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ARTICLE I.—*The Church Review and Register for October 1855.* Art. VI. “Professor Hodge on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office.”

As even the more important periodical publications of one denomination circulate only to a limited extent within the bounds of other Churches, we may, without offence, state for the information of some of our readers, that the *Church Review* is an Episcopal Quarterly, published in New Haven, Connecticut. It is ably conducted, and seems to represent the high-church party in the Episcopal Church, as distinguished on the one hand from the Puseyites, and on the other from the Evangelicals.

In the last number of the *Review* there is an article on an Address delivered in May last before the Presbyterian Historical Society. The object of the article is to present an argument, from the pen of Bishop McIlvaine, in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. This argument the Reviewer commends to our special notice. He pronounces it perfectly unanswerable; saying that a man might as well question one of the demonstrations in Euclid, as to contest either its pre-

class of Methodists themselves do not deny it, that their system of revivals and periodical excitements brings within their churches multitudes who profess to be the subjects of divine grace, who are deluded by mere emotional excitement, and who relapse into their former state, and become almost inaccessible to all subsequent impressions. The facts connected with this subject are so numerous and so well authenticated as to be really appalling. It cannot be otherwise. What is false in their system of doctrine and theory of religion, must produce the bitter fruits of evil, just in proportion as it is prominently presented and acted out. We have no disposition to pursue this subject; though it is one which calls loudly for the serious attention of all the friends of religion. In proportion as the Methodists become educated, and enabled to understand what Calvinism is, they become less bigoted and denunciatory, and we hope that many of the evils connected with their system will be lessened, if not entirely removed, by their progress in professional knowledge, which need not interfere either with their zeal or their hard working.

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ART. III.—*The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte.*—

Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau.  
New York: Published by Calvin Blanchard, 1855.

WHILE the truth is evermore one, it follows that all believers have "one faith," in so far as their faith is genuine. Their differences, therefore, arise from the residues of unbelief which still abide in them to weaken and corrupt that faith. As they go onward increasing in faith and knowledge, this residual disturbing element is proportionally eliminated—a process which is destined to continue, till all differences shall vanish by the ultimate extinction of all unbelief; "till we all come *in the unity of the faith* and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Meanwhile, during the upward struggles towards this celestial summit, the highest and lowest claim of the Church

must be, "in essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity." Less than this, she cannot demand of her members; to more than this, she cannot pretend in answer to the aspersions of her foes.

As this residuum of unbelief in real though imperfect believers, gives rise to innumerable diversities of opinion in minor matters, even among those who agree in the great fundamentals of Christianity; so, where this unbelief in the truth is total, it displays itself in forms, not only endlessly diversified, but mutually repugnant and contradictory in their essential character and radical principles. They agree only in springing from unbelief, in being constructed for the defence of unbelief, and in striving to offer a theoretical ground for infidelity or atheism open or disguised, which shall command the assent of our rational faculties. As to all else, they are often mutual contradictories, which simply show how extremes meet.

This absolute repugnancy was never more conspicuous than between the two systems now current among atheistic and infidel speculatists, especially as these are set forth by what they call their "more advanced thinkers," their chief defenders and oracles. Both were born on the continent of Europe, and both have been transplanted to Britain and the United States, where, though exotics, they have found, in certain classes, a congenial soil, and attained a vigorous growth. Never were two schemes in more absolute defiance and denial of each other, than the Transcendental Pantheism of Germany and the Positive Philosophy of France. Each is a negation of every radical principle of the other, and dooms it to annihilation. In its spirit and principles, the former is in the highest degree ideal and supersensual. With instinctive scorn for the grossness of matter, (the very existence of which it often denies,) it luxuriates in the realms of abstraction and mysticism. It refines and speculates, till whatever of existence it cannot philosophize away, it sublimates into divinity. Passing by phenomena, it regards rather the *noumenon*, (Coleridge adds to this word, the pregnant expletive, *numen*,) the *suppositum intellectuale*, which the mind places under them, and which bears the same relation to them as the substance to the shadow. Thus it deifies whatever it cannot explain away. Whatever is, is God. But with

the latter, Positive Philosophy, all this is reversed. This is wholly sensuous, materialistic, phenomenal. It recognizes nothing but phenomena. All else it either denies or ignores, as may best suit its purpose. All belief in the invisible is scouted as tolerable only in the rudimentary stages of human culture. The only realities cognizable by us are sensations, their antecedents and consequents. Whatever cannot be cognized by the senses, cannot be known, has no reality, at all events, for us. Whether there be anything beyond this or not, man might as well attempt to fly as to exercise his faculties to any purpose about it. The Positive Philosophy rules it out of the sphere of lawful inquiry, thought, and belief. In a word, it is blank, avowed, unblushing Atheism. So far from deifying man, it makes him only a refined animal. It signalizes his points of alliance with brutes, while it denies all superior beings to whom he could be allied.

Thus these two forms of desperate unbelief are poles asunder as to all their radical principles. Yet they originate in the same evil heart of unbelief, and they come together in the same antagonism to the very being of God and the gospel of his grace—as streams rising in the same mountains, and flowing down on opposite sides, often find their way to the same ocean. The Positive Philosophy avowedly and purposely un-gods the universe. By so doing, it surely erects man into the Great Supreme, who, since he can swear by no greater, swears by himself. Pantheism, on the other hand, deifies everything in pretension. What is this but to make man the Most High, and to deny that there is any God above nature; *i. e.* any God at all? Pantheism then is only refined Atheism. Both alike, in effect, deify the creature, and disown and claim to annul the Creator.

Of these two philosophies, the Pantheistic has long been familiar to us. Either in its completed form, or in some of the radical principles on which it is based, it had an early and favourable introduction among us; and in one or the other of these forms, has been an operative vital force in American literature and theology. Indeed, the transcendental philosophy, in its extreme as well as its safer forms, found an earlier and wider welcome, and a larger body of expositors and propagand-

ists here, than in Britain. We find it of every shape and hue, from the unmitigated and undisguised Pantheism of the Emerson school, down the descending series of Pantheism in a Christian garb, and Christianity in a Pantheistic garb, till we come to that large class of divines and *literateurs* whose thoughts and style have been somewhat vivified, but not corrupted, by a slight tincture from Coleridge or Carlyle. For those who have mastered these and like authors, instead of being mastered by them, have been frequently benefitted by them; while another large class, who have wanted the sense to separate the precious from the vile, have only caught "the contortions of the sibyl without its inspiration."

