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- ART. I.—1. *Report from Select Committee on the State of Education, with the minutes of Evidence and Index.* August, 1834. pp. 257, folio.
2. *Report from the Select Committee on Education in England and Wales, together with the minutes of Evidence, &c.* August, 1835. pp. 237, folio.
3. *Report from the Select Committee on Education of the poorer classes in England and Wales, with minutes of Evidence, &c.* August 1838. pp. 171, folio.
4. *A Letter to the Most Noble the Marquis of Lansdowne on National Education.* By Robert Isaac Wilberforce. pp. 65, 18mo.
5. *Second Letter from same to same.* pp. 73, 18mo.
6. *National Education, the Question of Questions, &c. &c., with brief notes on Lord Brougham's bill.* By Henry Dunn. pp. 48, 8vo.
7. *Speech of Rev. Francis Close at Freemason's Tavern, February 9, 1839. With a reply, strictures, &c.* [Several Pamphlets.]
8. *The Mission of the Educator, an appeal for the Education of all classes in England.* pp. 64, 8vo.
9. *Lectures on National Education.* By W. I. Fox. pp. 80, 8vo.
10. *National Education: ought it to be based upon Religion?* A Sermon preached at Bridport, February 24, 1839. By Philip Harword.

ART. III.—*The Works of Jonathan Edwards, D. D., late President of Union College, with a Memoir of his Life and Character.* By Tryon Edwards: in two volumes. Andover. Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. 1842.

THE editor and publishers of these volumes are entitled to the thanks of all who concern themselves with polemic theology, for the service they have performed, in making the productions of their distinguished author, accessible to the present generation. If we except President Edwards the elder, no theologian has been more quoted and appealed to as authority, in theological discussions among the divines of New England, and those divines elsewhere who have taken their fundamental bias from the standard theologians of New England. Indeed we are not sure that even this exception ought to be made, with regard to many of the later New England polemics. In proportion as they have been prone to innovation, or what they call discoveries and improvements in theology, they have also been disposed to cite more freely from the younger than the elder Edwards, to set forward the former in bold relief and keep the latter in the back-ground; to magnify the excellencies of the son, and disparage or pass unnoticed the excellencies of the father. In short, we have seen something like an effort to make them change places in the estimation of mankind, and by one stroke to lift the son to the summit of theological authorities, and strike down the father from his pre-eminence. This predilection for the son, is doubtless owing to the fact that he broke ground in the field of theological innovation. He proposed and strenuously urged some important deviations from the track pursued by most Calvinistic divines before him, especially in regard to the atonement. He advocated the general notion of improvements in theology, and enumerated in terms of high praise, those made by a class that he styled "the followers of President Edwards," of which he might safely say, *Quorum magna pars fui*. Hence he is referred to with the greatest respect and veneration, by those who esteem him a sort of pioneer in an enterprize in which they have far outstripped him. They appeal to the modifications of doctrine which he introduced, his love of metaphysics, and above all, to his belief that the science of theology, like other sciences, is a field for discovery and invention, as a warrant for their own adventurous flights, in which they soar far above his utmost daring. But while

his writings have thus been appealed to by controversialists, they have been so long out of print as to be inaccessible to the great body of American ministers. A good service has therefore been done, in thus enabling them to ascertain for themselves, what principles he espoused, and what he repudiated. Withal, these volumes contain a great amount of matter, which is original and instructive, and gives them a higher than merely polemical value. Dr. Edwards, as is manifest from these volumes, had an original, profound and logical mind, coupled with most unwearied industry and perseverance. Moreover, he was anointed with an unction from the Holy One, and held all his great powers sacred to the cause of God and Truth. For these reasons, we are much gratified with the publication of these volumes, and consider them an important contribution in our religious literature.

The memoir of Dr. Edwards's life and character by the editor, is well done. It has the rare merit of brevity, with as good a degree of completeness, as his scanty materials would allow. It is neither dry nor tame, but sufficiently spirited to be readable. We get from it a succinct but clear view of the author's lineage, the important events of his life, the characteristic qualities of his mind and heart, the principal works he wrought, and results he accomplished, without being obliged to plod through a barren waste of insipid and irrelevant matter.

It appears from the memoir that he was the second son and ninth child of the senior President Edwards, and was born at Northampton, Mass., on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1745. In 1751, he removed with his father to Stockbridge. This place being at that time mostly inhabited by Indians, he acquired a greater familiarity with their language than with his mother tongue, so that his thoughts then ran in it, and through life he often dreamed in it. His father, observing his proficiency in this respect, sent him, at the age of ten years, among the Six Nations with the Rev. Gideon Hawley, to learn their language, and become qualified for the missionary service among this people. After a short season, he returned from this expedition to his father's house at Stockbridge. From this place he went to Princeton with his father, on his taking the presidency of the College of New Jersey, in 1758. As all know, he was shortly afterwards left an orphan, by the sudden demise of his parents. Although his inheritance was too small to defray the ex-

pense of a liberal education, yet by the aid of family friends he succeeded in going through Princeton College, at which he graduated in September, 1765. During his connection with this college, under the powerful preaching of Dr. Finley, he was awakened, and hopefully converted, and made a public profession of religion, which he adorned by his whole subsequent life. He then began the study of divinity with Dr. Bellamy, of Connecticut, his father's most prominent coadjutor. He was licensed to preach the gospel in October, 1766. After preaching in various places, in 1767 he became Tutor of the college at which he was educated, and remained in that office two years. During this time, he was chosen Professor of Languages and Logic in the same institution, but declined the appointment. He was settled as pastor over the White Haven church and society, in New Haven, Conn., Jan. 5, 1769, where he continued till May 19, 1795. His separation from this people, arose mainly from the adoption of Unitarian and other errors by some of the leading men of the parish. In the January next following, he was again settled in Colebrook, a country parish of Connecticut. His ministry in this place, though short, was remarkably prosperous and happy. He was called from this situation to the presidency of Union College, which he assumed in July, 1799. His career in this important office, though auspiciously commenced, was terminated by his death, Aug. 1, 1801. Thus his own projects of usefulness, and the hopes of the friends of the college, and of religion and learning generally, were suddenly blighted by an inscrutable Providence.

