

THE
ALLEGED
Doctrinal Differences
OF THE
OLD AND NEW SCHOOL
EXAMINED,
BY AN OLD DISCIPLE.



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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following is an emended and abridged edition of a tract, entitled, *The alledged reasons for the act of excision and consequent division of the Presbyterian Church, examined by An Old Disciple.*

One reason for issuing this edition is, that the former one has so many typographical errors. Another is, that since the former edition went to press, Dr. Judd's History of the Division of the Presbyterian Church has come to hand. Finding that he has gone over much of the ground which I had traversed in relation to that Division, I have concluded to omit it in this edition. And another reason is, that new editions of "Old and New Theology," by Dr. Jas. Wood, and "Old and New School," by Dr. N. L. Rice, have been recently published; and that some additional remarks in relation to them seem to be needed.

INTRODUCTION.

MANY a religious controversy is prosecuted needlessly. On this subject much wisdom might be learned from the history of the altar "E D," as given in the 22d chapter of Joshua. After the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and the half tribe of Manasseh had aided the other tribes of Israel in subduing the Canaanites, they returned with the blessing of Joshua to the possessions allotted to them on the other side of Jordan. And on their way "they built there an altar by Jordan, a great altar to see to." But when the other tribes heard of it, they were filled with suspicion, that this was but a signal of revolt, and of rebellion against God and his people. And "the whole congregation of the children of Israel gathered themselves together at Shiloh, to go up to war against them." But previous to the commencement of hostilities, they concluded to send a deputation to the supposed offenders, to inquire why they had been acting thus. And the explanation given by the two and a half tribes showed, that it was not for the purpose of revolt, that they had reared this altar; but rather for the purpose of preventing it in after time.—Verse 24–29. This explanation satisfied their suspecting brethren; and thus a bloody war was prevented. And if in the commencement of the difficulties between the Old School and New, the like explanations had been candidly asked and given, how much evil might have been avoided. The present essay is an humble attempt to furnish the explanations that should have been long since asked and given.

Religious controversies are sometimes needful. But they are always to be deplored; and the love of them is an unlovely and unsafe propensity. Said Dr. Scott, "We must have controversies, but we must take care of our tempers." Few controversialists heed this caution as they ought. Often the contending parties "know not what spirits they are of." While they think they are "very jealous for the Lord God of hosts," their spirit is sectarian,

and their object mastery. The Lord keep the writer from such self-delusion.

When Dr. E. S. Ely was an Old School man, he wrote his "Contrast," to show that Old and New Divinity are very wide apart. And since that, I have heard him speak of his mother's saying to him, "My son, you have written a Contrast, and now I wish you would write a Harmony." Such a work was much needed *then*. But, as we have had several other Contrasts since, the Harmony is now needed more than ever. And in the absence of better hands for the work, I volunteer my own. I am anxious that this little work shall have at least one excellency, that of candor. I shall aim also to be simple and plain enough to be understood by common minds, even though it should be at the expense of my reputation as a writer.

I am aware that the enemies of the truth are now attacking it in a new and most adroit manner—not by directly denying and opposing it, but by admitting and corrupting it. The friends of truth should therefore be the more watchful, "lest Satan spoil them and others, through philosophy and vain deceit." And, if such be the policy and practice of the New School, let the Old be keen-sighted to discover, and loud in warning the community away from them. But if, on the contrary, the New School are the staunch advocates of the cardinal doctrines of revelation, then it is not only very unjust, but very unwise to denounce them as semi-infidels, and semi-Pelagians. To confound them with such errorists, pouring upon them the like maledictions, is not only doing great injustice to the former, but giving great advantage to the latter. If the Old School and New are standing on the same side of the grand line between truth and error, (as I hope to show that they are,) then, they ought not to turn their weapons upon each other, but bear down with united force upon the common enemy.

I am far from thinking that the New School have monopolized all the correctness of opinion, conduct and spirit in the Presbyterian Church. I am free to admit that some of us have been so loose and indefinite, so extravagant, (and wild, shall I say ?) in the statement of our doctrines, that taking them for a sample, it is not so strange that our Old School brethren misunderstand us.* And I doubt not that many of us (myself particularly) have been much

wanting in candor, respecting their views and conduct. I know there are faults on both sides, and they are more equally balanced, perhaps, than either side suppose. I would keep it ever in mind, that if I occupied the stand point of my Old School brethren, I should see fewer faults in them, and more in ourselves. And as it is, I see in some on my own side, a want of candor in weighing the statements of the other party, for which I feel no fellowship. Still I believe the New School (yes, and the Old School too) have in the main the right spirit, and hold the essential doctrines of the Gospel.

Such is the state of the controversy between us, that it should have more attention just now. Grievous charges have been brought against us, both of *hypocrisy* and *heresy*. And if they are true, they ought to be more fully known, and more pointedly condemned. But, if they are false, this should be more fully known, that our characters may be vindicated, and the obstruction to our usefulness may be removed.

Dr. William D. Smith, in his *Dialogues of a Minister and Convert*, holds the following language :

Minister. "That which is called 'New Divinity' is not the system of doctrine taught in our standards, with points of difference only. *It is entirely a different system*, one principal feature of which is, that it dishonors God, and exalts man; which you know is the reverse of the Calvinistic system, taught in our standards."

* Dr. J. Wood, in his late and enlarged edition of "Old and New Theology," gives us, pp 224-8, an account of certain observations made in the Auburn Convention of 1837, and to himself individually, as proof of the "Prevalence of Error" in the New School. This proof I consider very lame in several respects. In the first place, it is doubtful whether he infallibly understood the meaning of these New School brethren; for nothing is more common than for disputants to misunderstand each other. In the next place, it is doubtful whether he could recollect their language for sixteen years so as to report it exactly. And though his report were exact, it is more than doubtful whether the observations reported express the views of the New School correctly. According to the Doctor's own showing, those who made the remarks mistook the meaning of the Confession of Faith, thinking it taught the identity of Adam with his posterity, or transfer of his sin to them; while he and I believe it teaches no such thing. And as to the statements of others respecting the prevalence of errors as given pp. 229-31 it is doubtful whether they are infallibly correct; and whether some of those who made them were not *then at heart*, and are now *by connection*, Old School men.

Convert. "But do they not receive and adopt the Confession of Faith?"

Minister. "As a body, they receive and adopt it, in a certain way; that is, they adopt it so far as they believe it, which is little better than mockery. In that way we may receive the Turkish Koran. It says there is a God, and it inculcates some moral duties; and so far, any one could adopt it. Indeed, I do not know of any system that might not be adopted in this way. Others pretend to adopt it as a whole, but reserve the privilege of explaining it so as to accord with their own views.—They either make it mean nothing at all, or something the very reverse of its obvious sense.—As a body, they have most pernicious errors fostered among them."—pp. 193-4.

These are grave charges, and ought to be examined. Is it indeed true, that we are holding a *system* entirely different from the one taught in our standards—one that dishonors God and exalts man? Is it indeed true, that we adopt the Confession of Faith in a way that is little better than mockery? a way in which we might adopt the Koran? Do we explain it in a way which makes it mean nothing at all, or something the very reverse of its obvious meaning? Do we as a body have most pernicious errors fostered among us? If so, it ought to be more widely known, that all men may abhor and avoid us.

But other and perhaps severer charges are brought against us by Dr. J. C. Lord. In his Introduction to Mr. Cheeseman's *Doctrinal Differences between Old and New School Presbyterians*, he says: "With strange, yet characteristic inconsistency, they (the New School) caricature the doctrines of grace, and of the Confession of Faith, as though they embodied all that is inconsistent and perverse and monstrous." Yet if their conduct is so shockingly profane, why have they not encountered the universal remonstrance of the evangelical world? But Dr. Lord continues:

"Could it be made to appear to that large and respectable body of members of the Presbyterian Church, who, though sound in the faith, yet remain in the New School connection, that the principles for which the General Assembly (Old School) contended, and in defence of which they intended to bear testimony in the excision act of 1837, are the same maintained by Paul the apostle against the

gainsayers of his day, the same afterwards defended in the fifth century by Augustine against Pelagius, and the same which were revived by Luther, and with which as with a battle-axe he smote the gates of the great apostacy, they would not and could not give support and countenance and comfort to the enemies of the truth, by remaining one hour within the ecclesiastical walls of the New School General Assembly."—pp. 7, 8.

And just so I think. Only make it evident that the New School are holding those same grand errors which Paul and Augustine and Luther opposed, and the New School would *forsake itself*. But the marvel is, that Dr. Lord and his associates do not furnish the adequate evidence. And the mystery is the greater as he adds, "If there be anything clear, which may be *determined beyond a doubt*, it is that the theological contest between the Reformers, and the Romanists in the sixteenth century, is the same now waged between the Old and New School Presbyterians. No intelligent reader can peruse the controversy between Luther and Dr. Eck, the champion of the papist, without perceiving this. No degree of prejudice or blindness can conceal the fact. It is written as with sunbeams—it is graven as with the point of a diamond in the face of a rock. The doctrines maintained by all the reformed Churches have been rejected by them (the New School) for the theological tenets of the papacy. Nothing can be demonstrated by history, if D'Aubigne's account of the Reformation does not establish this."—p. 8.

But how happens it that what is "so clear" as to be "beyond all doubt," is disbelieved by so many, viz: that the contest between the Reformers and the Romanists is precisely the present contest between the New and Old School Presbyterians? *Many* "intelligent readers" *have* "perused the controversy without perceiving this." How is it, then, that they have failed to do what the Doctor tells us they *cannot* fail to do? Is it through prejudice? Oh, no; for he tells us, "No degree of prejudice or blindness can conceal the fact." And yet I doubt whether *any* have perceived it, except himself. Nor is it the less strange, that it took him so many years to find it out. So groundless and preposterous are these allegations, that it would seem at first thought, they would need no refutation. And yet we know that many honest, yet su-

perfidious minds, are apt to believe what is so confidently asserted, though ever so unsupported.

Allegations in other forms are brought against us by Mr. Cheeseman. He says, "The new divinity being a most glaring and wide departure from the ancient faith, is undoubtedly an *apostacy*, not a progress."—p. 167. "The new divinity, then, is *another gospel*, an apostacy from the faith."—p. 172. "Take for example these differences which separate Old from New School Presbyterians. One believes, that Christ endured the penalty of the law; another, that he did not. One, that he obeyed for his people; the other, that he obeyed for himself. One, that his righteousness is imputed to believers; the other, that it is not, but the act of faith is imputed. One that his faith receives the righteousness of Christ; the other that Christ needs it for himself. One, that regeneration is the act of God; the other, that it is the act of man. One, that it is a change of nature; the other, that it is a change of purpose. One, that man can do nothing of himself; the other, that he can do all that is required of him."—pp. 206–7. Charges so severe as these ought at least to be examined.

Can the charges now quoted from these three authors be true? Are New School men such barefaced and impious hypocrites as to subscribe solemnly to the Presbyterian standards, while they believe not the fundamental doctrines which they contain? And do they hold the foul doctrines thus alledged? If so, let it be proved and proclaimed to all evangelical Churches in our land, till there shall come back from them one united remonstrance, solemn and loud, "as the sound of many waters."

But what if these allegations are *not* true? Should New School men pass them by in silence? Yes, perhaps they should, if they themselves are the only ones concerned. But what if their characters, activity and influence are important to the world at large? If they are *not* what the Old School *declare* them to be, but *are* what they *profess* to be, then they constitute an important part of that "light of the world" by which is to be dissipated "the darkness" which "covers the earth"—that light, by which the saving influences of the Gospel are to shine into the hearts of sinners. It is therefore important that their light should not be obscured by the mists and clouds of foul aspersion. If they are

what they profess to be, they constitute no small part of that "salt of the earth" through the means of which the world is to be saved from moral putrefaction and final perdition. It is important, therefore, that "its savor" should not be impaired by false imputations. Yes, if they are what they profess to be, they form one grand division of that army of "the Lord of Hosts" by which the kingdoms of this world are to be subdued to the dominion of "the Prince of Peace." It is important, therefore, that no groundless charges should be left to impede their march, or to paralyze their power. That the influence and efforts of the New School have been very much crippled by such as the foregoing allegations, I verily believe. And believing as verily that they are *false*, I must think it their *right* not only, but their duty to *prove* them false.

Of the first of the authors now noticed I would say the less, as he has gone to his account. But as his book still lives, I must say at least that he must have been very ignorant of New School views, or as an honest man he could not have published what he did. Of the second I would say, that after all I have known of his propensity to random and extravagant utterances, I was not prepared to find him a man of such "strange," not to say such "characteristic inconsistency" as to "caricature" the views of the New School (so lately his own) "as if they embodied all that is inconsistent, perverse, and monstrous." And of the last author quoted I must say, I have seldom found in the same compass so much slander and sophistry.

What these authors have said against us would not have done us much injury, if they had not been endorsed by certain organs and individuals of high standing among our Old School brethren. It is these recommendations that has given, and is still giving them consequence and currency.

When the first edition of my tract appeared, an Old School editor remarked, "It is but little credit to any man to be found digging up the bones of this effete controversy, and trying to galvanize them into life, and clothing them with flesh and bones." But though the controversy were dead, it was not buried. For the Old School have been all the while plying their batteries upon it, by circulating the books above quoted, and by other means. Especially has the Board of Publication been doing so, by the

publication of books and tracts upon this controversy. Of late, too, has it issued an enlarged edition of Dr. Wood's "Old and New Theology." And since then, Dr. Rice has published a second edition of his "Old and New School." As, then, there are continued and increasing efforts made on the part of our accusers, is there not occasion on our part to speak again and more loudly in our own vindication?

The "History of the Division of the Presbyterian Church" is very brief and general in its remarks respecting the *doctrinal* differences between Old School and New. And the subject demands a more minute and extended investigation. For it is these alledged differences on which our excising brethren are now pretending to lay the greatest stress. Will not the reader be the more patient and attentive, then, while I attempt to examine them?

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL REMARKS.

OUR Old School brethren bring against us two general and grave charges. One is that of *hypocrisy*, in subscribing to the Presbyterian standards, while we do not believe the fundamental doctrines which they contain. The other is in *holding gross and pernicious errors*. Let us see, then, whether these charges are well founded.

On the first of these charges it may help us in settling the question, to inquire as to the general character of those against whom it is made. As described by their accusers, they would seem to be a set of sly and crafty, deceitful and designing men, that could not be trusted in the ordinary affairs of life. And do the New School stand out before the eyes of a discerning public in such a light? Let a candid community judge, whether they are not as open and honest, as transparent and straight-forward, as any corresponding portion of the Old School? And if they are, it is passing strange, that just so soon as they pass from secular to sacred concerns, they as a body should become signally evasive and double-dealing, lying, not only to man, but unto God. Can it be, that they are so base and impious, as to labor so much to impose themselves upon others as orthodox, while conscious of being heterodox! Can our accusers themselves believe it? If they do, why are they so anxious to "absorb" such heretics? I might ask, why they have been so ready to receive those who could not bring clean papers from us? Does not the principle prevail practically among them, that all a New School man needs to make him orthodox, is to change his connection? If examination is had at all on receiving them, is it not, with few exceptions, merely for the sake of form? But a

more serious question is, how they can allow their members to come over to us *uncensured*, if we are so hypocritical and heretical! I hope, however, the honesty of New School men will be yet more evident on inquiring, *whether they actually hold the errors which the Old School impute to them!*

It is often and boldly asserted, that many of our views are at war with our standards. But I am much mistaken, if we do not find, on full examination, that those moderate men who make up the most important portion, both of the Old School and New, are *substantially* agreed on all the *essential* doctrines of the Gospel. Where they do disagree, it will be found, I think, that it is not in regard to any fact or faith that is vital to the Calvinistic system; but in regard only to some theory or mode of expression which philosophy has associated with such doctrines. And such in both Schools can conscientiously subscribe to the Presbyterian standards.

The doctrines of our Church are all contained in the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms. The Confession contains 171 sections, the Larger Catechism 196, and the Shorter Catechism 107 questions and answers; making in all 474 paragraphs. And there are only 13, or 14 at most, of all these, on which Old and New School men, as such, are not confessedly agreed. Nor are there *so* many points of doctrine on which they disagree. Hetherington, in his history of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, says, (p. 258,) "They aimed to have no propositions in the Catechisms, that were not in the Confession." And though the sections of the Confession in which we seem to come in collision are seven or eight, the doctrines to which they relate are only four or five.

I do not mean that these are all the points on which Presbyterians disagree. I mean they are all the points on which they are divided into Old School and New. There are many other things in our standards in which we differ. But on these the two Schools are not more divided against each other, than they are among themselves. Some, I fear, are found in both Schools who deny Total Depravity. Regeneration by the Holy Spirit, Divine Sovereignty, Election, Saints' Perseverance, and Infant Baptism. Others in

both Schools disbelieve what is said in the Confession, chap. 23, sec 2, on *war*; and chap. 24, sec. 3, 4 and 6 on *marriage* and *divorce*: and more disbelieve what it says, chap. 18, on *Full assurance of hope*. Some may be found in both Schools who think the Confession teaches, chap. 10, sec. 3, that some of those who die in infancy are lost; while others think it teaches no such thing—both of whom believe, at all events, that *none* who die in infancy are lost. Probably some in both Schools believe in “the *eternal generation* of the Son of God;” while the most in both disbelieve it. Some believe that the *divine* nature of Christ suffered, when he made atonement for sin; while the great mass of both Schools believe the contrary. Some, perhaps, may believe, with myself, that Effectual Calling and Adoption should not be considered as separate and distinct acts of grace—that the former is included in Regeneration, marking more particularly the *mode* and *means* of it, while the latter is included in Justification and Sanctification; as the former *admits* the sinner to the *privileges* of the sons of God, while the other *fits* him to *enjoy* them. We disagree about these things, (and probably many others that are taught in the Confession,) and seem to do it by common consent; none expecting that we shall be perfectly agreed as to everything taught in our standards. Why, then, should some of our brethren talk so sneeringly about our subscribing these standards as “a system of doctrines,” without being understood to believe every jot and tittle of what they contain? They themselves do the very thing which they blame in us. True, the things above mentioned are not essential to our Calvinistic system. But in regard to the fundamental doctrines themselves, there are many forms and phases which nothing but a speculative philosophy has adventitiously attached to them. And there are many accidents and relations, which though intimately connected with these doctrines, make nevertheless no portion of their essence. These, then, should be distinguished from what is essential. And so have said some of our Old School brethren. See Biblical Repertory, Vol. 2, New Series, p. 252. And Dr. Green has told us that they received old Hopkinsians cordially, because the latter *differed from them only in non-essentials*. See Dr. Beman’s Review, pp. 21, 22. But old

Hopkinsianism used to be "the height and front" of New School offending. We should, therefore, rejoice that our Old School brethren have lately become so candid and liberal, as to acknowledge those to be essentially sound, whom they once regarded as grievous heretics. But if they can fellowship "old Hopkinsians," I see not why they cannot fellowship the great mass of New School men. For I hope to show, that if the errors of the former are non-essential, so are those of the latter.