The Positive Philosophy, however, has thus far not been sufficiently prominent in this country to command the attention of our chief thinkers. It is, nevertheless, as we shall yet see, insinuating itself surreptitiously, or obtruding itself openly among us, to an extent and through channels that cannot be much longer overlooked or ignored. We observe that it already has attracted a good deal of attention in Britain. It has enlisted there an enthusiastic corps of able expositors and defenders, whose productions are undergoing rapid reprint and circulation among ourselves. Among these, the great work of the inventor and oracle of Positivism, at the head of this article, of course stands pre-eminent. As a precursor and preparative for it, however, we have for some time had Mill's *Logic* extensively current among us; a work of consummate ability and skill, which is designed to train the intellect of our day to those modes of thought which must terminate in the Positive Philosophy. This book is all the more dangerous, as no such purpose is avowed, and it is constructed with admirable skill for averting the suspicions of the student. But that we have not misrepresented its real aim and scope, we hope hereafter to offer ample and undeniable proof. These and affiliated works have already made impression enough in Britain to engage the more recent defenders of theism and Christianity in their refutation. In the late works of McCosh, Tulloch, Thompson, and Bayne, we have observed that Positivism and Pantheism are alike combatted, as the chief adversaries in our day to the religion and the existence of God.

We have said that this Positive Philosophy is Atheism avowed and undisguised. But we do not ask assent to so grave a charge, till we prove it. This, however, would be, of itself, a short and easy task. But we also propose, in connection with this evidence, to present a brief outline and analysis of the radical principles on which this system is based, of the consummation to which it aspires, and of the methods to be adopted for its achievement.

The volume before us is a translation of M. Compte's series of discussions on the Positive Philosophy of which he claims and is conceded to be the father, by Miss Harriet Martineau, a lady already famous for her masculine literary productions, and her strong sceptical tendencies. Such a stupendous undertaking to rob creation of its God, and man of his nobler nature and destiny, seems monstrous in any one. For a woman thus to animalize her race, under the plea of ameliorating it, is absolutely horrible. We observe that the popular authoress, Mrs. Childs, has just published a huge work on the History of Religion, which is strangely recommended by some of our religious journals, in the same paragraphs in which they bear witness that she puts the Bible on a level with Confucius. This hostility to the gospel of truth and love, which has redeemed woman from heathenish debasement, on the part these and other gifted ladies, who are clamorous for the reconstruction of society, and the elevation of their sex, we hardly know how to explain. It was a maxim of Hume, the father of modern scepticism, to whom the Positive school is largely indebted, that "the best things, when perverted, become the worst." We remember a distinguished advocate, who was in the habit of quoting this maxim, with effect, to juries, when he had occasion to break the force of that delicate regard for the sex, which recoils from associating with it coarseness or indecency, scoffing or irreverence.

The animus with which Miss Martineau has undertaken the Herculean task of anglicising this work, appears in the following extracts from the Preface, which are also of value, as showing the interpretation put upon it by its intelligent friends and admirers. Referring to the probable reception of the book, she says: "The theological world cannot but hate a book

which treats of theological belief as a transient state of the human mind. . . . . As M. Comte treats of theology and metaphysics as destined to pass away, theologians and metaphysicians must necessarily abhor, dread, and despise the work. . . . . My hope is, that this book may achieve, besides the purposes entertained by its author, the one more that he he did not intend, of conveying a sufficient rebuke to those who, in theological selfishness or metaphysical pride, speak evil of a philosophy which is too lofty and too simple, too humble and too generous for the habit of their minds." How could a few words vent more hate and bitterness for every form of doctrine which acknowledges the existence of God, and an overruling Providence?

The theory of M. Comte is, that in all the departments of science, *i. e.* of human knowledge and inquiry, the mind passes through three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive, and that, in the last alone, does it rest in a sure conviction of truth, or success in searching for it. "The first is the necessary point of departure for the human understanding; and the third of its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition."

"In the Theological state the human mind seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, Absolute Knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings."

In the Metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (*i. e.* personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena in this stage, is the mere reference of each to its proper entity.\*

"In the final, the Positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself

\* We understand the author to mean by "proper entity" just what we all mean by those forces, powers, causes, instruments, agencies, which God uses to produce phenomena. As when we are warmed by the sun's rays, we refer this effect to some property or power of that luminary.

to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts, is simply the establishment of a connection between simple phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science.” p. 26.

The Theological system, according to him, culminated in Monotheism, or in referring all phenomena to the agency of a single being. The Metaphysical reached perfection likewise when it came to refer all things to a single entity, which it called Nature. The Positive system, in like manner, would be complete, if it could refer all phenomena and laws, *i. e.* uniformities, to some single and all-inclusive uniformity, such as the law of gravity. This, however, is hardly to be expected. The most that M. Comte hopes is, in the ultimate progress of scientific research, to resolve all particular phenomena, and special uniformities or laws, into a few that are general and ultimate.

All sciences, says he, that have reached “the positive stage, bear marks of having passed through the others.” Thus astronomy, which has become more purely Positive than any other, first existed in the form of Astrolatry. Then its phenomena were referred to abstract causes, laws, or entities. Now they are all referred and reduced to those great observed uniformities of succession which we express by the law of gravitation and the law of motion. Fetichism, the superstitious worship of natural forces and objects, then alchemy, and the fruitless search after quiddities and entities, indicate similar successive stages in natural philosophy, chemistry, and other sciences.

According to M. Comte, there is a profound rational necessity for these successive methods of philosophizing adopted by the human mind. In its primitive stage, before as yet any facts had been observed, there could be no legitimate theories, since these can be based only on such observed facts. But says he, “If it is true that every theory must be based on observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance

our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them, for the most part we could not perceive them. Thus, between the necessity of observing facts, in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle, but for the natural opening afforded by theological conceptions." p. 27. Moreover, the human mind inclines to pry into the most inaccessible truths, and to neglect what is within its reach, until by dire experience, it finds the limit of its powers. Hence, at such a period, "there could have been no reception of a positive philosophy, whose function is to discover the laws of phenomena, and whose leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to human reason those sublime mysteries which theology explains." While untaught by experience, the human mind would shrink from the patient examination of facts, because it could not conceive that it would thus be led to the discovery of laws. Hence it sought to leap by a single bound to the knowledge of supernatural agents, which rule over nature, and can shape its workings to suit the needs of their votaries. Thus, it is plain, that the theological stage of knowledge is requisite as a stimulus to that observation of facts, without which there could never be any advance to the positive method, while its inevitable tendency and effect must be to inaugurate that method. So astrology and alchemy induced the observation of facts, which have resulted in bringing physical science to a positive basis.

