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- ART. I.—1. *Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme, India.*  
Par E. BURNOUF. Paris, 1844.
2. *Manual of Buddhism.* By R. SPENCER HARDY.
3. *Eastern Monachism,* by the same.
4. *Notices of Chinese Buddhism.* By Rev. J. EDKINS. Shanghai: Published in the North China Herald, 1855-6.

IN the antiquity of its claims and the wide-spread influence of its dogmas, Buddhism comes to us as one of the most imposing systems which man has ever devised. Commencing with India, where it held sway for more than a thousand years, it sent its missions into Cashmere and Thibet on the north, to Ceylon on the south, to Birmah, Siam, Java, China and Japan, on the east, and to this day, though driven from the country of its birth, it holds sway in nearly every country of its adoption; while the number of its votaries far exceeds that of any other religious system on the globe.

To have sustained itself so long and so successfully, this system must have had some power of adaptation to the wants of mankind, and must also have found those in the course of its progress who have advocated its principles both with learning and zeal. Though it may now appear to us as a decayed and worn-out system, it has had its youth and vigour. The time was, when Kings and Emperors thought it their highest glory

ART. IV.—*Lectures on the Moral Government of God.* By NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D., late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Clark, Austin & Smith. 1859.

THE great prominence of Dr. Taylor in the theological conflicts which issued in the disruption of the Presbyterian Church, the loosening of the bonds between Presbyterians and Congregationalists, the formation of opposing parties among the latter, and the planting of rival theological seminaries to propagate their respective views, will lead many to scrutinize this full and authentic exposition of his system with peculiar interest. We say full, for although these volumes comprise but a portion of his theological lectures, which are, as we understand, to be published, yet they contain his entire series of lectures and disquisitions on the moral government of God. On this subject, and its applications, he laid out his chief strength. In this department chiefly he claimed to have made decisive and momentous contributions to theological science. Here he and his adherents challenged, in his behalf, the honours of discovery and invention. Here the cardinal principles of all that is distinctive and peculiar in his metaphysics and theology are most elaborately stated and defended. All that has been known as the cardinal principles of Taylorism is here subjected to exhaustive discussion.

Although these volumes are posthumous, they are not unfinished or fragmentary. They, with the volumes yet to follow, are the mature products of the author's life-long labour, and of continual retouching, with a constant eye to their ultimate publication. Indeed, few publications bear more unequivocal marks of the *labor limæ*. In some cases it goes to a length of inducing weak and cumbrous forms of statement, while the more free and unstudied expressions of the author are generally remarkable for precision and force.

This authentic exposition and defence of his system is welcome, because it enables us to settle some questions of historical justice. Dr. Taylor's previous outgivings of his system were partial and fragmentary, as they came forth in the discussions

of occasional controversies. He and his adherents claimed that he was injuriously misunderstood and misrepresented by his adversaries; and that the recoil from his system which rent our Church, and founded new institutions for the support of orthodoxy in his own communion, was largely due to groundless prejudice and "devout calumny." These volumes will brush away all mist that may still overhang these allegations. We deem them quite as important for the light they shed upon past conflicts, and the merits of the respective polemics, as for any power they possess to revive controversies already fought through, or to re-vitalize a system whose first meteoric success was only eclipsed by the rapidity of its decline. We do not intimate that this system is yet extinct, or absolutely effete. But we do assert, without fear of plausible contradiction, that since its first flooding irruption upon our American churches, it has been steadily ebbing. Old-school doctrines have been steadily gaining influence and ascendancy. They have shown their power in the quiet but rapid growth of the bodies which cling to them most tenaciously; in the comparatively stationary or retrogressive condition of most of the bodies which repudiate them; in the extensive reactionary movement within these bodies in order to their conservation from further waste and decay; in the new forms of latitudinarian theology itself which overshadow the issues of Taylorism, so obtrusive twenty years ago; and in the fact that many admiring pupils of Dr. Taylor, who still eulogize him as the oracle of his day, are forward to discard his fundamental ethical principles. How much of any peculiar theory of *moral* government can survive the overthrow of its fundamental ethical principle, it is not difficult to imagine.

In order to appreciate Dr. Taylor justly, it is necessary to look not merely at his theories—which, of course, stand or fall upon their own merits—but at the circumstances and surroundings which evoked and largely moulded his thinking. All men, while they have the roots of their character and achievements in themselves, are strongly impelled and guided in their development and outworking by the external influences in which they find themselves immersed. Even if they sturdily withstand all that besets them, they are not unaffected by it. The

conditions and objects that environ them are the provocatives and objects of their thinking. If these do not sway them—even if they are strenuously resisted—still, they incite this very antagonism, and give it their own “form and pressure.” It is impossible to understand the genesis of Dr. Taylor’s theories irrespective of the atmosphere he breathed, the training he enjoyed, the forms of doctrinal and practical opinion which in his view most urgently required an antidote, and the evils, real or supposed, which he aimed to remedy. Much less is it possible, without this, to account for a certain two-sided or ambiguous aspect of many of his writings, which has been an enigma to multitudes; or to reach the most favourable construction of his spirit and aims of which his case admits, and in which Christian charity will rejoice.

The principal circumstances affecting Dr. Taylor’s early theological development, which require to be noted in this connection are, 1. The wide prevalence of Infidelity and Atheism, which appalled good men, during the period of his theological training and early ministry. Its focus was France—but it radiated thence over Christendom, and shot its most baleful rays over our own country, then so deeply in sympathy, on political grounds, with revolutionary France. Presidents, Senators, jurists, public men of every grade, caught the infection—colleges and literary institutions were deeply inoculated with the virus. It was quite a matter of *ton* to be sceptical. The consequence was, that the mind of the Church was largely engrossed with the refutation of Deism, Atheism, and the various forms of scepticism, open or masked. The great theological works of this period were mostly apologetic. Dr. Dwight, Dr. Taylor’s theological instructor, achieved his highest fame and his grandest success by his celebrated discourses on infidelity. They revolutionized the current of opinion and feeling in Yale College, prepared the way for those revivals of religion which signalized his administration, and exorcised the fell spirit of infidelity from the institution. His whole system of theology, and tone of preaching, bear traces of being shaped with the especial design of confronting and overpowering infidels. Dr. Taylor’s mind, both from its own peculiar structure and from the impulses given it by his teacher, would inevitably

gird itself for the conflicts which then agitated the Christian world, and with ample confidence in its ability to solve difficulties which had before embarrassed the ablest defenders of the faith. This explains why most of his theological peculiarities, while they have to do with the very nature of the Christian life, are yet adopted for the purpose of strengthening the apologetic side of theology, and silencing infidels and sceptics.

2. At this period scepticism began to develop itself openly within the precincts of the New England churches, under the title of improved and liberal Christianity. Unitarianism and Universalism had obtained control of the metropolis of Puritan Congregationalism, of its most ancient and renowned seat of learning, and from these centres of influence had already propagated themselves into the very heart of Massachusetts, poisoning her more powerful churches, and commanding the favour of her educated and aristocratic classes. These heresies, which repudiate nearly all that distinguishes Christianity from heathen morality but the name, began to worm themselves into the adjacent States, having strong ecclesiastical and social ties with the old home of their birth and dominion; and to assume a formidable attitude which engaged the anxious attention of the friends of truth and piety throughout the land, but especially in New England. Dr. Taylor's speculations have a special respect to the objections levelled at the evangelical system from this source. Endorsing many of their objections to old orthodoxy, he endeavours to reconstruct the evangelical system so as to evade them. To this point much of his strenuous argumentation tends. He concedes much to the cavils of these errorists against the doctrines of the church, for the sake of proving that the doctrine of eternal punishment, which they most of all abhor, is demanded by the benevolence of God, on which they rely to subvert it. In maintaining and denouncing the eternal misery of the wicked to the uttermost, no divine is more emphatic, uncompromising—we had almost said, unrelenting.

3. Orthodoxy in New England had been undergoing transmutations in the laboratories of successive metaphysical schools, until it began to crystallize into the arctic dogmas of Emmons.

What these were, we have so recently pointed out, as to supersede the necessity of distinct specification here.\* This system in its higher or lower potencies, tintured much of the practical, and even revival preaching of many of the most able and earnest orthodox divines of New England. Divine sovereignty, election and decrees were intensified and pressed out of their scriptural relations and proportions, into that foreground which the Scriptures award to Christ and him crucified. They were largely employed to offend, startle, and alarm the unconverted, to perform the office of the law in producing conviction of sin; while submission to, or acquiescence in them, was often made the hinge-point of true conversion. Thus the love of God in Christ, the true inspiration of evangelic preaching—the power of God unto salvation—was often shaded into relative unimportance. Of course, all this arrayed orthodoxy in gratuitous horrors, which invigorated the Universalist and Unitarian defection, while it was like an ague-chill, alternating with the warm life of the gospel, in congregations still cleaving to the faith once delivered to the saints. This was keenly felt by Dr. Dwight, and the large class whom he represented in New England, who lost no opportunity of denouncing the sublimated hyper-Calvinism of Hopkins and Emmons, especially the latter, in regard to decrees, the divine production of sin, exercises, resignation, &c. It was inevitable that, to a mind like Dr. Taylor's, surveying this whole subject from the stand-point of one striving to clear the gospel of incumbrances which hindered its access to the unconverted heart, and exposed it to the assaults of Universalists, Unitarians and Deists, the whole doctrinal system in vogue should seem to require reconstruction. The peculiar state of speculative theology in New England, as may readily be seen by those conversant with the facts, had much to do with determining the drift of Dr. Taylor's speculations. This was so, not only as it presented the offensive features already noted, but also as in other respects it furnished the germs of those peculiarities which constituted the essence of his own system,

\* Article on Edwards, and the successive forms of New Divinity, in the October number, 1858.

and which he employed in assailing, not merely Hopkinsianism and Emmonism, but the whole Augustinian, or Calvinistic system. We refer here to the doctrine of natural ability, then naturalized and nearly universal in New England; to the dogma that moral quality pertains exclusively to exercises, which was prominent in Emmons's scheme; to the wide prevalence of the dogma, that all virtue consists in benevolence; to the nearly universal rejection of the doctrine of imputation, whether of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, inaugurated by the younger Edwards; to the governmental scheme of atonement, no less in vogue, and having the same author. Here we find the seed-principles of a large part of the treatise on Moral Government. The peculiar chaotic state of New England theology, when Dr. Taylor came upon the theatre, furnished the motives, the means, and the objects of his innovations. As his reading and theological culture scarcely extended beyond the astute metaphysical theologians of New England, he knew little of standard Augustinian and Reformed theology, beyond the fragmentary representations and misrepresentations of it, found in these second-hand, and in many respects, hostile authorities. To the day of his death he never comprehended this theology in its import, spirit, logic, power. He often confounds it with certain dogmas which it disowns, mere New England provincialisms, and quite as often with the caricatures of its adversaries.

