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ARTICLE I.—*The Elements of Political Science*. In two Books. Book I. On Method. Book II. On Doctrine. By PATRICK EDWARD DOVE. Author of the *Theory of Human Progression*. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter, 1854.

THIS publication is not a very recent one; but it is quite new to us, and we have read it with considerable interest. The author is evidently a conscientious and religious man, and, we may add, a ready writer. He expresses very well what he clearly thinks, and his courage, in presenting his views, is much more obvious than his skill in ordering his thoughts, or his patience in reflecting on their correctness. We regard his book as a very useful study for those who wish to classify their ideas on many difficult portions of the form and substance of political philosophy; not, however, because of what is true in the book, for that is very simple; but because of the mental skill which may be obtained by seeking out and exposing to one's self its abounding logical vices, and its philosophical and political heresies. We cannot undertake to point these out in detail, for that can be more profitably done by each reader for himself; and our task can be much more acceptably performed by limiting ourselves chiefly to the fundamental conception of the whole work, its aprioral and abstract deductive method.

it himself. At the same time, however, we cannot withhold our admiration of his contributions to natural history, and our expression of thanks to him for his noble essay on classification, while we demur to his notion about the unity of the human species.

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ART. III.—*Classification and Mutual Relation of the Mental Faculties.*

THE subject indicated by this title will vindicate its importance, as we proceed in the discussion of it. It will be seen to have a bearing on some of the most important questions relative to the sphere of human responsibility, sin and grace, anthropology and soterology. Besides the intrinsic importance of the subject, the publication of Hamilton's Lectures offers an additional motive for surveying it under the fresh and strong light which they throw upon it.

The accepted classification of the powers of the mind, until a comparatively recent period, was twofold—intellectual and voluntary, under the respective heads of understanding and will. The following statement of Reid describes with sufficient accuracy the doctrine on this subject in and before his day.\*

“The powers of the mind are so many, so various, and so connected and complicated in most of its operations, that there never has been any division of them proposed which is not liable to considerable objections. We shall, therefore, take that general division which is the most common, into the powers of understanding and those of will. Under the will we comprehend our active powers, and all that lead to action, or influence the mind to act; such as appetites, passions, affections. The understanding comprehends our contemplative powers, by which we perceive objects, by which we conceive or remember them, by which we analyse or compound them, and by which we judge and reason concerning them.”

\* Reid on the Intellectual Powers: Essay I. Chap. 7.

To the same effect Edwards says:\*

“I humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though there were two faculties. All acts of the affections are in some sense acts of the will, and all acts of the will are acts of the affections. All exercises of the will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the soul’s appetite or aversion; or, which is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another; but love and hatred are affections of the soul. Therefore all acts of the will are truly acts of the affections; though the exercises of the will do not obtain the name of passions, unless the will, either in its aversion or opposition, be exercised in a high degree, or in a vigorous and lively manner.”

According to this distribution and nomenclature, will is used to include all the powers of the mind except the cognitive; that is, all whose functions terminate in action or prompting to action rather than in knowing. Dugald Stewart classifies all these powers which had been previously included under the term *will*, under the generic designation of “moral and active powers”—a phrase which has since had extensive currency. According to this method, will, instead of being the genus under which all the appetitive, emotional, and optative powers rank as species, is simply one species co-ordinate with the various other species of faculties, included in the genus, “moral and active powers.”

This is a considerable advance towards that threefold primary distribution of the mental faculties, which has been adopted by nearly all later psychologists, and which sets intermediate between the intellect and will, a class of powers under the generic title of feeling, or sensibility, or susceptibility, or emotion, or other equivalent phrase. Under this head are included all mental powers which lie between cognition on the one hand, and deliberate choice or matured volition on the other—the appetites, passions, affections, emotions, desires, inclinations, etc. The more common phraseology in vogue to

\* Edwards’s Works, New York edition, vol. iv. p. 83.

denote this distribution of the powers of the mind is, intellect, sensibility, and will.

In themselves, the particular classification of the mental powers, and the nomenclature denoting it, are of small moment, so long as, under the various modes of distribution, the same essential faculties or modes of activity, in themselves and their reciprocal relations, are recognized and admitted. Up to this point, it is a question not of truth or fact, but of convenient arrangement, and perspicuous expression or definition. But it is quite obvious that the two-fold classification rules out certain theories in regard to the will's independency of the desires and feelings which some contend for, and which is compatible with, though not demanded by, the three-fold distribution above mentioned. If the dependence of the will on the feelings and desires be admitted, this inevitably implicates it with the intellect, since it cannot be denied that the feelings and desires are dependent on, as they are shaped and evoked by, the apprehensions of the intellect. This mode of conceiving of the mind and its powers, is wholly incompatible with that style of reasoning which treats the different classes of faculties, or modes of the soul's activity, as if they were different agents or entities—either a triad, a thinking substance, a feeling substance, a willing substance, or a duality, i. e. a cognitive substance, independent of the sensitive and optative. No one of course consciously or intentionally maintains any such dual or tripartite constitution of the soul. But there are many modes of thinking and reasoning which depend upon some such covert hypothesis for even the appearance of plausibility. The following are specimens. Dr. Taylor's celebrated formula for solving the mystery of the existence of moral evil, that the will or "power of choice is a power to choose morally wrong or morally right *under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action*,"\* is utterly inexplicable and absurd, except on the hypothesis, (which the author never meant to adopt,) that the will is an agent independent of the intellect and the feelings. Dr. Tappan defines the will as that "which has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will

