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ART. I.—*Remarks on the Studies and Discipline of the Preacher.*

THE habits of a young minister, in respect to mental culture, are very early formed, and hence no one can begin too soon to regulate his closet-practice by maxims derived from the true philosophy of mind, and the experience of successful scholars. Early introduction to active labour, in an extended field, partaking of a missionary and itinerant character, may, amidst much usefulness, spoil a man for life, in all that regards progress of erudition, and productiveness of the reasoning powers. Such a person may accomplish much in the way of direct and proximate good; but his fruit often dies with him, and he does little in stimulating, forming, and enriching the minds of others. On the other hand, a zealous young scholar, captivated with the intellectual or literary side of ministerial work, may addict himself to books in such a manner as to sink the preacher in the man of learning, and spend his days without any real sympathy with the affectionate duties of the working clergy. The due admixture of the contemplative with the active, of learning with labour, of private cultivation with public spirit, is a *juste milieu* which few attain, but which cannot be too earnestly recommended.

as often as the name of the Arabian impostor, who, besides the antiquated forms *Mahoma* and *Mahound*, has within a few years figured as Mahomet, Mahomed, Mohammed, Muhammed, Mehemet (in Egypt), and Muhummud (in India), without attaining perfect accuracy after all, which indeed is no more necessary in the case of the false prophet than in that of James, John, and Jerome, which no English writer in his senses ever dreams of writing Jacobus, Joannes, or Hieronymus. We return from this digression only to express our fears that this work, with all its excellences, is not calculated for the latitude or longitude of this utilitarian republic, that it presupposes the existence of a class of readers, and a previous training, which are hardly yet on hand, but which it may be the ultimate effect of such works to produce; as Sir Walter Scott says that the minds of children are improved, not by books expressly written for them, but by those immediately intended for their elders. That Professor Kœppen may exert this pedagogic influence upon us, by his present and his future publications, we sincerely wish, as well for his sake as our own.

S. H. Stealer.

- ART. V.—1. *The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.* By Francis Wayland, President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1854.
2. *A System of Intellectual Philosophy.* By Rev. Asa Mahan, First President of Cleveland University. Revised and enlarged from the second edition. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1854.
3. *Empirical Psychology; or, the Human Mind as given in Consciousness.* By Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., Union College, Schenectady. Published by G. Y. Van Debogert. 1854.

THE almost simultaneous appearance of these treatises is in itself significant. That three of the most devoted and experienced teachers of mental philosophy in our American colleges should, within a few weeks of each other, have issued

volumes designed for elementary text-books on the subject, betrays, at least, a deep and united conviction, that such a text-book has hitherto been a desideratum. It is safe to say that these authors are not alone in feeling such a want. We venture to assert, that it has been felt by nearly all teachers of this science, at least, if we except those who have supplied it for themselves, and hoped to supply it for others, by some publication of their own. Even while we now write, we see that another book, which has not yet reached us, has been published, doubtless with a similar intent. Professor Bowen, who now holds the chair of Mental Philosophy at Harvard, has published an edition of Stewart's Elements, with annotations designed to adapt it, as we understand, to the class-room and to the present attitude of this science. His distinguished predecessor in the same chair, Dr. Walker, now President of the College, had before published, on a similar plan, Reid on the Intellectual Powers, which has already reached its second edition, and been adopted in some of our principal colleges. We need not remind our readers that some years ago Professor Upham of Bowdoin College, published two volumes on the subject, prepared especially for this purpose, and which, whatever their merits or defects, were so rapidly and extensively adopted as text-books, as to show the extent and urgency of the want they were designed to meet. Although greatly deficient in that vigour and condensation which are so vital in works of this description, yet, being for the most part sound in the principles inculcated, and broken into short chapters highly convenient for teacher and learner, they met with a wide and cordial welcome. As the first important tentative effort, not to throw new light on any great problems of philosophy, but to put the elementary principles of the science into a shape better adapted to the recitation room, and the necessities of beginners, it surely had high merits, and a corresponding success. For amid other important contributions to this science made by the Scotch school and others in Britain and America, the dearth of works at all suited to the wants of our higher colleges was absolute. No stronger proof of this could be had, than the fact that Professor Upham's book, for want of a better, is, as we are informed, used by at least one Professor in the English universi-

tics—simply because its minute subdivisions into chapters and sections, render it easy to select the topics on which to exercise his pupils.

And yet, it is in no spirit of disparagement, that we say it is only for want of a better, and until a better is produced, that this has a place in our higher institutions of learning. It is no contradiction of what we have said in commendation of it, to add that the field on which it entered, still remained open and inviting to other adventurers. There was still a void, which all who felt it to be their mission, were warranted to fill in whole or in part, as best they might, “according to their several ability.” A work more compact in style, more logical in its structure, more vigorous in grasping the great problems of the science, more commensurate with its present state, was clearly demanded.

Those will readily understand us, who have known anything of this department in our colleges, when no resource in the way of text-books was known except Locke and the Scotch metaphysicians. They were encumbered with a twofold difficulty. Aside from the truth or falsity of their doctrines, they were never prepared with especial reference to the purposes of recitation. They were designed, to a great extent, to advocate or combat principles then in question, and now settled beyond rational controversy. The consequence is, that a large space is occupied in vindicating particular principles, and refuting all sorts of objectors, which so far as elementary instruction is concerned, can now better be disposed of in a most brief and summary manner. While there is much waste in tedious discussion of what now may be taken as undisputed principles, on the other hand, some of the finest forms of analysis on many subjects, which have been elaborated by later philosophers, British and continental, are wholly wanting. Thus, now by excess, now by defect, these treatises, masterly in their way, make exceedingly awkward text-books. Moreover, with the exception of Reid, they are too diffuse or antiquated in style, or too loose in arrangement, or confound psychology proper too much with the whole field of metaphysics, to serve well for rudimental studies and recitation exercises. So far as we know, on these accounts, teachers have felt serious embarrassments in the use of these text-books, while students have not been able to lay

hold of fundamental principles with sufficient clearness and certainty to acquire a thorough knowledge of, or retain a permanent interest in them.

That these difficulties have been generally felt, is sufficiently evinced by the fact, that so large a number of the principal professors of mental science in our colleges have undertaken to remove them. Besides these, various smaller works of less significance have been prepared for our higher schools and academies, some of which have had considerable currency. It was understood, we believe, that the late Dr. Marsh was meditating an elaborate work on this subject, which was prevented only by his untimely death.

It is hardly to be presumed that the recent works under consideration so completely supply this great desideratum, as to leave no place for further attempts. This may be said without implying that they have not made important contributions towards it, as in our judgment some of them at least have done. As to the question, which will best answer this end, doubtless different men will answer differently, according to their several stand-points for viewing and treating the subject. Some instructors would find one, and some another, of these treatises, most helpful in teaching, according as their respective doctrines and method harmonize best with their own metaphysical system, or with their personal idiosyncrasies.

