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ARTICLE I.—*Weissagung und Erfüllung im Alten und im Neuen Testamente.* Ein theologischer versuch von Dr. J. CHR. K. HOFMANN, Prof. Theol. in Erlangen. 8vo. pp. 362 and 386.

THIS work, which was published rather more than thirteen years ago, has been several times referred to in our columns. But its influence upon the opinions of an important class of continental scholars has been such, that we shall render, we doubt not, an acceptable service to our readers by presenting them with a summary of its contents. It should be distinctly stated in advance, that with whatever faults these volumes may be chargeable, they are free from all complicity with the principles or results of a sceptical criticism, which is upon proper occasions scored in a very wholesome way. Hofmann's aspirations after novelty have taken quite a different turn from this. The literal truth of the sacred narrative is everywhere adhered to, as opposed to all mythical conceits and legendary exaggerations. The integrity and genuineness of all the inspired writings, and in all their parts, are strenuously asserted, and the date to which unvarying tradition assigns them is unhesitatingly received. When even such men as Kurtz and Delitzsch have yielded to the torrent, it is deserving of commendatory mention that Hofmann should stand firm. While

The insufficiency of a pantheistic philosophy to meet the wants and cravings of the human soul have been abundantly manifest in China. Though it professes to be the development of a system which had its origin forty centuries ago, harmonizing the wisdom of ancient sages, yet the Chinese unsatisfied with its teachings, have resorted to other systems to find some guide about death as well as life, some knowledge of spirits as well as men. Morality has been found a poor substitute for religion; and Atheism has followed up the disowning of God with deifying its founder; while the unsatisfied cravings of the multitude have gone after gods many, seeking in Taouism and Budhism what they have not found in Confucianism.

ART. III.—*Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy.*

By WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M. A., late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Edited from the Author's Manuscripts, with Notes, by William Hepworth Thompson, M. A., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1857.

THESE two volumes of Lectures on Ancient Philosophy by Professor Butler show him to have been one of the most gifted men of his day. With all the disadvantages of posthumous publication, many of them having been not only not designed for publication, but prepared in haste to meet the immediate emergencies of his class, they betray rich learning, and keen philosophic insight, brightened by a certain poetic glow, and a rhetorical magnificence—often too gorgeous and diffuse for topics which rather demand a severe simplicity of style. This defect, however, may attract a class of readers to the great subjects of which he treats, who would be repelled by the dry light of exact and concise philosophic diction. At the same time it interferes with the clear and direct evolution of abstract truths, and often hinders the reader's ready apprehension of the

successive steps of the author's reasoning, in their mutual connections. This fault is more obtrusive in the first volume, whose contents are far more fragmentary, immethodical and immature, than those of the second, which consists chiefly of a thorough and masterly review of the Platonic philosophy. This bears evidence of being a ripe product of the author's mind, and affords the true gauge of his philosophic power. Viewed as a whole, we know not its equal or rival in our language, as an exposition of Platonism. It will remain a durable monument of the author's genius. The lectures on the preceding schools of Grecian philosophy are also searching and valuable. Those which follow on Aristotle and Neo-Platonism, though less exhaustive, are yet profound and luminous, and form a worthy contribution to our means of understanding these subjects. We will add that the disadvantage of not being prepared, nor, to a great extent, designed for publication by the author, is compensated, as far as possible, by the high qualifications of the accomplished editor, who gives unmistakable evidence of his accomplishments as a scholar and metaphysician. We have only repeated his own declared judgment, in regard to the comparative fitness of the lectures in the first and second volumes, to represent the author's power in this department of inquiry. It would have been his choice, had it been in his power, to omit the introductory and some other lectures.

Yet, although they do poor justice to their author, both in themselves, and especially considered in their relation to the unity and completeness of the whole, they are not without value. They offer many solid as well as brilliant suggestions in support of the possibility, the utility, and the royal preëminence of mental and metaphysical science. Whether we view this as culminating in theology, as the science of the first causes and reasons of things, as the knowledge of the power which gives birth to all science, and investigates the grounds and validity of all our knowing, or as a gymnastic and tonic for the intellect of the student, it readily takes the rank so often accorded to it, and so eloquently claimed for it by Professor Butler, of *Prima Philosophia, Scientia Scientiarum*.

