal profusion of contradictions? But before examining these antilogies at length, which are but ramifications of Kant's famous antinomies,* we will

* Antinomies of Kant:

First Antinomy.

The world has a beginning in time, and is limited in regard to space.

The world has no beginning in time and no limits in space, but is in regard to both infinite.

Second Antinomy.

Every composite substance consists of simple parts, and all that exists must either be simple or composed of simple parts.

bring to the notice of our readers, Mr. Mansel's attempted demonstration of the source and the necessity of these contradictory conceptions of things, as lying in the very nature of consciousness and personality.

“That man can be conscious of the Infinite is thus a supposition, which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation, for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and *actually nothing*; (!!) for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must be conceived as *actually everything, and potentially nothing*: for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that, which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature, by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness.

“This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for, when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation—if, whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception regarded as finite—the *infinite*, from a human point of view, is merely a

No composite thing can consist of simple parts, and there cannot exist in the world any simple substance.

Third Antinomy.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world; to account for the phenomena we must have the causality of freedom.

There is no such thing as freedom, but every thing in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

Fourth Antinomy.

There exists in the world, or in connection with it, as a part or as the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being.

An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it, as the cause of the world.

name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." P. 94.

It was surely a work of supererogation for the author to tell us, on the next page, that consistency requires us to "refuse to attribute consciousness to God," if we attempt any conception of him, because consciousness implies "limitation and change;" and still further, that we cannot conceive of God except under some characteristics—i. e. distinction and limitation: and yet that if we attempt to set aside or ignore these limiting modifications, "the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;—pure being is pure nothing." A finite being or nothing! O thou Most High God! is this the dread position into which the minds thou hast given us are, in the phrase of this author, "cramped by their own laws, and bewildered by their own forms!" that they should be compelled to conceive of thee either as a limited being or as nothing!

Similar quiddities, shall we call them? are evolved by the author, from the fact that consciousness involves relation, while "the Absolute as such is independent of all relation"—therefore "we cannot conceive it as existing." Pp. 96, 97. Still further, from the fact that consciousness in human experience involves duration and succession, a tissue of like contradictions is woven. Pp. 98, 99.

Consciousness, moreover, involves Personality. So also do "the various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example. . . But Personality," says our author, "as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation . . . a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness. . . Personality is also a limitation, for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other, and the several modes of thought are distinguished from each other by limitation likewise." Pp. 102, 103.

So the author strengthens, while he echoes, his great conclusion that the "*Absolute* and the *Infinite* are thus, like the *Inconceivable* and *Imperceptible*, names indicating not an object of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." P. 110. "It follows, indeed, that the infinite is beyond the reach of

man's arguments; but only as it is also beyond the reach of his feelings and volitions. We cannot indeed reason to the existence of an Infinite Cause from the presence of finite effects, nor contemplate the infinite in a finite mode of knowledge; but neither can we feel the infinite in the form of a finite affection, nor discern it as a law of finite action." P. 117. "The very conception of a moral nature is in itself the conception of a limit." P. 127. As to "a partial, but not a total knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute," we are told, of course, "the supposition refutes itself." P. 97.

If this series of dialectic feats tires the reader, this is not our fault. It is still more trying to the writer to transcribe, analyze, and refute them. Similar extracts might be multiplied at pleasure. We have thought proper to quote thus largely, in order to let the author speak for himself on the most fundamental point in his treatise—a question of intrinsic and acknowledged difficulty. We have thus before us the destructive portion of his theory. The constructive side will remain to be considered, when we have disposed of this. Those who are familiar with German transcendental modes of thought and expression, will recognize little that is new in these portentous demonstrations, which make it the prime function of human reason to commit suicide. The novelty lies in the use to which they are put by Mr. Mansel. He has undertaken to utilize modes of thinking heretofore employed in behalf of Pantheism or Atheism, and the demolition or corruption of Christianity in order to neutralize their own venom, and parry their own assaults upon our faith. He shows our supposed enemy to be our faithful and invincible ally. It is indeed true, according to Kant, Hegel, and their followers, that the mind of man cannot think of God as Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause, without running into all manner of contradictions and absurdities. But this need not alarm us. It proves not Pantheism or Atheism, but the utter incapacity of reason or philosophy to grasp religious truths at all, or exercise any critical judgment about them. Of course, all rationalistic or philosophic objections are undermined. For the very reason itself which makes them, is undermined, *quoad hoc*, and proved incapable of thought in the premises. This

is what is proved by the antilogies into which it runs, rather than the reality of those antilogies. Thus philosophy may at least evince its own futility. It is an engine which at least consumes its own smoke.

All this seems very good, only that it is too good. It is surely a good work to annihilate rationalism. But when this is done by quenching the light of reason as a faculty which can make the infinite God an object of thought, even when taught by his own Word and Spirit, (for the author's reasonings tend to all this, or they mean nothing,) we pause, and inquire if the boon proffered be not too great, and its cost too great?