There are obviously two methods of meeting the want in question, which have their respective advantages and drawbacks. The first is to take the standard treatises of the Scotch metaphysicians, which need no new trial to prove their worth, and by judicious omissions, transpositions, and divisions, together with notes supplementing the text with the more important results of later investigation, to adapt them to the present wants of the class-room. The other is to make a book wholly new, whether more or less original, with the design of making its style, method, and matter commensurate with the present state of the science and the wants of teachers and pupils. The former method, it seems, has been preferred by the learned and experienced professors of Harvard—the latter by the other authors under consideration. The former course is clearly the least arduous and perilous. Its successful execution requires

learning and judgment, perfected by experience in teaching; but it requires no original or constructive power, and is little embarrassed by the most formidable perils of authorship. It has the great advantage of making the substance of the book consist of matter which has already won undisputed rank in the philosophic world. In the case of Dr. Walker's edition of Reid, the notes are almost exclusively those of Sir William Hamilton, and occasional extracts judiciously selected from Stewart, Cousin, Jouffroy, and other leading metaphysicians, the better to elucidate matters which have been more fully ventilated by Reid's successors than himself. The basis of the whole, however, is Hamilton's Reid, as doubtless Hamilton's Stewart must be the basis of Dr. Bowen's edition of his *Elements*, while it must sustain the same relation to the first which the "*Elements*" themselves originally bore to Reid's "*Inquiry*"—that of an elegant finishing and adornment of the structure, which Reid alone had the strength and courage to plan and rear. But with respect to the use of Reid as a class-book, when thus arranged, (though we think it is susceptible of further improvement in this respect,) and brought up to the latest advances, we will not say of "*Rational Psychology*," but of all that is rational in psychology, one pre-eminent advantage must be patent to all. It brings the pupil's mind into contact with a great formative intellect that has given a turn and an impress to all subsequent psychological investigation, and that, beyond all rational dispute, has, more than all others, established the authority of those primitive and universal cognitions of the human race, which are the only bulwark against scepticism, and the necessary condition of every real knowledge or philosophy, against all pretended philosophical assaults whatsoever. It also puts him in contact with Sir William Hamilton, that mighty man, who, in philosophic learning and analysis, has scarcely an equal in the present, or superior in any age. Now, other things being equal, this is a signal advantage in any department of study. A thorough acquaintance with the great works which have permanently shaped opinion in any branch of human inquiry, will do more to illuminate and invigorate the mind, as well as to settle it immovably in the truth, than a knowledge of thousands that are only second and third rate.

Let any one master Augustin, Calvin, Turretin, Owen, Edwards, or, we had almost said, either of them, and he will be a mightier theologian than he who, ignorant of these, has ransacked all the common-place writers on divinity. And so of every other science. He who finds truths or opinions fresh and concentrated at their fontal sources, can readily trace them through all their streams, eddies, cross-currents, deviations, and confluence with other streams, or their defilement by foreign and filthy admixtures. He can see all important truths in their logical unity with first principles, and their antagonism to subtle and sophistical errors. But he who sees them otherwise, sees them only in fragments and atoms, floating hither and thither, without centre of attraction or bond of unity.

Yet the other method has its advantages, in the hands of a man equal to the undertaking. When there is adequate philosophic insight to originate and construct a clear, profound, true treatise on mental science, in a simple and concise style, with such a method and such divisions and subdivisions as the experience of an able teacher would suggest, it would obviously possess a unity, a compactness, a directness of movement in every part, which is impossible in a work that is the product of several minds, each working by himself, and supplemented by fragmentary excerpts from various authors. But alas! how rare are minds thus furnished for such a work. Yet this should not discourage any who feel called to it from tentative efforts, even when convinced that they shall succeed but in part. A partial contribution is better than none, and a partial failure is no discredit.

We are thus brought to the works named at the head of this article, which it is full time to notice more definitely.

First in order, and in our view, not least in merit, is Dr. Wayland's book. It is characterized by those qualities, as to matter and style, which have long since earned for him an honorable rank among American writers. It consists essentially, as he informs us, of the lectures which he has long delivered to the classes of Brown University. His views are generally sound and sensible, expressed in a clear and dignified style, which sometimes becomes ornate and vivid. He especially aims to give all his disquisitions a practical turn. He

closes almost all his chapters with judicious suggestions in regard to the improvement and right use of the faculties treated of. These strike us as the most valuable and attractive portions of the book; especially in the chapters on Reasoning, Taste, and Imagination poetic and philosophic. As to substance and radical principles, it is easy to see that the work rests essentially on Reid, with some modifications from his Scotch successors, down to Hamilton. The author propounds some views, on minor points, original with himself, some of which do, while others do not, command our assent. For example, after having defined taste as that whereby we "cognize the beauties of nature and art," we do not see on what ground he should deny that it is a "faculty," pp. 387, 8. We doubt whether it is a true or wholesome doctrine, that it is in the power of expressing our emotions by the tones of the voice, more than in anything else that the gift of eloquence consists, p. 58. While there is something of truth, there is more of exaggeration in such a statement. These and any other things the like, however, are minor matters. The great fault of the book seems to us one of omission in two particulars. 1. It makes scarcely any, if any, reference to the psychological principles and problems which the Germans have brought into such prominence. With the exception of an occasional reference to Cousin, there is no intimation either of the existence of continental metaphysicians, or of the great questions with which they have agitated the whole philosophical world. It is vain to say, that the doctrines of the Transcendental school have no foothold in this country, which renders them worthy of attention, or that it is useless and unprofitable to our American students to consider them. When they are introduced to our cultured and inquisitive minds, by writers of such might and fascination as Coleridge, Morell, and Cousin, it is but the merest fatuity to ignore their wide prevalence and influence. If any one author has exercised a stronger moulding influence on a certain class of minds in our country, that have grown up within the last twenty years, than Coleridge, we have yet to learn who he is. There are few of our prominent seats of learning and faculties of instruction, in which his inspirations have not been felt more or less, and, according to the measure

of them, for better or for worse. To say nothing of such men as Drs. Marsh, Henry, Professor Shedd, and a host of collaborators, who have toiled so successfully to bring this class of authors into notoriety; to leave out of sight a far different sort of men, whose Transcendentalism has pushed them to the opposite extremes of infidelity, as in the case of Theodore Parker and the Boston Transcendentalists, and of Romanizing ritualism, as in the case of the Mercersburg school, or to that mid-point in which both these tendencies blend with Rationalism and Mysticism, in forms ever changeful, undefined, yet beautiful as the kaleidoscope, as in the case of Dr. Bushnell, the two books by Drs. Hickok and Mahan, are sufficient evidence of the growth and influence of this school. They are both decidedly, though not equally, transcendental, and take their life from Coleridge, Kant, and Cousin. Both are from men who have long been prominent educators of youth, and contain the substance of their teachings. One, although so far re-written as to be essentially a new book, is yet a third edition. Our young students and scholars are sure, therefore, to be brought into contact with this sort of philosophy, not only in the formal treatises we have indicated, but as it is implicated or expressed in much of our current and influential literature. How constantly does it underlie and energize the writings of Carlyle, giving them half their electric power and strange fascination? We think, therefore, that justice to our educated youth, requires that they should be carefully taught what this vaunted philosophy is; what are its pretensions; or if this be impossible, on account of its inherent obscurity, that it be demonstrated how and why it is thus impossible; what of truth and what of error the system apparently contains; where its fallacies, extravaganzas, and principal vices and perils of every kind, lie. Let it be shown what of truth it contains as against the sensational school, and what of error as compared with the true system; where its tendencies to sceptical idealism, to pantheism, to a rationalizing infidelity, an arrogant self-deification, begin, and within what limits, if any, they may be avoided. In short, let the angle of divergence from the straight path of truth be clearly delineated. If this be not done; if the very existence of transcendental metaphysics, their problems, claims, and

tendencies, be ignored, we see not what is gained, while much is lost, by dropping the old masters.