Beyond this, he discusses, in the introductory part, the appropriate spheres of Psychology, Metaphysics, and Ontology.

His contributions toward a just apprehension of their mutual boundaries and relations are important, and, with some qualifications, just. Various circumstances have led to more or less confusion of thought and language on these matters. A common idea of Metaphysics has been that they simply stand in contrast with Physics, and comprise every department of inquiry but the physical sciences, or that world of matter which we cognize through the senses. In short, they are regarded as the science of immaterial, or the genus under which all the non-material sciences range as species. Viewed in this light, they of course include Mental and Moral Philosophy, Logic, Rhetoric, the principles of Jurisprudence, Political Economy, and Civil Government, and eminently, Christian Theology, which, in any view, has its strong metaphysical side. There has been no age in which the reigning theology and metaphysics have not exercised a powerful reciprocal influence. Accordingly, the study of Mental Philosophy has been deemed very commonly to be simply and purely the study of Metaphysics. Yet those who recognize not the distinction between them, here as elsewhere, often show that they are possessed by it, if they do not possess it. They imply it in their use of language, if they have never stated it clearly to themselves, just as idealists will show that they believe in an external world, although they have reasoned it out of being. Let any man speak of proving a proposition by metaphysical reasoning, and he means something quite different from what he does when he speaks of ascertaining any point psychologically, or by an analysis of the faculties and operations of the soul. He means that he proves it by evidence, *a priori*, and not by induction, observation, testimony or experience. If one argues that the essence of Deity is incommunicable to creatures, because self-existence cannot be predicated of the created and dependent without a contradiction, his argument is metaphysical, and recognized as such by all who have any notion of the word metaphysical, but it has no special relation to mental philosophy or psychology; no more than the argument that salt preserves meat by detaching its moisture, because it always effects this, and moisture is found to promote animal putrefaction. In either case the mind pronounces the judgment, in accordance with its

own laws, as it does in every act of knowing, in any science. But in neither case is there any special relation to Mental Philosophy, more than in any judgment in any sphere of human investigation.

As the distinction between metaphysics and the mere science of mind has come to be more distinctly discerned and defined in philosophic thinking, the term psychology has grown into very general use to denote the latter distinctively. It has the advantage of sharply defining its significate, the science of the mind or soul; of indicating it by a single word; of affording the convenient and indispensable adjective psychological; and of being less vague in relation to the term *metaphysics*, than the broader and vaguer phrases, philosophy of the mind, of the intellectual powers, &c., popularized by the Scotch school of philosophers. Reid and his successors had reason for introducing these titles. He found himself called partly to combat and partly to harmonize two opposite tendencies in philosophic method, each of which, employed exclusively of the other, had been pressed to the most extravagant results. The one, of which Descartes may be taken as a strong type, was the metaphysical. His ignoring all original knowledge but the simple *cogito*, and erecting the whole superstructure of belief by *a priori* reasoning from this one datum of consciousness, is a simple method of spinning out a universe from a single subjective fact of personal experience. This single fact is no more a fact than innumerable others pertaining to our souls, our bodies, or the external world, attested by evidence equally certain and immediate. And the chances of success in such a method are about as great as they would be to reason out, *a priori*, a system of astronomy from one observation of the sun, without observing any of the immense number of facts equally certain and equally accessible in the stellar universe. This method of reasoning out *a priori* what is matter of fact ascertainable only by observation and experiment, had vitiated not only mental, but physical science, until Bacon put forth his *Novum Organum*, which established the great principle that all conclusions relative to the sphere of *contingent* truth or existence, are to be founded on duly ascertained facts, must be tested by facts, and harmonize with all known facts. This principle, as all know, regen-

erated physical science. The simple principle of founding it on duly ascertained phenomena has inaugurated that career of marvellous and magnificent discovery, which has vastly widened man's original dominion over nature.

