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ARTICLE I.—*Outlines of Moral Science*, by Archibald Alexander, D. D., late Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. New York: Charles Scribner, 1852.

THIS treatise, although published after the death of its lamented author, had been fully prepared for the press by him while living, except in a few unimportant details, in the final revision of which he was arrested by his last sickness. It was, however, so far completed by him, that he instructed his sons to give it to the world, and empowered them to make all necessary literary corrections—a liberty which they scarcely found occasion to use. It differs, therefore, from most posthumous publications, in being published by the direction, and upon the responsibility of the author. It exhibits his thoughts on the momentous topics treated in it, in the form in which he has chosen to present them to the world. It is, in every sense, Dr. Alexander's work, and sets forth those ethical teachings for which, with death and heaven immediately in view, he stood ready to be held responsible, not only at the bar of human criticism, but at the tribunal of God. This is not often true of posthumous publications. We doubt whether it was true of President Edwards's posthumous work on one important branch of the subject, his "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue;" a

work which has "astonished most of his admirers," while it has, partly by a perversion, and partly by a fair use of its leading principle, been employed to subvert doctrines which that great divine gained his chief celebrity in defending.

The object of Dr. Alexander in preparing this unpretending volume, was to furnish a suitable text-book on moral science for our colleges and higher seminaries of learning. No one, at all conversant with the subject, can doubt that such a book has hitherto been a desideratum, or that he who succeeds in supplying this want, thereby renders one of the highest possible services to the cause of sound education, morality and religion. It would be difficult for any man to confer a higher benefit upon his race. Next to the knowledge of God, it is as true as trite, that "the proper study of mankind is man." But we need not say, that the rational and immortal nature of man towers above all other elements in his composition; or again, that of his spiritual essence, that whereby he is a moral and accountable being, ranks first in importance, as it is supreme in its authority over him. Surely that part of our constitution is most important to be understood, whose office it is to guide the rest. Moreover, the knowledge of our moral nature is intimately connected with the true knowledge of God, for it is here that the image of God in man is principally seated. It is this that binds us to God, and to love, serve, glorify and enjoy him. This alone makes us in any manner capable of religion or morality. Although the study and scientific knowledge of it be not indispensable to religion, yet it is, beyond all doubt, necessary to scientific theology; or, in other words, to the intelligent statement and vindication of the great principles of religion, especially of the redemptive system revealed in the Bible. The slightest glance will satisfy all that most of the great questions in Christian theology, particularly in the two great departments of anthropology and soterology, involve in their settlement all the main questions of ethical science. To determine whether moral good and evil be such in their own nature, or merely as they are a means to some further end; what properties in the will are requisite to free agency and accountability; and whether moral quality attaches to dispositions as well as acts, is in reality, to lay

down the great principles, not only of our ethical, but in some fundamental points, of our theological system; especially those which determine the nature and even possibility of experimental religion and spiritual regeneration. They run into almost every question connected with sin and grace. It is difficult, therefore, to overrate the value of a text-book which, besides being in its form happily adapted to the purposes of teaching, also inculcates and vindicates the truth in regard to the fundamental principles of moral science. It must be a powerful instrument for imbuing our professional and educated classes with just principles on some of the most fundamental and far-reaching questions which engage the attention or affect the welfare of our race. If the venerated author has succeeded in this attempt to provide a satisfactory text-book in moral science, although the last in time, it will be second to none, in value, among the contributions with which his devout and affluent mind has enriched our ethical, theological and devotional literature.

While many writers have elucidated the different branches of this subject with convincing light and power, few have undertaken to treat of it as a whole, and to adjust and compact its various parts together, in one systematic treatise. And of these, fewer still have succeeded, even if they have made the attempt, in unfolding the subject in that clear and simple style, logical method, freedom from irrelevant and burdensome matter, and from essential errors and omissions, which are so vital in a class-book. Butler has shed great light upon the subject. His solutions of some of the vexed questions relative to conscience, the nature of virtue, and the relations of the various appetites and affections to happiness and duty, will always be accepted and valued, because they are true and important. But they are found chiefly in a few detached essays, and incidental fragmentary observations. Moreover, he hardly touches any of the great questions concerning the will and free-agency, which are scarcely less important than those connected with conscience and the nature of virtue. Had he undertaken it, he had qualifications for preparing a text-book on this subject which ages could not have antiquated.

The Scotch philosophers, from Reid down to Chalmers, have

done much to illustrate this subject. Of these, some have excelled in one way, and some in another. But they are all so unfitted for the purpose of teaching, from important defects either in style or matter, that they have generally gone out of use as text-books. Who could fail to be entertained and instructed by the strong and pithy good sense, and the dense, luminous, nervous paragraphs of Dr. Reid on this or other subjects? Yet, to say nothing of other defects, his whole analysis of the will is unsatisfactory. The gorgeous periods and splendid diffuseness of Brown and Chalmers enchant while they enlighten us. But, to say nothing of errors and omissions, their very brilliancy and diffuseness render them useless as class-books. They only embarrass the teacher, while they dazzle and confound the pupil.

Few men have possessed that rare combination of gifts which Dr. Paley brought to the preparation of his celebrated text-book on moral philosophy. His simple, concise, transparent style, his abhorrence of all obscurity and mysticism, his acuteness in discerning wherein things differ, and wherein they agree, his focal power of mind so remarkably displayed in the *Horæ Paulinæ*, whereby, with effortless facility and inimitable tact, he would detect and gather into one bright, convincing light, all the scattered rays of truth, his sterling English sense and judgment, his experience as a teacher and lecturer on these subjects, all qualified him to make a book that should, in some good degree, approach the true ideal. And so he did. But alas! it lacked one thing yet. Its fundamental principle is false and corrupt. It poisons morality at the very heart, by degrading it into a mere instrument of happiness, a refined form of self-love. Thus basing virtue upon expediency, and denying to it any inherent worth for its own sake, the standard to which he appears to deem it expedient that all should conform, is the English Church in religion, the English constitution in government, and English society in manners. Yet, notwithstanding these grievous defects in principle, (the most vital thing,) such are the merits of its style and arrangement for didactic purposes, that it has, until recently, been the text-book in almost all our British and American colleges and universities. As such, it has exercised a vast and pernicious

influence. It has done much to poison the principles of the educated classes, and to corrupt theology, religion and morals. For these reasons there has long been a growing desire to lay it aside. The great difficulty has been to supply its place.

It is not surprising, therefore, that teachers in this department should strive, with various success, to produce a substitute. Among the works thus far provided for this purpose, Dr. Wayland's justly takes the lead. The rapid issue of successive editions of it, shows that the want was great, and that he has not failed, in some good degree, to meet it. His work has high merits. There could be no room for doubt between it and Paley's, as a safe text-book, or that it ought to be adopted as a substitute, until something still better is provided. It demolishes the utilitarian theory, and reproduces the scheme of Butler. It is conveniently arranged for study and recitation, by an able and accomplished teacher, yet it leaves almost untouched the fundamental questions relating to the will, free-agency, and those internal states, acts, and qualities, on which the moral faculty pronounces judgment, and which have ever been in controversy among men. Thus, it leaves some of the most vital first principles of the science unresolved. On the other hand, it goes largely into the details of practical duty as shown, not only by reason, but by revelation. These are also characteristics of Paley's, and many other works of this class. We cannot but deem the neglect to deal with any important portion of the first principles of a science, a material omission. It is of no avail to say that disputes about the will and free-agency are endless, and that the tenuous distinctions and mazy windings of the subject would only puzzle and confound the learner. The same may be said, just as properly, of questions concerning conscience and the nature of virtue. The very fact that disputes abound, is proof that errors abound on these subjects. If the discussion of them requires delicate discrimination, and is easily "in wandering mazes lost," this only shows what ample hiding-places they afford for errorists and sophists. It only makes the necessity and the obligation still more imperious, to guard our youth against these evils, by disentangling the webs in which polemics have involved these subjects; exposing vulgar errors, and setting forth the truth in

convincing clearness and simplicity. The very reason why our youth need to be instructed in moral philosophy, is that they are exposed to error respecting its first principles. If these be determined aright, the details will be managed with little difficulty. A correct system of practical ethics according to the Bible is of course indispensable in its place. It seems, however, in strictness, to pertain to the province of the Christian teacher rather than the moral philosopher, whose business it is to exhibit the facts and principles belonging to man's moral constitution, as shown by its own light, independently of revelation; in which state revelation finds it, and so finding it, addresses itself to it. For these antecedent facts in our moral nature necessitate natural religion, and alone render revealed religion necessary or possible. If we could suppose man divested of all knowledge of God, but in other respects just as he now is, there would still be a moral science, for he could not avoid judging some actions right, and others wrong. If, in addition to this, there be a belief in God, natural religion and theology inevitably result. If we superadd revelation and redemption, Christian theology, theoretical and practical, are at once generated. All these are distinct, and have their own distinctive principles. They run into each other in this sense, that each presupposes and includes all that precede it. Each exists independently of all that follow it; and should be rightly understood within its own limits, in order to a just conception either of itself, or what follows and is built upon it. Thus, if it be received as a fact in moral science, that "self-love is the primary cause of all voluntary action," this must be held with regard to Christian "voluntary action," and vitiates the whole exegesis of the Bible, the whole circle of Christian morality, piety, and theology.

