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ARTICLE I.—*Weissagung und Erfüllung im Alten und im Neuen Testamente.* Ein theologischer versuch von Dr. J. CHR. K. HOFMANN, Prof. Theol. in Erlangen. 8vo. pp. 362 and 386.

THIS work, which was published rather more than thirteen years ago, has been several times referred to in our columns. But its influence upon the opinions of an important class of continental scholars has been such, that we shall render, we doubt not, an acceptable service to our readers by presenting them with a summary of its contents. It should be distinctly stated in advance, that with whatever faults these volumes may be chargeable, they are free from all complicity with the principles or results of a sceptical criticism, which is upon proper occasions scored in a very wholesome way. Hofmann's aspirations after novelty have taken quite a different turn from this. The literal truth of the sacred narrative is everywhere adhered to, as opposed to all mythical conceits and legendary exaggerations. The integrity and genuineness of all the inspired writings, and in all their parts, are strenuously asserted, and the date to which unvarying tradition assigns them is unhesitatingly received. When even such men as Kurtz and Delitzsch have yielded to the torrent, it is deserving of commendatory mention that Hofmann should stand firm. While

in the Theological Seminary of his Church for years, at Canonsburg, having generally about twenty students; and at the same time pastor of a large congregation, and Professor of Hebrew in Jefferson College. He was a man of primitive simplicity, conscientiousness and self-denial, along with uncommon acuteness and profound acquaintance with human nature, as well as theological lore. He was very much like our own Dr. A. Alexander, except in the power of eloquence, and the extent of acquirements.

ART. V.—*Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will.* By JOSEPH HAVEN, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1857.

WE have before signified our high appreciation of this work, as to its general characteristics. Altogether, it is in advance of the manuals for elementary instruction in this department, which have been given to the public. By this we mean, that it has merits not found in its predecessors, while its faults are for the most part still more glaring in most other works of this sort. It consists of two principal parts, which, by the Scotch writers, and often by others, are dealt with in separate treatises. The first treats of the cognitive, the second, of the active and moral powers; the former terminating in knowledge, and having for their object the true; the latter terminating in action, and having for their object the good. Two faculties, taste and conscience, being both cognitive and emotional, overlap both departments. In his classification of the intellectual powers, Professor Haven is quite felicitous; and in this, as well as his analysis of the faculties and operations of the intellect in detail, he turns to good account most that is valuable in the discussions and suggestions of recent writers, American and European. Indeed, he sometimes goes too far in citing opinions from late authors, that have little importance, except what they derive from his sanction or refutation of them. The

style is simple, clear, and animated, fitted not only to instruct, but to please the learner; in happy contrast to many works in this department. Difficult points are elucidated by apt illustrations. The whole is divided into chapters, sections, and paragraphs, with appropriate titles, greatly facilitating the labours of teacher and learner. With this high estimate of the work as a whole, we now call attention to a few of the more important points of doctrine or opinion, in which we dissent from it. These chiefly refer to the second part, relative to the will and affections.

Although the author decisively distinguishes psychology from metaphysics, he neglects to define their respective spheres, and to show clearly where they diverge, and where they intermingle. The chapter on reasoning seems to us to go further into the technicalities of logic than is requisite for developing the nature of reasoning as a psychological process, and too meagre to amount to an adequate and satisfactory system of logic, especially for the instruction of beginners. There should have been more or less of it. He adopts the doctrine of Mill, that "every deduction implies a previous induction," p. 217. "Each is a perfectly valid method of reasoning, and each is, in itself, a distinct and valid kind of syllogism. Each requires the other. The deductive is wholly dependent on the inductive for its major premise, which is only the conclusion of a previous induction; while, on the other hand, the induction is chiefly valuable as preparing the way for a subsequent deduction," p. 209.

In our judgment, all this is utterly erroneous. So far from every deduction being founded on a previous induction for its major premise, every induction is a form of deduction. Induction is reasoning from particulars to generals; deducing general laws from particular instances in which such laws have been found operative. Why do we judge horned animals to be ruminant? Because they have been found so in all known instances. But how does this prove that it will be so in the innumerable instances not known to us? Why does the child once burnt dread the fire, believing that a second touch will give pain like the first? Is it not from a belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature, or that what has occurred once, will, in like circumstances, occur again? So Professor Haven signifies, p. 217.