This inductive method is clearly applicable to the phenomena of consciousness, which are in their nature, facts contingent and ascertainable. Under the prevalence of the metaphysical method, psychology was, like physical science, overborne before the Baconian era. The inductive method in relation to the mind was first displayed most signally by Locke, whose *Essay on the Human Understanding* gave a most decisive impetus to the psychological investigations of cotemporaneous and subsequent philosophers. But while Locke developed a real, and in many respects true psychology, it was nevertheless too exclusive and destructive. In his zeal against innate ideas, he swept away all *a priori* truths, jeopardized some of the first principles of morals and religion, annihilated the groundwork of metaphysics, and, so far forth, taught a false psychology, by giving a false view of what is contained or implied in the indubitable facts of human consciousness. Yet, while maintaining that the mind obtains all its ideas through the senses, and through reflection upon its own operations upon the sensuous matter thus furnished, he teaches that, even in regard to these, "the mind hath no immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate;" and therefore "the mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things." But how is it possible to be sure of this "conformity between our ideas and the things themselves," unless we have an immediate knowledge of the things themselves? It is not possible. All certain knowledge of any thing material or immaterial, outside of our own ideas, is annihilated. Nothing remains but pure subjectivity or idealism, an odd finality for what was begun with an assault on original, or *a priori*, under the title of "innate ideas." This is a type of the exclusive psychological method, in its way resolving all certain objects of knowledge into mental states or acts—modifications of the percipient or sentient Ego. The idealism of

Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume were easy and inevitable superstructures on such a foundation. This hyper-psychological extreme thus met the hyper-metaphysical, which has tended in all ages to turn the actual universe into an ideal structure formed out of the *a priori* ideas and reasonings of the mind. All systems whether psychological or metaphysical in their germ, whether Buddhist, Grecian, Transcendental, or Sensual, whether advanced by Locke or Hume, Kant or Hegel, which confound object and subject in knowledge, or which resolve all the objects of knowledge into ideas or feelings of the mind knowing, do so far forth tend to scepticism. In most cases they end in that Pantheism which makes All One, and One All, of which Professor Butler's lectures on Ancient Philosophy only afford numerous striking and instructive illustrations.

Dr. Reid entered the field when this sceptical chaos, arising from an exclusive and exaggerated use of either the metaphysical or psychological methods, by their respective masters, reigned. Without tracing the minute philosophic causes, he discerned the fact that nearly all philosophers agreed that the mind has no immediate knowledge of external objects, but only of some ideal images, or subtle media, which represent them. He saw that if we do not cognize external objects immediately, we do not know them at all with any certainty. So a basis is laid for scepticism. He further saw that certain first truths, not derived through the senses, are intuitively perceived by the mind, with as much certainty as external objects through the senses; that they embrace the first principles and conditions of ethics, theology, mathematics, logic, and indeed of substantial existence: and that these first truths were undermined or imperilled by the principles of Locke, especially as developed or perverted by the sophistical art of Hume. The great work which he undertook was to bring order out of this chaos, by showing that, within their proper sphere, our faculties are trustworthy, and the knowledge they afford sure. This he attempted chiefly by a psychology more exact than Locke's, the cardinal feature of which lay in proving incontestably that we perceive external objects immediately, and not mediately through some vicarious idea or other representation; that in touching a stone, we touch a stone and not a mere idea of a stone. This sim-

ple and impregnable truth,¹ which it requires the astuteness of a philosopher to unsettle or mystify, it is the great merit of Reid, not to have discovered—all the world knew it before—but to have rescued from the assaults of speculatists, who reared and still continue to rear upon the denial of it, in various forms, their fabrics of scepticism, idealism, and pantheism. While his system required to be perfected in some points by his successors, yet the service he rendered in putting the doctrine of Sensitive Perception on a right footing, has won for him an enduring and deserved renown. But beyond restoring the senses to their normal authority within their own sphere, it was necessary to recover those intuitive *a priori*, metaphysical truths and ideas which underlie all reasoning, all supersensual knowledge, and, in a sense, all existence, from the uncertainty in which Locke, Hume, and the Materialists had shrouded them. This also he accomplished by a psychological process, showing that the universal human mind is conscious of affirming that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, &c., with the same confidence as it affirms its own existence. Here he found his psychology passing into metaphysics, as all sound psychology must. But in the same sense, if not to the same extent, physics have their root in psychology. For what true science of material things can exist, if we have no sure and immediate perception of material objects, of aught beyond our own ideas or sensations? Physical science also has its root in metaphysics. For what valid science of matter can there be, if events have no cause, and qualities no substance? So it is impossible fully to analyze the operations of the mind in vision without reference to the laws of optics, or its mode of apprehending the primary and secondary qualities of matter, without reference to some principles of Natural Philosophy. But this does not make psychology natural philosophy, although they are to this extent mutually related. In this way, and to this extent, Reid's work was both psychological and metaphysical. As his work was the organizing of a sound philosophy out of the confusion produced by metaphysics overdone at the expense of psychology, and by a psychology overdone at the cost of a metaphysical truth, and to reclaim it from the disrepute arising from both these sources, by founding it on undisputed facts of the univer-

