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John W. Alden

ART. I.—*The Zurich Letters; or, the Correspondence of several English Bishops, and others, with some of the Helvetican Reformers, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.* Chiefly from the Archives of Zurich. Translated from authenticated copies of the autographs, and edited for the Parker Society, by the Rev. Hastings Robinson, D. D., F. A. S., Rector of Great Warley, Essex, and formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Second edition, chronologically arranged in one series.

WHAT will be the ultimate destiny of the established Church of England, it is perhaps impossible to foretell, and therefore, vain to conjecture. We know of no book, however, which throws so much light upon its origin, genesis, growth and complicated structure, as the one before us. It completely exposes the hypothesis lately put forth by D'Aubigné, that the English Reformation proceeded primarily from the people, and was a purely religious Revolution. It is equally at variance with the opposite sentiment, that it was nothing more than a political change dictated by the pride or the policy of her rulers. The truth is, as usual, to be found in the mean between the two extremes. The circumstances of the times were, unquestionably, favourable to the progress of the Reform-

received Christianity from the Greek colonists in Egypt; in the sixth century adhered to the Monophysite opinions, and refused submission to the Council of Chalcedon; in the seventh century encouraged the Mahometan invasion of their country, and enjoyed the favour of the conquerors for ages, to the exclusion of the orthodox or Greek Church. They are still governed by a Patriarch of Alexandria, but in a very low condition, retaining the Coptic as their sacred language, although the Arabic is their vernacular. Of late years they have become more prominent as objects of missionary labour and research.

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*Essex H. Stearns.*

ART. III.—*The Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science applied to the Evidences of Religion.* A new edition, revised and annotated for the use of Colleges. By Francis Bowen, A. M., Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, in Harvard College. Boston: Hickling, Swan and Brown, 1855.

ACCORDING to the purpose intimated in a brief notice of this work in our last number, we have given this book considerable attention. On closer scrutiny, it has not depreciated in our estimation. Nor can we say that certain radical defects, which seemed patent to us on a first cursory glance, disappear on a more thorough examination. Yet, on the whole, our respect for the intellectual and moral qualities of the work and its author has been enhanced by a more intimate knowledge.

The hearty and even intense theism of the book presents a warm side to the sympathies of good men, not excepting those who may think that the author has pushed some of his speculations on the Will, Power, and Causality, to an extravagant length, in his eagerness, not only to vanquish the atheist and sceptic, but to disarm them of their only practicable weapons. It indicates a degree of learning, of acquaintance with the literature of the subject, a power of metaphysical discrimination and analysis, a classic neatness and elegance of style,

which certainly places it among the most respectable American contributions to the sciences of which it treats. The author, of course, has occasion to discuss the nature of virtue. The ability and earnestness with which he insists on the true idea of virtue, and combats all attempts to analyze it into anything simpler, better, or other than itself, give his work a value which would outweigh many lighter faults. And our readers will agree with us, that it is something in these days, for a work on metaphysics and their relations to religious belief, to be at once able and scholarly, and also free from mysticism, and other obscurities not inherent in the difficulties of the subject.

We regret to find any serious drawbacks in a work, which, in so many aspects, we highly estimate.

Professor Bowen rightly maintains that the true idea of cause involves that of efficiency. A cause contains and exerts that power which produces the effect to which it stands related as cause. It is, therefore, more than simple uniformity of antecedence, as Brown, Mill, and other philosophers at the "extreme left" of the empirical school, contend. But his inference from this, that there are no causes to be found in the material universe, we deem gratuitous. He says, "true causes cannot be found in the material universe." Had he said, *first* causes cannot be found there, the deliverance would have been true. But he goes further. He denies that there is "*any power or efficient agency whatever in brute matter, even by transmission, or as derived from a higher source.*" (p. 117.) His elaborate arguments in support of this dogma, appear to have been wrought out for the purpose of sweeping away all objections to the conclusion that the "course of nature is nothing but the will of God producing certain effects in a constant and uniform manner." We humbly submit, that this momentous conclusion does not depend upon so precarious a premise. If material objects are endued with power to produce certain effects, by "transmission" from God, then, to all intents, they are "but the will of God producing certain effects," in and by them. The will of God is indeed the first cause; but it acts through second causes, which become such indeed, only because they are made such. Night always precedes day. So likewise does the approach of the sun towards the horizon, and the conse-

quent emanation of its rays over the earth. According to the universal convictions and language of men, the latter is, the former is not, the cause of day. Why? Because the one is not, the other is, a radiant substance, adequate to the production of the effect. This case is one of a thousand, showing, not only that cause implies efficiency, but, that material objects have efficient properties, derived of course from God, and are, therefore, second causes, but none the less causes for that. Professor Bowen argues that "power is not transmitted, but is always primitive," from the fact, of there being no evidence that the act following volition "propagates itself, or produces, by its own inherent energy, another event in the external universe," (p. 120.) What then? "With man, indeed, it is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

Our author presses this point at great length, and with his utmost powers of reasoning and eloquence, not only because he thus prevents the atheist from finding any cause but God, for the material universe, but because he supposes the received doctrine to which he objects, involves fatalism as a logical sequence. He says, "once admit that efficient causation belongs to matter, that one particle really *acts* on another particle by its inherent power or principle, and necessitates a change of its state, and it follows that the displacement of a grain of sand *must* alter the history of the universe. Each event is bound by iron necessity to all preceding and all subsequent events, the chain of Fate extending from the fall of an atom up to the throne of God." p. 116. This conclusion appears to us a great deal broader than the premises. Supposing matter with all its properties in various substances to be created and upheld by God, is it not under his control? And can he not adjust, and bound, work and counterwork it, at his pleasure? Where then is the chain of Fate, where any "iron necessity," beyond the free will of the Most High? That "a displacement of a grain of sand should alter the history of the universe," is true on one system, no further than on the other.

In further defence of his theory of causality, our author contends, that will is everywhere and always a true cause, and the only cause in the universe; nay, that the very idea of cause is derived wholly from the conscious exercise of power by our

own wills, and is thus wholly empirical. He says, "the will is the only known instance of efficient causation in the universe." "The idea of cause has its origin in internal experience, in the consciousness of volition and action." "Hence association leads us to believe that every other event must have a cause." Yet he speaks of this law or idea as "necessary," and concedes that "it has a better claim to be considered original and spontaneous than any other."