"This was a spontaneous philosophy, the theological, the only possible beginning, method, and provisional system, out of which the Positive philosophy could grow. It is easy to perceive Metaphysical methods and doctrines must have afforded the means of transition from one to the other. The human mind, slow in its advance, could not step at once from the theological into the positive philosophy. The two are so radically opposed, that an intermediate system of conceptions has been necessary to render the transition possible. It is only in doing this, that metaphysical conceptions have any utility whatever. In contemplating phenomena, men substitute for supernatural direction a corresponding entity. This entity may have been supposed to be derived from the supernatural

action; but it is more easily lost sight of, leaving attention free from the facts themselves, till, at length, metaphysical agents have ceased to be anything more than the abstract names of phenomena. It is not easy to say by what other process than this our minds could have passed from supernatural considerations to natural; from the theological system to the positive." p. 28.

Let it be observed here, that this school rejects and abjures as metaphysical, the hypothesis of laws, forces, properties, considered as "derived from supernatural (*i. e.* divine) action." All these, as science takes on its Positive form, come to be "only abstract names of phenomena," *i. e.* of the registered uniformities of succession.

The sum of the whole is, that the "first characteristic of the Positive philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural *Laws*. Our business is, seeing how vain is any research into what are called *Causes*, whether first or final, to produce an accurate discovery of these laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number." p. 28. By invariable laws is meant, as has already been made to appear, "invariable relations of succession and resemblance." These are the only categories under which the mind can lawfully contemplate phenomena. Causality, substance and quality, necessity and possibility, all *a priori* knowledge is peremptorily disowned as spurious, unless we allow this character to the relations of succession and similitude. As to quality, M. Comte teaches us that it is a modification of quantity. (p. 58.) While Mr. Mill suggests that quantity is a mere form of similitude and dissimilitude.\* Says our author, "Our positive method of connecting phenomena is by one or the other of two relations, that of similitude or succession; the mere fact of such resemblance and succession being all that we can pretend to know; and all that we need to know, for this perception comprehends all knowledge, which consists in elucidating something by something else—in now explaining and now foreseeing certain phenomena, by means of the resemblance or sequence of other phenomena." p. 802. According to this, knowledge and legi-

\* Logic. Harper's edition, p. 49.

timate inquiry are restricted to objects of sense, as contemplated under the categories of succession and resemblance—these being allowed, because they are involved in the very conception of uniformity of sequence in phenomena.

No one can have failed to observe already the arrogant assumptions and the supercilious dogmatism with which Positivism rules out every mode of knowing the invisible, of arguing from the seen to the unseen, from creation to its Creator. But it may be asked, Does it not admit a knowledge of the human mind, which though not cognizable by the senses, is known through its own consciousness? This also is interdicted as abnormal in its character, and treacherous in its results. It is “out of the question to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes. The observed and the observing organ are the same. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect this pause, you cannot observe. If you do effect it, you have nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity. After two thousand years of psychological pursuit, no one proposition is established to the satisfaction of its followers.” p. 27. Thus, after prohibiting all recognition of the spiritual and supersensual without ourselves, he forbids us to inspect our inner nature, where the activity of a thinking immaterial substance unmistakably appears. The fallacy of the pretexts urged in support of the author’s views, is only equalled by their audacity. Every exercise of the human mind is an exercise of consciousness, in which we not only know or feel, or desire, or purpose, but also *know that we thus know, feel, desire, and purpose*. To deny the power of knowing our own thoughts and cognitions, is to deny the power of knowing anything. We may be in doubt of other things; we may even doubt whether our consciousness does not bear witness to a falsehood. But that of which we can never be in doubt, is that we are conscious of what we are conscious. If anything can be inspected or studied, it is this. And is no proposition in Psychology established to the satisfaction of its followers? Will M. Comte claim that it is still a matter of doubt whether men have the power of sensation, external perception, of memory, of association, of conception, of judgment,

of imagination, of ratiocination, and much more, which is past question with all but Sceptics and Positivists?

But how would this school lead us to the knowledge of the human faculties? Locke thought that we could not investigate other subjects with safety and advantage, till we understood the nature and extent of the powers of the instrument with which we investigate. Hence he was led to those psychological inquiries which have given him enduring celebrity. The Positive Philosophy, however, reverses this order. It is going to regenerate the study of the logical laws of mind, by inaugurating the only fit method of investigation. "Every active, and especially every living being, may be viewed under two relations—the statical and the dynamical; that is, under conditions, or in action."

"If we regard these functions (of the mind) under their statical aspect—that is, if we consider the conditions under which they exist—we determine the organic circumstances of the case, which inquiry involves it with anatomy and physiology. If we look at the dynamic aspect, we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philosophy." pp. 32, 33.

Thus one fundamental part of Intellectual Philosophy and Logic is remanded to anatomy and physiology. The other resource is the study of the admitted conclusions which have been reached in physical science (on this scheme the only science,) and the methods by which they have been reached. Thus, says M. Comte, "The illusory psychology, which is the last phase of theology, is excluded." We leave this for the "physiological study of our intellectual organs." No wonder then that he eulogizes Gall as the father of the true method—the Bacon of mental science.\* The grand climacteric to which Positivism brings us in this sublime department, which has tasked the loftiest intellects, from a Plato to a Hamilton, is a wretched *caput mortuum* of craniology. We are turned over from self-inspection and meditation to the dissecting room. Phrenology is *scientia scientiarum*.

\* See pages 381—757.

But in answer to such gross materialism, so dogmatically propounded, we venture to assert that were one to dissect skulls all his days, and spend his life among the tombs, and were he shut out from all view of his own consciousness, he would never get the first glimpse of any mental property, faculty, or exercise. No truth is more evident than that, if we cannot gain a knowledge of the mind from consciousness, we can gain it nowhere. When the science of mind has been thus constructed by a patient study of our own consciousness, we do not dispute that the connection of its faculties with our physical organism, and the form and extent to which the latter conforms to and shadows forth the former, is a fair subject of inquiry. Whether a science of this sort may yet be constructed, remains to be seen. As yet, however, phrenologists, so far from surmounting its difficulties, and meeting its requisite conditions, do not seem, Mr. Mill being judge, even to have conceived them.\* They have thus far made only a flimsy contribution to Materialism, and Positivism, of which Mill, at least, notwithstanding the plaudits of M. Comte, appears quite chary—*Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.*

As to the Dynamical aspects of the mind, these are to be ascertained by a historical survey of what it has accomplished in the various sciences; *i. e.* in physics, for elsewhere it is, as we have seen, a fundamental postulate of this system, that man has accomplished, and can accomplish nothing. Material phenomena furnish the *omne scibile*.