sal consciousness, (*communis sensus*,) he and his followers adopted the convenient titles, Philosophy of the Intellectual Powers, of the Active and Moral Powers, of the Human Mind, of Common Sense, to indicate their sphere of operations; including not merely psychology proper, but as much metaphysics as they saw fit to deal with. Owing to the fortunate ascendancy of the Scotch school in Britain and America, these terms have continued in use to denote indiscriminately metaphysics and psychology, so that many confound the two, not knowing where one ends and the other begins.

Mental Philosophy *strictly understood* is indeed simply Psychology. And Psychology is simply *the science which investigates and determines the operations, laws and faculties of the mind, as these are given in, or inferrible from the phenomena of consciousness*. It is therefore a science of phenomena, of facts, of contingent truths. It classes therefore with the inductive sciences. In this respect it classes with the physical sciences, and has even by some writers been styled physical. As such, its province is, first, to ascertain the facts of consciousness, and next, to propound that and that only concerning the mind, which is fairly implied in these facts. Its simple function is to find and teach what the mind *does* and *suffers*, and thence what it *is*; not what by any *a priori* reasoning it may be shown that it ought to be. This, it may be remarked in passing, rules out all claims of Phrenology to be in any sense a philosophy of mind, since, whatever may be its uses, it never can give us a single phenomenon of consciousness. It may serve a great many good purposes, to map out the skull, and take the mensuration of its parts, but this can never reveal a single mental act. On the other hand, it rules out the pretensions of Rational Psychology, which some transcendentalists elevate above that derived from consciousness, and insist upon as a method of demonstrating *a priori* the possibility and validity of the latter. This method culminates in cosmogonies *a priori*, showing how potential, infinite, absolute being becomes actual, finite, and conditioned in the mere process of existing, instead of finding what the creation really is, and thence deducing those "invisible things" of its Creator, which are clearly seen and known from the things that are made.

And thus Psychology as a science of the phenomena of consciousness is effectually distinguished from Metaphysics, which is the science of *a priori*, necessary, meta-phenomenal truths. There are those who deny that there are any such truths. We shall not now stop to dispute with those who deny that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, that no two substances occupying space can occupy the same space at the same time; or that these are not phenomena; or that, however originally suggested by experience, they go beyond experience, are affirmed by the mind *a priori* with a certainty and necessity independent of experience. These characteristics broadly separate this class of truths from Psychology. True, Psychology shows that the mind affirms them, and that this affirmation is valid. But so it shows that the mind cognizes matter and that the cognition is valid, that the memory recalls past events, but it is not therefore the science of material objects, or of the past.

At this stage, it is important to observe that metaphysics are only in a partial and subordinate sense, (although a most important sense,) a science of real existence. For all real existences, except the Supreme God, are contingent on his sovereign will. Had he not seen fit to exercise his creative power, there would have been no created universe, and its non-existence would have involved no contradiction or absurdity. The necessity which characterizes metaphysical truths, so far as it affects real existence, is *hypothetical, conditioned on facts of actual existence otherwise proved*. It is a necessity of relation or consequence whereby, on the supposition that certain forms of existence are otherwise shown, certain other forms of existence must or must not be admitted. This proposition seems to us important and pregnant, and therefore we dwell a little upon its illustration.