Has the conclusion in these or other cases of induction any greater certainty than this *a priori* fundamental law of human belief? If we find, in such experiments as we make, that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, this constitutes the minor premise of a syllogism, of which the proposition that the laws of nature are uniform is the major. The conclusion that all water is composed of these gases, is just as certain as this major premise, and no more so. But in the case of the child above referred to, is this premise an induction from previous particulars, or can it be? Induction is therefore only a form of deductive reasoning—with the major premise usually suppressed, always implied. If it were not so, then no particulars could ever warrant any conclusion, or lead to any law more extensive than themselves. Nor is this view invalidated by Hamilton's fundamental canon of the inductive syllogism, that it goes from parts to the whole constituted by them. If it did no more than this, it would reach no whole more extensive than those parts, i. e. the sum of the particular instances observed. If induction does no more than this, it does nothing to any purpose. But it does more than this—just as much as is warranted by that major premise before spoken of, which renders it essentially deductive.

But aside from this, there is a class of intuitive *a priori* truths which form the original premises, on which all reasoning ultimately rests. That a proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true, and that one of them must be true; that action implies an agent; thinking, a thinker; events, a cause; qualities, a substance, &c., are not inductive conclusions. They are the necessary intuitive truths from which all reasoning originally proceeds, and without which it is but a chain without a staple. But on this point, there is the less need of argument, as we can cite our author against himself. He says, "all science and all reasoning depend ultimately on certain first truths, or principles, not learned by experience, but prior to it, the evidence and certainty of which lie back of all reasoning and all experience. Take away these elementary truths, and neither science nor reasoning is longer possible, for want of a beginning and foundation. Every proposition which carries evidence with it, either contains that evidence in itself, or de-

rives it from some other proposition on which it depends. And the same is true of this other proposition, and so on for ever, until we come, at last, to some proposition, which depends on no other, but is self-evident, a first truth or principle. Whence come these first principles? Not, of course, from experience, for they are involved in and essential to all experience. They are native, or *a priori* convictions of the mind, instinctive and intuitive judgments," pp. 238-9. How then are they inductive conclusions? The author's two positions on these points seem to us flatly contradictory. As the latter is demonstrably true, the former must be false.

Professor Haven teaches in one passage, p. 430, that the "feeling of the beautiful is the condition and source of our perception of the beautiful." This appears to us the reverse of the truth, and out of harmony with all else which he copiously and happily sets forth in regard to it. Nothing is more evident than that the agreeable feeling which arises in the mind in view of the beautiful, *is in view of it*, i. e. arises from the perception of it, and is otherwise impossible. It must be so, or the feeling is no longer a rational emotion, as our author justly represents it, but a mere blind, instinctive sensation. And by strict logical consequence, taste itself is no longer a faculty of intelligence, as he justly represents it, but a mere faculty of feeling, like the animal appetites. It is no answer to this to say, that the mind still judges in regard to these feelings and the objects which excite them. So it judges in regard to the sensations produced by sugar or aloes, and the objects which excite these sensations. But, in both cases alike, the sensation or feeling is the primary object or groundwork of its judgment. Intelligence differs from mere sentimentality, and rational from instinctive emotion, in just this, that in the one case cognition precedes and shapes the feeling, while in the other feeling precedes and shapes the cognition. The author has no difficulty in placing intellect and feeling in their due positions in the case of conscience. Indeed, his universal doctrine is, that "the intellect properly precedes the sensibility," p. 378. But his reasons for reversing them in the case of taste, apply equally well to that of conscience. On this account we deem the subject of considerable importance. The greatest evils result from