There was a call, therefore, for another effort to produce a manual, which should clearly set forth and prove the first principles and fundamental facts of moral science, in a form suited to the recitation room. This want Dr. Alexander was led to feel deeply in the course of his long experience as a teacher, and from his observation of the ignorance, error, and confusion of mind, on these subjects, of a large portion of the graduates of our colleges. It had been a favourite topic of study and

reflection with him from early manhood. His views were then essentially fixed, and while he examined with eagerness every new treatise or article on the subject, yet they all served to perfect and confirm, without materially changing his original convictions. He brought to the preparation of the treatise a rare assemblage of qualifications; remarkable clearness, depth, acuteness, and compass of mind; great fairness and candour; distinguished learning; a singular experimental knowledge of moral and religious truth in the exercises of his own soul; a half-century of study, meditation, and discipline upon these subjects; a long career as an eminent teacher in this and theology, an affiliated science; a peculiarly simple and perspicuous style. No one could better understand, or better state, the real issues on which the whole science turns. No one could better understand the objections of adversaries, or how to state his positions so as to unmask their fallacy. No one could have been better qualified to keep clear of crude, rash, untenable statements. No one could have better comprehended the importance, or the precise relations of the various questions involved, to sound theology. No one could have better known in what form it was necessary to present these subjects for the purpose of class instruction, in such a way as to ground the learner in the vital truths of the science, and to exclude all matter not conducive to this capital result. We reckon it an advantage that this was his last, and, if possible, his ripest work; that, being the substance of lectures delivered for a long series of years, his mind had acted upon it again and again, to purge away all impurities, until it came out thoroughly defecated.

It is correctly entitled "Outlines of Moral Science." It deals only with its great leading principles. If these be correctly laid down, the filling up of the details of duty will easily follow. Moreover, this science is chiefly important, not as furnishing a table of rules for our practical guidance—these are found in the Bible, and in summaries and expositions of its teachings—but as exercising a powerful moulding influence upon our general conceptions of Christian doctrine, experience, and duty. It is divided into brief chapters, each of which holds up some single point in strong relief, and, by a short and

happy method, leads the reader or student to test and verify it by his own consciousness. And it is so managed as to confine the attention exclusively to the question in hand, to bring the mind of the pupil to act upon that and nothing else; and to enable him to see the truth by immediate intuition, or a direct palpable inference, without any obscure labyrinthine, or transcendental process, to puzzle or discourage him. Thus the pupil is led forward, step by step, through all the great principles of the science, by a method so plain and expeditious, that ere he is aware of it, he has mastered its fundamental truths, and wonders why he had never seen them before. The memory is not burdened, while the reasoning powers are called into active play, without which no real knowledge on subjects of this sort can be acquired. While the learner is thus excited to think out and master the points for himself, ample room is left for the teacher to expatiate according to his ability and taste. We have seen nothing that so nearly approximates our idea of a model text-book on this class of subjects. In style and method it seems to us no way inferior, while in matter it is, of course, incomparably superior, to Paley. Even if a teacher should dissent from some of its positions, yet the points are brought forward in such a manner, that he can easily bring his objections, so far as they have any weight, to bear upon the minds of his pupils. For it is little else than a syllabus of leading principles, so put, as to lead the student to ascertain accurately the testimony of his own consciousness, or undeniable facts, in reference to them.

After thus exhibiting moral science on its own independent foundation, the author concludes the volume with some brief chapters, in which he considers it with relation to the Author of our being. After demonstrating the existence of God, he shows how this truth acts upon the conscience, and becomes the chief centre around which its judgments and mandates revolve, and how immensely it widens the sphere of moral exercises and moral obligations. He then proceeds to show what these obligations are, as prescribed by the natural, unperverted conscience; and since the essence of obedience is internal in the dispositions, purposes and feelings of the mind, he designates the various inward affections towards God, which conscience

enjoins by the light of nature, and so gives an outline of natural religion. The whole ends with the following passage: "The above enumeration, it is believed, comprehends the internal acts and exercises in which the duty of man to God consists, which duties plainly arise out of the attributes of God, and man's relation to him, as his Creator, Preserver and Benefactor. And if man had never failed in the performance of these duties, if he had continued to exercise those affections which spontaneously sprung up in his soul when he came from the hands of his Creator, this world, instead of being a land of misery, would have been a blooming paradise of joy. And we may be sure that a good God, who loves all his creatures according to their actions, would never have permitted the natural evils which now oppress the human soul to have entered the world. Sickness, famine and death, in all its thousand different forms, would have been unknown.

"It is evident, from the slightest view of the character of man in all ages and countries, that he has lost his primeval integrity, that the whole race have, by some means, fallen into the dark gulf of sin and misery. This reason teaches; but how to escape from this wretched condition she teaches not." pp. 271, 2.

Thus this book prepares the way for, and leads us to the margin of, revelation, redemption and Christian theology.

We are of opinion that incalculable good would result from the thorough drilling of the students in our colleges and higher seminaries in such a text-book.

Were there no higher reasons, the exercising of the students upon the elements of moral science is an important means of mental discipline, which is the first object of a liberal education. Without some exercise of this kind, the best powers of the mind are but poorly developed and trained. By it the faculty of close attention and discrimination, of consecutive and logical thinking, of seizing tenuous but important distinctions, of detecting sophisms; all the powers, indeed, required for managing high and difficult subjects, for clarifying the obscure, and disentangling the intricate, are sharpened and invigorated. Here lies the most important department of mental training.

Especially does it develop the power of just casuistry, and of treating in the light of first principles the various problems which are presented to our professional men for solution in the ever-varying exigencies of society. New questions are constantly arising, or old ones are presented in new forms, as new emergencies arise. It is of the highest moment that our educated men become such experts in reasoning on moral subjects, as to solve these on right principles. Otherwise the friends of truth are liable to base its defense on some false principle, whose ultimate influence is worse than the errors they combat. What deplorable examples of this have occurred in recent occurrences in Church and State! In order to induce men to embrace religion, Christian teachers have been induced to propound theories of moral agency, which endow sinners with plenary ability, divest the Great Supreme of his control over his creatures, and turn all moral excellence into a modification of self-love! One party, zealous to extirpate slavery, have confounded the state of involuntary servitude with certain enormities in practice or in law, which individuals and legislatures have perpetrated in connection with it, and have stigmatized them as all alike iniquitous and abominable, in plain contradiction of Scripture, and to the great detriment of all parties in interest. Another class, (chiefly political men,) justly anxious to crush the spirit of disloyalty and rebellion against an unpalatable law, have virtually taught the people that the law of the land was paramount to the law of God, and that individuals had no right to consult the dictates of conscience in a case of conflict between the two, and obey God rather than man. The true issue was not whether human law takes precedence of the divine, but whether the law in question was in contravention of the law of God. Many, in their zeal to promote temperance, have contended that all use as a beverage of any intoxicating drink is sinful, thus plainly impeaching the morality of the Gospel, and placing the temperance reformation on a basis which, if adhered to, must surely prove its ruin, and furnish a foundation for infidel attacks on the revealed standard of righteousness.

Again, we are persuaded that true conceptions on this subject among our educated classes, are necessary as an antidote

to the strong utilitarian tendencies of our age and country. These have been much fostered by the false systems of moral philosophy that have been taught in our colleges. They find much encouragement in the intense and growing commercial spirit, and the increasing inventions for saving labour and augmenting physical happiness, which characterize our times. The first question with most, in regard to all things, is, will they advance my pleasures or my interest? The idea that truth, beauty, goodness, have an inherent worth in themselves, seems to be lost. They ask not, is this true or right? but, what can I make by it? "Supposing that gain is godliness," they see nothing in piety to commend their regard but the loaves and fishes it may bring them. And why should they abide in, or contend for, the truth, unless it be a good speculation? Why maintain the right, unless they are likely to be paid for it? Why be patriotic, magnanimous, heroic, brave, just, liberal, unless at a bargain? It is in vain that we serve God, and what profit is it that we pray unto him? Does God need our prayers, our services or our alms, and can he not bless us as well without as with them? As this spirit cankers all morality and religion, so it sooner or later invades and crushes all that is honourable and tender in sentiment and feeling, all strivings towards the beautiful and ideal in life, literature and art. It subjects all things to this Iscariot standard, and asks, "to what purpose is all this waste?" It "carries the bag," and thinks that "the gift of God may be purchased with money." It would adjust morality by the ledger, and test the "first good and first fair" by the balance-sheet. As well might it measure perfumes by the yard-stick, or time by hay-scales. It is a way of thinking which eats out the heart, the soul of a people; it spreads a blight over literature, art, morals and religion; it taints the halls of justice and of legislation, all the spheres of private and public life. The root of all this lies in that spurious ethical system which denies that moral goodness is good in itself, even the highest good, or good at all, or obligatory at all, except as it is a means of happiness, and thus exalts happiness to be the supreme and only real good. The true antidote to this is a sound ethical training, which shall make it for ever indubitable, that moral good is in itself good,

and the highest good, which happiness follows but does not constitute, as it follows but does not constitute health, as motion follows, but does not constitute life, as summer verdure and fruitfulness follow, but do not constitute the summer's sun. And this is an ultimate truth which, justly put, shines in its own light, and is its own evidence. If this be once seen, then it will be seen that truth and other things may be good in themselves; yea, better than mere happiness or "filthy lucre." Thus utilitarianism receives its death-blow.