For example, the propositions that every event must have a cause, all qualities a substance, that what may be predicated of a whole class can be predicated of every individual included in that class, that every equilateral triangle must be equiangular, do not of themselves prove any fact of actual existence. They only prove, in case events, qualities, classes having common properties, equilateral triangles, exist, then, *quoad hæc*, ade-

quate causes, substances, the possession of these common properties by each individual of the class, equiangular triangles exist. The propositions that of two contradictories both cannot be true, and that one must be true, and that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same moment, of themselves prove no fact of real existence, or non-existence. But if one of two contradictories be otherwise proved true, the other must be false, and *vice versa*; if one body is shown to fill any given space, at any time, no other fills it at the same time. But let no one deem this principle unimportant, though thus hypothetical, as a means of proving actual existence. It is true that the principle of causal necessity proves no fact, till some other fact is proved. But the facts of creation being proved, and the most important of them perceived intuitively, or without the aid of science, this principle demands the admission of a Great First Cause adequate to the production of such effects. It gives us the Invisible God, the greatest of real existences. The highest of all truths, even the divine power and Godhead, is a non-phenomenal truth, deduced by a metaphysical principle, from phenomena. Rom. i. 20. We thus know that things seen are not made of things which do appear, *μη̄ ἐκ φαινομένων*. Heb. xi. 3. On such principles rest the whole sciences of Mathematics and Logic, which are justly styled Formal and Hypothetical science, as distinguished from those that refer to real existence. Yet, while Logic of itself can prove no fact till facts are given it, it can give laws for determining indefinitely what other facts are implied or denied in such facts as are given. Mathematics alone could not determine a single fact or principle of Astronomy. Yet, when sufficient facts were ascertained by observation, to afford a basis for mathematical computation, how immense is the number of astronomical truths which mathematics have proved to be necessarily consequent upon those otherwise discovered, till it has become as much a mathematical as an inductive science?

If there is any exception to this, it is found in the case of Space and Time, of which we cannot conceive as non-existent or limited, although we do not know them as actual phenomena. They are indeed first suggested to the mind by the phenomena of bodies which we see must be in space, and of events which

we see must be in time. But when once suggested to the mind, its conviction of their existence and infinitude is not dependent on or derived by inference from bodies or events. Whatever become of bodies or events, it conceives of time and space as existent and unlimited irrespective of them. Nor can we, without violence to our intellectual constitution, follow Kant in denying them objective reality, and evaporate them into mere ideas or necessary forms of thought. And yet again, if we undertake to define what they are, it seems difficult to regard them so much as substances, as the spheres or containers of all substance. If nothing had existence but space and time, how much of existence would there be? But we are only indicating the difficulties which beset us when we attempt to carry our speculations beyond the narrow limits for which we are fitted. They only show us how soon we confront heights which our intellects are not winged to reach;

How short the powers of nature come,
And can no further go.

It is hard to think time and space mere relations of other things, much less mere ideas or forms of thought; we can say no less than that they are illimitable, contain all else in their capacious bosom; we cannot conceive their non-existence, nor yet dare we think them independent of the Creator, who made all things and fills eternity and immensity; yet what they are, with Reid, we cannot say.

With just views of Metaphysics, we can readily dispose of Ontology, or the science of Being. If by this we meant simply the solution of questions as to the validity of our belief in the actual existence of ourselves or other objects known by our cognitive faculties—in other words the science of objective reality as assailed by sceptics and idealists—it is past all doubt that there is a room for such a science. There is a valid Ontology to this extent. It emerges immediately from the first principle of a sound psychology. That principle is simply this: All acts of intelligence suppose an object known as well as a knowing subject. The reason why we *know* objects as such and such, (if we know at all,) is that they *are* such and such, not that the mind makes them appear so, when they are not so.

These objects determine the mind's differing apprehensions more than the mind itself. A horse and a barley-corn are apprehended differently because they differ from each other, not because the mind differs or causes them to differ. When we know objects therefore, it is simply because they are present to our intelligence. All mankind live and act on this faith. They have no idea that all objects are mere mental phantasies. It takes philosophers who overfly their own humanity, to make nature a lie, and intelligence a sheer delusion, a grand transcendental imposture. As then we know that things exist without us, we learn by observation and induction what they are; and from things so known we go by legitimate metaphysical deduction to non-phenomenal truths, "things invisible," that do not "appear." Heb. xi. 3. So far as by Ontology is meant finding ground for a valid belief in what is certified to us by sense, reason, or revelation, so far it is to be admitted. The grounds for such a belief are abundant and indisputable.