4. It deserves consideration in this connection, that Dr. Dwight held the utilitarian theory of the nature of virtue; that it consists exclusively in benevolence, or a desire to promote the happiness of the universe. Dr. Dwight did not work this theory out to many of its logical and practical results. Nor did it so figure in his published writings, as to attract any marked attention. Yet there is reason to suppose it was a favourite theory with him, and that he signalized it even more in his private instructions than in his published works. And we do not doubt that his influence encouraged Dr. Taylor's speculations on this subject, till they culminated in startling dogmas, from which Dr. Dwight probably would have recoiled—at all events which, after being distinctly brought to public

notice, justly awakened the deepest distrust and dislike of his whole system.\*

Passing now from these objective moulding influences to notice the subjective peculiarities of inward life and intellectual constitution that contributed to make Dr. Taylor the theologian he was, it is to be observed that his extraordinary power was rather in the line of logical acuteness and ingenuity, than in that breadth and depth of insight, without which the mere logical faculty is quite as likely to precipitate us into error, as guide us to the truth. There are three ways in which the mind comes to the knowledge of truth: 1. Intuition. 2. Testimony. 3. Logical deduction from what is known by intuition and testimony. It is obvious that logical processes can unfold only what is enveloped in the premises from which they start; that the truth of the conclusions reached depends on the truth of the premises, and the accuracy of the reasoning process. It is obvious still further, that all reasoning must ultimately start from truths given by intuition or testimony, else it is but a chain without a staple; that it can have no stronger evidence than the self-evidence of its ultimate premises; that the longer and more involved the steps which intervene between first premises and the conclusion, the greater is the liability to error; and that if any conclusion reached by reasoning militates against any self-evident truth, the process is thereby clearly evinced to be faulty, either in the premises or the reasoning, whether we can detect the flaw or not. Now when we say that Dr. Taylor's breadth and depth of insight were not commensurate with his logical power, we refer to that want of insight into the intrinsic

\* In a letter from Dr. Taylor respecting Dr. Dwight, we find the following: "In my senior year, I read as an exercise before Dr. Dwight, an argument on the question, 'Is virtue founded in utility?'—a question in which he always felt a peculiar interest. To those who preceded me he said, 'Oh, you do not understand the question;' but when I had finished my argument he remarked with great emphasis—'that's right,' and added some other commendatory remarks, which, to say the least, were adapted to put a young man's modesty to rather a severe test. But it certainly had one good effect—it determined me to make intellectual efforts, which otherwise I probably never should have made; *not to say the very kind which, above all others, I love to make.*"—*Sprague's Annals*, Vol. i., pp. 162, 163.

nature of moral good and evil, the self-evident excellence and obligation of first moral truths, which an inspection of his reasonings will bring to light. Discerning no intrinsic good but happiness, he reasons at all lengths, and in all directions from this hypothesis; he follows the remorseless bent of his logic, whatever first principles and sacred instincts it overbears—even though, to use his own favourite phrase, it “go down Niagara.” A consequence of this was, that within the field of his vision he saw with the greatest confidence and assurance, while he pushed his reasonings within this circumscribed area with all the greater force and momentum, because he did not take that broader survey of first truths which would have made them brakes to check the impetus that bore him so rapidly and confidently to startling conclusions. Hence the remarkable assurance and self-reliance with which he propounded principles confessedly at war with the doctrines of all branches of the church, his marvellous confidence in the power of his reasonings to enforce the assent of adversaries, and his difficulty of understanding how men should reject them on grounds creditable to the head and heart. It is further to be observed, that Dr. Taylor believed that the true power of Christianity was to be found in those bodies that hold certain elements of the reformed and evangelical faith. Especially did he regard the doctrine of eternal punishment as vital to effective Christian preaching. On the whole, he found more in the practical and doctrinal tone of the Presbyterian and Congregational churches that was congenial to him than elsewhere. On the other hand, he regarded Unitarianism and Universalism as emasculating the gospel of all that can arouse the soul to salutary concern and earnest religious efforts, yet he deemed it necessary to reconstruct the accepted orthodox system, so as to obviate certain objections, to which he agreed with these errorists in thinking it obnoxious. This accounts for the double-faced aspect so often and plausibly charged against him and his system. He was often charged with seconding Unitarians in their assaults on the orthodox faith. In response, he claimed to be the most earnest and relentless adversary of these heretics, and to be unwaveringly devoted to the doctrines of Calvinism, which he was undertaking, not

to overthrow, but to place on a firmer basis. Within certain limits and in a certain sense, all this is true. It is quite certain that he adopted and echoed the arguments of Socinians against important parts of the orthodox system. It is no less true that he expected thus more effectually to vanquish them, and retain intact the essentials of the orthodox faith. Did he succeed? The answer to this question will bring us at once to the consideration of the distinctive features of his system.

Dr. Taylor's estimate of his own theological achievements in comparison with those of his predecessors, appears in such passages as the following:

"All the attempts made by theologians to systematize the great and substantial truths of both natural and revealed theology have hitherto proved utter and complete failures, by a necessity arising from the manner in which they have been made. For in all these attempts there never has been any exhibition, nor even professed attempt at exhibition, of that great and comprehensive relation of God to men, to which all things besides, in creation and providence, are subordinate and subservient; *his relation to men as administering a perfect moral government over them as moral and immortal beings, created in his own image.*" Vol. ii. p. 2.

"So unreflective and careless on this subject have been the prominent theological writers, Catholic and Protestant, Orthodox and Latitudinarian, that from the times of Origen, not to say of Irenæus, they have scarcely, to any extent worthy of notice, given any form to the great scriptural doctrine of justification, which has not in my view involved down-right Antinomianism, the subversion of the law of God in one of its essential elements." *Ib.* p. 151.

"Have the Orthodox ministry then thus pressed men to act morally right under God's authority, grace or no grace? . . . Have they not, to a great extent, taught a *mode of dependence* on the Holy Spirit, which, instead of enhancing as it does, man's obligation to act morally right in obedience to God's authority, absolutely subverts man's obligation so to act, and God's authority to require him so to act? . . . And more than this,—where in the whole range of theological literature, can be found anything, which even in pretence can be esteemed

a thorough treatise on the high relation to God, to which his every other relation is subservient—that of the supreme and rightful moral Governor of his moral creation?" *Ib.* pp. 25, 26.

This is extraordinary language. The moral government of God is his government of moral beings. Every treatise on theology is a treatise in regard to God's government of such moral beings as we have knowledge of. It treats of the being, attributes, law and gospel of God, of our relations thereto, and of what is necessarily implied therein. Dr. Taylor could not have meant that his assertion is true, except in a narrow sense corresponding to his own arbitrary restriction of the meaning of the words "moral," "government," etc. It is quite true that no one has treated the subject after the method of these two volumes, or founded his reasonings upon the same fundamental principles. It is in these that the primary peculiarity of Dr. Taylor's system lies. To these are to be traced its strength and its weakness.

Dr. Taylor undertook to silence those who insist that the eternal punishment of the wicked is incompatible with benevolence in God. In doing this, he contended that benevolence in God as moral governor, required the everlasting punishment of incorrigible sinners, and that failure on his part to threaten it would prove him to be a malevolent being, without right to govern his creatures, or claim to their confidence. He undertook to prove this by argument as cogent as mathematical demonstration. The argument is simply this: The happiness of sentient beings, or the means of such happiness is the only good; therefore, benevolence or the desire and purpose to promote such happiness is the only virtue, or the sum of all virtue. Sin, as the opposite of benevolence, consists in selfishness, or the preference of other sources of enjoyment to seeking the happiness of the universe. A moral governor cannot show himself truly benevolent, entitled to reign, or to command the confidence of his subjects, unless he promotes benevolence in his subjects by the highest rewards, and discourages selfishness by the extremest penalties. So far as he comes short of this, he fails to show perfect benevolence; for he fails to do what he might do to promote perfect benevolence, and thereby perfect happiness. This is the sum of the argument devel-

oped by the author in manifold forms, and occupying a large portion of his book. It seems, if the premises be granted, to be quite conclusive. The conclusion, however, though with a single qualification yet to be noted, proved by Scripture and not discordant with reason, does not prove the truth of the premises. A false conclusion proves the premises from which it is deduced false. A true conclusion, however, may happen to come from false premises as well as true, and therefore proves nothing with regard to their truth or falsity. From the premise, "all colleges have astronomical observatories," it follows that Yale College has such an observatory. The conclusion is true, the premise false. If the foregoing is a true account of morality, and if this gives us the differentia of moral government, then we must award to Dr. Taylor the honour of having first given it, as he claims, a thorough and systematic treatment. But it is time for us to verify our account of his system.

"Benevolence then, as the primary, morally right affection, is the elective preference of the highest happiness of all—the *sentient* universe—to every conflicting object." *Ib.* 255. On the next page and elsewhere, he speaks of veracity and justice as "forms of benevolence." Each of them, "contemplated as including this principle, is truly and properly said to be *morally* right, and is properly called a virtue. But then its *moral rectitude* consists exclusively in the element of *general benevolence*, since if we conceive the particular disposition, affection, or purpose to exist, as it may, without this element of *general benevolence*, we necessarily conceive of it as a form of selfishness. If again, we conceive of the element of general benevolence as existing in the same degree without the particular disposition, affection, or purpose, we necessarily conceive of the same degree of moral rectitude. . . . When, however, we contemplate justice or veracity, or any particular disposition, purpose, volition, separately from, or as not including either the benevolent or selfish principle of the heart, it is neither morally right nor morally wrong. At the same time it must be admitted that justice, veracity, &c., each being conceived as a particular subordinate purpose or disposition without general benevolence, and including its appropriate executive action, are in some

sense *right*, but not *morally right*. They are *right* as they are fitted to promote some limited good necessary to the general good. It may be truly said of any of these subordinate acts, that it *ought* to be done. But its *rightness* or *oughtness* is not *moral* rightness or *moral* oughtness, for this is a predicate only of (general) benevolence, or that which includes it." Pp. 256-7. He proceeds to describe this *oughtness* or *rightness*, as being like that of a watch or pen, with reference to the end for which it is made—a "mere *natural fitness*." The italics are all the author's. This representation clearly annihilates all virtue but benevolence, all sin but selfishness. Truth, justice, lying, fraud, cruelty, aside from the benevolent or selfish spirit which may prompt them, are void of moral character. They belong to adiaphorous things as truly as running or walking. The consequence is, they become morally good or evil, according to circumstances.

Says Dr. Taylor, "There is no kind of subordinate action, which in any circumstances is fitted to subserve the end of benevolence, which in other circumstances may not be fitted to subserve the end of selfishness, and be prompted by this principle." Vol. i. p. 53. "At the same time there are few, if any kinds of subordinate action, which in all cases are fitted only to promote the end of selfishness, or which in some possible circumstances may not be fitted to *subserve the end of benevolence, and be performed from this principle*." *Ib.* p. 54.

"And now, if we suppose the essential nature of things to be so changed, that the authority of law and the public good as depending upon it would be destroyed, and absolute and universal misery follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such fearful results, the ground of punishment? If it is now right or just to punish the disobedient, it would then be so to punish the obedient—to punish for a thing having the same relative nature, though it should have another name." *Ib.* pp. 134, 135.

We do not see how any language could more utterly confound and vacate all moral distinctions. Actions are right and wrong not intrinsically, but solely as they are instrumental of happiness. The end sanctifies the means, whatever they may be.