Now the consciousness we have, that we are the causes of our own volitions is one thing; the firm persuasion that every event *must* have a cause is another, which may indeed be wakened into consciousness by the acts of the will, or by other observed instances of causation, but is in no manner contained in, or derived from them. That *some* events have a cause is indeed matter of experience. That *all events must* have a cause, is one of those necessary first truths which shine in their own light, and are incapable of any evidence stronger than themselves. That there is no efficient cause in the universe but will, is true; only as we deny the existence of dependent causes, or, in other words, deny the character of causality to those efficient, which derive their causal energy from God. This is to deny it to all creatures—the human will itself. The will has its power by derivation from and dependence on the will of God, as truly as anything from which effects proceed in the material universe. And this none the less, although it is a kind of cause that acts freely. So, after all, the question is, whether there are any such things as second causes in the universe; or whether creatures may properly be deemed real, efficient causes, although their efficiency is wholly derived and dependent. We do not wish to dwell on this question. It is answered by the spontaneous actions, the most intimate convictions, and the universal language of mankind. And if it be not thus answered right, then there is no longer such a logical fallacy as, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*.

As might be expected, from his dread of Fatalism and his great exaltation of the prerogatives of the Will, Prof. Bowen asserts the power of contrary choice, and discharges upon the deniers of it, all the indignant eloquence of which he is so fertile, against fatalistic theories. Of course the question is not, whether man is

free; but whether this notion is fairly included in freedom. Our author says, "neither external nor internal causes determine the will." How then can it be determined at all, even by itself? We suppose, however, he means causes extrinsic to itself or its own activity. But in illustration of this sentiment, he answers the claim of his antagonists, that the character of choice is determined by a "motive, a pre-existent, a concomitant longing or desire," by saying, that on this supposition "the motive means nothing but *the man himself wishing for some object.*" "The assertion, that the motive determines the will, therefore, is only an abstract statement of the fact, that the *man wishing* determines the *man acting*, or that the will determines itself, which is precisely the theory of the advocates for human freedom." If this is all, we would simply ask, if one can act or choose contrary to his wishes, and choose freely. In other words, does not the author's own account of freedom and the self-determining power exclude the idea of contrary choice? We contend that no higher liberty than that of doing as we please, and choosing according to our inclination, is conceivable or desirable. If there be any higher liberty than this, it has never yet been brought to light, certainly not by our author. As to any choices determined by "neither external causes," nor reason, nor desire, nor persuasion, nor inducement, of what avail can they be, but to inaugurate the reign of "all-powerful contingency?" And how much is this to be preferred to Fate? Indeed, what is this but fate, in the form of dire fortuity, swaying our destiny by an "iron necessity?" Where are reason, freedom, responsibility, or motive, and encouragement to improve ourselves, on such a theory? Says Prof. Bowen, "both the creation of things and the direction of events are his," (God's), p. 224. If this be so, then human freedom involves nothing inconsistent with God's disposal of all events. We have nothing to say of idiosyncratic and personal aberrations. But we do say, that the great body of those against whom he so vehemently inveighs as Necessarians, hold to no necessity beyond that implied in God's ordering of all events, and in men's acting as they wish, all which, as we have seen, is virtually, however unconsciously, conceded by our author himself.

We are glad to see that he holds that the infliction of pain

in punishment for sin, is no disproof of the benevolence of God. This is one of those seminal principles, which consistently carried out, would upturn the foundations of Unitarian theology. In common with most writers on Natural Theology, he teaches that pain often proceeds from benevolence, because it subserves useful purposes. It is true that, in our present state, it is thus serviceable. But is it not possible for man to be so constructed as to realize the highest purity and bliss, without the instrumentality of pain? Was not this his condition in Paradise? Is it not in Heaven? How then can we account for this intervention of pain in order to our well-being now, except on the supposition that it is a visitation for sin; that it implies our apostacy from God; that it proceeds from justice tempering the allotments of his mercy? We think no solution of the problem of human suffering satisfactory which undertakes to explain it, *in any of its forms*, by the benevolence of God merely. No solution meets the case, which stops short of the original apostacy, and of the holiness and justice of God.

Professor Bowen thinks there is a proneness "to exaggerate the amount of moral evil in the world." He will have it, that we are apt to let stupendous and singular crimes so fill our eyes, as to blind us to the comparative innocence of the race.—p. 314. "Bad men are not so bad as they seem."—p. 316. "If we judge men by their intentions, instead of their outward conduct—and it is the former alone which the divine conduct assumes directly to regulate—much of their seeming lawlessness and wickedness disappears."—p. 322. We will not expatiate on the futility of such attempts to extenuate the depravity of a race, declared by the highest authority to be "dead in trespasses and sins, by nature children of wrath." The Bible is simply echoing all fact and history, when it declares that all have gone out of the way, and there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Mr. Bowen himself betrays his faintness of heart when he says, "No wonder that the doctrine of original and total depravity of the human race has obtained so ready an acceptance with most theologians, even on grounds apart from Scripture."—p. 310.

As might be expected from his doctrine of the will, the author accounts for the origin of evil by the supposed impossibility

of preventing sin, without impairing or destroying free agency. p. 375. This easy solution of the difficulty which we find recurring in a certain class of writers, from Pelagius down to Dr. Squier, in his "Problem Solved," would answer well enough if it were true, or if its truth could be admitted, without undermining our faith in God's Universal Providence, and in the perpetual conservation of the inhabitants of Heaven in holiness and bliss. Either of these indispensable truths supposes in the Almighty the power to render certain the exercises of free agents, without impairing their free agency.