the theory which makes the moral and regal faculty a mere blind feeling, a theory which our author wholly repudiates. We confess, however, to a jealousy of all reasonings which furnish apparent premises for such a conclusion. The subject also has an important bearing upon the whole subject of spiritual illumination in regeneration. According to the view we oppose, men love God and divine things, before they behold their beauty and glory, and in order to behold them. They become beautiful and glorious in their eyes because they are first made to love them. But according to the scriptural, the evangelical, the true psychological view, the eyes of their understanding are enlightened so as to behold the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, in the order of nature, if not of time, before they can have right feelings in view of it. It is when their eyes see God, that they repent in dust and ashes. We know that we here run counter to a system of theology which has had great currency, and in which Professor Haven has doubtless been trained. It tends to exclude the intellect from complicity with our moral and spiritual states, and to limit these to feelings and volitions, chiefly to the latter. But the fact is, there can be no rational and responsible feelings or volitions which are not implicated with, and largely shaped by, the views of the intellect, and which do not in various ways react upon its views. It is one sentient intelligent mind which feels as it thinks, and thinks as it feels. But the understanding is the guiding faculty. This accords with the phraseology of Scripture and the testimony of experience. We wish to add, however, to prevent misconstruction, that the chapter on the idea of right, and the various questions connected with the nature of virtue and moral obligation, is highly satisfactory with reference to this most fundamental subject.

We thus come to that portion of the book which treats of the Moral and Active Powers—the sensibilities, including emotions, desires, and affections—and the will, together with conscience, or the moral faculty, which is both intellectual and emotional. With regard to the distinction between rational and instinctive emotions, we think it valid, but our author fails to draw any definite or reliable line of demarcation between them. He vaguely assigns the higher emotions to the former class, the

lower to the latter. The true distinction we apprehend to be, that the rational emotions or feelings arise in view of the apprehensions of the intellect. The animal and instinctive arise irrespective of any such intellectual excitation. Cheerfulness and melancholy, sorrow at the loss of friends, sympathy with the happiness and joy of others, which our author classes with instinctive, are awakened by the views taken by the understanding—just as much so as “emotions of joy or sadness arising from the contemplation of our own excellence, or the reverse,” which he ranks as rational emotions.

We pass to a far more important topic—the morality of the emotions, affections, and desires, which our author deals with most directly, in treating of resentment. Speaking of this, and, by parity of reason, of all feelings having reference to matters of moral obligation, he says, and says truly, “Within due limits, and on just occasions, it is a virtue; when it passes these limits, when it becomes excessive, or is uncalled for by the circumstances of the case, it becomes a vice,” p. 468. This is a good deliverance, and will endure all tests. Along with this, however, he adopts the maxim, which is current in most of our popular treatises on psychology and ethics, and for which he cites the authority of Reid and Chalmers, that “Nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary.” This maxim is true with a certain interpretation, and within due limits. Beyond this, and in the sense intended by most of these writers, it is false. It is true with regard to all external acts, all bodily movements. It is true with regard to all internal exercises, provided the word *voluntary* be extended, as it is in the popular sense of this maxim, so as to include the free and spontaneous outgoings of desire, affection, inclination, and also the habitual disposition of soul which prompts such exercises, with regard to things morally right or wrong. But it is not true, if the will be regarded as it is by most of these writers, as the mere faculty of choice or volition, the executive, perhaps, of the desires of the soul, but still distinct from desire, affection, inclination. The voice of unsophisticated men as surely pronounces the hidden dispositions, the desires and affections of the heart, whether determined by volition or not, whether natural, acquired, or gracious, with respect to moral

objects, to be morally good or evil, as that "nothing can be moral or immoral which is not voluntary." Therefore the common sense of men sanctions the latter principle only in a sense consistent with the former. The Bible surely condemns all inordinate affections and lawless covetings, from whatever cause they arise. Their merit or demerit is determined by their nature, not their origin. As Professor Haven says, "Within due limits and on just occasions, it is a virtue; when it passes these limits, when it becomes excessive, or is uncalled for, it is a vice." Take the very instance he selects. Suppose any one possessed of such a malign disposition, that without any volition, or even against his purpose, he breaks out into infuriate rage against another who has denied him some unreasonable request; suppose that he does so "instinctively," if thus you choose to call it, is he not blamable? Suppose one a "lover of good things," so that without volition or purpose his heart goes spontaneously towards good men and good works, is not this morally good? To deny this is going further in the line of vocating and confounding moral distinctions than many of those intend, who assert that the affections and desires have no moral character, further than as they are moulded by the action of a will distinct from themselves. For they are quite apt, when this theory is out of sight, to teach that the morality of the affections is determined by their nature rather than their origin. The bearings of all this upon the theological questions implicated with it, are too patent to require illustration. Some of the chief questions relative to the scope of regeneration, repentance, Christian experience, and human ability hinge upon it. And it is just at this point of ability that our author's mind appears to have been perplexed in regard to it. This is needless. For as we shall soon see, his views of the will, at the most, leave only a theoretical unavailable power over the affections. We deem it proper, however, to say, that though he falls into the mistake so common among writers on mental philosophy, especially the compilers of manuals for beginners on this subject, he is more guarded than most of them. The only manual for young students, that treats this whole subject satisfactorily, so far as we know, is the little work on Moral Science by the late Dr. Alexander. For one