"What is God? God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This we were taught in our infancy. No words are more familiar to the old and young, the learned and unlearned of our own and many other communions. No words more articulately or happily utter the common faith of christendom in the premises. And we say, without hesitation, that they convey more real and more salutary truth in regard to the High and Lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, than all the books ever written in the vein of the foregoing quotations. Do these words convey to the mind no ideas, or express no thoughts, or objects of possible thought? Or, what is worse, do they convey only notions bristling with stupendous contradictions and fatuous absurdities! Does the attribute of infinity intimate the blasphemy, that in order to be true of God, he must comprise in himself all finite beings, all possible existences and modes of existence, including sin,* which our author says follows by "unassailable reasoning," if we can have any thought of the Infinite at all? Is it endurable that Christians should be taught by a Christian teacher, that the absolute

* In his preface to this edition, Mr. Mansel notices the severe criticisms which have been justly brought against the passage here referred to. He endeavours to parry their face by offering the following analogous passage:

"Suppose that an author had written such a sentence as the following: 'A circular parallelogram must have its opposite sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference shall be equal to each. The conclusion is absurd; but the reasoning is unassailable, *supposing a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.*'"

"Would such a statement involve any formidable consequences either to

moral perfections of God imply limitations inconsistent with his Infinitude, and relations inconsistent with his Absoluteness? Are we to listen silently while men tell us, that if we attribute consciousness or personality to our God, these likewise involve limitations and relations inconsistent with his infinity and absoluteness, and that the only escape from this is found in denying all attributes to the Great Supreme, till beneath the lowest deep, we reach that lower still, that abysmal nihilism and Hegelian pantheism, in which "pure being is nothing"? Is all this, and much more like it, true of this admirable answer to the question, "What is God?" or is it not, in all points capable of being understood, in a sense not irrational nor self-contradictory, and, however inadequate or disproportioned to the object, yet true, edifying, and fitted to inspire with devout feeling? This question answers itself in the consciousness of the whole church of God.

The first sentence in the Bible is, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." We ask if this does not present what is a true object of thought and knowledge regarding God? Does it not set before us what illustrates and confirms, not what contradicts, the absolute and infinite perfection of his being? Do "unrealized potentialities" before, or additions to the sum of being through and after the work of creation, conflict in the least with any real conception of the Infinite and Absolute of which we are conscious? Is not creation itself rather an outgoing and evidence of infinite power?

But perhaps it is time to meet the question directly, Are cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, apprehensible or knowable by man, so as to be in any manner or degree objects of his thought? We answer, Yes. God is an object of apprehension and knowledge. This knowledge is partial, for the finite of

geometry or logic?" Perhaps not. But if the conception of a "circular parallelogram" be a fair parallel to our conception of an infinite God, we think it involves very "formidable consequences" to theology and religion. For as the first conception is an impossibility, so, by parity of reason, must the latter be. This the author maintains, as also that if such conception of God were possible, it would include evil as a part of it. This is quite "formidable" enough for us.

course cannot fully grasp the infinite. But as far as it goes, it is true knowledge. The definition of God already cited from the Catechism, sets forth attributes which we can apprehend, however imperfectly, and which are the foundation of our love, trust, and adoration of the Most High. If any of them were wanting, it would diminish so far forth our confidence and reverence. All feel that this would inevitably be so. But how could it be so, if each one of them, "infinite" among the rest, does not convey some intelligible idea to the mind? Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, denies even a "partial knowledge" of the Infinite. But though partial, it by no means follows that it is untrue, or unreliable. If so, then all knowledge is fallacious. We know nothing fully, from the dew-drop to the ocean, from the mote in the sunbeam to the stellar worlds, from our own bodies and souls, and their mysterious union, to the infinite God. But we know, or may know, all that is needful for us, TRULY. In proof of this we adduce:

1. The testimony of Consciousness. We are certainly conscious of some thoughts of God as a being of power, goodness, and wisdom; and of these as unlimited. Nor does the latter attribute, although but partially comprehensible by us, detract from; it enlarges and intensifies our idea of the former.

2. The testimony of Scripture. This certainly teaches—

1. That there are vast depths in the nature, plans, and ways of God which we cannot fathom. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" "Who by searching can find out God?" "How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out?" These representations surely strike down all Rationalism. They show the absurdity of our sitting in judgment on the procedures or declarations of Him whose judgments are a great deep. But they do not show that we can know nothing at all about him. On the contrary they show that we "know in part," partially, that we know parts of his ways, though so little a portion is heard of him. "Secret things belong to God, but the things that are revealed are for us and our children." In Rom. i. 20, it is clearly taught that the heathen are culpable for not knowing his eternal power and Godhead. Nay, the Scriptures make the knowledge of God indispensable to true religion and salvation. Christ teaches that "this is life eternal, to *know God* and

Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. (John xvii. 3.) Every one that loveth is born of God and *knoweth God*." (1 John iv. 7.) He teaches that infidels and heathens worship "they know not what," an "unknown God;" that true worshippers know whom they worship, (John iv. 22,) and must worship him in spirit and in truth. How is this possible for those utterly ignorant of him, and incapable of making the Infinite an object of thought.