Passing from the memoir to the works of Dr. Edwards, it strikes us that the editor has made the order of their respective excellence, the order of his arrangement, putting the best first. At the threshold, we are introduced to his great refutation of Universalism, in reply to Dr. Chauncey. As this is the largest, so, in our judgment, it is decidedly the ablest treatise contained in these volumes. By this, more than by any other single work, perhaps more than by all his works combined, he has earned for himself the reputation which he enjoys.

Dr. Edwards's "Salvation of all men, strictly examined," exhausts the subject, and leaves little unsaid, that can be said in refutation of Universalism. It is a prostrating, mortal blow at the system, and all its advocates and supports. He first compares the leading arguments of his antagonists

with each other, and shows, that in a variety of particulars, they mutually contradict, and utterly destroy each other. Having thus gained a vantage ground at the very onset, he proceeds to examine all their pleas in behalf of their doctrine, singly on their own independent merits, whether purporting to be founded on scripture or reason, and shows their absurdity with an almost mathematical strictness and clearness of demonstration. He tears their specious webs of sophistry into shreds and tatters. He is careful to leave nothing unnoticed which his opponents have alleged to help out their cause, nay, he imagines many retreats which they may possibly make as he successively corners them, and pursues them till they are thoroughly vanquished, and are left without a solitary refuge. Having thus demolished all the supports of their cause, he proceeds to adduce the positive proofs of the falsity of their doctrine, and the truth of the contrary. By several independent trains of reasoning, each conclusive, in itself, and all conspiring to one result, he perseveres with a coolness and patience that never faint, to press upon them the argument cumulative, till they sink under its crushing weight. Throughout the whole, he discovers polemical gifts of a high order. He first states clearly the point he is about to discuss: he then keeps rigidly to the point in hand, till he has made out his case. He deals in no empty declamation. He never substitutes railing or invective for argument. He does not seize merely or chiefly on the weak points of his opponent's reasoning, and expose their absurdity, while he leaves his strong points untouched, and then exult with airs of triumph, as if he had fairly conquered. Much less does he, by garbled and unfair extracts, affix to them the stigma of sentiments or reasonings of which they were never guilty. On the contrary, he delights to seize and grapple with the strongest arguments of his foes, and on these he spends his own strength.

We do not of course intend in these encomiums, to endorse the accuracy of every statement, argument, or exegesis which occurs in this treatise of Dr. Edwards. If its beauty is in a few instances marred by a crude suggestion, its strength remains unimpaired. It still remains the greatest monument of the author's genius, and constitutes his strongest title to enduring renown.

Next in order, in these volumes, as also in our view, in the order of merit; is his "Dissertation on Liberty and Ne-

cessity." This treatise is designed chiefly as a vindication of his father's work on the Will against the strictures of Dr. Samuel West. As the fulfilment of this design, it is complete and masterly. From beginning to end we see the same clearing up of all ambiguities, the same honest abiding by his definitions, the same dialectic skill and subtlety, the same mastery of his subject, the same fairness towards his opponents, the same patient perseverance in tracking them through all their hiding places, which mark his more elaborate treatises. Still his weapons are all forged and made ready to his hand in his father's great work. He simply takes them, and aims and discharges them at his father's assailants.

In regard to the will, metaphysicians have always been divided into two great parties, which for convenience may be respectively denominated the Calvinistic and Arminian. Both agree that choice is in its own nature free. But the former contend that choices are governed by a previous necessity, or rather certainty, that they should be what they are, and not otherwise, and that this certainty no way militates against their liberty. The latter contend that choice cannot be governed by any antecedent certainty without thereby losing its freedom. But the former class use the word necessity in a peculiar sense, which they are careful to define. Their necessity is not such as forces the subject of it to act against his will, or admits of any real opposition, or endeavour of will against the choice made; for this would not be any real choice, but the contrary of it. This would be, what they call, natural necessity. But it is a *previously constituted certainty that the agent will choose as he does choose*. This certainty is based on the prior existence of a cause adequate to excite the will freely to choose as it does choose, and on the sure connection between that cause and its effect; this they style moral necessity. When necessity is thus defined, most of the Arminian reasonings against it lose their force, because they are directed against a necessity which is supposed to force the will contrary to its own free choice. Thus they waste their strength against a fiction for which nobody contends, and keep up a shadow-fight against a word foe. Arminians, on the contrary teach that the will, in each volition, is free to determine itself either way, and is undetermined by any previous cause, making it certain that its choices will be what they are, and not otherwise. Correspondent to the distinction between natural and moral necessity, is the distinction between natural and moral

inability held by many Calvinistic divines, and especially the Edwardses. Inability is the reverse of necessity, and is natural or moral according as the necessity to which it stands opposed is natural or moral. Thus as every act of the will is necessary by a moral necessity, or a previous certainty of its being put forth, so there is, in the nature of the case, a moral inability for the contrary choice. In those events which are brought to pass by a natural necessity, there is a natural inability to cause the contrary events. Now the great doctrine of Calvinists in regard to the will is, that all its acts are determined by antecedent causes, which without impairing their freedom, make it certain that they shall be what they are and not otherwise. We need not inform our readers which of the two conflicting doctrines on the will Dr. Edwards advocates. He maintains a moral, and denies a natural necessity of its actions. He holds a natural inability to the opposite actions, but denies all ability opposed to the moral necessity or previous certainty of those actions, i. e. he holds to moral inability.