But by far the most important advantage of a correct system of ethics to the rising race of educated men, is found in the radical relations it sustains to Christian theology, to which we have already alluded. This none can so fully appreciate as the theologian himself. And in this view Dr. Alexander was eminently qualified to write such a work. It is obvious that he had this in mind in every part of his book. Here lies one of its chief merits. Nearly all the great errors in theology derive their main plausibility and support from a false philosophy in relation to man's moral constitution, state and capabilities, i. e. a false moral philosophy. He so unfolds the truth as to lift the veil from these specious sophistries, and make their absurdity palpable; and this not by assuming any polemic attitude, but by the easy, natural exposition of his own principles, and the candid consideration of objections.

That the bearings of moral science upon theology may be more distinctly seen, we propose to show its influence in originating some of the phases of theological opinion that have been current in the country.

As connected with theology, moral science distributes itself into two main divisions, with respect to conscience and its operations: 1. The nature of that moral goodness which it approves, and the want of which it condemns in moral agents and their actions. 2. The various, and especially, the internal states and exercises in moral beings, in regard to which it pronounces its verdict.

On the first of these, Dr. Alexander gives the key to his own, and, in our opinion, to the true system, in the following deliverances:

"There is in the human mind a capacity of discerning what

is termed beauty, in the works of nature and art. This judgment is accompanied by a pleasurable emotion, and to this capacity or susceptibility we give the name Taste. There is also a power of discerning moral qualities, which conception is also attended with a vivid emotion; and to this power or faculty we give the name Conscience, or the moral faculty. Both these are so far original parts of our constitution, that if there did not exist in every mind a sense of beauty and its contrary, and a sense of right and wrong, such ideas could be generated or communicated by no process of education." pp. 46, 7.

"Virtue is a peculiar quality of certain actions of a moral agent, which quality is perceived by the moral faculty with which every man is endued; and the perception of which is accompanied by an emotion which is distinct from all other emotions, and is called moral. This being of a nature perfectly simple, does not admit of being logically defined, any more than the colour of the grass, the taste of honey, the odour of a rose, or the melody of a tune." p. 184.

"To see that an action is useful, and will produce happiness to him that performs it, or to others, is one thing; but to perceive that it is morally good, is quite a distinct idea; and virtue and mere utility should never be confounded." p. 186.

"The moment we see a thing to be morally right, the sense of obligation is complete; and all further inquiring for reasons why I am obliged to do right, is as absurd as would be inquiring for reasons why I should pursue happiness." p. 52.

These positions he sustains by incontestable proofs. As to the diverse moral judgments of different men, he shows that they originate in that ignorance and perverseness, whereby the whole truth of the case on which conscience sits in judgment, fails of being presented to it. Hence these diverse moral judgments, in reference to the same action, respect in reality diverse representations of it or its circumstances presented to the conscience by different persons. So far as these representations are false, he is blamable who makes them to his conscience, as also for the false moral judgments that follow. But when precisely the same case, *in all-aspects*, is presented to the consciences of different men, the verdict of their consciences upon

it is immediately and unavoidably the same. And hence arises the necessity of that study and investigation which are found requisite for ascertaining the right in complicated cases. The object is to bring clearly to the view of conscience the precise point on which its decision is needed; but when this is accomplished, its judgment is immediate and sure. This solution coincides with that given by Dr. McCosh, of the same facts.

The theory of morals, which the system here set forth confronts, is that which makes happiness the only good. According to this, other things, such as virtue and truth, are good only relatively, as they are instruments of promoting it. Nothing is morally good except as, and because, it conduces to happiness. Of this theory there are two forms, both of which have had great influence upon theological speculation in our country. The first and least offensive form of it, is that which makes the essence of virtue lie in promoting the highest happiness of the universe. According to this, nothing is morally good in itself, but only as it is a means of happiness, the only ultimate and real good.

The second and most revolting, but most logically consistent form of it, is that which makes the essence of virtuous action to lie in its tendency to promote the highest happiness of the agent. We say most revolting, for what principle can be more so, to beings gifted with a moral sense? We say more logically consistent, for if happiness be the supreme good, is it not incumbent on every man to make it his first object of pursuit?

This theory is maintained in its unmitigated boldness by Dr. Paley. In the form in which it is advanced by him, and in full reply to his chief arguments; Dr. Alexander exposes its futility and foulness.

Most of our readers are aware that this same doctrine of morals is one of the main pillars of the New Haven Divinity, which not long since shook our various Calvinistic communions to their centre. Once allow it, and most of the other principles of that school, and some things disowned by it, follow by direct consequence. If self-love or the desire of happiness be the highest principle in the best of men, it surely is in the worst, and hence there is no radical difference between the two. Both act from the same principle, the only difference being,

that the one class does it with more sagacity than the other. Hence there is and can be no such thing as native and inherent moral depravity. There is no room for implanting any new principle by the Spirit in regeneration. - The office of the Holy Ghost, if he has any, is essentially the same in kind as that of the preacher. His work is one of moral suasion only. The sinner has plenary ability to choose to follow his own highest happiness. All that is necessary, is to present to him the truth, and show him what course leads to it. If all this be true, that preacher was guilty neither of hyperbole nor irreverence, who said, "If I were as eloquent as the Holy Ghost, I could convert sinners as fast as he." It was not surprising that religion, thus levelled to the natural man, should for a time multiply its converts. It reminds one of the label which a gentleman once placed on a bundle of Socinian tracts, "Salvation made easy, or every man his own Redeemer."

In all the reasonings of the abettors of this scheme, so far as we have observed, they constantly impose on themselves and others, by an unconscious begging of the question. They constantly use the word *good* as if it were only the equivalent of happiness; as if, in short, happiness were the only good. On this depends the whole plausibility of their logic, which surely ought to be conclusive, if they furtively assume their whole theory in the premises. Thus one of these writers, after laying down the principle that "it is the ability we possess to appreciate His (God's) disposition to render us happy, and in view of it to derive enjoyment, that constitutes us the proper subjects of obligation," and that the "true ultimate foundation of obligation is its tendency to promote the highest happiness of the agent, by promoting the highest welfare of all," says, "the bond of obligation fastens upon him precisely at this point of *his highest good*." "He ought not to prefer a less to a greater *good*." "It is the nature of the being, constituted as every moral agent must be, to seek happiness, to *obtain good*, if possible."* "The very reason which God assigns, (for the obligation of his law,) is, that it is *good*—the surest way of making us most happy."† Another writer says, "that

* Christ. Spectator, Vol. X., No. iv., pp. 530-2.

† *Ib.* p. 533.

such an action, which has no tendency to produce *good or happiness* either to the agent or others, should be supposed to be morally right or morally good, is to suppose that to be morally right or *good*, which is *good* for nothing."* This, and much more the like, would be as fine as it sounds, were not the very question in issue, whether happiness be the only and the highest good, and whether moral rectitude be not a good; distinct from, and superior to happiness? We leave the answer to these questions to the moral sense of our readers. Due notice of this paralogism will kill volumes of sophistry on these subjects.

Again, this same writer contends that the idea of right is not simple, because it involves, "first, the idea of the action as intelligent; secondly, the idea of the action as voluntary; thirdly, as tending to the greatest happiness of others; and fourthly, as tending to the greatest happiness of the agent."† We deny that the two last ideas enter into our idea of an act as right, however such an act may promote the happiness of ourselves or others, any more than they enter into the idea of truth, albeit truth may promote happiness. To say that right is a complex idea, because it characterizes the actions of intelligent voluntary agents, is like saying that happiness is a complex idea, because it can only attach to sensitive beings; or proportion, because it can only hold between a plurality of objects, or colour, because it belongs only to matter, and requires light and eyes to be seen. However, these things are not to be argued. Each one must consult his own consciousness as to whether the idea of right is only the idea of productiveness of happiness.

Another common shift is seen in the following, from another of these writers. He asks, "is it mean to seek our highest happiness in making others happy?"‡ But why is it obligatory to do it in this way rather than any other, if there be no ultimate ground of obligation but a regard to our own happiness? Besides, the meanness or nobleness of "making others happy" depends entirely on the intention with which it is done.

* *Christ. Spectator*, Vol. VII., No. iv., pp. 608, 9.

· † *Ib.* p. 608.

† *Ib.* Vol. VII., No. iv., p. 567.

If a man proposes to make others happy in unrighteousness, that he may thrive upon their vices, he is "mean" and detestable.