3. There is no true religion without faith in God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, substantially as they are revealed in the Scriptures. But how is faith possible in respect to that which is in no manner a possible subject of thought or apprehension? How can aught be brought within the sphere of faith, which cannot be brought within the sphere of cognition? Mr. Mansel employs his doctrine that God and the things of God cannot be objects of the mind's thought or knowledge, any more than a "circular parallelogram," to prove that these high matters must be handed over from Reason to Faith. There is a high sense in which this latter is true, as may yet more fully appear. But it is not the sense of our author. In this sense faith is an impossibility. It is so, from the utter absence of any apprehensible, credible, or definable object of belief, unless we take the old maxim of some extreme super-fidians, "it is certain because impossible." But downright contradictions, or contradictory affirmations or attributes cannot be objects of faith. We cannot believe in round squares or circular parallelograms.* The

* "Hamilton represents the notion of infinity as an 'impotency' of the mind, an impotency to conceive that space and time should have bounds. I am endeavouring to show in these paragraphs that there is more than this. Hamilton admits that we have a belief in the infinite. 'The sphere of our belief,' says he, 'is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and therefore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have indeed anxiously evinced both by reason and authority.' (*Metaph. App.* p. 684.) Handing us over in this way to belief, he has nowhere explained the psychological nature of this belief, or of belief in general. Must not a belief of a thing of which we have no conception be a belief in *zero*!" (*McCosh*, note, p. 218.)

This last interrogatory strikes us as quite unanswerable. It is quite noteworthy that such eminent philosophers as Hamilton and Mansel while proposing a psychological solution of these problems, and remanding so onerous a service to Faith; should nowhere have attempted, by a psychological analysis of its nature, to prove it capable of the labour they assign to it.

mind may believe that some apparent contradictions are not real, and that completer knowledge will dissipate them. This state of things may often occur with regard to God and divine verities. But it is wholly different from that contemplated in this volume. It is perfectly consistent with our KNOWING in whom we have believed, and that he is able to keep that which we commit to him. Nay,

4. We believe that he is "able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." We *know* that love which yet *passeth knowledge*. We comprehend in one sense, a height, and depth, and length, and breadth, which in another sense defy comprehension. We know God. We know his attributes. But we know his attributes and excellencies as unlimited by the bounds of our knowledge, or any other bounds—i. e., as infinite. But while God has thus all perfections in a degree surpassing our comprehension, yet we have some knowledge of what thus passes our knowledge. Have we no idea of what is meant by omnipotence, eternity, absolute and infinite wisdom and goodness? A standard method of defining the manner of our knowledge of God, is, that we obtain it by way of causality, by way of eminence, by way of negation. Our own consciousness of producing effects by our own volitions enables us to have some idea of the First and Omnipotent Cause making all things out of nothing. We have a consciousness of knowledge, of approving righteousness and condemning iniquity. We can have some idea then of consummate intellectual and moral excellence in the Most High. By negation is meant the removal of limits to any excellence or attribute of God. Do we not in this way attain a true though imperfect knowledge of God, and his adorable perfections? It is to no purpose to retort upon this, as is done by writers of the German school, that we thus form a conception of a magnified or infinite man, rather than of God. We have the testimony of God himself, that man was made in the image of God, and that this image consists in knowledge and righteousness. And can we not know God primarily from this similitude to him, and secondarily and still more fully by the infinite distance between him and us, between the Infinite and the finite? Dr. Young very forcibly calls attention to the

striking fact that Hamilton, notwithstanding his doctrine of the unthinkable character of the Infinite and Absolute, and of causality, still teaches that we ascend to the knowledge of God from the points of resemblance to him in our own souls. He says, as quoted by Dr. Young, "Though man be not identical with the Deity, still he is created in the image of God. It is indeed only through an analogy of the human with the Divine, that we are percipient and recipient of the Divinity." "Mind is the object, the only object, through which our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of God."* We are unable now to put our eyes on these passages in Hamilton. But language essentially equivalent to it will be found in the second of his *Lectures on Metaphysics*. And even Mr. Mansel says, pages 104, 105, "It is from this intense consciousness of our own real existence as persons, that the conception of reality takes its rise in our minds; it is *through that consciousness alone that we can raise ourselves to the faintest image of the supreme reality of God.*"

5. The mode of knowing God by negation, of which we have spoken, is something quite contrary to the negation of all thought—the mere mental impotency into which the school we are criticising resolve all our mental exercises in regard to cause, infinite, absolute, unconditioned. It is, viewed from another side, the greatest, the most positive affirmation the mind can make. It simply denies all limits, and in so doing affirms being, energies, excellencies, beyond all bounds imaginable, *ad infinitum*. Is this a mere negation of thought? When the mind affirms that space and time are illimitable, is this a mere negation of thought, or is it not the most positive and intense mental energizing?†

6. Nor does this involve the absurdity of conceiving the

* See *Province of Reason*, pp. 166, 167.