Another omission, which we should not notice in a book purporting to treat only of "intellectual philosophy," were it not that Dr. Wayland long ago published a text-book of Moral Philosophy which is silent on the subject, is the want of any analysis of the will, desires, susceptibilities, indeed the whole emotional and optative faculties of the mind. Saving a casual sentence here and there thrown out in the discussion of other subjects, both volumes pass by these points. Dr. Wayland, alluding to conscience incidentally, in his recent work, declines going into a discussion of it, on the ground that it properly belongs to moral philosophy, in which he has treated the subject in form and at length, on the same principle, we suppose, that the affective and voluntary faculties could properly be referred to the same department. In one aspect, they belong to psychology, in another, to moral philosophy. At all events, they belong somewhere, and must have a place in every proper system of mental and moral philosophy. Without them the first is incomplete, and the latter without any logical basis. Possibly, however, Dr. Wayland intends to follow the Scotch metaphysicians through and through, and publish a separate volume on the Active and Moral Powers—as a distinct branch of psychology. The greatest objection to this course is, that it looks like countenancing the too common error, which divides the human soul in twain by completely divorcing the intelligence from the will. As Dr. Wayland's works usually live, we have made these suggestions with all deference for his consideration, in preparing future editions.

Messrs. Mahan and Hickok, whatever may be their merits or demerits, are not chargeable with these omissions. So far from ignoring the Transcendental philosophy, the former builds his treatise chiefly upon it, not without many and earnest protests against the extreme aberrations and impious daring of some of its illustrious advocates; while the latter is not often transcended in his Transcendentalism. Dr. Mahan says, "the individuals to whom I feel most indebted as a philosopher, are Coleridge, Cousin, and Kant—three luminaries of the first order in the sphere of philosophy:" and that he has aimed to

“give to the public a work, on this great science, which should meet the fundamental philosophic wants of the age.” Yet, we are pleased to find that he combats with zeal and ability, many of the more extravagant and dangerous dogmas of these philosophers. He battles everything in Kant and Coleridge which puts in doubt the validity of our perceptions of external objects, or casts a shade of doubt over the objective reality of the material world. He stoutly assails with remorseless ridicule and invective, the fiction of Kant, that *nooumena* are the only realities in sensible objects, while *phenomena* are but “baseless fabrics of a vision.” He not only argues, but inveighs against the blasphemous pantheistic dogma of Cousin, that human reason is “impersonal,” and that “this principle is God the first and the last of every thing!!” He likewise holds up to merited detestation, the equivalent statement of Coleridge, the mouth-piece of Schelling, that reason is an “organ identical with its appropriate objects;” and that “God, the soul, and eternal truth are not the objects of the Reason, they are the Reason itself.” Indeed for one who defers so greatly and avowedly to these philosophers, he exhibits a freedom from servility as rare as it is wholesome. It is quite refreshing, as we look over his index of topics, to find how often the phrases, “error of Coleridge,” “error of Kant,” “paralogism of Cousin,” recur. Withal, he devotes a whole chapter to a clear statement and refutation of the several systems of egoistic and pantheistic idealism, successively elaborated by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. If we pass from the general drift of the book, to its method and style, it has some decided merits. The style is clear, terse, and direct, to a degree that is uncommon in those who are “sounding their dim and perilous way” through the mystic depths of Transcendentalism. The work is also broken into small sections, headed by formal titles, often not more, or even less than a page in length; and this without breaking the chain of arguments which often include many such sections. This feature of it greatly adds to its convenience and value as a text-book. The method is, for the most part, direct and logical. It is well adapted to bear the learner onward to the core of his system, and foster a constant and lively sympathy with it.

Having thus shown our appreciation of the merits of the work, we shall with equal freedom and fairness indicate some features of an opposite kind. He begins with that threefold distribution of the mind into intellect, sensibility, and will, which Dr. Hickok also adopts, and which is now quite general among all those who seek to limit moral responsibility to acts of the will, considered as endued with the power of contrary choice, or self-determination of the will. This work is chiefly confined to the intellect, although he treats of conscience as falling appropriately under this head. He also indicates his opinions with sufficient plainness in regard to the will—the full statement of his philosophy concerning it, having (as we judge from an intimation on p. 14) been given to the public in a separate volume, which we have not seen. He then divides the faculties of the intellect into two classes, which he calls primary and secondary. In the former he classes the intuitive powers, which give us our first ideas and elements of knowledge by immediate intuition, without the intervention of reasoning, argument, or any other medium. In the latter, he classes the various faculties which act upon, *i. e.* analyze, combine, compare the primitive cognitions given by the primary faculties. He proceeds first to the consideration of the primary faculties, to which he refers sense, consciousness, and reason, insisting, with great warmth and decision, upon the German distinction between reason and understanding—a thing of course in one who defers so greatly to Kant, Coleridge, and Cousin. Upon this distinction we shall offer some suggestions in the sequel. For the present we have only to observe, that, granting its validity, we cannot see the propriety of ranking consciousness as a distinct faculty of the mind, either primary or secondary. It is rather a common property of all exercises of intelligence, whether of the primary or secondary faculties—that by which, in knowing, we know that we know. So it is a common property of all our mental exercises, whereby, in feeling or willing, we know that we thus feel or will. It enters into all the cognitions by the senses, and by the reason as defined by these philosophers, together with all operations of the understanding, and what are styled by Dr. Mahan secondary faculties. It is not, therefore, a distinct faculty, first or second, but an element in

all the exercises of every faculty. This is the view of it given by philosophers of all schools, so far as we know.

After making this classification, we see no good reason why Dr. Mahan should put two of his primary faculties, sense and consciousness, before, and one, reason, after the so-called secondary faculties, in the order of treatment in his book; for, although he makes reason the supreme faculty, yet on all logical grounds the primary faculties go together not less than the secondary. We are sorry to observe that he contends warmly for Kant's arbitrary distinction between understanding and judgment. This by no means follows, even if the distinction between understanding and reason be conceded. In any case, judgment is a property of the understanding, and is inseparable, according to Reid, from nearly, according to Hamilton, from quite, all acts of intelligence. We cannot perceive a material object without a judgment that it exists. We cannot cognize any *a priori*, universal, or necessary truths, without a judgment that they are such. We cannot form even a conception or imagination, however false, without at least a mental judgment or affirmation that such a mental state exists. Were it otherwise, we see no reason for his ranking judgment, association, memory, imagination, as faculties specifically different from the understanding. They are branches of it. In this respect, Dr. Mahan's method is as arbitrary as transcendental, without shadow of warrant in common or philosophical language, and fitted only to produce confusion in both. We will only add, that, in developing his theory of imagination and of reasoning, he, like Dr. Wayland, takes considerable strides into the departments of rhetoric and logic. We do not complain of this, for these sciences so flow into and flow out of the true science of mind, that it is difficult to draw any but an arbitrary line of demarcation between departments which so interpenetrate each other. And his elaborate and able chapter on imagination, while it does not in everything command our assent, will well repay careful study. Beyond this, he intrudes somewhat into the domain of theology, which also has strong points of contact with mental science. And here the evils of the extravagant exaltation which this system gives to the reason, are in some measure developed. But as we hope again to advert to

the distinction between reason and understanding, we will defer further remark on this subject for the present.