From this survey of the sciences in connection with the developments of our race as shown in history, M. Comte erects a science which he calls Sociology. This exhibits man in his social relations, and thus his moral aspects, so far as the idea of morality can find place in such a system. M. Comte boasts himself as the inventor and constructor of this science. He constantly expresses the sublimest assurance of its rapid growth and speedy ascendancy, to the extinction of theological and metaphysical systems. He fancies that he has placed this on a positive basis, *i. e.* on the basis of an observed uniformity of sequence in the phenomena of society, or of man in his social

\* Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 295, 296.

relations. We, however, drop this topic just now, expecting soon to revert to it, as being the grand consummation in which the whole system culminates.

It is not surprising that M. Compte looks for great and beneficent revolutions from Positivism. Not only is the science of mind to be reorganized—education is to be regenerated not only by teaching in a positive and sure way, but by viewing each science in its relations to all. This, in the third place, will further the progress of each science, because each contains many problems insoluble except as seen in the light of related sciences. Fourthly, it will afford “the only solid basis of Social Reorganization.” Thus this besom of destruction, which begins by sweeping out of existence the divine, the supernatural and supersensual—all religion, and the very basis of morals—proposes to end with the overthrow of all ordinances and institutions in which they are embodied.

With these fundamental principles and purposes, M. Compte proceeds to construct his Positive Philosophy. He commences, (having abolished every religious ministry,) to organize what he calls the “hierarchy of the sciences.” These he sets in the order of their relative complexity and obscurity. With this view he makes one grand division into—1. Science of inorganic; 2. of organic objects. To the former belong in the order of complexity—1. Astronomy; 2. Physics, properly so called; 3. Chemistry. To the latter, 1. Physiology; 2. Social Physics—the former concerning itself with vital organization as it exists in the individual—whether vegetable, animal, or human; the latter with the phenomena exhibited by them as gregarious, which modify their individual properties and workings, and as seen in man, surpass all other things in moment and interest. These sciences thus arranged present an ascending series of increasing complexity, and decreasing generality in their laws. For, says M. Compte, with all his horror of *a priori* principles, “it is clear *a priori* that the most simple phenomena must be the most general: for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases.” p. 44. Thus two or three simple laws run through and determine the whole of astronomy. But they pervade all matter; and they are best seen in their true char-

acter by the study of that science, in which they are most universal and unmixed. In Physics we find all the laws developed by Astronomy mixed with others which complicate them. Therefore this is best understood after a previous training in Astronomy. In like manner Chemistry involves every law of Physics with others in addition. Physiology contains all of Chemistry with the vital, organic element added. Social Physics all of Physiology and much more. Thus each of these sciences requires the study of the preceding as a due preparation for it. It cannot be denied that this arrangement gives evidence of a philosophic mind. It is one among innumerable proofs, that if the system here arrayed against Christianity is in itself contemptible, the ability and tact of its advocates are far from being so. Of course, they allow no place to Metaphysics, Theology, and affiliated sciences. But what, meanwhile, shall be done with Mathematics, which is neither organic nor inorganic, which is in itself purely abstract and immaterial, and yet, without which, no progress can be made in the simplest of the inorganic sciences? M. Comte, after purposely omitting all allusion to them, till the grand distribution which we have noted had been completed, places them first in his ascending series because of their simplicity, universality, and the necessity of employing them in all the succeeding sciences. They are also needful as an intellectual gymnastic to prepare the mind for the due investigation of the departments which follow. This, then, is the ascending series of the hierarchy of the sciences, in the order in which they can be most profitably studied, while each preceding one runs into and pervades that which follows, and thus all tend towards scientific harmony and unity.

But how do the Positivists meet the fact, that while mathematics are the surest, the most positive, the most universal of the sciences, they are nevertheless founded on axioms which are not phenomena perceived by the sense, or deductions from such phenomena, but which, by an intuitive judgment of the mind, are seen to be self-evident, universal, and necessary truths? The Positive philosophy cuts this knot at a single stroke. The first principles of mathematics are not allowed to be intuitive truths. Our very ideas of space itself, and of points, lines, and figures in space, are mere deductions from

sensible experience. The axioms which we take for *a priori* truths are obtained in this way—"After observation has shown us, for instance, the impression left by a body on a fluid in which it has been placed, we are able to retain an image of the impression, which becomes a ground of geometrical reasoning. We thus obtain, apart from all metaphysical fancies, an idea of Space. This abstraction, now so familiar to us that we cannot perceive the state we should be in without it, is perhaps the earliest philosophical creation of the human mind." p. 92. Need we say in answer to all this, that all knowledge of extension got thus, or otherwise by sensation or perception of bodies, is one thing; the intimate and inextinguishable conviction that there is no time in which, no conceivable limits beyond which, space is not, and, in short, that there are no circumstances in which we can conceive its non-existence, is another and very different thing? The idea of body may first be consciously in the mind; it may be the occasion of wakening the notion of space into consciousness, because we see that, although bodies are not space, yet they cannot exist without space to contain them. But the idea of body is not the idea of that space whose non-existence we cannot think. If the notion of space is chronologically posterior, it is logically prior to that of body, because presupposed in order to its existence. Body is conceived as limited, space as unlimited: body as contingent, space as necessary; body as a sensible representation, space as a pure rational conception. With all their contempt for Psychology, Positivists could not help seeing this, if they would interrogate their own consciousness.

We pass now to the "second abstraction which it is indispensable for us to practise—to think of surface and line apart from volume. We effect this by thinking of volume as becoming thinner and thinner, till surface appears as the thinnest possible layer of film; and again, we think of this surface as becoming narrower and narrower till it is reduced to the finest imaginable thread; and then we have the idea of a line. Though we cannot think of a point as a dimension, we must have the abstract idea of that too; and it is obtained by reducing the line from one end or both, till the smallest conceivable portion of it is left. This point indicates, not extension of

course, but position, or the place of extension. Surfaces have clearly the property of circumscribing volumes; lines again, circumscribe surfaces; and lines, once more, are limited by points." p. 93.