Desert of punishment and the righteousness of its infliction depend not upon the culpability of the victim, but upon its relation to the public good. This determines whether the woes of punishment may righteously be inflicted upon the innocent, or the wicked! These are the inevitable logical results of the theory that virtue is founded in utility, that it has no intrinsic quality, but is merely the means of happiness. All actions and dispositions are indifferent but benevolence, and even that is good, not intrinsically, but as a means to happiness, as will yet more fully appear! On such a subject, argument is out of place; there is no doubt what the primary intuitions of every unperverted mind reveal on this subject. Let him who undertakes to speculate them away, find anything out of the Bible more certain with which to begin or end his reasoning if he can. Dr. Taylor does not hesitate to impress these intuitions into his service where it suits his purpose, and to make them oracles for determining what scripture may or may not teach. He says in reference to imputation as misconceived by himself, "that a morally perfect being, even Jesus Christ, cannot be ill-deserving, is an *intuition*." Vol. i. ii. p. 158. Indeed, we accept as the conclusive refutation of the above ethical theory, the very language which Dr. Taylor hurls with prodigious force at his own imagination of the doctrine of imputation.

"Indeed, if we are to rely on the necessary decisions and judgments of the human intellect—without which we can rely on nothing as true—then in this scheme these necessary decisions concerning law, justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God, are changed into their opposites; law ceases to be even respectable advice; for the lawgiver abandons its claims by sovereign prerogative, justice is converted into injustice." *Ib.* p. 159. Suppose all this were so—what then, if Dr. Taylor's ethical theory be true, and if our intuitive "necessary decisions respecting justice, truth, equity, veracity, moral government, everything which lies at the basis of faith, of confidence and repose in God," do not bury this scheme for ever out of sight? So true is it that men who speculate away their own moral instincts, are compelled after

all to recognize them—and to use them as both shield and sword in defensive and offensive warfare. They can no more eliminate them from their practical faith, than an idealist can act as if there were no external world.

But we have not yet reached the lowest deep of this ethical theory, to which logical necessity precipitates, and our author follows it “down Niagara.” Why is benevolence singled out to be made the comprehensive generic virtue, rather than justice, veracity, &c.? And why is selfishness made the only sin? “Inasmuch as one is perfectly, or, in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest well-being of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself; and the other is perfectly, or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself.” Vol. i., p. 19. But is there no good, and no well-being but happiness? No evil, but misery, &c.? Let the author answer. “Nothing is good but happiness and the means of happiness, including the absence of misery, and the means of its absence.” *Ib.* p. 31. “Nothing is *evil*, but misery or suffering, and the means of it, including the absence of happiness and the means of his happiness.” P. 35. The *goodness*, or the *worth*, or the *value*, or the *excellence* of a thing, is not the *absolute* nature, but the *relative* nature of that of which it is the predicate; or more particularly, it is the real nature of that of which it is predicated, *as related to sentient being.*” P. 31. “All the evil which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce misery or suffering to other beings and to himself.” P. 35.

According to this, moral acts and qualities, even benevolence itself, have no intrinsic moral quality whatever. Their excellence is wholly “relative,” and consists simply and exclusively in their being means of happiness. It is the happiness of beings too, considered simply as “sentient”—whether their sensibility be corporeal or spiritual, animal, esthetic or moral—the *quantum* rather than the *quale*. Says Dr. Taylor, in vindication of the doctrine that the love to God primarily required by the divine law is the love of benevolence, not of complacency:

“The love of benevolence is the love of the well-being, or of the highest happiness of the sentient universe. As God comprises in himself immeasurably, ‘the greatest portion of being,’ and of course compared with the universe besides, the greatest capacity of blessedness, his perfect happiness has more worth than any that can come into competition with it. If then the mind does not *primarily* love the highest blessedness of God, and his perfect character as the means of this end, and this on account of its perfect fitness or adaptation as *the means* of producing this end, it does not love his character on account of its *intrinsic loveliness or excellence*—does not love it at all.” Vol. ii., p. 196.

How exclusively this founds all on quantity, rather than quality of being and happiness, and derives all quality from quantity! See the application of this utilitarian arithmetic, to calculate the decrease of love to God in proportion to the temptation it surmounts. Says our author, “Perfect holiness in a moral creature consists in loving God as much as he can love him, while he is under a necessity of loving an inferior good in some degree. At the same time he has but a limited power, or capacity of loving all objects of affection. Suppose this capacity in a perfectly holy being to be the capacity of loving fifty degrees, and that being under a necessity of loving the inferior good ten degrees, he loves God with forty degrees, or with perfect love. Let us now suppose the temptation increased; in other words, the value of the inferior good increased, so that it becomes necessary to love the inferior object fifteen degrees. The consequence is, that he must love God so much the less, as he loves the inferior object more, &c.” Vol. ii. p. 365. By this calculus perfect love will soon be differentiated down to zero. Is not the statement of such a system its refutation. As well might we measure fragrance by squares and triangles, as moral quality in this way. Who does not shudder at the bare suggestion of merging the holiness, righteousness, and truth of God, in mere boundless “sentient capacity,” or sinking them into mere instruments for gratifying it? Does it terminate in anything short of absorbing his moral perfections, all that can be a ground of love and trust to his rational creatures, in mere physical or metaphysical

infinitude? We stop here. We will not hurl back those epithets which we might justly employ, and which Dr. Taylor applies so freely and gratuitously to the God exhibited, as he maintains, in the scheme of his adversaries. But really, is bare amount of sentient capacity irrespective of its quality, the measure of worth and claim to regard, as this scheme requires? And who would not slaughter thousands of rams, if he had them and it were necessary, to soothe the anguish of a suffering babe? And are not all bodily sufferings, however intense and protracted, less to be deplored, reprobated, and shunned, than one pang of remorse, however faint or transient? And is the agony of the Son of God no more momentous than an equal amount of agony in a sentient being of any species?

But if benevolence be the only virtue, because it is a means of happiness as the only good, should not each one seek for himself this only good? and can he be under obligation to be benevolent or anything else, on any other ground, or in any greater degree than as it is seen to be conducive to his own happiness? Says Dr. Taylor:

“Were the agent wholly unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and as therefore he must be wholly indifferent to their happiness, he must be wholly indifferent to benevolence on his own part, as the means of their happiness. Benevolence in such a case could possess no worth or value *to him*, either directly or indirectly. . . The worth *to him* of the highest happiness of all other beings, is its fitness to give him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action; and the worth to him of benevolent action is its perfect and exclusive fitness to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, and *herein* its perfect fitness to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action.” Vol. i., p. 32. In the same manner he proceeds to argue that, “selfishness would be no evil to the moral agent, were he entirely unsusceptible to misery from the misery of others; that the *evil* of this kind of action to the agent, is equal either to the evil *to him* of the highest misery of all other beings, or to the evil *to him* of his own misery from their highest misery.” P. 35.

There can be no mistake as to what all this, and much more

of the like means. The only obligation to benevolence is the constraint we are under to pursue our own happiness; but does not the author maintain that men are bound to do right and avoid wrong? Assuredly. But then, what is right and what is wrong? Let us hear him. "The word *right* denotes the *fitness* of that to which it is applied, to produce or accomplish some given end; and the word *wrong* denotes the *fitness* of that to which it is applied to prevent the same given end. . . . Of course, the same general ideas of fitness to produce or prevent the end, or the great end of action on the part of moral beings (i. e. happiness,) are denoted by the words right and wrong, when applied to such action. To deny this, is to deny a fixed and universal principle in the use of words. It is to deny in the language of logic that the genus is predicable of the species, or that the same word has one and the same general meaning as applied to different things, to which it can truly be applied in that meaning. It is the same as to deny that the word *black* or *white* has the same general meaning when applied to a bird and a horse of the same colour." Pp. 63, 64. This must be the answer which, on page 135, he says he has already given to those who say that the "idea of moral rectitude or rightness is a simple idea, an idea incapable of analysis and definition." And what an answer! If this is all that Dr. Taylor's astuteness could devise, we may safely say they are unanswerable. Right as commonly understood means conformity to a standard as fitness to an end, of which Dr. Goodrich shows himself well aware in his edition of Webster's Dictionary. It means not only conformity to a standard, but, as often, the very standard idea, or law to which we ought to conform, or the characteristic element of that to which we ought to conform, i. e. moral goodness. Thus used, it denotes a simple idea. As such it may be indicated by synonyms. But it cannot be logically defined. For it is incapable of analysis into genus and differentia. It is itself the differentia of morally right action. But its own genus and differentia cannot be found, any more than those of black and white. Says Dr. Taylor, usage is "that only which gives to words what may be called their *proper* meaning, and their only fixed and permanent meaning so far as they have any. It is, of course, the only criterion of decid-

ing what that proper meaning is." Vol. ii. p. 213. This is just. How absurd then to attempt to settle one of the greatest questions in psychology, ethics and divinity, by erecting a partial and secondary meaning of the word *right* in some of its applications into a generic sense which must pervade all its applications, and settle all questions depending on its meaning, as a moral term! Does any thing but usage decide this meaning? When then men use the word *right* in reference to a moral act or state, do they, or do they not mean something else than is implied in the phrase, "a choice of the highest happiness of the sentient universe as a means of my own happiness?" This is a psychological question which each one must answer for himself, looking to it that his answer does not contradict the consciousness of the human race, as shown by their words and their deeds. What that answer must be, is not a matter of doubt. And it directly contradicts the assumption which runs not only through the above argument, but through these two volumes, that there is no good but happiness or the means of happiness.

We have seen it recently stated by an apologist of Dr. Taylor's ethical theory, that he was accustomed to say in his lectures somewhat as follows: "We hold that virtue and vice are respectively good and evil in themselves. We do not allow our opponents exclusively to appropriate this language. We attach great importance to it." The following quotation shows in what sense he adopted this phrase. "There are, generally speaking, two things and only two, each of which may properly be said to be *evil in itself*. The one is *suffering*, including unhappiness or misery, and the other is the *direct means* of suffering. Each is truly and properly said to be *evil in itself*, in distinction from being evil as *the indirect means* of suffering." P. 132, vol. ii. What is this but a dexterous word-play? After all, the evil of sin is not intrinsic, but lies solely in its being the means of suffering—precisely what his adversaries charge—and what the above language is not even an attempt to parry, and only a very poor attempt to disguise. In this sense destitution of food and raiment, foul air, close confinement, are evils in themselves. They are the direct means of

suffering. Have they, therefore, the intrinsic evil of blasphemy, perjury, and malice, i. e. intrinsic moral turpitude?

One other evasion, which is put forward in defence of this scheme by its abettors, with all the pomp and circumstance of demonstration, whenever they find themselves *in extremis*, we must notice. It is shadowed forth in the passage already quoted from pages 32-35. It is there maintained, that if a moral agent were unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and to misery from the misery of others, he would be indifferent to them, would not choose or refuse them, and they could be neither good nor evil to him. In short, the familiar axiom of moral liberty, that in all free choice we choose as we please, is the virtual premise for proving that if we choose at all, we must choose our own pleasure or happiness. To which we reply,

1. This confounds the subjective impulse which impels or determines choice with the object chosen. Because I choose as I please, it by no means follows that I may not be pleased to choose goodness, truth, beauty, as such, on account of their perceived intrinsic excellency, and irrespective of any perceived relations to my own happiness. Nay, does not the possibility of delight in the highest objects to a noble mind, depend on their perceived objective intrinsic excellency? How does it appear that a man may not be pleased with other objects as well as his own happiness, or things considered as the means thereof? Does not every man's consciousness attest that he may be pleased with the noble, the beautiful, the true, irrespective of their perceived relations to his own happiness?