† A negative predicate, in form, is often the most positive in fact. When the subject is wholly undefined, except by a negative predicate, then this predicate becomes simply indefinite; it simply points out one thing that the subject is not, leaving it wholly uncertain what of all other things in the universe it is. Thus, if we say of any subject which is in itself wholly undefined, that it is not Washington, not a stone, not broad, we deny these attributes of it, but we point out nothing concerning it. But if we deny of any defined subject, qualities congruous with it, we may thus predicate the most

Infinite as comprehending in itself all possible, and all actual being. Dr. McCosh has forcibly demonstrated this in his chapter on our intuition of the Infinite. He says, "We can talk of space and time and God as being infinite. We can utter judgments about it, as that the infinite God is in every given place; there is no place of which we may not say, Surely the Lord is in this place. We can even reason about it; thus we can infer that this puny effort of man, set against the recorded will of God, shall surely be frustrated by his infinite power." P. 229. In a note he adds, "I decidedly demur to the statement of Mr. Mansel, 'that which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.' . . . I would rather agree with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel than any metaphysicians of the past or present age. But whether I agree with them or not, I must hold it to be quite possible to muse and reason about the attribute 'infinite,' as it is in fact conceived and believed in by the mind, without falling into the difficulties in which the German supporters of the absolute have involved themselves, and that we can think of God and write about God, as infinite, without being compelled by any logical necessity to look upon him as embracing all existence, or to reckon it impossible or inconceivable that he should create a world and living agents differing from himself. We cannot conceive that God's power should be increased, but we can conceive it exercised in creating beings possessed of power. We cannot conceive his goodness to be enlarged, but we can, without a contradiction, conceive him creating other beings also good. Nor can we by this conception be shut up to the conclusion that the creature-power or creature-excellence might be added to the Divine power and goodness, and thus make it greater. To all quibbles proceeding in this line, I say that,

positive properties. Thus, if we predicate of a man, that he is not wise, or good, or poor, or influential, or of water that is not pure, or of a stone that is not soft, we make the most positive affirmations respecting them. So, if we declare of an intelligent and moral being that his wisdom, goodness and power, are infinite, this is the most positive kind of thought. On this and related points, Mr. Calderwood offers some excellent observations. See *Philosophy of the Infinite*, chap. iii.

for aught I know, it may not be possible they should be added, or that if added, they should increase the Divine perfections; and no reply could be given, drawn either from intuition or experience, the only lights to which I can allow an appeal." (*McCosh on Intuitions*, pp. 228, 229.)

Finally, the whole alleged antagonism in our conceptions of the infinite and absolute is a groundless assumption, a pure fiction of philosophers; it is unknown to the normal consciousness and intuitions of the unperverted human mind. Who but the transcendentalists and those moulded by them, ever conceived that the absoluteness of God was invaded by the correlation and harmony of his own attributes, or by his relations to his creatures, or by any relations *ad intra* or *ad extra*, which do not imply a dependence on something without himself? Who ever imagined that consciousness and personality in God are inconsistent with his infinitude; or that it is impossible to conceive of space and time not only as absolutely limited but absolutely unlimited? On this subject we again refer to McCosh. Speaking of this antilogy as put by Hamilton, he says, "The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense in which the word 'conceive' is used. In the second of these counter-propositions the word is used in the sense of imaging, or representing in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions, the word 'conceive' is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. When thus explained, all appearance of contradiction disappears; indeed, all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions will vanish, if we but carefully inquire into the nature of the convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there is no contradiction. They stand thus: 'We cannot imagine space without bounds;' 'we cannot think that it has

bounds, or believe that it has no bounds.' The former may well be represented as a creature impotency; the latter is most assuredly a creature potency, is one of the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed, and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn." (*Mc Cosh*, p. 219.)

Having thus examined the destructive side of Mr. Mansel's system, in which he demolishes Rationalism by the attempt to establish the utter impotence of the human mind to attain any true speculative conception or knowledge of God, or to essay it even, without plunging into a chaos of contradictions, we now pass to consider the constructive side of the book—how it tries to reclaim to man that effective knowledge of God, without which religion is a nullity, and which it seemed to have taken away.

He first summons to his aid the great dogma of Kant, which, in various potencies, has streamed or been filtrated through the subsequent masters of Transcendentalism, until we find a portentous infusion of it in Hamilton and Mansel. We refer to the doctrine of what is technically called the "relativity of knowledge." It is in substance this. When the mind apprehends any object, whether material and by the senses, or immaterial and supersensual, it contributes from itself a part or the whole of the phenomenon—how much it is impossible to tell. Therefore, it is impossible to tell how much of what is perceived is subjective, and how much is objective, how much belongs to the object discerned, how much to the mind discerning. Therefore we have no knowledge of things *as they are in themselves*, but only as they exist in relation to our faculties. Whether, and how much of this mode of existence, as perceived by us, comes from the percipient mind or from the object, is wholly uncertain and unknowable. But what we appear to know may safely enough be taken for practical truth to regulate our own conduct with regard to it. If this be so in regard to all objects of thought and knowledge, much more is it so with regard to our knowledge of the Absolute and Infinite. Therefore, while we can have no knowledge of God as he is, yet we can have such apprehensions of him as may safely guide our practice. We can have, through the Scriptures, a safe regulative, although not a true speculative knowledge of him.