But since it is manifest that all men desire other objects besides their own happiness, and this fact breaks the back-bone of this scheme, they try to evade its force by turning all the desires into forms of self-love, and by saying that in seeking any object of desire, we are seeking the *subjective* pleasure which arises from procuring and possessing it. "All our desires are only different forms of self-love. They are nothing but the soul going forth after happiness, or the means of it, (for we desire nothing else)." * Again, "we do not mean the objective motive; whatever it may be, which is at the moment of choice *in view* of the mind, and which influences to the specific decision; but we mean that deep laid spring which sets in motion the activity of a moral being." † This shows that the writer had a moral sense which yet rose above his speculations. It is giving up the whole in a sentence. The following from Bishop Butler, is the best comment upon it: "That all particular appetites and passions are towards *external things themselves*, distinct from the *pleasure arising from them*, is manifested from hence, that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitability between the object and the passion. * * * And if, because every particular affection is a man's own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from self-love; and every action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into this one principle. But then this is not the language of mankind; or, if it were, we should want words to express the difference between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage, and an action, suppose of revenge, or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another."

The second form of the dogma that happiness is the only good, makes the promotion of the highest happiness of the

* Christ. Spectator, Vol. VII., No. iv., p. 566.

† *Ib.*, Vol. X., No. iv.

universe, the essence of moral goodness. Those who hold this view, of course resolve all virtue ultimately into benevolence. But it is a mistake to suppose that all who simplify all virtue into mere benevolence, however erroneous this opinion may be, make happiness the only good, or deny that virtue or vice is intrinsically good or evil. Dr. Emmons thus reduced all virtue to benevolence alone. Yet no man dealt more frequent or ponderous blows against utilitarianism. He says, that "to suppose that virtue consists in utility, is to suppose that there is nothing right in the nature of things, * * that there is nothing in the universe intrinsically good or evil, but happiness or misery, * * that there is really no such thing as virtue and vice in the universe."—*Works*, Vol. IV., pp. 175–7. Again, "moral good, which consists in true benevolence, is morally right in its own nature. And moral evil, which consists in selfishness, is morally wrong in its own nature. * * Or, if it were supposable that benevolence should have a natural tendency to promote misery, still it would be morally excellent in its own nature. Or, if it were supposable that selfishness should have a natural tendency to promote happiness, still it would be in its own nature, morally evil. * * It is the nature of a voluntary exercise in a moral agent that renders it morally good, and not its tendency."—*Ib.* pp. 226, 7. Although it is an error to suppose that benevolence is the whole of virtue, yet this is consistent with the idea that it is good in itself, irrespective of its tendency to promote happiness. It consists, on this hypothesis, in a desire to impart a like benevolence to others on account of its own moral excellence, and is *toto cælo*, above that form of it which makes happiness the only good. On the other hand, Dr. Dwight, in this instance, unfortunately departing from his usual habit of allowing the intuitive beliefs and common sense of mankind higher authority than mere speculation, laid the foundation of virtue in mere utility or tendency to promote happiness. Yet he is careful to say that this is not the rule for our guidance, because we are incapable of applying it. And his main object seems to be, to find some ground or standard of moral excellence in the nature of things, as distinguished from mere will. For in common with most leading writers on this subject, he rightly argues,

that if virtue be founded in the mere *will* of God, then if God should so ordain, lying, theft and blasphemy would be virtuous, a conclusion from which we instinctively revolt. So Edwards in that Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, which is supposed to have given the first start to the peculiar speculations of some New England divines on this subject, appears to have been led to propound his fundamental dogma on this subject, viz: that "virtue is benevolence or love to being in general," by his repugnance to the sentiment, "that conscience can be truly said to be no more than a *sentiment arbitrarily* given by the Creator, without any relation to the nature of things."* It seems to have escaped both these penetrating minds, that moral rectitude is as much a part of the nature of things, and as much an ultimate good, and a simple uncomprehended idea, as beauty, truth or happiness. He argues that "if virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, * * we never come to any beginning or foundation; it is without beginning and hangs on nothing."† But virtue is a good in itself. To love it is therefore good. If it therefore "hangs on nothing," then happiness "hangs on nothing," for it surely is no more than good in itself. To inquire why righteousness is good, and why we ought to pursue it, is no more reasonable than it is to inquire why happiness is a good, and why we ought to pursue it. This fact these distinguished men appeared to see clearly, when they were not speculating on the subject, and trying to explain that which can be explained into nothing more simple and ultimate than itself. They were possessed by the idea, if they did not possess it. The very title of one chapter in Edwards's Treatise on the Religious Affections, and that which is the key to the whole book is, "the first objective ground of gracious affections, is the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things *as they are in themselves*; and not any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest."‡ Again, "the holiness of love consists especially in this, that it is the love of that which is *holy, for its holiness*; * * * *It must be the nature of holiness chiefly to tend to and delight in holi-*

* Edwards's Works, New York edition, Vol. III, p. 155.

† *Ib.*, p. 96.

‡ *Ib.*, Vol. V., p. 129.

ness."* If this is in direct contradiction of the main reason which he assigns for seeking a foundation for virtue stronger than itself, it is only what often happens in the case of the mightiest men. They may think that they have succeeded in speculating away their intuitive convictions, their belief in free-agency, or in the intrinsic difference between moral good and evil, or like Berkeley, in the reality of the external world. And yet they will soon make it manifest that a belief in these things underlies all that they do and say, when their theories are out of mind. Edwards's speculations on this subject appear to have had very little influence on his views of practical and theoretical theology. His "Dissertation" seems to have been a sort of tentative effort, made late in life, to erect a new adamantine barrier against a selfish scheme of religion, which then began to inundate the churches. The disorders of the "great awakening" gave birth to two opposite forms of spurious religion, each based on no higher principle than self-love. One was that of frigid Arminian moralists, who felt emboldened by these disorders to assail experimental religion and supernatural regeneration, and to contend for the sufficiency of an orderly life animated by self-love. The other was that of the fanatics who conceived the essence of conversion to lie in getting comfort, and in loving Christ merely from the persuasion that he would save them. It will be observed that the stress of the practical writings of Edwards, and of his two distinguished friends and coadjutors, Bellamy and Hopkins, is mainly directed against these two forms of religion based upon self-love. It was therefore natural that benevolence, the opposite of mere self-love, should be uppermost in their view as the chief element of true goodness, until, as often happens, the opposite of a given wrong came to be regarded as the essence of all right. Hopkins took up the main principle of Edwards's *Essay on Virtue*, not as a speculation outside of the main fabric of his theology, but as its fundamental principle, which he undertook logically to carry out in his system. He therefore fell athwart some of the doctrines of catholic Calvinism, and of Edwards, their eminent defender. His followers, in

* Edwards's Works, New York edition, Vol. V., p. 146.

this respect, however, were never numerous. They were always, like those of Emmons, a decided minority even in New England itself, as Dr. Woods has proved by incontestable evidence.* Bellamy, on the other hand, has always been conceded to be a representative of the prevailing type of New England doctrine in his day, and not, like Hopkins, the head of a little party. He followed Edwards in all the great principles of practical and theoretical divinity, but followed him not in this single exceptional case wherein he was eccentric to his main orbit. He contended that "right and wrong do not result from the mere will and law of God, nor from any tendency of things to promote or hinder the happiness of God's creatures. It remains, therefore, that there is an intrinsic moral fitness and unfitness absolutely in things themselves."†

Yet of all his compeers, he marshals the most weighty and crushing arguments against a religion founded in mere self-love. And well he might. He held the strongest position from whence to assail it. Truth alone is mighty. But still the doctrine that all virtue is reducible to benevolence, either on the ground of its utility, or because of its intrinsic excellence, received so great an impulse, not chiefly from the writings of Hopkins, or of the younger Edwards, his follower, but from the great and sacred name of the elder Edwards, that it came at length to impregnate a large part of the writings

* Theology of the Puritans, pp. 13-15.

Dr. Woods is confirmed in the main position taken in this excellent pamphlet, by the following, published in 1845 by an author whom no one will charge with unfair Old-school partialities: "As early as 1648, our fathers gave in their unanimous adherence to the Westminster Confession; this they did, as they say, that they might express their belief and profession of 'the same doctrines which had been generally received in all the reformed Churches in Europe.' And in 1680, the churches of the Commonwealth drew up a confession of faith, affirming the same doctrines and using nearly the same words as the Westminster. This is the authorized faith of the Congregational churches—the only faith which has ever been preferred by the churches assembled by their pastors and representatives in synod or council. And this has been not only the publicly authorized faith of our churches, but it has been the *real or implied faith of every church calling itself Congregational.*"—*Badington's History of the First Church, Charlestown, Mass.*, p. 151. On this ground the author proceeds to vindicate the exclusion of the Unitarians from fellowship, by the orthodox churches of Massachusetts.