We hasten to notice Dr. Hickok's book, which, if it comes last, deserves not the least of our attention. It is an extraordinary book, although less so than its counterpart, which the author published a few years ago, under the title of *Rational Psychology*. In this general method he has an eminent example in Wolff, who undertook to exhaust the philosophy of mind in two great treatises, entitled respectively *Psychologia Empirica* and *Psychologia Rationalis*. Dr. Hickok displays his enterprise and courage in the serene confidence with which he prosecutes a work in which such illustrious men have already failed. Whether his ability is equal to his confidence is now to be considered. As he is more intensely transcendental than Dr. Mahan, so his method and arrangement are wholly different. While his book has little more than half the matter contained in Dr. Mahan's, full half of that is taken up with disquisitions pertaining to the susceptibility, and will; while there is a long preliminary dissertation upon anthropology, the relations of the mind and body, and the great divisions of the human race. The result is that but little over a hundred pages of small size are devoted to the intellectual faculties, the main stress of the volume being manifestly laid upon the subject of moral agency in its theological bearings. This, however, is perhaps all that would be expected on "the human mind as given in consciousness," by the readers of the author's heavy volume on *Rational Psychology*, in which he undertakes to determine *a priori* whether any such experience as consciousness is possible, and if possible, what it *must necessarily be*. Those who have settled beforehand *what it must be*, need surely occupy but little space to ascertain *what it is*. But knowing the liability of critics to the charge of misrepresentation in cases of this sort, we prefer to let the author speak for himself. We quote the first sentences of the book under review:

"Psychology is comprehensive of all the necessary principles and the developed facts of mind. The necessary principles determine the possibility of an intelligent agency, and reveal in the reason how mind must be constituted in order to any cognition of a nature of things as existing in space and time;

and is thus distinguished as *Rational Psychology*. The developed facts of mind are taken as they reveal themselves through an actual experience in consciousness, and when combined in systematic arrangement, they give the specific science known as *Empirical Psychology*. It is this last only which comes within the field of present investigation.

"*Empirical Psychology* is thus inclusive of all mental facts which may come within human consciousness. The being of mind, with all its faculties and their functions; every phenomenon in its own manifestation, and its law of connection with other phenomena; all, indeed, about which an intelligent inquiry can be made in reference to mental existence and action, come within the province where this philosophy should make itself thoroughly and familiarly conversant."

Again, he says in his *Rational Psychology*, p. 18: "In the conclusions of this science, (*Rational Psychology*,) it becomes competent for us to affirm, not as from mere experience we may, that this *is*—but, from these necessary and universal principles, that this *must be*. The intellect is itself investigated and known through the *a priori* principles that must control its agency."

Still further: "Such, also, is a truly *transcendental* philosophy, inasmuch as it *transcends* experience, and goes up to those necessary sources from which all possible experience must originate." (*Rat. Psych.* p. 22.)

If it be lawful for those who, like ourselves, have not soared to those giddy heights which transcend our own consciousness, to indulge in a judgment *a priori*, we are of opinion that a science of mind "as given in consciousness" *must be* much more "rational" than any which undertakes to determine beforehand what this consciousness must be, or whether it is possible. Such a science is preposterous on the face of it. Dr. Hickok himself being judge, "all about which an intelligent inquiry can be made in reference to mental existence and action," comes within the province of what he calls *Empirical Psychology*. According to our conceptions of rationality, the question whether any science of mind beyond this is rational, answers itself to all rational men. And how, pray, are these *a priori* principles themselves, which are to determine the anterior possibility of experience or consciousness, to be found, except as

they are "given in consciousness," and evolved in its light? And if one should reason out *a priori* that the present consciousness and experience of himself and the race were impossible, what then? Which witness will he believe? In all his practical procedures, he will soon show whether he trusts his own consciousness or his rationalizing sophistry. A Berkeley and a Fichte will show that they consider matter something more than an idea, when they see a stiletto entering their bosoms—a Hume and a Brown, that they believe causes have a real power to produce effects, when they flee from a burning house.

The fact is, that these absurd conclusions, which contradict the first data of consciousness, are the products of speculation, which either takes for its premises some imaginary deliverance of consciousness, or reasons illogically from some true one, without detecting the fallacy. But all men proceed, and all sound philosophy proceeds on the hypothesis that our first principles and intuitive judgments, which are the basis of all reasoning, must have an authority paramount to all arguments which contradict them, and that all such arguments must have a covert fallacy, no matter how cogent they may seem to be.

As to our primitive judgments and intuitive ideas themselves, as given either in perception through the senses, or in the mind itself through what these men call the reason, there is no such conflict as this *Rational Psychology* supposes. Dr. Hickok, (*Rat. Psych.* p. 42,) referring to Hume's sophisms, speaks of the case as one in which "consciousness contradicts reason, the reason belies consciousness," and hence contends for the necessity of rational psychology to end this "drawn battle." But if a *rational* system is the judge that ends the strife, then it is not true that "reason belies consciousness," and the alleged necessity is imaginary. We are sometimes at a loss to know whether Dr. Hickok, like Mahan, Coleridge, and most of this school, considers reason a purely intuitive, or likewise a discursive faculty. If the latter, it would seem to have usurped some of the functions of the understanding, as usually defined by them. He speaks of it as "oversceing" and "comprehending" the whole "operation of the sense and understanding." (*Rat. Psych.* p. 534.) So far as it operates discursively, either in

itself or through the understanding, in speculation about the legitimacy or possibility of our consciousness, it, like every human faculty, must soon prove its impotency.

But whether speculative or intuitive, we utterly deny that the intuitions of any one faculty are amenable at the bar of any other—much more that consciousness, through which alone we know the cognitions of any faculty, must vindicate its affirmations before them, or can be subverted by them. Dr. Mahan well contends that intuitions, of whatever faculties, “can never be opposed to each other.” Nor is it the province of one sort of intuitions to impeach the possibility or validity of another. But the very idea of a “rational” psychology to supervise and legitimate a psychology given in consciousness, implies the contrary. It implies that the intuitions of one faculty may be subverted by those of another, which, in our judgment, is the radical error underlying the most dangerous systems of philosophy, ideal and sensational. It was by arraigning sense-perceptions at the bar of reason so called, that Kant, and Coleridge after him, came to the conclusion that the “things which we envisage, (*i. e.* as we suppose, represent to ourselves through the senses,) are not that in themselves for which we take them.” The *noumena* or real entities are totally different from the *phenomena* of material objects as apprehended through the senses. Therefore our intuitive apprehensions of such phenomena are not trustworthy. They are nullified by the judgments of that higher faculty, the reason. But if our intuitions of external objects are not reliable, if our faculties deceive us here, why may they not deceive us in all our intuitive convictions, whether of the reality of objects of sense, or of universal, necessary and moral truths, as given us by the reason? The all-annihilating idealism and pantheism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, are legitimate logical consequents of such a procedure. On the other hand, if the cognitions of necessary and universal truths which originally arise from within the mind itself, are not deemed valid till they have been arraigned and tried at the bar of the senses, then there is no reason for trusting the perceptions of sense. Universal scepticism is the logical result. Not only so, but all ideas of the good and the beautiful are resolved into “transformed sensations,” till utilitarianism, epi-

cureanism, and materialism are enthroned in morals, religion, literature, science, and the arts. Such was the result of the French sensational school, based on an overstrained interpretation of Locke's extreme and incautious deliverances in this direction, called forth in combating the contrary error. Such must ever be the result of resolving all our ideas into sensations, or the products of sensation. All philosophy and all knowledge is undermined, and gives place to a dreary scepticism, as soon as we take the ground that the intuitions of the mind, either through sense, or reason, or that its consciousness, are not trustworthy until they are validated by some faculty beyond themselves. Each is good within its own sphere, and has no warrant for leaving its own domain. It is because Dr. Hickok's process of legitimating the affirmations of sense and consciousness seems to us to imply the contrary, that we have thus dwelt upon it. The great merit of Reid as a philosopher, lies in the fact that he established the doctrine for which we are contending, and gave to the intuitive judgments of the mind, whether in its outward perceptions, or its inward, instinctive, axiomatic beliefs, their proper and unquestionable authority. In doing this, he rendered a service to mental science, not unlike that which Bacon rendered to physics. As a consequence, the fruits of investigation in this department since his day, culminating in Sir William Hamilton, have been equally rich and splendid. His great position is thus stated by himself, and it is impregnable: "The faculties of consciousness, of memory, of external sense, and of reason, are all equally the gifts of nature. No good reason can be assigned for rejecting the testimony of one of them, which is not of equal force with regard to the others."* Thus alone could he rear any effectual barrier against the scepticism, we were about to say nihilism, of Hume, and put inquirers on the true and fruitful track of inquiry.