\* Taylor's Moral Government, vol. i., p. 307.

indifferent, for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its action would be necessary."\* Again: "The only escape from necessity, therefore, is the conception of will as above defined—a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly which may act in the indifferency of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion."† Again: "The reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or creative or modifying power in itself, self-moved, self-directed."‡ Such representations are plainly inconsistent with the unity of the human soul, and the most familiar facts of consciousness. Instead of one cognitive, sentient, optative agent, whose thinking, feeling, and willing, all mutually interact and determine each other, it sets forth the will as a separate and independent agent, with "creative or modifying power in itself," so that it may act either in opposition to the views of the understanding, to the highest pleasure and strongest inclination of the soul, or in "the indifferency of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion." Such language implies a pair or a triplet of agents in the human soul. Yet this is not the author's doctrine, although it is logically implied in his theory of the will. He tells us elsewhere, "the will is so conditioned in its relations to the other faculties, and in the unity of the mind, that it cannot go into action, unless supplied with objects, aims, and laws, by the reason and the sensitivity."§ Is not here a plain contradiction? Can the will at the same time act "without reference to the reason and the sensitivity," and be dependent on them for its "objects, aims, and laws"? This mode of reasoning, which implies not only distinction, but the separate being of the intelligent, emotional and voluntary powers, is no necessary consequence of this threefold distribution of the mental faculties. As we shall presently see, it is far from

\* Tappan's Review of Edwards on the Will, p. 221.

† Id. p. 227.

‡ Id. p. 244.

§ Tappan on the Will, p. 300.

being embraced by the highest authorities in favour of such a distribution.

For reasons already in part indicated, those who class all the faculties of the mind under the heads of understanding and will, seldom tend towards any such breach of the soul's unity. Since, on this theory, the desires are included under the will and determine its choices, while they are guided and evoked by the views of the intellect, which in its turn is largely excited and determined in its activity by the feelings and will; all these are thus but diverse yet reciprocally intertwined modes of the energizing of the one rational sentient, voluntary mind. So Reid well represents in a passage immediately following that already quoted from him.

“Although this general division may be of use in order to our proceeding more methodically in our subject, we are not to understand it as if, in those operations which are ascribed to the understanding, there were no exertion of will or activity, or as if the understanding were not employed in the operations ascribed to the will: for I conceive there is no operation of the understanding wherein the mind is not active in some degree. We have some command over our thoughts, and can attend to this or that, of many objects which present themselves to our senses, to our memory, or to our imagination. We can survey an object on this side or that, superficially or accurately, for a longer or a shorter time; so that our contemplative powers are under the guidance and direction of the active, and the former never pursue their object, without being led and directed, urged or restrained by the latter.” \* \*

“And as the mind exerts some degree of activity even in the operations of the understanding, so it is certain, that there can be no act of will which is not accompanied with some act of understanding. The will must have an object, and that object must be apprehended or conceived in the understanding. It is therefore to be remembered, that in most, if not all the operations of the mind, both faculties concur; and we range the operation under that faculty which hath the largest share in it.”

It is only in this view that the maxim, “nothing is moral which is not voluntary,” which Chalmers felt constrained to

enounce with "all the pomp and circumstance of a first principle," can be accepted—at least if it be applied beyond external acts to the interior exercises and states of the soul. If the will be regarded as including the desires and feelings, as both influenced by and itself influencing the judgments of the intellect, the maxim will hold, otherwise not. For nothing is more surely attested by consciousness, by the universal language and conduct of men, and by the most explicit testimonies of the word of God, than that the desires, affections, feelings, and even judgments of the mind in regard to things moral and spiritual, are themselves moral and responsible. Dr. Chalmers, overlooking the breadth of the word will, voluntary, &c., according to former usage, sought to reconcile these undeniable facts with the foregoing maxim, by making the character of the desires and feelings contingent on the choice of the will, viewed in its restricted sense, as the mere faculty of choosing or purposing distinct from them. The difficulty with this solution is, that the facts are all the other way. Regarding the will as distinct from the desires, its choices are directly determined by them; they are in accordance with the preponderant desires, while it in turn can only very indirectly and partially control these desires.

This threefold distribution of the powers of the mind has served the exigencies of those who deny all moral character to the desires, feelings, and dispositions. Using will in the restricted sense, and applying the maxim that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, they easily reach the conclusion that only volitions and acts consequent on them have moral quality; and not only so, but that these volitions must be acts of a power of self-determination or contrary choice, "despite all opposing power," "without reference to reason or passion," judgment or inclination. This, however, may be easily shown to be rather a perversion of this classification than a disproof of its validity. The most thorough and trust-worthy thinkers now adopt it, so drawing their lines of demarcation, and explaining the grounds and nature of the partition, as to avoid the pestilent errors to which we have alluded. We will quote first from Dr. McCosh, and then from Hamilton, whose de-

velopment of the same essential view is more scientific and complete. Says Dr. McCosh :

“We think it high time that writers on mental science should be prepared to admit that there is a separate class of states of the mind, which, for want of a better, we may call by the term WILL, or, as we should prefer, the OPTATIVE states of mind.”\*

“We hold the will to be a general attribute of the mind and its operations manifested under various forms. It says of this object, It is good—I desire it; of that, It is evil, I reject it. In its feeblest form, it is simply wish, or the opposite of wish; and according as it fixes on the object as more or less good or evil, it rises till it may become the most intense desire or abhorrence. In its most decisive form, it is resolution or positive volition. When inconsistent objects present themselves, and the mind would choose both if it could, there may for a time be a clashing or contest. Where there is no clashing of desires, or where one of the contending desires has prevailed, and the object is declared to be better or best, and where it is also ascertained to be attainable, then the will assumes this form—I choose this; I resolve to obtain it. This, the consummating step, is commonly called volition, to distinguish it from simple wish or desire. And we hold that it is the same attribute of the mind which says, this object is good, I wish it, and desire it; and which says, on there being no competing good, or no good esteemed as equal to it, I choose it.”