2. This destroys all differences in voluntary action. The argument is, that virtue must consist exclusively in the pursuit of happiness, because men cannot choose objects in which they feel no interest, or which they are not pleased to choose. In this sense, and to the fullest extent, vicious and virtuous choices are alike. They are so, simply because they are choices, and it is the nature of choice to choose as we please. It is the nature of the *objects* chosen, and in which we find pleasure, not the mere subjective choosing as we please, that determines the moral character of the choice and of the man choosing.

And he alone who loves the good *as good*, is a good man. Indeed, the argument now under consideration, obliterates not only all moral, but all other distinction between choices.

Another source of plausibility in many of the statements of Dr. Taylor, and the whole Epicurean and Utilitarian school, is found in the intuitive conviction of the whole human race, that there is, under the government of a holy God, an inviolable nexus between holiness and happiness, sin and misery; and, moreover, that aside from positive rewards and punishments, in their own nature, the one gives peace, no matter what present suffering it may involve; the other gives torment, no matter what transient pleasures it may procure. But though in moral beings, sin and misery, holiness and happiness, always mutually suppose each other, it does not follow that they are identical, or are so regarded, in the universal judgments of the race. Solidity supposes figure, colour, extension. These are not, therefore, identical. The rational and animal natures coexist in man. They are not, therefore, the same. The practice of holiness is the sure road to happiness. Wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness. It does not, therefore, follow that pleasantness or the pursuit of it, involves all that is implied in wisdom. Nay, the pursuit of happiness, except in subordination to holiness as a good to be sought in some measure for its own sake, is the inevitable forfeiture of it. He that seeks his life shall lose it; he that loseth his life for Christ's sake shall find it. But those who make happiness the only good, often employ the same language as those who make holiness the supreme good, and all the more readily, since happiness follows moral goodness, as the shadow the substance. In aid of this comes the *petitio principii*, which runs through these volumes, that nothing is good but happiness or the means of happiness. This is the very thing to be proved. It is simply assumed without proof. But when Dr. Taylor asks, in innumerable forms, as if concluding all debate on these subjects, whether that action can be virtuous which does not seek some good, he asks a self-answering question. The answer is conclusive for his purpose, if we grant his postulate, that there is no good but happiness or the means thereof. But it is wholly in a circle and irrelevant for the purpose of proving this, the spinal

principle of the happiness scheme, without which it falls helplessly and irremediably.

The exhibition of this theory which we have thus given at great length in the words of its author, is its refutation. On its own showing it subverts the first principles of morals, the intrinsic difference between virtue and vice; and enthrones a shifting expediency in place of eternal and immutable morality. All but seeking the highest happiness of the sentient universe, is classed among things indifferent; good or evil not in themselves, but according to circumstances. In support of this view, Dr. Taylor refers to our Saviour's doctrine in regard to the Sabbath, Matt. xii. 1-13, to prove "that the greatest good is to be done in all cases, notwithstanding the unqualified language of particular precepts." Vol. i. p. 58. The Sabbath is a positive institute as regards the time and form of its observance. Like all positive institutes, the manner of its observance is a thing in itself indifferent, and becomes good or evil according as it promotes or hinders the higher moral and immutable interests to which it is auxiliary. All this is determined and varied, and made binding by the express command of God, according to his infinite wisdom. But does all this serve to show that there is nothing intrinsically good or evil, but a benevolent or selfish purpose—that there are exceptions at the behest of expediency to the intrinsic obligation of veracity, justice, &c.? Believe this who will.

We cannot forbear adding, that if the quality of moral action lies not in its nature, but its perceived tendencies, or consequences to the highest happiness or misery of sentient being, then it must be for ever impossible for men to know the moral quality of their actions further than as they are taught it by the authority of revelation. Says Dr. Taylor: "In respect to the most momentous agency in the universe of causes, *moral action*, he (the agent) knows what is true, what is false, what is good, what is evil, according to the eternal and immutable nature of things. Act as he may, he acts with a just and adequate view and comprehension of all that need be known, that the great end of all being, of all existence may be accomplished or defeated." Vol. i. pp. 36, 37. Now this is true, if the moral quality of actions be intrinsic and seen to be so.

This quality may be as surely seen by the moral faculty in actions, as beauty or colours in objects by the eye, at the first dawn of intelligence or moral agency. But on the supposition that the right or wrong of actions depends upon their consequences to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, who of men can calculate the consequences near and remote of his conduct? Or, if it were possible for any man, at what age does the intellect become sufficiently developed and comprehensive for this purpose? When, if ever, can moral agency begin on this supposition? What did Joseph's brethren or Christ's crucifiers know about the bearings of their nefarious deeds on the happiness or misery of the "sentient universe?" They meant it for evil, but God meant it for good. Gen. 1. 20. Does the child, when committing the most common sin of childhood, and conscience-smitten for it, know or think of its bearings on the happiness of the sentient universe? If he did not know that it was wrong in itself, could he ever know that it was wrong at all? And what is the testimony of the universal consciousness of men on this subject? Do they undertake to compute, if this were possible, the consequences of most actions to the happiness or misery of the sentient universe, in order to adjudge, approve or condemn them as worthy or unworthy, noble or mean, right or wrong? Are veracity, fidelity, magnanimity, self-sacrifice, piety, falsehood, treachery, sordidness, selfishness, estimated by this arithmetic? Would it ever be possible to know right or wrong, whether they were doing good or evil that good might come, on such a theory? So far as we can see, it puts moral action beyond the range of possibility.

We omit other comments which this scheme invites, except so far as they may rise collaterally in our observations upon those modifications of Christian doctrine, urged by Dr. Taylor, with which they are implicated.

Deists and Universalists, however, are not silenced, if this whole scheme be conceded; if it be granted that the Divine goodness consists exclusively in benevolence, and that benevolence requires the utmost possible punishment of the wicked, both as regards intensity and duration. The question still arises, if the one exclusive desire of the Almighty be the high-

est or the perfect happiness of the sentient universe, why does he not effect it? Dr. Taylor is not at a loss for an answer. He says, "can human ingenuity devise an answer, or even be authorized to say there can be any other reason, except that a perfect God cannot prevent all sin, even under the best conceivable system, or in other words cannot prevent all sin for ever without destroying moral agency?" Vol. ii. p. 366. He more than intimates that the denial of this inability in God leads logically to "Atheism, Infidelity and Universalism." Vol. i. p. 324. It might be rejoined, why does not God make a delighted sentient universe, without this intractable element of free-agency to destroy or impair it? Or if it be said, that free-agency is an indispensable requisite to high and rapturous enjoyment, how does it appear that God cannot control without destroying it? Says Dr. Taylor, "moral agency implies free-agency—the power of choice—the power to choose morally wrong as well as morally right, under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action." Vol. i. p. 307. "Moral beings, under this best moral system, must have power to sin, in despite of all that God can do under this system to prevent them; and to suppose that they should do what they can under this system, viz. sin, and that God should prevent their sinning, is a contradiction and an impossibility. *It may be true* that such beings in this respect, will do what they can do—that is, will sin—when of course it would be impossible that God, other things remaining the same, should prevent their sinning without destroying their moral agency." Vol. i. pp. 321, 322. This Dr. Taylor argues does not limit the power of God, because the accomplishment of contradictions has no relation to power. It is not within the province of power to make two and two equal to five. "No more does it imply any deficiency in power on his part, that he cannot prevent in supposable cases, beings who can sin in despite of his power, *i. e.* moral beings, from sinning under the best moral system." P. 322.

Probably this dogma of Taylorism has contributed to its discredit quite as much as the ethical theory we have examined. To solve the mystery of evil by investing man with a power of contrary choice, superior to divine omnipotence, is hardly more consonant with the feelings of devout Christians, than to restrict

his power of choice to happiness as its object, and self-love as its inward motive. However demonstrative Dr. Taylor's argument may be, to show that we cannot maintain God's benevolence and sincerity, unless we admit his inability to prevent sin in a moral system; Christians will yet believe that there is some flaw in the argument, whether they can detect it or not. The consequences of such a principle are too radical and subversive of the first principles of religion, to allow of its being entertained at all. These consequences are—

1. The annihilation of God's providential government. The highest class of creature agents are above his control. No power that God can exert can prevent their acting in opposition to his decrees. There can be no certainty or stability in his administration of the government of the universe. A single uncontrollable free agent may turn all his counsels to confusion, and frustrate the plans of infinite wisdom in the realms of providence and grace. The greatest events may often be traced to the will, or even caprice of single persons, insignificant as well as great. No one knows how vast a network of providential events may be complicated with his most trivial acts. Every one can call to mind insignificant circumstances which have apparently shaped his sphere and his destiny. One of the decisive battles of the Revolution was turned in favour of the American arms, because the British commander chose to finish a game in which he was engaged before reading some dispatches sent to him. Says Dr. Taylor, "the annihilation of a single particle of matter would *instantly* cause some change throughout the material system; nor can it easily be told how long before the world would rush to chaos." And is not any act of a free agent more in itself and its relations than a material atom?

2. On this system prayer must be, to a great extent, "empty breath." All spiritual blessings, and nearly all temporal blessings require some action of free moral agents, either in their bestowment or realization. But these are endued with a power to frustrate God's will and purpose. He is dependent upon their permission, which he has no power to ensure, for the privilege of executing or conferring any good which involves their agency.

3. On this system, it is not God who makes Christians to differ from other men. They make themselves to differ. The theory is that God is doing all he can to make men good and happy, but is defeated with regard to a portion, by the exercise of a power to sin, which is an over-match for all the power he can exercise to subdue it. Others do not so frustrate the effort of God to draw them to himself. To whom then are they indebted for the difference between themselves and the ungodly? Surely, if this theory be true, to themselves; and there is an end of the sovereignty of grace.

4. It is impossible on this scheme for God to work or implant holiness in the soul. It is for a power to act despite all God's power, to decide whether and on what conditions omnipotence itself shall induce it to be holy. There is no room nor possibility for the creation of a new heart and right spirit by the immediate exercise of a divine power upon the soul. The work of the Spirit must be essentially like that of the preacher, *suasory*, by the objective presentation of truth and motives. Says Dr. Taylor, discussing this subject, "the direct prevention of sin, or which is the same thing, the direct production of holiness in moral agents by dint of omnipotence, is an absurdity." Vol. i. p. 308. This is a great deal for a Christian theologian to say, but no more than this theory requires him to say. But how does such a view quadrate with those scriptural representations which exhibit God as creating a new heart, quickening those dead in trespasses and sins, as exerting the exceeding greatness of his power upon those who believe, even according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead? Eph. i. ii.

5. It is obvious that this scheme involves plenary ability to obey God perfectly without divine grace. This is not disguised, but earnestly maintained by Dr. Taylor, against what the church has understood to be the plain averments of the Bible, and every historical creed of Christendom.