That we have not mistaken the Edwardean notion of liberty and necessity, as held by father and son, we think will readily appear from the following account of them given by the author, at the very opening of his treatise. As his first object was to clear away ambiguities, and show exactly the point in dispute, he begins with quoting his father's statements on this subject, and then proceeds with the following comment :

“This is the account given by President Edwards of the distinction which he made between natural and moral necessity. Moral necessity is the certain, or necessary connection between moral causes and moral effects. Natural necessity is the connection between causes and effects which are not of a moral nature. The difference between these two kinds of necessity lies chiefly in the nature of the two terms connected by it. Natural necessity admits of voluntary, but ineffectual opposition from him who is subject to the necessity ; the immediate effect produced by that necessity may be opposed by the will of the subject. But with respect to moral necessity, which is a previous certainty of the existence of a volition or voluntary action, it is absurd to suppose that *in that act*, the will should either oppose itself or the necessity from which the act arises. The distinction between natural and moral inability is analogous to this. Inability is the reverse of necessity.”—Vol. i., p. 300.

With the exception of Mr. Tappan, who was bold to combat Edwards on the will, and who if rash, had also the merit of being frank, and who failed of success in this enterprize, not so much from any moral as from a purely natural and innocent inability, we believe that all the present advocates of self-sovereignty, indifference, or liberty *ad utrumque*,

have attempted to shelter themselves under the ample shield of Edwards's authority. They have at least tried to obtain some semblance of sanction from him for opinions which it was a principal labour of his life to refute. For this purpose, they sometimes cull out a few passages, which if they do not favour, at least seem not, if taken by themselves, to discountenance their scheme. But a more common and adroit method is, to represent the son as the expositor of the father, and that we cannot understand the writings of the latter, except as we view them through the explanations of the former. They then seize upon those passages in the son's book which resolve all necessity of volitions, into simple certainty. By a pitiful play on the word certainty, they apply it to the mere certain truth of an identical proposition, e. g. that whatever is, is, or that whatever will be, will be, instead of the certainty of future events, made sure by decisive and effectual causes. Now, say they, the certainty that whatever will be, will be, does not make it certain what shall be, or militate against the most perfect contingency, and liberty to either of two opposite volitions in every act of will, or, as they style it, "power of choice, with power of contrary choice." Moreover, they say that Dr. Edwards, in allowing the natural power of contrary choice, expressly asserted the self-sovereignty of the will in volition for which they contend. Now it has already been shown that all that he meant by natural power to any act, was simply that the will is not prevented from it by a natural necessity, i. e. a necessity which coerces it in spite of its own choice or endeavour to the contrary. But it is not a power opposed to moral necessity, or capable of defeating the previously established certainty of the action. Therefore it is no liberty either way—or such power of contrary choice as is adequate to the production of that choice. As the real sense in which Dr. Edwards used the terms *certainty* and *natural ability* is important to be understood, on account of its bearing on recent controversies, we will cite a single passage on each of these points. Speaking of Dr. Clarke's illustration of the nature of moral necessity by this case, "that a good being continuing to be good, cannot do evil," he says,\* "This last account implies no other necessity, than that a thing must be when it is supposed to be; which amounts to the trifling proposition, that *what is, is*. But the certainty implied in the divine prediction that the

\* Vol. i. p. 308.

world will continue to a particular period, is a very different matter." On the subject of natural power, he says,\* "I grant that we have a *natural* power to choose or refuse in any case; but we have no moral power, or power opposed to *moral* necessity; for moral necessity is the previous certainty of a moral action; and a power opposed to this must imply a previous uncertainty. But no event, moral or natural, is, or can be, uncertain, previously to its existence."

The radical question between the two parties is, as we have already seen, whether the acts of the will become what they are and not otherwise, in virtue of antecedent causes which are effectual to excite the will to those particular volitions and prevent the putting forth of any others, or whether they become so, by virtue of a self-determining property of the will, which is such that while it is unbiassed either way by any antecedent and extrinsic influence, it does by its own inherent and isolated power of willing, exert itself in one way rather than its opposite, in every act of choice. In answer to the question, why a man chooses one thing rather than another, is the act sufficiently accounted for, by replying that he has the faculty of will, and power of self-determination either way? Or is it a more correct and satisfactory solution of the fact to say he was induced to that choice by certain reasons and motives, which were effectual to fix his choice? On this subject, every man's consciousness must testify for himself. But it seems to us that the statement of the question leaves it susceptible of but one answer. For who ever made a choice, who can conceive of one, in which the person choosing has not some reason or inducement prompting him to elect the object chosen, in preference to its opposite? It matters not what that reason or inducement may be, whether a prior inward bias or propensity, or intellectual view, or attractiveness in the object chosen, or which is generally the fact, some or all these combined; still if it be something antecedent to choice, which effectually excites the mind to one volition rather than its opposite, then is the will determined by causes, other than its own act, or power of willing, or of self-determination.

Some deem it a sufficient answer to the question, why does the mind make a particular choice, instead of the con-

\* Vol. i. p. 313.

trary? to say that it has the power of choice, with power of contrary choice. This may account for the mind's choosing at all. But how does it show why it makes any given choice instead of the contrary? It may be enough to account for our seeing objects to say that we have eyes. But does this account for our seeing mountains instead of plains? If the conception of a choice of any object, that does not on some account appear eligible, is possible, we confess that we are strangers to that conception. Now what is more obvious, than that it depends on the intellectual view, and the state of our various passions, propensities, and all the susceptibilities of our sensitive nature, what objects shall appear most desirable, and what shall appear otherwise? This being granted, which cannot be denied, it follows conclusively that the will inclines to any particular choice, in consequence of causes aside from and antecedent to its own self-activity in that choice.