“It is of the utmost moment, even in a psychological point of view, to distinguish between the emotions and the will. We cannot comprehend man’s nature and constitution, without conceiving of him as endowed with more than a mere emotional impressibility or receptive sensibility.”†

This distribution differs from that of Hamilton, only in the terms used to denote it. For the word “optative,” Hamilton uses “conative,” and he does not, like McCosh, use the word will to denote desire. We quote at some length his exposition of his views, both for the sake of the intrinsic light it sheds on a subject so important and so difficult, and as evidence of the

\* “Divine Government, Physical and Moral,” p. 275. † Id. pp. 277-8.

doctrine of the most eminent of recent philosophers in relation to it.

“But taking, again, a survey of the mental modifications, or phenomena, of which we are conscious—these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great classes. In the first place, there are the phenomena of knowledge; in the second place, there are the phenomena of feeling, or the phenomena of pleasure and pain; and, in the third place, there are the phenomena of will and desire.

“Let me illustrate this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of all—I am conscious of perceiving a certain complement of colours and figures—I recognize what the object is. This is the phenomenon of cognition or knowledge. But this is not the only phenomenon of which I may be here conscious. I may experience certain affections, in the contemplation of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be unalloyed; but if it be an unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon of feeling—or of pleasure and pain. But these two phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the picture long—to see it often—to make it my own, and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so to do. This is the complex phenomenon of will and desire.

“The English language, unfortunately, does not afford us terms competent to express and discriminate, with even tolerable clearness and precision, these classes of phenomena. In regard to the first, indeed, we have comparatively little reason to complain—the synonymous terms, *knowledge* and *cognition* suffice to distinguish the phenomena of this class from those of the other two. In the second class, the defect of the language becomes more apparent. The word *feeling* is the only term under which we can possibly collect the phenomena of pleasure and pain, and yet this word is ambiguous. For it is not only employed to denote what we are conscious of as agreeable or disagreeable in our mental states, but it is likewise used as a synonym for the sense of touch. It is, however, principally in relation to the third class that the deficiency is manifested. In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of ade-

quately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the *nisus* or *conatus*—the tendency towards the realization of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire, a blind and fatal, tendency to act. Now, to express, I say, the tendency to overt action—the quality in which desire and will are equally contained—we possess no English term to which an exception of more or less cogency may not be taken. Were we to say the phenomena of *tendency*, the phrase would be vague; and the same is true of the phenomena of *doing*. Again, the term, phenomena of *appetency*, is objectionable, because, (to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression,) *appetency*, though perhaps etymologically unexceptionable, has both in Latin and English a meaning almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin *appetentia*, the Greek ὀρεξις is equally ill-balanced, for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in English the term *orectic*. Again, the phrase, phenomena of activity, would be even worse; every possible objection can be made to the term *active powers*, by which the philosophers of this country have designated the *orectic faculties* of the Aristotelians. For you will observe, that all faculties are equally active; and it is not the overt performance, but the tendency towards it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The German is the only language I am acquainted with which is able to supply the term of which philosophy is in want. The expression *Bestrebungs Vermögen*, which is most nearly, though awkwardly and inadequately, translated by *striving faculties*—faculties of effort or endeavour—is now generally employed, in the philosophy of Germany, as the genus comprehending desire and will. Perhaps the phrase, phenomena of *exertion*, is, upon the whole, the best expression to denote the manifestations, and *exertive faculties*, the best expression to denote the faculties of will and desire. *Exero*, in Latin, means literally *to put forth*—and, with us, *exertion* and *exertive* are the only endurable words that I can find which approximate, though distantly, to the strength and precision of the German expression. I shall, however, occasionally employ likewise the term *appetency*, in the rigorous

signification I have mentioned—as a genus comprehending under it both desires and volitions.”

“This division of the phenomena of mind into the three great classes of the cognitive faculties—the feelings, or capacities of pleasure and pain—and the exertive or conative powers—I do not propose as original. It was first promulgated by Kant, and the felicity of the distribution was so apparent, that it has now been long all but universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of every school; and, what is curious, the only philosopher of any eminence by whom it has been assailed—indeed the only philosopher of any reputation by whom it has been, in that country, rejected, is not an opponent of the Kantian philosophy, but one of its most zealous champions. To the psychologists of this country, it is apparently wholly unknown. They still adhere to the old scholastic division into powers of the understanding and powers of the will; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into intellectual and active powers.”