† Bellamy's Works, New York edition, Vol. I., p. 83.

which have received the distinctive appellation of New England theology. What was held by the Edwardses, father and son, by Hopkins, Smalley and Dwight, and Emmons, of course had a wide prevalence. The consequences of this peculiarity were not at once developed. They scarcely appear in the writings of the elder Edwards, who was, with hardly a deviation, a defender of Calvinism, after the Reformed and Puritan standard. But it had the effect very soon among his successors, of leading to a denial of the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness, and to some important innovations upon the received doctrine of the atonement. The abandonment of our race by God to depravity and ruin, instead of being deemed a penal visitation of justice for the sin of its representative, came to be regarded as a mere sovereign infliction of evil, not in punishment of sin, but for the greatest good of the universe. And it became necessary, therefore, (if we may borrow a word from the Tractarians,) to put a "non-natural" meaning upon such words, as that "by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation." The important idea was thus unconsciously introduced, that God sometimes inflicts the most fearful evils upon moral beings in mere sovereignty, irrespective of any *sin* in themselves, or their representatives. Of course too, it was impossible to ignore the idea of justice as distinct from benevolence, without giving up the idea of the atonement as being strictly a satisfaction of justice, or as the sufferance of the sinner's penalty by a substitute. It became a mere *expedient* to display God's hatred of sin, and regard for his law, by subjecting his Son to death, instead of punishing sinners, and this, for the sake of the greatest happiness of the universe. As regards to this, indeed, these writers call "public justice," and in this sense, they say that Christ satisfied divine justice.* Of course the whole basis of the idea of imputation as connected with the work of Christ, by which he is punished for our sins reckoned to his account, and we are justified and rewarded for the sake of his righteousness, reckoned to our account, is lost, while it is yet, we rejoice to say, most strenuously held in another sense, that the believer is pardoned and

See the Sermons of Jonathan Edwards the younger, on the Atonement.

justified, solely by faith in Christ viewed as suffering and obeying in his stead. Whether it has been the effect of these modifications of the doctrine of the cross, to give Christ and him crucified a more commanding place and power in preaching, than before prevailed, must be determined by those who have the means of judging. All facts known to us indicate a contrary result.

Another fruit of the principle under consideration was to resolve all sin into selfishness. But as men are conscious of virtues which do not class under benevolence, so they are conscious of sins which do not class under selfishness. A man who in a fit of generosity, gives away his estate or his time to a prodigal friend, which is needed for his own support, or that of his family, as truly sins, as the veriest miser. Men often sin in making their own welfare a sacrifice to the overbearing demands of others. They are bound to be "just before they are generous." In short, benevolence must be regulated by justice, or it is no longer a virtue. The two are complements of each other. It is artificial, one-sided, inadequate to reduce all sin or all virtue to one category. It fails to find a response in the living consciousness of men, and must weaken the power of that preaching into which it radically enters, over their consciences. It must therefore tend towards a one-sided development of moral and religious character. The disposition to reduce all religion to philanthropy, is a dangerous vice of the times.

Moreover, all extremes tend, by reaction, to produce the contrary extremes. As we have already seen, the dogma that benevolence is the whole of virtue gave place within the present generation, to the opposite dogma, that "self-love is the primary cause of all voluntary action," on the part of a numerous and powerful school.

Nor is this all. If benevolence is the sum of all goodness, then it is the only element in God's moral character. He is therefore disposed to produce all the happiness possible in the universe. Why then does he not make all his creatures happy, by making them holy? One hypothesis is that he cannot, without destroying moral agency. We need not say, where this has found earnest and able advocates. Another, is the

heresy of the Universalists, that God is both desirous and able, and therefore will save all men. President Clap in his syllabus of the heresies that were beginning to threaten the Churches, published more than a century ago, specifies the following as one: "The ultimate end and design of God in the creation, is the happiness of the creature.

"God's ultimate design never can be finally frustrated or defeated; therefore all intelligent creatures shall be finally happy." The solution of the orthodox, who hold this theory, of course is, that God creates the greatest aggregate of happiness in the universe, by consigning a portion of his creatures to misery. But we think it a far weaker defence against these heresies, than the theory which distinguishes justice from benevolence, and makes them both equally necessary elements of the divine goodness. When it is pleaded in behalf of the scheme objected to, that "God is love," and that "love is the fulfilling of the law," we simply ask, love to what? Is it not primarily love to moral excellence, as it exists in the Most High? And do not the Scriptures show that this is just, as well as benevolent?

It is worthy of note in this connection, that Dr. Bellamy, as he held the true view of the nature of virtue, also strenuously defended the imputation of Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness, and held the atonement to be strictly and properly in satisfaction of divine justice, as we should be glad, if we had space, to make more fully appear.

We have a single remark further, in concluding this branch of the subject. It will be observed from the analysis we have given, that there is a very general agreement among the leading writers on Moral Philosophy, in rejecting the theory that the *mere will* of God is the *foundation* of obligation, while all concur in making it the rule of duty. Their repugnance to this theory lies in this, that if virtue be founded in *mere will*, then had that will ordained the opposite of what it has, it would be virtuous and binding. But our moral sense revolts at the idea that lying, blasphemy, and malice, could be made right by the mandate of even an omnipotent will. Therefore there must be some immutable standard of virtue to which the divine will conforms, and commands all others to conform. But others

feel a strong repugnance to this view, inasmuch as it seems to make God amenable to a power out of himself; or implies some eternal entity extraneous to him—and in a vital point superior to him—thus militating against his supremacy, independence, and exclusive divinity. The true solution seems to be, that an eternal standard of rectitude exists to which the will of God conforms, and requires all moral agents to conform; but that this is not extraneous to his own being. It is the eternal, immutable, immaculate sanctity and goodness of his own nature, to which his will infallibly conforms, for he cannot deny himself. This is original rectitude, and the norm of all rectitude in Creator and creatures. The power of perceiving what is thus right or morally good, he has implanted in all moral agents, by enduing them with conscience, or the moral faculty. It is by this faculty that the creature discerns the obligation to obey and honour his Maker, when once he knows his existence and character. And without such a faculty he could neither feel this, nor any other moral obligation. Thus Turretin and orthodox divines generally dispose of this question, and, in our judgment, dispose of it aright.

It is perhaps proper also to notice an evasion sometimes attempted by the abettors of the happiness scheme, in either of its forms, for the purpose of parrying objections against it. It is this. They say they mean, not that the essence of goodness consists in pursuing or promoting happiness of whatever sort, but only that which is of the most pure and elevated kind. To say no more of this, it is enough that it really gives up the whole. For it confesses that the essence of goodness lies not in the *amount*, but the *purity* of the happiness pursued or promoted, *i. e.* in subordinating our devotion to happiness to a rectitude which is superior to, and regulative of it. It is no longer “love to being in general,” or to happiness “in general,” but to the *right kind* of being, and happiness. It is no longer *quantum*, but *quale*, that is the standard, and rectitude and purity are enthroned, as they should be, in supremacy over happiness.

Passing now from the consideration of conscience and the standard of moral obligation to the actions and states on which the moral faculty passes judgment, it is conceded on all sides,

that it is only the acts or states of moral beings, endowed with reason, conscience, and will, that come under its jurisdiction. It is another question, how far these faculties must be developed into active and conscious moral agency, in order that the inherent, native dispositions of the soul may be deemed to possess moral character, merit, or demerit. The following extracts from Dr. Alexander's work will indicate the leading principles laid down by him on this subject, which he illustrates and sustains with his usual felicity and force.

"When it is said that the actions of moral agents are the only proper objects of moral approbation or disapprobation, two qualifications of the assertion must be taken into view. The first is, that the omission to act when duty calls, is as much an object of disapprobation as a wicked action. * * * The second qualification of the statement is, that when we disapprove an external act, we always refer the blame to the motive or intention. But if we have evidence that the agent possesses a nature or disposition which will lead him often or uniformly to perpetrate the same act when the occasion shall occur, we not only censure the motive, but extend our moral disapprobation to the disposition or evil nature lying behind." pp. 93, 4.

"Indeed if there is one point on which responsibility above all others rests, it is on the motives, that is, the active desires or affections of the mind, from which volition proceeds, and by which it is governed." p. 120.

"It is admitted that man has power to govern his own volitions, and does govern them according to his own desire. He has the liberty within the limits of his power, to act as he pleases, and greater liberty in our judgment is inconceivable. To suppose, in addition to this, a power to act independently of all reasons and motives, would be to confer on him a power for the exercise of which he could never be accountable. It would be a faculty which would completely disqualify him from being the subject of moral government." p. 127.

"In every act of choice or will it is implied that the person willing might, if he pleased, act in a different way from what he does, for otherwise he would be under a necessity of acting in one way only, and there could be no freedom in such an

action. * * * A man may do what he pleases, but it is absurd to suppose that he can will to do what it does not please him to do."

"The doctrine of a power of contrary choice, as the thing has now been explained, is a reasonable doctrine, and in accordance with all experience, if with the volition you include the motive, if with the choice you take in the desire. But to suppose a volition contrary to the prevailing inclination is inconsistent with all experience; and, as has been shown, such a liberty or power would disqualify a man for being an accountable moral agent." pp. 132-4.

"When it is asserted that all moral actions are voluntary, the meaning is, either that by actions only external actions are meant, or that under the word voluntary, the affections of the mind which precede volition are included. * * * Our desires are as free and spontaneous as our volitions, and when it is said that every moral act must be voluntary, the word is used in this comprehensive sense." p. 137.

"It is clear then that men are more accountable for their motives than for anything else; and that primarily, morality consists in the motives; that is, in the affections." p. 140.

"As to the maxim, that nothing is sinful which is not voluntary, it relates to positive acts, not to dispositions of the mind. But as was explained before in regard to the desires and affections, so in regard to dispositions, we say that they are in a sense voluntary. They properly belong to the will, taking the word in a large sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary acts, the principle from which they proceed is always included in our view, and comes in for its full share of the blame. Thus Bishop Butler, in his excellent essay on the 'Nature of Virtue,' says, in speaking of the moral faculty, 'it ought to be observed that the object of this faculty is actions, comprehending under that name active and practical principles.' This sagacious man saw that it would not do to confine virtue to positive acts, but that principles must come in for their full share of approbation or disapprobation."