6. No man's salvation is sure on this theory. Whatever may be his present strength of faith, who will dare ensure himself against apostasy, by virtue of any goodness within himself? And while he cannot ensure himself, he has a power

within him which is liable to fall, despite all that men, angels, or God can do to prevent it.

7. For the same reason, there is no security against the fall and revolt of holy angels and redeemed men in heaven.\*

For these and other like reasons, this theory can never command the faith of God's people. No apparent conclusiveness of metaphysical demonstration can establish it in the face of those elementary Christian truths which it subverts. The judgment of the church will still be that there must be some flaw in the supposed demonstration, whether it can be detected or not. Even Universalists cannot be brought to believe that God cannot control the acts of moral agents. If eternal punishment can only be vindicated by such a theory, they will regard it as incapable of vindication. They will be confirmed in their soul-destroying delusion. We doubt whether a soli-

\* Dr. Taylor argues on the supposition that the only alternative to his theory is, that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good." This is the alternative adopted by Emmons and some New England theologians. It is the logical alternative, if we take for our "point of departure," the utilitarian scheme, or Dr. Taylor's form of that scheme of ethics. That "sin is the necessary means of good," is for them to maintain who avow it. This is no part of our theology, or of church theology, whatever individual polemics may have promulgated. In regard to the permission of evil, we are glad to take refuge in "mystery," notwithstanding Dr. Taylor's protest that such a course will not satisfy atheists.

It is proper, however, that we should recognize what God has been pleased to reveal on this subject. It is quite certain that redemption is the grandest outshining of the perfections and glories of God: and that it was his eternal purpose, that by the redeemed church should be made known unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God. Eph. iii. 10. It is equally certain that redemption, and God's declarative glory therein, are impossible without sin. Redemption from sin without sin, is indeed a contradiction. The preservation of moral agents from sinning, is not a contradiction. This may throw some light upon the Divine permission of sin, not enough, however, to clear it of all mystery. However this may be, it is no proper use of language to call "sin the necessary means of the greatest good." That cannot be good, or the means of good, which is itself evil and evil only, and requires to be counteracted and frustrated in order to any good whatever. The pollution of our great cities is the occasion of much Christian and philanthropic self-sacrifice for its abatement. This is a great good, which would not otherwise exist. Is this pollution, therefore, properly the means of good, because it is the occasion of noble efforts to neutralize it, which otherwise would be impossible?

tary instance can be found of an Atheist, Deist or Universalist, reclaimed by means of this scheme.

We do not, however, for a moment admit that there is even a respectable show of even a seeming demonstration that God cannot prevent, or that it may be that he cannot prevent sin, without the destruction of moral agency. The alleged demonstration, as we have seen, is that since moral agents must have power to sin, to suppose them prevented from sinning, supposes them dispossessed of the power which makes them moral agents—which is to suppose that moral agents are not moral agents—a contradiction, the accomplishment of which is beyond the range of power.

This could not assume even the look of a demonstration in the view of one who did not overlook distinctions which Dr. Taylor elsewhere and abundantly makes. It is one thing to have the power to sin in every sense requisite to moral agency—that is, the power to commit sin, if the agent is pleased to do it. It is quite another, that it should not be made certain that he will not exercise this power in sinning. The former by no means involves the latter. But unless it supposes the latter, it is unavailing to support the conclusion built upon it. Has not the Most High consummate powers of moral agency? Yet does not the holiness of his nature make it so certain that he will never do evil, that it is declared without hyperbole, that he cannot deny himself, and that it is impossible for him to lie? Are not the holy angels and glorified saints free moral agents? And is it not made certain that they will never sin without infringement of their moral agency? Will not the saints on earth be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation without infringement of their moral agency? There is no contradiction then in supposing that it may be made certain that a being who has the power to sin will not sin—*i. e.* should be prevented from sinning without prejudice to his freedom.\* What freedom can be conceived but that of

\* This whole conception of freedom as involving in its very nature, a state of equilibration between good and evil, and so a liability to contrary and sinful choices is a superficial, empirical induction from the phenomena of our fallen state. It is contradictory to the normal and rational idea of freedom as it is realized in the most perfect moral agents. For God, for holy angels, for man

doing or choosing as he pleases? Would it lend any new finish or grace to moral agency, to suppose him endowed with a mysterious uncontrollable property of doing or choosing the contrary of what he pleases, or would he be in any manner responsible for the actings of such a power—a whit more so, than for the beatings of his pulse? And is it a contradiction that it should be made certain what it will please a moral agent freely to choose and do? Cannot God do his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of earth, without impairing their moral agency? At all events, what has been done, it can be no contradiction in the nature of things to do. The contradictions which are no objects of power, are in the expressive phrase of Dr. Taylor, “mere thought-things,” whose actual existence is neither possible nor conceivable. The making it certain that free-agents will use their freedom in a given way is alike conceivable, possible, and actual.

2. The ground we have taken is fully sanctioned by Dr. Taylor himself. In arguing the universality of God's purposes, (which must inevitably be subverted by the hypothesis we have been refuting,) he says, “who can doubt that physical propensities may be so strong toward a given action or course of action, and the motives or temptations so powerful, that such action will be certain? But if this may be so in one case, it may be in all . . . None will deny that the voluntary acts of the Divine being are certain, nor that the divine nature is the ground of such certainty. Is it not equally undeniable, that there is in the nature of things a ground or reason why a being of such a nature as God, chooses and acts in every instance as he does choose and act? If so, then the real ground or reason of the certainty of his acts is substantially

restored to heavenly perfection, evil has no attractions. There is in them no oscillation or equipoise between sin and holiness. Perfect freedom even up to the point of perfect spontaneity on the one hand, and immovable continuance in good on the other, are different phases of the same moral perfection. The very fact of a propensity to wrong, having power to act upon the will so as to produce any hesitancy in it between good and evil, or to render an evil choice practicable, is itself a symptom of an inward lapse from perfect rectitude. This view was one of the strong points made by Augustine against Pelagius.

the same with what we affirm to be the ground or reason of the certainty of human action . . . God in this respect made man in his own image." Vol. ii. p. 313. "Every one who acts voluntarily or as a free agent, knows why he acts as he does. But whatever be the reason why one acts in a given manner, is the reason of the certainty of such action. Now that this is a matter of human consciousness, supersedes the necessity of further argument." Pp. 314, 315. "If it be asked, what gives this certainty of the wrong moral action, we may, or may not be able to assign some one antecedent as the cause, ground or reason of this certainty in all cases. It may be the nearness of the inferior good, or it may be the peculiar vividness of the mind's view of it, or it may be any one of many other possible circumstances." Vol. i. p. 195. But is it not clear that all these antecedents which fix the certainty of moral action right or wrong, are within the control of the Most High? And so far as we can see, might they not have been so shaped as to prevent all sin? Is it then asked why he did not prevent it? We do not know. We can only say, "even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight!" Dr. Taylor says, "it is vain, and worse than in vain, to cry out '*mystery*,' in answer to Atheists who plead the existence of evil against the being of God." Be it so. We yet deem it safer, more reverent, and more likely to benefit even Atheists, than to deny God's sovereign power over moral agents.

3. Dr. Taylor's ethical scheme is utterly inconsistent with this alleged power to act, despite all opposing power. As has been abundantly shown, it is part of this scheme that nothing can be an object of choice but happiness or the means of happiness. Nothing can be an inward spring or source of volition but self-love, or the desire of happiness. If this be so, how plain is it that those objects must be chosen which are deemed most conducive to happiness in preference to all others. Suppose two objects offered to the mind's election. One is deemed more, the other less conducive to happiness. That by which the former differs from the latter, therefore, is its tendency to happiness. According to this scheme, therefore, it must be chosen, or else choice is made without a motive. What becomes

then of this stupendous power of contrary choice, with power to act despite all opposing power?\*

Our readers have, of course, already seen that the plenary ability of sinners to perfectly keep the whole law, is implied and expressed in the parts of the treatise we have already considered. But as this is a chief feature of his scheme, to which in various ways other parts are subsidiary; as the author deemed it indispensable to the due power of the gospel for parrying the cavils of sceptics and unconverted men; as he avows himself most unmistakably in the statement of his own dogma of ability, and in denunciation of the theology of the whole church on this subject, his deliverances upon it deserve more special attention. The following passage reveals his mind with emphasis.

“And here I am constrained to ask, whether in all this theology both Catholic and Protestant, theologians in maintaining the doctrines of grace, have not extensively maintained opinions—philosophical dogmas, unscriptural principles—and held them as essential doctrines of the word of God, which are palpably inconsistent with, and utterly subversive of, God’s authority as a lawgiver? Without referring to more remote incongruities on this subject, may it not be said to be a prevalent doctrine of the Christian church from the time of Augus-

\* We find at the end of a recent volume, entitled “Evil not from God,” by John Young, LL.D., of Edinburgh, and republished in this country by Mason Brothers, of New York, the following note. “While these sheets were going through the press, the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for last January, was shown to me by a friend. Amongst others, there is an article on sin, containing a review of a recent work by Dr. Squiers, of America. That work it is my misfortune never to have seen. But it delights me to learn from the review that in one point, the impreventability of sin, Dr. Squiers maintains the view which is put forth in this volume.” This is a book of vastly higher ability than that which it refers to as authority. The theory in question has often appeared in past ages, and has as often been repudiated by the church. It is amusing to see these sepulchred heresies unearthed from time to time, and given forth, in all simplicity, as new discoveries. Especially is it amusing to see Transatlantic writers referring to obscure authors in this country, who feebly reflect the opinions which have been alternately broached and refuted by our ablest divines for thirty years, as if they had been equally fortunate with themselves in discovering a new principle in theology, and were lending to it the weight of their authority.

tine, and emphatically in the two great divisions of the Reformed church, known as the Calvinistic and Arminian, that 'God commands what man *cannot* perform;' 'that man by the fall lost all ability of will to anything spiritually good;' 'that God did not lose his right to command, though man lost his power to obey?' 'The error of Pelagius is, not that he maintained man's ability to obey God without grace, but that man does *actually* obey God without grace.' Vol. ii. p. 132.\*

Before proceeding farther, we remark just here,

1. The foregoing is an explicit admission, nay, charge, that the doctrine of man's inability without grace to obey God, is and has been the settled and universal faith of the Christian church. It is, therefore, one of the fixed cardinal doctrines of Christianity, which if anything can, may be regarded and treated as past dispute among Christians, and not fairly to be called in question, except among outsiders.

2. Is it not absurd to assert that a doctrine is utterly subversive of God's authority as a lawgiver, which confessedly has been embraced by the whole Christian church, all the good and holy of earth, all who have recognized and obeyed his authority as a lawgiver? Ought not this decisive fact to suggest to a considerate inquirer that he probably misconceives the doctrine in its import and influence, before he ventures such unmitigated denunciation of it? Is not this proof that it is not so evidently monstrous and repugnant to the intuitive convictions of men, as he maintains?

3. In view of the foregoing, and other statements, we not only regret with his eulogist, Dr. Dutton, that Dr. Taylor should have spent so much of his "precious time" in trying to show his orthodoxy according to the symbols of the church. We are astounded at the courage which could have attempted it.