“By its author, the Kantian classification has received no illustration; and by other German philosophers, it has apparently been viewed as too manifest to require any. Nor do I think it needs much; though a few words in explanation may not be inexpedient. An objection to the arrangement may, perhaps, be taken on the ground that the three classes are not co-ordinate. It is evident that every mental phenomenon is either an act of knowledge, or only possible through an act of knowledge—for consciousness is a knowledge—a phenomenon of cognition; and, on this principle, many philosophers—as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Platner, and others, have been led to regard the knowing, or representative faculty, as they called it—the faculty of cognition, as the fundamental power of mind, from which all others are derivative. To this the answer is easy. These philosophers did not observe that, although pleasure and pain—although desire and volition, are only as they are known to be; yet, in these modifications, a quality, a phenomenon of mind, absolutely new, has been superadded, which was never involved in, and could, therefore, never have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowledge. The faculty of knowledge is certainly the first in order, inas-

much as it is the *conditio sine qua non* of the others; and we are able to conceive a being possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and yet wholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, and of all powers of desire and volition. On the other hand, we are wholly unable to conceive a being possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same time, without a knowledge of any object upon which his affections may be employed, and without a consciousness of these affections themselves.

“We can further conceive a being possessed of knowledge and feeling alone—a being endowed with a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the exercise, and of grieving at the restraint, of his activity—and yet devoid of that faculty of voluntary agency—of that conation which is possessed by man. To such a being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be determined to energy through a pain or pleasure—through an estimate of the relative worth of objects.”

“In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters;—in nature they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyze the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination. These elements are found, indeed, in very various proportions in different states—sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another; but there is no state in which they are not all co-existent.”

“Let the mental phenomena, therefore, be distributed under the three heads of phenomena of cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; phenomena of feeling, or the capacities of pleasure and pain; and phenomena of desiring or willing, or the powers of conation.”

“The order of these is determined by their relative consecu-

tion. Feeling and appetency suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, therefore, stand first. But as will, and desire, and aversion, suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and painful, the feelings will stand second as intermediate between the other two.”\*

Few who have attended to this subject, and felt its difficulties, will fail to appreciate the aid which this luminous discourse contributes to its elucidation. It clears much of the obscurity and confusion which have so long clouded it. Still it is not exhaustive, or in all respects unquestionable. And here we take occasion to say, that while few set a higher value than ourselves on Hamilton’s contributions to philosophy, we hope that his writings will warm into life no school characterized by a servile adherence to his opinions. Those opinions on some subjects, especially the “relativity of human knowledge,” causality, the absolute and infinite, in our opinion, require to be subjected to the test of a rigorous, competent, and impartial criticism, and to be severely qualified, in order to leave a sure foundation either for knowledge or faith. In regard to the foregoing passage, we have simply two comments to offer.

1. Both Hamilton and McCosh imply, if they do not expressly affirm, that mere feeling or emotion, as distinguished from desire and will, has no moral character. This is true of some feelings and emotions, but not of others. It depends wholly on what the feeling is, subjectively and objectively, in itself and its object. Feelings of pleasure in view of acts of injustice, fraud, violence, licentiousness, malice; of pain at the triumph of truth, or the presence and influence of holy men, are plainly immoral and criminal. So to rejoice in the moral improvement, the conversion, or growth in grace of another, and to grieve over his downfall and apostasy, are morally right and praiseworthy. Those who were “glad” at the diabolical proposal of

\* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., pp. 127—131. We quote from the Boston edition, published by Gould & Lincoln, an excellent reprint of the British edition, on fine paper, and in large clear type, which it is a pleasure to read. We take this method of bringing the American edition to the notice of our readers, which we inadvertently omitted to do in our last number—the article on Hamilton in it making exclusive reference to the Edinburgh and London edition.

Judas, were certainly and deeply criminal therefor. Luke xxii. 5. Such as "have pleasure in those" that do things worthy of death incur the condemnation of God and all right-minded men. Rom. i. 32. In short, while other feelings are indifferent, feelings in regard to things of a moral and spiritual nature are morally right or wrong according to their nature. They are energizings of soul which emit and evince its purity or corruption. This we deem a principle of great moment in morals, religion, and especially Christian doctrine and experience.

2. In the passage just quoted, Hamilton says: "By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal tendency to act." Such a statement demands earnest and profound consideration. That which may properly be described as a "blind and fatal tendency to act," is thereby divested of moral quality and responsibility. There are, doubtless, desires of this description, as we shall presently see. But our desires in regard to things strictly moral are neither "blind" nor "fatal" nor irresponsible. Desire is distinguished from volition by being spontaneous rather than deliberative. But it is none the less free and intelligent for that.\* Are not covetousness, inordinate ambition, all malevolent desires free, intelligent, and culpable, although they have not as yet ripened into any deliberate volition or purpose? Are not benevolent desires, holy aspirations, the desire to glorify God and bless man, free, intelligent, and morally worthy and commendable, even when no opportunity is offered for volitions, purposes, and overt acts in gratification of these desires? No unper-

\* Dr. Archibald Alexander, speaking of the maxim that all moral actions are voluntary, says: "The word *voluntary* as employed in the maxim under consideration, includes more than volition; it comprehends all the spontaneous exercises of the mind; that is, all its affections and emotions. Formerly all these were included under the word *will*, and we still use language that requires this latitude in the construction of the term. Thus it would be consonant to the best usage to say, that man is perfectly voluntary in loving his friend and hating his enemy; but by this is not meant that these affections are effects of volition, but only that they are the free spontaneous exercises of the mind. That all virtue consists in volition is not true, as we have seen; but that all virtuous exercises are spontaneous, is undoubtedly correct. Our moral character consists radically in our feelings and desires."—*Moral Science*, pp. 207, 208.

verted conscience can waver as to the true answer to such questions. And whoever may hesitate, the word of God places the matter beyond all controversy. For to those who do not otherwise know lust as sinful, the law says, "Thou shalt not covet." It condemns fleshly lusts, which war against the soul. It denounces emulations, wrath, strife, hatred, as works of the flesh lusting against the Spirit, and therefore excluding from the kingdom of God. (Gal. v. 19—21.) But to adduce all the scriptural proofs, express and implied, of this truth, would be to quote the whole Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse.