This theory breaks down in the very statement. Compare its parts for a moment. Surface is the "thinnest possible layer of film." "Surfaces circumscribe volumes." Is not film, when attenuated to the thinnest, still a volume circumscribed by surfaces? And, according to this genesis of the idea of a surface, is it not that which is included between surfaces? So of a line. Take the finest thread you will; it is still circumscribed by lines and surfaces too. How then can it be a line itself? Or again, take the "smallest conceivable portion" of that line; it has length, breadth, depth, points in proportion. How then, on this theory, can it indicate "position" merely, without extension? The truth is, these boundaries in space are not given in, though they may be suggested by, sensible, external representations. Any such representation is circumscribed by, and cannot constitute, them or any of them. They are forms which the mind conceives, but not objects cognizable by the senses. Visible geometric figures are symbols which suggest them, but are still included in, without *being*, them. Every material, visible, or tangible line, is in reality a minute parallelogram included within other geometric lines. We are so constituted, that the moment we conceive of matter, *i. e.*, substance occupying space, however minute, we cannot but conceive of it as circumscribed by these pure lines, points and surfaces. Positivists themselves admit, that if there be any necessary intuitive truths, they are such as these. They however deny them altogether; yet they cannot reason or discourse long, without implying their existence. Says M. Comte, in this very connection: "We *cannot conceive* of any space, filled by any object, which has not at once *volume, surface, and line.*" Assuredly not; and therefore, and just as surely, we cannot conceive of it except as limited by surface without depth, by lines without breadth, by points without extension.

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

If this system will not hold with regard to the primitive

geometric ideas and definitions, it must of course fail with regard to the origin of mathematical axioms which have a more obvious generality, and are still less implicated, in our conceptions, with sensible representations. We hope, however, in the next article to notice Mr. Mill's memorable attempt to overthrow their attributes of self-evidence and necessity.

Having constituted his ascending hierarchy of the sciences in the order of Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Social Physics, (all others being regarded as branches of these,) M. Comte proceeds to consider the essential characteristics, the historical development, and the present state of these sciences, for the purpose of showing their successive emergence, through the theological and metaphysical, into the positive state, and the degree of approximation to, or distance from, that state, in which they now are. They are in the positive state just in proportion as they have been brought under the rule of invariable laws of sequence, inductively ascertained; as they are prosecuted with a view to the discovery of other similar laws, similarly ascertained, and the mutual interconnection of these with the general laws of other sciences; and above all, in proportion as they have eliminated the theological and metaphysical methods, *i. e.* all reference of phenomena to causes first, second, final, or instrumental, natural or divine. It is not too much to say, that, in this colossal undertaking, the author displays prodigious power—a cyclopaedic mastery of the whole field of physical science—and that he throws out a multitude of original and valuable suggestions, deformed of course, by being connected evermore with the fontal heresies which underlie his whole system, and which the whole survey in question is designed to strengthen. Upon these, we have no time to remark in detail. We gladly hand them over to the masters in the several departments. We must hasten to the crowning science in the series, which more especially concerns us, because it has to do directly with man, as a social, moral, and religious being. We refer to Sociology, which occupies the larger part of the volume. The author boasts that he is the first to put this science on a positive footing, and complains that it has hitherto been exclusively under the dominion of Metaphysics and Theology. Those who have

paid any attention to the foregoing analysis, must have observed, with what ingenuity and thoroughness he has prepared to reduce the phenomena of our spiritual being to a mere branch of physical science, controlled by physical laws and conditions. Indeed he teaches that physiology, biology, and sociology, are all in their nature as capable of mathematical computation as astronomy. But the elements involved in these sciences are so complex and subtle, that we cannot seize all the data (for the present at least) which are necessary to render the calculations reliable. If we could, they would undoubtedly be amenable to mathematical laws. (p. 59.) Thus virtue and vice, holiness and sin, beauty and deformity, liberty and order, magnanimity and baseness, truth and falsehood, can be brought to the test of arithmetic. "The age of chivalry has gone; that of sophists, economists, and calculators has succeeded."

In approaching Sociology from the stand-point of Physiology, M. Comte unceasingly and emphatically reiterates his protestations against the broad and impassable distinction, which Psychologists set up between man and brutes. This, he thinks, arises wholly from the vicious study of man by self-inspection, whereas no such process is possible in case of brutes. The positive method of studying them physiologically and by external observation, would greatly attenuate, if not finally obliterate this distinction. He says, "animals, in the higher parts of the scale, at least, manifest most of our affective and intellectual faculties, with mere differences of degree." p. 383. "The famous theory of the *I*, is essentially without any scientific object, since it is destined to represent a purely fictitious state. There is, in this direction, as I have already pointed out, no other real subject of positive investigation, than the study of the equilibrium of the various animal functions—both of irritability and sensibility. . . . Among superior animals, the sense of personality is still more marked than in man, on account of their more isolated life." p. 385. "There is no other essential difference between humanity and animality, than that of the degree of development admitted by a faculty, which is, by its nature, common to all animal life, and without which it could not even be conceived to exist. Thus

the famous scholastic definition of man as a *reasonable animal*, offers a real no-meaning." p. 386. "On the ground of this hypothesis, it is said that man must have begun like the lower animals. The fact is so—allowing for superiority of organization; but perhaps we may find, in the defects of the inference, a misapprehension of the states of the lower animals themselves. Several species of animals afford clear evidence of speculative activity; and those which are endowed with it attain a kind of gross fetichism as man does, supposing external bodies, even the most inert, to be animated by passion and will." p. 546. "It is a very irrational disdain which makes us object to all comparison between human society and the social state of the lower animals. This unphilosophical pride arose out of the protracted influence of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy; and it will be corrected by the positive philosophy, when we better understand and can estimate the social state of the higher orders of mammifers, for instance." p. 478. "The real starting-point (of our race) is, in fact, much humbler than is commonly supposed, man having everywhere begun as a fetich-worshipper and a cannibal." p. 545.