thing not altogether alien from this subject, we especially thank Professor Haven. He denies that the "term natural is properly opposed to the term moral as designating distinct and opposite things," p. 390. Had this been kept in mind, the distinction between the faculties of the soul and their moral state would never have been indicated by the now nearly effete phrase, "natural and moral ability," which, in its day, was so pregnant with perplexity to good men, so convenient a refuge for Pelagians, and so fruitful both of logomachy and substantial controversy in the Church.

Our readers will look, with the greatest interest, after the author's views of the will, both from the intrinsic importance of the subject, and because they have already, to some extent, been made the subject of public discussion. This, in common with most modern writers, he distinguishes from all forms of mere desire or sensibility, and makes simply "the executive power of the mind," the power which it has "of determining or deciding what it will do, and of putting forth volitions accordingly." We may remark here, that even if this be taken for the normal idea of will, the extension of the term voluntary to the dispositions, desires, and affections, in common speech, admits of a ready explanation. For as the will acts in accordance with the dominant inclination of the soul, no act is voluntary which is not in accordance with the ruling desires.

The first question in regard to the will is not, whether it is free—this all admit—but wherein does its freedom consist? Some say that it consists in acting from indifference, independent of any bias or inclination of the soul towards the objects of choice. Others locate it in what amounts to the same thing, if it amounts to anything—an alleged power of contrary choice. But the orthodox view, which accords with consciousness, with the highest possible conception of liberty, and with the fundamental doctrines of providence, sin, and grace, is that it consists in the power of the mind to will as it pleases. This, we are happy to say, is so clearly the doctrine of our author, that it can scarcely be necessary to cite passages. *Instar omnium*, "my will is free, when I can *will to do* just what I *please*," p. 545. He goes on to say, "that mere *strength of inclination* can by no means impair the freedom of the will.

Be the inclination never so strong, it matters not. Nay, so far from interfering with freedom, it is an essential element in it. Freedom presupposes and implies inclination." Still further, "it is of no consequence *how I came* by that inclination or disposition. The simple question is, am I at liberty to follow it?" "Interference must be from without, and must affect the choice," in order to impair freedom. "If there *be* an act of the will, it is, in its very nature, a *free* act, and cannot be otherwise." Against this, "all that could *possibly* be contended is, that the supposed inclination to a given choice is likely to prevent my having *another* and *different* choice. But that has nothing to do with the freedom of my will, which depends, as we have seen, not on the power to choose *otherwise* than as one is inclined, or than he likes, but *as he likes*," p. 547. The italics are the author's. This is the radical view of the freedom of the will presented by him. Of course, if we have any difference with him, it must respect either passages contradictory to these, or other aspects of the subject, or his manner of using certain terms.

Professor Haven deviates from the use of terms which has been common since the days of Edwards, in distinguishing choice from volition, as in the following passage: "But suppose now that I am not prevented from choosing, but only from carrying out my choice in actual volition; from willing according to my choice," p. 546. As choice and volition have very commonly been regarded as synonymous terms, some might be led to infer that our author's theory is, that a volition is free only when caused by a preceding volition. If so, he would expose himself to the famous refutation of Edwards, who demonstrates that, on such a theory, no volition can be free unless preceded by an infinite series of volitions. This, however, is not our author's meaning. By volition he means that mental determination, in obedience to which the man exerts his faculties in any given way, as I will to raise my arm, and directly consequent on that volition it rises. By choice he appears to mean that antecedent mental preference out of which every free volition flows, and, so far as it is free, must flow. The *usus loquendi* of ordinary discourse does not militate against this use of terms, if they be carefully defined.