Dr. Taylor founds much on the statement of the divine law as given by Christ, as "measuring man's duty by his ability,"

\* We suspect that Pelagius would hardly have troubled himself to combat such a doctrine as this. Let any one study Neander's analysis and exposition of the Pelagian controversy, in its doctrinal issues, and the inner spirit and aim of Pelagius and Augustin, and he will find himself in little doubt as to the respective sides with which our American New and Old-Schools respectively class. See *Neander's Church History, Torrey's translation*, vol. ii. pp. 5, 64, 626.

when it says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself." Vol. ii. p. 7. This argument is put in a variety of forms elsewhere. His plausible exegesis of this is that it requires man "to love God as much as he can love him." P. 137. That it means all our capacity of love absolutely considered is one thing. Our ability to direct this entire absolute capacity of love upon a particular object for which we have a dislike, is another matter. Suppose that one should command another to love a neighbour whom he abhors with all his heart, mind and strength. If he "loves him as much as he can love him," *i. e.* not at all, or slightly, does he come up to the meaning of the precept? Does he love him with all his heart? As we have already intimated, this command makes ability the measure of obligation, only so far as the absolute capacity of loving at all is concerned. It does not require men to love with angelic faculties. It requires that amount of love which he would be capable of, were he not disabled by his sin. But it does not recognize as the love of all the heart, mind and strength, such affection as a sinful unrenewed heart can render to God. Can the carnal mind, which is not subject to the law of God, *neither indeed can be*, love God with all the heart, mind, soul and strength? But wherein lies its disability? Simply in its condition of enmity against God, *i. e.* its sin. The inability of the unrenewed soul is its sin. God requires nothing which we could not perform, if our sin did not disable us. Our sinful lusts enslave us. Are they their own excuse? or do they excuse the non-performance of duties to which we should be adequate without them, or do they annul God's right to command the discharge of such duties?

This inability which all Christendom asserts in its creeds, its literature, and still more strongly in its devotions, is simply the inability of sin to conquer and extirpate itself. Of this inability every awakened man is intimately conscious. And he is no less conscious that he is culpable just in proportion to the rooted, invincible strength of his sinful lusts. Dr. Taylor is good authority for the principle that speculation weighs nothing against consciousness. But it is claimed that man is conscious

of power to will either way as he pleases. This is not denied. But sin lies deeper in the soul than these merely phenomenal acts of what is here called will, even in the covetings, the lusts, desires of the flesh and the mind—the HEART. Who does not know that he cannot expel or mortify the deceitful lusts of his soul, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, covetousness, ambition, wordliness, ungodliness, by merely willing to do it? that when he *would* do good evil is present with him? Who does not know that he cannot, by a mere act of will, or by any power within himself, or by any resource short of supernatural grace, fill his soul with faith, love, hope and joy in God? But what Christian is insensible that he ought to have these feelings and affections, and that it is his sin to be partially or wholly destitute of them? That the affections and desires are not immediately under the control of the will is indeed admitted by Dr. Taylor himself. Speaking of other objects besides God, he says, “man cannot extinguish all affection in his heart for each and all of them.” Vol. ii. p. 192. Indeed, his whole theory of the will implies its inability to overcome and extinguish that “self-love or desire of happiness,” which he maintains prompts and determines all voluntary action. But it may be said that these affections, which it cannot suppress, are innocent. That is another matter. Still it proves none the less the impotence of the will to control the affections, and the certainty that the affections—the deeper seat of moral character, as we maintain—control the will. Let one whose soul cleaveth to the dust, will that his affections shall be set on things above. Does this volition set them there, *propriis viribus*?

Dr. Taylor, however, represents all the appetencies of the soul which are not acts or products of will in the narrow sense of a power of choosing between two objects, as “constitutional susceptibilities” to good from different objects, in themselves void of moral character. Accordingly he says, “if it be said that God in regeneration gives man *the power* to will morally right, or to obey, or produces some other constitutional change in the mind, called a *new taste* or *relish*, diverse from right moral action; I answer, that to create any new mental power or property, is not to produce a new moral character, nor that which necessarily ensures such a character; that such

a change in man is never taught in the Scriptures; and further, the Scriptures have not only never taught that man is unable to do his duty perfectly, *i. e.* to act morally right, but the contrary, in the express terms of the divine law," etc. Vol. ii. p. 21. We regret that this, and all else that we have quoted from the first thirty pages of the second volume, is from a lecture, written as the editor informs us, only six months before his death. The words taste and relish were used by Dr. Dwight and some others to denote what has been commonly indicated by disposition, principle, habit, or by affection and inclination. But they are in no sense "constitutional." It is, no doubt, a property of the human constitution to have some tastes or dispositions. But their being towards good or evil, holiness or sin, God or the world, is not "constitutional." Human nature—the human constitution—remains in its essential properties and faculties, whether any given dispositions which are accidents of it, be present or absent. And is it to be seriously maintained by a Christian theologian, that no such relish, taste, or disposition is wrought in the soul by the Holy Ghost in regeneration, disposing and empowering it to holy exercises, of affection and of choice? On what pretext can it be denied, in the face of those manifold declarations of Scripture, which speak of God's giving, creating a new heart, shedding abroad his love in the heart by the Holy Ghost, of his quickening those dead in trespasses and sins; of our being his workmanship, created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works; of our being born of God, born of the Spirit, etc.? Do not these and innumerable other passages assert a work of God's Spirit in the soul, disposing and enabling it to obey the gospel? It is to no purpose to say, as our author does, that regeneration is a moral change, and therefore must be an act of the will of the subject of it; that the love of God shed abroad in the heart is an act of the person loving, that if God works in us to will and to do, we will and do. Pp. 20, 21. That there cannot be a change in our moral state which is not an act of our own will is the very thing to be proved, not taken for granted. That we love is true; but this is in consequence of God's putting in us the disposition or heart to love. And we will and do what is pleasing to him, when he works in us that disposition

which inclines and enables us thereunto. The truth is, Dr. Taylor and his adherents persistently confound regeneration and conversion—the work of God renewing the soul with the act of man, flowing from this renovated state, in which he believes, repents, turns to God, and does works meet for repentance. Surely when men are turned they repent. When God gives faith, they believe. When he begets them unto a lively hope, they rejoice in hope. This is something far higher than Dr. Taylor represents it—“no other than a change by a sinful moral being, of his own moral character.” P. 22. Nor is it, as he would have us understand, “to transform the trees of the forest, or the stones of the street, into moral agents; or to change the physical properties, or physical laws of things created—things, including man himself, pronounced by their Creator to be very good.” P. 23. Such language exposes nothing but its author’s ignorance of orthodox doctrine. It is not trees or stones, upon which God puts forth this “working of his mighty power,” but rational, voluntary, sinful, immortal men. Nor does he make them herein moral agents. They are such already, although “corrupt according to deceitful lusts.” Nor are the physical, or other laws of man’s being changed. This change, though supernatural, is not a miracle contravening the laws of nature; it is wrought in harmony with the laws of our corporeal and spiritual, our rational and voluntary nature. Much less does it change aught that God pronounced very good. It simply eliminates the corruption and blight with which man’s sin has degraded and deformed that which God pronounced very good. It does not create new “constitutional” faculties which did not before exist—faculties of intellect, sensibility or will, in which sense Dr. Taylor often uses the word “power”—but it removes the moral vitiosity, which disorders and depraves the action of these faculties, whereby they are “indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good.”

Truth is very apt to assert itself even in the thought and speech of those who impugn it. The doctrine of the church has been that sin is self-perpetuating. “He that committeth sin is the servant of sin,” and can only be liberated from his bondage, even though it be a willing bondage, by Divine grace.

Dr. Taylor describes the "selfish preference," as "alike ceaseless in its activity and duration." Vol. i. p. 28. He maintains that the moral agent is called upon "to choose God, or an inferior good as his portion *once for all*. The transgressor does in his first act of sin become *ipso facto*, an eternal rebel against God." Vol. ii. pp. 230, 231. Again: "It is true indeed, that the natural man, the man enthralled by grovelling appetite and passion, discerneth not the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them. Such a man under such a mental tyranny, must be a miserable interpreter of the lively oracles of God. His very intellect, by the bad dominion of this state of mind, is not only unfurnished with the first principles, the very elements of successful interpretation, but is stupefied and cramped as to all vigorous action on such subjects. The soul's constitutional discernment is peculiarly blunted in respect to the beauty, and weight, and excellence of Divine realities, and disqualified for that perception which is necessary to give them their practical influence. In this state of sinful enthrallment, the man cannot appreciate, nor apprehend, nor successfully judge of the things of God's revelation." *Ib.* p. 216. To our view, there is more of vital truth in this simple statement than in all the rest of his toilsome reasonings about ability. We only wonder at his life-long efforts to rear a fabric which he so unceremoniously strikes down at a single blow.

Of course, the denial of native sinfulness and of all sin, until the age of developed moral agency, when the moral agent can see the consequences of his act to the happiness or misery of sentient being, is implied in the theories we have been considering. But as this topic is not emphasised or elaborated in these volumes, we omit specific comment upon it.

On no subject is Dr. Taylor more earnest or denunciatory of standard theologians, than atonement, justification, and connected topics. We have already seen features of his ethical system, which must of themselves undermine the doctrine of the church on this subject. If there is no good but happiness and the means thereof, no evil but misery and the means thereof; if holiness has no intrinsic desert of approbation and favour, and sin no intrinsic demerit; if God's moral government is administered solely for the purpose of accomplishing

the highest happiness of the universe, requiring obedience and prohibiting disobedience, solely as a means to this end; if the innocent, without their own consent, and the guilty might rightly be made to change places as to reward and punishment, provided this would enhance the happiness of the sentient universe; if justice is only a specific form of benevolence; of course, the very fundamental ideas on which the received doctrine in regard to Christ's atonement rest, and by which alone it can be explained, are utterly subverted.

We have no space for a minute examination of Dr. Taylor's positions on this subject. His theory, with some modifications, is the governmental scheme introduced by the younger Edwards. The distinctive characteristic of this scheme is, that it treats the atonement exclusively as a device of state, to render the pardon of penitent believers consistent with the authority of law, and the highest happiness of the universe, and not at all as a provision required by the inherent turpitude and ill-desert of sin in discharge of the demand of justice, and the threatening of the law. The scheme is reasoned out mostly on the principles which underlie human governments, between which and the government of the infinite God there is a partial analogy, and, at the same time, an immense difference. The very idea of satisfaction for sin seems abhorrent to Dr. Taylor, and he devotes pages to the denunciation of it, or rather to a figment of his own imagination than to any recognized idea which this term is employed to indicate. He reasons that the claim of the law is obedience, and that this can never be satisfied in case of disobedience. "It is inconceivable and impossible, that a perfectly benevolent lawgiver should be *satisfied* with sin, and with the infliction of the legal penalty on transgressors, as a substitute for their perfect obedience and consequent perfect blessedness." Vol. ii. p. 141. Is it really necessary to say, that it is no part of the doctrine of satisfaction that God is satisfied with sin? It is because he abhors it, that when it is committed the very rectitude of his nature impels him to manifest that abhorrence by visiting upon it its proper deserts of indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish. If it go unpunished, if it be treated like innocence and virtue, our intuitive judgment is that injustice is done, that there is a lesion in the moral

system, a derangement of moral relations. The criminality of sin, of course, cannot be obliterated. The only possible compensation or reparation of the evil of it is punishment. This justice demands. Without it, it is unsatisfied. So the law—the articulate expression of eternal justice—is not satisfied with sin; but if sin be committed, it is unsatisfied without the infliction of the penalty it denounces. This punishment the sinner owes to the law and justice of God, to him and his kingdom wronged by his sin. So it is due *from* him. He deserves it. So it is *to* him. The claim of justice is satisfied with its infliction, and with nothing else, certainly not with the sin which deserves it. So it is styled a debt, *i. e.* a thing due. Satisfaction in this sense is rendered when this penalty is discharged, either by the offender or a satisfactory substitute. These conceptions harmonize with the representations of Scripture. It tells us of every transgression receiving its just *recompense of reward*, Heb. ii. 2; that it is a righteous thing in God to *recompense* tribulation to them that trouble his people, 2 Thess. i. 6; that he will recompense; that he will repay fury to his enemies, Isa. lix. 18; vengeance is mine, I will *repay*, saith the Lord, Rom. xii. 19. If such language does not import the intrinsic ill-desert of sin, and that God will visit upon it the penal recompense which is its due, then it seems to us impossible for language to express these ideas.