We have quoted these passagss simply for the purpose of signaling them. They speak for themselves. Of course we are now ready to see M. Comte tracing the philosophical source of the greatest error prevalent in Sociology, to "the great theological dogma of the Fall of Man." On the basis of the principles we have brought to light, he proceeds to evolve the principles of social science. "From Science comes Prevision, from Prevision comes Action," is his favourite motto. By ascertaining from history the social and political organizations under which man has lived, he gathers the laws of Social Statics. By contemplating his course and progress under these organizations, he works out the laws of Social Dynamics. From the nature of the case the two largely interblend. These laws, if truly deduced, will enable us to predict the future, because if applied retrospectively, they would enable us to "predict the past." They can only be relied on for the future, when they will endure this test. But, as in other departments of science, when we know the laws of sequence, we can control and modify results by a due adjustment of such antecedents as are in our power,

(*e. g.*, by a due adjustment of fire, water, and iron, the locomotion results;) so here, by adjusting our social arrangements to the ascertained laws of human action and development, we can control and perfect the future of society. Such will be the benign results which these men predict from the introduction of Positivism into man's ethical and political relations.

According to the fundamental law of the development of every science, Sociology has its three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. As has been the case with other sciences also, so this now is in that state of confusion which results from the intermixture of the three methods. This, however, only shows that it is entering the positive stage, and the others having prepared the way for it, have decayed and are ready to vanish away. The theological stage, too, of human development had a three-fold succession, first of Fetichism, then of Polytheism, then of Monotheism. The Metaphysical also has its three-fold stage; first of Protestantism, or liberty of conscience and private judgment; next, of Socinianism or Deism; and third, of Atheism and referring all phenomena to an entity called Nature—these two last, however, being two downward, suicidal, yet unavoidable strides of Protestantism as well as Metaphysics; for each of the false methods of human science, though provisionally necessary to prepare the way for a higher, and at length for Positivism, yet by its very progress becomes self-destructive.

The hostility of this Philosophy to the doctrine of the Fall, arises manifestly from the repugnance of this truth to this whole scheme of the successive development of the race, from a kind of ourang-outang state, to an approximate perfection commensurate with its advancement in Positive Philosophy. M. Comte attributes the universal tradition of an ancient state of perfection from which the race has degenerated, to a false pride of origin. He thinks the Positive theory of progress from cannibalism to the present condition of civilized nations, a truer ground of pride. We have no doubt of it. This doctrine of a continuous advance toward perfectibility, by the development of our own inherent and unaided powers, coupled with disbelief in superior beings, must of course nurse in man whatever pride arises from regarding himself as the Greatest and Best.

The success of the Positive Philosophy requires that we gain the power of "prevision;" *i. e.* of foreseeing future phenomena. This can only be obtained by ascertaining from observation, the invariable laws which govern man's action in his social relations. But this is impossible, if will, human or divine, have any part in regulating these phenomena; for this would subject them to caprice instead of invariable laws. And hence, the persistency with which Positivism excludes theology and metaphysics from philosophy, and the realities with which they have to do, from existence. "The arbitrary can never be excluded while political phenomena are referred to will, divine or human, instead of being connected with invariable natural laws." p. 435. "If social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible." p. 456. When he elsewhere tells us that the doctrine of Providence is inconsistent with such prevision, he is only declaring the same thing in other words. And the consequence of the whole is, what he asserts in forms innumerable, that man must disown his spiritual and immortal nature and turn atheist, as a prerequisite to the vaunted regeneration of society which Positivism is to usher in.

In evolving his theory, M. Comte takes the most advanced nations, in other words, Christendom, as the supposed theatre in which it is most fully exemplified. In these, as all other nations, man standing as a cannibal, could not avoid "fetichism, which allowed free exercise to that tendency of our nature by which man conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity." p. 545. In the lowest debasement of man, "a certain degree of speculative activity exists which obtains satisfaction in a gross fetichism." "Thus is fetichism the basis of theological philosophy . . . no aberration of theology, but the source of theology itself." pp. 546, 7.

Gross however as fetichism is, it was provisionally necessary as an incentive to that observation and classification of phenomena, which is the beginning of that positive spirit which reduces it first to polytheism, then to monotheism, then to metaphysics, till finally nature is substituted for divinity, and

at last, beneath this hitherto lowest deep, we find a lower still in Positivism.

The *rationale* of this transition from fetichism to polytheism, is thus given. "When certain phenomena appeared alike in various substances, the corresponding fetiches must have formed a group, and at length coalesced into one principle, one, which thus became a god. Thus, when the oaks of a forest, in their likeness to each other, suggested certain general phenomena, the abstract being in whom so many fetiches coalesced was no fetich, but the god of the forest. Thus the intellectual transition from fetichism to polytheism is neither more nor less than the ascendancy of specific over individual ideas, in the second stage of human childhood, social as well as personal." p. 559.

Polytheism, according to M. Comte, had three phases; the "Egyptian or theocratic, the Greek or intellectual, the Roman or military." The destination of the Greek philosophy being to serve as the organ of the irrevocable decline of polytheism, in preparations for the advent of monotheism. . . . The confused sense of the necessary existence of natural laws, awakened by the introduction of geometrical and astronomical truth, was the only means of giving any philosophical consistence to that universal disposition to monotheism which arose from the steady progress of the spirit of observation circumscribing supernatural intervention, till it was condensed into a monotheistic centre." p. 595.

Thus the author reaches Christianity. The light in which he regards it, will soon be seen to correspond with the theories already noted. Meanwhile, a quotation or two, showing his estimate of the Scriptures, will not be out of place. "These considerations point to the little Jewish theocracy derived in an accessory way from the Egyptian, and perhaps also, the Chaldean theocracy." p. 598. He censures Protestantism, as "offering for popular guidance, the most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures—that which relates to Hebrew antiquity." And while he concedes that "the first dawning sense of human progression was inspired by Christianity, which, by proclaiming the superiority of the law of Jesus to that of Moses, gave form to the idea of a more perfect state, replacing a less perfect," nevertheless, he insists that any such pro-

gression was "barred at once by the claim of Christianity, to be the ultimate stage at which the human mind must stop." p. 440. It was a great merit of Romanism that it restricted the media of inspiration, which must be admitted, to some extent, in order to the very existence of theology, to the supreme ecclesiastical authority. "This papal infallibility which has been regarded as such a reproach to Catholicism, was thus, in fact, a great intellectual and social advance." p. 609.

