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- ART. I.—1. *Synopsis Evangelica. Ex quatuor Evangeliiis ordine chronologico concinnavit, prætexto brevi commentario illustravit, ad antiquos testes apposito apparatu critico recensuit Constantinus Tischendorf.* Lipsiæ, 1851. 8vo.
2. *Synopsis Evangeliorum Matthæi, Marci, Lucæ, cum locis qui supersunt parallelis litterarum et traditionum evangelicarum Irenæo antiquiorum. Ad Griesbachii Ordinem concinnavit, prolegomena, selectam Scripturæ varietatem, notas, indices adjecit Rudolphus Anger, Phil. et Theol. Doctor, utriusque in Acad. Lips. Professor, etc.* Lipsiæ, 1852. 8vo.
3. *A new Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, comprising a Synopsis and a Diatessaron, together with an Introductory Treatise, and numerous tables, indexes, and diagrams, supplying the necessary proofs and explanations.* By William Stroud, M. D. London, 1853. 4to.
4. *A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels, consisting of a parallel and combined arrangement on a new plan, &c.* By James Strong, A. M. New York, 1852. 8vo.
5. *A Harmony of the Gospels in the Greek of the Received Text, on the plan of the author's English Harmony, with the most important various readings, &c.* By James Strong, A. M. 1854. 12mo.
6. *The Four Witnesses: being a Harmony of the Gospels on a new principle.* By Dr. Isaac Da Costa, of Amsterdam. Translated by David Dundas Scott, Esq. New York, 1855. 8vo.

THERE is something strange in the unwearied constancy with which the Church, in every age, has wrought at the great

ART. V.—*Intellect, the Emotions, and the Moral Nature.* By Rev. William Lyall, Free College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1855.

OUR Scotch brethren, wherever they go, betray their characteristic instincts. They soon take rank for their industry and enterprise, their honesty and integrity, their consequent success in the various spheres of life, and importance as members of society. All this is largely due to the fact, that they are no less forward and emphatic in manifesting their quenchless love of Christianity, under the type commonly known as Calvinism in doctrine, and Presbyterianism in government. They evince the spirit and power of this sort of religion in the active interest they take in education, especially in such institutions as are requisite for the Christian instruction of their children, and the effective training of learned and able Christian ministers. Wherever the Scotch colonize, they carry these distinctive principles and institutions with them. Dr. Duff has afforded a stupendous exemplification of the *ingenium perfervidum Scotorum*, in these respects, on Missionary ground. And, aside from the monuments of their zeal in these things, which abound in our country, we find fresh indications of it in the colleges and other institutions for liberal culture and ministerial training, which they are rearing up in the British provinces, although, as yet, they form but a fragment of their population. Our knowledge of Knox College in Toronto, and of the Free College in Halifax, is derived solely from the published productions of their Professors. From each of these institutions disquisitions upon psychology and metaphysics have emanated, which show that this department is prosecuted in them with an earnestness and ability rarely surpassed, and that the Scotch mind loses none of its characteristic relish and keenness for these subtle and sublime investigations, by migrations to new abodes. This is happily and forcibly evinced in the volume of Mr. Lyall, now before us, which gives us our first and only knowledge of him.

This volume displays a freshness, vivacity, independence, together with a general justness and sanity of thinking on these

subjects, which adapt it, in an unusual degree, to general reading, while they indicate some of the most important requisites of the teacher. Indeed, he often expatiates with a fulness of illustration, and a scope of free discourse on the remoter bearings of the principles discussed, which, however interesting and instructive to the general reader, swell the volume to an inconvenient bulk, and make us feel a want of the precision and compactness so requisite in discussions on such subjects. With all its merits, it seems to us that the book would be greatly improved by condensation. Diffuseness is its greatest blemish, and we hope the author will take it as we mean it—not as an offence, but a kindness—if we add, that his style, notwithstanding many salient and pithy passages, which redeem it as a whole, betrays a certain looseness and negligence which not only tend to diffuseness, but even a slovenly obscurity, hardly excusable in such a volume on such a subject. We give an instance or two, to show our meaning:

“What may be desirable in one respect, may not be desirable in another; and if the non-desirableness in the one respect prevails over the desirableness in the other, even the desirableness itself is not really desirable. We prefer something on the ground of some other of the active principles of our nature; even while certain of our active principles would lead us to a different choice, makes something else really the object of our desire.” P. 565.

“Taking beauty in its widest sense as inclusive of sublimity, the picturesque, or whatever appeals to the aesthetic emotion—that is, whatever may have more or less of the beautiful and the sublime, and the picturesque—be made up, more or less of each, or any two of them to the exclusion of the third.” p. 576. We should, of course, refer such paragraphs to some freak of the types, were they not too frequent, and were there not so many other indications of a looseness in the structure of sentences, more tolerable in the freedom of extemporaneous oratory, than in an elaborate, heavy volume on metaphysics. We have signalized this point, because it needs only care for its correction. Such care, we are sure, would add to the reputation and usefulness of those future productions of which we trust the present is only the earnest.

As psychology is the science of the soul's phenomena, it holds an intimate relation to theology generally, which, although centring in God as its prime source, object, and end, concerns itself largely with the human soul as being made in the image of God, to the end that it may serve, glorify, and enjoy him for ever. This is eminently true of Christian theology, which relates distinctively to God's method of glorifying himself in the salvation of the human soul. From the necessity of the case, the views which men entertain of the faculties and operations of the soul, (i. e. questions in mental and moral philosophy,) must, as it always has done, give a strong bias to all their thinking in regard to theology in all its departments of anthropology and soterology. Our conceptions of the nature of the thing saved, must affect our views of the nature and method of its salvation. He who has fixed views of the "Intellect, Emotions and Moral Nature," as treated in this volume, has taken a long stride towards determining his whole system of theology.

So far as Metaphysics occupy any ground not strictly included in Psychology, and verge towards Ontology, i. e., so far as they deal with the necessary, possible, or contingent relations and grounds of phenomena, in short, with the metaphenomenal, whether in the realms of matter or mind, it is manifest that they are constantly touching the very fundamentals of all theology—all religious faith. This is evident enough, if we look at some of the most elementary questions in this science. Thus, if with the empirical school, we say that we can cognize nothing but phenomena, we are at once driven to the atheism of the Positive Philosophy; while, at the opposite pole, Pantheism develops itself in the fiction that God is the only substance of which all else are phenomena. The theory of Hume and Brown, which resolves cause into mere antecedence, by eliminating the element of power and dependence from the relation of cause and effect, is fatal to that great argument for the being of God, which ascends from the creation to the Creator, from dependent and final causes to the First Great Efficient. If all events are not due to some power which produces them, then it is impossible to deduce the existence of things not seen from the things which do appear.