Those who adopted our standards for the use of the American Church were far from being unanimous in their views. And we are accordingly informed that, "When adopted by the Presbyterian Church in this country, it was with the distinct understanding, that the mode of subscription did not imply strict uniformity of views. And from that time to this, there has been an open and avowed diversity of opinion on many points among those who adopt the Confession of Faith, without leading to suspicion of insincerity or dishonesty. It is clearly impossible, that any considerable number of men can be brought to conform so exactly in their views, as to be able to adopt such an extended formula of doctrine precisely in the same sense."—Biblical Repertory, Vol. 3, pp. 521–3.

In accordance with this was the Adoption Act of 1729. It is as follows: "And we do also agree that all the Presbyteries within our bounds shall always take care not to admit any candidate of the ministry into the exercise of the sacred functions, but what declares his agreement in opinion of all the *essential* and necessary articles of said Confession; and in case any minister of this Synod, or any candidate of the ministry, shall have any scruples with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechism, he shall, at the time of his making his declaration, declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge his scruples or mistakes to be only about articles *not essential* or necessary in doctrine, worship or government. And the Synod do solemnly agree that none of us will traduce or use any opprobrious terms of those who differ from us in these *extra essential* and not necessary points of doctrine;

but treat them with the same friendship, kindness and brotherly love, as if they had not differed from us in such sentiments.”—Records of the Presbyterian Church, p. 92.

Collision in doctrine and practice occasioned a division of the Synod in 1741, which was healed in 1759: both parties agreeing to adopt the Confession and Catechisms according to the proviso and pledge of 1729. And as this agreement has never been annulled, it is still in force. But we shall see in the course of our investigations, how little it has been regarded by those who have excinded us, and by those who charge us with dishonesty in subscribing to the Presbyterian standards. We shall see, too, whether in our interpretations of these standards we exceed the indulgence which, according to the above agreement, should be allowed to all: or rather, whether we have not kept within the probable meaning of these standards, and whether we have not, therefore, taken less liberty of interpretation than it allows us.

Yet one of the prominent charges of the Old School against us is, that we presume to *interpret* these standards in our own way. Are they aware how bold is their assumption in denying us this right? “What,” say they, “you interpret? That privilege belongs to us alone.” They must not be surprised, then, if we answer them somewhat as a king of the forest answered the king of England who offered to let the Indian monarch kiss his hand. “Ugh,” said he, “I king too.” They may reply, perhaps, “These standards speak for themselves, and they speak *only* as *we* believe.” But that is a thing to be *proved*—not assumed. If it appear on investigation that yours is the only tenable interpretation, we yield—not otherwise. All other language (even that of Scripture) is capable of different constructions. And are not our standards subject to the same? If they are, why may not all be allowed to judge what is their most probable meaning, and to give their reasons for so judging?

Dr. N. S. Rice tells us (Old and New Schools, p. 13) that the “New School were the first to declare the existence of important doctrinal differences in the Presbyterian Church.” He ascribes this declaration to Dr. Beman, as made in 1823. But as early as 1821, there came up to General Assembly from Tennessee (I think) a complaint,

numerously subscribed, against certain New School men in that region. And even as early as 1816, the Synod of Philadelphia made a similar complaint. See Judd's History of the Division, pp. 10, 91.

At one time, the Old School drew up sixteen charges of error against us. See Minutes, pp. 468, 9. But of these sixteen charges, the Princeton Review of Oct., 1834, said: "We have not the least idea that one-tenth of the ministers of the Presbyterian Church would deliberately countenance and sustain the errors specified above." And I think that few would now charge us with more than four errors of doctrine. These are in respect to Imputation, Original Sin, The Nature and Extent of the Atonement and Human Ability. It is true that Drs. Rice and Wood still insist that we deny the Need of Regeneration, or hold that a change of heart is a *gradual* work. But I deem it enough to meet such a charge with a direct denial. The authors whom they quote on this charge are but little read, less understood, and still less adopted by the New School at large. While the authors most extensively read and approved by us, directly assert the doctrine of instantaneous regeneration by the Spirit of God.

It is true, that *some* in both Schools take ultra views of the four doctrines now to be examined—views not only wide apart from each other, but (as I think) wide apart from the truth. But there are also *medium* views, in which I am confident by far the greater and more intelligent part of both Schools can cordially unite. For I verily believe that a large share of men on both sides misapprehend the views of the party opposed to them. What I mean is, that the Old School generally believe the *ultra* New School views to be held by *all* the New School, while they are held only by a few of them: and on the other hand, the New School generally believe the *ultra* Old School views to be held by *all* the Old School, while they are held only by a few of them. In entertaining these misapprehensions, both parties may be alike culpable. And I for one am willing that my own party should assume a full moiety of the blame. For I believe their error is in misunderstanding the views of the Old School, rather than in holding doctrines essentially different from them.

We will now examine these mooted doctrines separately.

CHAPTER II.

IMPUTATION.

THIS doctrine includes both the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and the Imputation of Christ's righteousness to the redeemed. The former of these will have our chief attention; for I believe it is the only portion of this doctrine which the New School are suspected of rejecting. And the other portion will be sufficiently noticed incidentally.

According to the *ultra* views of our Old School brethren, the sin of Adam in partaking of the forbidden fruit is either by *personal identity*, or otherwise so *transferred* to his posterity, as to become *literally theirs*; that is, that God *literally blames* them for his sin, as much as if they had been actually present, and had shared in the will and the work of plucking the forbidden fruit; and that he actually threatens to *literally* punish them for it, irrespective of their own personal sins; in other words, that Adam's sin is *theirs* in such a sense that they should feel remorse, and exercise repentance in regard to it.

But in my opinion this view is held by few of our Old School brethren. Dr. Wood denies transfer.—“Old and New Theology,” p. 50. And Dr. Rice rejects personal identity.—“The Old and New Schools,” p. 21. So did the Princeton professors.—Theological Essays, p. 136. And some accuse us of willfully misrepresenting them in ascribing this *ultra* view to them. Dr. Willis Lord, in his treatise called “The Federal Character of Adam, and the Imputation of his Sin,” a tract published and endorsed by the Old School Board of Publication, says, “The personal identity of Adam and his race is a *theory exploded*. Indeed, it is questionable, if ever it existed, except in the prolific fancy of theological caricaturists.”—pp. 10, 11. And I suppose Rev. Dr. J. C. Lord intended to bring the

same charge against us, in saying in language already quoted, "They caricature the doctrines of the Confession of Faith, as though they embodied all that is inconsistent and monstrous." But if their lordships would read what Prof. Park has quoted (in *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1851, pp. 611-614) from their Old School authors, they could not think it strange, that their brethren are supposed to hold this inconsistent and monstrous notion. Yet I for one rejoice that our Old School brethren are now repudiating these ultra views of imputation. And I am the more willing to bear the charge of misrepresenting them, as this charge shows them the more firmly united with us in abhorring and opposing this literal, ultra view of imputation.

And among our New School brethren also there are ultra views on this subject. Some of them deny that Adam *is in any sense* the head and representative of his race; or insist at least that the race are *in no sense sinful* in consequence of his original transgression. But I think the number of such is small. And some of my brethren are unwilling to believe there are *any* such among us. Yet to say the least of it, there are those among us who believe the doctrine of imputation, as held by the Old School, consists in charging personal demerit on the posterity of Adam on account of *his* sin; and who, in opposing *such* a view of imputation, have used such language as has led many of the Old School honestly to believe that they deny the headship of Adam altogether. And yet, if this denial were charged upon them, they would probably say the charge is false.

But between these ultra and opposite views there is, I believe, a *medium* one, in which nearly all in both Schools could in the main most cordially unite. The view is this: God constituted Adam the Federal Head and Representative of his posterity, with the purpose that, if *he* continued obedient, *they* should all be born with such a holy disposition as would secure their obedience on earth, and thus their blessedness in heaven: *but*, that if *he* fell, *they* should be born with such propensity to sin, that their first moral exercises and actions would *certainly*, though not

*necessarily** be unholy. And as he *did* fall, imputation consists in accounting and declaring his posterity to have sinned and fallen with him, (not literally but metaphorically, and representatively,) because they all eventually sin in consequence of the native depravity which they receive through him. In this view the race is said "to sin and to be doomed in him," because *his* sin decided the question as to *their* sin and ruin.

Concerning this view of imputation, three questions demand attention :

I. IS IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SYSTEM OF DIVINE TRUTH?

II. IS IT ONE IN WHICH THE MAIN PORTION OF BOTH SCHOOLS CAN CONCUR?

III. IS IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LANGUAGE OF OUR STANDARDS?

I. Is it in accordance with the system of Divine truth? The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity is the *opposite of justification* through Christ's righteousness. This we see in the use which Paul makes of the language of David in Ps. 32: 2. "Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity." In allusion to this the apostle says, "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that *justifieth* the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. Even as David describeth the blessedness of that man unto whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not *impute* sin."—Rom. 4: 5–8. According to this passage, not to impute sin, is the same as to justify through the righteousness of Christ. The imputation of sin, then, is the *opposite* of justification. And, as we distinguish justification that is *literal* and *legal* from that which is *metaphorical* and *evangelical*: so we must distinguish respecting its opposite, *imputation*. Now as the imputation of Adam's sin is the opposite of *evangelical* justification, it cannot be a literal, legal imputation, but must be a figurative, Gospel one. And so says

* This distinction between *certain* and *necessary* was taught by Luther.—Milnor, Vol. 5, chap. 12, sec. 2. And also by Dr. Alexander.—Moral Science. And by the editors of Bib. Repertory, Vol. 17, p 638.

Tuckey, one of the framers of the Confession of Faith. "We are righteous through Christ *in the same manner* as we are counted guilty through Adam." *Prælectiones* p. 234. Turretin also says, "We are constituted sinners in Adam *the same way* that we are constituted righteous in Christ."—See Hodge on Rom. Princeton Essays, pp. 136, 142, 144.

Now, to justify sinners is not literally to *make* them just. That were impossible. Neither is it to *declare* them just. That would be asserting a falsehood. But it is purposing to treat them (for Christ's sake) as if they were just. In other words, it is releasing them from their liability to punishment. It was in this meaning of the term that Shimei said to David, (2 Sam. 19: 19,) "Let not my lord *impute* iniquity unto me, neither do thou remember that which thy servant did perversely." In asking David not to *impute* his iniquity, he simply asked him *not to punish it*. And if *not* to impute is to *release* from punishment, then, *to impute* is to *make liable* to punishment. So says Dr. Rice, "To impute sin is to punish it; not to impute, is to pardon."—Old and New Schools, p. 21. And so says Owen, p. 460.

Here, then, we have the figurative sense in which God is said in the Bible to impute the sin of Adam to his posterity. It is *making them liable to the same suffering with him*. And we think it evident that *the way* in which he makes them thus liable is in bringing them into the world with that corrupt propensity, through which they will *certainly, yet voluntarily, and without necessity*, commit sin; and thereby will become deserving of the death denounced upon Adam. And this accords with Calvin. He says: "Paul ascribes our ruin to him (Adam) because *his sin* is the cause of *our sin*."

Imputation, like many other things in the Bible is expressed elliptically, and by *way of anticipation*. By anticipation men are said to have fallen, and to have been condemned in Adam. Thus the entire result of man's ruin is spoken of as having taken place already; while a great share of those to whom this result is eventually to reach, are not yet born. "Death," says the apostle, *passed upon all men, for that all have sinned*."—Rom. 5:

12. "If one (Christ) died for all, then *were* all dead."—2 Cor. 5: 14. And thus the race is said, by way of anticipation, both to sin and die in Adam, not only before they have really sinned, but before they were born.

The Scriptures nowhere directly assert the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. The passage most relied upon as teaching it, has just been quoted. "So death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned," translating the last clause, *in whom* (Adam) *all have sinned*. But this translation is at most doubtful. Calvin, Hill, Hodge, and many others give it up. Yet it is not a point worth contending. The more important question is, How, or *in what sense* did we sin and fall in Adam? Several passages of Scripture will give us light on this question.

Said Paul, (Heb. 7: 9, 10,) "Levi also who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham, for he was in the loins of his father, when Melchisedec met him." By Levi, Paul meant the Levitical priesthood; and declared them to be in the loins of their great progenitor, when returning from the rescue of Lot, he met this king of Salem, and paid tithes to him. But neither philosophy nor common sense allow us to interpret this language literally. It is, therefore, metaphorical, and means only that this act of Abraham in paying tithes to Melchisedec, affected the standing of the tribe of Levi, showing it inferior to *him*, and therefore inferior to Christ, who is "a priest forever after the order or standing of Melchisedec."—Ps. 110: 4. Now as it is the same apostle using the same metaphor here and in Rom. 5: 12, he must have used them in the same sense. If, then, he did mean to say that all men sinned in Adam, he must have only meant to be understood, that Adam's sin grievously affected the condition of his posterity.

The charge of Christ against the Scribes and Pharisees, as found in Mat. 23: 35, will afford us further illustration. He says, "That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel, unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom *ye slew* between the temple and the altar." In these words Christ declares plainly, that the blood of all the martyrs, from Abel to Zacharias, would be imputed

to the Jews then living. Not only so, but he imputes to them most positively the murder of the latter, although he was slain long before their birth, so that they could in no sense have been the abettors of his death. There may be imputation, then, without covenanted headship. For none will say, that those who slew Zacharias and other prophets before him were the appointed representatives of those to whom Christ spoke. In this case it rests on the ground of *likeness* or *imitation*. Christ charges the murder of the prophets upon the Jews to whom he spoke, because they breathed the like spirit, and pursued the like course with those who did actually shed their blood. This will be evident to all who will read the context from the 29th to the 36th verse. And may not the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity rest upon the same ground—on the ground not only of representation, but also of imitation? Are not Adam's posterity anticipately charged with his sin, because they will feel and act as he did, and will deserve therefore the same doom?

A still further illustration of this doctrine may be derived from Paul's words to Philemon, (verse 18,) "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account." In Greek, "*impute* that to me." Surely, Paul did not mean that Philemon should hold him to blame for the wrong which Onesimus had done him, or as bound *in justice* to pay what Onesimus owed him. But more of this passage hereafter.

Our Old School brethren are fond of supporting the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, by its analogy to that of Christ's righteousness. And their argument is conclusive. But suppose we carry the analogy a little farther than they do. Suppose we say, As the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer does not make him *deserving* of life, so the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity does not make them deserving of death. Again: As the imputation of Christ's righteousness is no benefit to the elect, till they put forth some voluntary exercise, the exercise of faith; so the imputation of Adam's sin is no injury to the sinner, till he puts forth some voluntary evil exercise. For, if imputation in the former case is conditioned on voluntary exercise, why not in the latter? Paul's words,

Rom. 5 : 15, 20, favors this position, as in both cases of imputation he speaks as if it had taken place, while it is yet to come. He says, "For, if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, *hath* abounded unto many. Moreover the law entered, that grace might abound: but where sin *abounded*, grace *did* much more abound." Thus it appears, I hope, that the present view of this doctrine is in accordance with the system of Divine truth. Our next inquiry is,

II. Whether this view of imputation is one in which the main portion of the Old and New School can substantially concur? It would seem as if the great body of the Old School must adopt it; for they repudiate the ultra views of *personal identity, transfer*, and all such participation of the demerit of Adam's sin as would call for *repentance* and *remorse*. A few quotations will now be given from standard publications to show the doubting ones among my New School brethren that the Old School do really adopt this medium view.*

In an article ascribed to the Professors of Princeton, (already alluded to,) we read as follows: "What we deny, therefore, is that this doctrine (of imputation) involves *any mysterious union with Adam*, and any confusion of identity with his, so that his act was properly and *personally our act*; and secondly, that the *moral turpitude of that sin was so transferred* from him to us. We deny

* In the position that I have taken I suppose I am between two fires. I expect opposition from both Schools. Numbers in the New School will insist, I fear, that the Old, as a body, are more ultra than I represent them. They are too slow, I think, in believing the Old School really hold the medium views which they often avow. But although they err in this respect, I think there is some apology for them. Many of them are doubtless as ignorant of the real views of the Old, as the Old are of those of the New. And I think they are the more excusable on account of the contradictory statements of Old School authors. I think our Old School brethren would not condemn us so severely for insisting that they hold to ultra imputation, if they duly considered the strong expressions of some of their approved authors. They speak of the imputation of Adam's sin very frequently as "just"—"most just"—"by the just judgment of God"—that not only the "punishment," but "the guilt and fault of it" (Adam's sin) is passed over to us—that it is "imputed most *deservedly*"—"that it is the *meritorious* cause of our condemnation"—that "the *fault* and *guilt*, together with the resulting *punishment*, are transferred unto his posterity"—that all our race were *literally* in Adam, and

the *possibility* of such a *transfer*.”—Princeton Theological Essays, p. 136.

Dr. Hodge says, that in the writings of the old divines the sin of Adam “is never said to be in us truly sin, (vere peccatum) “that the phrases, we sinned in Adam,” “were sinners in him,” “were ill deserving, have “demerit,” etc., do not denote “moral pollution,” or “moral turpitude.” He says, “We were in Adam as Levi was in Abraham. Was this literally?”—Biblical Repository, Vol. 7, p. 436.

In his Commentary on Rom. 5: 12–21, he says, “The doctrine of imputation is clearly taught in this passage. The doctrine does not include the idea of a mysterious *identity* of Adam and his sin, nor that of a *transfer* of the moral turpitude of his sin to his descendants. It does not teach that his offence was personally and properly the sin of all men, or that it was in any mysterious sense the act of his posterity. The sin of Adam, therefore, is no ground to us of remorse.”—p. 135. And in the Biblical Repertory he tells us the only sense in which we should repent of Adam’s sin is “on the principle that a child is humbled at the misconduct of a father.”—Vol. 7, pp. 460, 461.

Of this doctrine, Dr. Rice says, “The meaning is not, that there was between them and him such a personal identity as that they really committed the same act, which is grossly absurd.”—Old and New School, p. 21. And

literally sinned in him—that “original sin includes these three deadly evils, the actual fault, the legal guilt or penalty of death, and the depravation or deformity of nature; that *in the mass* they (the posterity of Adam) committed the *same* sin, and therefore it is imputed to all.”—Bibliotheca Sacra of 1851, pp. 611–614.

Twisse says, “Original sin which the children of Adam contract is a *punishment* of the actual sin committed by the same man.” Augustine says, “Original sin is *inflicted* upon us for *avenging* and punishing the first sin.” Boston says, “The want of original righteousness is sin—and it is a punishment for sin, and so justly inflicted of God.”—pp. 629, 630. Dr. Rice says that *in the eye of the law* Adam’s sin is ours.—Old and New School, p. 41. And the editors of the Biblical Repertory say, “For ourselves we are free to confess, that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being *penal* inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative.”—Vol. 6, p. 465. And in the same connection they complain of others for regarding “that as a matter of sovereignty which *we* regard as a matter of justice.”