Taking the Roman Church as the grand concrete embodiment of Christianity, M. Comte passes by other churches till he reaches Protestantism, which he regards not so much a form of Christianity, as its annihilation. It is chiefly a negation of Romanism, and it is simply destructive, not constructive. This self-destructive element is inherent in theology, which advances towards perfection, only by a proportionate growth of the positive element, which, in its turn, only advances by eliminating theology itself. "So provisional is the theological philosophy, that, in proportion as it advances, intellectually and morally, it becomes less consistent, and less durable. . . . Fetichism was more deeply rooted than polytheism, yet gave way before it. Polytheism had more intrinsic vigour and a longer duration than monotheism." p. 642. Thus the intellectual activity prevalent among the learned class, always cherished in the bosom of the Roman Church, made continual progress in the observation of phenomena—in the discovery of their uniformities. The speculative mind was, in this way, led to look, more and more, away from will to laws, from God to abstract forces as the causes of phenomena. Thus the way was preparing with constantly increasing rapidity, for supplanting the theological, by the metaphysical or Protestant element, which bridges over the gulf between theology and Positivism.

M. Comte constantly treats Romanism with respect, Protestantism with contempt—so far as their intrinsic merits are concerned. All systems, indeed, are alike to him as rendering provisional service in removing the obstacles to Positivism. In his view the mischievous part of Romanism was its doctrine—the meritorious part its polity. The former is destined to expire. The latter, in substance, will live and constitute a

part of the benignant *regime* of Positivism. Protestantism assailed and broke down the organization of Rome, for its chief work. The doctrinal part of Catholicism it retained with partial and incidental modifications. "The part of Catholicism which was thus destined to expire was the doctrine, and not its organization, which was transiently spoiled through its adherence to the theological philosophy; while, reconstructed upon a sounder and broader intellectual basis, the same constitution must superintend the spiritual re-organization of modern society, except for such differences as must be occasioned by diversity of doctrine." p. 636. Hence Protestantism, retaining as it did only the weaker part of the Roman system, was destined to speedy dissolution—passing through Socinianism and Deism, until it culminated in Atheism, and referred all things to a metaphysical entity called Nature. Thus Protestantism, weak as it is in itself, becomes a powerful coadjutor of Positivism, being first born of its spirit, and then, with suicidal progress, removing every obstacle to its complete ascendancy.\* As to modern Pantheism, our author, with unusual felicity, disposes of it as a refined fetichism, and finds in it a fresh proof of the innate tendency of the human mind to that type of theology.

The metaphysical entities which have been set up to govern society during the revolutionary interregnum between the reigns of Theology and of Positivism, are the rights of man and unbounded liberty of conscience. These, it is claimed, are the ruling forces introduced by Protestantism. They are in their nature revolutionary, and therefore temporary. They simply remove barriers to the speedy enthronement of Positivism. They are neither constructive nor conservative; they avail only for destruction. "Negative as we now see this dogma (liberty of conscience) to be, signifying release from old authority while waiting for the necessity of Positive science, (a necessity which puts liberty of conscience out of the question in astronomy, physics, etc.) the absolute character supposed to reside in it, gave it energy to fulfil a revolutionary destination. This dogma can never be an organic principle; and, moreover, it constitutes an obstacle to re-organization, now that its activity

\* See pages 643, 644.

is no longer absorbed by the demolition of the old political order. . . Can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small number of highly prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds?" pp. 409, 410. To the same category M. Comte refers the dogmas of equality, popular sovereignty, and national independence. Provisionally necessary to the destruction of the old *regime*, and the conservation of society in the interim, they are now hinderances to its proper re-organization!

We think we have now found the clew to M. Comte's meaning, when he teaches, as we have seen, that the valuable element in Romanism was its polity, and that this was spoiled by the Christian doctrine which was mixed with it, while purged of this poison, it is to be restored without taint or abatement during his sociological millennium. The infallibility of the Pope is to be superseded by the infallibility of the Positive Philosophy. The hierarchy of Rome is to be supplanted by a hierarchy of atheistic speculatists. Pope Pius and his successors are to be displaced by Pope Comte and his successors, disobedience to whose decrees and fulminations is no more to be tolerated, than disbelief in the principles of astronomy! If liberty of conscience is to be cloven down, we would greatly prefer the iron sceptre of one who owns his accountability to the Most High, from whom he claims to hold his power, to the remorseless tyranny of the atheist, who knows none higher than himself!

But how are the nations, after having cast off the yoke of civil and spiritual despotism, to be induced to submit to this more terrible bondage? This problem is easily solved by M. Comte. The law of human progress, as inductively shown by all past history, is, that the social development of the race follows in the track of its more advanced speculative thinkers. It is, therefore, established with as much certainty and positiveness, and as full a claim to the assent of men, as the laws of astronomy, physics, etc., that the most advanced thinkers should be installed and obeyed as the guides and counsellors of society. They need not indeed be the formal civil rulers of the

nations. They will hold a relation to civil government analogous to that which the Roman hierarchy has held—a power behind the throne, greater than the throne itself; or like that which science holds to art. As artists are controlled by men of science, because they see the truth and evidence of the principles the former discover and propound; so “we see by the universal admission of scientific truths, notwithstanding their opposition to religious notions, how irresistible will be the sway of the logical force of demonstration when human reason attains maturity; and especially when its extension to moral and social considerations shall have imparted to it its full energy.” p. 773. Thus there is every reason to suppose, that what first establishes itself as true in single superior minds, will also establish itself in the mind of collective humanity. As the sailors obey the captain, the captain his compass, and the maker of the compass the discoveries of science; so under the positive *regime*, “all in their several order and manner,” will obey the dictates of the hierarchy of intellect, because they will carry with them demonstrative evidence. The new system is to teach men, “that there is a public utility in the humblest office of coöperation, no less truly than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labours were but systematized, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honour of a share in the general economy.” p. 774. With a coolness, which, if not sublime, is ridiculous, says M. Comte, “I will venture to say, that sociological science, though first established by this book, already rivals mathematical science itself, not in precision and fecundity, but, in positivity and rationality.” p. 803. And much more of the like.

But we cannot extend our quotations further. We have in a few pages, aimed to give a faithful, though necessarily inadequate, exhibition of the fundamental principles of the Positive Philosophy. When it is considered that the unfolding of the system by its author, as given in this volume, occupies more than eight hundred closely printed octavo pages, our readers will make due allowance for any omissions of importance which have occurred, whether through inadvertence or necessity. Yet we certainly have endeavoured, and hope we have not entirely

failed, to give a fair and just exhibition of the radical principles and peculiarities of the system. As to all that is most momentous, our readers can judge whether the quotations we have given are explicable on any supposition, except the construction we have put upon them—a construction which we do not hesitate to say is borne out by the entire scope, and the minuter details of the work.