So, if the true doctrine of personal identity be denied, we not only undermine the resurrection of the body, but all moral responsibility. If there be no true substance underlying, supporting, unifying the qualities of objects, then all existence becomes an unreality—only a grand phantasmagoria. If right be not an ultimate, irreducible fact, idea, or truth, we have nothing left but Epicureanism and Utilitarianism. If it be impossible that truth should be communicated to the mind from without, unless it have been already grasped by its own inward intuitions, then all increase of our knowledge by testimony is impossible, and the idea of an external authoritative revelation is chimerical. This is only a condensed statement of the theory of Morell and others of the Schleiermacher school, which has already found a wide and cordial welcome.

The turn which metaphysical science is taking for the time being, can never, therefore, be without the deepest interest to theologians and Christians. This must be all the more so, in proportion as the points agitated touch the fundamentals of natural and revealed religion, and of Christian experience. It is with special reference to this fact, that we propose to notice our author's resolution of some of the hinge-questions lying on the debatable border, where mental, moral, and metaphysical philosophy interblends with revealed religion. Hence, we shall give our attention chiefly to the third and last part of the book, which relates to the "moral nature." We will, however, first call attention to a few of the positions taken in the previous sections.

We fully agree with the author, that our consciousness is "the starting point of philosophy," and we think it deserves to be enunciated with all the emphasis belonging to an axiomatic truth. But when he pronounces consciousness "the only immediate object of cognition,"* we think he strains the doctrine too far. We know the existence and the externality of the table we touch, just as immediately as we know our own consciousness. We not only know that it is, but that it is a *non-ego*, a substance distinct and separate from ourselves. Says Mr. Lyall, "I have sensations, impressions, ideas; how do I know that

* See Table of Contents, p. 1.

these are anything more than sensations, impressions, ideas?" (p. 14.) Sure enough. But suppose that in addition to these subjective states, or modifications of self, I also cognize an external object, or an intuitive truth, (as that no two bodies can fill the same space at the same moment,) do I not know these things as immediately as I know my own consciousness? What is my consciousness here but a consciousness of immediately knowing these and other like things: and is it here a false witness? How, then, shall it be trusted for anything? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. All our knowledge is obtained either by intuition or deduction. But it is so evident as to be universally conceded, that all deduction must depend ultimately on what we know by intuition, else it is like a chain without a staple. If consciousness then be "the only immediate object of cognition," how can we, by deduction or inference, ever get beyond it? We are reminded of the curt answer of Dr. Emmons to a young clergyman, who asked him why so many ministers had few or no inferences at the end of their sermons. He replied, "because they have nothing to infer from." If all that the author means is, that it is only in and through our consciousness as a condition of all our mental states, that we are aware of the immediate knowledge of other things, this is not only true, but a truism. And this would seem to be what he has in view, if we may judge from such passages as the following, in his argument. "Even those principles which are perceived by pure reason, and are first truths of the mind, are known only as they are the subjects of consciousness." (P. 15.) But it is none the less unwarrantable, notwithstanding, to say that they are not "objects of immediate cognition." The mind is conscious that it knows them immediately, and not by indirection; consciousness, indeed, is simply the knowledge that it so knows them. The author contends with good ground against Dr. Brown, that we perceive external objects by an intuition, i. e., by immediate knowledge. (P. 24.) This is the truth, and our only defence against the idealism of Hume and Berkeley. But we see not how we can hold it, without conceding that somewhat beside consciousness is the "immediate object of cognition."

We are glad to find Mr. Lyall strenuously contesting the theories of Brown, which eliminate the element of power from

the idea of cause, and corporate it into mere antecedence. And we are no less rejoiced to find that in doing this, he does not swing over to the opposite extreme—of late, the fashion of some theistic advocates—of resolving all power and causality into the immediate exercise of the divine efficiency. The following extract will show that the author comprehends the scope and reach of this question, while it affords a happy illustration of the general soundness and freedom from extravagance, of his thinking :

“Every subordinate agency holds of God, but it is an agency ; it has an independent action, or there is no subordinate agency ; and Spinozism or Pantheism are the true theories of the universe, making God to be all, or all to be God. In this view, then, subordinate agency is absolutely necessary in the universe ; and there must be a consistency between independent subordinate agency, and yet a divine agency on which that subordinate and independent agency is still dependent. This looks like a contradiction to which our reasons must succumb. It is what we observe ; it is the phenomenon exhibited in *creation*. Creation is the Creator calling into existence agencies besides himself ; to give them independent action was not surely impossible, otherwise God is still all, and creation is, as Spinoza makes it, the effluence of God, and nothing apart from Him—but a mode of the divine action and not distinct from God.” Pp. 590–1.

We quote this with the more satisfaction, as we have felt called upon to say substantially the same things in reference to the position taken on this subject by a recent school of theistic writers. We also notice with pleasure that he resists the Kantian theory, espoused also, as we are surprised to find, by Whewell, that space and time are purely subjective, mere forms of thought. For, although, with our limited faculties, it is hard to say whether they are either substances or mere attributes, yet it is simply absurd to say that the distance across the ocean, or the time passed over in the history of the world, are mere forms of our own thoughts, having no objective reality without ourselves. It is a mode of thinking which tends to, and has often issued in, sceptical idealism.

We cannot pass over the author's remark, that Sir William

Hamilton's resolution of the doctrine of causality into "our impotence to conceive the possibility of an absolute commencement," means merely the impossibility of conceiving an effect without a cause. P. 75.

The truth is, that every effect or event is a commencement or beginning of something new, which did not exist before, either in substance or in form. It is just this commencement or beginning to be of something that was not, that the mind undertakes to account for, when it postulates a cause, or asserts that every event must have had a cause. But the idea that there could have been no beginning, so far from accounting for the fact, simply denies it; so far from explaining the idea of causation, virtually annihilates both cause and effect. If this were like many other things of the sort, a mere ingenious speculative figment, having no further reach, we should not deem it worthy of even this casual notice. But it seems to us impossible, on this theory, to preserve any substantial distinction between Creator and creatures. Do not man and nature thus become mere forms, developments, phenomena of the one eternal God? How then shall we escape the Monism or Pantheism of Hegel. We have noticed that several writers have objected to Hamilton's theory of causation, as invalidating the great argument for the being of God, which ascends from the universe of effects to one great First Cause. We think that it is objectionable on this score; but we think it still more so, as tending to that Pantheism which is the worst form of Atheism—although the great metaphysician meant not so, and, doubtless, detested this philosophic abomination as heartily as we. Let the following passage, among others which occur in his discussion of this subject, show whether we have spoken in our haste.