We wish it to be understood, that we do not mean to imply that Dr. Hickok discredits the testimony of sense and consciousness in fact. He has validated it to his own satisfaction, at the bar of Rational Psychology. What we protest against is, the principle that it needs to be thus legitimated. This is

* Inquiry, Essay VI., Chap. iii.

the mother heresy. If we are not authorized to trust our senses and consciousness till we have digested his transcendental demonstrations, we are afraid we are doomed to scepticism. And indeed it seems to us, that Dr. Hickok himself finds it necessary to trust his consciousness rather than his rational psychology. After telling us that "the qualities of substances and the exercises of agents alone appear in consciousness, and thus that all experience can vouch for is the quality and the exercise, and not the essential being in which the qualities inhere, and from which the exercises spring," and that "there is thus an occasion for scepticism to come in, modified in various ways, and which can be excluded only through the most profound demonstrations of transcendental science;" he tells us on the next page, that "there is also in this one consciousness the additional testimony that these exercises are not thrown upon its field as shadows passing over a landscape, but that they come up from some *nisus* or energy that produces them from beneath; * * and thus that there is some *entity* as opposed to non-being, which *abides and energizes in consciousness,*" pp. 73-5.

The following from the chapter on Anthropology, besides being for the comfort of dyspeptics, is one among many illustrations of a tendency to arbitrary and capricious generalization, in a mind intensely speculative, prolific in subtle and tenuous threads of thought, now true and striking, and now the reverse. He says, "Where the digestive organization is vigorously active, and the vital force goes out strongly in the process of assimilation and nutrition, there will be the *melancholic* temperament. * * * * Jeremiah in Judea, Homer in Greece, Dante in Florence, Cowper in England, and Goethe in Germany, are all, in different forms, examples of the melancholic temperament," pp. 48, 9. We will not weaken the emphasis of such a statement by any comment.

According to Morell, the order of topics in Hegel's philosophy of mind viewed subjectively, were Anthropology, Psychology, Will. This is, with hardly a deviation, the order adopted by Dr. Hickok in this volume. But how the first of these topics becomes an integral part of the "science of mind as given in consciousness," except as all sciences are more or less

implicated with it, is not evident to us. The intellectual faculties he classes under the three grand divisions of Sense, Understanding, Reason; and more philosophically than Dr. Mahan, he includes under the understanding, as branches of it, all that the former ranks as secondary faculties distinct from understanding. In this system of philosophy, such a division seems to us natural and logical.

We do not think Dr. Hickok's style the most felicitous for elucidating abstract and recondite subjects. They need the aid of the utmost simplicity, clearness, and point in expression. A turgid and ambitious style aggravates even transcendental formulas, which, we confess, are greatly alleviated, when they are articulated in the lively and pithy sentences of Cousin, or even of Mahan. But our readers will better comprehend our meaning, if we give them a specimen of what we object to. The following is the definition of understanding:

“The Understanding is that Intellectual Faculty by which the single and fleeting phenomena of sense are known as qualities inhering in permanent things, and all things as cohering to form a universe. In the sense, the operation of the intellectual agency is engaged in putting the content in sensation within limits; in the understanding this agency is employed in putting that which has been defined into its grounds and sources. The first is a *conjoining* and the last a *connecting* operation. The sense-object is a mere aggregation; the understanding-object is an inherent coalition. In the sense the object appears; in the understanding, it is thought. One is a perception; the other is a judgment.” p. 127.

Perhaps our readers are now prepared to appreciate the nature and grounds of the distinction between reason and understanding. But although there are several things of a minor sort, which we had marked for comment, we hurry forward to those portions which have an ethical or theological aspect, and which, of course, have a paramount importance.

First: We think Dr. Hickok's use of the word *supernatural* as groundless and mischievous as it is transcendental. The higher faculties of reason and will in man, he constantly, in all his metaphysical works, pronounces supernatural. Thus on page 371 of this book, he says:

“In the possession of reason, man is competent to apply necessary and universal principles, for expounding and comprehending all the perceptions of the sense, and the judgments of the understanding. In this sphere he rises above the natural, and is truly supernatural.”

So in vindicating his peculiar views of the nature of virtue and the power of contrary choice, he says:

“Nature is working in him, and upon him, and were he only nature, he must obey her currents, and float as the stream should carry him. He is not only nature; he is supernatural. In his spiritual being he has a law of worthiness, and he may hold on to this imperative which awakes in his own spirit, and resist and beat back all the imperatives which awake in his animal nature.” p. 376.

We are aware that in this Dr. Hickok has the sanction of Coleridge, in one of those fancies which he was wont to intermingle with his grandest enunciations of momentous truths. Dr. Hickok says, “*Nature of things a nascor.*” Coleridge says, “Nature, that which is *about to be* born, that which is always *becoming*. It follows, therefore, that whatever originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be *spiritual*, and consequently *supernatural*: yet not on that account necessarily *miraculous*. And such must the responsible WILL in us be, if it be at all.” (*Aids to Reflection*, p. 155.)

Now supernatural, and nature as contrasted with it, have a fixed and intelligible meaning in ordinary and scientific use. *Nature* means the sum of all created things, properties, laws, powers, agencies, together with their workings and effects. *Supernatural* is used to characterize operations and effects which creature agents and powers are incapable of producing *propriis viribus*, and which can only be produced by the interposition of divine power. It is, therefore, not only in monstrous violation of all usage, that the human will or reason, or any of their acts, are called supernatural; but it looks to us akin to a deification of them. It must be a most potent and pestilent stimulus to human pride and glorying. It eviscerates the most pregnant terms and definitions relative to miracles and grace, of their meaning. A supernatural work of renova-

tion in the soul, after all, may mean nothing more than an act of that Supernatural Power, the Will, paying due homage to this Supernatural Excellency, the Reason. A supernatural revelation may be a revelation of our own reason. We are sorry that Dr. Hickok should have adopted a use of terms, which brings all professions of faith in a supernatural religion, on the part of transcendentalists, into just suspicion; especially as we have no doubt that he is himself a supernaturalist, in the accepted sense of the word.

We confess that, with such a starting point, we should not, in advance, look for a safe and sound analysis in the ethical portion of his book; and we are sorry to say that our apprehensions have been realized.

In regard to the nature of virtue or moral goodness, Dr. Hickok takes the same ground which he had previously taken in his *Rational Psychology*, and which lies at the foundation of his recent treatise on Moral Philosophy. This is nowhere more clearly stated than in the following passage, p. 297:

“The man can be worthy, and thus attain his highest good, only in the possession of a radical spiritual disposition fixed in conformity to the claims of his own excellency. He obeys neither man nor God ethically, except as he directly sees that the proper dignity of his own spirit requires it of him; and that spirit, permanently disposed to that end, is a righteous spiritual disposition.”

Again, p. 172: “The insight of reason into its own being, gives, at once, the apprehension of its own prerogatives, and its legitimate right to control and subject nature and sense to its own end, and hold every interest subordinate to the spirit's own excellency.”

Surely, then, man has something whereof to glory! According to this, every man is his own Deity. No allegiance is due to God, which does not flow from the allegiance first due to ourselves. Our obedience to God is not even “ethical,” unless rendered because we “directly see” that our own “proper dignity” and “excellency” require it. Surely this makes us quite level to, if not above Him, who by reason of his perfection “cannot deny himself,” and by reason of his infinitude, because he could swear by no greater, sware by himself! We

confess that it passes our comprehension, how a mortal could reach such an elevation. It overflies all recorded hero-worship.