He says: "The object of which we are conscious is thus, to adopt the well-known language of the Kantian philosophy, a *phenomenon* not a *thing in itself* (called by Kant a *noumenon*):—a product resulting from the two-fold action of the thing apprehended, on the one side, and the faculties apprehending it, on the other. The perceiving subject alone, and the perceived object alone, are two unmeaning elements, which first acquire a significance in and by the act of their conjunction.*

"It is thus strictly in analogy with the method of God's Providence in the constitution of man's mental faculties, if we believe that in Religion also, he has given us truths which are designed to be regulative rather than speculative; intended not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but *how he wills that we should think of him* in our present finite state." Pp. 142, 143.

"To have sufficient grounds for believing in God is a very different thing from having sufficient grounds for reasoning about him. The religious sentiment, which compels men to believe in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of his existence, but not an exhibition of his nature. It proves *that* God is, and makes known some of his relations to us; but it does not prove what God is in his own Absolute Being. The natural senses, it may be, are diverted and coloured by the medium through which they pass to reach the intel-

* Hamilton puts the matter thus: "However great and infinite, and various, therefore, may be the universe and its contents—these are known to us, not as they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing them." (*Lec. on Meta.* p. 43.) "Whatever we know is not known as it is, but only as it seems to us to be: for it is of less importance that our knowledge should be limited than that it should be pure. . . . I see a book . . . let us suppose in the example I have taken, that the full or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made up of three several parts—of four contributed by the book—of four contributed by all that intervenes between the book and the organ—and of four contributed by the living organ itself."

"I use this illustration to show that the phenomenon of the external object is not presented immediately to the mind, but is known by it only as modified through certain intermediate agencies." (What then, we ask, becomes of Hamilton's doctrine of immediate perception?) . . . "But this source of error is not limited to our perceptions; and we are liable to be deceived, not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowledge what is contributed by sense, but by not distinguishing what is contributed by the mind itself." (*Id.* pp. 102, 103.) If all this be so, what is left to us but utter incertitude and scepticism?

lect, and present to us, *not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us*. And this is manifestly the case with the religious consciousness, which can only represent the Infinite God under finite forms. But we are compelled to believe on the evidence of our senses that a material world exists, even while we listen to the arguments of the idealist, who reduces it to an idea or to non-entity; and we are compelled by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a personal God; though the reasonings of the Rationalist, logically followed out, may reduce us to Pantheism or Atheism." Pp. 128, 129.

"Religious ideas, in short, like all other objects of man's consciousness, are composed of two distinct elements—a Matter furnished from without, and a Form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." P. 158.

It does not appear to us that such a system can plant itself very widely or deeply in the soil of sturdy, old-fashioned English common-sense. Its clear statement is its refutation.

1. While it is, of course, true, that we know only what is in relation with our faculties; and while it is further true, that we may know but a portion of the properties of any object which may be known to other intelligences, still it must be maintained that our faculties, in their healthy and normal modes of operation, know truly. Otherwise they do not know at all. And if we know, we know that we know, for the former involves the latter. Of course, an uneducated person knows little of a quartz crystal in comparison with a mineralogist; little of his own body, compared with the anatomist or physiologist. Still he knows the colour, the shape, the hardness of the former; he knows most of the exterior members, proportions, organs, hues, functions, and the interior vital sensations of the latter. He knows them truly, even if he have never studied them, or qualified himself to state them in an orderly manner. He knows them so far forth, as truly as the scientist, although he is ignorant of much lying beyond, which the latter knows. The dangerous point in this scheme of "relativity," is not that we know only what is in relation with our faculties, and that we know only in part,—but that we do not and cannot know truly, or, at least, be sure of knowing

truly. As Hamilton phrases it, "it is of less importance to us that our knowledge should be limited, than that it should be pure." "The Matter," says Mr. Mansel, "is furnished from without, and a form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." "Form" in the nomenclature of these philosophers means whatever is phenomenal in objects, the characteristics by which they are known. How do we know any Matter or substance sensuous or super-sensuous, except through its form or manifested properties? Be this as it may, according to all the forms of statement which we have quoted from Hamilton and Mansel, how is it possible to know in regard to any object, material or immaterial, what portion is contributed by the mind, and is subjective, what comes from the object, and has objective reality? It is clearly impossible. We are plunged into absolute uncertainty as to the reality of objects without us in the realms of both matter and spirit. If the mind contributes the form, why not the matter; if it creates the phenomenon, why not the *noumenon*; and what remains but the absolute subjectivity and infinite egoism into which Fichte so logically developed Kant's theory? At all events, the best that can be said of it, is that it lands us in utter uncertainty and scepticism. It destroys knowledge by destroying its certainty.