"The notion that corrupt principles must vitiate the essence of the soul is without foundation. The soul is the subject of many affections which are not essential to it. Natural affec-

tions may be extirpated, and yet the soul remain unchanged. Moral qualities may be entirely changed, without any change in the essence of the soul. The faculties remain, while the moral principles which govern them may be changed from good to bad, and from bad to good. The same faculties which are employed in the performance of virtuous actions, may be occupied as instruments of wickedness. That inherent moral qualities may exist in the soul, has been the belief of all nations, and is the sentiment of every common man whose judgment has not been warped by a false philosophy." pp. 151-3.

"Those, however, who maintain that the will possesses a self-determining power, independent of motives, deny the existence of any such principles lying back of the acts of the mind, especially in moral exercises." p. 147.

"The reason why one effect is necessary and another free, is not that the one takes place without an adequate cause, or that the same cause may produce different effects; for both these are contrary to common sense. The true reason is, that the one is produced against will, or without will, whereas the other is a voluntary act." p. 106.

These several positions will carry their own evidence to unbiassed minds, that faithfully inspect their own consciousness. For those, however, who entertain any doubt, they are abundantly vindicated by the author, with his usual clearness and cogency of argument and aptness of illustration. Those who have been interested in the great controversies that have agitated the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches of our country during the last quarter of a century, will at once see their bearings on the main questions in issue. They present a conclusive answer to nearly all the objections which have been raised against the doctrines of the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, in regard to original sin and original righteousness, inability, regeneration, and decrees. The whole force and plausibility of the arguments for what is commonly called the New-school Divinity, lie in the denial of these plain ground-truths, we had almost called them postulates, of moral science: so fundamental is the relation of this science to these subjects.

Irrespective of the happiness scheme of morals already considered, which large numbers who advocate the New Theology,

as a whole, have rejected, (how consistently it is not for us to show,) it has been founded on three leading principles: 1. That moral character attaches to acts only, and not only so, but to acts of volition only; and that the spontaneous desires and affections of the mind lying back of, and prompting volition, are constitutional propensities devoid of moral character, except so far as they are acted on by volition. 2. That those dispositions which underlie and give birth to all exercises, whether spontaneous or voluntary, have no moral character and no good or ill desert. 3. That we are not responsible even for our volitions, unless they are the acts of a will, which in each instance of choice, has at the same moment, and under the prompting of precisely the same internal and external motives, power to make the contrary choice. Allow these principles, and not only New-school Theology follows, but a great deal more. There is no consistent stopping-place short of unmitigated Pelagianism. And few have ever long remained content in such a resting-place. *Facilis descensus*. Those who have not returned from this point towards the landmarks of eternal truth, have usually plunged rapidly downward from depth to depth of error. On the other hand, take away either of these three cardinal principles, and the system of which they are a part at once staggers and reels. Thus, deny either of them, and the doctrine that wicked men are able instantly, *proprie viribus*, to repent, believe, and fulfil all righteousness, without which most persons would care little for the whole *catena* interlinked with it, must be given up. Deny these principles, and every plausible argument against native, inherent, sinful depravity, sinful inability, efficacious grace, the implantation of new principles in regeneration, the sovereignty of God and the dependence of man therein, and unconditional personal and eternal election, is neutralized. On the contrary, if the principles in question are admitted, then not only must these doctrines fall before them, but it will follow that religion must be excluded from its main théâtre, from the spontaneous affections and inmost principles of the soul; that evil lusts and passions are not morally wrong, except so far as they are produced by a volition; that when we *would* do good, moral evil *cannot* be present with us; that the will of a moral agent has, in the lan-

guage of a distinguished divine of this school, "power to act despite all opposing power;" and thus, that God is divested of his sovereignty over the moral universe.

That some of the worst of these principles have been extensively and earnestly propagated, and have kindled bitter contention in the Church, is painfully notorious. There is, however, a portion of those who hold the "exercise scheme" as it is called, *i. e.*, that moral quality pertains only to acts, who escape some of the most offensive of these dogmas, by rejecting the figment, that the acts of the will are not determined by any thing antecedent to themselves, sometimes called by its advocates, the self-determining power, and sometimes, the power of contrary choice, and by maintaining the opinion, which few have accepted, that infants from birth have their faculties sufficiently developed to make them true and proper moral agents. Of this class were Hopkins and Emmons, and their limited circle of followers. Few have been stronger sticklers than these men for native depravity, a real moral inability, efficacious grace, and especially for decrees, predestination, and absolute divine sovereignty over the human will. These last indeed, were their favourite and habitual themes. Emmons at least, pushed them to the extreme of hyper-Calvinism. With fearless consistency, he openly preached that God is the direct efficient of the sinful as well as the holy actions of men, and that the wicked are as truly dependent on him as the regenerate, for their volitions and character. The following is a sample of the manner in which he taught these revolting dogmas.

"Since the Scripture ascribes all the actions of men to God as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude that the divine agency is as much concerned in their bad as in their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinction here, and to ascribe only the good actions of men to the divine agency, while they ascribe the bad ones to the divine permission. But there appears no ground for this distinction in Scripture or reason. * * * He not only prepared these persons (Joseph's brethren,) to act, but he made them act. He not only exhibited motives of action, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives exhibited. But there was no possible way in

which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts. And if he produced their bad as well as their good volitions, then *his agency was concerned in precisely the same manner in their wrong as in their right actions.*"* "Though they (men,) always act under a divine influence, yet that influence neither increases their virtue (merit?) nor diminishes their guilt, and of consequence ought never to be brought into view when they are praised or blamed for their conduct."† It was not strange, when such hyperborean metaphysics came to be thrown like so many icicles from the pulpit, upon Christian assemblies, that there should have been a violent recoil to a contrary extreme. If God works sin as much, and in the same manner as holiness, then it is easy to say he is no more the author of holiness than of sin, and to deny divine efficiency and special efficacious grace altogether. Somebody shrewdly said, "Taylorism is Emmonsism with the divine efficiency part cut off." And the venerable doctor himself once replied to a distinguished improver of theology, who greeted him with the congratulation, "Well Dr. Emmons, we are all agreed that moral quality pertains only to exercises;" "Yes, only we differ as to where they come from."

Since the appearance of this more recent scheme of metaphysical theology, efforts most strenuous and unsparing have been made to lead the public to believe that in its leading principles, it was sanctioned and taught not only by Hopkins and Emmons, but by the whole body of leading New England divines, from Edwards down. In particular, the attempt has been made in various and laboured forms, to persuade us that the characteristic features of the theology of these men were—

1. A limitation of moral quality to actual choice, with power of contrary choice at the same moment, and in the same circumstances.

2. As a consequence, plenary ability in fallen man to fulfil all God's commands.

3. That all dispositions, desires, feelings, and principles, lying back of, and uncaused by choice, in the manner afore-

* Works, Vol. IV., p. 371.

† *Ib.*, pp. 369, 70.

said, have no moral character, consequently that man cannot be the subject of native, or as Bellamy says, "connatural" sin and guilt, or of holiness infused. We deem all such representations, however intended, in reality a libel upon these luminaries in the church, and a fraud upon the living and the dead, which, as it is a high duty, so it will require but little space, to repel and expose. We grant this recent school whatever "aid and comfort" it can derive from Hopkins and Emons. This is limited to the single point that moral character is confined to acts. In this particular, however, they were only the heads of a small party, out of sympathy with the prevailing current of opinion in New England, and with those great divines whose writings were most in repute and authority among her ministers and churches. If any divines may be taken as exponents of the prevailing theological sentiment of New England, before the outbreak of recent controversies, they are the elder Edwards, Bellamy, Dwight, and Smalley. The very names of the first three will satisfy our readers as to this. Smalley may be less known. But he elaborated the distinction between moral and natural ability and inability beyond all his predecessors. His writings contributed much to commend it to general acceptance, and were recognized as the completest exposition of New England doctrine in regard to it, while his method of treating theological subjects generally, was reckoned eminently sound and judicious. We propose simply to let these distinguished divines speak for themselves on the points in question.

I. THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE, AND THE NATURE OF NATURAL AND MORAL INABILITY.

EDWARDS. "There are some, who, when they talk of liberty of will as consisting in indifference, express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the indifference of the *inclination* or tendency of the will, but an indifference of the soul's *power* of willing; or that the will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or the left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. * * *

I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider, whether they

distinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinction between an indifference of the soul, as to its power and ability of choosing, and the soul's indifference, as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at all."

"Surely the will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevalent inclination of the will. * * * It is equally impossible for the will to choose contrary to its own remaining and preponderating present inclination, as it is to *prefer* contrary to its own present *preference*, or *choose* contrary to its own present choice."—*Freedom of the Will, Part II., Sec. 7.*

"We are said to be *naturally* unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or because of *some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will*; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. *Moral* inability consists not in any of these things, but either in want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination.