According to this view, right is analyzed or resolved into other elementary ideas simpler than itself. It is what is due to the excellency of our own spiritual and rational nature. But then what constitutes the excellency of that nature, unless its capability of moral rectitude? The question then returns, What is moral rectitude? what is the idea of right? Thus this new definition of right, like every other which explicates it into elements simpler than itself, aside from other faults, is of that circular kind, which soon returns to its starting-point; it being the nature of all simple ideas, that they cannot be resolved into anything simpler than themselves. We are glad to see that the attempt to resolve it into utility, or gratification of self-love, or desire of happiness, which we have felt compelled to combat so strenuously in time past, is now generally abandoned. By the three authors under consideration, these heresies are condemned. The revolt of conscience, which has nearly exorcised these degrading but once popular theories from current ethical writings, will, in our opinion, quickly dispose of Dr. Hickok's new theory. It is indeed a scheme of self-love or self-hood, absolute and unmitigated. If it tends less to sensuality, it tends more to pride than the other—the root of the original apostacy, and the mightiest antagonist of that Gospel, which first of all abases man and exalts God; which excludes all boasting, and leaves not the flesh whereof to glory, and builds itself upon “humility, the low, but deep and broad foundation of all our virtues.”

As God casteth down all high imaginations, and maketh humbleness of mind the only path to true elevation, so we deem it our duty to say that such a scheme is debasing in its whole tendency. It is only by looking above himself to the First Good and the First Fair, to the supreme source and model of all goodness, that man can become truly good. Nor can he improve or dignify himself at all, except as he goes out of himself to nobler standards. As some one has said, all creatures receive their true proportion and grandeur by tending upward

towards higher forms of being, and even the dog is conscious of a nobility acquired from looking upward to his master.

“ Unless above himself
He can erect himself,
How mean a thing is man!”

What astounds us most of all, is that after thus analyzing the idea of right and moral obligation into such elements, Dr. Hickok should give it as one attribute of “the intuition of the ultimate right” that it is “simple.” By this, says he, “is meant that it is wholly uncompounded, and thus incapable of further analysis.” (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 53.) But he certainly does analyze it into that which is due to the “spirit’s own excellency.”

That which is laboured out at greatest length is the power of contrary choice. It is true, he does not use the phrase; but, as we think our readers will soon see, he asserts the thing, under more circuitous phraseology. Dr. Mahan takes the same course in incidentally asserting the same doctrine, pp. 237, 8. These are pleasing indications that, to maintain in plain terms that we have a power with the same internal state and external motives which prompt a choice of a given thing, to choose the direct contrary, has already become a forlorn hope. Whether the new strategy of circumlocution will succeed any better, remains to be seen. We of course cannot undertake to follow Dr. Hickok through all his toilsome disquisitions.

He says, “The definition of the human will is a capacity for electing.” “Election is the taking of the one when it might have been not the taking of that, but some other,” (p. 255.) “I know that I could have done differently, if I pleased; and I know, moreover, that if I was pleased to do wrong, that pleasing was not inevitable. It was not determined in the conditions of nature, but wholly in my spiritual disposition; and to that there was a full alternative,” (p. 272.) The merely spontaneous desires and preferences of the soul, however free, have not the element of liberty and responsibility, because in their very nature they go to some certain object, without alternative. “Cause in liberty is not only spontaneous, but with an open alternative.” “In man, though fallen, the alternatives still lie open,” (pp. 320, 1.) “The law is nigh to every man,

and speaks out from the conscious imperatives awakening within his own spirit. Man is competent to obey this law," (p. 389.) "When wrongly disposed, it (the spirit of the man) is competent to change the disposition, and take again the end for which existence is given," (p. 390.)

The author's doctrine is thus placed beyond all doubt. His alternative lies not objectively in having different objects within our election, to be chosen or not chosen, as we please; it lies not subjectively in the power and liberty of choosing according to our inclinations; but it lies deeper than this, viz. in the power of choosing the contrary of what we do, the inward inclinations and external motives to, and the objects of, choice remaining the same. It goes the length of asserting full ability in fallen man to keep the law of God, and to change his sinful disposition. An inability lying "in any kind of necessity is a natural inability, without alternative, unavoidable, and wholly irresponsible." It must be "always in contingency and avoidable," in order to be "responsible," (p. 366.) Hence, it is argued that such texts as Rom. viii. 7, and 1 Cor. ii. 14, assert not inability, but only the "absurdity" of the idea that a man can be carnal and spiritual at the same moment, (pp. 364, 5.) It cannot be necessary for the confirmation of our readers to rehearse the arguments which we have, in former articles, arrayed against this whole scheme. It, however, gives us pleasure to present a complete refutation and denial of it, from this book itself, wherein, as it appears to us, by a single blow, the author strikes down the fabric he had erected with such protracted toil. Nothing is more cheering than to see such triumphs of Christian feeling (however empirical,) over the most transcendental speculations.

He says, p. 357, "In the case of going against a radical disposition, or of changing that disposition, the deep consciousness of moral impotence in the human mind will never be satisfied to clothe its conviction in any other form than that of directly expressed inability. A sense of great guilt, and of great danger, may press upon the spirit in the conviction of its perverse and depraved disposition, and the man may know and own his responsibility for every moment's delay to 'put off the old, and put on the new man,' and yet be deeply conscious

that the spirit has so come to love its bondage, and to hate its duty, that he can only adequately express his sense of his helplessness, by emphatically saying, 'I cannot change;' 'I find myself utterly helpless;' 'I am sold under sin;' 'Some one else must help me, for I cannot help myself.' The deep conviction cannot rest in any weaker expressions." On the next page, Dr. Hickok says such language is "no hyperbole, but honest, felt conviction." He also says that this corrupt state of the soul is anterior to consciousness. "It is as plain a truth in the book of human experience as in the Bible, 'that men go astray as soon as they are born.' With the opening dawn of consciousness, we find the spirit already has its bent, and is permanently disposed to self-gratification, not to dignity," (p. 298.)

Moreover, although he repeatedly denies that the spontaneous moral affections of the soul involve any moral accountability, further than as they are the products of the will having the "alternative" of contrary choice, yet he says, p. 282, "Our spiritual feelings are the subject of commands, and come within the reach of legal retributions. Love and hatred, joy and sorrow, in the sense of spiritual affections, are enjoined upon us in regard to certain objects. This may very readily induce the conviction, that they are themselves volitions. But their distinction from all direct acts of the will is manifest in the utter impracticability to immediately will them in or out of being."

If now we consider the conditions which he affirms to be necessary for willing, his self-refutation is complete. He says, p. 103, "The willing state, as capacity for putting forth any voluntary exercises, must thus be preceded by both an object known, and an object felt, and must thus be occasioned by an intellectual and an emotive state. In these only, is the condition of willing at all given." What then becomes of the omnipotent power of the will to choose in independence and contravention of all desire? In our view, there is more precious irrefragable truth in these few brief quotations, than in all the countervailing speculations of the book.

When we find, moreover, that the liberty asserted by our author is confessedly of such a kind that "the logical understanding can neither find it, nor get a conception of it," that it

is to this faculty an absurdity," (p. 273); that, as we have already seen, the powers requisite to it are affirmed to be *supernatural*; that God, the most consummate of moral agents, is acknowledged to be "above all occasion for alternatives to perfect rationality," such as he contends are requisite to moral agency in man, (p. 254); that his scheme requires him to define desire as "the mere craving of the animal susceptibility," thus excluding it from the sphere of the spiritual and rational, we feel excused for not travelling beyond the record in search of rebutting arguments, plenty as they are. It is hard to make any demonstration of a false dogma that is not suicidal.