2. The reason why objects are apprehended by us as we apprehend them, is that they are such—such whether we know it or not. In order that a book may be known as a book, a tree as a tree, they must be such in themselves, whether we know them or not, and as the condition of our knowing them. Our minds do not give them their form or appearance. We could not perceive them as we do, unless they were as we perceive them. Our minds are dependent on the presence of these objects for their perception of them. But these objects are not dependent on our minds for their being and form. Space is no mere form of thought. It exists outside of and independent of any man's thinking, and as the condition of his thinking it. We know things thus, so far as we know them at all. It is witnessed by our deepest consciousness that objects are what they are, irrespective of our cognitions of them, and in order to those cognitions. Any other system, as

O. A. Brownson says, in one of the finest passages he ever penned, ends in a "sublime system of transcendental nullism." And we must insist that it contradicts Hamilton's doctrine of the veracity of consciousness. It is a first principle with him that the absolute and universal veracity of consciousness is to be maintained; that if its testimony to the non-ego cannot be trusted, neither can its testimony to the ego; that the maxim applicable to all other witnesses holds with regard to this; *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*; that on this hypothesis, "every system is equally true, or rather all are equally false; philosophy is impossible, for it has now no instrument by which truth can be discovered—no standard by which it is to be tried; the root of our nature is a lie." (*Metap.* p. 196.) This cannot be gainsaid. But it is utterly annihilating to the scheme, which makes these objects or properties, or phenomena, subjective or egoistical, which are apprehended in consciousness as objective realities 'external to the mind itself. Mr. Mansel makes a futile effort to parry this argument, by telling us, that the reality which the mind understands itself to cognize in consciousness, "is not identical with absolute existence unmodified by the laws of the perceiving mind." P. 307. The mind holds itself to perceive objects and properties as they are, not as they are "modified" by its own "laws" or agency. Or rather it holds itself so constituted as to be veracious, not false, and under "laws" which lead it to know things as they are, not as they are modified by itself. He tells us, on the same page, that Kant's theory "amounts to no more than this: that we can see things only as our faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of other intelligences, embodied or spiritual." With all respect, we will ask if this is precisely the Kantian doctrine as he had before defined it? And whether it be or not, and whatever may be the superiority in the extent and mode of knowing in other intelligences, we submit whether it is not an intuitive conviction that all intelligences, so far as they know at all, know alike? One may know more and another less, one may know through the senses, the other by spiritual faculties alone; one by intuition,

the other discursively; but so far as they know at all, in reference to the same matter, they know not in contradiction of, but in harmony with each other. All intelligences who know at all in the premises, know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that blasphemy is wicked, that an oak tree is not an apple tree, that an elephant is not a man, and that black is not white. Any ideas not conformable to these representations, amount not to knowledge, but to ignorance. This does not mean that we never err through inattention, carelessness, passion, even in matters within our scope; nor that the sphere of our knowledge is broad; nor that our insight is more than insignificant in comparison with other intelligences. But it postulates that this insight, be it more or less, is insight, and that what we know, be it more or less, we know. Less than this, as it seems to us, cannot be maintained, without absolute scepticism and intellectual suicide. The whole issue is, after all, a very plain one, when we once brush away the dense fogs in which philosophy has shrouded it. It is merely, whether the minds with which our Creator has endowed us, are (so far as we know) so made, as to see, so far as they see at all, things, not as they are, but as they are not, not truth but error?

3. We are now prepared to estimate the value of the hypothesis that our knowledge of God is regulative merely, not speculative—intended, “not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but how he wills that we should think of him in our present state;”—“not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us.” We fear this solution will not stand. The question is not whether we can know God completely; not whether we can see the mutual harmony and consistency of all that we do know concerning him; not whether we know in regard to God or creatures so infallibly that nothing remains for us to learn or correct; but the question is, whether our knowledge of God, in its best estate, *is real knowledge*, and gives us true or false conceptions of Him. It is not whether our “reason is satisfied,” in the sense not only of knowing that things are, but comprehending *how*; not whether the scriptural representations concerning God are not sometimes