"Now, we are unable to think, that the quantity of existence of which the universe is the conceived sum, can be either amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, of the creation of a world; this, indeed, as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination

at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than the moment before there existed in the Deity alone? This we are unable to imagine."* It may be due to our own obtuseness. But we are unable to see why this does not make the creation a mere emanation from God, and consubstantial with him.

We do not see that the author's analysis of the cognitive faculties, generally interesting and able, calls for further observations. Nor shall we stop to examine the sections on the emotions, although of course we might note some things that we do not endorse in a disquisition, which, as a whole, we heartily approve. What we wish to say in regard to our emotional faculties, will appear in our observations upon the last section relative to the moral nature, which reaches through the powers of intelligence, feeling, and will.

The first and most fundamental question in Moral Philosophy respects the nature of virtue, right, moral goodness, and moral obligation. If an author goes astray here, we take little interest in following him further. All the various theories on this subject may be distributed into two classes—those which make right an original, simple idea, or quality, irreducible to any elements more simple and original—and those which make it a derivative from, and dependent on, other things of which it is compounded, or to which it is a means. All attempts to analyze the idea of right into anything other, simpler or better than itself, be it happiness, individual or general, utility, the fitness of things, sympathy, conformity to truth, respect for our own excellency, must of necessity fail. They presuppose the very idea they are intended to explain. For, why am I obliged to pursue utility, or my own or other's happiness, unless because it is morally right? The feeling of obligation to conform to truth or fitness of things, presupposes the idea of right, and that the mind has already the knowledge of moral truth and moral fitness. Sympathy is worthless, unless it be sympathy with

* Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, by Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, pp. 582-3.

right, and deference to our own spirits; excellency supposes that we have already a standard of excellence. But the fault of these schemes, as mere speculations, is not the worst. Every such analysis vitiates the conception of virtue itself, and, to the full extent of its influence, becomes the bane of morals, theology, and piety. We are glad to see that Mr. Lyall strenuously and ably maintains this view, and insists that the moral idea or quality is "ultimate." A treatise is always welcome to us which makes any contribution to the support of this precious truth. The grosser forms of opposition to it, which were so rife in theological discussion a few years ago, have given way before earnest conflict, aided by the self-affirming intuitions of the soul. But, if we no longer encounter Epicurean or Utilitarian ethics, we find ourselves confronted with laboured efforts to build morality upon the fitness of things, or deference to our own excellency, put forth by distinguished metaphysical professors and speculatists. In these matters, the thing that has been, is the thing that shall be, and we can look for nothing less than ceaseless combat with exhumed errors in the guise of new discoveries.

There is an incidental question connected with this subject which our author seems to us to have treated less happily. In vindicating the truth that moral distinctions are intrinsic, immutable, and eternal, such as no mere will can make or unmake, he occasionally uses language which seems to us unnecessary and unsafe. He pronounces the distinction "independent of God himself." "Were it to depend even upon the nature of God, it would lose half its worth, might we not say all its worth?" P. 491. "It is not too much to put this law then, not above God, but in a place of authority, in which it can be regarded apart from Him, and as of eternal and immutable obligation." P. 493.

Now we think it will not answer thus to set up a standard "apart from" God, and which does not "depend upon the nature of God," by which he himself is to be tried, and to which he is thus subject. It is certainly unnecessary. Right is none the less uncreated, eternal, immutable, in its origin and nature, although the first norm and standard thereof be the moral perfection of the Divine Nature itself. Is not this

uncreated, eternal, and immutable, and so far from being contingent on mere will, the very standard to which God's will freely and unchangeably conforms? There is no necessity then, to go beyond God in order to find a standard of rectitude that is intrinsic, and independent of mere will or caprice. To have an origin superior to mere will, is by no means the same with being "independent of God." Wisdom and truth are independent of mere will. They are intrinsic. Are they, then, independent of God? Is there any wisdom, or truth, or standard thereof, which has not its source, model, law, in the eternal and infinite wisdom and truth of God? Must God take lessons of or bow to some standard of wisdom and truth without, and therefore above himself? And is there any more reason why he should pay obeisance to any standard of morality or other excellence "apart from" himself? We more than suspect not. And we more than suspect that reverent people, the longer they ponder the matter, will agree with us.

If there be any such eternal standard of truth, wisdom, or rectitude outside of God, where is it to be found? Is it in some other eternal mind? And are there thus more Gods than one—a God over the Supreme God? But if it be not in such an eternal mind, where or how in the universe can it exist, or be conceived to exist? Tell who can. There is no need that zeal in combatting one error, should urge us to the opposite and equally dangerous extreme. The fiction of a standard or law of right "apart from" God, logically tends to more Gods than one. And although there may be little danger of its running this extravagant length, yet it lends great countenance to those who would set up the useful, the fit, the pleasant, the true, the beautiful, the good, or some favourite ideal of their own minds, as the ultimate law of rectitude, by which they presume to govern themselves, and test the merits of the divine law itself. Those who think that the revealed law of God needs amendment in conformity to such fancied standards, and who thus refuse to take the yoke and learn of Christ, are not now, nor ever, few. Withal, it seems to us, that the doctrine that God's glory, or the manifestation of his perfections, is the proper ultimate end of his own acts, as well as of the acts of all intelligences, can hardly

stand before the principle that he is subject to a standard or law apart from or superior to himself. In short, this principle seems to us to lower God, and in various ways to work a degradation of theology and piety. For ourselves, we desire no higher source or standard of goodness, than God's infinite and eternal goodness; no better security than "What he does is ever best," than that he cannot deny Himself; no surer object of trust than Him for whom it is impossible to lie; no safer refuge than Him who, since he could swear by no greater, sware by Himself.

The quality of right, our author justly holds, is perceived by the moral faculty, or conscience, or understanding, judging in reference to moral objects—for all these terms denominate the same mental power. So far, this faculty is intelligent and rational. It is no mere blind instinct or sensibility, as some would have it. But the judgments of this faculty have this peculiarity, that they are attended with correspondent emotions, pleasing in reference to right actions, painful in reference to the opposite. But because emotions follow moral judgments, it does not hence follow that they are the essence or basis of those judgments to which they are consequent. This were to install a mere unintelligent impulse as the rightful sovereign to rule our conduct. As has been well observed, this faculty is quite analogous to that of taste, which first perceives beauty or deformity in objects, and is then followed by an emotion, pleasant or painful, occasioned by that perception.