We are unwilling to close this article, already protracted beyond our first intention, without a few suggestions in regard to the great distinction between reason and understanding, which is so fundamental with Drs. Mahan, Hickok, and others of this school.

Dr. Mahan defines reason as "the faculty which apprehends truths necessary and universal," (p. 41.) Dr. Hickok describes it as 'the capacity to attain principles which were prior to any faculty of the sense or understanding, and without which neither a faculty of sense nor of understanding could have had its being; principles strictly *a priori* conditional for both faculties," (p. 156.) On the next page, he speaks of it as attaining "its necessary and universal *principles* by its own insight." These definitions, as we understand them, agree substantially with each other, and with that given by Coleridge. We have already quoted Dr. Hickok's definition of understanding. Those who comprehend it, and see where precisely the boundary between it and the reason lies, are more fortunate than ourselves. Dr. Mahan, as we have seen, makes the understanding only one of several secondary faculties which operate upon the elementary intuitions given by sense, consciousness, and reason. It will probably be safest, therefore, to go to the fountain-head of authority, so far as the introduction of this distinction into British and American metaphysics is concerned. Coleridge compares them thus: "1. Understanding is discursive; reason is fixed. 2. The understanding in all its judgments refers to some other faculty as its ultimate authority. The reason in all its decisions appeals to itself as the ground and *substance*

of their truth. (Hebrews vi. 13.)* 3. Understanding is the faculty of *reflection*; reason of contemplation. Reason, indeed, is far nearer to SENSE than to understanding; for reason (says our great Hooker) is a direct aspect of truth, an inward beholding, having a similar relation to the intelligible and spiritual, as sense has to the material and phenomenal." (*Aids to Reflection*, p. 142.)

No doctrine, however erroneous, ever gained extensive and permanent favour, which had not its element or side of truth to recommend it. All great and pernicious heresies even, are half-truths, or truths turned into lies, by intermingled errors. There is no doubt an element of truth in this system, in so far as it asserts that there are certain intuitive beliefs, first principles, universal and necessary ideas, which are not obtained through the senses; are not the products of reasoning, but lie at the foundation of all reasoning; which shine in their own light and are their own evidence; and that the mind has a faculty by which it knows the truth of these things intuitively and infallibly, as soon as they are suggested to it. This is only briefly stating the doctrine of common sense and first principles which was so elaborately and triumphantly established by Reid, although, as Hamilton has shown, it had been in one form or another recognized or implied in the writings of nearly all philosophers before him. Hamilton has, with his masterly and unrivalled analysis, given the criteria of these first principles—as follows: "1. Their Incomprehensibility (i. e.—we know that they are, but not how, or why they are)—2. Their Simplicity—3. Their Necessity and Absolute Universality—4. Their Comparative Evidence and Certainty." (*Hamilton's Reid*, p. 754.) We suppose it to be true still further, that in the faculty of knowing these axiomatic truths, or primary maxims which are presumed in all reasoning, lies a chief element of man's rationality; insomuch that, if he were without it, (e. g.—if he did not see that every event supposes a cause, and that thought implies a thinker,) however he might have some sort of intelligence, he could hardly be a rational or reasonable creature.

* "Because he (God) could swear by no greater, he sware by himself!"

Conformably to this, understanding is used to denote the faculty of intelligence simply, of whatever sort that intelligence be, and so, our intelligent or intellectual powers as a whole, without respect to one sort more than another. Reason, when used to denominate the mental faculties, is often employed interchangeably with it. But nevertheless, it always includes, especially in its meaning, the faculty of perceiving the intuitive truths of which we have spoken. There would doubtless be less violence in speaking of the understanding or intelligence, than of the reason, of a brute.

But conceding thus much is conceding all that the truth will bear. As understanding signifies generally the faculty of intelligence, so, applied to man, it signifies his entire intellectual powers. And this meaning is so inwrought into the very texture of our language in the best literary, common, and philosophical use, that the attempt to restrict its application to some single faculty or class of faculties, and those obscurely and variously defined, can serve no possible object, but to make darkness visible. So with regard to reason. While it always implies the faculty of knowing necessary and self-evident principles, and is, unlike understanding, inapplicable to those beings who, having some intelligence, have not this power, nevertheless, in the case of those, who, like men, possess it, it has a wider import, and is used to denote, at least, all the higher faculties of the intellect. So far from being "fixed," or confined to the intuition of the self-evident, it is oftener used to denote the discursive operations of the mind, in ratiocination, than understanding. Indeed Dr. Wayland, following Stewart, makes it merely the faculty of reasoning, and goes the extravagant length of denying to it, what these writers make its only office—the intuition of first truths. He says, "All reasoning must commence from truths *not* made known by the reason!" p. 283. Reid, more to the purpose than all, says: "We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or degree of reason."

(*Intellectual Powers*, Essay vi. Chap. ii.) It is clear therefore, that this arbitrary restriction upon the word Reason, which Coleridge has borrowed from Kant, and others from Coleridge, is no less unwarrantable, than the correspondent process with the word Understanding. Hamilton observes, that Kant, as was his wont, twisted these and other terms out of their accepted and well-defined use, and after all, never consistently adhered, in his own practice, to these arbitrary and unwarrantable definitions.

But we should not deem mere errors of definition, even when the whole method of psychological analysis is founded upon them, entitled to any great attention, were it not that graver evils seem to be intertwined with this distinction, which have brought it into just suspicion among the friends of evangelical truth and piety. Whether they attach necessarily to it, or arise from the extravagance of its advocates, may be a question. With regard to the evils themselves, there can be none.

1. The imperial, autonomic, and almost divine prerogatives ascribed to Reason by this school, are utterly inconsistent with all the declarations of Scripture and all the evidence of fact, in regard to human wisdom, which is from these sources proved to be foolishness with God. There are indeed a few truths which the human mind sees intuitively in their own light, as soon as they are distinctly set before it. They are, however, very few. The few axioms of grammar, logic, and mathematics; those of metaphysics, such as that effects imply a cause, qualities a substance, intelligence an intellect; a few contingent first truths, such as the permanence of the laws of nature, and the reliableness of our faculties in their proper sphere; the first principles of morals; some dim and vague idea of a supreme Deity—these pretty nearly, if not quite, exhaust the circle of intuitive beliefs, of truths evident in themselves. These, however, are so interlaced with errors and delusions in most of our race, as to become vastly deteriorated; often the truth turned into a lie. Hence all true knowledge begins in a profound sense of our own ignorance; and, especially in religion, if any man will be wise, he must first become a fool that he may be wise. Now in opposition to all this, we

have seen how the claims of vast, superlative, authoritative insight which are made by this school for this faculty, lead them (Dr. Mahan excepted) to try the validity of our knowledge by sense and consciousness, at its bar; and if some succeed in thus confirming it to their minds, others, including Kant, Coleridge, and the whole German ideal school, are driven by the process, and, if it be legitimate, quite rationally too, into sceptical idealism. For if we cannot trust one faculty of intelligence in its own sphere, why should we trust another out of its sphere?