"To give some instances of this *moral inability*: A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave. * * * A great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness; and render him *utterly unable* to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good."—*Ib., Part I., Sec. 4.*

BELLAMY. "Our impotency in one word is not *natural*, but *moral*; and, therefore, instead of *extenuating*, does but *magnify* and *enhance* our fault."*

"If it was the business of the Holy Spirit to give us new natural *faculties*, then we might plead our inability, and plead God's not giving us sufficient power, in excuse for ourselves.

* Works, Vol. I., p. 156.

But since our impotency takes its rise entirely from another quarter, and all our need of the influences of the Holy Spirit to bring us to love God, results from our badness, therefore are we without excuse.”*

“If it is not just for God to require of us more than we *can do*, i. e., any more than we have not only a *natural* but a *moral* power to perform, then these things will necessarily follow.”†

DWIGHT. “The degree of our inability to obey the divine law does in no case lessen our guilt. Certainly he, who is more disinclined to obedience, is not less guilty than he who is less disinclined. Disinclination to obey is our inability, and our sin. The greater our disinclination is, the greater plainly, not the less is our sin.‡ If there be *no bias* towards either virtue or sin, at the time immediately preceding each of its volitions, and the freedom of each volition arises out of this fact, then certainly, there being no bias either way, the number of virtuous and that of sinful volitions must naturally be equal; and no cause can be assigned, why every man independently of his renovation by the Spirit of God, should be sinful only.”

“The freedom of will, and consequently moral agency, in man in this world, is the same with that of *the spirits of just men made perfect in heaven*; the same with that of angels; the same with that of the man Christ Jesus. Whence, then, does it come to pass, that the same moral agency leads, or influences, these beings universally to virtue, and men in this world universally to sin? This question the objectors are bound to answer.”§

SMALLEY. “In these discourses, under moral inability to that which is good, is meant to be included all that impotency which consists in *moral depravity*; whether in principle or exercise; whether in privation, that is, the want of moral rectitude only, or in any positive lusts and corruptions; and whether native or contracted; whether removable by moral suasion, or not without a new creation.”||

“The very first idea we can have of sin, is a depraved and

* Bellamy's Works, Vol. I., p. 163.

† *Ib.*, Vol. II., p. 253.

‡ Dwight's Works, Vol. IV., p. 468.

§ *Ib.*, Vol. II., pp. 12, 13.

|| Smalley on Natural Ability, New York edition, p. 60.

wicked heart; and if this is not a blamable thing *in itself*, there is no danger of finding any thing that is so. * * *

“If the distinction now insisted on was well understood, and clearly kept in view, it would appear in like manner, that a sinner’s not being able to change his own heart, is really nothing in his favour. * * * Sinners do not see how it is their own fault, that they have such bad hearts, and do nothing from gracious principles, provided it is not in their own power to alter themselves in this respect. Now if a wicked heart was not a *moral evil*, but a thing of the same nature as a weak head, a bad memory, this would be the case.”*

“An ability to act otherwise than agreeably to our own hearts, would only be an ability to act unfreely and by constraint.”†

II. WHETHER THE AFFECTIONS AND FEELINGS, TOGETHER WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND DISPOSITIONS WHICH LIE BACK OF, AND GIVE RISE TO ALL MORAL EXERCISES, HAVE MORAL CHARACTER, AND ARE IN A SENSE VOLUNTARY.

EDWARDS: “True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections.”

“The affections are no other than the more vigorous and *sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.*‡

“It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that *good* choice, is virtuous. * * * A virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and therefore it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition.”§

One of the most remarkable attempts in the whole history of polemics, has been made to parry the force of this and other like declarations of this wonderful man, by representing him as here inconsistent with himself; and especially by alleging that his maturer views on the subject are to be found in his *Disser-*

* Smalley on Natural Ability, New York edition, pp. 63, 4.

† *Ib.*, p. 77.

‡ Works, Vol. V., pp. 9, 10.

§ *Ib.*, Vol. II., p. 407.

tation on the Nature of Virtue, and are contradictory to the foregoing. Never have we seen a more gratuitous plea in serious argument. It is perfectly clear that it was no part of Edwards's purpose to treat of the will in this essay. Nor has he written a syllable in it, in contradiction of the positions he had laid down in works, in which he treated of it *ex professo*. We can conceive no reason why this attempt has been made upon this production, unless because Old Calvinists in common with a multitude besides, have been generally dissatisfied with it. But their dissatisfaction has no reference to questions of this sort. It refers to the main position of the essay, with respect to the nature, the foundation of moral obligations, and is based on reasons which we have partially indicated on previous pages. It has been alleged that because he holds that virtue consists in *benevolence*, therefore he held that it consists exclusively in *acts of will*. Any of his treatises affords as good premises for such a conclusion. If he held that virtue consists in benevolence, is this any proof that he did not hold that it lies in principles and dispositions, as well as acts? Or that such principles might not be native or infused as well as acquired? But let us go to the record. In the Dissertation under consideration, he says, "When it is inquired, what is the nature of true *virtue*? This is the same as to inquire what it is that renders any *habit, disposition or exercise* of the heart truly beautiful?"* "A *principle* of general benevolence softens and sweetens the mind, &c."† Now we will cite his own definition of principle and disposition.

"By a *principle of nature* in this place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul; or a natural habit or foundation of action, giving a person ability and disposition to exert the faculties in exercises of such a certain kind; so that to exert the faculties in that kind of exercises, may be said to be his nature. * * * The new, holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new *faculty* of will, but a *foundation* laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of will."‡

* Works, Vol. III., p. 94.

† *Ib.*, p. 147.‡ *Ib.*, Vol. V., pp. 102, 3.

BELLAMY. "As Adam was created in the image of God, to prepare him for holy acts and exercises of heart, so the same image is restored in regeneration, to prepare us for the first holy act. As there was a holy principle in Adam before the first holy act, so there is a holy principle in the regenerate sinner before the first holy act.*

"The idea of spiritual beauty supposes an internal spiritual sense communicated to the soul by the Spirit of God."†

DWIGHT. "*These (amiable natural characteristics) and all other qualities of the mind are, however, means either of virtue or sin, according to the nature of that controlling disposition, or energy, WHICH CONSTITUTES THE MORAL CHARACTER.* By this disposition or energy, I intend *that unknown cause, whence it arises, that the actions of the mind are either sinful or virtuous.*"‡

"The divine law originally requires nothing but affection."§

"Regeneration is a change of the *temper, or disposition*, or, in other words, of the heart of man; and by consequence of his whole character. The heart is the great controlling power of a rational being—the whole of that energy by which he is moved to action. The moral nature of this power, therefore, will be the moral nature of the man."||

"This disposition of Adam, existing antecedently to every volition, was the real cause why his volitions subsequently existing, were virtuous. It ought to be remarked here, that plain men, with truth, as well as with good sense, ascribe all the volitions of mankind to *disposition*, the very thing here intended, as their true cause.

"In regeneration, the very same thing is done by the Spirit of God for the soul, which was done for *Adam* by the same divine Agent at his creation. The soul of *Adam* was *created* with a relish for spiritual objects. The soul of every man who becomes a Christian is *renewed* by the communication of the same relish."¶

"God created man in his own image; in the image of God

* Works, Vol. III., p. 334.

† Works, Vol. I., p. 527.

|| *Ib.*, Vol. III., p. 75.

‡ *Ib.*, Vol. II., p. 503.

§ *Ib.*, Vol. IV., p. 460.

¶ *Ib.*, p. 64.

created he him. In a former discourse I have shown, that the likeness or image, here mentioned, is the *moral image of God*, consisting, especially, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, as we are informed by St. Paul.*

When Dr. Dwight says, "man is the actor of his own sin,"† he in no manner contradicts the foregoing doctrines, which are ingrained into his whole theology, but is simply denying the doctrine of Emmons, that sinful acts are directly created by God, as the context proves.

SMALLEY. "It is agreeable to common sense, and seems plainly supposed in several texts and doctrines of Scripture, that depravity of nature must be antecedent to all sinful actions and the cause of them. But if so, there may be a *wicked* heart prior to knowledge. * * * Both the first and second creation unto good works, spoken of in Scripture, necessarily suppose that there may be holiness in man, prior to his having any actual perception or exercises; and why not sin, as well, prior to all acts of sin? * * * We know as well what a good or bad disposition is, prior to virtuous or vicious exercises, as we do what reason is, prior to rational actions. * * * Were not an ungovernable inclination to iniquity criminal in its own nature, it would excuse whatever it necessarily occasions, as much as any other innocent cause does, its unavoidable effects. But if a depraved disposition be a moral evil—a culpable thing, then he who hath it may justly be condemned for it, before he has time to act at all."‡

III. NATIVE DISPOSITIONS SINFUL.

EDWARDS. "*By original sin*, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the *innate sinful depravity of the heart*."§ "We may well argue from hence that infants are not sinless, but are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes on mankind at this early period. But besides the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases,"|| &c.

"The things which have been said, obviate some of the chief objections of *Arminians* against the *Calvinistic* doctrine

* Works, Vol. II., p. 7.

† *Ib.*, Vol. I., p. 460.

‡ Smalley's Sermons, Hartford edition, pp. 188-90.