Consonant with this is the constant representation in the Scriptures of the effect and intent of Christ's death. They tell us that he suffered the just for the unjust; that for the transgression of God's people he was stricken; that he bare our sins, and became sin and a curse for us; that he purchased, redeemed, ransomed us with his own blood. If these phrases do not import that he bore the punishment, and discharged the obligation to, or debt of suffering, which our sin had incurred, then how can language do it? And why did he this? "That God might be JUST, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Dr. Taylor allows himself to say more than once, that the punishment of sin on account of its intrinsic demerit, or for any purpose except the promotion of happiness, is "beyond the capacity of infernal malice." Vol. ii. p. 278. And is it "more than infernal malice" to render to sin its just

recompense of reward? If it be wicked to punish sin for its intrinsic demerit, can it be right to punish it for the public good—to do that which is in itself evil, that good may come?

But not only does Dr. Taylor say that God cannot be satisfied with sin, which, in the sense of approving it, we know to be impossible; he indicates that God cannot be “satisfied with such results of a moral government,” as are finally developed under the present administration; that sin “impairs his blessedness,” that he has been “crossed and thwarted in this highest, greatest design by sin.” *Ib.* pp. 142, 146, 147. We shrink from this limitation of the power and blessedness of God. Our God hath done whatsoever he pleased—his counsel shall stand and he will do all his pleasure. Even the Eternal Son, after all the crying and tears of his earthly agony, shall see of the travail of his soul and be SATISFIED. He is blessed over all, for ever. Even to dwell at his right hand, is to receive the fulness of joy evermore. What! are the grasshoppers of earth, the nations that are less than nothing and vanity, to thwart the designs and impair the blessedness of their Maker? Is this the God of the Bible, and our God?

Dr. Taylor thus portrays the orthodox scheme of atonement and justification:

“It maintains that God, in his sovereign supremacy and right, constitutes a mystical union between Christ and the elect whereby they are *one moral person!* That in consequence of this constituted union, God imputes the sins of the elect to Christ, and in his sufferings and death inflicts the legal penalty of their sins on him; that he also imputes the righteousness of Christ to them; that by these acts of imputation and mystical union, the sins of the elect become as really the sins of Christ as if he had committed them, and the righteousness and obedience of Christ become as really the righteousness and obedience of the elect, as had they rendered it; that thus every justified sinner is regarded, and considered and treated, not merely *as if he-had*, but as having really and truly—in *re ipsa*—in his own person never sinned, but perfectly obeyed the divine law; and thus every justified sinner having in actual verity fully met and satisfied and sustained every claim of law

and justice, can *meritoriously* claim, before God, justification and eternal life." Vol. ii. pp. 155, 156.

Dr. Taylor is unsparing in his invectives against the scheme above misstated. He speaks of "sovereign acts of necromancy, called constituting a mystical union, imputation," p. 173; of "the mystical absurdity of imputing and thereby making the righteousness or obedience of one subject of law, which could only satisfy the claim of law on himself, the righteousness or obedience of others," p. 144; of its making "known phantasms realities, and known realities phantasms." "Can an all-perfect lawgiver by sovereign prerogative make eternal truth falsehood, and eternal falsehood truth? Can he by sheer despotic authority set at defiance, transmute, abolish every principle of eternal immutable rectitude, and substitute its opposite in the actual administration of his government? Can he by his mere *sic volo* make myriads of beings one being, and yet each to retain his personal individuality—make one perfectly holy being to *deserve* the legal penalty due only to these sinful myriads, and make these sinful myriads perfectly righteous by the perfect righteousness of one, regard such an exploit and its effects as a reality, proceed to adjudicate the retributions of eternity on the basis of such transmutations, and yet reign in the glory of his justice and in the majesty of his authority?"

"Some may think that to ascribe such views and opinions to wise and good men requires an apology . . . I have no apology to make for these representations, except my own full conviction of their truth." Pp. 160, 161. By these weapons, and the stereotyped cavil that if the penalty of sin be discharged by Christ, there is no grace in the forgiveness of the sinner, twisted into manifold forms, and hurled with remorseless violence at the explicitly enounced doctrine of the symbols of the church, and as we think may be easily shown, of Scripture—the mystical union of believers with Christ, the imputation of his righteousness to them and of their sins to him are assailed. Our principal object is to show Dr. Taylor's attitude and animus unmistakably. While an entire article or volume might easily be written in reply to his extended arguments, our limits constrain us to the briefest possible refutation. This

will be for the most part accomplished by correcting his misrepresentations of the scheme on which he heaps such unmeasured obloquy.

1. He says that the mystical union he opposes makes Christ and believers "one moral person." If this phrase is used literally, the word *moral* is a pleonasm. A person *ex vi termini* is a moral being. But what is charged is that "mystical union" involves the contradiction that a plurality of persons are made numerically one person. What author or authors may have represented Christ and his people to be one person we know not—although we recollect some phrases quite analogous in Crisp and other Antinomian extremists—but we do not now remember such phrasology in standard divines or confessions. If used at all, by standard theologians, it is used in a metaphorical not a literal sense—a use for which we have the authority of Dr. Taylor himself, in an analogous but much weaker case of mutual relationship. He says, "as a matter of convenience in the use of language, we may conceive of the public or a community as a moral person." Vol. ii. p. 266. Surely no Christian will deny that the union between Christ and his people is more intimate and profound than that between the members of a civil community. And suppose that the advocates of mystical union had been unfortunate in their illustrations, is this more than what often happens with regard to important truths, or does it in any manner impair the overwhelming proofs of such union? There is not merely the natural union in that he took part of our nature of flesh and blood, and is our brother; not merely the federal union whereby he stipulates for us as our surety and with us that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish but have everlasting life; there is the mystical union constituted by the Holy Spirit, which dwelt in him without measure, dwelling in and vitalizing his people with a spiritual life, common to him and them, so that he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit: Christ is our life; he liveth in us; we are quickened together with him; he is the vine, we are the branches; he the head and we his body, yea, members of his body, his flesh and his bones. One form in which it is shadowed forth, is the marvellous union of husband and wife, whereby, "they two become one flesh." Let those who will,

stigmatize this mystical union between Christ and his church as a "mystical absurdity." It is the well-spring of our salvation and the life of our life. To us it is a great mystery. We speak concerning Christ and his church. Eph. v. 32.

2. Dr. Taylor sets forth that imputation implies that the "sins of the elect become the sins of Christ as really as had he committed them," and in like manner the righteousness and obedience of Christ become those of the elect. This language may mean more or less. But it is fitted and probably designed to convey the impression that imputation implies the contradiction that the moral acts and dispositions, whether good or evil, of one person, become those of another person; or are regarded and considered as those of another person, inherently. Now is it necessary to iterate for the thousandth time, that imputation means to reckon to the account, as a ground of judgment and treatment, not the transfer or infusion of personal qualities? Let any one examine his Bible from beginning to end, and he will find that the word *impute* always has and must have this meaning, and the words translated impute, are sometimes translated by the equivalent terms, "count," "reckon to the account of." "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Does not "impute" here speak its own meaning, which is not to transfer or infuse, but reckon to the account of? "The blessedness of the man unto whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works." Does this mean the communication of inherent righteousness? Or does it not mean, most indubitably, reckon righteousness to his account as a basis of judicial treatment? Whose or what righteousness? The man's own? How then can it be without works? Is it no righteousness at all? This is the contrary of what is affirmed. What is it then but the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and upon all them that believe—that obedience of one by which many are made righteous? That righteousness of one which is to all men (who believe) for justification of life? This does not make his righteousness ours, morally or inherently; but ours only in its title to reward, or as a ground of justification. As well might it be said, when a surety pays the debt of his principal, either that the money with which it is discharged is the money of the principal, or

that it is not counted to him as a discharge of his debt; or that when a father pays a fine which his son has incurred by crime, and procures his discharge, the son really paid it, because it is reckoned to his account as if he had paid it; that thus "known phantasms are made realities, and known realities are made phantasms." Imputation in the above sense is plainly and undeniably taught in the Scriptures, word and thing. In this sense and no other, it is taught in our Protestant confessions, and by standard theologians. In this sense *the thing* enters into the faith, the spiritual life of the church, and is the foundation of her hope, whatever may become of the word. With a grief which we cannot express do we find the teachers of the teachers in Israel tasking powers worthy of a nobler service, to impugn and defame it.

And the demonstration from Scripture in regard to the imputation of the sins of believers to Christ is no less cogent. It is certain that he bare the sins of many; that knowing no sin he became sin for us; that on him was laid the iniquity of us all. How? By becoming morally sinful, or having our sins transfused into him, so that he partook of their moral taint and pollution? This will not be said. How then, unless they were reckoned to his account as a ground of his bearing their penalty in our place? Is it said this is unjust? So it would be, unless done with his full and free consent. Is it said, as Dr. Taylor maintains, that it is even then unjust to punish him as ill-deserving? So it would be, if he were punished as morally ill-deserving. But if he assumes to himself voluntarily another's just obligation to punishment, out of love to him, what then? Or if this be assailed as unjust, what shall be said of the scheme substituted in its place, wherein all this fearful anguish, at which earth shuddered and the heavens darkened, was inflicted without regard to any sin inherent or imputed? If that is injustice, is not this the climax of injustice? But we cannot follow these tortuous cavils. The controversy is not with us, but with the word of God. Thither we remand the adversaries of imputed righteousness. Besides, whoever else may offer the old Socinian objection, that in this scheme innocence and sin change places, it is not for those who maintain the doctrine of expediency; who ask, as we have

already seen, and in a way which implies the absence of doubt, if "absolute and universal misery would follow, unless the innocent were to be punished, would it not be right to make innocence, now become the true and necessary cause of such results, the ground of punishment?" And are such theologians to charge the doctrine that Christ suffered penally, as voluntarily standing in the law-place of his people, and for their sins as having taken them upon himself, with confounding moral distinctions?