And pursuing this line of thought a little further, it is manifest while the will is in a state of indifference, or equipoise towards any object, it can neither incline for or against, it can neither choose nor refuse it. In order to a volition which either elects or rejects any object, that object must be viewed with a previous correspondent complacency or aversion. On any other supposition, choice must proceed from the most motionless stupefaction and insensibility, which is a contradiction in terms. The activity of a rational and sensitive being, must be in the way of perception and propensity, through which the object chosen becomes arrayed before him with such apparent qualities, as render it an object of desire, and excite to a choice of it. And, as we conceive, no other foundation of choice in a rational being, is conceivable.

This view of the will is so obviously true, that even the most earnest advocates of the power of contrary choice, contingency, &c., cannot write long on this subject, without unconsciously maintaining it. Thus Dr. Taylor, although he insists on "a power to act despite all opposing power" as essential to all moral agency, and the back-bone of all enlightened theology and metaphysics, likewise insists that "of all specific voluntary action the happiness of the agent in some form is the ultimate end." Now this last proposition cannot be true, unless the will always elects that object, which is viewed as most conducive to the agent's happiness. For if it refuses this object, and chooses in preference one which is less promotive of his happiness, then in

making this election, the agent has some other "ultimate end" besides his own happiness. The same conclusion follows from his great proposition, that "self-love is the primary cause of all voluntary action." If this be so, then how is any "voluntary action" possible, that is opposed to the dictates of "self-love?" That either of these propositions is true, we deny. But this makes them none the less conclusive on the part of their author, as contradicting his "power to act despite all opposing power."

Mr. Tappan likewise\* maintains that "the only escape from necessity is in the conception of a will as above defined—a conscious self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, that may act in the indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion." Again:† "But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to oppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the correlation of its nature with certain objects, a will indeed which has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent." But then in attempting to show the consistency of his scheme with the divine prescience,‡ he observes, "the connexion on which we base the prediction of human volition, is the connexion of will with reason and sensitivity in the unity of the mind and spirit. Secondly: By this connexion, the will is seen to be designed to be regulated by truth and righteousness, and by feeling subordinated to these." This is a queer specimen of a will "not correlated to any objects," acting in sublime indifference to all the dictates of reason and passion! Again,§ he observes, "The will has efficiency or creative and modifying power in itself—self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without rules,—a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing what to do." We ask, then, whether that which furnishes the will with "objects, designs and rules," and teaches it "what to do," has or has not any influence in making its choices what they are, rather than otherwise?

From this, we ascend a step higher. We observe that dependence is a necessary attribute of all created power. Perfect independence and self-sufficiency belongs only to the Uncreated One. All power in creatures is therefore

\* Review of Edwards, pp. 226-7. † p. 221. ‡ p. 270. § p. 244.

subject to innumerable limitations and restraints. They have, by the fact of being creatures, what some divines have styled a *passive power*, i. e. a susceptibility to be affected by influence, *ab extra*. From this liability no one can exempt himself, and still remain a creature. This extrinsic influence therefore becomes a necessary element among the reasons why the actions of creatures are what they are. Suppose what power of will you may, still the man does not exist, whose actions are not affected by the circumstances in which he is placed, and would not be different, were his surrounding circumstances different: i. e. if he remains a free agent and chooses freely. This demonstrates the reality of an influence extrinsic to the agent in determining volition. On any other view, Divine Providence is reduced to an impossibility.

Many confound internal liberty, or liberty in an act of choice, with external liberty, or power to execute that choice. It is conceded that if a man be willing to do a good deed, but be prevented by insurmountable obstacles, frustrating any endeavour he may make, he is not to blame for the non-performance of it, because he is hindered from executing his choice by a natural necessity. Now many reason against the determination of the acts of the will by any influence out of itself, as if in spite of its utmost endeavours, it were forced to choose contrary to its own liking, i. e. its own choice—and were therefore prevented by a natural necessity from executing its own choice. But the bare act of choosing, excludes the supposition of any contrary choice, and therefore cuts the sinew of all objections founded on its supposed existence.

But although this may be a satisfactory account of free-agency, so far as the subjects of it are concerned, a grave and difficult question arises from it in relation to the holiness of God, and the manner of justifying his ways to man. It is constantly objected by the advocates of self-determination, that if volition be determined by antecedent causes, which are themselves controlled and appointed of God, and at any rate are traceable to him as the Great First Cause, then God is the author of sin, and sin is his own work, the product of his own direct efficient and creative operation. Any scheme against which this objection lies, is crushed and annihilated by it. For to say that God works iniquity is blasphemous, and undermines the foundation of all religion. So serious an objection, all Calvinistic writers on the will, have found it necessary to repel, not by a few random

remarks, but by most faithful and elaborate argumentation. Dr. Edwards did not fail to see its fundamental importance, and devoted to it one of the most laboured chapters of his dissertation, in which he evidently tasks his controversial skill and adroitness to the utmost. But we confess that this is to us the least satisfactory part of the treatise. And we here detect his first deviation from the temperate zone of Reformed and Puritan theology, into the arctic regions of Hopkinsianism. For he followed Dr. Hopkins, more closely than his father.

Whenever his father encounters the objection to his scheme, that it makes God the author of sin, he always at once threw out that broad and adamantine shield, which most Calvinists have made their defence against this objection. He always began by maintaining that depravity originates not in a *positive* but a *privative* cause, not from *divine agency*, but *the absence of that agency*. He said the principles which belonged to human nature essentially, and which in the state in which they came from God are innocent, when combined with liberty and that susceptibility to influence which we have already shown to be inseparable from created power, would inevitably run to excess, disorder and depravity, unless graciously counteracted by the direct agency of God, infusing into the soul higher principles of true holiness and righteousness. Thus whenever God puts forth any positive influence in the human soul, holiness is the result. When he withholds or withdraws that influence, sin ensues. His concern in the production of sin, is not that of production, but of non-prevention. As darkness does not come from the sun, but from the absence of the sun. In one sense indeed, God is creator of all things, he is a cause *sine qua non* of sin, and this must be conceded in every system of divinity. In the same sense a father is the cause of the sins of his children, or a law-giver of all the violations of his laws. But to be a cause of sin in this sense, none will contend, is to be its author, or in any manner tainted with it. So as God has power to prevent it, but sees fit for most wise ends not to prevent it, and in this sense, appoints and decrees its existence, he is a negative cause, but not an author or creator of sin.