But more and worse than this; whether the testimony of other faculties be thus arraigned and tried or not, this dangerous process is quite sure to be applied to the truths of revelation, and of morals and religion generally. Those who conceive themselves possessed of such a faculty, variously styled "supernatural," "autonomic," "divine," will be pretty sure to make it authority for all their own favourite dogmas, even though they are expressly condemned by the word of God, the unbroken testimony of the Christian Church, and by their own Christian consciousness. What indeed is any revelation, when it confronts the decisions of a faculty, which, according to the express definition of Coleridge already quoted, can appeal to "none greater than itself," and so is itself either equal to, or one with the infallible God? Coleridge, amid his eloquent advocacy of various Christian doctrines, strikes down the doctrine of vicarious atonement at one fell blow, as being contrary to the intuitive judgments of the reason. That in this he has had followers, the American Church knows, alas! too well. We need not further show how Dr. Hickok establishes his theories of the nature of virtue, of the will, of inability, by its autonomic authority, even when they are admitted to be logically inconceivable. Dr. Mahan moves in the same track at no unequal pace. He thus defines the idea of liberty as given by the Reason. "The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents are possible, and consequently, when any one does arise, either of the others might arise in its stead. * * * The existence of the idea of Liberty can be accounted for only on the supposition of the appearance in consciousness of the element of liberty in the action of the

will," pp. 237-8. This is cool and all-inclusive. It is a short and easy method against all antagonists. If any notion, however baseless, be espoused, its very existence in the consciousness is evidence of its truth! It thereby becomes a self-affirmation of reason. We do not wonder that *rational psychology* gains adherents, when it affords this easy resource for demonstrating dogmas, that have been contested from the foundation of the world. The question has not been, whether men are free-agents. This, we grant, is a first truth. But the question is, What is fairly implied in free-agency, and whether such a notion as this does not utterly overthrow it. The Great Supreme is not a free-agent in this sense—Dr. Hickok being judge, p. 254. In a like spirit, Dr. Mahan enounces as a canon, "If God himself should directly require us to affirm as true, what our intelligence thus affirms to be false, we could not comply with the requisition." The "*judicium contradictionis*" in regard to scriptural language undoubtedly has its place, but only within very narrow bounds. And wherever it is asserted without duly defining these bounds, it falls into just discredit. It is not only to be confined to propositions in contradiction of intuitive, self-evident principles, but also to cases in which we are so sure of a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances, relations, and bearings, as to be able to assert infallibly that these first principles are violated. Now, in the first place, these first principles are much fewer than most polemics suppose. All are apt to imagine that their own favourite dogmas, or those of their coterie, or sect, or other dogmas from which these are immediately deducible, are first principles. There are few of the so-called first principles that will bear the application of the test of universal acceptance. "Unaquæque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit." Then again, how seldom are we capable of prying far enough into the divine administrations, to be sure that admitted first principles are applicable, or are contradicted by propositions that from our point of view seem to violate them? Without such limitation of the *judicium contradictionis*, every article of the Christian faith is at the mercy of Pelagian, Socinian, and Transcendental assaults.

2. This system obviously tends to intellectual pride and the

undue exaltation of human nature. It is the extreme on one side, while sensationalism is the extreme on the other side, of a sound Christian philosophy. It is the less debasing of the two. From Plato downward its tendencies have not been so much to grovelling sensuality, as to a refined intellectual pride and self-sufficiency. When mingled with and modifying Christianity, whether in the Neo-Platonism of early times, or the Platonizing English divines, it is not difficult to trace in it somewhat of this conscious superiority to Catholic Christianity. Nor is this tendency yet extinct, if we may judge from the fact that Dr. Hickok resolves all moral obligations into the obligation which each one owes to his "spirit's own excellency," and that Dr. Mahan has heretofore been chiefly known as a defender of Oberlin Perfectionism.

3. So far as we have seen, this school either overlook or deny the effects of sin in blinding the mind to moral and spiritual truths, which shine in their own light, and are self-evidencing to all who have eyes to see them, but to none else. We observe that while others are silent, Mr. Morell is especially impatient with this idea. Now no truth is more constantly asserted in the Bible, or more firmly held by the Church, or more familiar in religious experience, than that while the natural man may perceive many important elements of spiritual truth, he perceives not that which is most vital—its divine beauty and attractiveness, "the things of the Spirit," until the "eyes of the understanding are enlightened" by the Holy Spirit. It is perfectly obvious, that, so far as the field of Christian theology is concerned, either this extravagant view of the insight and authority of reason must be abandoned, or that the evangelical doctrine of spiritual blindness and spiritual illumination must fall before it.

4. The close affinity of this system with the intuitional theology, which makes the inspiration and normal authority of the word of God identical in kind (however superior in degree) with the intuitions and inspirations of ordinary Christians, is too obvious to need extended illustration. It accords in every part with the high prerogatives of intelligence and authority ascribed to the Reason. So far as our observation goes, the

rationalism of transcendentalists, like Morell's, most frequently takes this turn.

5. This system, claiming, as it does, such an amount of inward and self-evidencing light in man's constitution, tends to the disparagement of external sources of illumination and instruction, whether from the works of nature or revelation. To say nothing of the Germans, Coleridge's disparagement of the argument from miracles, and other external sources for the inspiration and divine authority of the Scriptures, is among the most striking features of his system. His disgust with them was such that he felt the need of a treatise entitled "Christianity defended from its Defenders"—not a whit less extreme than the previous neglect of the internal evidence of the Bible had been in some popular apologetics. Dr. Mahan tells us that "reason exists in all men, and equally in those who possess it at all," p. 262; that the idea of God "must be ranked among the *primary* intuitions of Reason," p. 438; that "theology is the science of God systematically evolved in the light of the fundamental ideas of reason pertaining to Him," p. 461; that "we should not go to the Bible to *prove* that a characteristic is to be affirmed of God, but the teachings of inspiration should be adduced, to show the correspondence between the affirmations of science and the word of God," p. 462; as already cited, and without qualification, that we cannot believe even on the authority of God, what "our intelligence affirms to be false;" that the "so-called common systems of theology" are characterized by an almost, if not quite, total want of scientific development, inasmuch as they are without "one or more great central truths or principles which impart unity and harmony to the whole," p. 470; that theologians have erred in going "*beyond the circle of the mind's convictions* to find some facts in the external world from which, as a logical consequent, the truth of the divine existence would follow," p. 470; and, finally, that the common treatises on natural theology, like Dr. Paley's, "appear really worse than useless, if presented as grounds of proof of the existence of God, particularly as the infinite and perfect." As Dr. Mahan, like Dr. Hickok, has gone considerably into the domain of theology, we have given our readers a little opportunity to judge of his

tone in dealing with so momentous a subject. We would only, in reply to all this, refer to the knowledge, or rather ignorance of God which men possess and ever have possessed, where they are not enlightened, directly or indirectly, by divine revelation; to the words of Paul, "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, *being understood by the things that are made*, EVEN HIS ETERNAL POWER AND GODHEAD;" to the words of Christ, TAKE THE YOKE AND LEARN OF ME; to the fact that Christ and he crucified is the "one central principle" of every tolerable system of Christian theology. These men seem to forget that whatever ideas may belong to the human mind, they are in it only potentially, until developed into activity and consciousness, by contact with the external world and objective truth in all the processes of training and culture; that if they carry the reaction from sensationalism so far as to disparage sources of light outside of the mind's own self-affirmations, they will prepare the way for a rebound to that excessively outward, sensational, and debasing system, from which philosophy has just emerged.

Wm. August Green

ART. VI.—**Nahum's Prophecy concerning Nineveh, explained and illustrated from Assyrian Monuments*, by Otto Strauss. Berlin and London. 1853. 8vo. pp. 136.

GERMAN commentators have been very unequal, and even capricious, in the amount of attention respectively devoted to the different books of Scripture. The influence of fashion has been as marked in this as in less important matters. A few of the more adventurous lead the way, while the general throng are content to follow in their footsteps. Some portions of the Bible have been examined with the most laborious minuteness. Not only every shade of reasonable or possible exposition, but every variety of extravagant and absurd conjecture has been

* Nahumi de Nino vaticinium explicavit, ex Assyriis Monumentis illustravit Otto Strauss.