This book pains us most when it comes to the hallowed precincts of revealed religion, not so much for what it affirms, as for what it ignores. It is all the sadder, inasmuch as the author displays so much mastery of the whole field of Natural Religion, and so much of elevated moral sentiment, and even religious sensibility, so far as natural religion can inspire it. Withal, he insists, with great justice, that even the principles of natural religion, i. e., principles sufficiently manifested by the light of nature, to render those culpable who do not see and conform to them, are, in fact, really unknown to the race, except so far as they are brought home to us in all their fulness and clearness by revelation. Men are culpably blind to the light which reveals them. Hence revelation is needed to brighten and clarify our knowledge of natural religion. This is unquestionably so. But is this all? Does Christianity merely revive our lost knowledge of natural religion? No, says Mr. Bowen. "We need helps to obedience. The inducements to right conduct must be strengthened by a fuller view of the consequences of sin." p. 462. And what truths does the Bible reveal for this purpose which are peculiar to Christianity? In order to find something thus distinctive of Christianity, our author goes through a long and most elaborate argument, to prove that we have no reliable proof of our immortality by the light of nature, and that this sublime truth is first made sure by the testimony of revelation. He also assures us, that "Christianity first revealed the paternal character of God!" If he has specified any other addition, or "help to obedience," which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion, we have been unable to find it. And is this all?

Then, in the sorrow of our souls, we say such a scheme gives us nothing of Christianity but the name. Every one of its distinctive mysteries and life-giving elements is gone. It contains no gospel. It gives no Redeemer. It is a kind of religion to which men will never long cling. If they do not go forward to something more distinctive and vital than a cold reproduction of natural religion, they will ere long let it go for infidelity or atheism. Such is, and such ever must be, the course of Socinianism. A system so barren, comfortless, rayless, can never be the light of the world. It cannot long be felt to be worth contending for or retaining.

While we are sorry to note such blemishes in a book of so much merit, we will add a further suggestion. The book is designed for Colleges. It originally consisted of two courses of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute of Boston, which has already had the merit of giving birth in a similar way to the able treatise of Dr. Hopkins on the Evidences. It is, (we judge, with little alteration in other respects,) broken into sections with appropriate headings, for the purpose of adapting it to use as a text-book. All our experience and observation have convinced us, that a good class-book can rarely be produced, unless prepared specifically for the purpose. All popular lectures, essays, and general dissertations, will lack the simplicity, precision, and condensation, which are so essential in the class-room. They are too diffuse at some points, too meagre at others. They present matters in a form ill adapted to recitation. Few men, even of those eminent in these departments, are capable of writing good text books; and fewer still have written them. Able as Whately's *Logic* is, it was originally prepared as an article for an encyclopedia. And how surely do those who are compelled to teach it, wish it were recast in a form better suited to their purposes! How sensible the relief in passing from the use of this, to instruction in treatises so clear, methodical, and compact, as Paley's *Natural Theology*, or Alexander's *Moral Science*! We think moreover, that the book under review, although far from being more faulty on this score than most works of the sort, would, nevertheless, gain vastly in the number of its readers, and in general influence, if it were thoroughly condensed. Amid the

multitude of books claiming readers in this busy age, those especially which are addressed to educated minds, have the best chance of success, that crowd the greatest amount of matter into the smallest space in which it can be clearly set forth; who seize the main points on which a question turns, and condense the light they can throw upon them into a focus, omitting a multitude of minor reflections, even if not unimportant, as so many veils which bewilder and tire the reader. Now, more than ever before, brevity is the life of books, not less than the soul of wit.

Professor Bowen tasks himself in several introductory lectures, in settling the proper method of investigation and sources of proof in reference to the being of God and religion generally. He rules out metaphysics as wholly irrelevant, just as much so as the measures of space would be to the mensuration of our spiritual nature. His whole speculations about cause have this aim. If there are no causes in the material universe; if that universe exists; if created spirits are unable to create it, then the *bare fact* of its existence, aside from all metaphysics, proves a Supreme Creator, endowed with the wisdom, power, and goodness requisite for its production. So the moral constitution of man implies that moral excellence in his Maker, which alone would have endowed him with such a constitution. Thus facts, not metaphysics, according to our author, become the proofs in natural theology. And his metaphysical reasonings are designed simply to exorcise metaphysics from the controversy; because he holds them just as irrelevant as pure mathematical analysis would be in chemistry, in place of "the logic of the crucible, the scales, and the blowpipe." Speaking of the nature and logic of religious belief, he states the question thus:

"What is the nature of religious belief properly so called, and by what kind of testimony is it supported? Are we here concerned with realities, or with abstract speculations? And do we look to demonstration or to moral certainty as the result of that inquiry? The question is not yet, be it observed, whether the belief is legitimate or the testimony sufficient; of that hereafter. I do not now ask whether religion be true, but how we are to prove or disprove it; what arguments are to be admit-

ted into the discussion, and what considerations are shut out as irrelevant? I use the word *religion* here in its most comprehensive sense, including both theology, as a system of doctrines and principles, and practical piety."—pp. 34–5.

The subject thus brought to view is the logic of theology in its entire range, doctrinal and practical. Its great importance is manifest. Without adding to what we have already said upon natural theology as a separate science, we propose to devote the residue of this article to some suggestions upon the Logic of Christian Theology.

Logicians very properly divide our knowledge into two sorts; that which we possess by intuition, which discerns self-evident truths and first principles; and that which we acquire by reasoning, wherein we deduce truths before unknown from what was or is known. It is obvious that the former comprehends that part of our knowledge which is most sure and universal to our race. The latter, however, comprises much the larger portion of what we know on most subjects. To prevent mistake, nevertheless, it is to be observed, that all our perceptions and cognitions by the senses and by consciousness—of external objects and of the exercises of our own minds—are in their nature intuitive. Our knowledge here is obtained by immediate intuitive insight, not by any process of reasoning. The knowledge thus given, together with the intuitive first principles and necessary ideas of reason before mentioned, constitute either the premises of all reasoning, or the premises from which all other premises are ultimately deduced. An additional source of original premises must be brought to view, as belonging to the very pith of our present subject. We mean testimony. Very much of our knowledge is derived from the testimony of other persons, divine or human. All human conduct supposes a certain confidence in human testimony, which, however, may be weakened or destroyed by various circumstances going to impeach its credibility. Dr. Reid classes this among the *contingent* first principles of human belief; contingent, because, had it been the pleasure of God, we might have been so made that human testimony would neither deserve nor receive our confidence in any circumstances. There is no doubt that confidence in human testimony is so far a principle of our nature, that we

believe, and ought to believe, many matters of fact, not from any personal intuition of these facts; not from any process of argument; but from the testimony of other men. Nearly all our knowledge of history, and of facts occurring not under our own eye, rests on this basis. It is rare that our beliefs thus founded are fallacious, unless something appears to discredit the veracity of the witness, or to indicate that he was deceived or had imperfect means of knowledge. And when, from the number of the witnesses, the impossibility of collusion, the abundance of corroborating circumstances, all suppositions of falsehood or incompetency are excluded, belief in this testimony is well founded, and, to every candid mind, unavoidable.