Now President Edwards the elder, whenever he found it necessary to combat the objection under consideration, made this his grand defence, that sin proceeds not from any positive agency of God, but from a "defective or privative

cause," and thus vindicated his Maker's holiness. Thus he says: "It would be strange arguing, indeed, if because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them *to themselves*, and necessarily sin when he does so, and therefore their sin is not *from themselves*, but from God; and so that God must be a sinful being; as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disc and beams must needs be black."\*

But our author makes no use of this great shield, which is his father's chief reliance. His constant reply to the arguments of Dr. West on this point is, that they apply with equal force to the divine infliction of pain, calamity, and other natural evils upon men. Thus he meets the objection, that "if God so order things that sin will certainly follow, he is the cause of sin, and therefore is sinful himself,"† by saying, "if this argument be good, God is the subject of pain, sickness and death, since he is the cause of them." This is his constant retort throughout the chapter, by which he parries all the blows of his antagonists on this subject. We give one more example. Dr. West is represented as arguing, that "if God had so disposed events, that sin certainly follows, it is his work; and to be opposed to sin is to be opposed to God's work, and so to be opposed to God."‡ Dr. Edwards rejoins, "So calamity is the work of God, and to be opposed to that, is to be opposed to God's work, and to be opposed to God. And will Dr. West admit that every one who wishes to escape any calamity, is in a criminal manner opposing God?" In remarking on an assertion of Dr. Hopkins, that "moral evil and holiness are equally the consequence of the divine disposal, but whether by the same mode of operation he could not tell,"§ he simply vindicates it against the exceptions of Dr. West, without calling it in question himself. He formally repudiates his father's great weapon of defence on this subject, viz. that sin results not from the exertion, but from the negation of divine influence in the following terms. "It may be added that through darkness a mere nonentity may take place in the withdrawal of light; yet malice, envy and inordinate self-love,

\* Edwards's Works, New York Edition, vol. ii. p. 251. See also the same idea more completely developed in his treatise on Original Sin, in the same volume, pp. 532-8, which we have not room to quote.

† Edwards's Works, Vol. i. pp. 441-2.

‡ p. 450.

§ p. 457.

positive acts of the mind, will no more take place in consequence of the mere withdrawal of influence, than benevolence or supreme love to God."\* He vindicates the assertion of Dr. Hopkins, that "if God be the origin or cause of moral evil, this is so far from imputing moral evil to him, or supposing that there is any thing of moral evil in him, that it necessarily supposes the contrary."†

His great argument to show that God's purity is unsullied in the causation of sin, is the same by which he is justified in the allotment of calamity, i. e. that he does it in order to the greatest good. He will more promote the interests of the intelligent system with it, than without it.

But the question arises, have he and Dr. Hopkins really improved upon the theology of President Edwards and the old Calvinists, in making God an efficient cause of moral evil, and vindicating him therein on the same grounds on which they vindicate the infliction of natural evil? We think not, and for the following reasons.

1. That which shows that the infliction of pain or calamity is consistent with the highest moral purity and goodness, does not prove that the intentional causing, inducing or impelling of men to sin, is consistent with perfect holiness. A father may inflict much pain upon his children for their profit, but may he purposely incite or allow them to sin, that good may come in this way? Although a moral being may not only without impurity, but in consequence of his purity, inflict much suffering, yet can he exert an active and direct agency in diffusing wickedness, without contracting any taint therefrom? If a surgeon may inflict excruciating pangs for the benefit of his patient, may he therefore induce him to do evil, that good may come?

2. The natural evil inflicted on moral agents is the punishment of their sin. If it were otherwise, how could we justify the ways of God to man? How then can that which proves this consistent with the equity of God, prove the efficient causation of sin, consistent with his purity?

3. Although the Hopkinsians say, that God causes sin as a means of the highest good, and therefore, that this instead of being a stain upon his perfections, evinces the largest benevolence, yet this only reveals another crudity of their scheme, which is, that all moral perfection in God and crea-

\* p. 463.

† p. 457.

tures, consists in benevolence. This answer, therefore may satisfy themselves; but it satisfies no others. This resolving of all moral attributes into benevolence, seems to us one of the most groundless and inexplicable of all errors. We do not see what could have been the original temptation thus to disorder all our primary and intuitive moral perceptions. Under an affectation of simplicity, it throws into confusion and perplexity, all our first and surest intuitions. Under the pretext of doing "the greatest good," it tends in its ultimate consequences to corrupt morality at the core. To declare one just, is not to declare him benevolent, and to declare him benevolent is not to declare him just. This will ever be so, while language is a vehicle of thought; for the ideas conveyed by these respective terms are radically different. On this scheme, what defect attaches to his moral character, who does evil that good may come? Even the trite maxim, "be just before you are generous," impeaches this dogma. We happen to know a glaring case of the consistent exemplification of the principle that all moral excellence consists in doing the greatest good. An officer of a Christian church is now imprisoned awaiting his trial for forgery. The reason he assigns, for perpetrating his crime is, that he could not otherwise avoid failing in business, and loading religion with discredit! Those who know him, believe that he was really and honestly influenced by that consideration! This system is only a form of placing the morality of an action, not in its nature but its consequences, which in our opinion is the bane of morals. Indeed, Dr. Edwards formally maintains, in an essay on this subject, that "the foundation of moral obligation is happiness to the intellectual system."\* To say that God is very benevolent in producing sin, is no answer to the objection that he is the author of sin, and that his holiness is thereby impeached.