This subject is important, not only because it behoves man, as a rational being, to be under the government of a rational faculty, but because it bears upon the whole question of the relation of the emotional to the cognitive powers. It is often said by mystics, and divines of the intuitional or transcendental school, that religious emotions and affections are the sources and conditions of our knowledge of religious truth; that this truth cannot be known otherwise than by Christian experience; that theology is only the systematic development of the results of that experience; that it cannot be derived from external revelation, since this can teach us only what we know by our experience of religious feelings and intuitions; that this inward experience is the true inspiration, which, therefore, all Chris-

tians have as really, if not as strongly, as the sacred writers; that hence the true standard of faith is subjective within us, not any objective revelation. These men are wont to speak with great emphasis of the "perceptive power of Christian love." It is easy to see, that on such a system, the normal authority of the word of God is a nullity. The only authoritative law to each man is his own feelings and preferences.*

Of the many things which might be said in refutation of this dangerous system, all the more dangerous because it so artfully simulates and perverts to its own interest, the great Christian fact of the necessity of spiritual illumination and Christian experience, we wish now simply to signalize one. It is this. Emotion follows and results from intellectual apprehension. It is not the cause or ground of such apprehension. Whenever the soul moves or is moved in the form of feeling, desire, inclination, or affection, it is in view of some object so apprehended that it thus moves, or is moved. The reverse process of first loving or hating an object, and then perceiving it, is simply an absurd contradiction of our own consciousness. Christian feelings, emotions, and affections are awakened and moulded by the perception and belief of Christian truth. They are Christian only in so far as they are actuated by and conformed to that truth. The "perceptive power of Christian love" is what is implied in the love of truth already perceived. So far from doing away with the necessity of an external standard, it is by its conformity to the Scriptures that we can determine this or any other affection to be Christian.

Many reason about the emotions, as if they were precisely like the bodily sensations or animal appetites—blind, unintelligent feelings or impulses. Sensation precedes and is conditional to the perception of external objects. In touch and vision, for example, the sensation felt precedes, and is requisite to the perception of the object causing it. But even here, the stronger and more obtrusive the sensation, the weaker is the perception, and *vice versa*. The one is inversely as the other, as Hamilton has acutely observed. In vision the sen-

* See Morell's Philosophy of Religion; also Dr. Bushnell's Discourse on Dogma and Spirit.

sation is seldom noticed. The object seen commands the entire attention. In taste and smell, the sensation is the obtrusive thing; in the latter case, the perception of the object causing the sensation is only indirect and inferential. Thus even if the resemblance between bodily sensation and mental emotion were closer than it is, it would furnish but a slender basis for the system which derives intelligence from feeling; since the intelligence would grow weak as the feeling grows strong. But in fact all mental emotion or feeling is consequent upon, and shaped by the intellectual view which excites it. It does not produce, it is dependent on the cognition.* This simple fact, to go no further, overturns this whole mystical and infidel theory, which exalts our own feelings above the written word. This latter view goes to derationalize man, by deriving his intelligence on the highest subjects from unintelligent emotion and shapeless impulse. In an equal degree, it compromises his proper dignity and responsibility.

There is another aspect of the emotions in regard to moral and spiritual objects, which bears strongly on this whole subject. We have said that the emotions are awakened by the perceptions of the intellect. There are many objects which may be known or apprehended in part, so that a certain order of emotions will arise toward them, while they are not apprehended in reference to those higher qualities which alone will call forth those higher and more appropriate emotions, of which these objects are every way worthy. This is especially true of the moral and æsthetic emotions. How many know all about *Paradise Lost*, the finest products of nature or art, except their exquisite beauty, or if they know this, know it only by the testimony of others, not by any personal discernment or appreciation? Of course, they have none of the corresponding emotions of love, delight, and admiration. Precisely the same thing occurs with regard to spiritual truths and divine objects. The unregenerate man often has a conviction of the truth and excellence

* Says our author, (p. 522) "The right is what is *worthy* of these emotions, not merely *what excites* them. The right is an *object of perception*, not merely *what produces an emotion*; it is an object of reason, not of feeling, but so an object of reason that it cannot be seen without feeling; it is perceived, but it cannot be perceived without emotion."

of the Scriptures, and of the consequent obligation to obey the gospel. But he discerns not the divine beauty, glory, and loveliness of it. He may have heard, and may believe, on testimony that these qualities are in it, but he does not discern them for himself. The difference is like that between knowing the sweetness of honey by hearing of it, and by tasting it, between knowing the beauties of a picturesque region by seeing them with an appreciative eye, and believing that they exist from competent testimony. Now, in regard to the spiritual objects and divine truths set forth in the Bible, it is doubtless true that the natural man may know everything, short of what is involved in the personal intuition of their transcendent beauty and loveliness, which alone can draw forth his heart in love, trust, delight, and admiration. That which is most important in them, he has no power to perceive, till the eyes of his understanding are enlightened, that he may know what is the hope of his calling, what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints. There is no form nor comeliness in Christ to his view, that he should desire him. Hence the strict and literal truth of those strong representations in the Bible, of the impotence of the natural man to discern the things of the Spirit, and of his need of spiritual illumination. These passages are plausibly cited by the mystic and intuitional school of rationalists now prevalent, in proof that the gift of inspiration is still continued, and bestowed on all Christians, and that we must look to our own experience instead of the Bible for the truth; in short, that an authoritative external revelation is impossible. As well might it be said that the blind man, whose eyes are opened, is to look to himself and not to the landscape, to ascertain and determine its features and beauties. As well might we insist, that the cultured mind is to look to itself, not to the "Paradise Lost," or the "Excursion," to learn their sentiments and beauties; that the astronomer is to look *at* his telescope, and not *through* it to the stars, to find what they are; as that we are to look to ourselves, and not to the Scriptures to find what they teach, and what beauties they contain, when God opens our eyes to understand wondrous things out of his law.

The true inward light which God's Spirit sheds into the soul, leads it to search, to understand, to believe, love, and obey the

Scriptures as God's infallible truth, the rule of all faith, the guide of all feeling, the test of all doctrine. Where this effect is not produced, whatever else there may be, there is no divine light in the soul. "To the law and the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because *there is no light in them.*" Isa. viii. 20.* On any other supposition, it is clear that there can be no objective standard, by which religious feeling is either to be moulded or tested. Enthusiasts have it all in their own way; and not only they; all infidels and free-thinkers have an authoritative standard of truth and duty within, which legitimates their revolt from Christianity. Their feelings of aversion to the truth as it is in Jesus, are *inspiration!* This will never do. It upturns all foundations, and obliterates all landmarks. If the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do? There can be but one criterion in this matter. "He that knoweth God, heareth us. He that is not of God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error." 1 John iv. 6.