Dr. James Wood says, "Who does maintain this opinion?" viz: "that Adam's sin involved his posterity in its consequences, on the principle that his sin is literally accounted their sin."—Old and New Theology, p. 49. Again he says, "The transfer of the moral turpitude of Adam's sin is no part of the doctrine [of atonement] as held by its advocates."—p. 50.

Says Dr. Boardman, (who is now a Professor in Princeton Seminary,) in his treatise on Original Sin and Imputation, "When our standards say that the posterity of Adam sinned in him, and fell with him in his transgression, they do not mean, that all mankind constituted one moral person in Adam, so that his sin was actually and personally the sin of each of his descendants."—p. 44. "Again, as this doctrine implies no personal oneness between Adam and his race, neither does it involve any *transfer* of his moral character or acts to them. The criminality of my act can never become another man's. So the criminality of Adam's could not pass over to his posterity."—p. 43.

Here is enough to convince us, it would seem, that the Old School do not believe in an Imputation that makes the sin of Adam *ours* by way of personal *identity* with him, by *transfer* or in *any other* way implying that its *criminality* is *ours*, or in such a sense that we should feel either *godly sorrow* or *remorse* for it. Then cannot the Old and New School fully concur in the medium view of this doctrine? Perhaps they cannot. Perhaps there is a narrow neck of "debateable ground" across which we cannot reach to shake hands. Of this, however, I am willingly doubtful. For I know not that I fully understand the position of my Old School brethren on this point. Having denied that Adam's sin is the sin of his posterity, either by *identity* or *transfer* or in any way that would require repentance or remorse, yet do they attempt to foist it upon them by a form of *judicial trial* and punishment? Do they mean to say, God judicially and deservedly condemns and punishes mankind for Adam's sin? and that, too, irrespective and independent of their own conduct? If they do, I see not how we can

harmonize on this point. Neither how they can harmonize *with themselves*.

Dr. Hodge has just told us, "The sin of Adam is no ground to us of remorse;" and that the only way in which we can repent of it is "on the principle that a child is humbled and grieved at the misconduct of a father"—grieved at it, as his calamity, *not as his crime*. And how can I deserve literal *punishment* for that for which I need not feel compunction of conscience or godly sorrow? Dr. Wood has told us, the *moral turpitude* of Adam's sin is not transferred to us. And how can I be punished while free from the turpitude of sin? Dr. Rice has told us such a transfer would be grossly absurd. And Dr. Boardman has told us, that the criminality of Adam's act, could not pass over to his posterity. And how can I be justly punished while free from crime? For, as Lightfoot, one of the framers of the Confession says, "Punishment argues a fault or *crime* preceding."—Lightfoot's Works, p. 22.

Dr. Hodge seems to deny positively that men are punished for Adam's sin. He says, "It is no part of the apostle's doctrine, that eternal misery is inflicted on any man for the sin of Adam, irrespective of his inherent depravity, or actual transgression."—Notes on Rom. 5: 12–21, p. 135. And yet the editors of the Biblical Repertory (of which Dr. H. is one) appear to have avowed this very doctrine. They say, "For ourselves, we are free to confess, that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we *bow submissively* at the thought of their being *penal* inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative."—Vol. 6, p. 465. The two opinions last stated appear to me to be in perfect conflict. And I meet the same incompatible opinions in the Old School authors; while it seems that those who hold the one, must renounce the other. Which of them, then, is held by the mass of our Old School brethren? I prefer to believe it is the *former*. I do so, because so many of their standard writers so often and so positively *avow* it; and because I am unwilling to believe they would maintain an opinion so preposterous as the contrary one. I

think their moral sense must revolt at the thought that God *judicially* condemns and punishes as a *crime*, that which calls neither for remorse nor repentance.

Here I may be asked, "Why then have our Old School brethren positively asserted that we are *judicially* condemned for Adam's sin, if they do not believe it?" To this I reply, they may have made the assertion *incautiously*, under the pressure of circumstances, as a means of relief from a certain difficulty. But I hope they use the terms *just*, *judgment*, *condemnation*, *punishment* and *guilt*, (as they must, to be consistent with themselves,) in a modified, metaphorical sense—that by *just*, they mean *fit*, *meet*, or *suitable*: as Cranmer did, when burning at the stake, he held his right hand first in the flame, because, as he said, it was *just*, that the hand which had signed his recantation should be the first to suffer: and as Paul said, (Rom. 15 : 27,) that the Gentiles were debtors to the Jews. Then the terms *judgment* and *condemnation* must be used in a sense corresponding with the *punishment* resulting from them; which "punishment," the Biblical Repertory tells us, (Vol. 6, p. 441,] "as connected with imputation is not used in its most strict and rigid meaning, and does not imply any *moral demerit* in us." And then, the term *guilt* must mean a liability to *that* kind of punishment, which does not imply any "moral demerit," or criminality. Such an interpretation removes the apparent self-contradictions of our Old School brethren. And I am the more willing it should do so, as it removes the chief, if not the only hindrance to our agreement with them, on the doctrine of imputation.

All that is meant by our Old School brethren in saying we suffer on account of Adam's sin, is on the ground of what is aptly called "Social Liabilities." These have been treated on at considerable length by Dr. Bishop, late President of Miami University. He says, "These liabilities may be classed under two general heads, viz: Natural and Positive. The son inherits a diseased or a healthy body, and in many cases also an intellectual or a moral character; and generation after generation sustains the character of their ancestors by what may be called a natural influence. Like produces and constitutes like. But

in commercial and political transactions, lasting and important liabilities are created and continued by positive arrangements.

In all cases of social liabilities, the *individual* and the *representative* are always *distinct*. Nor is it in most cases a very difficult thing to have a clear and distinct conception of the two distinct responsibilities. Every citizen of these United States who thinks at all, must feel that himself and children are deeply interested in the conduct and character of the President of the United States for the time being. But yet no man ever thought of attributing to himself or to his children the personal wisdom or intellect, ability or inflexible integrity which has marked the character of any distinguished executive officer; nor on the other hand, has he ever thought of being charged individually, or of having his children charged individually with the weakness or wickedness of a bad executive officer. His children and his neighbors and their children feel and acknowledge, that they are personally and deeply involved in the consequences of the official acts of these men, whether those consequences are of beneficial or of hurtful tendency; but at the same time, the individual, and the personal *merit* and *demerit*, and individual and personal *responsibility* are clearly understood; and never for a moment merged in social and representative transactions."—Quoted by Dr. L. Beecher, *Views of Theology*.

In the light of these remarks it is most evident, that while by the imputation of Adam's sin we suffer most sadly, still we are not chargeable with the criminality of that sin; and therefore cannot literally be condemned and punished *judicially* for it.

Our Old School brethren condemn Albert Barnes for trying to illustrate imputation by "social liabilities," or by "representative relations," as Dr. Boardman calls them. But their own writers do the same. Says Dr. W. Lord, "But this principle [of imputation] pervades the whole constitution of domestic and civil society. The father is the legal representative of his children, during their minority, and this not by previous or subsequent election, but always without and often against it, by the laws of nature, of society, and of God. In certain cases he can

bind them, not only temporarily, but forever. All civil government is, to a greater or less extent, representative; the many are responsible for the act of one. What multitudes have no part, and cannot have, in the election of that government, who yet are subject to its authority, and in their proportion responsible for its acts."—Federal Character of Adam, p. 11. All this is true. But what does it prove? Not that the son is *blame-worthy* for the sin of his father, or the subject for the crime of his ruler. What would be thought of arraigning and trying, condemning and punishing a man for the iniquity of his father or ruler? Would there be any bounds to the indignation which such a case would excite?

In his tract already mentioned, Dr. Boardman has cited several facts from the Bible for the purpose of illustrating this doctrine. He quotes Deut. 32 : 25, and Ezek. 9 : 6, in which children are said to be slain on account of the wickedness of their parents. Likewise Joshua 7 : 24, 25, in which for the sin of Achan, his sons and daughters were said to be put to death. He also quotes Numbers 16 : 27, 32, in which their wives, sons and little children were said to be destroyed on account of the sin of Korah, Dathan and Abiram. Likewise 1 Sam. 15 : 2, 3, in which God is said to command Saul to slay the Amalekites, old and young, because their forefathers distressed the Israelites. And what do all these cases prove? Not that the persons who suffered thus were personally to *blame* for the sins which *occasioned* their sufferings; much less that they suffered by a *judicial* condemnation. Nothing like it. Nor do they prove that these persons did not deserve all that they suffered on account of their *own* sins. If they prove anything to the point, it is that God may inflict sufferings on us for some *other* reason than our connection with the sin of Adam—that he may do it on the principle of "social liabilities."

The difficulty of reconciling the justice of God with the sufferings of the innocent, is not at all obviated by giving them a *judicial* aspect. To suppose that we are judicially condemned and punished for Adam's sin, is loading rather than relieving the difficulty. I am, therefore, the more surprised at the declaration before quoted from the

Biblical Repertory, Vol. 6, p. 465: "For ourselves we are free to confess, that we instinctively shrink from the idea that God in mere sovereignty inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being *penal* inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative." Nor am I less surprised to find in the same connection a complaint, that we "call that a matter of sovereignty" which they, the editors, "call a matter of justice." Do they mean that what it would be *wrong* for God to do as a Sovereign, it would be *right* for him to do as a Judge? In other words, that the *injustice* of punishing mankind for a sin which they never committed, is *transubstantiated into righteousness* by the formality of a *judicial* trial?

Though imputation do consist in the infliction of suffering upon us on account of Adam's sin, what is the use of giving them a judicial aspect or form? Why not refer them at once to the sovereignty of God? for at any rate they must be ultimately referred to it. If, as some Old School authors contend, Adam was appointed of God to be our representative, and to stand trial for us as well as himself, and that on account of this *appointment* we become responsible for his sin, it is purely a *Sovereign* arrangement. So said Calvin. Asking why it was made, he answers, "Because it seemed good to Jehovah."—Cal. Inst., b. 3, chap. 23, sec. 7. Yet, if God did thus stake our destiny upon the conduct of Adam, what effect has that divine act upon the principles of eternal justice? Why not rest the act of imputation upon the inscrutable sovereignty, and the inherent righteousness of God, assuredly believing it must be right because he has done it, although we cannot see distinctly how it can be right? Why not say in regard to *this* as Christ said in regard to another instance of mysterious sovereignty, "Even so Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight?"

It is certainly difficult to discover the justice of God in literally punishing men (whether as a sovereign or a judge) unless it be for their own moral turpitude. And those who maintain the doctrine must be more orthodox than the father of Presbyterianism. Said Calvin, "Some contend our ruin to be connected in such a manner with

the sin of Adam, that we perish not from any fault of our own, but merely because our first father had as it were sinned for us. Paul, however, expressly affirms that sin is propagated to all who suffer punishment on its account." —Comment on Rom. 5: 12. Again he says, "Lest any should arrogate to himself innocence, he (the apostle) adds, that each one is condemned because he is a sinner." —Rom. 5: 15.

The Professors of Princeton, Dr. Boardman and others, admit that in its theological use, "guilt" signifies *exposure* or "liability to punishment;" and by consequence that God imputes the sin of Adam to his posterity, by making them liable to the punishment which his sin deserved. The main question is then, *How*, or *by what means* does he make them thus liable? And we think he does it by bringing them into the world with that "corrupted nature" which makes it *certain* (though not necessary) that their first exercises and actions will be sinful. So Calvin seems to have thought, for he says, "Paul ascribes our ruin to him, (Adam,) because his sin is the cause of our sin." This punishment may therefore be viewed in two aspects. Considered in anticipation, it is metaphorical and unmerited. But, considered as a recompense for eventual sin, it is literal and deserved; because the evil exercise or action resulting from depravity is voluntary.

These views of imputation, as expressed by Dr. Leonard Wood, late theological professor of Andover, would be adopted, I believe, by a great share of the Old School and New. I give them at length.

"If I am asked whether I hold the doctrine of imputation, my reply will depend upon the meaning you give to the word. Just make the question definite by substituting the definition for the word, and the answer will be easy. Do you mean what Stapfer and Edwards and many others mean, viz: that for God to give Adam a posterity like himself, is one and the same thing as to impute sin to them? Then my answer is, that God did in this sense impute Adam's sin to his posterity. This is the very thing implied in the doctrine of native depravity. By the doctrine of imputation, do you mean that Adam's sin was the occasion of our ruin? and that it was the distant, but

real cause of our condemnation and death? I consider the doctrine thus understood to be according to Scripture. Do you mean that we are guilty, (that is, according to the true original import of the word) exposed to suffering on account of Adam's sin? In this view, too, I think the doctrine scriptural. Do you mean that God visits the iniquity of our common father upon his children through all generations? This, too, accords with truth. But if the doctrine of imputation means that Adam's posterity are literally and personally chargeable with his sin, and that God inflicts the penalty of the law upon them for his offence alone, they themselves being in all respects sinless, then the doctrine in my view wants proof. There appears to me to be no place for such a doctrine, seeing all of Adam's posterity are in fact morally depraved. And if they are so, I know not why any one should think God has no reference to their depravity in the sufferings which he brings upon them. The apostle does not use the word impute in relation to the subject; but he teaches in the plainest manner, that the fall spread depravity and destruction through the whole human race. The particular word which shall be used to express this doctrine is not essential; and as the sacred writers do not express it by *imputation*, we should not be over strenuous for that particular word. Nevertheless, as it is the name which is generally given to the doctrine in orthodox creeds and systems of divinity, and as the word is used in an analogous sense in Rom. 4: 6, I can see no reason for rejecting it. Properly explained, it is well adapted to the subject. Were it not, we can hardly account for it, that Calvin and Edwards and all the most distinguished orthodox divines have used it."—Wood's Works, Vol. 2, pp. 351–2.

Perhaps many of our Old School brethren will be more ready to concur in the views of imputation now maintained, than to believe that the New School will concur in them. But I shall be able to show by quotations from their own authors, that they hold these views cordially.

Dr. James P. Wilson, of Philadelphia, was regarded in his day as decidedly a New School man; and yet he is quoted by Dr. Boardman, in his work on Imputation, (already noticed,) as holding this doctrine. The quotation is

as follows: "He constituted the first man a representative of his race. 'Let us make man'—the race is one. To be fruitful and multiply, and fill and subdue the earth, were directed to the race. 'In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.' He did die, spiritually; he lost his innocence; he became a subject of guilt, shame and fear; and all his posterity inherit the fallen nature. Being already cursed, when afterwards arraigned and sentenced it was only necessary to curse his enjoyments in the world. His posterity was included, for they are subject to the same afflictions and death."—pp. 76, 77.

Dr. Bishop is also a New School man. And what we have quoted from him on the subject of "Social Liabilities," shows him to have adopted the present view of imputation.

Dr. Lyman Beecher adopts it, for he quotes with approbation the following from Dr. Hodge: "Reason, Scripture and experience therefore all concur in support of this common doctrine of the Christian world, that the race fell in Adam, lost their original rectitude, and became prone to evil, as the sparks fly upward."—*Views of Theology*, p. 168. In his own language, he said, "Social, representative liability, and a just desert of punishment in that sense, is a possibility and a reality; but social and personal demerit are quite different things."—p. 171. The judgment was by one man to condemnation; i. e., the sin of one man and one single act of sin subjected his posterity to a depraved nature as the consequence."—p. 175. Next he quotes with approbation the foregoing extract from Dr. Bishop on "Social Liabilities." And then the following from Turretin: "Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not the former, for we are treating of a sin committed by Adam. The ground of this imputation is the union between Adam and his posterity."—p. 185.

Rev. Albert Barnes, the successor, of Dr. J. P. Wilson, is also a full believer in this view of imputation. I know that Drs. Wood, Rice and others have quoted largely from him to prove that he rejects the doctrine. But all that their quotations prove is, that he rejects the *ultra* views of it. Dr. Wood, in his *Old and New Theology*, (p. 196,) has quoted from Mr. Barnes' Introduction to Butler's

Analogy, where he opposes the notion that God might at pleasure and by an arbitrary decree make *crime* pass from one individual to another; that he holds men to be personally *answerable* and *actually punished* for a sin committed by another.* What Mr. Barnes here opposes is, simply the notion, that Adam's sin is *literally* accounted the sin of his posterity. And does Dr. W. believe this doctrine himself? If he does, why does he ask (p. 49) "Who does maintain this opinion?" If he does *not* believe it, why does he censure Mr. B. for not believing it?

In his "Old and New Schools" Dr. Rice quotes (pp. 22-5) several passages from Mr. Barnes to prove that he denies the doctrine of imputation. But the truth is that Mr. Barnes mistakes the nature of this doctrine as held by the main portion of the Old School. He supposes them to hold the ultra view of *identity*, *transfer*, and *personal demerit*. And it is *this view alone*, which he opposes in the passages quoted. The fact is that Dr. Rice and his brother Barnes are substantially agreed on this point without knowing it.† Dr. R. lays his chief stress upon Mr. B's declarations (quoted p. 25) that "The Bible does not teach that they [Adam's posterity] acted in him, or by him, or that he acted for them." But Mr. B. denies here only that they acted *literally in or for* each other.—And Calvin does the same. See his comments on Rom. 5: 12, before quoted. And does Dr. R. hold that Adam's *posterity acted literally in him, or by him*, or that he acted for them? If he does, he holds, (contrary to his own assertion) to *identity*, *transfer*, and our *personal demerit*, on account of the sin of Adam.

The following quotations from Mr. Barnes' Notes on Rom. 5, will show, that while he rejects *ultra* imputation, he fully believes in that *medium* view of it, which is main-

* Dr. W. thinks all that is needed to prove the heterodoxy of the above quotation is to say, that Unitarians consider it *sound* and *lucid*. And it is perfectly sufficient, if it has been fully ascertained that *everything* is heterodox which they pronounce "sound and lucid," not otherwise. Did Dr. W. think it would be? Or did he only aim at the "odium theologicum?" The like is often practised upon us. But is it either logical or generous?

† They disagree *only* as to whether Adam acted as our representative by *covenant* or *law*!

tained in this tract. "The sin of Adam was of such a nature in the relation which he stood, as to affect all his race"—pp 125,6. "Adam was the head of the race, he was the fountain of being, and *human nature was so far tried in him*, that it may be said, he was on trial, *not for himself alone, but for his posterity*, inasmuch as his fall would involve them in ruin. Many have chosen to call this a *covenant*, and to speak of him as a federal head, and if the above account is the idea involved in the terms, the explanation is not exceptionable. As the word covenant, however, is not applied to the transaction in the Bible, and as it is liable to be misunderstood, others prefer to speak of it as a *law* given to Adam, and as a *divine constitution* under which he was placed. His posterity are, in consequence of this, subject to the same train of ills, as *if they had been personally the transgressors*. Not that they are personally ill deserving or criminal for his sin. God reckons things as they are, and not falsely, as his imputations are all according to truth. He regards Adam as standing at the head of the race; and regards and treats his posterity, as coming into the world, subject to pain and death, and depravity, as a consequence of sin. This is the Scripture view of imputation"—p. 128.