In reference to the testimony of God, no suppositions which can, by any possibility, invalidate it, have place. And inasmuch as Christianity, so far as it adds anything to the light of nature, is founded wholly on the testimony of God, and consists only of truths supported by that testimony; it follows that our first sources of knowledge, and the fundamental premises for all Christian reasonings must be found in the Bible itself. This will not be disputed by any who deserve the title of Christians; with others, we have now nothing to do.

So far, however, as apologetics are concerned, we may say, in a word, that the divine origin, and inspiration of the Scriptures, depend on two sorts of evidence; external and internal. The external evidence relative to the genuineness and integrity of the canon; and in regard to the actual occurrence of the miracles which are its outward divine attestation, is attended with all the conditions of trust-worthiness. It cannot be discredited, except on principles, which would shatter all confidence in most reliable, and even recent facts of history, as Whately has well shown in his "historic doubts" about Napoleon. But the more conclusive, and for all classes, obligatory evidence of the divinity of the Bible, is the internal. It is the self-evidence, the radiance of divinity, which it carries in its face. Its authors speak as never man spake. Thus there is laid upon all to whom the Bible comes, an instant and inevitable obligation to receive it, and its fundamental truths; not as the word of man, but as the word of God. Hence, unbelief is inexcusa-

ble. No candid mind can fail to be convinced by this evidence. So the dread penalty on all who refuse to believe the Gospel, when declared to them, is vindicated—"He that believeth not, shall be damned."

There is also, with reference to some of the chief truths of Revelation, a self-evidence, beyond that which merely evinces the divine origin of the Bible as a whole. Many of its main doctrines carry their own evidence to the mind, when once they are distinctly stated to it; and this none the less, even though, without revelation we may be wholly incapable of knowing them adequately, or even at all. We seldom distinctly apprehend intuitive truths of any kind, till they are suggested to the mind, from without it. A large class of these in morals and religion, have first been duly and adequately presented to us in the Bible. But when so presented, the mind is intuitively convinced of their truth, if its faculties are in a sound state. What the Bible affirms to be true of human corruption, guilt, helplessness, finds its attestation in every man's conscience. So what it affirms of the unity, perfection, infinitude, wisdom, holiness, righteousness, and benevolence of God, of the excellence of his law, of our own immortality and accountability, at once satisfies the instinctive demands of our rational and moral nature. We are so constituted that we cannot be satisfied with any other view, while this instantly commends itself to every mind not utterly blinded or bewildered by sin. The necessity of atonement laid in the deep foundations of man's sin and God's purity, is felt co-extensively with that sin, as all the dire sacrifices and penances of heathenism prove. Hence, when the only perfect and sufficient expiation is presented in the word of God, and is made the very centre of Christianity, the mind intuitively sees it to meet all the exigencies of God's glory, and man's need; to be what alone could be looked for, from a holy God having purposes of mercy towards the guilty. Hence arises a preparation, if we may so speak, a moral and intellectual adaptation to accept, as implicated in this whole method of salvation, those high Christian mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, which unaided reason could never even guess, which baffle comprehension, which offer a ready pretext for unbelief to those to whom the cross is an

offence; but which have ever commanded the faith of Christendom. And out of all this, we need scarcely add, that the doctrine of regeneration by the Spirit, when duly declared to the enlightened conscience of man, is at once felt to be a necessity of his fallen nature. Thus it is strictly true, that unless torpor or defilement of conscience prevent, by manifestation of the truth we commend ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. And conscience is a faculty which, in reference to objects purely moral and religious, is intuitive in its perceptions, immediate in its judgments. As to other great doctrines, which touch religious experience effectively, but less vitally, they are so involved in these, that they are deduced from them by a single step of inference, and cannot be denied without denying them implicitly, and if logical consistency be adhered to, expressly: e. g., to deny personal and eternal election, is to deny either regeneration, or that God has eternally purposed his own acts.

We have thus dwelt upon the self-evidencing character of the vital truths of revelation, as distinguished from the self-evidence which this revelation bears of its divine origin, because it has to do so largely with the interpretation of Scripture, which, after all, is the most essential element in the logic of Christian theology. In fact, the inspiration of the Scriptures being once agreed upon, as it is, by all Christians, all other questions in theology resolve themselves into questions of interpretation. We wish not to be misunderstood, as stretching the self-evident character of Christian truths beyond the limits we have indicated. We do not apply it to the forms in which polemics and speculatists often state them. Nor would we tie it to any human dogmatic statement. And we maintain that sinful blindness, the stupefaction and defilement of the conscience, often disables men from seeing what is in itself self-evident. For there must be not only light, but a healthy eye, in order to right vision. Further, we only extend it to that class of truths, which, when stated, are either at once affirmed by the conscience, as the being, perfections and law of God, and our own condemnation thereby; or to those requisites to redemption, which we know, in our most intimate convictions, are worthy of God and necessary for our peace and purity. It is clear that, of all evi-

dence short of the testimony of God, self-evidence is the strongest by which any truth can claim or enforce belief. What is self-evident we cannot doubt. All arguments which go to contradict, or end in contradicting, self-evident truths, must be fallacious, whether we can detect the fallacy or not. An argument which appears to prove that we ought not to love God, or speak the truth, or are not sinners, never can be valid. It contradicts our most intimate moral convictions. It is just like Berkeley's argument to prove that there is no external world. Even if it seem an adamant chain of logic in which no flaw can be detected, we never can practically believe it, or fail soon to make it evident, that we believe there is a God; a law of righteousness; an external world. As intuitive evidence is superior to all outside proof or argument, so it can never be really in conflict with the Bible—the testimony of Him who cannot lie. Truth can never contradict truth.