It is worth observing, moreover, that our knowledge of the objects of taste, morality, or religion, may be sufficient to awaken just emotions of a certain kind, while it is insufficient to awaken those which are most essential. Many men, in reading Addison or Shakspeare, see enough to excite a certain high approbation, while they have not that insight into their peculiar beauties which produces positive delight, love, and admiration, and leads them to frequent communion with such authors, as a pleasure. So is it with different sorts of men in regard to the various objects of taste. This is eminently true of moral and spiritual objects. The conscience, unless seared into unnatural torpor, compels men in a sort to approve of, or at least, to sanc-

* The argument advanced by Morell and others, that there can be no intelligible revelations to the mind, of any truth which it has not already perceived intuitively, and hence, no external revelation, if good for anything, is good for a great deal.—How could the statutes of the state on this hypothesis, prohibit larceny, burglary, manslaughter, treason, or compel an answer to a writ of *quo warranto* or *scire facias*, in the case of those who are not schooled to know what these things are? How could any new treatise convey any information, or be any guide to those who do not already understand the matters of which it treats? Is it said that nothing but their own moral fault can hinder them from learning whatever they need to know in reference to such books? And is it not as true, that their own sin and moral blindness alone unfit them for apprehending the divine truth and beauty of the Bible?

tion and revere the good and holy—and to reprobate what is sinful and wicked. But this state is compatible with another, as all experience testifies, in which there is no such discernment and appreciation of the excellence and glory of God and things divine, as will allure the heart away from the pleasures of sin, and lead it to find its delight in loving and serving God, and in communing with him as the First Good and the First Fair, having none in heaven, and desiring none on earth besides him.*

Still further, it is of vital moment that we should not forget that this blindness to moral and spiritual excellence in God, his gospel, and people, is sinful and culpable. It is the fruit, or rather the essence of corruption. Deceitfulness is a radical element of sin, in its inception and continuance. Sin depraves all the moral faculties of the soul, cognitive, emotional and voluntary. Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. Such is the spontaneous judgment of conscience. We cannot believe the man innocent who is blind to moral excellence and moral distinction, or who forms perverse moral judgments. We cannot but echo the denunciations of the Bible against those who call good evil, and evil good, who put light for darkness and darkness for light. An erratic conscience can never make wrong right. A good intention can never do it. The end cannot sanctify the means. Paul sinned in persecuting the church, although he verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus. It has been supposed that the opposite opinion would promote charity, and prevent persecution for opinion's sake. This is a great mistake. If a good intention justifies a wrong act, it will legitimate the hottest persecutions with which the people of God have been tortured. He who has persuaded himself that a wrong act is right, sins against his conscience if he does not commit it, against the law of righteousness if he does. He is in a sore dilemma, as

* Says Mr. Lyall, (page 510,) "There is a certain moral beauty as well as augustness, in the principle of right, and the one as necessarily inspires delight and love, as the other begets awe and reverence. This is not to destroy the rightness of the principle which awakens both, and awakens both equally. . . . It would seem to be necessary, in order to moral approbation being real, that there should be love as well as reverence for the law; it would be otherwise a distant reverence, not approval; there would be assent to the rightness of the law, not approbation. Distant reverence is at most a cold feeling, and it is not properly approbation till there is love."

has been well observed. His fault lies in neglecting to enlighten his conscience, his remedy in putting away his prejudice, his aversion to truth and goodness, and opening his eyes to the light. For "every one that doeth good, cometh to the light. He that doeth evil, hateth the light and refuseth to come to the light, because his deeds are evil." We have dwelt the longer on the moral æsthetics of our nature, because the topic is generally passed by, or but vaguely alluded to by ethical writers, and lies, we are deeply persuaded, near the roots of some of the most formidable errors of the present time.

We have read no part of this book with greater interest than the closing portions which treat of the will and desires, their relation to each other, and to moral responsibility. Some of the great questions in ethics and soterology hinge on these points, which are mainly reducible to the following: 1. In what sense the will is a dependent, and in what sense an independent faculty? 2. Whether the emotions and desires relative to moral subjects involve moral responsibility? 3. Whether this moral responsibility attaches to the moral affections, desires and emotions directly, on account of their very nature, or only indirectly, in so far as the will has contributed to their formation?

We are of opinion, that no small part of the interminable disputes relative to this whole subject is due to an ambiguity, or, at least, inconstancy in the meaning of the words will, voluntary, &c., as used by most writers, and in ordinary discourse. Will is sometimes used for the entire optative power of the soul, which shows itself in the form of desire, wish, and choice, and sometimes for the last of these alone, or the power thereof. It means, in this case, the resultant or executive of the predominating desires of the soul, by which it goes forth in act for their gratification. There are few writers, however able in other respects, who do not constantly employ the words in question, in each of these senses. Thus, Edwards, who seldom used language blindly or vaguely, gives for his formal definition of Will, "That by which the mind chooses anything . . . an act of will is the same as an act of choosing or choice."* Again, he speaks of "immanent acts of the *will itself*, or of the *affections*,

* Inquiry on the Will. Part I., Sec. 1.

which are only certain modes of the exercise of the will."* But still further, in defining his position that the will is determined by the strongest motive, or "greatest apparent good," he shows that "the state of mind," its particular "temper," natural, acquired, or casual, has much to do with making an object appear good to one and the reverse to another.† It is difficult to see what is meant by "temper" here, unless those affections or desires which are so various in different men, and excite them to a corresponding diversity of choice. But then, if these excite the exercises of the will, it would seem, according to a previous definition, that they excite themselves. It is probable, however, that he was here governed by a conscious or unconscious reference to that distinction which he elsewhere so clearly defines, between principles or dispositions, and acts; by state or temper of mind, meaning an affection in principle; by exercises of will, meaning that affection in act. His real meaning might, doubtless, be fairly put thus: The acts of the will are considerably determined by its states; the affections are a class of the acts of the will determined by corresponding states of it. According to this view, will denotes the whole optative power of the soul, or what are often called the active and moral powers as distinguished from the cognitive. And this accords with the old distribution of the mind into intellect and will; by the former of which it knows, while by the latter it acts; by the former it apprehends things as true, by the latter, views them as good, and inclines to, or embraces them as such. Accordingly, Edwards says, that "whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as *good*; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such."‡ Yet, if will be simply and merely the power of choosing, according to his first and formal definition, it is something more than the power of desire and affection. However these may be requisite to choice and determinant of it, they are not all we mean by it. They are antecedent and

* Inquiry on the Will. Part III. Sec. 4.

† Ibid. Part I. Sec. 2.

‡ Ibid. Part I., Sec. 2.

lower exercises of the optative power, the whole of which is often denoted by the term will, both in philosophic and popular use. It is so difficult for those who attempt it, to avoid this usage, that there seems to be some foundation for it in the consciousness of our race. All the exercises of the soul, beyond and consequent on mere intellection, by which it tends towards objects viewed as pleasant and agreeable, in the form of inclination, affection, or choice, are in their nature free. They are the free motions of the soul towards some object. Volition is but desire developed and executed. Desire is but inchoate volition. Hence, all those acts, whether of the body (as in the circulation of the blood, or from outward coercion,) or of the intellect (as in discerning a mathematical demonstration,) which involve no free motion of the soul towards any object viewed as good, pleasant, or from it as the reverse, are justly pronounced involuntary and irresponsible, in all those forms of expression in all languages, by which the race utters its universal and unavoidable convictions. On the other hand, all acts proceeding from the desires and inclinations of the intelligent soul, *including such desires and inclinations themselves*, are pronounced free and voluntary, and, if related to moral objects, moral and responsible. To say that an act is morally good or evil, well or ill-deserving, because it is voluntary, is, in all languages, just the same as to say, it is so, because it is an act done of one's own free-will, or desire, or inclination, or pleasure, or that it is his desire, choice, or pleasure. These phrases, whatever else they express, convey to every mind an idea involving the elements of freedom and responsibility.