made in figurative language, not whether the propositions delivered to us are not regulative, or designed for the regulation of our faith and practice; but whether they are TRUE: whether what God "wills that we should believe" concerning himself is the TRUTH. This question we conceive is fundamental. We take it for an axiom, which no sophistry and no logical dexterity can shake, that we ought to believe and be governed by the truth, so far as it is within reach, and by nothing else: and especially, in regard to the things of God, by the realities of eternal truth, not by any representations prepared for effect, which disguise, distort, or in any manner give a false or erroneous version of these realities. We do not think this can be an open question till all the pillars of morality and religion are undermined. And "if the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?" But we are not left to our own reasoning or intuitions on this subject. God himself teaches us that by the truth we are "begotten," "made free," "sanctified." "But ye have an unction from the Holy One whereby ye know all things. I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth, *but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth.*" (1 John ii. 20, 21.) On the opposite theory, truth is no better than error, the search after it is irrational, and "the root of our nature is a lie." If this is the antidote to Rationalism, the remedy seems to us, if not worse than the disease, at least tainted with it. If there is any type of rationalism specially offensive to us, it is that which maintains that God does, or says, or requires things for regulative and practical purposes, which are variant from truth and reality. This is that empoisoned stream which, issuing from German Transcendentalism, has flowed down through Schleiermacher, and from him through various diminutive channels in England and America. It has given us a Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, which are unrealities, mere modes of representation for the purpose of working the mind of the race in devout practice. It is abhorrent to every well-constituted mind. It leaves every one free to accept or reject, (as far as the truth of it is concerned,) as much or as little of the Bible as he pleases. We hardly understand how Mr. Mansel should have fallen into this view

after the pungent condemnation he has uttered in regard to an analogous view of prayer, as set forth by Kant.*

A corollary from the foregoing positions, which our author enounces, is that "the legitimate object of a rational criticism of revealed religion, is not to be found in the *contents* of that religion, but in its *evidences*." Pp. 204, 205. He seems, however, to be aware that the two cannot thus be separated and sharply contrasted. A most material part of the evidence is the contents of revelation. It is this in-evidence of divinity that has borne it to the hearts of God's people of every age and nation in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. It is because they hear a voice therein speaking as man never spake, and see a radiance of divinity not paralleled in the material creation or the light of nature, that they are conscious of vastly stronger evidence that the Bible is the word, than that the material world is the work of God.

It is not merely miracles in contrast to the "contents" of revelation, but these very contents, too, that attest its Divine origin. Mr. Mansel says, "The primary and direct inquiry which human reason is entitled to make concerning a professed revelation is—how far does it tend to promote or hinder the moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and indirect question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far it is compatible with the Infinite Goodness of God." P. 210. With all deference, this seems to us a *ὑστέρων προτέρων*. It is because we see the impress of the "Infinite Goodness of God" upon the Scriptures, that we believe them "given by inspiration of God, and thus profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be per-

* "Let us hear then the philosopher's *rational* explanation, upon this assumption, of the duty of prayer. It is a mere superstitious delusion, he tells us, to consider prayer as service addressed to God, and as a means of obtaining his favour. The true purpose of the act is not to alter or affect in any way God's relation towards us; but only to quicken our own moral sentiments, by keeping alive within us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver. He, therefore, neither admits the duty unconditionally, nor rejects it entirely; but leaves it optional with men to adopt that or any other means, by which, in their own particular case, this moral end may be best promoted;—as if any moral benefit could possibly accrue from the habitual exercise of an act of conscious self-deception." P. 56.

fect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17.) The first judgment of natural men, of a great majority of philosophers and thinkers destitute of spiritual illumination, has been, that the Christian method of salvation by grace tends to licentiousness—not "to promote but to hinder the moral discipline of man," by encouraging him "to continue in sin that grace may abound." It is only as man sees that the Infinite Goodness and Wisdom which manifest themselves in the Scriptures have provided this method of salvation; as its Divine efficacy to promote holy living is known to him by its fruits in the case of those who embrace it; and as he himself is effectually taught by the Holy Spirit; that he makes trial of its efficacy, and finds in blessed experience how, "being made free from sin, and become servants to God, we have our fruit unto holiness and the end everlasting life." Moreover, if miracles prove the doctrine, the doctrine also proves the miracle, at least negatively—inasmuch that signs and wonders wrought in support of idolatry would thus be proved to be not from above, but beneath. (See Deut. xiii. 1—5.) Doctrine and miracle are both parts of one arch, and they are interdependent.

Nor does this enthrone man's reason over the Scriptures, or allow it to reduce their contents to its own measure and standard. On the contrary, there being clear evidence in the divinity of the contents of Scripture as well as from miracles, that it is the word of God, this enforces the submission of our reason to its teachings, whenever they surpass or confound it. It constrains us to take the yoke and learn of Christ,—to lay aside all rationalistic cavils and doubts, to take the Bible in its plain import without torturing it into accord with our preconceived views, and if we find what is incomprehensible, still to accept it; not doubting that there is a solution worthy of God, whether we are permitted to see it or not. So our faith will not stand in the wisdom of men but in the power of God. Indeed, what can seem more monstrous than that the deliverances of the Infinite Mind should be attenuated to the standard, and subjected to the revision of our short-sighted reason or common-sense? As well might we test the luminous capacity of the sun by our gas-lights.