Here applies the plain logical maxim, that of two contradictories, both can never be true. Christian polemics therefore have to combat those who in some form claim to have established the *contradictory* of some Christian truth or truths. And as we now have to do exclusively with those who profess to accept the Bible as the word of God, the effect of such contradictories on the part of those who conceive they have established them, must be to lead them to strain the interpretation of Scripture into agreement with them. As the Scriptures are true, they cannot teach the contradictory of truth—therefore, says the objector, not of this particular truth, which I have established by indubitable evidence. Whatever violence there may be required in turning the literal into the figurative, and prose into poetry, the particular doctrine so impugned, must be interpreted out of the Bible. It does not belong there. It never can have been the intent of God to put it there. The Scripture truths so reasoned and interpreted away, by those calling themselves Christians, as all know, are the high mysteries which surpass comprehension, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, Original Sin, Predestination, and those which, although intuitively evident to the spiritually enlightened mind and conscience, are nevertheless revolting, a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to carnal pride, such as sin in its bondage, pollution, and curse,

and grace in all its remedial provisions of atonement, justification, and sanctification. And of all these, we need hardly add, more that is essential is thus impugned by some, less by others.

Of these, it is claimed that the contradictory is, in some instances a self-evident truth, in others, some immediate and unquestionable inference from a self-evident truth, and partaking, therefore, of its certainty. How then shall these alleged contradictions be disposed of? The first thing to be said here is, that the seeming contradiction is between an erring and an unerring mind. "Let God be true, but every man a liar." There are a thousand possibilities that man may have mistaken the averments of God, or wrought up what is merely a strong persuasion of his own mind into an intuitive truth. It is impossible for God to lie. Then, even of intuitive truths, or truths established by other incontestable evidence, it is impossible for man, by any logical analysis of which he is capable, to define all their points of contact, or methods of agreement. We know intuitively that we are free-agents. We know as intuitively, that we cannot free ourselves wholly from sinful inclinations, that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would." Every man knows the first of these truths, every man whose conscience is duly enlightened, knows the second. But few can define what is included in each, so perfectly that it shall not seem to contradict something included in the other. Yet this is due to the weakness of our understandings. There is and can be no real contradiction between them. We know that there is not, and are never troubled with the suspicion of any, until we attempt to explicate them into mutual logical harmony. In regard to simple ideas, this attempt must of necessity fail. Being un-compounded, they are incapable of analysis. If we take truth, beauty, goodness, colour, &c., every attempted analysis will mix something with them that does not belong to them. Language serves only to awaken ideas of these things in minds already possessing them. But by no definition or analysis could we convey the idea of white, or of moral obligation, to those who have it not.

This suggests the remark that, if we cannot master the logical relations and harmonies of much that we are compelled

to believe, even of some self-evident truths, much more may this be true in respect to the relations of certain self-evident truths to the unquestionable affirmations of God in his word. God's word is true. So are self-evident truths. Yet we may be unable so to define or explain some of these, as to show how they can meet at every point, and not cross and cut each other. And if we could, we should no longer be dealing with the revelations of that God "whose judgments are unsearchable and his ways past finding out." Aside from revelation, innumerable facts in nature and providence cannot be explained on any principles which do not lead us up to the impenetrable recesses of God's infinitude. What scale do we possess for the mensuration of immensity? That act of God which may seem to contradict some self-evident principle, so far as its relations are visible to us, may be in precise accordance with that principle, in those vast and complex relations which open out to the view of the Omniscient. Children often deem the best and kindest measures of their parents harsh and inexplicable. Or rather we might say, they cannot see why they are not so, except as they confide in the tried wisdom and goodness of these parents. When their minds expand in riper age, they see herein their own folly and their parents' wisdom and goodness. In reference to the Infinite Mind, we are less than babes.

Looking at the objections to Christian doctrines most assailed, in the light of these principles, to what do they amount? The doctrine of the Trinity is assailed with the objection that three cannot be one. But how does this prove that God may not be one as to substance, three as to persons? Is it said that no instance can be found among creatures of a plurality of persons in one being? But if there be not, who can prove that there might not be, if God had so pleased; much more, that there may not be, and is not, tri-personality in God?

So of the two natures and one person in Christ, How can two be one? says the Socinian. But why may not the two-fold in one respect, be one in another? Has not even man a two-fold nature joined in one and the same person? And whether he have or not, who can show that the one of these is the contra-

dictory of the other, or that all these things are not possible to God?

As to all the allegations, that the doctrine of a strictly vicarious atonement revolts the instinctive feelings and contradicts the intuitive convictions of our race, inasmuch as these teach us that a good being cannot refuse to pardon the penitent without exacting equivalent sufferings in a substitute, we assert that the instinctive feelings and judgments of our race teach just the contrary. That sin must be compensated by adequate suffering, and cannot otherwise be remitted, without dishonour to God and disorder in the moral system, is the intuitive belief of the human race, as shown by their religious rites. The whole Christian Church has been unable to find peace and hope in anything short of the substituted sufferings of their Redeemer. So distant is this precious truth from contradicting the intuitive convictions of the soul, it is in harmony with them. If any suppose otherwise, it is because they mistake their own perverted feelings and moral judgments, for the intuitive beliefs of their race.

But there is no subject in regard to which the attempt has been more frequently or confidently made, to emasculate the plain meaning of the Bible, by the force of intuitive principles alleged to contradict it, than that of inability. It is contended that this doctrine contradicts the most self-evident facts of goodness and justice in God, and free-agency in ourselves. We have only to repeat what we have already said, that self-knowledge and the knowledge of God's law are no sooner awakened in the soul, than we perceive our inability and God's justice, no less immediately and intuitively than our own free-agency. In proof of this, we appeal not to theories, but to the consciousness of every child of God, as that consciousness utters itself in his devotions. If any cannot reconcile the two into logical consistency, this only proves that they fail in their attempts to explicate or define them.