There is another idea of Ontology, according to which we have no faith in it. We refer to attempts to explain the nature, grounds, or genesis of being by metaphysical and *a priori* reasoning: which usually amounts to a process of attempting, not to find what the universe or any part of it is, in the legitimate use of the faculties given us for that purpose, but to show *a priori* how it *must* be, either as to some of its particulars, or how it must have been evolved into actual existence from some vague potentiality called the Absolute, some "Brahma sleeping on eternity." Metaphysics, as we have seen, do not, of themselves, give immediate and original knowledge of actual existence. They only furnish formulas by which, from actual existence otherwise ascertained, we may and must conclude something else. In the study of Being, therefore, we are first to find in the use of the faculties given for this purpose, what is, and how it is, as far as possible. Then we are to find what necessarily results therefrom, taking due care that our conclusions contradict no known facts. This is one thing. To show first metaphysically what must or should be, and then to strain all known facts into a forced consistency with it, is quite another. It is one thing, to ascertain that the world is full of objects, having a distinct yet dependent existence, which imply

a self-existent creator. It is quite another, to reason out metaphysically that all things are manifestations or forms of the Infinite become finite in the process of becoming actually existent, and to turn what we have taken for a distinct man, horse, or tree, into a phenomenon of God. Metaphysics have no commission, no competency for such a work. It is sheer transcendental fatuity. This sort of Ontology has run into pantheism or close approximation to it in all ages. It is the staple of that continental philosophy which has shot its poison through so much of our current literature, history, and theology. If we open a German history of philosophy, we are very apt to find that it is largely a history of the progress of the solution of the question, how Being passes into Becoming, and that little else is recognized as appertaining to philosophy. One of these,* with a prefatory recommendation from a prominent theological professor, pronouncing it "one of the best works for a text book in our colleges, upon this neglected branch of scientific investigation," comes to this grand summation of past philosophic discovery in its closing paragraph; that in Christianity, "stripped of its form of religious representation, we have now the stand-point of the *Absolute Philosophy*, or the thought knowing itself as all truth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from itself, having the system of philosophy for its development—a closed circle of circles!" This is enough. We have no difficulty in disposing of this volume, without further notice. It is in no proper sense a history of philosophy, or valuable, except to show how astute minds may mistake nullities for ultimate truths—*lucus a non lucendo*. We heartily agree with the repugnance felt by so many eminent physicists to this kind of metaphysics and ontology. But we see no reason why some of them, because of this abuse, should denounce all metaphysics, and repudiate all *a priori* and necessary truths. The inductive sciences themselves imply the metaphenomenal at their base, and employ it in rising to their summit. One of their most eminent cultivators, Dr. Whewell, in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, has shown this with sig-

* *A History of Philosophy in Epitome*, by Dr. Albert Schweglar. Translated from the original German by Julius H. Seelye, with a prefatory recommendation by Prof. H. B. Smith, of Union Theological Seminary, New York.

nal ability. To abjure metaphysic because false, destructive, or ridiculous theories have been propounded by its abettors, is about as rational as it would be for us to denounce physical science, because a Compte and Mill pervert it into a support of atheism.

If the foregoing analysis is just, it follows that Psychology and Metaphysics, as dealing, in diverse ways, with the thoughts of the mind, are, on one side, the science of the ideal, while, on the other side, they go deepest of all sciences into reality and the ground of all reality. This interferes not with the supremacy of Christian theology, which largely interpenetrates and interlocks with both these sciences. Viewed on the former side, some, though with indifferent success, have sought to have them all included under the comprehensive title of Ideology. But viewed from the other side, as the science of Truth, Reality, and Being, they, and more especially metaphysics, have in all ages obtained the title of Philosophy, not as it is used to denote the philosophy of this or that subordinate department, but philosophy in general, *eminenter*, underlying all particular philosophies, *Prima Philosophia, Scientia Scientiarum*. Thus, while psychology deals with the operations of the mind or ideas, it at the same time deals with the most indisputable of realities, for whatever else may be brought in doubt, no one can possibly doubt that his own consciousness and its phenomena are what they are. But when we inquire whether these phenomena belong to any thinking substance, we resort to metaphysics for proof. The principle that all qualities, accidents, or phenomena must belong to some substance is metaphysical and ideal. It does not of itself prove the existence of phenomena or substance. But phenomena of thought being otherwise proved, this principle proves the existence of a mind or thinking substance, which, though not itself a phenomenon, is evinced by the phenomena of conscious intelligence. So metaphysics, though conversant, in the first instance, about principles which are mere ideas or necessary forms of thought, and do not, of themselves, prove real existence, yet, when phenomena are actually proved, conduct us necessarily to the substantial being which underlies them.