That Dr. Skinner holds to the headship of Adam, and thus to imputation, will be doubted by none who will read his sermon, entitled, "Man a Fallen Being," pp. 9, 14, *et al.*

Dr. Rice tells us, p. 24, that the New School party in the Gen. Assembly of 1836 declared, "Mr. Barnes nowhere denies, much less 'sneers' at the idea that Adam was the covenant and the federal head of his posterity. On the contrary, though he employs not these terms, he does, in other language, teach the same truths which are taught in this phraseology." Thus in asserting the orthodoxy of Mr. Barnes on this doctrine, *they prove their own*. And in 1837 this party of the Gen. Assembly drew up a formula of their view of the doctrines taught in our standards, and the same was afterwards unanimously adopted by the Auburn Convention. And on this point they said: "By divine constitution Adam was the head and representative of the race, and that as a consequence of his transgression all mankind became morally corrupt, and liable to death, temporal

and eternal." And again "The sin of Adam is not imputed to his posterity in the sense of a literal transfer of personal qualities, acts and demerit; but by reason of the sin of Adam, in his peculiar relation, the race are treated, as if they had sinned."

Here I would hope is ample evidence that the New School are holding to the present view of imputation, and thus that the Old School and New are, on this point, nearly, if not entirely, harmonious. The only remaining question respecting it is,

3. Whether the view now taken is in accordance with our Confession and Catechisms? Does it agree with the language of these standards, fairly interpreted? If so, I trust it will be acknowledged, that thus far at least we are "honest" in avowing them as the symbols of our faith.

Chap. 6, and sec. 3, of the Confession, and answer 16th of the Shorter Catechism, contain the only language, I believe, which can be suspected of conflicting with our present views of imputation. The former reads thus: "They" [our first parents] "being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin" [partaking of the forbidden fruit] "was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature, conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."

What is here said to be imputed? The guilt of Adam's sin. And what is this *guilt*? Several authors, Old School as well as New, have told us it is "liability to punishment." And Dr. Boardman says in respect to this very article, "But does not the Confession say, that the guilt of his sin is imputed to his posterity? It does. But the word "guilt" means, in its constant theological usage, not moral turpitude, or criminality, but *liability to punishment*. In this sense the old writers frequently speak of the Savior as "guilty of our sins," meaning merely, that he was *liable to the penalty of the law* on account of our sins; not by any means, that the pollution or ill desert of our sin was transferred to him." p. 43.

What is it then to *impute* this "guilt," or *liability to punishment*? We saw in the former part of this chapter, that imputation is the opposite of justification. And as the latter *removes* the liability to punishment, the former

must *impose* it. To *impute* the guilt of Adam's sin to his posterity is, then, to make them liable to suffer its penalty. And how is this done? It is, as we have heretofore said, by giving them a "corrupted nature" by which they are *certain* to sin, though they sin freely, and thus deserve the same punishment that Adam did. Thus we see, that even according to the teachings of the Old School itself, our view of imputation accords with the language of this article of our Confession.

The other article on this doctrine is as follows: "The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him, in his first transgression."

Our view of imputation includes the headship, and representative character of Adam, as expressed in this article. That sovereign act by which he was thus appointed is here called a *covenant*. But some of us think this word was not well chosen, as it seems to imply the consent of the race to this arrangement. And this use of the word is not an essential point. The only thing in this article that will be thought to conflict with our view, is the expression, "sinned *in* him, and fell *with* him, in the first transgression." And this does not *really* conflict with it. We have seen that even according to Old School teachings this phraseology does not involve the idea of *identity*, *transfer*, or *personal demerit*, calling for *remorse* or *repentance*.—See the foregoing quotations from the Princeton Professors, Hodge on Rom. and Boardman on imputation.—These bring the schools so near together, that the one can as well adopt this language as the other. We suppose it means as Hodge, Rice and others say, that we sinned in Adam, as Levi paid tithes in Abraham: that is, that Adam's sin affected his posterity in the same sense that Abraham's act of paying tithes to Melchisedeck, affected the tribe of Levi, (though far more grievously.) We suppose, that mankind sinned in Adam somewhat as Christ told the Jews they had slain Zacharias, whom their forefathers had slain long before: that is, by partaking of the same spirit, and pursuing the like course. And so far as the phrase, "fell with him," "relates to the infliction

of the *penalty* of Adam's sin, we suppose it to be either on the principle of "Social Liability," or as a just desert for the actual sins resulting from native depravity.

And now let the candid reader judge, whether the construction which we of the New School give to these articles of our standards is unnatural, and constrained?—whether it is not nearly, if not exactly such, as the Old School are compelled to give? and whether therefore as regards the doctrine of *imputation*, we do not "make an honest subscription to our standards?" Let him judge, too, whether the moderate men of both schools do not *substantially* agree in their understanding of this doctrine? If they disagree at all, is it not on the unimportant questions whether Adam, as our representative, acted under *covenant*? or under a sovereign constitution? or on the question whether we are punished *directly* for Adam's sin? or *indirectly* for it? punished, that is, for sins that were occasioned by depravity derived from Adam?

I have dwelt the longer on the doctrine of imputation, not only because of its intrinsic importance, and of its bearing on other doctrines; but because, from its nature, it needed this extended examination. None of the remaining doctrines will need to detain us long.

CHAPTER III.

ORIGINAL SIN.

The term, Original Sin, is nowhere found in the word of God. And from the structure of the expression it would seem to signify the *first sin*, or that of eating the forbidden fruit: or that sin from which all other sins *originate*. But it is used in theology to signify that *native depravity* which we inherit from Adam. Original Sin is distinguished from Imputation, as the effect from the cause. Imputation is the act of God in giving the posterity of Adam a *corrupt nature*: or more properly perhaps, it is the *ground* of it: while Original Sin is the *result* of it.

On this subject also there are both ultra and medium views. I fear on the one hand there are too many in the Presbyterian Church who deny the native depravity of man. Nor are all such, in the New School connexion.—On the other hand our Old School brethren are supposed by many to hold certain very ultra views on this subject. One is, that the depravity of man is such, that he sins not only of certainty, but of *necessity*—that such is his depravity, that he cannot avoid sinning—that, as Dr. Junkin said on the second trial of Barnes, “man has no ability of *any* kind to obey God—a sentiment expressed also by Dr. Green. See “Debates on the [first] trial of Albert Barnes.—p. 66.

But this point will be more fully considered under the head of Human Ability. The question as to the *demerit* or *criminality* of man's depravity will have our first attention.

Our Old School brethren are supposed to hold that man deserves God's displeasure and wrath, not only for the voluntary exercise of depravity, but for the mere *possession* of it. But this ultra view of the doctrine is held, I hope,

by few of them. The medium view is, that depravity is *sinful* only in a qualified sense—sinful, as the Sabbath and the Sanctuary are holy, that is *in their relations*; or rather, sinful as to their tendency and effects; just as inanimate objects are said to be fearful, not because they *feel* fear, but because they *produce* it. So held Augustine. Of concupiscence he says: Though called sin, it is not so called because it is *itself* sin, but because sin is *produced* by it, just as writing is called the hand of some one, because the hand produced it.” Bibliotheca Sacra for 1851—p. 643. Concerning this view also let us inquire,

1. Whether it accords with the system of gospel truth?
 2. Whether the Old and New School can unite in it?
- and
3. Whether it accords with the language of our standards?

1. Is it in accordance with the gospel system? To believe depravity to be inherently sinful, is to make God ultimately the author of iniquity. Man did not voluntarily acquire this depravity. God put it, so to speak, within him. And as he came in possession of it passively, involuntarily, and of necessity, how can he be blameworthy for *having* it? If this depravity is itself sinful, God and not man is the author of that sinfulness. And Pictet, who is good Old School authority, says, “If the nature of man is sinful, the author of our nature is the author of sin.” Bibliotheca Sacra, 1851—p. 32. If then we would avoid this blasphemous conclusion, we must regard sin as the *result* of depravity and not as consisting in depravity itself. All that is truly *criminal* then, is the free outgoing of depravity, in exercise and action.

It is reasonable to suppose there is in the production of sin a process like that which is figuratively described by James (1: 15.) “Then, when lust is conceived, it bringeth forth sin.” This lust cannot be anything which lies back of depravity. It must be depravity itself. According to this apostle, then, it cannot be sin itself, but that which brings it forth. The *cause* must be distinct from its effect. Probably man’s first sin consists in choosing to gratify his native propensity to evil: or rather, perhaps, in not resolving to resist that propensity.

The view of Prof. Park on this point will probably satisfy many, both of the Old School and New. It is expressed as follows: "When it is said, 'sin is a transgression of the law,' the objector replies that sin lies deeper than the outward overt act. Very true, it involves the covert deep preference for a wrong outward act. But the objector adds, it lies deeper still: not in the executive volition, but in the inclination, disposition or propensity to choose wrong. Very true, it does not lie in the executive volition, but in the inclination, disposition or propensity to do wrong, provided that these words be used as they often are to denote the *generic* choice or preference, lying deeper than the specific choices." Bib. Sacra, 1851, pp. 626-7,

Some argue the sinfulness of depravity from the sufferings of infants. They assume that *all pain is penal*, and that infants suffer before they can have committed any external or internal transgression: and thence they infer that they suffer for the sin of *possessing* a corrupt nature.* But both assumptions may be doubted. It is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, that *all pain is penal*. Cannot God impose sufferings on the innocent without injustice, when it is needful to secure the greater public good; just as an affectionate, upright parent may impose, at times, more labor or self-denial on one of his sons, than would otherwise be his share, doing it because the good of the whole family requires it? Is not such extra burden often put upon the most worthy of the sons, simply because he can do the work thus assigned him better than any other? And should not that son submit most cheerfully to such extra services? And if this regal right is denied to God, how can he act, in full, as Governor of the universe, in consulting for its highest welfare? True, it cannot be right to *blame* the innocent. But may he not *afflict* them for the sake of the greater good to others? Can justice forbid what benevolence requires?

Why may not God lay suffering upon the innocent child as well as upon the innocent beast? The reply to this is,

* Some teach, (if we understand them,) that the infant is first punished for Adam's sin, by having a corrupt nature *inflicted* on him; and then he is again punished for possessing it. See Boardman, pp. 59-62. Do they, indeed, mean that he is thus doubly punished?

that such a comparison is *revolting*. But this seems to me to be a very weak reply. For wherein is the child brutified by suffering like a beast, any more than he is by having, like the lower animals, a susceptibility to pain? The last verse of the Book of Jonah shows that God regards the good of beasts as well as of babes. And is it not a censurable cruelty to inflict needless pain upon *brutes* as well as upon men?

Again, though undeserved pain be inflicted upon infants, may it not be *compensated* by a counterbalance of good dispensations? This principle of compensation seems to be recognized by Job, 12-10, where he says: "Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?" This compensation would be most emphatic to those who *die* in infancy; for they undoubtedly are taken at once to perfect bliss.

But again, death is the only suffering, I think, that can be called *the punishment of imputed sin*. And it may be doubted whether it is ever suffered, before depravity begins to be exercised. A child cannot be a subject of moral government till he is a complete moral being; that is, till he has all the faculties necessary to moral action. And when he has them, will not moral action immediately commence? Who can conceive of a complete mind, without *thought*, or of a complete heart without *moral feeling*? And just so soon as the soul acts at all, it will act wrong; in other words it will sin. *How soon* this moral action will begin, I pretend not to tell. Dr. Spring, now in the Old School connection, thinks it begins *at birth*. He says: "There is no sin in the empire of Jehovah, except this," that is, actual transgression; and that which "constitutes the human soul a sinner at the age of three score years and ten, essentially constitutes it a sinner from its birth."—Dissertation on the Nature of Depravity. So said Dr. Witherspoon: "The guilt of *all* impenitent corruption must be *personal*, because it is *voluntary* and consented to. And so said Dr. Chalmers: "Now it is very true, that we are only responsible for what is *voluntary*." Correspondence. See New York Observer, for September 15th., 1853.

I think the following, from the pen of the late Dr.

Woods of Andover, will satisfy the moderate men of both Schools on this doctrine.

“The moral nature or disposition of men, though it may be contemplated as distinct from action, mental as well as bodily; and though it is evidently pre-supposed, does not exist as such, in a manner that it can be really regarded and treated, as in fact exclusive of action. What I mean is, that there is no such thing as a moral being who is treated as a subject of retribution, while the moral nature is not in some way developed in holy, or unholy action. The very idea of a moral agent receiving retribution, implies the exercise of his moral faculties; the acting out of his disposition. That any one can, as a rational being enjoy good, or suffer evil, without moral action, is inconceivable. I say, then, there can be no such thing as reward or punishment actually dispensed to a moral being, whose moral nature is not developed in some kind of exercise. The disposition, the intelligent nature does indeed exist, and is a reality, and God is perfectly acquainted with it before it is made known in action. But it cannot be known to created beings, not even to him who is the subject of it, except as manifested by internal, or external action. It cannot in any other way, become a matter of direct consciousness; and as it cannot be known, it cannot be visibly recompensed, aside from its outgoing in action.

“But here a question arises which it is more easy to propose than to answer, to wit: What is to become of human beings who die before their nature is any way developed in action? The most proper reply to this inquiry, is to say frankly, that it is a subject which lies beyond the reach of our intelligence. Neither our own reason, nor the word of God furnishes any adequate information. All that we learn from scripture concerning a future retribution, relates to those who have acted right or wrong in a state of probation, and who are to be rewarded according to the deeds done in the body. Respecting any other retribution than this, we are left in ignorance. It cannot be doubted that those who die before they have any moral action, either holy or sinful, will exist in a future world. But they cannot, in any conceivable sense, be regarded as

moral agents who have passed through a state of trial. They cannot 'receive according to what they have done,' as by the supposition they have done nothing. None of our ordinary conceptions concerning a just retribution, can apply to them. There is a veil over the particulars of the future state except, that the word of God contains some cheering intimations, that divine grace will sanctify them, and that they will belong to the Redeemer's kingdom. I am not aware that any intelligent Christian can be found who maintains the unauthorized, appalling position, that infant children, who are not guilty of any actual sin, either outwardly or inwardly, will be doomed to misery in the world to come.—Woods' Works, Vol. 2, pp. 340-1.

I am not confident that the remarks which I have made, are exactly conformed to truth. I would only recommend them to a careful consideration. I have said, that the native disposition is not to be regarded as actually standing alone. While any one exists and continues to exist with a disposition or propensity which has not in any way been manifested in action, how can he be treated as a subject of retribution? Though his disposition be wrong, (wrong as a disposition) he must ultimately be treated according to his *actions*, they being the *true expressions of his disposition*. His being treated according to his actions, seems to amount to the same thing as being treated according to his disposition. The former is made the express rule of the divine conduct toward man, for the obvious reason, that actions are directly visible to the conscience, and can be compared with law, and so are the proper ground of recompense. In the divine government, then, disposition is treated as morally wrong, only as developed in action, and as thus made visible to those who are the subjects of that government. Government which is addressed to conscience, must be administered in this manner. If any one speaks of our natural depravity as deserving of divine displeasure, he must intend to speak of it as developed in moral action. The two views that have been taken of this subject, need not, then, be considered as opposite and clashing views. They are only different views of the same subject, contemplated under different aspects. Man, at the commencement of his existence, is, according to one view,

characterized from his *disposition*; and is regarded as sinful so soon as he is born, on account of his *invariable propensity* to sin. According to the other view, this propensity to sin is really connected with sinful emotion, and is certainly followed by it. Man, considered in one point of view, is judged according to his actions, in another point of view, according to his *disposition as developed in action*. If a disposition is pronounced to be sinful, it is pronounced to be so *relatively* to the action to which it leads. And if the action is pronounced sinful, it is relatively to the mind, and to the disposition of the mind from which it proceeds. Each is invariably related to the other. If any one regards moral qualities, as belonging to either, as though it were entirely separate from the other, he is mistaken. He does not conform to the nature of things. If any one confines his attention to either, exclusively of the other, does he not betray the want of enlargement in his habits of thinking?" pp. 342-3.

I cannot but persuade myself, that the foregoing arguments and observations are sufficient. They show, I trust, that Original Sin or depravity is not of itself blame-worthy; that it can be *sinful* only, as it *leads to sin*.

2. We are next to inquire whether this view of Original Sin is one in which the Old School and New can unite? I cannot believe that the main portion of the Old School hold the ultra view of this doctrine, and must therefore believe they hold as their only alternate, the medium view now maintained. Can they believe that all men are deserving of eternal wrath, simply because they *possess* a nature which they did not voluntarily acquire, and which they could not avoid possessing? I appeal to all the intelligent and candid of that School to say, whether they verily believe such a dogma? It could not have been the belief of Zuingli. For he says: "Original sin I call a disease, not sin, because sin is conjoined with fault. But fault arises from the transgression of one who has chosen wickedness. Our original fault is not called fault truly, but metaphorically, on account of our first parents."—Huldrici Zuingli Opera, Vol. 3, pp. 628-9.

Nor could it have been the belief of Augustine. He said: "All moral character consists in preferences; all

iniquity has, and must have its origin in the will; as far as respects us, we should always be without sin, if we were never to consent to evil." And of "concupiscence," or depravity, he has told us, "though called sin, it is not so called because it is *of itself* sin, but because sin is produced by it, just as writing is called the hand of some one, because the hand produced it." Nor can it be the belief of Dr. Hodge, if he is consistent with himself. For he says: "Though they [the standards] speak of original sin, as being first negative i. e., the loss of righteousness; and secondly, positive, or corruption of nature, yet by the latter state is to be understood, *not* the infusion of any thing of *itself evil*; but an actual tendency or disposition to evil, resulting from loss of righteousness. Notes on Romans, p. 136. According to him, then, "*sin itself*" is something distinct from "a disposition to evil," that is from depravity. And to the same amount, he quotes Bretschneider (Vol. 2, p. 30,) as follows: "It is not, however, the doctrine of the Scriptures, nor of the reformed Churches, nor of our standards, that the moral corruption of our nature, of which they speak, is any depravation of the soul, or an essential attribute or infusion of *any positive evil*."

If any reader doubts whether the leading writers of the New School hold to original sin, as now explained, he is referred to the quotations in the last chapter from Drs. Wilson, Beecher and Skinner; from Mr. Barnes and from the formula of the New School portion of the General Assembly of 1837, on the doctrine of Imputation. For, as our Old School brethren often assert, these two doctrines are so intimately connected, that they who hold to the one, must hold to the other.