While will is thus often, and for good reasons, used to denote the whole optative power of the soul, it is, of course, used *eminenter* to denote that condition or exercise of this power, in which its highest collected energy is exerted, i. e., in which it directly chooses some object or course of action, at the bidding and in gratification of desire.

Still further it is to be observed, that there is often a conflict of desires, and that choice is the outgoing of the preponderant desire in acts for its own gratification, and in denial of its competitors. Thus it is the acting of the will's intensest energy. And this brings to view the point at which the action

of the optative faculty becomes deliberative and elective instead of spontaneous, as in the case of the emotions and desires. As there are competing desires urging their own gratification, so deliberation and inquiry arise with reference to them and the comparative claims of the objects on which they severally fix. As we have already seen, the whole emotional and volitional power depends upon the intellect for light and guidance. As emotion and desire arise only with reference to objects as seen and apprehended by the mind, so they arise spontaneously on the mere presentation of such objects, without consideration or inquiry. But since the mind obtains light by inquiry and argument, as well as by intuition, so it employs either method in forming its judgments as to what is good or desirable. And when it comes to decide between given objects or courses of action, it inquires, compares, and deliberates for the purpose of determining which will best further the end it has most at heart. Thus the mind decides between various objects equally put at its election, and which awaken its desires, in nearly all volitions or exercises of will which immediately impel the man to any form of action for the gratification of his desires. As here then is a higher energy of will than in mere unreflective, though not unintelligent, spontaneity, so, on this ground, it has often been discriminated, by classing the exercises of the former as voluntary in distinction from the latter which are spontaneous. Thus the will is not unfrequently by the best writers put in contrast with its own feebler and more elementary exercises, just as the intelligence, as evinced in deduction and discourse, is often contrasted with its own more rudimentary exercises in intuition, perception, and especially sensation.

It is at this highest point of optative energy, as shown in executive determinations, or choices of different objects within reach, that questions have arisen and been controverted interminably as to the power which the will possesses over these determinations, and all the springs and motives in which they originate. Without adverting to the extravaganzas of ultraists on either side, it is enough to say that the question here is not whether the will is free in choosing, or has an alternative object offered to its election; but whether it is of the essence

of liberty and responsible choice, 1. That there should be an ability, under precisely the same motives of external inducement and inward inclination, which prompt it freely to make a given choice, to make the contrary choice: 2. Whether the will is thus a power capable of contravening reason, desire, all internal and external motives, and acting from a state of pure indifference to the objects chosen. The statement of these questions is their answer to all who consult their own consciousness, or would not degrade the will from a rational and responsible to a senseless and hap-hazard agent; and, at the same time, put blind contingency in place of Infinite Wisdom on the throne of the universe. But it becomes all the more clear and incontestable, if we view desire and volition as different stages of the same movement of the soul after its object.

In reference to this subject, Mr. Lyall says, "We never act without a motive; and a motive is just a state of desire, along with a judgment, producing preference and leading to volition. . . It is the strongest desire upon the whole that leads to action. The prevailing desire may not have very much the aspect of a desire; it may seem rather a judgment merely, that a certain course of action is best; but a desire follows that judgment, and the reason that it may be less lively than the other is, that it is the desire, perhaps, of advantage, of worth, something valuable in the estimate of the mind—the desire of value, not of happiness." Pp. 554—556.

While this is undeniable, we think it entirely consistent with certain qualifying or explanatory views which the author offers, and which are requisite to a rounded view of the subject. When these are overlooked, as they often are, by zealous Necessarians, they leave man's free and responsible activity too near the borders of fatalism or passive causation. He says, "the will follows reasons, inducements, but it is not *caused*. It cannot in any proper sense be said to be so. It obeys, or it acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly." P. 581. "It exhibits the phenomenon of activity in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it rather than another. It determines in reference to it, that it is the very motive which it will obey. There is, undoubtedly, this phenomenon exhibited, the will obeying but elective, active in its obedience. If it be asked,

how this is possible, how the will can be under the influence of motive, and yet possess an intellectual activity, we reply, that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted, while they cannot be explained." P. 592.

We deem this view, not indeed every word of the author, but his substantial meaning, important, and fully borne out by consciousness. We are conscious of being active and free in choice, and yet of not being independent of motive. It is important to shun the quicksands of indifference. It is no less important to shun the hidden rock of fatalism which lies in close neighbourhood. It is far safer and more rational to admit both facts, whether we can explicate them into logical harmony or not, than to deny either. Every man knows that his choice is his own free act. No man can conceive of himself as making a choice without any reason or motive for doing it.

When our author contrasts the acts of the will with the emotions and desires, in this respect, as if the mind were passive in the latter, and they were effects wrought in it otherwise than by its free activity, we think him less felicitous. We think this mistake arises from his overlooking the fact, that all these are diversified exercises of one and the same radical faculty, and is the source of some of the perplexities which he encounters in treating of the desires. He says, "Is this action then, the peculiar action of the will to be resolved into an effect merely? Is it an effect just as the emotion is an effect—the desire is an effect—and the whole motive is an effect of circumstances determined by causes? It cannot be said so." P. 592. Now here, we apprehend, is a great though common misconception. The emotions and desires, [except animal appetites and the like] are indeed effects. So also, are volitions. But effects of what? Of the soul's free, intelligent activity. In this case, the passivity is in the objects of desire or choice. The activity is in the mind choosing or desiring. In the spontaneous inclinations there may be a lower form or degree of this activity than in volition—but they are none the less, as Edwards says, "certain modes of the exercise of the will."* They are none the less,

* Mr. Lyall seems to recognize the truth on this subject, when speaking of the first rising of sinful emotion in our first parents. "Here is a volition which it would be difficult to trace to any previous motive, the previous state of the moral

in their measure, exercises of freedom. The love of God, the desire of fame, the thirst for wealth, are free, intelligent outgoings of the soul, totally distinct from involuntary animal appetites, the circulative and respiratory motions of the body, or the mere cognition of facts which excite no emotion.