This brings us to the sempiternal, archetypal ideas, which

form the salient point of the Platonic philosophy, so ably and beautifully treated by Professor Butler. Probably no word has been impressed into such varied and onerous service, or is liable to greater vagueness of meaning than idea. To be sure, it is always employed to denote some act or object of intelligence, or some synthesis or relation of the two. Yet within this limit Reid defines idea as a thought of the mind, while Coleridge says, "a distinguishable power self-affirmed, and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence, is, according to Plato, an Idea." In its true and proper sense, it is essentially one with conception which, in the first instance, signifies a mental image *εἶδος* of an external object before perceived, and thence almost any intellectual apprehension whatever. But as the mind itself and its acts may become objects of thought, so those metaphysical truths, which show themselves in the form of mental affirmations that some things exist, on condition that other things exist, are often called ideas—as the idea of cause, substance, &c. In this phrase, we often refer, not only to the separate notions of cause and effect, substance and accident connected in the mental affirmation, as subject and predicate, but to the judgment connecting them. So also in regard to the properties which distinguish any individual or class, whatever in the view of the mind constitutes the essence of it, is often and properly called the idea of that thing or class.

Plato's system was a natural exaggeration of this, resulting from his lofty effort to rise above the transient, variable, and manifold, to one Great Supreme, the fountain of Good, of Life, of Being. All his perplexities at this point would have been solved by a single ray of Christian light, showing us what instantly, when clearly suggested, commands the assent of reason, that the Almighty at his sovereign pleasure creates, upholds, and destroys all things by the word of his power, whether material or immaterial. But to Plato's eye, matter, because subject to change and dissolution, was hardly a substantial and real existence. It was rather a transient and shadowy phenomenon of the real, which was spiritual and eternal, and was obscured and disparaged by its sensuous embodiment. This spiritual and eternal element, which was the only real substance of things, was, in another view, according to Professor Butler,

their "mental ground," yet not merely the constructive plan in the mind of God, according to which he made them; although in a sort distinguishable from the divine essence, while inseparable from and participant of it. Such, for substance, were Plato's ideas, the archetypal essential of things, the only genuine realities. In the apprehension and contemplation of these, especially in their unity with God, we have genuine knowledge and philosophy. The perfection of the soul is attained by rising above the sensuous and phenomenal to these eternal ideas, until, at last, cleared of its material integuments, it resumes its normal state, (whence it had inexplicably fallen,) in the sphere of the super-sensual and eternal. It is easy to see that this system had strong Pantheistic leanings, although Plato was careful to maintain, often vaguely, the distinction between God, man, and nature, which parts of his philosophy tended to confound. Nor can we wonder that the germs thus developed flowered out subsequently into complete pantheism in the hands of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic schools. Nor can we doubt the substantial accuracy of Coleridge's terse and pregnant account of the Platonic idea, as a "distinguishable power self-affirmed and seen in its unity with the Eternal Essence." He impressed it into good service in his efforts to anglicise the philosophy of Schelling. His most feasible method was to take the Platonic idea as a solvent, and he used it not in vain upon some of the finest intellects in Britain and this country. Still, when we compare Plato with preceding heathen philosophers, we wonder, not at his errors, but at the caution with which he guarded them against their worst consequences, a caution which many of those who aspire to be the philosophic leaders of our own age, have not had the wisdom to imitate. We wonder at his pure and lofty ethics, the glimpses he caught of some of the sublimest spiritual truths, approximating sometimes to the highest mysteries of revelation. Extravagant, and therefore perilous, as was his antagonism to matter, yet this is a noble error in an age which deified flesh and blood. It is nobler to rise above our nature than to sink beneath it, an alternative to which philosophy is ever doomed when it either has not, or scorns, the light of divine revelation. Hence whenever there has been a reaction from a dominant sensism or

materialism, Plato's writings have commanded high regard, and he has never failed to elicit a genial and sympathetic admiration from the most lofty thinkers and accomplished scholars. This is well on the part of those who, like Professor Butler, see his defects as well as his merits, and master his philosophy instead of being mastered by it. His able analysis and vindication of the merits of Plato's philosophy is happily concluded with the following summation of its faults, which we quote for the purpose of giving our readers a specimen of what they will find in these volumes, and as an expression of our own judgment.

