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
# BATTLE OF FIRST MANASSAS or FIRST BULL RUN.

July 21, 1861.

Confeds., 28,000.                      Federals, 35,000.

Scale: 5 miles, Stone Bridge to Manassas Junction.

BEAUREGARD & JOHNSTON v. McDOWELL.




# BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.

March 23, 1862.

Federals, 7,000-9,000 (Shields).

Confeds. 3,400 (Jackson).

Scale: 2½ miles, Winchester to Kernstown.



# BATTLE OF McDOWELL.


May 8, 1862.


Confeds., 6,000.

Federals, 6,000.

Scale: 1 mile, from Hull's Hill to Sitlington's Hill.

JACKSON v. MILROY.





# BATTLES OF FRONT ROYAL & WINCHESTER.

May 23 & May 25, 1862.

Federals, 6,500 (Banks).  
Confeds., 16,000 (Jackson).

Scale: Strasburg to Winchester, 18 miles.


# BATTLE OF CROSS KEYS.

June 8, 1862.

Confeds., 6,000 (Ewell).

Federals, 12,000 (Frémont).

Scale. Cross Keys to Harrisonburg, 6 miles.




# BATTLE OF PORT REPUBLIC.

June 9, 1862.

Confeds., 6,000 (Jackson).

Federals, 3,500 (Tyler)

Scale: Port Republic to Lewiston, 2 miles.





# BATTLE OF SECOND MANASSAS or, SECOND BULL RUN.

August 30, 1862.

Federals, 65,000 (Pope). Confeds., 50,000 (Lee).

Scale: 2½ miles, from Groveton to Stone Bridge.





# BATTLE OF ANTIETAM or SHARPSBURG.

September 17, 1862.

Confederate front, 6 miles.

Confeds., 45,000.

Federals, 90,000.

LEE v. McCLELLAN.

# BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.


December 13, 1862.


Confederate front, 6 miles.

Federals, 110,000.

Confeds., 70,000.

LEE v. BURNSIDE.






 10,000 Federal Cav.

# BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

May 1-5, 1862.

To Richmond  
↓

Confeds., 60,000 (Lee).  
 Federals, 130,000 (Hooker).  
 Scale: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, 10 miles.




WEST VIRGINIA

White House Bridge and Columbia Bridge are S.W. of Luray over the S. Fork.

### SHENANDOAH VALLEY.


Scale: Strasburg to Winchester, 18 miles.

The Valley Turnpike Road goes from Staunton to Williamsport.



SCALE Richmond to Philadelphia, 60 Miles

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NOTES ON THE LIFE OF  
STONEWALL JACKSON  
AND ON HIS CAMPAIGNING IN VIRGINIA,  
1861-1863.



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STONEWALL JACKSON  
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1861-1863.

BY

J. H. ANDERSON, F.R.Hist.Soc.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW; LATE LECTURER AT KING'S COLL., LONDON; SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE  
IN INDIAN CIVIL, AND HOME CIVIL (CLASS I.) EXAMINATIONS; LECTURER ON  
MILITARY HISTORY AND STRATEGY AT 5, LEXHAM GARDENS, W.

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
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NOVEMBER, 1904, WITH ANSWERS.

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## PREFACE.

FOR Promotion Examinations of November, 1904, and of May, 1905, is prescribed the study of Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*, more especially of that portion dealing with the Shenandoah Valley Campaign (April, 1861, to June 9th, 1862). These notes are intended as an aid to the study of those two volumes, and will have to be read in conjunction with them. It is important that Colonel Henderson's comments should be carefully read, and the pages on which they are to be found are always given.

The maps and plans are mere diagrams. The numbers, as to which there is great discrepancy, are frequently only approximately accurate. The quotations are not verbatim. The authorities used are:—Doyle's *History of America*; Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*, and *Fredericksburg*; Palfrey's *Antietam and Fredericksburg*; Nicolay's *Outbreak of the Rebellion*; Ropes' *Army under Pope*; Webb's *Peninsula*; Hamley's *Operations of War*; Allan's *Valley Campaign and Army of Northern Virginia*; Maguire's *Campaigns in Virginia*; Kellogg's *Shenandoah Valley*.

It should be noted that this war first saw any extensive employment of breech-loaders, ironclads, and railways.

The most important chapters in Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson* are :—Lord Wolseley's Introduction, chapters v., vi., viii., ix., x., xi., xii., xvi., xvii., xx., xxiii., xxiv.

Officers should try to learn the maps of Virginia and of the Valley by drawing them, and then they should place on their own rough maps the marches of the troops, especially Jackson's.

As to battles, it is only necessary to have a very general idea of them, say, of *First Bull Run, Cross Keys, Port Republic, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville. Particularly study operations in the Valley, April, 1861, to June, 1862.*

In discussing the strategy, I have intentionally adopted the diagrammatic or geometrical views of Jomini and Hamley, though I am aware of the reaction against those views. Probably the truth lies between the two extremes, *i.e.*, between the views of the two above writers, and the views of those who reckon organisation and logistic skill as the causes of success.

I should like to state that in my study of these campaigns I have been much assisted by the kindly advice of Lt.-Col. W. H. James, late R.E.

## LIST OF DIAGRAMS.

*In pocket at end of Book.*

1. First Bull Run or Manassas.
2. Kernstown.
3. McDowell.
4. Front Royal and Winchester.
5. Cross Keys.
6. Port Republic.
7. Second Bull Run or Manassas.
8. The Antietam or Sharpsburg.
9. Fredericksburg.
10. Chancellorsville.
11. Shenandoah Valley.
12. Virginia.
13. United States.