The most inviting field for this kind of assault upon fundamental truths, lies in the doctrine of original sin and its adjuncts. That our race is fallen into a state of sin and misery, few have the front to deny, in the face of the appalling and undeniable facts which surround us. Mr. Bowen indeed, and a

small school of soft religionists try their skill in disguising or attenuating these facts. But they dare not utterly disown them. Now, if the facts are admitted, it is clear that they involve all the difficulties which the scriptural doctrine of original sin involves, and more and greater difficulties without that doctrine, than with it. The grand difficulty lies in the fact that our race comes into being under conditions which involve them in immediate, or, according to the concessions of all with whom we now have to do, in speedy sin and consequent misery. This, at least, is conceded by all who do not make shipwreck of the whole doctrine of sin and grace. Moreover, they cannot deny that infants, before moral agency, are subject to pain, disease, and death. All that the Scriptures add to these undeniable facts is, 1. That this corruption of nature which always and only develops itself in sinful acts, is itself sinful, inasmuch as they affirm, that men are "by nature children of wrath," "that which is born of the flesh is flesh," and the "wages of sin is death." 2. That this dire estate of sin and misery in which men are born, is a penal visitation for the sin of their first parent, in whom they had a probation, and who fell, while on trial as their representative. "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "In Adam all die." Now it is claimed that this view, according to which one is condemned, or suffers judicially, or is punished, for the sin of another, directly contradicts the self-evident principles of justice, and therefore must be interpreted out of the Bible. But those who allege this, omit a material circumstance which makes this self-evident maxim wholly irrelevant. Whatever degree of force it may have in reference to vicarious suffering simply considered, it has none whatever in reference to being punished for the acts of a lawfully constituted representative. To say otherwise is to impeach the justice of the dealings of God and man with families, communities, and nations. For herein the sins of the fathers are constantly visited upon the children, of the ruler upon the nation, of the principal upon the surety. If we cannot explain these facts into obvious harmony with all other truths, yet they are far from being in direct contradiction to any self-evident principles. The great principle, therefore,

which underlies the doctrine of imputation, and which this objection denounces as contradictory to the first principles of justice, pervades the providence of God, and enters largely into the dealings of man. The objection then is suicidal; it proves too much; if good for anything, it leads not merely to Pelagianism; not merely to Infidelity; but to sheer, unmitigated Atheism. But whatever objection lies against the scriptural view, lies with vastly greater force against that substituted for it. For according to this, these terrible evils were visited upon man without allowing him any probation, without being the penalty of any sin, and in mere arbitrary sovereignty. It is this scheme, if any, that contradicts our first moral intuitions, with an emphasis too, which loomed up in the mind of one of its chief advocates as the "conflict of ages," and urged him back to the poor fiction of a pre-existent state of trial, as the only refuge from infidelity.

Not only so, but the rejection of imputation on these grounds undermines all vicarious punishment, and severs the eternal *nexus* between sin and suffering in moral beings. Thus it contradicts our first moral intuitions. It prepares the way for expediency and utilitarianism in ethics and divinity. It shatters the doctrine of an atonement truly vicarious, by destroying the principles on which it rests, and turning it into a mere demonstration, based on expediency. Whether the views we advocate are theoretical merely, or whether they are not based on most solid grounds, let all history declare.

It is also objected, that, according to this view, God is the author of sin, since our very nature is sinful, when we come into the world. Of course it cannot be true, that God is the author of sin. But if the effect of God's withdrawing his favourable presence from men is, that they, in all the principles of their internal activity become disordered and corrupt, we know that he does thus withdraw from men in punishment for their personal sins, giving them over to a reprobate mind, to their own heart's lusts. This does not make him the author of sin. Neither does he become the author of sin, when he withdraws his favourable presence, his restraining and sanctifying grace from the race, in punishment for the sin of their head and representative.

It is further insisted that the doctrine of sinful dispositions anterior to and causative of sinful acts, contradicts the self-evident principle, that sin pertains only to acts. We deny that this is a self-evident principle. On the contrary, nothing is plainer from the whole language and conduct of mankind, than that they not only intuitively judge evil dispositions worthy of condemnation, but that their condemnation of evil acts is very much graduated by their estimate of the dispositions which prompt these acts. We have dwelt somewhat longer upon original sin and its adjuncts, and reproduced some views which are doubtless familiar to most of our readers, because it is upon this point particularly, that latitudinarians concentrate their assaults. They ply appeals to the softer sensibilities of our nature, with an ingenuity which would deceive, if possible, the very elect—appeals which, if valid for this purpose, are valid against the providence and perfections, yea, the being of God. A similar process is adopted by another class against the doctrine of eternal punishment. Our object has been simply to show that while the true doctrine (whatever points of mystery it involves,) contradicts no self-evident principles, as they allege, this rationalistic substitute for it, goes athwart such principles on all sides. It has all the difficulties of the scriptural scheme it would supplant, besides many others peculiar to itself. Taking the facts of providence and history as they are, no scheme approaches the doctrine of the Bible and the Church, in clearing away the perplexities of the subject.

As we have seen, purely moral truths are self-evidencing when fairly presented to, and apprehended by the mind. Religious truths, so far as they have the moral element in them, i. e., not purely positive enactments, possess the same character. We have seen that this is so, just as far as the doctrines of the Bible pertain to the moral consciousness. They find an immediate witness there. The higher Christian mysteries indeed, such as the Trinity and Incarnation, are incomprehensible; they are wholly undiscoverable by human reason; they are not, however, contradictory to any first principles of right reason; they are far enough from being directly and in themselves self-evident, yet they are so cognate with, and essential to the whole method of our redemption, that there is a

moral and intellectual adaptation to welcome them, as the history of all Christendom testifies. A religion without mysteries transcending sense and finite reason could scarcely be the religion of the Infinite God. Indeed, more or less immediately, everything terminates in mystery. *Omnia exeunt in mysterium.* Even this has a moral power in it of the very highest moment. It inspires awe, reverence, and adoration, which belong to the essence of true devotional feeling. "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery."

The fact that the principal Christian truths are intuitively evident to the enlightened moral faculty when duly presented to it, while many are unable to explain them into accordance with their philosophy, has led some of this latter class to attempt a solution of the difficulty, not by concluding that their philosophical system is wrong, but that there is a conflict between the intellect and the feelings in regard to religious truth. This error assumes a two-fold form. The first is that of pure mysticism. This bases all knowledge on feeling, and makes it a mere product of what they call the "perceptive power of Christian love." Another form is that which strives to preserve a basis of evangelical feeling in company with rationalistic theology. According to this theory, the intellect demands one set of doctrines, pious feeling another. That is true in fact which is true to the intellect. That is for edification which is true to pious feelings. What is often welcomed and demanded by the feelings, and is to be held fast and used as edifying, must, when tested by the intellect, be repudiated as false. We do not wish here to repeat the obvious and unanswerable objections to such a theory. Argument would be lost upon him, who does not see, intuitively, the impossibility of pious feeling being excited by what is false to the intellect, or that all feeling must be in view of what is first apprehended and believed by the cognitive faculties, and that consequently that system of belief, which is embraced by the intellect, alone can shape religious feeling, or be the real faith of the man. Our object rather is to point out the source of the error. It lies in mistaking the intuition of self-evident moral truths, which the mind receives without any process of reasoning, and despite all reasoning to the contrary, for mere feeling, or the dictates of