4. It is difficult on this scheme to see why men are not as much indebted to God for sin as for holiness. Dr. Hopkins, as already quoted, cannot tell whether or not they are "produced by the same mode of operation." Dr. Edwards has a sermon entitled "God the author of all good volitions and actions," from Phil. ii. 13.† It is a purely metaphysical discussion about liberty, contingency, &c. After a careful examination of it, while we find it abun-

\* Vol. ii. p. 541.

† Vol. ii. pp. 348-60.

dantly urged that all volitions, evil as well as good, are caused by extraneous influence, we cannot find any distinction intimated, in regard to the modes in which they are respectively produced. Nor have we noticed such a distinction in any of his writings. We think no follower of his, would imbibe the notion of such a distinction from his works. And we think so clear headed a reasoner, would not have failed to lay great stress upon it, if he had held it, when he wrote so much on topics that are so greatly affected by it. At all events, rejecting as he did, the idea of a privative origin of sin, and attributing it to the divine efficiency, we see not what remains, but that most revolting feature of the systems of Hopkins and Emmons, that we are as much indebted to God for sin as holiness! a thought that shocks every Christian heart, and is absolutely monstrous and intolerable. It follows, moreover, that God is not more the special cause of holiness than of sin, and there is no special grace in conversion, only as God makes some holy, while he makes others sinful. When this system became matured in the hands of Emmons, so that its deformities were no longer obscured, but glaringly paraded in bold relief, and in the fearless assertion that God was the author of all sinful as well as holy exercises, and that the soul itself was but a chain of these exercises, it was too much to be long endured. Men could not long be held to the belief that God was the author of all sin. They, therefore, retained that part, which confines all moral character to exercises, but they renounced that part which attributes them to the divine efficiency, and held that men were the authors of their own exercises, evil and good alike. This is about the substance of what has been current for some time past under the title of New Divinity. It has been the habit of this class of divines to acknowledge their obligations to Dr. Emmons, for a clew to their discoveries. A noted one among them is reported to have said to him, well we agree "that all moral character consists in exercises." "Yes" replied the Doctor, "but we differ as to where they come from." It has been shrewdly observed, that "Taylorism is Emmonsism with the divine efficiency part cut off."

But from all the foregoing objections, and others that might be urged, the views of President Edwards the elder are exempt. Simply to permit or not hinder sin, when good and holy ends are to be answered by not interposing

to prevent it, argues no moral defilement in God or man, and no way makes them the authors of sin.

Taking our leave of this treatise, we find remaining in the first volume, a treatise on the language of an Indian tribe, which he had learned in youth, and which is worthy of its author; also, "Remarks on the improvements made in theology by his father, President Edwards," which themselves would furnish fruitful matter for an entire article, but we are now obliged to pass without further notice—with some smaller pieces. But we must hasten from them to the second volume, which is filled with sermons of various merit, and short pieces on theological subjects which he contributed to the magazines of his day. What we wish chiefly to notice is the three sermons on the Atonement, which in magnitude rank next after the two works we have already noticed, and in the influence they have exerted on New England theology, probably equal or surpass them. His biographer observes concerning these sermons, that they "may perhaps be said to have laid the foundation of the views on that subject now generally held by the evangelical divines of New England." We have often heard the same opinion expressed by those who are best qualified to judge. This fact renders the peculiarities which mark them, of great interest and importance.

In the introduction, he represents himself, and many others as being puzzled with a difficulty, which he thus states: "If we be in the literal sense forgiven in consequence of a redemption, we are forgiven on account of the price of redemption previously paid. How then can we truly be said to be *forgiven*; a word which implies the exercise of *grace*? And especially how can we be said to be forgiven according to the *riches of grace*? This is at least a seeming inconsistency. If our forgiveness be purchased, and the price of it be already paid, it seems to be a matter of debt, and not of grace." By this difficulty, he states, that some have been led into Socinianism, and he himself has always regarded it as one of the gordian knots of theology. In these discourses he attempts to disentangle it.

In pursuance of this endeavour, he admits and contends for the Socinian notion, that if Christ paid the price of the sinner's redemption, and discharged the demands of divine justice and law against him, then forgiveness is not a matter of grace, but of strict justice. The plain answer to this is, that the discharge of the sinner's dues by Christ, is

not of his own, but of God's procuring, so that in the gift and proffer of it to the sinner, it is a matter of pure grace towards him. Just as if a king, should make his son with his own consent, a substitute for rebels against his throne in the endurance of punishment, and on this ground should proffer pardon to them: would not this be an act of mingled justice and grace? Against the sufficiency of this answer he strenuously contends.\* He then proceeds to argue, that no debt was due from us to God, and consequently none was paid by Christ. He asserts† that the terms *redemption, ransom, bought with a price*, applied in the scripture, to the atonement, "are metaphysical expressions, and therefore not literally and exactly true. We had not deprived God of his property; we had not robbed the treasury of heaven. God was possessed of as much property after the fall as before; the universe and the fulness thereof still remained his. Therefore, when Christ made satisfaction for us, he *refunded* no property." Again, "We neither owed money to the Deity, nor did Christ pay any on our behalf. His atonement is not a payment of our debt."‡

It is painful to witness the motley mixture of weakness and strength, which a great mind always displays in maintaining a bad cause. Who ever supposed, or maintained, that sin had taken from God money, or any species of material or commercial property, or that Christ restored it? What then? Is there no other sort of indebtedness, no obligation to render to God any thing besides commercial values? Do not children *owe* obedience to their parents? Do not beneficiaries *owe* gratitude to their benefactors? Does not the criminal *owe* to the law which he has injured a compensating punishment? Do not men *owe* to God all love, homage, and devotion, and failing to yield them, do they not *owe*, are they not under obligation to endure the just penalty of their offence? And may not Christ, as their substitute, endure this penalty for them, and thus discharge the debt they owe to the divine justice? Is, in short, "property," in Dr. Edwards's sense, the only thing that men can owe to God? And if the words *redemption, ransom, &c.*, imply not the payment of money, does it hence follow, that they imply the payment of nothing? We like the remark of some old divine in regard to scrip-

\* Vol. ii. pp. 25-26.