But, as it is said so often and so roundly, that Mr. Barnes denies the doctrine of depravity, it may not be amiss to add a few more quotations from him. "There is something antecedent to the moral action of his posterity, and growing out of the relation which they sustain to him, which makes it certain, that they will sin as soon as they begin to act as moral agents." [What now becomes of Dr. Rice's assertion that Mr. B's position on this subject excludes the idea of a depraved nature or original sin? p. 29.] "What this something is, we may not be able to

say. But we may be certain, that it is not *physical* depravity, or any created essence of the soul, or anything which prevents the act of the sinner from being voluntary." [And so virtually says Bretschneider. Vol. 2, p. 30. Hodge's Notes on Rome, p. 136. Boardman, p. 7, and many others.] "This hereditary tendency to sin, has been usually called 'original sin,' and this, the apostle evidently teaches. As the infant comes into the world with a certainty that he will sin as soon as he becomes a moral agent, there is the same certainty that, if he were removed to eternity, he would sin there also, unless he were changed. There is need, therefore, of the blood of the *atonement*, and the *agency of the Holy Ghost*, that an infant may be saved." Notes on Romans, p. 128. [What now becomes of Dr. R's insinuation, that New School men teach that infants are saved independently of atonement and regeneration?—p. 38.] "The simple fact in regard to Adam, is that he sinned; and that such is the organization of the great society of which he was the head and father, that his sin has secured as a certain result, that all the race will be sinners also."—p. 129. [This "organization of the great society" which Dr. R. misunderstands, (p. 29,) is evidently what he, Dr. R., means by 'the *covenant* made with Adam.' And what if, as Dr. R. again says: "*Here* he says nothing of a corrupt nature," (p. 29,) since he says enough elsewhere?] "Though men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam, e. g., by being born with a *corrupt disposition*; with loss of righteousness, with subjection to pain and woe, and with exposure to eternal death, yet there is reason to believe that all those who die in infancy are, through the merits of the Lord Jesus, and by an influence which we cannot explain, changed and prepared for heaven."—p. 122. Surely, here is evidence enough that Mr. Barnes believes the doctrine of original sin, and if, as Dr. R. says, he is our acknowledged representative, here is ample evidence that the New School believe it.

I know that Mr. Barnes is accused of making contrary statements on this subject; that elsewhere he denies the doctrine of imputation, and consequently of original sin, which he here affirms. But this is a misapprehension. He denies not the *medium*, but the *ultra* view of these two

doctrines. But what if he did actually make contradictory statements respecting original sin, at one time *denying*, and at another time affirming it? Which statement does charity, which "hopeth all things," require us to judge he *truly* believes? What right have we to think he must of course hold the *wrong* view? The Old School have also their contradictions; maintaining sometimes *ultra* and sometimes *medium* views. And I, for one, believe that the fault of us, New School men is, that when they avow right views, we do not believe in charity that they are sincere. And I wish they would not imitate this fault of ours. I believe if the two schools were rightly disposed towards each other, a great share of their apparent divergences would vanish. But to put this point beyond dispute, I quote another passage from the formula of the New School portion of the General Assembly of 1837, which was incorporated into their protest, and subsequently adopted unanimously, by the Auburn Convention. "Original sin is a natural bias to evil, resulting from the first apostacy, leading invariably and certainly to transgression."

We have yet to inquire—

3. Whether our view of original sin accords with the language of our standards? I find only three paragraphs with which it can be suspected of conflicting. They are Confession of faith; Chap. 6, Sec. 5 and 6, and the 18th answer of the Shorter Catechism. Those of the confession read thus: Sec. 5. "This corruption of nature during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both *itself*, and *all the motives thereof* are *truly and properly sin*." And Sec. 6. "Every sin *both original and actual* being a *transgression* of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death with all miseries, spiritual, temporal and eternal. The 'corruption of nature' in the former paragraph, is evidently the same as 'the original sin' in the latter. In the former paragraph it is said to be 'truly and properly sin:' and in the latter, to be 'a transgression of God's righteous law, and contrary thereunto,' and if these paragraphs are intended

to teach that the *possession* of this corruption, distinct from its *exercise*, is sin in the same sense as actual transgression is sin, I see not how the New or the Old School can "honestly" adopt them. Hodge and Bretschneider tell us that this corruption is not the infusion of any thing *in itself sinful*: Augustine, that "though it is called sin, it is not so called because it is of itself sin, but because sin is produced by it:" and Zuingli, that "Original sin is a disease, not sin." How, then, can those who adhere to these authors, subscribe to these paragraphs, if they teach that the mere *possession* of depravity is blameworthy? But that such is not their meaning is evident for the following reasons:

If it were wrong to *possess* this corruption, it would be equally wrong in God to *put* us in possession of it, and thus make himself the author of sin. Surely, then, they were not intended to assert what would involve such blasphemy. Again: the persons spoken of in the 5th section are evidently old enough to have had sinful *exercises*; for they are supposed to be regenerated. It must, therefore, be *corruption in exercise* of which it speaks. And the distinction between "the corruption itself" and the "motions" of it must be that between *internal* and *external* action; or (according to Park.) between the *propensity to choose evil* and the *executive* choice of it; or at most, between the *generic* and *specific* choices. And this I think is confirmed by the 6th section. Here "*original*," as well as "*actual*" sin, is said to be a "*transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto.*" But transgression is an *act*, and supposes *exercise* at least. The law cannot be "transgressed," but by some *action* or *exercise*, which violates its demands or prohibitions. And nothing can be contrary to the law but what it forbids. But it forbids nothing except wrong exercises and actions. As Pictet says, "it does not forbid corruption, it forbids only actual sin."—La Theologie, Lib. 6, Chap. 7. And how could God consistently forbid our *having* what he makes us possess? Must we not understand these articles, then, as asserting simply, that this corruption of our nature is properly and truly sin, "and is a transgression of the righteous law of God," and "contrary thereunto,"

only as it is in exercise, at least by *generic* or *specific* preferences; or as in the words of Woods, "it is developed in moral action." This I think is the only understanding in which either the Old or New School can receive these articles: and in this understanding I see not why both cannot receive them, and with equal sincerity.

The 18th answer of the Shorter Catechism reads thus: "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and *the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin*; together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it." Here again the native corruption of man is virtually declared to be sinful, as it is said to make a part of that sinful estate whereinto he fell. And here we say of this, as of the articles just examined; that if it is to be understood literally, our brethren of the Old School can no more receive it than we of the New. For like us, as noticed above, they believe with Zuingli, Augustine, Bretschneider and Hodge, that this corruption is not of itself literally sinful. If then we are to receive this article intelligently and cordially, we must understand, as in the articles above, that this sinfulness refers, according to Park, to man's generic as well as specific preferences for evil, or according to Woods, to corruption as developed in action; or else according to Augustine, we must suppose that "sinfulness" is here used in a modified metaphorical sense—sinful in the sense of producing sin. We all believe that original sin, or the corruption of man's whole nature is sinful, in that it leads to sin. And in this understanding of it we can cordially receive this article.

Enough has now been said, I trust, to show that this view of original sin does not conflict with the standards of our Church; and that as regards this doctrine as well as imputation, we can subscribe them as honestly as our Old School brethren.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ATONEMENT.

All Presbyterians believe that the Atonement, as made by Christ, was absolutely *necessary*, and altogether *adequate*. It was needed, in order to render the salvation of sinners compatible with the justice and authority of God. For without such an atonement he could not have released them from the punishment threatened in his law without paralyzing the restraining power of that law; and thus without encouraging transgression. All Presbyterians believe, too, that what *needed* to be done, was done; that Christ *performed* and *suffered* all that was requisite in order to a sufficient and ample atonement. Thus far Old and New School men are perfectly agreed. There is no controversy between us, except as to the matter and extent of the atonement. And in the examination of these, I shall not need to be very methodical. Respecting the *matter* of it, there are two questions. One is whether it consists alone in the sufferings of Christ, or whether it includes both *obedience* and sufferings? The other question is, whether *Christ suffered the penalty of the law*?

I do not suppose the former question has ever contributed to the division of the Old School from the New. Yet, it may not be improper to give it a passing notice here. Dr. Alexander contends, that justification consists both of *pardon*, which releases the sinner from condemnation to hell, and of *restoration to righteousness*, which entitles him to heaven.—“Justification by Faith.”—p. 23 He insists also, that the atonement of Christ, consists of his *suffering* to secure the *former*, and of his *obedience* to secure the *latter*. But after all that Dr. Chalmers has said so eloquently, and so interestingly on them, I do not see much necessity for these distinctions, neither much

objection to them. These two portions of justification and of atonement I have been accustomed to group together—principally because I have found them so grouped in the Bible. In the Bible, justification is often called *pardon*, *forgiveness*, *remission*, *redemption*, and non-imputation of sin and the like. And the grace thus expressed is represented as securing all the blessings of salvation. When I call justification *pardon*, I regard myself as using the latter word in its larger sense, as covering the whole ground of Dr. Alexander's justification, viz: the forgiveness of our sins; and the acceptance of our persons as righteous, on account of Christ's righteousness. And Mr. Barnes gives to justification the same extent, in his notes on Romans, 4: 25. "The word justification seems here to be used in a large sense, to denote acceptance with God, including not only the formal act by which God pardons sins, and by which we become reconciled to him, but also the *completion* of the work."—p. 103. Also Notes on Galatians, p. 319. I have been accustomed to regard "the curse of the law" as including both exclusion from heaven, and consignment to hell: and to suppose that Christ redeemed the race from the whole of this curse of the law, by "hanging on a tree." Gal. 3: 13. In the same way I have been accustomed to group together the obedience and sufferings of Christ: supposing, as Owen says, "In suffering he obeyed and in obeying he suffered;" or as Paul expresses it, "He became *obedient* even unto *death*."—Phil. 2: 8. And I suppose my brethren of the New School generally have the same views on this point as myself. But all the evidence I have of it is the declaration in the New School portion of the General Assembly of 1837. They said, "All believers are justified, not on the ground of personal merit, but solely on the ground of the *obedience* and death of Christ." And this I believe is almost precisely in the language since used by Dr. Alexander. Dr. Dick, who is good authority for the Old School, says, "The righteousness of Christ is strictly one; and is divided into *action* and *passion*, for the sake of explanation only."—p. 376.

The question whether Christ *suffered the penalty of the law*, would seem to be a modern one. I can find no pas-

sage in the Bible, nor even in our standards, which asserts that he did suffer it. I am therefore surprised that *any* and especially that Dr. Alexander, should regard the denial of it, as bringing in "another gospel."—"Justification by Faith."—p. 28. Our Old School brethren regard this denial, I think, as involving much more than it really does—much more than the Westminster Assembly did, or they would have spoken out upon it in the Confession and Catechisms.

As Christ has confessedly made an adequate atonement, we need not inquire *what*, or *how much* he suffered. All we *need* know, and all we *can* know, is told us by the holy evangelists. No reasoning a-priori, a-posteriori, or hypothetical, can help us in the least to be "wise above what is written." What he suffered, he suffered; and no conjectures or arguments of ours will effect any change in his sufferings, or increase our knowledge of them. And it is enough to know, that (be their nature or degree what they may,) they were enough to sustain the government of God in saving all who repent and believe.

We may inquire and speculate as much as we please, as to the *aspects* in which these sufferings are to be *viewed*—whether they are to be regarded as the exact endurance of the penalty of the law denounced upon transgression, or whether they are sufferings of another kind, which God accepts as equivalent to that penalty, or sufferings rather, which he *appointed* for Christ to endure, in order to make an adequate atonement. But before we can come to any safe conclusion, a previous question must be settled. It is, whether God *can* consistently accept *any* substitute for such a penalty. For, if nothing can constitute an appropriate atonement, but the endurance of this identical penalty, then Christ did certainly suffer it. But neither scripture nor reason prove that he *could* not, or *did* accept of such substitute. But if it could be demonstrated that Christ did suffer the exact penalty of the law, still it regards the *aspect*, and not the essence of the atonement. It is a point, therefore, of minor importance. Surely, then, as the question is so difficult and doubtful, it cannot be a very grievous heresy to believe that Christ suffered what

God accepted as an adequate substitute for the penalty of the law.

Why not take the sufferings of Christ just as they stand recorded on the Sacred pages? believing them to be just what they needed to be—just what the majesty and justice of God required for making an adequate and proper atonement, though we cannot be agreed how far these sufferings are wearing the features and character of the legal penalty. As these sufferings are just what God has accepted as sufficient for the purposes of mercy and of moral government, why should not *we* be satisfied?

I have often wondered at the zeal manifested on both sides of this question, and as I think the undue importance ascribed to it. Some oppose the opinion that Christ suffered the penalty of the law the more strenuously, because they suppose it to involve the fact of his suffering remorse, and all the other pains consequent on criminality. But I will venture to say that few, if any of our Old School brethren believe he felt such anguish, or even that in any proper sense he endured the penalty of the law. Probably the most intelligent of them would argue with Lightfoot, one of the Westminster Assembly. He says: "Was Christ so much as punished of God? Much less was he overwhelmed by the wrath of God. Was the lamb *punished*, that was sacrificed? He was afflicted, but not punished; for punishment argues crime, or a fault preceding. Were the sad sufferings of Christ laid on him as a punishment? certainly not for his own sins; no, nor for ours."—Lightfoot's Works, Vol. — pp. 23-4.

Hill, who is good Old School authority, denies that Christ suffered the literal penalty. He says: "Although the sufferings of Jesus Christ, in consequence of this translation of guilt, became the punishment of sin, it is plain that they were not that very punishment which sin deserved; and hence it is called by those who hold the Catholic (orthodox) opinion, a *satisfaction* for the sin of the world. The word *satisfaction* is known in the Roman law, from which it is borrowed, to denote that method of fulfilling an obligation, which may either be admitted or refused. When a person by non-performance of a contract, has incurred a penalty, he is entitled to a discharge

of the contract, if he pays the penalty; but if instead of paying the penalty, he offers something else in the place of it, the person who has the right to demand the penalty may grant a discharge, or not, as he sees meet. If he is satisfied with that which is offered, he will grant the discharge; if he is not satisfied, he cannot be called unjust: he may act wisely in refusing it. According to this known meaning of the word, the sufferings of Christ for sin have received the name of *satisfaction* to the justice of God, because they were not the penalty which had been incurred, but something accepted by the Lawgiver instead of it."—pp. 435, 6.

Symington, who also is Old School authority, follows Hill. He says: "Satisfaction properly denotes, that the sufferings borne by Christ were not the identical punishment required by the law, but a proper equivalent with which the great moral Governor was pleased to be *satisfied* in its place. What Christ endured was not the precise penalty of the law, but something equally *satisfactory*, serving the same purpose, as far as the rectoral honor of God is concerned."—p. 16.

Dick, in his *Theology*, (said to be a text book in Princeton,) teaches the same. He says: "Perhaps our ideas are not always distinct, when we speak of the death of Christ, as a satisfaction for sin. That word, indeed, is used to signify any thing with which the person having a claim is contented, whether he receive the whole of what he claims, or only a part of it, or something instead of it. In law it strictly signifies a payment, which may, or may not be admitted, according to the pleasure of him to whom it is due; and it takes place when not the very thing which he had a right to demand, but something which he is pleased to accept as an equivalent. In the present case, what the law demanded was the death of the transgressors themselves: it was therefore a relaxation of the law to admit another to die for them; and on this account the death of Christ was properly a satisfaction to justice, something with which it is content, although not the very thing which was originally required."—Vol. 2, p. 74.

Dr. Rice will find in each of these three quotations of his Old School authors, a full refutation of his assertion,

p. 44, that "*to make satisfaction to divine justice, and to suffer the penalty of the law*, are phrases of *precisely the same import* ; and thus a complete refutation of all he has quoted and said, (pp. 44, 54, and 64-5,) to prove that Beman and Pearson deny the atonement in denying that Christ suffered literally the penalty of the law. And Dr. J. Wood will also find in them a full refutation of all *he*, too, has quoted and said (pp. 92, 104) to prove that Beman, Jenkyn, and Barnes, deny the atonement, by denying that Christ suffered this legal penalty. In each of these three extracts may be found, too, a full refutation of all that Smith and Cheeseman have said to prove that the New School, by denying that Christ suffered the penalty of the law, deny that he made any atonement at all. Will Rice, Wood, and Cheeseman insist, that such staunch Old School men as Hill, Symington, and Dick, by denying the sufferings of Christ to be legal and penal, have brought in the "damnable heresy" of "even denying the Lord that bought them?"

To the foregoing quotations on this point, I will add one from Dr. L. Woods of Andover: one to which I think the most of Old and New School men will cordially subscribe. If the length of it needs an apology, it will be found in the appositeness and excellency of the extract itself.

"It is the common opinion, that Christ by his death *satisfied the law*, and that he *endured its penalty*. Are these representations scriptural? And how are they to be understood? Reply. Christ suffered and died *for our sins* ; that is, *on their account*. He suffered *for us* ; that is, in our stead ; in order that we who otherwise must have suffered the penalty of the law, might be exempt from it. The Bible does indeed declare, that Christ saved us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. But it does not say, that he endured literally, the very curse denounced by the law against sinners, *the very curse* from which sinners are saved ; but it says, he was "*made a curse*." As it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." The particular curse spoken of was crucifixion, which was a very painful and ignominious death. But crucifixion does not constitute the exact curse de-

nounced by the law against transgressors ; and very few who have fallen under that curse, have suffered crucifixion. The language of the Bible on this subject, and the corresponding language of Christians is just and proper. But they must have a reasonable construction, and must be explained and limited by other expressions, relating to the same subject. The law was indeed satisfied by the death of Christ, in this sense, that all the good ends which it sought, and which would have been accomplished by our perfect obedience, or by merited punishment, were accomplished by the obedience and death of Christ. In his vicarious sufferings, the law fully compassed the ends which would otherwise have been accomplished by the punishment of sinners ; that is, it completely answered *in another way*, the ends that would have been answered by a direct and full execution of the penalty of the law ; which penalty is a very different thing from crucifixion. Or to express the same thing differently, the law was satisfied by the substitution of Christ's death, for the punishment of transgressors. But if we would speak with strict propriety, we must say, the Supreme Lawgiver is satisfied, for satisfaction really pertains to a person. If what the Lawgiver aims at is done by the vicarious death of Christ, as fully as it would have been done by the punishment of sinners, why should he not be satisfied ? And if his great object as Lawgiver could not have been accomplished by the death of Christ, then why did he appoint that death as a substitute for the punishment of sinners ? It would really seem that God had a preference for the former : and we should naturally think, that the reason for that preference was, that on the whole, more good would result from the sufferings of Christ, than from the execution of the penalty of the law.

As to the demands of the law, Christ undertook to do all that was necessary in order that those who believe might be forgiven. Whatever demands the law, or the Lawgiver made upon Christ, as our Redeemer, or our substitute or surety, these demands he fully answered. And thus he *virtually* answered the demands which the law made against us. The same in regard to the penalty. Christ suffered it virtually. He suffered that which had

the like effect, or had the like value in God's moral government. As to the ends of government, it was as though the curse of the law had been endured literally. So that it is sufficiently correct for common purposes, especially for the purposes of impression, to say as Storr and Flatt, and a thousand others have said, that *Christ endured the penalty of the law*, that *he suffered the penalty due to us*.

And this mode of representation is perfectly justified by Scripture example. For, when the prophet says: "he bore the sins of many—the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all;" and when the apostle says: "he bare our sins in his own body on the tree;" the obvious meaning is, that the punishment of our iniquities was laid on him, or that he endured the sufferings which our sins deserved. And wherever phraseology like this is used, it is only necessary to keep in mind, that it is used for the purposes of brevity and impression, and is to be construed with a reasonable latitude, not with an over rigid exactness, just as we construe other expressions used in Scripture and free conversation. If we were to lay aside all language that will not bear to be construed literally and strictly, we should lay aside what is most impassioned and moving in Scripture and in common discourse. That language is good which is suited to the nature of the subject, and which, with reasonable and candid construction, is adapted to impress the truth upon the understanding and the heart."—Wood's Works, Vol. 2, pp. 471–4.