§ Works, Vol. II., p. 309.

|| *Ib.*, p. 402.

of the *total depravity and corruption of man's nature*, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do anything that is truly acceptable in his sight."—*Freedom of the Will, Part IV., Sec. 14.*

Edwards doubtless understood his own purpose in this treatise, as well as the modern impugners of the doctrines he designed it to fortify.

BELLAMY. "Adam was considered not merely as a single private person, but as a public head and representative, standing in the room of all his posterity; and considered in this capacity, was he threatened with *death* in case he sinned; and considered in this capacity, was *natural death* denounced upon him after his fall. So that in both his posterity were equally included; and therefore St. Paul calls Adam a *type of Christ*."* "We are, in fact, born like the wild ass's colt, as senseless of God, and as void and destitute of grace; we have *nature*, but no grace; a *taste* for *natural good*, but no *relish* for *moral beauty*; an *appetite* for *happiness*, but no *appetite* for *holiness*. * * * We are *natively diametrically opposed* to it (the law of God) *in the temper of our hearts*. * * * These propensities, perhaps, in some sense, may be said to be *contracted*, in opposition to their being strictly and philosophically *natural*, because they are not created by God with the essence of the soul, but result from its native choice, or rather more strictly, are themselves its native choice. * * * They are not *natural* in the same sense as the *faculties* of our souls are, for they are not the workmanship of God, but our native choice, and the voluntary, free, spontaneous bent of our hearts. And to keep up this distinction, I frequently use the word *native* instead of *natural*."† "Choice" here is clearly used in the sense of "spontaneous bent," *i. e.*, disposition or principle. See *Works*, Vol. III., p. 334, already quoted.

"As to our sentiments touching total depravity, works done by unregenerate man, and the sovereignty of divine grace in the conversion of sinners, we profess to agree with the Assembly of Divines at Westminster. And you know, that their

* *Works*, Vol. I., p. 315.

† *Ib.*, Vol. I., pp. 200-202.

Confession of Faith, and Larger and Shorter Catechisms, are adopted by the Church of Scotland as their test of orthodoxy; and are much the same with the Savoy Confession of Faith, which is adopted, in general, by the churches in Massachusetts and Connecticut.”*

DWIGHT. “With these facts in view, we are compelled to one of these conclusions: either that infants are *contaminated in their moral nature*, and born in the likeness of apostate Adam; a fact irresistibly proved, so far as the most unexceptionable analogy can prove anything, by the depraved conduct of every infant, who lives so long as to be capable of moral action; or that God inflicts these sufferings on moral beings who are perfectly innocent. I leave the alternative to the choice of those who object against this doctrine.”†

SMALLEY. “The mortality of mankind, in every period of life, is full proof of their being sinners from their birth.”‡ “There may be good nature, or ill nature; a holy or an unholy temper of mind, in a man when he is in the most profound sleep; and is as unknowing and inactive as an unborn infant.”§

“There may be a wicked heart prior to knowledge. * * * This may be in us, as early as we have human souls.”||

But it is time to bring these citations, which might be indefinitely multiplied, to a close. The evidence is cumulative and irresistible, that the attempt to turn these great lights of the Church into patrons of the modern Pelagian speculations, which assert in man a plenary power of contrary choice, a plenary ability to do works acceptable to God, without grace, and which deny either that the dispositions, or that the affections possess moral character, or that man is sinful from birth, is one of the most amazing pieces of strategy ever recorded in the annals of polemic theology.¶

* Works, Vol. III., p. 428.

† Ib., Vol. II., p. 13.

‡ Sermons, p. 172.

§ Ib., p. 190.

|| Ib., p. 168.

¶ Perhaps, however, our readers will cease to wonder, when we tell them that a complimentary notice of the book under review has already appeared, (in the Portland Christian Mirror for Nov. 16,) in which the writer appears most of all pleased, that in it, as he understands it, Dr. Alexander confines moral quality to acts! It is supposed to be from a theological teacher, whose known character forbids the suspicion that he intended any unfairness. Thus strangely do men's

The inherent good or ill-desert of inward dispositions to good or evil respectively, has been believed in by all unsophisticated men. This belief is a part of the intuitive convictions, and is implied in the language of the whole human race. Once admit this, and the great argument against a sinful native depravity vanishes, and that doctrine is impregnably confirmed by Scripture and undeniable facts. It is a part of the faith of the Christian Church, as shown in her creeds, rites, literature and devotions. Notwithstanding the incessant rationalistic assaults upon it, we are persuaded that no other disposal of the subject can so well be vindicated at the bar of reason even, in view of the undeniable facts which objectors themselves are compelled to admit. The least objectionable variation from the orthodox doctrine, is that of those advocates of the "exercise scheme," who, denying inborn sinful propensities back of action, assert that men are complete moral agents, and so actual sinners, from birth. But no doctrine, conditioned on the belief that infants are complete moral agents, can widely or permanently prevail. The men are too few who can be persuaded to believe it. The speedy consequence of basing the doctrine of native sinfulness on this hypothesis, was the utter rejection of the doctrine in many quarters where this resolution of the subject prevailed. Indeed we cannot help thinking that the advocates of this view must have some inward misgivings after all, as to the theory that moral character pertains to acts only. Dr. Pond, in a recent article, in which he argues the doctrine of the sinfulness of infants with great success, nevertheless contends that they have no sin but actual sin, and that they have this from birth. In answer to the question, whether the infant can also repent, he says, it may undergo such a change that "it will have the *element* of repentance, though not perhaps, the precise form of it. It has that which *will be* repentance the

theories distort their interpretations of other men's language. After the extracts we have given from Dr. Alexander on these points, and the known fact that he laboured all his life in opposition to the doctrines here attributed to him, it is indeed strange that a candid and intelligent man should understand him to advocate them. If this is possible, we need no longer wonder that heated partisans understand Edwards, Bellamy, and Dwight to have been its decided and earnest defenders.

moment it comes to a sight and sense of its sins."* How much this differs from a principle of repentance distinct from, and prior to, and the source of, acts of repentance, we are glad that we are not bound to show.

Another solution of the case is the Pelagian and Socinian, that man is not really fallen, and that before moral agency begins, or that with regard to all that lies back of volition, his soul is in its pure, normal state. This is so palpably contradictory to all facts, that it could never command extensive and permanent support.

A third method of treating the subject, which has always found numerous adherents, denies moral character to all but acts, while it asserts that men uniformly sin, and only sin, from the commencement of moral agency, till conversion; and that this is owing to a disordered and vitiated moral nature, which yet (because it is not an act, nor series of acts, nor the fruit thereof,) is neither sinful nor guilty. But although thus sinless, these men say, "still this nature is so odious in itself, and so pernicious in its influence, that our emotions often prompt us to stigmatize it as sin!"† If that within us, which is "so odious in itself," that our moral sense often prompts us "to stigmatize it as sin," is to be exculpated as blameless, we are in little danger of finding sin anywhere. Besides, how, on this theory, can we account for the sufferings and death of infants? Why, under the administration of a righteous God, should the "wages of sin" be inflicted upon them, if they are sinless?

A fourth view of the subject is thus presented. Says a recent writer,‡ "It is impossible, without destroying the attribute of justice in God, to hold that any *guilt* attaches to original sin, previous to the actual choice of transgression; unless there is also held a doctrine, which New England rejects as a foul and fatal error, the doctrine of 'one baptism for the remission of sins.'" This position is the weakest that we have yet seen taken on the subject. If baptism procures "the remission of sin," then there is antecedent sin and guilt

* Bibliotheca Sacra., Oct. 1852, p. 759.

† Bib. Sacra, July, 1851, p. 627.

‡ Church Review, Oct. 1852; Art. New England Theology.

to be remitted. It exists in all before baptism, and in all who do not receive baptism. These constitute a vast majority of our race. If this in itself is contrary to the justice of God, then baptism cannot make it otherwise. God has provided no ordinances of grace, as a remedy for his own injustice. They all imply the utter sinfulness of man, and the perfect rectitude of the Almighty. According to the Articles of the Episcopal, and all other Christian churches, the corruption of man's nature, "deserveth God's wrath and damnation." No other view of the subject agrees with Scripture or undeniable facts.*

If we have succeeded in showing the vital connection between moral science and Christian theology, and that this important work of Dr. Alexander forcibly exhibits the truth on the subject, we need not add that we hope it will be not only extensively used as a text-book for teaching the science, but that it will prove a welcome addition to the libraries of ministers, theologians, and all who are interested in the high subjects of which it treats.

* A standing difficulty in the minds of all classes of objectors to the doctrine of original sin appears to be, that it makes God the author of sin. They present it indeed in innumerable forms. But "to this complexion" they all come at last. We need not say, that all advocates of the doctrine but those who, like Emmons, make sin a direct creation of God, regard sin as a negative thing, arising from a *privative* cause, as darkness from the withdrawal of light. It is not the effect of God's presence or agency in the soul; but of his withdrawal from it, on account of the sin of the first parent and representative of the race. The effect of this withdrawal is, that the inferior principles of nature become ascendant, and thus inordinate and depraved. So Augustine, Edwards, Bellamy, Smalley, and the whole *consensus* of Calvinistic confessions. With one consent they repudiate the idea, that God is the author of sin, or interferes with the freedom of the human will. Their words are, "God, from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own *will*, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away; but rather established."—*Westminster and Savoy Confessions*.