There is, however, a class of desires that are both "blind and fatal," and therefore irresponsible, except so far as indulging or curbing them is concerned. These are the animal appetites, which are uneasy sensations generating a desire for what will allay them, and returning periodically after they have been allayed. These are the *coecae cupiditates* of the ancients. They arise without any exercise of reason, and are entirely irrespective of any apprehensions of the mind. This is their specific difference which distinguishes them from the desires we have been considering. Those are evoked by the cognitions of the intellect, and reach forth towards the objects thus set before them. Now it is obvious that these desires in themselves possess no moral quality. Our whole responsibility terminates with our agency in restraining or denying, indulging or enkindling them. The following observations by Dr. Archibald Alexander on this subject seem to us eminently sound and judicious.

"We cannot extinguish the animal feelings by an act of the will; they arise involuntarily, and therefore cannot be in themselves of a moral nature. Yet as man has other principles and powers by which he should be governed, he becomes faulty when he neglects to govern these lower propensities in accordance with the dictates of reason and conscience. But in regard to other desires and affections, they are good or bad in every degree in which they exist. For example, not only are malice and envy sinful when ripened into acts, but the smallest conceivable exercise of such feelings is evil; and as they increase in strength, their moral evil increases. It does not require an act of volition, consenting to these feelings, to render them

evil; their very essence is evil, and is condemned by the moral sense of mankind.

“A clear understanding of this distinction might have prevented or reconciled an old dispute, viz. whether concupiscence was of the nature of sin, in the first rising of desire, prior to any act of the will.”\*

This, as all competent persons must see, strikes at the very root of the great controversies respecting sin and grace. And it is no less evident that the psychological and metaphysical questions which emerge out of the subject we are now discussing, reach very far into the field of anthropology and soteriology. It is on this account that these questions are invested with permanent importance and dignity.

With this dissent from some of Hamilton's statements in connection with the distribution of the mental faculties, we think the distribution itself eminently luminous and philosophical. Not the least important of his observations are those in regard to the necessary dependence of the powers of feeling on the intellect, and of desire and will on both feeling and intellect together with the fact that these various forms of the soul's activity, though capable of being distinguished, are inseparable from, and mutually implicated in, each other. We shall devote the residue of this article to some remarks on the unity of the soul, and the reciprocal interaction of the cognitive and optative faculties—of the intellect and will, in the broad sense of the latter term.

It is a cardinal principle, which rises almost to the eminence of a first truth, that the mind or soul of man is one, however diverse its faculties or modes of operation; even as the body is one organism and substance, however various its members and forms of activity. This truth is often forgotten or obscured by modes of reasoning which imply that the will is a separate substance from the intellect, just as independent of it, as one soul is from another: also that the desires and affections are not less separate from the will and intellect; and that all three departments of our nature, the voluntary, the emotional, and the intellectual, are not like the pulse and lungs, and blood,

\* *Moral Science*, pp. 145, 146.

the mutually dependent workings and developments of one common life, but the separate and independent activities of different agents—as it were of an angel, man, or devil. How common is it for men to reason on these subjects as if the same person might be in intellect an angel, in will a man, in feeling a fiend! Now the human soul is no such double or triple essence as this. It is one, indivisible, self-same soul, that knows and thinks, that feels and wills. This is a first truth. Let it not be supposed that a man can be in thought an angel, in feeling a fiend; in opinion an atheist, in his affections devout; in his thoughts a hero, in his feelings a coward; in his intellect an unbeliever, in heart a saint. “As a man *thinketh in his heart*, so is he.” That there is in fallen humanity greater or less conflict between the decisions of conscience and other judgments, apprehensions, feelings, and purposes of the soul, is true. But this is not so much a war between the thinking and feeling faculties, as between the judgments and emotions of conscience on the one hand, and other judgments and feelings of the one identical mind on the other, as we shall yet more fully see. But whatever this conflict be, it is the effect and the evidence of a fallen state of the soul. In its original integrity and normal actings, there is no discord. All is harmony, not only between the different faculties, but between the different actings of the same faculties.

The intellect and will plainly differ from each other, as it is the province of the one to know; of the other to desire or choose. The formal object of the one is truth, of the other good; i. e. if we know anything, we know it as true. If we desire or choose anything, we desire or choose it as good; i. e. as worthy, lovely, or pleasant. It may, however, happen through the imperfection of our faculties that what we take for truth may prove false—and, through our depravity, that what we take for good, may be evil. Nevertheless, what the will chooses, it chooses under the notion of its being good; just as the intellect perceives a thing under the notion of its being true. As Edwards says, “The will is always as the greatest apparent good.” “Apparent good,” observe, not necessarily, of course, real or intrinsic good; good in the sense of

being pleasant, fitted to gratify the longings of the soul at the time. It is impossible to give a definition or analysis more philosophically accurate than the inspired record presents in its description of the origin of the first sin of our race. Mark the language; Gen. iii. 6, "And when the woman saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree *to be desired* to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." When the will chooses any object, therefore, it does so in view of its being on the whole, *in the existing state of its desires*, better, i. e. more to be desired than any competing objects. It is in short "as the greatest apparent good." This being evident and undeniable, a great principle follows, which brings to view the first nexus between the operations of the will and the intellect. It is this. Before anything can be chosen or desired by the will as good, it must be seen or apprehended as such. How is it possible to choose or desire what is not seen to be good or desirable? Every one's consciousness teaches him that it is not. Now to see or apprehend is an act of the intellect. Hence it follows,