† p. 26.

‡ p. 30.

tural metaphors: viz. that the Holy Spirit unquestionably uses those terms in conveying truth to us, which are most fitted to give us a just conception of it. We are surprised that Dr. Edwards should have undertaken to refute a doctrine, which many of the best divines have maintained, by imputing to them, and then demolishing, a fiction of his own, which nobody holds. We see not, but that by undermining the foundation of his reasoning we likewise overturn the superstructure he has reared upon it; and with it those horrible caricatures constructed upon it, entitled "Commercial views of the atonement," which have been so much admired by certain divines.

Dr. E. makes justice of three kinds,\* 1. "*Commutative* justice respects property and matters of commerce solely, and secures to every man his own property." 2. "*Distributive* justice. . . . To treat a man justly in this sense, is to treat him according to his personal character or conduct." 3. "*General or public* justice comprehends all moral goodness. . . . To practice justice in this sense, is to practice agreeably to the dictates of general benevolence." Here we see justice and benevolence again made identical. How true is it, that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump?

Now he says,† "it is only the third kind of justice before mentioned that is *satisfied* by Christ." As to the first which relates solely to property, it of course has nothing to do with the subject. "Nor is *distributive* justice satisfied. If it were, there would indeed be no more grace in the discharge of the sinner, than there is in the discharge of a criminal, when he hath endured the full punishment, to which according to law he had been condemned." He says, moreover,‡ "With regard to the *third* kind of justice, as this is improperly called justice, as it comprehends all moral goodness, it is not at all opposed to *grace*; but comprehends that as well as every other virtue, as truth, faithfulness, meekness, forgiveness, patience, prudence, temperance, fortitude, etc." He says,§ that the word *just* is used in this sense in Rom. iii. 26. Now the simple, naked result of all this, after evolving it from all the circumlocutions in which it is expressed, is that Christ suffered to satisfy not God's justice, but his benevolence; and that in strict propriety of speech, the above verse should read—To declare

\* Vol. ii. p. 29. † p. 47. ‡ p. 30. § p. 33.

his *benevolence*, that he might be *benevolent*, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus. Comment is superfluous. The way in which such language strikes the ear of the humble, experimental believer in God's words, is enough to determine its merits. But yet how obvious a corollary is it, from that scheme which resolves all the attributes of God into benevolence. Still, in this respect, he had grown wiser than his teacher. For Dr. Hopkins did not drive his metaphysic plough through the atonement. He says, "that by the death, the blood of Christ, full atonement is made for sin; the curse of the law is executed on the Redeemer, by which he has bought, redeemed his people from the curse, and opened the way for their pardon and complete redemption."\*

It is not difficult therefore to account for the following observation, which we find in a recent pamphlet: "In sentiment, he (Dr. Edwards) was, in general, a *Calvinist*, in particular, a '*Hopkinsian*'; indeed the founder of the Hopkinsian school, more, perhaps, than Hopkins himself. He made very decided *improvements* in Calvinism; and ranked himself among the New Divinity men, rather than among Calvinists. He was, so far as I can learn, the first to state and defend those more rational and philosophical views of the *Atonement*, which are now generally adopted through New England, and by a large part of the Presbyterian Church in the United States."†

In the sermons on the Atonement, on which we have animadverted, many important truths which are maintained by all evangelical divines on this subject, are ably defended. So far forth they are valuable. But we believe we have shown in the preceding extracts, that fundamental deviation from the Reformed doctrine on this subject, which he originated, and which, according to the testimony of friends and foes, has ruled in New England theology ever since. All other peculiarities of opinion in these discourses, are derivatives from this, and stand or fall with it. We are constrained to add, that aside from this radical obliquity of opinion, the whole development of the subject is more after the "rational and philosophical" than the scriptural method, and rather leads the famished soul into an arid waste of soulless and lifeless metaphysics, than in the green pastures

\* Works, Boston Edition, vol. i. p. 475.

† *History of the North Church in New Haven*. By S. W. S. Dutton. pp. 73—4.

which feed the soul with the simple, tender, foodful, vivifying statements of inspiration, the words which are "spirit and life."

And now we ask, *cui bono?* If we try this system by its fruits, what can be said in its behalf? If it has been the New England doctrine of the atonement, has the preaching of Christ and him crucified, been the *forte* of New England preachers, the department in which they have shown their greatest strength, and appeared with pre-eminent advantage? Or is it not rather a fact confessed and deplored that whatever may be the characteristic merits of their ordinary preaching, it is far from being affluent and powerful, in unfolding the person, work, offices, and glory of Christ, and that great article, *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*, of justification by faith alone? For ourselves, and we speak not without some opportunities of knowledge, we are obliged to say, that this is not the field in which they have most excelled. Of mighty and ponderous discourses on election, decrees, sovereignty, special grace, repentance, moral agency, moral and natural ability, there has been no lack. But there has been too great a poverty and leanness in that which is above all, *the way, the truth, and the life, the power of God, and the wisdom of God unto salvation.* The defect is as great as the barrenness of Edwards the younger, in comparison with Edwards the elder, or old Dr. Owen in their exhibitions of this fontal truth of the gospel.