mere feeling. This is all the more natural, inasmuch as the moral, like all the æsthetic cognitions, are immediately followed by correspondent feelings pleasant or painful, of like or dislike. This circumstance led Hutcheson and some other moral philosophers to resolve the moral faculty into a mere sensibility, or susceptibility of feeling differently in view of different moral actions. They forgot that this difference of feeling, in view of different moral actions, can arise only in view of different moral qualities perceived by the mind. These qualities are none the less perceived, although perceived intuitively. In fact, intuition is the highest form of knowledge and exercise of reason. Herein, more than in aught else, we are in the image of God as to our knowledge. Intuitive truths are the most sure and fundamental of all truths—saving always the supreme authority of God's word. Any other view would resolve conscience into a mere irrational instinct; dethrone reason from the empire of the soul; and turn all religion into mere blind fortuitous impulse. Any philosophy which contradicts these moral and spiritual intuitions must be false. So far from being intellect in opposition to feeling, it is a low and treacherous kind of intellectual activity arrayed against our highest and surest intelligence. The only reason why in such a case the latter moulds pious feeling, while the former cannot, is that we trust the one and distrust the other, so far as they are in conflict. If men hold a philosophy in conflict with evangelical principles, it will doubtless control their feelings, so far as conscience and spiritual discernment are wanting, or are feeble. Truly pious men who are fettered in the toils of a false philosophy, may swing towards and away from the truth, just in proportion as the higher spiritual intuitions are vivid or faint. But in either case, the intellect will govern the feelings, and there will be no conflict between them.

But has philosophy no place in religion? Here all depends on what we mean by philosophy. As no truth can contradict any other truth, so true philosophy cannot contradict the word of God, while it may often be of service in illustrating its truths, and defending them against the assaults of philosophy, falsely so called. Nothing is plainer, other things being equal, than that any man is an abler expositor and defender of Chris-

tian truth, for being master of the truth in mental and moral science. But no philosophy should have a hearing which contradicts the fundamental truths of Christianity, as they are manifoldly set forth in the Bible, as they have been held by the Israel of God always and everywhere, as they are witnessed in the consciousness and affirmed in the devotions of genuine Christians. No philosophy is to be regarded, which contradicts intuitive truths or divine revelation. But it is only by a stretch of license that we call any thing of this sort philosophy. It is in reality only an attempt at reasoning which contains some flaw, whether we can see it or not. This holds in regard to all metaphysical speculations of every kind, and all processes of deduction and inference, which are arrayed against divine testimonies, or axiomatic truths. Nor can any essentially greater contradictory weight, as against revelation, be allowed to physical science. It is to be considered, however, that physical science touches theology only indirectly, and that it has only remote relations to soterology and anthropology. What we now understand by the physical sciences, scarcely had even an incipient existence when the Bible was written. They have been mostly formed by experiments which bring to light facts otherwise occult, and not palpable on the surface of things. The sacred writers only describe facts of appearance in the material world, in the ordinary language of life. Theologians as well as scientific men, must not be in too great haste to conclude, that because any physical science appears to establish laws at variance with this language of the sacred writers, there is, therefore, any real conflict between it and revelation, unless it is directly repugnant to some momentous revealed truth. When ethnologists deny the descent of our race from one original pair, we give place to them not for an hour, because they directly contradict a fundamental doctrine of Christian anthropology. But as to the question, whether the apparent motion of the sun is real, or arises only from the motion of the earth, who does not regret that Turretin's works are deformed with an elaborate argument to prove that the latter opinion is a dangerous heresy, because the Bible speaks of the sun's rising! And may not the cause of Christian truth receive injury, if theologians are too precipitate in pronouncing any

alleged discovery in physical science, which does not accord precisely with the popular language of the Bible, but which touches no vital spiritual truth, a dangerous heresy? May it not be safe to wait in such a case, till truth, which in these matters is the daughter of time, is undeniably elicited and established? We need not fear the result. Whenever it is so established, it will be as surely and evidently established, that there is no real discrepancy between it and revelation. Every real truth in nature and providence will be found to run towards Christianity. "All shall be gathered in to me, headed up in Christ, whether of things in heaven, or things in the earth."

It is not to be forgotten, moreover, in reference to the logic of religion, that the discoveries which God has made of himself, while they have grown more luminous and full at each successive stage, have also with every increase of light, brought to view more and more that is unsearchable and past finding out, in his works and ways. Every new revelation brings with it new and profounder mysteries, which stretch to heights and depths beyond all human insight. It is the glory of God at once to manifest himself and to conceal a thing, and so to manifest himself as to conceal much pertaining to that wherein he thus manifests himself. The very light by which he discloses, is also such as to hide parts of his ways. "He *covereth* himself with light as with a garment." Any light, therefore, which so unveils him as to leave nothing obscure or inexplicable to human reason, is surely not from him. What he enables us to see, only intimates still more of the unseen. We must still, in every stage, walk by faith and not by sight. They who are left to sneer at a "sightless faith," while they boast of solving the "great problem" of evil, are to be pitied for their infatuation. They must be mournfully ignorant of that faith which is the evidence of things "not seen." In fact, all increase of knowledge by finite mortals, on any subject, also increases our knowledge of the extent of our ignorance. He whose knowledge does not deepen his sense of his own ignorance, is rather a sciolist than a philosopher.\*

\* "True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy: 'A God understood would be no God at all.' 'To think that God is, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy.' The divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed: in a certain sense is concealed: He is at once known and unknown."—*Sir William Hamilton.*