In fact, however, this preference is nothing more nor less than the preponderant desire, which, in common speech, is called the mind's choice. The cases cited by our author from Locke, Reid, and Upham, do not show the contrary. They only show that the strongest desire, of which the will is the executive, may run counter to and prevail against feebler desires. Abraham offering up Isaac, indeed did violence to some of the strongest feelings of his soul; but he did so in conformity to a desire mightier than them all, the desire to please God. In this sense, too, and no other, we have power over our own volitions, i. e. the power of willing as we please. In this sense, and no other, can the power of contrary choice be admitted; i. e. that we might will otherwise than as we do, were we so disposed or inclined. This is all that we understand Professor Haven to mean, so far as he seems to assert such a power, pp. 543, 451-2. Indeed, it is all that can be maintained in consistency with his radical definition of the freedom of the will, which by logical necessity sweeps away most other heresies relative to this subject. This is precisely what the author explains himself to mean: "The actual choice of any given moment is by no means a necessary one. Another might have been in its stead. A different inclination is certainly possible and conceivable, and a different inclination *would* have led to a different choice. If, instead of looking at the advantage or agreeableness of a proposed course, and being influenced by that consideration, I had looked at the right, the obligation in the case, my choice would have been a different one; for I should have been influenced by a different motive," p. 552. According to this, the inclination remaining the same, the choice cannot be otherwise than as it is, and still be free. Contrary choice is possible only on the supposition of the inclination being different from what it actually is. The only question that remains is, whether it is proper to call this a power of contrary choice; and this depends on the question whether the term is likely to mislead or not. That it is extensively employed by those who assert a power to will in opposition to the prevailing bias or inclination of the soul, to indicate such a power, is undeniable. As employed in theological controversy, it has been used chiefly in this sense, and intent.

While therefore we accept the idea which our author maintains under this phrase, we object to the phrase as being a common vehicle of a very different and mischievous notion.

Professor Haven objects to Edwards's formula, that "the will is as the greatest apparent good." But the propriety of this depends on the meaning of the terms good, or apparent good. If we take good in the sense of desirable, with Edwards, it will be hard to deny that it chooses what on the whole, in the view of the mind, and the state of its feelings at the moment of choice, seems *pro hac vice*, most desirable. To deny this, would be to deny that we will as we please. To be sure, in a multitude of cases, we ought to have felt and thought differently. But this does not affect the principle in question.

As to the question whether motives are the causes of volitions, this too is a mere question of words. We agree with our author, that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts. We agree with him further, that its own desires and inclinations are the motives which influence or determine it to will as it does, and not otherwise. If the question then be, whether motives are the causes of the volitions which they prompt, we answer, that they are not in such a sense that the mind is not the cause or agent of its own acts; they are, as Professor Haven concedes, in such a sense that they are the reasons why it wills one way rather than another. Now it is not mere willing that is to be accounted for, but choosing as we do rather than the contrary. As every event must have a cause, what is the cause of, not the mere act of willing, but of willing in this particular way? Plainly the motive or inclination which excites the mind to will thus and not otherwise. Professor Haven concedes it to be the *reason* of the choice being as it is. It is, therefore, the *cause* of its being so. But although a cause, it is not a physical cause, moving a blind passive object, but a moral cause acting upon, or influencing the free action of, a free moral agent. Our author objects to the use of the word cause in this connection, because he apprehends it may be construed to imply that the will is passively determined by forces *ab extra*. This by no means follows. If I am hungry, and take bread because it is at hand, while I would prefer meat which is at some distance, the urgency of my appetite is the cause of

my choosing the bread rather than meat; but not a cause which interferes with my own free activity in the premises. Says our author, "there is a *cause* why the apple falls. It is gravitation. There is a *reason* why mind acts and wills as it does. It is motive." True. But is it any the less a cause because it is a reason? Moreover the real motives, whence all others derive their power, are within the mind itself—its active desires.