Our object in thus presenting the outlines of the system, as a compact whole, and with due authentication, has been not to present an argumentative refutation of it. Such gross atheism and materialism must stand self-refuted with the readers of this journal, who may be presumed to be theists and Christian believers. We have rather desired to let them know what the system is, in its principles, reasonings, and results, that they may the more readily detect them, as they furtively insinuate themselves into the literary, philosophic, scientific, and educational works of our day. As some conception of the drifts of modern Pantheism is requisite to an intelligent appreciation of the origin, reach, and animus of pantheistic ideas, as they run, like veins in marble, through certain descriptions of theology, philosophy, and literature, so a similar knowledge of the great principles of Positivism is requisite to a due discernment and estimate of the virus, when it partly conceals that it may the better insinuate itself, in powerful and influential treatises. A memorable work of this sort is Mill's *Logic*, as we purpose to show in our next article.

We would not be understood as disparaging the ability of M. Compte's great work, or of the auxiliary productions of his coadjutors, when we treat them as needing not so much laboured refutation as exposure.

The encyclopediac scientific knowledge displayed in this work, the many profound, striking, and comprehensive thoughts of which it is prolific, will ensure for it consideration and influence, in spite of its atheism. Not only so: so far as it is within the compass of human ability to render such monstrous doctrines plausible and current, that ability is here displayed. All that we mean to intimate is, that our readers need not arguments to fortify them against a system which teaches either that phenomena are in such a sense "uniform and invariable"

as to be unalterable by the Almighty; or that so far as they possess uniformity, they are therefore incompatible with a reigning God and a superintending providence, (of which they are rather the instruments and illustrations;) that man can attain any "prevision" and control of the future, which is not either revealed from above, or liable to be dashed by a thousand contingencies, beyond either his foresight or his power; that when men come to the positive knowledge of the principles of social order and right conduct, they will of course freely obey them; that man is only a superior brute; that society is to be advanced to perfection by the extinction of Christianity and all religion; that effects were without causes; qualities without substance; the body without a soul; the universe without a God.

Nor do we imply that we think there is no danger of this system spreading to any serious extent. If absurdity were a sure guaranty of harmlessness, all systems of scepticism would be impotent. But their power lies not so much in any pretended proofs and demonstrations, as in the heart of sinful man, not willing to retain God in its knowledge.

No system of atheism or infidelity indeed is likely to be permanent. In the long run, their folly shall be so manifest, that they will shame their abettors, and can "go no further." Yet, if not lasting, it may be wide-spread, and its blighting effects may be both broad and enduring. Atheism, and materialism, propagated first by a band of speculatists, diffused itself through the masses of the French people, and combined with the madness induced by oppression, to precipitate and aggravate whatever was terrible in the French Revolution. Although the forms of unbelief have changed, yet the scepticism of the French Revolution was not confined to the limits of that age or nation. In the Positive Philosophy it has its resurrection. No man ever more completely argued away the primitive and irresistible judgments of the human race, than Hume. Yet no philosopher ever gave a more decisive bias to speculation, whether among supporters or adversaries. The influence of his shrewd and astute speculations still lives, and even the Positive Philosophy is little else than the following out of his principles to their logical result—the superstructure, of which he laid the foundations, reared and made imposing with the aid of

materials borrowed from modern science. The folly and absurdity of a system which ministers to the ungodly propensities of fallen man, will not deprive it of adherents among the high and the low, philosophers and the vulgar. Surely we must be convinced of this, when we see entire schools of philosophers, devoted to the propagation of the whole spawn of mystical and profane German absurdities, from infinite egoism to infinite nihilism. It is the essential characteristic of them all, that "professing to be wise they become fools." Pantheistic infidelity and atheism offer an attractive side to men's moral corruption and intellectual pride, not only by undermining accountability, but by their mysticism, their profound inanities, and meaningless platitudes. The Positive Philosophy, in its turn, by its clearness and narrowness, its show of evidence and demonstration, its "mock humility" in giving up all pretence of knowing anything, not evident to the senses, will not be without its attractions, not only for sceptical minds of the sensational school, but for the uneducated and unthinking, the socialist and the sensualist. Miss Martineau and M. Comte are loud in their protestations against the reproaches that have been hurled at their philosophy, for the "lowness of its aims." For ourselves, if mankind should cease thus to reproach it, we should take it for a strong symptom of the tendency of the race towards that cannibalism and brutality which this school makes its starting point.

Irreconcilable as Pantheism and Positivism are in their principles and methods, there is a wondrous confluence or similarity in their practical results. With both alike, the race is a great social unit, a collective man, to which the individuals composing it are but as the sparks on the anvil to the iron whence they fly, as the chips of the sculptor to the statue he makes, by chiselling them off.\* All the phases of opinion and practice, even the foulest abominations that have ever prevailed, have been good and true for their day and generation; just as good and true for the time, as Christianity, which like them, is evanescent in the end. There is no such thing as

\* See an able Article, entitled "Realism Revised," in the last "*New Englander*," and Comte *passim*.

absolute and immutable truth. It is the boast of M. Compte, that, on his theory, truth is not absolute but relative—just what observed uniformities of phenomena happen to make it, to each individual, a mere dress, varying with every change of circumstance, and grade of intelligence. How well this accords with the style of modern pantheists, to whom all opinions and religions are equally true, and who can accept as many creeds as are offered them, all understand, alas, too well. But by whomsoever held or taught, such opinions sap the foundations of all responsibility, religion and morality, and of all real earnestness in the investigation of truth. For how shall men seek that, in whose existence they have no faith?

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ART. IV.—*A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*: Being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill. Now York: Harper and Brothers. 1855.

ACCORDING to the intimation given in the article on the Positive Philosophy, we now invite the attention of our readers to an examination of Mill's Logic. This is no ordinary book. False or true, pernicious or salutary, for better or for worse, it is, like the great work of Compte, to which it is auxiliary, of an order of which no single generation produces more than one. Indeed, while a rapid succession of treatises, from different hands, on Logic as a whole, or on some of its controverted questions, has appeared, since the memorable work of Whately, which, by universal consent, has done more than all else to restore this branch to its proper place in education, the whole put together do not, in our opinion, contain as much clear, close, and deep thinking, as the work under consideration. The six hundred formidable octavo pages of fine, closely set type, which this edition contains, are guiltless of vapid generalities, barren repetition, verbose diffuseness, or, with reference to the objects the author had in view, waste matter of any sort.

Having thus shown that we are neither unable nor indis-