I see not why the Old School as well as the New, cannot adopt the views contained in the foregoing extracts from Hill and Symington, Dick and Woods. But be that as it may, I shall not need to inquire whether this view of ours conflicts with our *standards*. For as to the question whether Christ suffered the literal penalty of the law, they say *nothing*.

Rice, Wood, Cheeseman, and others, complain of Beman and others, for maintaining that God made a grand "exhibition" by the death of Christ, for the purpose of making a mighty impression on the moral universe. But are not Old School writers doing the same? Hill says: (p. 436,) "It appears even to us inconsistent with the character of the Lawgiver of the universe, and many rea-

sons in his universal government, which we are not qualified to perceive, may render it in the highest degree unfit that an act of indemnity, by which the sins of all that repent and believe are forgiven, should be published to the human race, without some *awful example* of punishment of transgression. It pleased God to exhibit this example in the sufferings of his own Son."

The New School have been charged with holding that this exhibition and impression are the *only* aim and effect of Christ's death. But this charge is effectually repelled by the following assertion of the New School in the Assembly of 1837, and in the Auburn Convention. They say: "The sufferings of Christ were not symbolical, governmental, and instructive, *only*, but were truly *vicarious*, i. e., a substitute for the punishment due to transgressors. And while Christ did not suffer the literal penalty of the law, involving remorse of conscience, and the pains of hell, he did offer a sacrifice, which Infinite Wisdom saw to be a full equivalent. And by virtue of this atonement overtures of mercy are sincerely made to the race, and salvation secured to all who believe."

The main, if not the only point of dispute between the two Schools on the doctrine of atonement, is in regard to the extent of it. In all the warfare between the parties, none perhaps has elicited more feeling and effort than this. But I am now convinced it is pretty much "Point-no-point"—that there is little between us worth contending for—that our Old School brethren virtually concede all we are insisting on. We have generally regarded our Old School brethren as holding that the atonement was made, *in all respects* for the *elect alone*: so that the non-elect could not be saved, even though they should be ever so willing to comply with the conditions of salvation. And it may be that some do hold this view. But I believe the great mass repudiate it. On full inquiry we shall find them holding, I think, that in an important sense, the atonement was made for all mankind—that such provision is made that none *need* perish, and none *will* perish, but by their own voluntary rejection of the offers of life—that in their view of the atonement, the non-elect are left where *we* leave them, and where Arminians leave *all* men:

that is, they leave them standing at the open door of mercy, with an invitation to enter in; but with no special and effectual influence to press them in; yet needing nothing to secure their salvation, but their own consent to the conditions of life. But for the proof of it.

The New School have full confidence in Fuller. And he says: "If we say the way was opened by the death of Christ, for the free and consistent exercise of mercy in all the methods which Sovereign Wisdom saw fit to adopt, perhaps we shall include every material idea which the Scriptures give of the important event."—Gospel its own Witness, p. 194. And we shall find, I think, that the writers about to be quoted, will give the atonement the wide scope here spoken of. Symington, on the atonement, is approved in the Princeton Essays, (Vol. 2, p. 49,) and published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication and he is very strenuous on Limitation. And yet he is much more liberal toward General Atonement men, than many on this side of the water. He says: "If *sufficiency* were the point on which the controversy turned, it might be soon ended. And we are strongly inclined to believe, that nothing more than this is meant by many of those who contend for Christ's having died for all men. It is with such persons a mistake of words, more than of opinion. In the fullest sense of the terms, then, we regard the atonement of Christ *as sufficient for all*. This all-sufficiency is what lays the foundation for the unrestrained universality of the Gospel call; and from every such view of the atonement as could imply that it was not sufficient for all, or that there was not ample warrant in the invitations of the Gospel for all to look to it for salvation, we utterly dissent. Against every such limitation and restriction we enter our solemn and deliberate protest, as alike dishonorable to Christ, and unwarranted by the testimony of Scripture."

Here is virtually conceded all, on this point, that the New School have asked. Not only is the *sufficiency* of the atonement granted, but that this all-sufficiency "lays the foundation for the unrestricted universality of the gospel call." Here it is averred, too, that any restriction to this provision and offer of salvation is alike dishonora-

ble to Christ, and unwarranted by the word of God. And for nothing have the New School contended, more than for such a view of atonement as would authorize and render consistent the offers of salvation to all.

Symington says, again: "The present controversy hinges wholly on the *divine intention* regarding the subjects of the atonement."—p. 187. And then, if I understand him, he has no controversy with the New School; for they do not believe it was the intention of God that all should be saved by the death of Christ. That were Universalism on the one hand, or Arminianism on the other. We believe that Christ died for all, yet especially for the elect, and on this wise: All men, if left to themselves, would reject salvation by the atonement; and of these rejectors, God intended to bring some (the elect) to accept this salvation. Christ died therefore, not *only* to make atonement for all men, that all *might* be saved, *if they would*; but *also* to procure that influence of the Spirit by which "all that the Father hath given him *shall* come to him" for salvation, being made "willing in the day of his power."

Dr. A. G. Fairchild has published a valuable little work called "The Great Supper." It is published and thus endorsed by the Old School Board of Publication. It therefore speaks *ex cathedra* for the whole connection. And in it we find the following declarations:

"The first subject for consideration suggested in the parable (Luke 14: 16–24) is the *infinite sufficiency of the provisions of the gospel*." "A certain man made a great supper and bade many, and sent his servant at supper time to say to them that were bidden, come, for all things are now ready." This language clearly implies, that the provision in readiness was abundant in proportion to the number invited; and it may teach us the infinite value of the Redeemer's sacrifice, and its *ample sufficiency for the whole world*. And this is in perfect accordance with the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church, which always, in the most explicit manner, inculcated the sentiment, that no sinner can perish through any deficiency in the atonement. Accordingly, the Confession of Faith, speaking of the non-elect, says: "They never truly come to Christ, and there-

fore cannot be saved.”—Chap. 10, Sec. 4. The reason why they cannot be saved is, that they will not come to Christ. Nor is it true, that the doctrine of the infinite sufficiency of the Redeemer’s sufferings is of recent origin in the Presbyterian Church. This is often insinuated by the opposers of our views. The slightest examination might satisfy them, that the doctrine has been maintained by those called Calvinists from the earliest period. Calvin, himself, in his comment on 1 John 2: 2, plainly asserts that the sufferings of Christ were sufficient for the whole world. And he repeats the same sentiment distinctly, in many parts of his writings. In the Synod of Dort, more than 200 years ago, the whole Calvinistic world united in the declaration, “that the death of the Son of God is a single and most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sin; of infinite value and price, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world: and that because many who are called by the Gospel, do not repent and believe in Christ, but perish in unbelief; this doth not arise from defect or insufficiency of the sacrifice offered by Christ, but from their own fault.”—Syn. Dort, Chap. 2, pp. 23–5.

“We invite all to the feast of the gospel, because our Divine Master has commanded us to do so. We invite them to come because the provision in readiness is sufficient for all; and if they will come, they shall in no wise be cast out.”—p. 41.

“It was remarked in a former discourse, that the first great truth presented to view in the parable before us, is the sufficiency of the atonement of Christ; a truth which has ever been believed and taught in the Presbyterian Church. Nay, in some instances, the whole Calvinistic world has united in the declaration, that the death of Christ is a most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for our sins; of infinite value and price; abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world. I will go further and say: “There is,” as Dr. John Owen observes, “a sense in which Christ may be said to die for all, and the whole world. His death was of sufficient dignity to have made a ransom for all the sins of every one in the world; and on this internal sufficiency is grounded the universality of

the gospel offers.”—Dis. Armin Chap. 9. We also admit most cheerfully that Christ died intentionally, to save all believers. Hence he declares: “Him that cometh unto me, I will in nowise cast out.” We wish you distinctly to understand, that when Calvinists deny that “Christ died for all,” they only mean to deny, that he died “for all,” in the same sense in which that expression is explained by their opponents. That is, they mean to deny that he died for all men, in the *same sense*, and with the *same intention*. Accordingly, our Confession of Faith, Chap. 8, Sec. 8, affirms that “to all those for whom Christ purchased redemption, he hath certainly and effectually applied the same.” The passage serves as a guard against the idea, that the Savior may be defeated in his great designs which were to be accomplished by his death. And here I believe, after all, lies the main point of dispute with regard to the atonement. Among those who agree as to its nature, the chief question in debate is its design. What was it intended to effect? This assertion is not made on my own individual authority. All who have been qualified by learning and experience, have stated the question in this form. Among others, the celebrated Francis Turretin, the successor of Calvin, in the theological chair in Geneva, in his Institutes, Qu. 14, on the atonement, says: “The question is not concerning the value and sufficiency of the death of Christ, but the hinge of the controversy is the design of God in sending his Son into the world, and the intention of Christ in expiring on the cross.” So also the distinguished Ridgely, in Vol. 2, p. 209, says: “It is allowed on both sides, especially by all who own the divinity and satisfaction of Christ, that his death was sufficient to redeem the whole world. The main question before us is, whether God *designed* the salvation of all men by the death of Christ.”—pp. 85–7. The Calvinist presents an offer grounded upon the infinite sufficiency and *applicability* of the Savior’s blood, accompanied with the assurance to him who accepts it, that “he shall in nowise be cast out.”—p. 87. The sufferings of Christ were not only sufficient for all, but actually secured the salvation of all who are truly willing to come to him. And therefore, if any do not experience their saving effica-

ey, it is, to use the words of our Confession, "because they never truly come to Christ." That they do not come to him is ascribed *wholly* to their *voluntary* blindness, and cherished depravity of their own hearts."—pp. 96, 99.

In the foregoing extracts are not our New School views of the extent of the atonement sufficiently asserted? I am aware that many in the other School use some phraseologies different from what we do to explain this doctrine. But as to "the infinite sufficiency and applicability of the Savior's blood," are we not substantially agreed? Is there a single expression in the above extracts from which any moderate New School man would seriously dissent. Must we not recognize in them a description of our own belief? and rejoice that our Old School brethren, through their Board of Publication, have adopted the same? We believe only, as Calvin expresses it, that the atonement is *sufficient for all*, but *efficient* only for the elect. And do not the Old School believe exactly the same?

It may seem inconsistent in some of them, that after making the above concessions, they should try to invalidate those passages of Scripture which declare that Christ died for all men.* True, they may seem to us on this point as on some others, to contradict themselves. But I say again, what is that to us? What they have conceded, *they have conceded*. And we have no right to pronounce them mistaken or insincere in these concessions. Nor need we fear that they will recede from them. For if any thing is needed to keep them to their position, we can find it in Calvin, whom both Schools regard as "the father of us all." I quote from his comments:

Mat. 26: 28. "This is my blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the remission of sins." "Under the name of many, he (Christ) denotes not a part of the world only, but the whole human race."

Rom. 5: 18. "The free gift came upon all men to justification of life." "He (the apostle) makes the grace common to all. For although Christ *suffered for the whole*

*The following are the passages principally relied upon, as teaching that Christ died for all. John 1: 29; 3: 17; 4: 42; Rom. 5: 18; 2 Cor. 5: 14, 15; 1 Tim. 2: 6; 4: 10; Heb. 2: 9; 1 John 2: 2.

world, and is offered to all, without distinction, yet all do not embrace it."

1 Cor. 8: 11. "Through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish for whom Christ died." "If the soul of *every* weak person was the purchase of the blood of Christ, he that for the sake of a little meat plunges his brother again into death who was redeemed by Christ, shows at how mean a rate he esteems the blood of Christ."

2 Pet. 2: 1. "There shall be false teachers among you, who shall privily bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction." "Though Christ is denied in various ways, yet in my opinion Peter means the same thing here, as Jude expresses, viz: that the grace of God is turned into lasciviousness. For Christ has redeemed us, that he might have a people free from the defilements of the world, and devoted to holiness and innocence. Whosoever, therefore, shake off the yoke, and throw themselves into all licentiousness, are justly said to deny Christ, by whom they are redeemed."

1 John, 2: 2. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." "Here a question is raised: how the sins of the whole world are atoned for: Some have said, Christ suffered for the whole world *sufficiently*, but for the elect *efficaciously*. This is the common solution of the schools; and *though I confess this is a truth*, yet I do not think it agrees to this place." To deny, then, that Christ died for *some who will be lost*, nay, for *all men*, is to be more Calvinistic than Calvin himself.

I hope I have now shown that the New School views of a general atonement are conformable both to the word of God, and to the avowed understanding of Old School standard authors. And need I show that we as a body believe in any atonement at all? Yes: for it is sometimes insinuated that we deny it altogether. Dr. Smith says of Mr. Barnes, (whom he considers our organ,) that, "In his whole book he has not a single passage expressive of salvation through the merits of Christ alone."—Dialogues, p. 199. In reply to this let Mr. B. speak for himself. In his Notes on Rom. he says: (3: 24,) "It does not mean

that it (the free gift) has been obtained, however, without any price or merit from any one, for the Lord Jesus Christ *has purchased it with his own blood*; and to *him* it became a matter of justice, that those who were given him should be justified."—pp. 85, 6. "In the plan of salvation, therefore, he (God) has shown a regard to his law by appointing his Son to be a *substitute* in the place of sinners."—p. 89. "He (God) showed that he had so great a regard for it, (the law,) that he would not pardon one sinner without an *atonement*. A full compensation—an equivalent has been provided by the sufferings of the Savior in the sinner's stead."—p. 90. "The intervention of the *atonement* by the Messiah, prevented the immediate execution of the penalty of the law, and produced *all* the benefits to *all* the race, resulting from the sparing mercy of God."—p. 123. "The sin of one man involved men in ruin; the *obedience unto death* of the other restored them to the favor of God."—p. 125. "There was *an original applicability* in the work of Christ to all men, a richness and fullness of the *atonement*, fitted to meet the sins of the entire world, and restore the race to favor."—p. 126. Who, after reading these extracts, can say that Albert Barnes denies salvation by the substituted sufferings of Jesus Christ?

But what would it avail to prove that Mr. B. denies this doctrine, so long as the New School have so fully affirmed it by their representatives in the Assembly and Convention of 1837? In a paragraph already quoted, they say: "The sufferings and death of Christ were truly *vicarious*, i. e. a *substitute for the punishment due to transgressors*. By virtue of this *atonement* overtures of mercy are sincerely made to the race, and salvation secured to all who believe."

It is probably for the sake of form only, that we need to inquire, whether our views of atonement are in conformity to the Confession and the Catechisms. They are so much at one with the views of most of the Old School, that if there is any difficulty here, both Schools must share in it. I can find but three paragraphs in which there is any seeming difficulty. They are found in the Confession of

Faith, Chap. 8, Sec. 5; Chap. 11, Sec. 3; and in the Larger Catechism, Ans. 59.

The first paragraph reads thus: "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he, through the Eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased not only reconciliation, but everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him." This article speaks of the *obedience* of Christ as making a part of the atonement. And we have seen that both schools believe this truth. It declares also that Christ satisfied the justice of God; but does not say whether he did it by suffering the literal penalty of the law, or whether he did it by *other* sufferings, with which his Father was equally well pleased. And we have seen that such Old School authors as Hill, Symington, and Dick deny as fully as we do, that Christ suffered the *literal* penalty. This article teaches also that Christ purchased salvation for the elect; but says nothing about the rest of mankind; nothing therefore that conflicts with the doctrine of a *general* atonement. And the New School believe as fully as any other Calvinists, that Christ "purchased this reconciliation and everlasting inheritance," for the elect; and thus that he died for them in a higher, more emphatic sense, than for the rest of mankind, in that he died for *all*, that they *might* be saved, and for *the elect*, to *insure* their salvation. Consequently they believe as it is expressed in sec. 8, of this chapter, that "To all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply the same."

The next paragraph reads thus: "Christ by his obedience and death did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf. Yet inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for any thing in them, their justification is only of free grace; that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners."

Much of this article is alike in a meaning to the forego-

ing; and has therefore been in a measure considered already. It speaks of Christ's *discharging the debt*, that is, the sins of the justified; which is the same as *satisfying the justice of God*, (as mentioned in both articles,) but tells us not whether he paid this debt of sin in the same kind of coin (so to speak) as was due from the sinner? that is, whether he bore the same sufferings which were due from the sinner to the justice of God? or whether he bore *other* sufferings equally acceptable to God? The words of Paul to Philemon respecting Onesimus may illustrate this point. "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought, put that on mine account; I, Paul have written it with mine own hand; I *will* repay it."—Philem. 18: 19. "Put that to mine account." In the Greek, "*Impute that to me.*" Here, then, we have an instance of imputation similar to that of the believer's sins to Christ. "I will repay it." Here, as we may say, is Paul's "note of hand," to pay for the injury which Onesimus had done his master in leaving or defrauding him. But we cannot suppose he intended to render Philemon either servile labor or money. Evidently he intended to repay him in gospel labors. Or rather, he intended that Philemon should regard himself as paid in such labors already. This he evidently intended to intimate in the adroit allusion: "Albeit, I do not say to thee, how thou owest unto me even thine own self beside." And it seems to me, that "the exact justice" of God would be fully "satisfied," and thereby fully "glorified" (illustrated and honored) by *such* sufferings of Christ as God might accept in the stead of those to which the sinner is doomed.

The 59th answer in the Larger Catechism reads thus: "Redemption is certainly applied and effectually communicated to all those for whom Christ hath purchased it, who are in time by the Holy Ghost enabled to believe in Christ according to the gospel." It may be thought this article denies that Christ died for any but such as will be saved; consequently that none holding to general atonement, can subscribe it without involving the doctrine of Universalism. And if so, it would conflict with many of the Old School, as well as of the New. To see this, the reader will need only to look back on what has been quoted

from Symington, and Calvin, and especially from Dr. Fairchild, who is commissioned by the Old School Assembly, through their Board of Publication, to declare that Calvinists offer salvation to *all*, "upon the infinite *sufficiency* and *applicability* of the Savior's blood."

But it is *redemption* and not *atonement* which is here said to be "*effectually communicated to all* for whom Christ purchased it." And redemption and atonement are not the same. The former is the application of the latter. In other words, redemption is an atonement made in a higher sense, for the *elect*, than for the *rest* of mankind. Christ died for *all*, to make their salvation *possible*, and that is the *atonement*. But he died also for the *elect*, to make their salvation *certain*. The elect were the ones given to him by the Father as a sure reward for his sufferings. By his death he thus *purchased* the elect; or, in the language of this article, he *purchased redemption* for them.