1. That there can be no act of the will or optative faculties without some corresponding cognition of the intellect to guide it. It cannot choose to desire without light from the intellect to direct it. In the order of nature, too, if not of time, this intellectual apprehension or discernment, must precede the choice of the will, else how can it guide that choice? This however needs not to be argued. If any one says he can conceive of a choice, without first knowing or discerning the object chosen, he is plainly beyond the reach of argument. Not only, however, is there this *a priori* necessity that the mind can choose nothing which it does not first perceive; but,

2. As has already been hinted, the mind can only choose what is viewed as good or desirable. It can only desire what is viewed as attractive; and among the things thus viewed as pleasing or desirable, it will, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all, elect that which seems best, i. e. most pleasing or desirable. Here again the exercises of the intellect are not only implicated with, they take the lead of, they guide, they in a high degree determine the exercises of will and desire. There

is no such divorce between the will and intellect, and their respective actings as many have contended for. It is one and the same mind in the same complex act, discerning, desiring, wishing, choosing one and the same object. But among its faculties it is past all doubt that the understanding is, or of right ought to be, at the head. The will, including the sensibility and inclinations, is the motive energy—(hence called moral and active) like the engine of a steamship. But the understanding is the helm, the directive power which determines the course of this motive energy, and of the whole man as moved by it.

3. But if the understanding leads the will, in the sense explained, the will reacts upon and leads the intellect. Their influence is reciprocal, although that of the understanding is first in order and power. It is a familiar fact that the judgments of the intellect are much affected by our desires and preferences, our likes and dislikes. Men are very apt to think as they desire to think—as interest, taste, passion, prejudice, a friendly or unfriendly bias disposes them to think on all subjects. How constantly do they make their thinking and reasoning powers the slaves and dupes of their passions!

This is emphatically so in regard to moral and religious truths. When the will and desires are corrupt or averse to truth and righteousness, they suborn the intellect to do their bidding—to call evil good and good evil; to put light for darkness and darkness for light; to become a false, because a prejudiced witness. Thus the language of inspiration exhibits the perverse will as enticing the mind away from the true knowledge of God; while right feelings restore it to true wisdom. The language of the wicked is declared to be, "Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways. Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him? and what profit should we have, if we pray unto him?" On the other hand, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding." Let a man in his feelings dislike any just person, or any duty, and all his judgments and reasonings in regard to them will be perverted and poisoned thereby. They will be dragooned into subserviency thereto. To

vindicate what is liked; to make the worse appear the better reason, are among the most familiar intellectual phenomena.

It must not be forgotten, however, that these feelings of aversion or preference (for reasons already indicated,) in their rise, were implicated in the views of the intellect, as these evoke, guide, and shape our emotions, desires, volitions. The common phrase, "to *conceive* an aversion or preference," shows how, in the common judgment of men, the intellect is concerned in the genesis of our desires and feelings. The constant phraseology of Scripture shows how indissolubly united are the will and understanding in all moral acts and states. We are there told of the thoughts of the heart; the desires of the mind; the understanding darkened; of men being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart. But it is needless to accumulate authoritative testimonies and arguments. It is enough to refer each one to his own consciousness. And among its most obvious phenomena is this, that in reference to objects of choice we generally think as we feel, and feel as we think. It is no argument to the contrary, that men in their desires, purposes, and conduct, fall below their convictions of duty. This only proves that the soul is seduced by some competing attraction, which, for the time being, and without good reason, is viewed by it as more desirable. The judgments of conscience, its emotions of pleasure or pain, have not been allowed their rightful supremacy. Other views and emotions have been allowed to thrust themselves into the foreground; to usurp the command which belongs to the decisions and emotions of conscience—the true monarch *de jure*, if not *de facto*.

But it may be inquired, how is it possible for the intellect, which is made to apprehend truth and evidence, to evade their force, or fail to be controlled by them? How can the will prevent the natural working of the intellect or forestall its judgments, especially since, as we have already seen, the understanding is or should be the ruling faculty? This is a fair question. In regard to the first upspring of desire and volition, it has undoubtedly been shown, that the cognitive faculties must take the lead. How then can will or desire prevent

or blind the intellect? This brings us to another and most important point of correlation between conative and intellectual powers, showing the influence of the former over the latter. We say then,

4. That the will largely controls the judgments of the intellect, by controlling its acts of attention. *Attention is in most cases a voluntary act.* We attend to objects, only as we will or determine so to attend to them. Hence, the world over, men ask attention to what they have to say, as if they considered such attention a purely voluntary act. Belief they do not ask for as if it were at the option of the will to give or withhold it, when evidence is fairly attended to and appreciated. But they ask whether, in view of the proofs they offer, any can help believing the proposition they advocate. They treat the act of attention as depending on the will—conviction as depending upon the proofs adduced, attended to, and duly weighed.