And yet this revelation is delivered to rational beings, and

addressed to their reason. It supposes and requires the exercise of reason in ascertaining its evidences and import. It supposes an intelligent subject whose reason it employs, and at the same time purifies, enlarges, and perfects. Now there is a very limited range of subjects in regard to which we cannot doubt what is true, without a denegation of our rational nature. No amount of authority can convince us that two contradictories can be true, *i. e.*, that a thing may be, and may not be at the same time. If we know that we exist, we cannot believe the contrary. If we know that a body occupies space, we cannot believe that it does not occupy space. We cannot believe that things equal to the same thing are not equal to each other, or that a bit of bread on earth is the body of our Lord in heaven. So far forth, all competent divines have allowed a *judicium contradictionis*, in the interpretation of the word of God, *i. e.* that it must not be interpreted to teach contradictories, because contradictories can never both be true. Yet this principle is allowable only within very narrow limits. The contradiction must be immediate, unambiguous, undeniable,—not a matter of inference, or the result of inaccurate statements, or disputed definitions and representations of the points to which the alleged contradiction pertains. The in-evidence of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures, patent to the eye of faith and of unperverted or spiritually illuminated reason, will stop all that tampering with the plain averments of Scripture, which is known as Rationalism.

Our readers will agree with us that it is time to hasten to a close. Our specific object has been, not to treat with any minuteness of Mr. Mansel's book as a whole, but of that theory which constitutes its novelty and peculiarity, and which it is specially framed to commend to public acceptance. We do not wish to disparage the work in other respects. It has excellencies which have not been exaggerated by its warmest admirers. The notes in the appendix constitute a thesaurus of choice extracts from the great masters of the different schools of philosophy and theology, such as no mere philosophic pedant could have gathered. These alone are worth more than the cost of the volume. The Lectures themselves withal, abound

with observations at once just and profound in regard to the virus of Rationalism, whether it be intuitional, logical, or sentimental. Many things said in accordance with, and in support of the line of demarkation between Faith and Reason recognized by the church, are said with a precision, force, and beauty, such as cannot be found in writers of less scholarship, culture, and philosophic insight. These features of the work impart to it a high and permanent value. But these do not constitute the feature,—the differentia of the book. This consists in its new psychological method of annihilating Rationalism. Along with much that is true, it seems to us to contain a false and pestilent element, the exposure of which is important, just in proportion to the great power and plausibility with which it is presented and enforced.

We fully appreciate the triumphant exposure which these giant metaphysicians have made of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned: we mean that philosophy or theology, which from some postulate, true or false, in regard to the *primum ens*, undertakes to evolve the whole process of being, becoming, and knowing all forms of existence, God, man and nature, and all systems of philosophy and religion. From all such "intellectual intuitions," whether transeending or transeended by consciousness, and their correspondent monster systems of ontology and metaphysics, we pray to be delivered, and we devoutly hail our deliverers. But it sometimes happens, that physicians who combat malaria or contagion most effectively, themselves inhale the poison in a greater or less degree. And all the more so, if they employ the poison to counterwork itself. It is one thing to deny the competency of human reason to spin out a trustworthy system of theology from its innate and unregenerate intuitions; another, to maintain such incompetency of human reason on the ground that its normal intuitions, in their best and purest estate, with regard to the Infinite and Eternal, are a chaos of absurdities and contradictions, and that consequently the Infinite God cannot, even partially, be an object of thought. This, to be sure, undermines Rationalism. But it does more. And it does too much. It renders the possibility of faith itself even, problematical, to say no more. When we see Hamilton shattering to fragments the proud fabric of the

Philosophy of the Unconditioned, we rejoice. But when he tells us, that the Philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned "both agree that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy," this is more than we desiderate. It is too much alike for our Reason and our Faith.

A remarkable characteristic of the types of Rationalism originating with the modern transcendental and pantheistic philosophy, is that they attenuate and undermine the truth, by overstating it, and weaken faith by overdoing it. They accept Christian doctrine in a generous breadth, so far exceeding the reality, that it must be battered down to a thin film before it can expand to these vast dimensions. Of course, the pantheist can simulate and intensify the vocabulary of the highest orthodoxy in regard to the divine foreordination and in-working in Nature, Providence, and Grace; the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement. And in using such phrase he means so much more than the truth as to nullify it. We meet with those known as sceptics and rationalists, who astound us by the gracious announcement of their belief, not only in the inspiration of the Scripture writers, but of all, or of the more eminent Christians and sages of every age and nation—a volatile scheme, which now evaporates into the most super-sublimated mysticism, and now condenses into the most icy rationalism—but in either case destroys the proper divine inspiration and objective truth and authority of the Holy Scriptures. So we have those who impugn rationalism by invalidating reason to an extent inconsistent not only with rationalism, but with faith itself. We hear of the relentless adversaries of the doctrines of the church, all at once, not only retracting their opposition to creeds, but "ready to accept as many as are offered them" by virtue of a "chemistry of thought," which melts them all into each other, by melting them away to nothing. The principles of this "Broad Church" school we cannot sanction, even when advanced by men having no communion with it, and for the worthiest ends—as we understand to be true of Mr. Mansel.