The Scriptures observe this distinction very emphatically. They never confound redemption with atonement, except when the cause is put for the effect. They speak of atonement as *for* sin; (Ex. 32: 30; Lev. 4: 20, 26, 31, 35; 1 Pet. 3: 18;) but of redemption *from* sin, and its consequences. (Ps. 25: 22, 49: 15; Gal. 3: 13, and 1 Pet. 1: 18) They speak of redemption only in connection with Saints, and as having already taken full effect. (Isa. 35: 9; 51: 11; 62: 12; 63: 9; 1 Cor. 1: 30; Eph. 1: 7; Col. 1: 14; Tit. 2: 14, and Rev. 5: 9.) Not so of the atonement. Christ is said to have died for many who are not, and never will be redeemed. (John 1: 29, 3: 17; 4: 42; 2 Cor. 14: 15; 1 Tim. 2: 6; 4: 10. Heb. 2: 9; 1 John 2: 2; 1 Tim. 4: 10; 1 Cor. 8: 11.) Enough has now been said, I trust, to show that atonement and redemption are not the same, and thus to relieve both Old School and New from the fear of conflict with the foregoing article.

And now I would bespeak again the candid decision of the reader. I ask him to decide, in view of what has been said on the doctrine, whether the New School cannot make an "honest" subscription to what our standards say respecting the atonement?

CHAPTER V.

HUMAN ABILITY.

On this doctrine also, has there been a vast amount of theological conflict. But many, in my opinion, have been fighting in a fog; or rather, perhaps, in the smoke which they have been making by their own ammunition. Such combatants would do well to heed the following remark of Dr. Woods to Dr. Beecher: "The principal, if not the chief difference which exists among thinking and candid minds, is *verbal*. If this should be kept in view, as it ought to be, and if men who are going to dispute would just stop and inquire what they are going to dispute about, it would very much *narrow* the ground of debate, and *diminish*, if not remove the occasion of strife."*

There are supposed to be two ultra and opposite views of ability, held in the Presbyterian Church. One is, that unregenerate man has *no* ability of *any kind*, to obey God and to secure salvation; as expressed by Drs. Green and Junkin in the trials of Barnes, and by Dr. Wilson in the trial of Beecher. But I believe that few in the Old School would avow such an opinion. So on the other hand it is supposed the New School are maintaining that the unregenerate have all needful ability of every kind to obey the law and to comply with the conditions of salvation. But

*" Dr. Stuart was rather fond of controversy. A favorite topic with him was the true nature of saving faith, on which subject he regarded Dr. Chalmers as in error. They met in the streets of Edinburg, and entered at once into a warm controversy; street after street, and square after square were passed, and at length the disputants parted: Dr Chalmers taking Dr. Stuart by the hand and saying: "If you wish to see my views clearly and distinctly, read a tract called "*Hindrances to Believers of the Gospel*." "Why," said Dr. Stuart, "that is the very tract I published myself." Dr. Chalmers used often to describe this scene as a proof that many may think they differ when they really agree."—Family Christian Almanac, 1855.

I am confident that few, if any, among us would avow such a belief. Thus while one School is declared to be Antinomian, and the other Arminian, both are misapprehended.

Besides these opposing views, there is a medium one, in which, as I think, the great mass of both schools can fully concur. It is that, notwithstanding the native corruption of man, his constitutional powers, including his intellect and conscience, affections and will, are not so impaired that he needs a *physical* regeneration; that his depravity consists in the perversion (not the destruction) of his affections and will; that these need to be renovated; (not restored;) that man has all the *capacity* which he needs, in order to love and obey God, and could do so without difficulty, if he were *rightly disposed*; or, as the Scriptures express it, if he had "a heart to it." (Prov. 17: 16;) or, "a willing mind." [2 Cor. 8: 12.] And that this depravity renders it *certain*, that he will sin, and sin *only*, till renewed by the Spirit of God; yet, that it does not coerce or compel him of necessity, to sin; since, as our Confession of Faith [Chap. 9, Sec. 1,] expresses it, "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good or evil."

According to this view, ability with inability is distinguished into Natural and Moral. *Natural* inability is whatever prevents our doing a thing, when we are *willing* and *sufficiently inclined* to do it. *Moral* inability is the *want of a heart, disposition, or will* to do a thing. In other words, when a man *would* do a thing, and cannot, he is a subject of *natural* inability. And when he *could* do a thing, *if he chose*, yet chooses *not* to do it, he is a subject of *moral* inability. This latter inability is literal *only* in that he cannot act against his will.

Let us now inquire,

1. Whether this medium view of inability is according to truth?
2. Whether it is one in which both schools can unite? and
3. Whether it accords with the Confession and the Catechism?

Some Old School men seem inclined of late to discard the distinction of ability into *natural and moral*, as if it were a distinction without a difference. [See Princeton Essays, p. 271, and Winchester's Inability no Excuse.] But this distinction is both evident and important. It is evidently recognized in the word of God. Out of many passages I adduce only the following: "Thou hast appointed his bounds, that he *cannot* pass."—Job 14: 5. And, "*None can* redeem his brother."—Ps. 49: 7. Here is *natural* inability. "They" [Joseph's brethren] "hated him, and *could not* speak peacefully unto him."—Gen. 37: 4. And, "Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye *cannot* hear my words."—John 8: 43. Here evidently is *moral* inability: for there was nothing to hinder Joseph's brethren from speaking kindly to him, but their own *disposition*; and nothing else to hinder the Jews from hearing Christ's words.

We are always making this distinction in the moralities of common life. The parent must make it, when he commands his two sons to engage in the same business, and both fail, the one because he has *not strength enough* to do it, and the other because he *dislikes the service*. And the creditor must *feel it*, when two of his debtors fail to meet his demands, one because he has no money, and the other because though he has the necessary sum in hand, he prefers to put it to another use.

This is a distinction, too, which learned and orthodox divines have long regarded as of great importance. Dr. Twisse, prolocutor to the Westminster Assembly, said: "The inability to do what is pleasing and acceptable to God is not *natural*, but *moral* inability; for no faculty of our nature is taken away from us by original sin; as saith Augustine, "It hath taken away from no man the faculty of discovering the truth." The power still remains by which we can do whatever we choose. We say, that the *natural* power of doing any thing according to our will is preserved to all, but no *moral* power."—Beecher's Views, p. 61.

Said Dr. Witherspoon, [who was one of those who adopted the Confession and Catechisms for the American Presbyterian Church,] "Oh that you would but consider

what sort of inability you were under to keep the commands of God. Is it *natural*, or is it *moral*? Is it really want of ability or want of *will*? Is it any thing more than the depravity and corruption of your hearts which is itself criminal, and the source of all transgressions?"—p. 61. "The *moral* inability under which sinners lie, as a consequence from the fall, is not of such a nature as to take away the guilt of sin."—Quoted by Dr. Green, in his *Christian Advocate* for March, 1830.

And says Dr. Watts, "I own his faculties have been greatly corrupted by vicious inclinations, or sinful propensities, which has been happily called by our divines a *moral* inability to fulfill the law, and not a *natural* inability."—*Views*, p. 62.

A late writer in the Old School connection, while he admits the distinction, as in itself correct, objects to the phraseology in which it is always expressed. His main objection seems to be, that the phrase *moral* inability conveys the impression, that man's indisposition and unwillingness to obey God is not *native*. But it never conveyed that impression to *me*: nor should I think it would to *others*, any more than the phrase, "*moral* faculties" conveys the idea that man is not indued by nature with reason and conscience. It is perfectly understood by all, that we apply the term *moral* to these faculties, simply because they are employed in all *moral* action—not because nature never confers them. And so when we apply the same term to the affections and will, it is because they are more immediately and emphatically employed in moral action, and moreover because they characterize such action, as good or bad. And when we apply the self-same term to *inability*, it is always understood, I should think, as in relation to the *morality* of man's conduct, and not to its own origin. Since, then, this phrase, "*moral* inability," has been so generally employed, is so generally understood, and is so needful to distinguish this *blameable* from all *blameless* inability, I should regret to have it discontinued.

Drs. Wood and Rice admit this distinction, but insist that the New School exalt man's *natural* powers too highly, ascribing to them a self-restoring agency, so that he needs not the regenerating influence of the Spirit. But

this is a mis-apprehension, which I hope to correct in another place.

Some have attempted to disprove this distinction, by urging against it the fact, that so long as a man refuses to act, his natural powers are of no use to him. But this objection lies against neither the fact, nor the philosophy of this distinction. If a man has *power* to lift his hand, he *has* it, whether he is willing or unwilling to *use* that power. And so it is as to man's *natural* ability to obey God. If he has such ability, he *has* it, however unwilling he may be to render such obedience.

Others have objected that there is a great inconsistency in saying a man has *natural* power to do a *moral* act. But in answer to this I need only to ask such objectors, how they could contrive to perform a *moral* act *without* *natural* powers. Are idiots and maniacs accountable moral agents?

This distinction is important in itself, as a general truth; for if we lose sight of it, we shall make wrong estimates of human conduct. And it is particularly important to keep sight of it in this investigation; for thereby the Old School can more clearly perceive that the New School admit in substance (if not in the form they prefer) all they should insist upon respecting human impotency: and the New School can see that all *they* insist upon, the Old School virtually admit.

The position which we now maintain, is, that man, by the fall, lost *not* his *natural*, but his *moral* ability; or, as our Confession expresses it, his "ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation."—Chap. 9, sec. 3, —Not, however, that he lost his *freedom* of will; for, as the first section of the same chapter expresses it, such is its "natural liberty that it is *neither forced*, nor by any *absolute necessity* of nature, determined to good or evil." We believe that though the sinner rejects the good, and chooses the evil of a *certainty*, he does it not of *necessity*, but with perfect freedom; that *if he were* to choose the right way, there would be no irregularity or deficiency in his natural powers that would hinder his pursuing it: and that the only reason why he cannot choose the *right* way is, that he freely chooses the *wrong*, and cannot choose

both at the same time. And this freedom of choice, we say, is what makes his conduct *criminal*. This view of human inability is sustained by the following passages of the word of God :

1. Such as declare that sinners have "eyes to see, and see not," and have "ears to hear, and hear not."—Isa. 42 : 19, 20 ; Jer. 5 : 21 ; Ezek. 12 : 2 ; Mat. 13 : 13, 15 ; Mark 8 : 18, and John 9 : 41. If these are not intended to teach that men have all-sufficient capacity to know and do their duty, they can have no meaning at all.

2. Such gospel invitations as are addressed to *all*, to those who *refuse*, as well as to those who *obey* these calls.—Isa. 45 : 22 ; 55 : 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 ; Mat. 11 : 28, 29 ; Luke 14 : 17–20, 24 ; John 7 : 37 ; Rev. 3 : 20 ; 22 : 17. If it is literally and positively impossible for all the impenitent to comply with offers of salvation, why are they made to all ? How can the *universal* offer be sincere ?

3. Such passages as express God's *desire* that *all* would come to him for salvation, his *regrets* that any refuse salvation, and his *reproof* of them for doing so.—Deut. 5 : 29 ; 32 : 29 ; Ps. 81 : 13 ; Isa. 1 : 18 ; 48 : 18 ; Ezek. 18 : 32 ; 2 Pet. 3 : 9 ; Ezek. 33 : 11 ; Mat. 23 : 37 ; Prov. 1 : 22 ; 17 : 16 ; Isa. 55 : 2 ; Luke 14 : 21. For, if God had made men incapable of laying hold of eternal life, how could he consistently desire their salvation, or regret their failure of it ? and how, especially, could he reprove them for "despising his goodness," and for "treasuring up wrath against the day of wrath," if he had made them incapable of doing otherwise ?

Let us now inquire,

2. Whether the present view of human ability is one in which the Old and New School can substantially unite ? That our Old School brethren hold this view, is evident from the fact that they admit all obedience and disobedience to be *voluntary*, consequently that men fail to obey God only because they are *unwilling* to obey him. That is, their unwillingness is their only inability. That this is their view will be proved by quotations from authors, ancient and modern, whom they approve.

Augustine says : "Which free will if God had not given, there could be no just sentence of punishment, or re-

ward of right conduct, nor of divine precept to repent of sins, nor of pardon of sins, which God has given us through our Lord Jesus Christ; because he who does not sin with his *will*, does not sin at all; which sins, as I have said, unless we have free will, would not be sins.”—Beecher’s Views, p. 57–8.

Luther says: “There is no restraint either on the divine or human will. In both cases the will does what it does, whether good or bad simply, and as at perfect liberty, in the exercise of its own faculty. And so long as the operative grace of God is absent from us, everything we do has in it a mixture of evil; and therefore of necessity our works avail not to salvation. Here I do not mean a *necessity of compulsion*, but of necessity as to the *certainty* of the event. A man who has not the Spirit of God, does evil, willingly, and spontaneously. He is not violently impelled against his will, as the thief to the gallows.”—Milnor, Vol. 5, Chap. 12, sec. 2.

Calvin says: “God is voluntary in his goodness, Satan in his wickedness, and man in his sin. We must therefore observe, that man, having been corrupted by the fall, sins voluntarily, not with reluctance or constraint; with the strongest propensity of disposition.”—Institutes, B. 2, Chap. 3, sec. 5. “I always exclude coercion, for we sin voluntarily, for it would not be sin, unless it were voluntary.”—Com. on Rom. 7.

The Biblical Repertory says: (Vol. 17, p. 638 :) “According to the proper usage of language, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; and to say a thing is necessary, and, at the same time *free*, is a *contradiction in terms*. *Certainty* and *necessity* are not the same. A *necessary volition* is an absurdity, a thing inconceivable.”

The passages quoted, pp. 72-3, from Twisse, Watts, Witherspoon, and others, in behalf of the distinction between *natural* and *moral* inability, show also, that they consider the latter to be the *only* inability to which man is subject.

Dr. Green says: “The parties in this controversy are agreed, that all actual sin is voluntary, and therefore criminal and inexcusable.”—Christian Advocate, 1831, p. 348.

Dr. Spring says: "Seriously considered, it is impossible to sin without acting voluntarily. The divine law requires nothing but voluntary obedience, and forbids nothing but voluntary disobedience. As men cannot sin without acting, nor act without *choosing* to act, they must be voluntary in sinning."—Spring's Essay, p. 120.

Dr. Mathews, formerly Professor in the Theological Seminary of New Albany, says: "We possess, indeed, *all* the natural faculties which God demands in his service; but we are *without moral power*."—Quoted in Beecher's Views, p. 79.

In a tract entitled, "Inability no Excuse," Rev. Mr. Winchester evidently intends to teach that the sinner's inability is in part if not wholly distinct from his unwillingness to obey God. And yet, in order to prove his point, that "Inability is no Excuse," he is compelled all through his treatise to insist that nothing but unwillingness does, in fact, prevent the sinner's obedience. And if *this* is the whole hindering cause, why insist on another, a nameless nondescript, as the cause of such hindrance?

But more frequently and fully is our view of this doctrine asserted by Dr. A. G. Fairchild, in his Great Supper. He says: "Sinners are urged to come to Christ, inasmuch as their inability is an inability of will, which can furnish no just grounds of excuse for disobedience. The reason that they cannot truly come to the Savior is, that they are not cordially willing. It is not their choice to come. We do not, therefore, teach that 'sinners are bound hand and foot,' and thus prevented from coming to Christ though desirous to do so. *They would be able*, if they were truly willing."—pp. 35, 36. "What hinders them from coming? Nothing in the universe, but their own *voluntary*, and cherished sinfulness. Since they choose to stay away, they cannot throw the blame of their perdition on God, and say, let them do what they will, they must be lost. Of what can they complain? That they were not invited to the feast? No. That the provision was not sufficient? No. Did they come, and were refused admittance? No. Did they earnestly desire to come, but were prevented? No. Of what, then, can they

complain, unless of this—that they were not constrained to do what they were unwilling to do.”—p. 45.

I am happy here to say, that I concur in nearly all that Dr. Wood has said in his “Old and New Theology,” and that Dr. Rice has said in his “Old and New Schools,” on the subject of Human Ability—*except their misapprehensions*, perhaps their *excusable* misapprehensions of our views of this doctrine. I say *excusable*; for I do think that *some* of us, in our eagerness to show the absurdity and unrighteousness of what we *thought* to be the views of our Old School brethren, have used such strong and unguarded expressions as have given them wrong impressions of our *own* views. I regard this as one of the most difficult points in theology: one, therefore, on which controversialists are very apt to mistake each other’s meaning.

While Drs. Rice, Wood, and others, admit that the New School believe in the total depravity of the will, they complain that we exalt *natural* ability so much as to make it overtop this depravity. Or, in the language of Dr. R., that we “exalt human ability, so as almost to make the operations of the Holy Spirit unnecessary.” But these brethren would not charge us thus, if they kept it in mind, that we believe as firmly as they do, that this depravity of the will makes it *certain* (though not *necessary*) that men will continue in sin, till renewed by the Spirit of God. Consequently, they have not an adequate recuperative, or self-renovating power. We believe that *natural ability*, and *moral inability* are perfectly distinct, and have little or no influence on each other. And when we say a man has power to change his course, we only mean he could change it, *if he chose*; and that his will is free; in other words, he is not constrained to continue his present choice of a sinful course. We assert the *freedom* of his will; but not the self-determining power of his will: much less the power of self-regeneration. Regeneration is *God’s* act upon the sinner’s heart, while repentance and faith, are a man’s *own* acts, acts that he can, but *never will* put forth without renewing grace. The distinction may be imperfectly illustrated thus: A father commands his son to go to his work in the field. And though he is perfectly able to do the duty commanded, yet he refuses. The father

therefore chastises him, till he is effectually persuaded to obey. But who would suppose, that to say *the son had power at first to obey*, was the same as to say *he had the power to lash himself into obedience*? Self-regeneration is not only an impossibility: it is utter *nonsense*.

Dr. Wood (pp. 167–182) has quoted largely from Dr. Gilbert, to show that he held to *gradual* regeneration. I have never seen the tract from which he quotes. But it seems to me from the extracts themselves, that Dr. G. was more incorrect in his use of terms, than in his statement of facts. Conviction and sanctification, which are indeed *gradual*, he seems to confound with regeneration: while, in truth, conviction makes no part of it; and regeneration (taking place at the point B. in his diagram) is the commencement of sanctification, and must therefore be instantaneous. But be Dr. G.'s views on this point what they may, I know of none in the New School connection who hold to either *gradual* or *self-regeneration*. Indeed, the charge of holding them was strenuously repelled by the New School, in the General Assembly, and the Auburn Convention of 1837. They said: "Regeneration is a radical change of heart, *produced by the special operation of the Holy Spirit*," determining the sinner to that which is good, "and is *in all cases instantaneous*."

I suppose it will not be doubted by any reader, that the New School hold the view of human ability which has here been maintained, viz: that man has all the natural ability which is needful for doing the will of God: so that he is perfectly inexcusable for not doing it; and yet, is perfectly destitute of *moral power*: that is, he is so fixed in his aversion to God's will, that he never will obey it, till renewed by the Spirit of God. But if any doubt it, their doubts will be removed on reading the following averments, made in the Assembly and Convention mentioned above: "All mankind become *morally corrupt*, and liable to death, temporal and eternal. Infants come into the world with a nature inclined to evil and only evil. While sinners have all the *faculties* necessary to a perfect moral agency, and a just accountability, such is *their love of sin*, and *opposition to God and his law*, that, independently of the *renewing influences*, or almighty energy

of the Holy Spirit, they *never will* comply with the commands of God. While all such as reject the gospel of Christ, do it not of coercion, but freely, and all who embrace it, do it, not by coercion, but freely. The reason why some differ from others is, that *God* has made them to differ."