Although then our intellectual judgments and convictions depend upon and are controlled by evidence, yet, without attention to this evidence, it can never be effectively before the mind, or be estimated, or followed by its due effect. And this attention is a voluntary act. Here, in our view, we find the clew to some of the most mysterious and perplexing facts in our mental operations. The first is, that it is the nature and office of the intellect to discern and be convinced by truth and evidence. The second is the undeniable fact that it is often swayed by passion, prejudice, wilful (*will-full*) resistance to truth and evidence. How can these two things co-exist—an intellect whose convictions must be controlled by evidence, and yet in fact often judging in utter defiance of all evidence, in obedience to the behests of a depraved will? Simply because the will can often divert the mind from such evidence or aspects of evidence as are unwelcome to the mind. Is not this the secret of the mistaken, perverse, and even wicked judgments so often formed in spite of evidence? Is it any excuse for errors thus imbibed, that they are honestly entertained? Is not the cause of them manifestly culpable? Can good intentions sanctify wrong acts, which, if we had candidly searched and weighed the evidence, we could not but have known to be

wrong? Then are the greatest cruelties of tyrants and persecutors justified. Paul was innocent in hunting the saints to death. The barbarous atrocities of the French Revolution, and of the Hindoo idolatry, can be alike justified. Jesuitism is the only true morality, and the end sanctifies the means. The immutable distinction between right and wrong is obliterated. Men then are responsible for their opinions on moral subjects.

The fact that attention is a voluntary act, leads to another important practical consequence. We have shown that it gives the will great control over the truths and evidences that may be brought to bear on the mind. We have also seen that the purposes and desires are largely swayed by the views and conceptions of the intellect. Hence it follows that the will, though it cannot change the affections and desires immediately by any purpose or determination to do so, may yet often indirectly exercise a considerable influence over them. It may and constantly does decide what objects and truths shall occupy the attention of the mind. But the objects and truths held in the mind's view go very far to determine the character of its affections and desires. No emotion can arise in the soul, unless in view of its appropriate object. The feeling of filial affection cannot arise unless we think of our parents. The fear and love of God cannot arise if God be banished from the thoughts. The love of truth, goodness, beauty, cannot arise in a soul which ignores them, or keeps them out of sight. If one allows his mind to gloat over the pleasures of sensuality and licentiousness, and turns it away from the excellence and loveliness of purity and goodness, he will nourish pollution in his soul. They who will not retain God in their knowledge, will not of course keep him in their affections. Thus we see that in most exercises of the will, the intellect and the desires are mysteriously implicated, that they interact with and upon each other in reference to all objects of choice; that the will is dependent on the intellect for light, and is governed by its views, while in turn it reacts upon the intellect, affecting its judgments, controlling its attention to the evidences and facts on which its judgments depend; in short, that it is not will alone, nor intellect alone, that is concerned in choice, but

the one individual soul at once choosing as it sees, and seeing, to a great extent, as it chooses. Agreeably to this, the Scriptures teach that it is one and the same thing to love and to know God. Both are eternal life. To know him truly is to see that in him which awakens love. To love him is impossible for those who do not thus know him.

There is indeed much knowledge which excites no desire, and leads to no act of will. To know that there are innumerable grains of sand on the sea-shore does not necessarily awaken any desire for them. The whole optative faculty may be indifferent to them, and to a multitude of objects. The converse, however, is not true. There can be no *desire* or volition without knowledge. And in regard to rational desires and choices on the one hand, and all cognitions of the intellect relative to objects of choice on the other, it is clear that they can no more be sundered, than the flesh can be torn from the bones, or the bark from the tree, without disintegration and death.

And it can scarcely be doubted which is the guiding faculty. In so far as the intelligence or reason fails to have the lead, our desires, choices, and actions, can neither be intelligent nor rational. We become the creatures of blind fortuitous impulse—even as the beasts that perish. To this issue does all depravity tend—hence so often termed FLESH in Scripture. Neither desires nor feelings can have any moral character that are in no sense dependent on or related to reason or intelligence. If our desires and volitions become corrupt, the intelligence shares in that corruption. It constantly happens, indeed, that men do violence to their conscience and better judgment. But it is none the less true, that they persuade themselves for the moment that they have a reason for doing so, which excuses them, or mitigates the atrocity and baseness of their conduct. All such errors of principle are culpable, because they arise from a culpable refusal or neglect to ascertain and weigh the facts in the case. They hate the light, and will not come to the light, because their deeds are evil.

In general, it may be said, that we know that we ought to obey conscience and to seek all possible light to guide its judgments. This is both an intellectual and emotional faculty—

adapted at once to guide and to determine, as we know it ought, the choices of the will. We know that we cannot refuse to give it all due light, or to obey its enlightened dictates, or allow false views, apprehensions and desires to overbear it, without the deepest criminality. Whether we commit sin knowingly, or not knowing what we do, we are guilty. For we ought to have known, desired, chosen, done our duty. There is nothing that we know more intimately and surely than that all the thoughts and desires and actions ought to be subject to the conscience, and that conscience an enlightened one.

It is here to be observed, in accordance with what has been said before, that the intellect views things under a twofold aspect. 1. In pure cognition, as true. 2. When acting as a guide to the will, as good or desirable. Now many things may be viewed as true, under the first aspect, without being viewed either as things to be desired or shunned. That the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles—that here is a forest and there a plain—are things known as true—but it does not necessarily follow that they are viewed with desire or aversion. On the other hand, we may view things as desirable, which we cannot believe to have any real existence except in our own imaginations—as that the earth were a theatre of painless and paradisaic bliss. Again, we may see a tree—and viewed as simply having existence,—we may be indifferent to it. But if it be viewed as beautiful in shape and foliage; as affording a grateful shade; as a decoration of our premises, it may thus be apprehended as in the highest degree good and desirable.