Closely allied to this subject is the logic of future events as related to religion, in other words, of prophecy. Except so far as we may, to a certain extent, calculate future events in the material world from the uniformity of the laws of nature, we are dependent for all knowledge on this subject upon revelation. From the mere intuitions and reasonings of our own minds, we know not what a day or an hour may bring forth. In order to ascertain the general scope of prophetic revelation, with the laws of its *exegesis*, we can only apply the inductive method. We must judge of the future by the past, and reason from God's ways in prophecies that have been fulfilled, to his ways, in those that have not been fulfilled. That all the knowledge which God gives us of the future is mingled with much that is unknown, and that our highest welfare demands that it should be so, is undeniable. We know in general that we must die, and that we cannot live much beyond seventy years. But what else do we know, or is it well for us to know, about the time and manner of our death? From the first germinant promise in Eden to the coming of Christ, the future advent of a great deliverer from the curse, was constantly kept before the minds of the people of God, as the object of their faith. By rite and symbol, promise and threatening, the character of the deliverer and the nature of his mission were pre-intimated and foretold, with increasing clearness and fulness, up to the very time of his advent, and so far, that the Israelites indeed, in whom was no guile, and who were waiting for the consolation of Israel, could not fail to recognize him when he came. And yet all this previous light, precious and sufficient as it was for the Church in its then state, was to that which attended and followed our Saviour's advent, as that of the moon and stars to the sun. The same principles, we apprehend, apply to vicissitudes of the Church yet future, so far as they are the subjects of prophecy. The great principles and general facts, which it concerns us to know, are so clearly revealed that he who runs may read them. But the details are veiled in an obscurity which will be dissipated only by the event, if we may judge from the extent to which any minute system of prophetic interpretation was ever obtained in the Church, or has been verified by the event, or from the highly

figurative and symbolical language in which the biblical predictions on these subjects are clothed. The doctrines of immortality, of the resurrection, of the second advent of Christ to judgment, and the salvation of his people, of future and eternal bliss or woe for all, are so plain that they have commanded the faith and shaped the life of the whole Christian Church. As to details, those who have undertaken to make out dates, places, and other like particulars, have adopted theories as discordant as the ground upon which they proceed is uncertain. The only question here, respects the proportion of the known to the unknown, prior to the fulfilment of the event. The attempts to enlarge the proportion of the former have not been deficient in number, zeal, confidence, or an absorbing interest in this department of interpretation. They have, however, failed to command any general or extensive assent among the people of God. Of late, indeed, a new method of prophetic interpretation has appeared, which claims to shun the difficulties of previous systems, and to establish, by a most rigid induction, a calculus for the resolution of prophetic symbols, which enables us to determine their meaning with infallible certainty. It professes to derive the law of their interpretation from the manner in which such symbols were uniformly interpreted in Scripture. But when we find that a chief law on which the whole scheme depends, viz. that "living agents represent living agents," encounters confessedly an exception in the fat and lean kine of Pharaoh's dream, it appears that this alleged law will not bear the lowest test of a valid induction, even that *per enumerationem simplicem*.\* It does not hold of all *known* cases. How then are we warranted, without express divine authority, in asserting it of the unknown? If, of six known bodies, we find gravity operating in five, but not in the sixth, what sort of induction is that which would erect gravity, in such circumstances, into a universal property or law of matter? To go no further then, we are estopped *in limine*, from relying on this new organon, for results more satisfactory than those obtained in the attempts which preceded it.

It may be added, in conclusion, with regard to those who,

\* Premium Essay on Prophetic Symbols, by the Rev. Edward Winthrop, p. 28.

like the ancient servants of God, or weak Christians now, have only a rudimental knowledge of the truths of salvation, that if they receive these truly and sincerely, they of course receive implicitly that which is involved in them, even the whole doctrine which is according to godliness. They are, therefore prepared to receive it when it shall be fully and fairly unfolded to them expressly and in detail. And the manner in which they receive these fuller disclosures of saving truth is among the chief criteria of the spirit with which they received its rudiments. So the pious Jews received Christ and his instructions when he appeared in person. So those weak in the faith now grow in knowledge as they grow in grace, and when they become strong men, have a keen relish for the strong meat of high Christian truth, which, as babes in Christ, they could not bear. But either implicitly or explicitly, the whole Church of God, by which we mean, not any visible hierarchy or corporation, but his faithful people, have ever held the evangelical system against all assaults, whether from the ritual or rationalistic side; and with greater or less explicitness on particular points, according to the opposing heresies which they were called to confront or contradict. And as to the greater part of the doctrines of Christianity, illuminated by God's Spirit, they have seen their truth by an immediate and certain intuition, which no human tradition, authority, or sophistry could render dubious. They know in whom they have believed, for they have an unction whereby they know all things essential to salvation, and especially the things that are freely given them of God. They know that it is the truth and no lie, and that no lie is of the truth.

What is true of the growth of individuals, is also true of the growth of the whole Church in the knowledge of divine truth. Progress is its law. This progress, however, is not in the way of ignoring or denying the great principles of the doctrine of Christ which are patent in the word of God, and have sustained the faith and hope of his people in all ages. It consists in the fuller knowledge and comprehension of them in themselves, their mutual harmonies, and the boundaries which separate the sphere of knowledge from the sphere of mystery. All true progress implies permanence. If there be anything better

than a tread-mill motion, it requires a firm foothold. Thus, by proving all things and holding fast that which is good, we shall go onward, "till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ: that we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but speaking the truth in love, grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ." Eph. iv. 13-15.

*J. M. Sherwood, ed.*

- ART. IV.—1. *A Pastor's Sketches; or, Conversations with anxious inquirers respecting the way of salvation.* By Ichabod S. Spencer, D.D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, New York. New York: M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel, City Hall Square, 1850.
2. The Same: Second Series. Sixth Thousand. Same Publisher, 1855.
3. *Triumph in Suffering. A Discourse delivered at the funeral of the Rev. I. S. Spencer, D. D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Brooklyn, L. I.* By Gardiner Spring, D.D., LL.D., Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the city of New York. New York: M. W. Dodd, Publisher, 1855.
4. *Sermons of Rev. Ichabod S. Spencer, D. D., late pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, L. I., Author of a Pastor's Sketches; with a Sketch of his Life.* By Rev. J. M. Sherwood. In two volumes. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd, corner of Spruce Street, and City Hall Square, 1855.

THE qualities of a good pastor, and pulpit talents of a high order, are not always found united in the same person; but then it is a mistake to suppose that there is anything incompatible in the work of a Christian pastor out of the pulpit, and his work viewed simply as that of a preacher. One may be preparatory and supplementary to the other. But men differ not only in respect to the gifts which pertain to public speaking,