We should be glad to submit some observations on other sermons and pieces in this volume, but we are admonished that we have already outrun our limits. As a matter of historical interest in regard to a question now agitated, it may be stated, that in one sermon preached before the ministers of Connecticut, by their request, in 1792, he strenuously argued that the marriage of a deceased wife's sister was unlawful. The attentive reader can scarcely avoid observing, that whenever he touches any doctrine of the gospel, and upon doctrine he spent his force, in ordinary discourses, he is exceedingly apt to recast what he takes from scripture, in his metaphysical mould; and in most cases, it comes out, as we think, not improved, but somewhat distorted from its naked beauty, and shorn of its original brightness. This result we regard, not as peculiar to his, but to all metaphysical preaching. The foolishness of God is wiser than men. Metaphysics indeed have their place; but preaching is not their place. They only taint and render unwholesome the

bread of life. "Not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect." Many of the sermons of Dr. Edwards are little less than metaphysical disquisitions. This we reckon among the chief causes, why his power, success and popularity as a preacher, were so far beneath his father's, and his own real intellectual stature. Of this we judge that he himself at last became satisfied. For his biographer remarks, "In the later periods of his ministry, and especially after he left New Haven, his preaching became less metaphysical and argumentative, and more experimental and tender."

We think, if we had the space, it might easily be shown that some things, which he specifies under the title of "improvements made in theology by his father," were things that his father expressly discarded and opposed. In short, there is evidence that Drs. Hopkins and Edwards were regarded by the great body of ministers in their day, as forming a separate and new party in divinity, and as making serious encroachments upon Calvinism. In the historical discourse of Mr. Dutton already alluded to, are found two extracts from an unpublished diary of Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, before Dr. Dwight, which shed much light on this subject. We should be glad to print them entire, but for want of space must refer to pp. 68, 73-4 of that discourse. From these it appears that Dr. Stiles abhorred what he calls the "new tenets" of Dr. Hopkins and others; that he styled them, "*unintelligible and shocking new points, Eureka's of New Divinity;*" that he believed in the old Calvinistic doctrines," and thought that the decay of religion, of which Dr. Hopkins complained in Newport, was owing to "Brother Hopkins's New Divinity:" and that the people "would gladly attend such preaching as Dr. Owen's or Dr. Doddridge's, or preachers of far lower abilities, provided they were *ejusdem farinae* with the first Puritan divines."

It appears further that Dr. Edwards told him, in 1777, that "there were three parties in Connecticut. . . . Arminians, who he said were a small party; the *New Divinity Gentlemen*, of whom he said he was called one, who were larger, he said, but still small; and the main body of the ministers, which he said were *Calvinistic*." These few intimations speaks volumes.

On the whole, we feel that we have been handling the writings of a great and good man. He was an original

thinker, and adroit logician, a mighty polemic, a great divine, and a devout Christian. Still, we study his writings with most satisfaction, when he is refuting some noisome heresy, that is best baffled by metaphysical ingenuity and tact. This is pre-eminently his sphere. When he passes from polemic to didactic theology, and proceeds to the positive statement and inculcation of the Christian scheme, there is an abatement of our satisfaction, as we have already intimated. We think he mars its wondrous beauty, with certain crudities of his own invention; and that even in his ordinary sermons, he was too fond of filtrating the word of life through his own metaphysics. As it is common to compare him with his father, we have no hesitation in declaring him to be in all essential respects, decidedly his father's inferior. Dr. Emmons, in one of those mystic responses, which are so much revered by his admirers, said that "the father had more *reason* than the son; but the son was a better *reasoner* than his father." This, like many of his oracular sayings, was more smart than true. As the father's mind was confessedly more prolific and brilliant; as it swept a wider compass and embosomed greater resources; as it was more profound and far-sighted, as it illuminated a greater variety of subjects, and was surer to avoid all deflections from the true orbit of evangelical doctrine; so he was the more powerful reasoner, and formidable antagonist in a controversy. If the son was seemingly more nimble and dexterous in some of his logical movements and evolutions; the father was the more sure-footed, ponderous and irresistible in his onset upon his foes. If the father sometimes seems more languid and faltering in his movements, it is only because he descries some snare or pitfall, by his masterly insight into all the aspects of the case, which it requires great caution and circumspection to shun. If it be granted that with premises equally good, the son would outstrip the father in reaching the conclusion, it must also be granted, that the father, by reason of his deeper insight, was more sure of having his premises unquestionable, and therefore his conclusions were more impregnable. And as securing the premise, is the most material part of good reasoning, the father was the greater reasoner. A still greater superiority appears in all the father's sermons, and writings on practical godliness, above those of the son. They are far more rich, scriptural, tender, moving, instructive, and nutritious; they have far more unction and spirituality;

they are less metaphysical, frigid and jejune. The father resorted to metaphysics, because he was driven to them for the refutation of error; and when he could avoid them, preferred the style and teachings of scripture, to the method of the schools. The son resorted to metaphysics, because he loved them, and his mind inclined to cast all subjects in their mould. Such is our view of the relative rank and attributes of these remarkable men.

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*Geo. W. Alexander*

ART. IV.—*The Evils of an Unsanctified Literature.*

IT has been common to speak of the books which men read, as their companions; and it is as just to infer the character of men from their reading, as from their associates. Men will be like their books, and this for a twofold reason: first, because the literary productions of a country are the fruit of its intellect and heart, and secondly, because they act with a mighty influence on society. It is therefore by no means uninteresting to the philanthropist to inquire, *What will be the reading of our posterity and countrymen, fifty years hence.* If it be pure, heathful, and fraught with wisdom, the generation will be exalted in holiness: if it be frivolous, or false, or corrupting, or godless, the generation will be perverse and abandoned. In the remarks which follow, an attempt will be made to show, that an unsanctified literature is threatened, and that it is our duty to avert so dire a calamity; for which purpose, a series of observations shall now invite attention, in such method as seems to promise due perspicuity.

I. A CHRISTIAN LITERATURE IS POSSIBLE, AND IS EARNESTLY TO BE SOUGHT. There is nothing incompatible with true religion, in the attainments of secular wisdom, or the delights of taste. The union of Science, Letters, and Art, with the revealed truth of God and the sentiments of grace, has been suggested and applauded a thousand times, until, so far as abstract statements are concerned, the topic is already hackneyed. The ever-blessed God who is the author of Nature, and the creator of our powers and susceptibili-