This view relieves us of all difficulty in ascribing to the desires and emotions of the soul on moral subjects, that moral responsibility which conscience compels us to fasten upon them, despite all logical and speculative objections. So our author constantly maintains, that "while it is to action (volition) that morality belongs, the morality of action depends upon the motive; it is in motive that morality resides. The purpose, intention, feeling, with which an action is done, gives its character to an action." P. 599. This view seems to require that the moral emotions and desires should involve, and be the first subjects of moral character and responsibility; and that so far from deriving these from volition, which is prompted by them, they have them in themselves, and impart them to volition. This our author seems to hold. He says, "a moral emotion without a moral character, seems a contradiction. What can a volition do to that emotion in itself considered? The volition is but the consent to the emotion; the emotion is moral in itself, whether good or bad, virtuous or vicious. If the will could render an emotion good or bad, it would have a transmuting power." P. 601. Again: "it is essential that in the moral emotions there be morality. They are moral in themselves, and an act of the will is not needed to make them so." P. 603. Accordingly, he strenuously and justly impugns the favourite theory of Chalmers, which that great man would proclaim "with the pomp and circumstance of a first principle," that no emotion is "moral or immoral which is not voluntary," i. e., in some way produced or adopted by a volition as distinguished from an emotion. Few maxims are more plausi-

agent being one of perfect moral rectitude. A wrong emotion first will hardly account for the phenomenon in this case. *There must have been consent in the very emotion which first sprung up in the now fallen nature. . . . There would be consent to the emotion, for the very admission of the emotion would be consent.*" P. 603. Thus the very admission of an emotion involves the free consent or activity of the soul. Again he says, speaking of benevolence, "the emotion will be the regent principle, the will, the ancillary and executive. The emotion must will." P. 604.

ble, groundless, or dangerous than this. Its plausibility arises from the ambiguity of the word "voluntary," as already shown. It is proved groundless as soon as that ambiguity is evinced. Its danger lies in ruling out of the domain of moral responsibility, the deepest moral qualities and exercises of the soul. Says Mr. Lyall, "Let covetousness, or improper desire, be the emotion in the mind, is there no blameworthiness till the will has put its stamp upon the emotion, or followed it into action? . . . There was immorality in the first motion in the direction of covetousness or impure desire. The simplest state of the emotion was wrong, must be wrong. If it was inconsistent with the right, then it must be wrong; if it has an improper direction when the will has taken effect, it had the same direction from the first. There is no new direction, and therefore there can be no new character derivable from the will. The state decides the emotion, and if depraved, the emotion must be depraved; and does depravity infer no morality? Does morally depraved nature infer no punishment? All this seems like repeating a truism." Pp. 605, 6.

This is another among the many instances, which illustrate the sound and healthy tone of Mr. Lyall's thinking, in the great results upon which he settles, even when there is some confusion in the speculative and logical processes by which he supports them. Taking for granted the principle which has been current with many ethicists, especially since the time of Chalmers, that the will is simply the executive of the optative faculty, the source of volitions and not of desires and emotions; and that the latter are passive effects, produced otherwise than by the free internal power of the soul, he finds himself compelled to face the formidable puzzle, how these passive effects can involve that moral responsibility which confessedly attaches to them. A large class, with Chalmers, derive this responsibility from their alleged dependence on volition, and deny its existence beyond the sphere of such dependence. But this solution, so far from relieving, only complicates the difficulty. For it is a first principle, that choice is prompted by desire, and derives its character from that desire. So says con-

sciousness. So says Mr. Lyall. So says Chalmers.* So say all, when pressed clearly to define their position. If, then, volition itself depends for its moral character on the emotions which prompt it, how do these get their morality from the volition? There is no such process. Moral character is inherent in the moral emotions from their very nature, as our author well maintains. This is so true, that even where there is a volition antagonistic to an evil desire, arising from the preponderance of conflicting desires, the conscience charges guilt for the presence of such wrong emotion. If, at the bidding of conscience, or a due regard to my well-being, I resolutely strive to subdue the feeling of envy to which I am prone, I still feel guilty for its uprisings. So the Apostle mourns, and all Christians with him, that when they "*would* do good, evil is present with them." Doubtless there is a guilt in allowing and cherishing such passions, which he escapes who repents of and wrestles against them. But this does not destroy the guilt of the motions of sins themselves. This can only be taken away by the blood of atonement. Here lies the Christian conflict, which all Christians know, as a dire reality, but which is too often evaporated into thin air by a false philosophy.

But yet, although our author is with us thus far, this theory of the passivity of the emotions requires him to bring in the will, (in the narrow sense as distinguished from the emotional faculty,) somewhere, in order to legitimate our moral responsibility for them. We have already seen that he holds that "the emotions are moral in themselves, and an act of the will is not needed to make them so." For what then is it necessary? "*An act of the will only makes them ours,*" says the author. "The relation of will to morality is only in making *the act* or *the state* our own." But by what volition are they made ours? He answers, "our emotions are our own in virtue of that primordial volition that occasioned the first apostacy." Pp.

* "A determination of the will may be viewed, not merely as the prior term to the act which flows from it, but also as the posterior term to the influence which gave it birth; or, in other words, either as the forthgoing of a power, or as the result of a susceptibility." (Chalmers's Moral Philosophy, Chap. 4.) "It is quite indispensable, then, that the beneficence should be originated, not by the hope of return, but by a proper impulse of its own—by a genuine principle of well-doing." *Ib.* Chap. 9.

602, 3. "If Dr. Chalmers had taken into account the primordial volition from which our depraved nature took effect; and if his remarks had regarded that volition—all our emotions characterized by that volition, or connected with the guilt of that one act of the will—the principle he announces might have been admitted; for undoubtedly guilt is attached to our depraved nature as springing out of that one volition. How otherwise could there have been *depravity*? And how can *depravity* be separated from guilt? A mere *pathological state* in which there is evil, is impossible." P. 606. "Now was man the cause of his own evil nature? In one sense, he was, in another, he was not. He was, *through federal representation*; he was not, *directly himself by his own immediate act*. The question comes to be then, how far does federal representation make the act his own? And here it must be unequivocally admitted that such a constitution does make the act truly his own, and that for his state man is now responsible; that even for evil in his very nature he must be held guilty. . . . But this very view of the matter shows that volition, will, is necessary in order to moral culpability; for it is *will*, that makes any state our own; without volition, any state would be as little our own as the state of any other being." P. 500. "It is not the will that makes the emotion moral, but a moral emotion supposes the possibility of volition. The two states are the complements of each other. The mind consenting to the emotion, is will in relation to the emotion. . . . The emotion must will." P. 604. "The very admission of the emotion would be consent." P. 603.