It will be said by some, that this explanation of imputation assimilates it essentially with the views of those who deny it, since they hold that sinners are treated as if they were righteous for Christ's sake. But the ground of the treatment is very different in the two cases. Imputed righteousness is quite different from mere putative or imaginary righteousness. It is a real righteousness reckoned to us, of which we have the eternal benefit. Trusting in this, we build on a sure foundation. On this our salvation rests secure without infringement of the law, justice, or holiness of God, but supported by these as well as by his love and mercy. In the other case, it is founded neither on our own righteousness, nor the righteousness of another imputed to us. It is in conflict with the law and justice of God which are both unsatisfied. In the one, mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other. In the other we have the mercy and the peace, but where is the truth and the righteousness? But can there be a doubt, which sets the strongest foundations of mercy and peace, or to which a trembling sinner will most joyfully commit his perishing soul?

As to the objection, that if justice is satisfied, there is no grace in the sinner's pardon, put in endless forms, it has been answered a thousand times. It was mercy that provided a ransom for him, so that he could be saved without infringement of justice. Is it any the less mercy, because at a stupendous sacrifice it saves its object, without compromising the perfections, the law, the glory of God? Although it becomes righteous and just in God, to exercise forgiving mercy towards those for whom Christ has purchased it, and to whose faith he has stipulated it; is God any the less gracious because he is just,

while he justifieth him that believeth in Jesus? Is grace any the less grace because it "reigns through righteousness?" On this subject it is enough to quote from a document once, if not now required to be subscribed by the Professor of Theology in Yale College, a passage, nearly every sentence of which expresses what is vigorously impugned in these volumes: "Christ by his obedience and death did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did by the sacrifice of himself in the blood of his cross, undergoing in their stead the penalty due unto them, make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to God's justice in their behalf; yet inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners." *Confession of Faith of the Churches of Connecticut, adopted at Saybrook, A. D. 1708*, chap. xi. 3.

Here the whole Deity is known,  
Nor dares a creature guess,  
Which of the glories brightest shone,  
The justice or the grace.

Dr. Taylor objects to this scheme, that according to it "the sinner can *meritoriously* claim before God, justification and eternal life." On the strength of whose merits? His own? Never. It is the merits of Christ then. Can any but a Socinian fairly complain of this? Or will any evangelical theologian venture to do it? But it is a "claim." How, and in what sense? Is it anything else than a claim founded on the merits of Christ, and in view thereof warranted to every believer by the infallible promise of God? And may not we poor sinners "lay this humble claim" for the salvation of Christ? If we may not, then wo is us—we are for ever without hope!

And what does Dr. Taylor give us as a refuge from sin, and the curse, in place of the strong tower which he would demolish? In order to escape the judicial relations of Christ's atonement, and consequent imputation, much of the second volume is devoted to proving that the law of God is a "rule of action

but not of judgment." What sort of a law is that which is not a rule of judgment? Is it any law at all, or mere advice? Says Dr. Taylor, "any view of God's sovereignty, of mystical union, of imputation or atonement, which separates from God's perfect law, its penal sanction in respect to a transgressor, annihilates that law for the transgressor's benefit." Vol. ii. p. 172. What hope then remains for the transgressor, unless that penalty can be discharged by an Almighty substitute and surety? This and all other merely governmental schemes say that Christ's sufferings serve the same purpose in the support of law and government, which would be answered by the eternal punishment of penitent believers; and that hence the sin of the latter can be remitted. But does not this separate "God's perfect law from its penal sanction in respect to the transgressor?" And how do Christ's sufferings sustain the violated law, unless they vicariously discharge the justified sinner's obligations to the law? The "absurdities and contradictions" of every kind, which Dr. Taylor so lavishly charges upon the church theology, find their true home and birth-place in his own.

There are various other eccentric theories advanced by Dr. Taylor, which appear to be maintained chiefly for the purpose of giving consistency to his cardinal doctrine, that benevolence as the means of promoting happiness is the only virtue; and that the penalty of endless punishment for sin is defensible, because benevolence requires the visitation of the highest possible misery upon sin as the antagonist of the greatest happiness. Nothing less would prove God's benevolence; hence his fitness to reign; hence prove his authority and establish his government. Punishment, we are taught, consists exclusively in natural evil or suffering, and the utmost possible degree of it. Vol. i. p. 160, *et seq.* Therefore spiritual death is not penal. Neither is temporal death, even under a legal dispensation, except as it is a beginning and constituent part of eternal wo. Vol. ii. p. 225, *et seq.* A long disquisition is written to show that no civil punishment except death is a legal sanction. P. 367, *et seq.* The robber who is punished, but not capitally, "is considered and treated as essentially an obedient subject. He is not considered as actuated by a

principle hostile to the welfare and existence of the state, nor as disobedient to the supreme law of the state. P. 377. The only degrees of punishment which this system admits, result from the varying capacity of the subject, not from variations in the positive infliction of penalty proportioned to varying demerit. Vol. i. p. 163.

These and other like crudities ground out by subtle logic from one-sided premises, we must leave to dispose of themselves. It is this process of twisting familiar words and phrases, which bear an established and recognized meaning, to be the vehicles of his peculiar philosophy, which has caused much of the difficulty and embarrassment felt by so many in understanding Dr. Taylor's system. The words justice, due, right, wrong, penalty, legal sanction, good, etc., are illustrations of this, some of them being subjected to an elaborate process of this kind. The difficulty did not arise from any studied reticency, or politic reserve, or from his having an esoteric as distinguished from his exoteric system. Our quotations show, what was so evident to all who knew him, that he was perfectly frank and out-spoken in his opinions. There is no difficulty in understanding his system, for those who are capable of apprehending tenuous distinctions and abstract trains of thought.

We think the foregoing analysis of his system makes it sufficiently evident, why, since it first flowered out in a sudden promise of triumph, it has been steadily withering and dying out of the theological life of our country. As an antidote to the rationalistic revolt of Universalists, Unitarians, and unbelievers generally, against the gospel of God, it is itself too rationalistic. It concedes too much, and endorses too many of their objections to the evangelical system. Instead of disarming them, it puts weapons into their armoury. Rationalism will not yield to a lower potency of itself. It rather feels itself endorsed and largely invigorated by the new theology, and instead of conceding to it, boasts of it as a substantial victory.\*

Apologetics constitute an important side of theology. Still, they are only its outworks. Their proper function is to show that the Bible is the word of God, and as such, entitled to im-

\* See Ellis' Half-century of the Unitarian Controversy.

PLICIT faith and obedience. It may also very properly be shown, that what is thus revealed, is worthy of God, and suited to man. But when we proceed as if we were bound to dispose of all philosophic and sceptical cavils, till the rationalistic mind of unbelief is satisfied, and to rationalize the gospel till this result is achieved, we attempt what is a sheer impossibility, unless we explain away the Gospel itself. We let ourselves down from the high vantage ground of speaking by divine authority, truth which commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God, to the level of mere disputants with the sceptical understanding, which will never want the sagacity to put questions a great deal faster than any body can answer them. Instead of conquering opposition by the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, piercing the heart and conscience of adversaries, we lay aside our divine armour, and go to making terms with them in their own way. The dilutions and modifications of the clear teachings of Scripture, for the purpose of conciliating sceptics, have often emasculated it and invigorated them. When divines sink the authoritative in the apologetic aspect of Christianity, nothing is gained; much is lost. We may well ask in regard to some of these attempts, that "Christianity be defended from its defenders."

This system has been steadily losing ground among evangelical Christians, because it rationalizes some of the first moral truths and Christian doctrines into forms that antagonize with the moral and Christian consciousness. This has been all the more so, as the precise points of collision between this system and the older theology have come to be more fully developed, defined and apprehended in this consciousness. The resolving all good, all right, into happiness and the means thereof, and all our inward impulses to action ultimately into self-love, contradicts, and even nauseates, not merely the Christian, but the moral consciousness. The assertion of plenary ability, the denial of any inability which is not innocent, conflicts with the most constant and intimate experience of the Christian, and with manifold representations of the word of God, which are written, sealed, witnessed on the heart, in that experience. The notion that creatures, by virtue of moral agency are, or are liable to be an overmatch for the Almighty, shocks every

reverent feeling, and unsettles the very foundations of confidence in the stability of his throne, and the security of his people and kingdom. The pillars of heaven tremble. The Christian knows that the roots of his sin and of his spiritual life strike deeper than the mere choices of the will, into the desires, covetings, affections and latent dispositions of his soul; and that all achievements of his mere power of choice are perfunctory and unreliable. And he knows that it is in a Saviour who has borne our sins, and taken their curse upon him, in whose righteousness he can stand, and in whose life, by mysterious union to him, he lives, he has peace, hope, holiness and strength,—the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Ingenious tirades and hair-splitting cavils against mystical union and imputation are constantly losing the respect of Christian people. We anticipate, therefore, that the publication of these lectures will accelerate and consummate the downfall of the peculiar system they advocate. We say this in no disparagement of their power, acuteness, and even eloquence. They show all these in a degré even unexpected. It is not because they lack ability fully commensurate with the author's fame, but because they reveal clearly and beyond a peradventure what his system is. That system clearly apprehended, the church never has accepted, and never will accept. These volumes will justify, confirm and invigorate the immovable opposition which has so long and decisively arrayed itself against Taylorism.

Much more it is in our hearts to say on this subject, but stern necessity forbids. We will only add, that there are many passages in these lectures in the line of practical application, which are not only highly eloquent, but just. Some of these are majestic and alluring representations of the love of God, fitted to soften hearts of stone. Even in these we miss that fulness of Christ, which wells up from the theology he rejects. They are mostly, however, passages directed to Deists, Universalists, and godless philanthropists, who feign for themselves a God too tenderly benevolent to punish sin, and who ignore or repudiate judgment and eternal retributions. Much sentimentalism and "rose-water philanthropy," are exposed with graphic power, and rebuked with indignant eloquence.

The terrors of the Lord, with other lines of moving appeal, are arrayed with power before the ungodly and thoughtless. It would give us pleasure, if we had room, to transfer some of these passages to our pages. But they are passages having no special relation to his philosophic or theological peculiarities. They would at least, be quite as fully developed from the system he impugns. They are not the new things which are not true; but the true things which are not new. To these we could wish he had devoted himself, instead of developing a new philosophy of moral government by which to explain them. Here lies the fountal source of his errors. And so must it ever be with our human excellency of speech or wisdom. One word which the Holy Ghost speaketh, one ray of divine light shot by him into our sin-darkened souls, is worth more than all that wisdom by which the world never knew God.

We have believed, therefore have we spoken; plainly indeed, but with all that respect for the dead which is consistent with fidelity to the living, and to that, in our view, inestimably precious truth which is attacked in these pages as our readers have seen, in no soft or honeyed phrase. Dr. Taylor has passed beyond these conflicts, and is not under our review. His works are now given to the public for the purpose of moulding its opinions. They are of course on the same footing as other publications, amenable to the bar of impartial and faithful criticism. They compel the defence of what they assail.

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ART. V.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly met, agreeably to appointment, in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 19th, and in the absence of the Rev. Dr. Scott, the Moderator of the preceding Assembly, the Rev. Nathan Rice, D. D., was, on motion of Dr. McGill, chosen to preach the opening sermon, and to preside until a Moderator be chosen. Dr. Rice preached from 2 Cor. v. 7, "We walk by faith, not by sight."

The Stated Clerk reported, that he had received official