It only remains for us to inquire,

3. Whether this view of Ability is in accordance with the language of our standards? And it hardly seems needful to quote more than one paragraph from them; for this will bring out the only point on which it can be thought to conflict with the Confession, or the Catechisms. It is found in Confession of Faith, Chap. 9, Sec. 3. "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good, accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto."

The loss of ability here spoken of, is that which pertains not to the body or intellect, but of the *will*. It teaches, then, not a *natural*, but a *moral* inability; the very inability insisted on, in the foregoing pages; an inability concerning which we have seen that the Old and New Schools agree. With the first clause of this paragraph, then, this view has no conflict. And the latter clause must be in keeping with the former. "Strength," in this clause, then, does not mean *natural*, but *moral* strength or power, that is, *moral ability*. And hence the paragraph itself teaches that the loss of this "strength," or *ability*, is owing to the fact that man is "altogether averse from that which is good." That is, his *inability* is his *unwillingness*. The meaning of the clause, then, is that man has not *moral* ability to "convert himself," in other words, to turn to God. And this we have seen is precisely the belief, both of Old School and New. Man can neither turn to God, nor prepare himself to do so without *moral* power; that is, a "willing mind;" and of that he has *none*. So, when our standards speak of the need of divine *aid*, to *enable* man to do his duty, (as in Confession of Faith, Chap. 10, Sec. 2; Chap. 16, Sec. 3.

Larger Catechism, Ans. 149, and Shorter Catechism, Ans. 82,) they mean not that any *natural* strength of body or mind is needed. Neither is any *such* strength ever given in regeneration.

And now I call again for the candid decision of the reader. I ask whether as regards the doctrine of Human Ability, the New School are dishonest and hypocritical in subscribing to our Confession and Catechisms? Finally, I ask whether as regards *any* of the doctrines examined in this tract, the subscription of the New School to our standards, is what Dr. Smith declared it to be, that is, "little better than mockery?" Whether, as he said, we might "with as much propriety subscribe the Koran?" Whether, in explaining the Confession, we "either make it mean nothing at all, or something the very reverse of its obvious meaning?" Let the reader judge, too, whether, as Dr. J. C. Lord has said, we caricature the doctrines of grace, and of the Confession of Faith, as if they embodied all that is inconsistent, perverse and monstrous?" Whether, while we profess to be Presbyterians, we are, as he intimates, only Judaizers, Pelagians, and Papists? And whether the like epithets bestowed upon us by others of the Old School, are merited?

I know I have here investigated but a small portion of our standards. But those that I have examined are the only ones, I think, which any intelligent Calvinist would regard as conflicting with the New School opinions that have now been considered. And I challenge a more thorough investigation. Let the reader, let all Presbyterians search our Book through, and see if there is any thing in it, rightly understood, to scorch a hair of our heads. Ah, if all would examine our opinions, and our standards, candidly, I think we should no longer be taunted as pseudo-Calvinists, and no longer held out before the world as a set of designing and false-hearted men.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

If the foregoing investigations have been properly conducted, they lead us to the safe conclusion that the doctrinal differences between the two schools are few, at most, and comparatively unimportant. They show that if the Old School differ *at all* from the New, on Imputation, it is in believing that mankind are born with a corrupt nature, as a *literal* and *deserved punishment* upon *them* for Adam's sin : or, at least, that they suffer pain and death as a *literal penalty* for his sin : (both of which views their accredited authors appear to deny.) While the New School believe, on the other hand, that in consequence of Adam's sin, his posterity became corrupt, neither *deservedly* nor unjustly, but by the sovereign and holy purpose of God. The pain and death endured, they believe to be inflicted on the principle of "social liabilities," just as we suffer through the misconduct of our parents ; in which case no criminality is charged upon us : or that they are inflicted as a *literal punishment* for those *free* and therefore *sinful* exercises and actions, which are the voluntary outgoing of native corruption. And these very views many of the Old School *seem* to adopt.

Again, if the Old School differ at all from the New, on the doctrine of Original Sin, it must be in that *they* believe there is a *blameworthiness*, a *positive criminality* in the bare *possession* of native depravity—something literally and positively sinful, *lying back of moral exercise* : (an opinion which they oftentimes *appear* to repudiate.) While we of the New School believe, that all the *blame*, and *literal punishment* inflicted, are due only to man's

free sinful exercise, (specific or generic,) and to his *voluntary action*.

Again, if the Old School differ from us at all, on the Atonement, it must be in that *they* believe Christ suffered the exact *penalty of the law*; (though many of their ablest writers disavow it.) While the most of us believe (what these able writers avow,) that Christ suffered what his Father accepted as an ample *substitute* for that penalty: both schools believing that his sufferings, whether we call them the *penalty itself*, or its *substitute*, are sufficient to satisfy the justice of God in the pardon of the penitent. Or, it must be in that the Old School believe the atonement to have been made for the elect, *alone*; so that no others could be saved, even though they should repent and believe: (a view which many of their own authors repudiate.) While we believe that ample provision was made by the death of Christ for the salvation of *all* men, so that all might be saved *if* they would but repent and believe. And many, if not all, of the Old School teach the very same. Both schools believe, also, that those who are actually saved, are brought to saving repentance and faith, by that influence of the Spirit which Christ purchased for the elect alone, by his obedience and death.

And lastly, if the Old School differ from us at all on Human Ability, it must be in that *they* believe man is in such a sense depraved, that he could not obey the gospel, though ever so much disposed to do so—that he is so ruined in his mental powers as to be under absolute necessity to sin: (a view disowned, I believe, by the most intelligent among them.) While we believe that man is depraved in such a sense, that he is not *literally unable*, but *hopelessly unwilling* to obey the gospel—that he will sin of certainty, but not of *necessity*, till renewed by the Holy Spirit. (And such I suppose to be the view of the great body of our Old School brethren.)

Where, then, are the alarming “Differences of Doctrine,” that have divided the Presbyterian Church into moral antipodes? Where is that supposed occasion of contention and strife, of alienation and hate, by which our family have been so long and grievously convulsed? This question can be answered only by its own echo. And as

to those who have labored so much to prove that there are wide differences between us, are they not solemnly rebuked in the charge of the apostle, "that they strive not about *words to no profit*, but to the *subverting* of the hearers?"—2 Tim. 2: 14.* If the differences were the widest above supposed, they must be unimportant compared with the injury which the division has occasioned.

What if God does bring mankind into being with a corrupt nature? and does inflict many and sore evils upon them? And what if he does all this by way of *literal punishment* upon them for *Adam's sin*? Where, still, is the grievousness of our error in supposing he deals out these inflictions in a *holy sovereignty*, (as he has a right to do,) and not in vindictive justice? Both hypotheses declare God to be righteous in such inflictions.

And what if God does *blame* and *punish* men for merely *having in possession* that corrupt propensity which he has placed within them? Where, still, is the atrocity of believing that he inflicts this censure and suffering, not for their *having* this propensity, but for *yielding to*, and *indulging* it? Is not the *total depravity* of the race in consequence of the sin of Adam, the all-important point as to the doctrines of Imputation and Original Sin? And this point is maintained as firmly by the New School as by the Old.

Again, what if Christ did suffer the exact penalty of the law? and did suffer in no sense for all men? Where, still, is the grievous heresy of believing, that what he suffered was not the identical penalty, (including remorse and sorrow;) but was something else of equal value, and

*It is not in theology alone that groundless disputes occur. Said the editor of the Scientific American, "We do not know how many pens have been worn out by philosophers writing against the *undulatory* theory on the one hand, and the theory of *emanation* on the other; but there is *no difference* between the two *in essence*. The only difference consists in the *words* employed by the reviewers of both theories in darkening their own ideas, and the ideas of their respective champions.

It is well known to philosophers how Leibnitz and Maclaurin and their followers, disputed for thirty years about the true method of estimating the force of moving bodies, and to the no small disgrace of great mathematicians, the controversy was dropped, not ended. It was at last discovered by D'Alembert that both were right, and that they had been hammering at each other with mere terms." How much these resemble our Old and New School controversy.

which was therefore as acceptable to God, as the penalty itself. Wherein is the great difference when, in either case, Christ's sufferings are the same in fact, have precisely the same efficacy, and accomplish the same end? Is not the *sufficiency* of Christ's sufferings to sustain the justice and authority of God, in saving sinners, the *only essential point* in the doctrine of atonement? And since both Schools believe the sufferings of Christ to be the same, that is, just such as the Evangelists *say* he suffered, wherein is it a question of such mighty importance, whether these sufferings are considered to be the identical *penalty of the law*, or something else of *equal value*? What is the difference between paying a debt in *gold* or *paper*, when they are to the creditor of equal value? And what great matter is it, whether we believe, that Christ died for the *elect only*? or whether we believe he died for *all* men, in such a sense, that they *could* be saved, *if they* would but repent and believe; *yet*, that he died moreover to *secure* the salvation of the elect alone? since, on either supposition, the *intention* and event would be exactly the same.

And again, what if sinners are depraved in such a sense, that they could not obey the gospel, though ever so willing to do it? Where, still, is the great sin or danger of believing their inability consists in the *perversion of their wills*, and not in the derangement of their *natural powers*? Does not the essential element of inability lie in the fact, that of a certainty, sinners will never obey the gospel, till renewed by the Spirit of God? Wherein, then, is the wickedness or danger in believing the whole difficulty lies in the affections and will? especially, as it is admitted on all hands, that these are the first and *only* things which keep men from obeying the gospel; and since they are the only things rectified in regeneration.

Still, I believe that very few in the Old School connection, would avow the ultra views which have just been alluded to. How many can be found who insist that God *inflicts* depravity upon man as the *literal penalty* of Adam's sin? and then threatens to punish the depravity that is thus inflicted, with pain, and death, and woe? Is not the *punishment of a penalty* too preposterous for any to believe? How many can believe that he *blames*

and threatens men for having a nature which he gave, and they were passive and involuntary in receiving, and to which they have as yet never yielded? How many can be found who believe that no provision has been made for the salvation of the non-elect, who nevertheless are invited to come and be saved, and are threatened with the greater damnation, because they reject a salvation that never was provided for them. And how many can be found, who believe the unregenerate could not obey the gospel, though ever so much disposed to obey; and have to suffer the greater wrath for not doing what they have "no ability of any kind" to do? For one, I think the number of our Old School brethren who hold these dogmas, is very small. I would confidently appeal to the mass in that connection, and ask: "Do you hold these views?" And if they *did* hold them, I should ardently desire them to make a plain and positive avowal of them: as it would show more evidently the relative positions of the parties in the Presbyterian Church. But I am confident that the great mass of the Old School reject them, and hold the same views with ourselves. And if they tolerate them in their *own* connection, why should they severely condemn them in *ours*? Is not "consistency a jewel?"

But I do not insist that there is *no* difference at all between the belief of the Old School and the New; nor that the difference is of *no importance*: but that it is *comparatively* unimportant; because it is not *essential* in the Calvinistic system. And much of the *apparent* difference pertains to the *modes* of *explaining* and *illustrating* the doctrines in dispute, rather than to the *essence* of them. Two persons may be looking at the same time, but from different stand-points, at the same object. And although the object seen is the same, the views are different; though both views be correct, one may be better than the other. If it be asked, then, why the New School are not willing to give up their favorite modes of explanation and illustration, I answer, Because we think them better suited than those of the Old School to set the doctrines of grace in a favorable light before the moral sense of mankind, in that they show these doctrines more evidently to accord with

natural justice ; thus showing the divine government in a more amiable aspect ; and more fully “commending” these doctrines “to every man’s conscience, in the sight of God.”

To specify: we think the government of God in connecting the depravity of man with the first sin of Adam, and in subjecting them thereby to pain and wo, is more evidently in accordance with natural rectitude, when spoken of as acts of *sovereignty*, than as acts of *punitive* justice. And we think the pain and wo inflicted upon us, as a consequence of this depravity, is more evidently in accordance with such rectitude, when spoken of as a punishment for the *indulgence* of that depravity, than when spoken of as if it were for the mere *possession* of such depravity. We think, too, that the death of Christ for sinners is more evidently according to reason and righteousness, when spoken of as a *substitute* for the punishment of sin, than when spoken of as if it were the identical punishment to which sinners are condemned ; which *seems* to indicate that Christ suffered sorrow and remorse for us. And we think the atonement provided by his death is more evidently in accordance with the invitations, and threatenings of the gospel, when spoken of as *made for all men*, than as made *only* for the *elect* ; for the latter mode of expressing it is apt to awaken the inquiry, *how the universal offers of salvation can be sincere?* And especially is it difficult in such a case to see what foundation there is for the following divine lamentations over lost sinners : “ Oh that my people had hearkened unto my commandments ! then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea.”—Isa. 48 : 18. “ Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not.”—Mat. 23 : 37. For, how could the Lord have made the peace of these sinners perpetual, and gathered them under his saving protection, if no atonement had been made for them ? And finally, we think the *inability* of man to obey the gospel is more evidently in accordance with the sincere, universal offers of life, when spoken of as a *moral* inability, or the inability of *unwillingness*,

than when spoken of in a way which gives the impression, that sinners are *in every respect unable* to comply with the offers of salvation. For it is difficult, under such an impression, to see how God can be sincere in his offers; and how he can be righteous in condemning them to a *deeper* damnation, for not accepting them, while *utterly unable* to do so. On these accounts, *we would discourage, in technical theology, those favorite phraseologies of our Old School brethren, by which we have so often been misled ourselves, as to their real views on the doctrines of grace, and which we think would be likely to mislead others.*

Our brethren of the other school say, their views and modes of expression are more simple and plain than ours. But we think them more complex and bewildering. They say, we perplex by our metaphysics. And this is just what we say they are doing. Some of their interpretations of scripture are more *literal* than ours. And in these they may think they are more simple. But we think that by understanding literally what is meant to be taken metaphorically, they are led into the more metaphysical inconsistencies.

The foregoing thoughts have not been presented for the purpose of effecting an ecclesiastic reunion. No: I am in more danger of disdaining, than of seeking such a union. But I would do neither. I would not seek for a reunion, till there is less crimination and more love between us. I have presented the foregoing for the purpose of promoting that right understanding, harmony and love, that ought to exist in all the family of Christ, and especially among brethren so nearly allied, and so nearly alike as to doctrine and order. I have done it, also, because truth is better than error; and because a correct understanding of each other's position is better than misapprehension. I have done it because I believe that while the two portions of the Presbyterian family remain apart, they would *feel* better, and *be* better, and would do much more for the welfare of wretched, ruined humanity, if they would see each other *just as they are*—would mutually and candidly confess their past misapprehensions of each other—and would resolve that hereafter they will “love

each other with a pure heart, fervently." How much better, if both schools had more of that "charity which thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth."

I hope these pages will not often encounter a spirit that I have lately seen manifested; a spirit of determination to insist at all events, that there is a wide difference between "Old and New Theology," and that says, "The decision has been made. Disinterested observers have been generally forced to admit that there are material variations in faith between the two bodies."—Wood, p. 12. In reply to this remark, I would say, that this author's observations of the public mind are widely different from mine. According to mine, many are inquiring what is the difference between the two schools, while few are able to answer them, and fewer still are giving the right answer. And many others are heard to say, the differences must be trivial. If, however, any "disinterested observers" are "forced to admit" them to be "material," it is no wonder, since so much is said through misapprehension, or otherwise, to give them an unreal magnitude. It is the more important, therefore, that such mistakes be corrected.

Great evils have arisen from the division of our brotherhood. Many congregations and even families have been filled with heart-burning and strife. Many churches have been rendered too weak to support the gospel; and others entirely broken up. Other denominations have rooted them out and absorbed them. The latter event were not to be so much lamented, if our doctrine and order were not of unrivaled excellence. When either party causes the division of a Church, the other is loud in condemning it. And I know not but the two schools may be nearly equal in this fault. I only know, that in some instances the New School have lost much, numerically, by their moderation. If they had driven the plough share of division as rapidly and as far as they might, they would have secured many ministers and churches that are now in the Old School connection. But the worst thing of the division is the bitterness with which the parties have been "biting and devouring one another;" consuming their piety in the fire of party zeal. How important, then, to cultivate that

peace and love, by which they might move on separately, yet harmoniously together, as distinct tribes of Israel.

It is true that some good has resulted from the division of our body. And I desire to rejoice in it, though most of it has taken place in the Old School connection. This division has done them much good, in calling out their zeal and efforts in revivals, and their liberality and enterprise. They have been the more stimulated to these things, I think, as aware that they had been thought to be deficient in them before. And "I therein rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." I recollect the time when the terms, "aggression," and "aggressive movements," as used by Albert Barnes, gave great offence to many of our Old School brethren. But now these terms are watchwords among them. Their efforts in Missions and Church extension are truly commendable. Their system of parish schools, and their Board of Publication, I have long and much admired. And I wish I could provoke my New School brethren to imitate and excel them. Yet I cannot approve of the boast of some respecting their prosperity. They seem to regard it as Heaven's seal of approbation on the Exscinding Act. (See "Old and New Schools."—p. 6.) They ought to know that prosperity is not always a proof of an upright course. And if they need to learn this truth, I would refer them to the error of the friends of Job, in supposing that wickedness of life is the only cause of affliction; and to the foolishness of the psalmist, when he "saw the prosperity of the wicked," Ps. 73: and to the many instances of scripture in which oppressors have prospered. They ought to consider, too, that much of their increase and success is to be traced to the decision of the United States Court, in Bank, rather than to the distinguishing influences of the Spirit of God; as it gave them the chartered funds, and many accompanying advantages. I know of some who determined to side with that Assembly, with which this tribunal of our country should side. And it is reasonable to believe that very many have given preference to the Old School, on the same ground. They have followed "the loaves and fishes."

But I regret to believe, on the other hand, that our New School brethren have in a measure fallen asleep over their

reputation for activity and zeal in revivals, and for their enterprise and liberality in spreading the gospel. Instead of making the needed extra efforts to repair the loss sustained by the decision of the Court, they have seemed to be satisfied with their former degree of faithfulness. And as they have looked upon the aggressive movements of the Old School, they have attributed them to sectarian zeal: and having, as their motto, "Charity and liberality to all evangelical denominations," they have been slow to emulate such movements. How much better, however, had they *done the right thing*, taking care at the same time, *to have the right motive*. I do not mean by these remarks that my brethren have been very signally deficient in their efforts for "church extension;" yet I do mean to say, they have fallen far short of what their duty and their prosperity have required of them. I bless God, however, that of late they seem to "remember their first love."

Oh that the time might come, and come speedily, when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim"—when they shall fly upon the shoulders of the "enemies of God, toward the West, and spoil them of the East together."