We have quoted thus largely, italics and all, that the author's views might be fairly exhibited. We think that our readers will feel with us, that there is some confusion in these views, and that this confusion arises from the clear conviction of the writer that our moral emotions involve responsibility in their very nature, on the one hand; and on the other, from the theory that without an act of volition added to them, they are mere "pathological states," out of the sphere of freedom and responsibility. The first of these propositions is unquestionable. The second is the cause of all the embarrassment. Is it true? Is it consistent with many of the author's own statements? Who could af-

firm more abundantly or decisively that it is not the will that makes the emotion moral, and that it has moral character in itself? For what purpose, then, is the volition needed? To make the emotion our own, it seems. Is this so? Is not the emotion of love, hatred, or envy in any soul, that soul's "own," be there any additional act of the will or not? We think this can hardly be denied. Besides, is there, or can there be, any act or quality having moral character, that does not belong to a rational soul? Never. "Emotion must will." "The very admission of it would be consent," to adopt our author's phrase, so far as to make it fully that soul's "own," in which it arises. On his own showing, therefore, we see no occasion to look further than the emotion itself, to fasten responsibility upon it.

This is all the more evident, when we consider where he is at length obliged to find the guilty volition. It is the choice by which Adam fell, that makes our sinful emotions properly our own, and so properly culpable. We need not here declare our belief in the federal headship of Adam; his representative character in his first sin, the consequent imputation of that sin to his posterity; their condemnation and abandonment to sin and death, as the punishment of that first transgression when the race was tried and fell with him. We believe this doctrine scriptural, a far more rational solution of the present condition of our race, than any that has been offered to supplant it; the key to a sound theology. Yet we do not think it has anything to do with each man's personal propriety in his own affections, emotions, and volitions, or his proper responsibility therefore. It has much to do with accounting for the fact that men are so far forsaken of God, as to be given up to corruption, to evil dispositions, emotions, affections. It shows this sad state of men to be a judicial visitation for their sin in the person of their representative. But it has nothing to do with making each man's corrupt state and exercises really his. They would be just as truly his, if they were in no wise traceable to Adam's sin. They are culpable in themselves, and we are guilty for what they are in themselves. If they are innocent in themselves, they are not made otherwise by any relation to Adam. If they are wrong and blamable in

themselves, they need no "primordial volition" of Adam to make them so. Accordingly, original sin is held to consist of two elements in the great body of evangelical confessions—1. The guilt of Adam's first sin by imputation. 2. As consequent upon that, the want of original righteousness and the corruption of his whole nature from which flow all acts of transgression. Inherent sin is doubtless the consequence of imputed sin. But being inherent from whatever cause, it is doubtless sin and our own sin, and like all moral acts and states has its character of merit or demerit in its nature, not in its origin. This we are sure is the testimony of conscience. Who ever thought of envy, malice, covetousness, being at all the more or less guilty—more or less his own, on account of Adam's fall or any other influence which may have fostered them?

But even if this theory would stand, a further perplexity arises in regard to this "primordial volition" of Adam, which thus makes our emotions and desires our own. If that, like other volitions, was prompted by desires, and derived its character from them, whence did these in turn acquire their moral character and responsibility? To meet this, Mr. Lyall suggests modestly whether "there may not be in the will a *power apart from motive*, and may not this very power, in the degree in which it exists, have been the cause of evil, evil in the will itself?" We rather suspect, it will be difficult to conceive of the will's making a choice, except for reasons, or with some end in view; and that, if this were possible, such an act would not be intelligent or responsible. The following proposition, we apprehend, exhausts our wisdom on the subject, without mastering all the metaphysical grounds of the mutability asserted. "Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it." That man was thus mutable, is past all doubt. That he is now mutable in many of his emotions and choices, is shown by all experience. That he is capable, under a due change of his internal state, wrought by the Spirit of God, of even loving and choosing the God he has forsaken, we rejoice to know. But that he is

capable of choosing, "irrespective of motive," i. e., of outward inducement, and inward inclination, is what no man can prove, and every man's consciousness disproves. Such a property is no requisite to freedom. It would be destructive of it. We are intimately conscious of our free and responsible agency. We are no less conscious that, in every free choice, we choose something rather than the opposite, and from motives and reasons which prevent the contrary choice. We know that we, not God, are the authors of sin. We may not be able to explain all this to the logical understanding. But we know it with a certainty superior to all logical deductions. We escape no difficulty, we only plunge into a thicket of new ones, by resorting to this figment of a power of motiveless choice from mere indifference. If such a power be essential to free-agency, what security have we that saints or angels will abide faithful another day—that almighty contingency will not usurp the throne of Almighty God in the kingdoms of providence and grace?

We have noticed, that among Christian and theistic apologists, quite a disposition has of late been shown to revive this Pelagian theory of the will, as affording the most facile solution of the origin and prevalence of evil in the universe. Mr. Thompson, in his Prize Essay on Theism, after conceding that "God is unalterably determined by the perfection of his will to do what is best upon the whole," p. 117, and that "the feelings, emotions, or dispositions which are the mind's motives to action, are not altogether uncaused [motiveless] efforts of the mind," p. 156, seems to set forth "an ability to act without cause," or a "power of choice without an adequate cause," as the only alternative to dogmatic fatalism, or semi-panteism. P. 158. We are not surprised, therefore, that he inveighs against those who, he says, "think they can exalt the Grace and Sovereignty of God by taking away the free-agency of man;" who state the "doctrine of human depravity in such unqualified terms, that one might think man were in that desperate condition which would have befallen him, if no Saviour had been revealed." Pp. 450, 1. There may be a few ultraists who deserve these vague denunciations. But they are uttered as being widely applicable to current Christian teach-

ing. In this aspect, their extravagance and their animus are too evident to need comment.

Mr. Tulloch, in a competing prize essay on the same subject, not merely clears God, as he should do, of the authorship of sin, by referring its origin to human freedom; but in meeting the question, why God suffers it, or the present degree of it, and does not recover the whole of our race from it, by the power of the gospel, says, "the idea of a forcible and compulsory advance of the gospel is not for a moment tenable, even as a supposition. For in the very statement of this idea there is already implied the annihilation of the moral quality in man. . . . Unless man were truly possessed of a will, the gospel would lose all meaning," &c. This implies, if it implies anything, that the true vindication of God for suffering the sin that exists in the world, is, that it could not be prevented without a forcible annihilation of man's moral agency. Our readers need no refutation of a theory which our Church has long since confronted and banished from her pale; which sustains God's benevolence at the expense of his sovereignty; which renders it uncertain whether another sinner will ever be converted, and whether the saints on earth and in heaven will be kept from falling; which makes the pillars in heaven tremble, and unsettles the moral universe. We simply note it, for the purpose of calling attention to those renewed, though modest and tentative efforts to put life into this *caput mortuum* of a scheme of theology, already effete, if not extinct, on this side of the Atlantic.