“In the first place, then, there runs through Plato a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial *κάθαρσις*. This arises partly from his conception of the divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, inasmuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath or its results inapplicable to the Deity; from the latter, because, in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connection as incidental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat its inalienable rights. He must be a very uncandid critic who could censure Plato severely for these misconceptions; but he would be a very imperfect expositor who should not mention them as such. There is probably no single point in the moral relations of the creation for which we are so much indebted to revelation as this of the enormity of sin and the severity of the divine judgment. Thus instructed, it is possible that the demands of the divine justice may be demonstrated accordant with the antecedent notices of the moral reason. But there is a wide difference between proving a revealed principle and discovering it before it has been revealed. We are not then to blame Plato for overlooking that mystery of divine righteousness which even the reiterated and explicit intimations of Inspiration can scarcely persuade even ourselves practically to adopt. But we *are* to censure those (and it is for this reason I mark the matter distinctly) who labour by un-

warrantable glosses to dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God. These teachers have abounded in every age, and in one remarkable era of our English Church history were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title. Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts nobly expressed, but they are all marked with the characteristic defect of a Platonized Christianity—a forgetfulness, or inadequate commemoration, of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for sin—the fact of the Christian Atonement.” (We add that this tendency is quite as conspicuous in Coleridge and nearly all the schools of transcendental theology in our day, as in rationalistic and ritualizing Cudworth, More, John Smith, and other Platonizing divines of the seventeenth century.—*Reviewer.*)

“The next point in which the exclusive cultivation of Platonism may become injurious, is its indirect discouragement of *active* virtue. I need not say that no moral teacher can recommend in higher terms the usual exercises of social duty; but the true influences of any moral system depend less on the duties it verbally prescribes than on the *proportion* it establishes between them. And no one that remembers the Platonic conception of the contemplative ‘philosopher’ as the perfection of humanity, can hesitate in pronouncing that Plato inclines the balance to that very side, to which the students of his writings, from their reflective and sedentary habits, may be supposed already too much biassed. The results of this tendency are obvious. To contemplate ideas is, in a certain sense—if the soul and its ideal objects are ultimately blended—to introvert the mind *upon itself*; to do this exclusively, or as the main excellence of man, is—if constitutional temperament combine—to endanger sinking into moral egotism, intellectual mysticism.” . . .

“Nor can it be denied again, that Platonism is defective in those engagements for *the affections*, which no system of human

nature can omit without fatal imperfection. We saw how, in the scheme of social life advocated in the *Republic*, the whole body of domestic affections are annihilated by a single provision, (the community of wives)." . . .

"Much, doubtless, of this practical deficiency in Platonism arose from its illustrious author's extravagant conceptions of the essential evil of *Body*, in all its possible *human* forms. Wholly engaged with the immortal essence it imprisoned, and attributing to matter the organization of almost all which restrains that glorious stranger from asserting its native skies, Plato was accustomed to regard with coldness and suspicion every principle which could not trace its connection directly with the rational part of our complex constitution. . . . In proclaiming the bodily organization, the Christian system has for ever dried up the source of those delusive dreams of super-human purity, which proceed, more or less, upon the supposition that there is something inherently debasing in the very possession of a material frame. And when we enumerate the internal proofs which establish the fact that this divine system never could have been the natural growth of (at least) the fashionable or popular philosophy, we ought not to forget that, so universal and so deep were these impressions of the ineffaceable malignity of body, that the earliest internal dissentients from the general creed of the Christian Church were those who could not believe it possible that an Immaculate Redeemer could have been invested with an earthly body, and therefore maintained that the Divine Sufferer was but the shadowy apparition of a human frame."

"After all—it must be said in behalf of Plato—and I rejoice in a qualification which allows me to close this subject in that tone of sympathy and admiration in which I began it—after all, it must in fairness be allowed that these errors are rather the tendencies of his system, than his own original representation of it." Vol. ii., pp. 231-5.