The author combats the great argument of Edwards in which he contends that the doctrine of his adversaries involved the absurdity of an infinite series of free acts, in order to any one free act. He selects for attack the statement of this argument given by his son, which, by proving too much, proves nothing. We think, however, that there is a certain degree of truth and force in the celebrated demonstration of the elder Edwards. He was opposing the theory that volition is not free when we will as we please, unless it be an act or product of a self-determining power beside. This is altogether aside of the question, whether the choices and determinations of the mind are from within itself, and not from exterior forces. Nor is it necessary to maintain that Edwards's phraseology was always so precise, as to give no appearance of aiming at something more than this. But if a volition is not free in its own nature, when, in willing as we please, we exercise according to our author, "the highest practical freedom of which it is possible to conceive," without some other free act of self-determination added to it, the same must be true of this other free act, and so on in an infinite regress *ad infinitum*, till free agency is driven out of sight, and out of existence.

A very important question in this connection respects the control of the will over the inclinations, desires, and affections. That these may change, as circumstances or our views of things change, is agreed on all sides. That whatever we may do, if we are inclined to do it, may be said to be within our power, is what few will question. But the question is, has the will power, *propriis viribus*, to change the affections and desires? Consciousness answers, No. The nature of the will as a faculty of choice in obedience to our inclinations, not against them, answers, No. Yet, no one doubts that indirectly we may exercise much influence over our inclinations and desires on many

subjects by the associations we cherish, the objects to which we give attention, the habits we form. On the other hand, it is a capital truth, certified by Scripture and Christian experience, that divine grace alone can change the aversion of the heart to God, to holy love. And to this we understand our author to come, after having, by the usual arguments on that side, maintained that one whose "heart is wrong can do right." "It must be admitted, however, that so long as the heart is wrong, so long as the evil disposition continues, so long the man *will* continue to do evil, notwithstanding all his *power* to the contrary. . . . This is precisely the want of his nature which divine grace meets. It creates within him a *clean heart*, and renews within him a *right spirit*. This is the sublime mystery of regeneration. The soul that is born of God is made *willing* to do right. The inclinations are no longer to evil, but to good, and the man still doing what he pleases, is *pleased* to do the will of God. The change is in the disposition; it is a change of the affections, of the *heart*. Thus the Scriptures always represent it." The chief question that arises here then, respects words more than things, except as in such matters words are things. It is not indeed a question whether unrenewed man has "power to do right" in his external acts, as to the matter of them, or to do many things which tend to promote right feelings rather the opposite, in some respects. But is it correct to say that he can, without divine grace, make an unholy heart holy? Can he please God without a right heart? Ought he not to please God? Can he then, at this cardinal point, do right of himself, in his own strength? Let those say yes, who will. For ourselves we answer with Scripture, with all Christian creeds, with the deepest consciousness of every convinced sinner, with the daily confessions of all Christians on their knees, no, never. "They that are in the flesh cannot please God."

To the pleasing evidences we have already given that our author rejects the Pelagian notion of free agency, is to be added the fact, that he labours to show that God's universal providence can determine all the actions of free agents without impairing their freedom, because it can reach and shape, in ways innumerable, those inclinations of the heart

which the will obeys in all its free acts. We greatly rejoice in the amount of truth which the volume so clearly sets forth. That the author should have tried to reconcile this with some phrases and ideas which are the outgrowth of another system long dominant in the sphere of his life and culture, and for which its abettors claim the dignity and authority of first truths, is not surprising.

ART. VI.—*The Providential Government of God.*

A LARGE proportion of the heresies by which the Church has been corrupted, in respect to the nature of man, and the remedy which his ruin demands, have originated from error on the subject of second causes;—either in the denial of causation to the creatures, or the recognition of such a force in the nature of moral agents—such a power of will and action—as is independent of God, and uncontrollable by his power and sovereignty. In respect to second causes, four several theories have obtained more or less currency. Some deny them any efficiency whatever, and make the laws of nature to be nothing but the uniform modes of divine operation; so that God is not only the first, but the only cause. The opposite extreme is held by others, who look upon the universe as a machine, from the natural operation of which all things take place, without the interposition of the Creator; who continues for ever an inactive spectator of the fated process. Another opinion is, that the powers of nature are ordinarily left to their own operation; but that on special occasions the Creator interposes, as in miracles. The fourth, and as we believe, the scriptural doctrine, is, that whilst the creatures are endowed with a real efficiency and true causation, they are at the same time under the constant and universal control of God;—that he, “the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according