This leads us to repeat another remark, viz. that while there may be, and are, many acts of the intellect that are merely and exclusively cognitive, which incite no exercises of desire or volition; i. e. which view objects simply as existent and true, without thinking of them as desirable or undesirable; yet the reverse is not true; there can be no outgoing of desire or volition without an antecedent exercise of intellect which perceives the object chosen or desired, and apprehends it as desirable or otherwise.

Here we have the clew to one of the most undeniable and important truths of religion, while it is among the most difficult to be logically defined and explained. We refer to the

blindness which the word of God everywhere ascribes to sin and unbelief; and the spiritual illumination which it affirms to take place in regeneration—and this in regard to those truths which in some respects are perfectly known, understood, and believed. Many who know and believe speculatively the truths of Christianity are the subjects of this blindness, and need to have it dispelled before they will ever love or choose religion. How then is this to be explained? Simply thus. They discern everything in these truths but that which is most important, their infinite beauty and attractiveness, that which once apprehended at once draws the heart after it. They see everything in Christ, but that he is chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. To them there is no form nor comeliness in Him or his religion that they should desire Him. They apprehend, in short, all but that which if seen would make them desire him, even as according to the example just noted, one may see in a tree everything but that which makes it grateful or attractive—or a rustic would see all the words and letters of *Paradise Lost*, or all the parts of a splendid edifice, without detecting the element of beauty or attractiveness.

It is further true that, in these moral æsthetics—if we may so call them—this blindness to the beauty of moral excellence is itself sin. It is mysteriously implicated with the workings of desire and will. It cannot exist without a culpable closing of the eyes to the evidence in the case; it constitutes but does not excuse a material part of our depravity; it is on the footing of all moral blindness which arises from the deceitfulness of sin; and is no more excusable than that state of mind in which a man sees nothing better or more desirable in virtue than in vice.

If the foregoing analysis of the connection between the intelligence and the emotional faculties be correct, then we learn where to rank that sentimentalism which places all virtue in mere sensibility and beautiful emotion, uninformed by intelligence, and unguided by principle. This mawkish sensibility, substituted for intelligent and high-toned conscientiousness, forms the ideal standard of excellence which is glorified at the expense of knowledge and virtue, in novels as frail as the paper and the gilt in which they are bound; and for the most part

forms the web and woof of our Pickwick literature. If any are in danger of adopting a standard of character so impotent and effeminate, so degrading and demoralizing, let us remind them that it is in keeping for irrational brutes and dead matter to be the passive creatures of unintelligent impulse, the sport of blind fortuity. But man is rational and intelligent. He abnegates his higher nature, when he disowns his reason to be swayed by mere emotion—when, for the pole-star of clear and manly principles he takes the fire-fly light of passion for his guide and law!

*Practical and Speculative Reason.* We have noted the difference between those exercises of the understanding which take a purely speculative view of an object, and those which take that view which apprehends it as good, as a thing which is or ought to be desired and chosen. To this latter class belong the judgments of conscience, and not only these, but also those perceptions and judgments regarding objects which tend to incite desire or volition. With reference to this distinction in the exercises of the mind, and more particularly with reference to the judgments of the moral faculty, Kant made a distinction between the Speculative and Practical reason. In the sense which we have already pointed out, there is a solid ground for such a distinction, i. e. if by practical reason we understand the faculties of the mind which take those views of objects that directly excite or tend to excite desire, volition, action, as distinguished from those which have no such tendency. It is to be observed, however, that in all cases of right feeling, the practical view harmonizes with, it does not contradict, the speculative view, although it may go beyond it. The two are parallel or concentric. They do not cut or cross each other. In other words, before I can desire or choose, or try to obtain a tree, I must speculatively believe its existence; and still farther, that it is desirable to possess. Kant's object in setting up the distinction between the Speculative and Practical Reason was wholly inconsistent with this view. His theory of the Speculative Reason led logically to scepticism as to all things outside of the Ego or Reason; in other words to subjective Idealism. Of course it subverted Religion and Morals. To escape this dire consequence, with a "noble inconsistency,"

as it has been justly called, he asserted the existence of the Practical Reason, meaning thereby the conscience which gives the ideas of freedom, God, immortality, right; whose judgments, he said, are valid, although directly contradictory to the conclusions of the Speculative Reason, when rightly exercised. They are indeed valid against all arguments to the contrary. The only mistake lies in supposing that the Speculative Reason rightly exercised, asserts the contrary.

It is in this region, we apprehend, that we find whatever of truth lies in some analogous and cognate distinctions between the theology of the intellect and of the feelings, Christianity as a doctrine and as a life. There is just as much and as little ground for them as for Kant's distinction between the Practical and Speculative Reason, to which, in the form in which it is now fashionable to present them, they may trace their fatherhood. The only truth in them is that the æsthetic, moral and spiritual view of objects is more and better than the barely speculative, but not that it is contrary to or subversive of any true speculation or doctrine. It may overbear a false dogma or speculation; but it supposes and requires true doctrine as the ground in which it roots itself, the trunk on which it is engrafted. A rustic may spell the syllables and words of Paradise Lost and be utterly blind to its beauty. But then how can one perceive its beauty who knows not its syllables and words? Many persons believe orthodox doctrine and scriptural truths who are wholly void of spiritual life and right feeling. But then, how can one feel aright towards God and Christ, who rejects the truth concerning them as absurd and monstrous? How can he be devout in his feelings, who, with his intellect disowns the truth which awakes devotion? How can he live unto Christ, who rejects the truth as it is in Jesus? But we need not multiply questions which speak their own answers.