## LIST OF DATES.

1824. Birth of Jackson.
1842. Jackson at West Point.
- 1845-8. The war with Mexico.
- 1851-61. Jackson a professor at Lexington.
1854. Death of his first wife.
1857. Second marriage.
1859. John Brown executed at Harper's Ferry.
1861. Lincoln, President.
- April 13. Confederates took Fort Sumter.
- 1861-5. Civil War.
- April 29. Jackson at Harper's Ferry.
- May 24. General Joseph E. Johnston in  
        command at Harper's Ferry.
- June 15. Johnston retired on Winchester.
- July 3. Jackson made Brigadier-General.
- July 21. Battle of First Bull Run or First  
        Manassas.
- Nov. 4. Jackson as a Major-General at  
        Winchester in command of the Valley.
- Dec. 6-21. Jackson's expedition against the  
        Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.
- Dec. 25. Loring joined Jackson.
1862. Jan. 1-14. Jackson's Romney Expedition.

1862. Jan. Jackson's disagreement with the Secretary's interference.
- Feb. 24-7. Banks crossed at Harper's Ferry.
- March 7. Johnston evacuated Centreville.
- March 12. Banks in Winchester; Jackson retiring southwards towards Mount Jackson.
- March 17. McClellan embarked at Alexandria.
- March 23. Battle of Kernstown.
- April 2. McClellan at Fort Monroe.
- April 17. Banks on Harrisonburg.
- April 19. Jackson in Swift Run Gap.
- April 29. Jackson in command of Ed. Johnson and of Ewell.
- May 8. Battle of McDowell.
- May 23. Combat of Front Royal.
- May 25. Battle of Winchester.
- May 31-June 1. Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.
- June 6. Death of Ashby.
- June 8. Battle of Cross Keys.
- June 9. Battle of Port Republic.
- June 17. Jackson *en route* for Richmond.
- June 25-July 1. The Seven Days' Battles.
- Aug. 9. Battle of Cedar Mount.
- Aug. 25. Jackson's flank march.
- Aug. 28. Battle of Gainesville.
- Aug. 29. Battle of Groveton.
- Aug. 30. Battle of Second Manassas or Second Bull Run.
- Sep. 6. Lee crossed the River Potomac.

1862. Sep. 15. Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry.  
Sep. 17. Battle of Sharpsburg or the Antietam.  
Oct. 11. Jackson made Lt.-General.  
Dec. 13. Battle of Fredericksburg.
1863. May 1-5. Battle of Chancellorsville.  
May 10. Death of Jackson.

## THE TROOPS.

THE organisation of the forces may best be shown by giving the Federal and the Confederate troops at Winchester, May 25th, 1862. Allan, in his *Valley Campaign*, on page 109, states that Banks's numbers were "about 6,400. Jackson's force was about 15,000."

### FEDERAL TROOPS.

The Division of General Williams consisted of two infantry brigades, *i.e.*, of Donnelly's Brigade of three regiments (numbering 1,700), and of Gordon's Brigade of five regiments (numbering 2,958). It also included 1,500 cavalry under Broadhead and Hatch. The guns numbered 16 in three batteries.

### CONFEDERATE TROOPS.

The Division of General Jackson consisted of three infantry brigades, under Winder, Campbell, and Taliaferro respectively.

The Division of General Ewell consisted of four brigades, under Taylor, Trimble, Elzey, and Scott respectively.

The cavalry were commanded by Ashby and Stuart. As to guns, there were 48 in eleven batteries.

As to armament, the rifles were muzzle-loaders, effective at 250 yards; the rifled artillery was effective at 2,000 yards, but the Confederate artillery was less numerous and less powerful than that of their opponents. Of the United States regular troops most joined the Federal cause: the other troops were both in the North and in the South extremely ill-disciplined, though the Southerners were naturally adapted to soldiering and their cavalry was almost invariably superior to the Federal horsemen; as to the infantry, there was little to choose between the two sides, courage in particular being conspicuous.

NOTES ON THE LIFE OF  
STONEWALL JACKSON  
AND ON HIS CAMPAIGNING IN VIRGINIA,  
1861-1863.

CHAPTER I.

THOMAS J. JACKSON was born in 1824 at Clarksburg, in West Virginia, and in 1842, as a cadet, entered West Point Academy, where four years later he obtained a commission in the Artillery. When war broke out in 1845 between the United States and Mexico, General Scott landed with an expedition at Vera Cruz (1847), and marched with flying or movable magazine on Mexico City, which yielded to his arms; during these operations Jackson did good service, for which he was breveted major: he had two guns assigned to him, and with them displayed great power of initiative during the attack on the city. Peace was arranged in 1848, and the future hero of the Shenandoah took up duty in a fort near New York.

In 1851 he became a professor in the Lexington

Military Institute, a post he held for ten years. It was at Lexington that his first wife died, and that he married his second : it was there that his character assumed its ascetic cast, and from there he paid a visit to Harper's Ferry, when (in 1859) John Brown, the pro-negro agitator, was hanged at that celebrated spot ; and it is at Lexington that he lies buried.

## CHAPTER II.

THE cause of the great American Civil War, or War of Secession (1861-65), was that the Northern (Stars and Stripes) and Southern (Stars and Bars) States, divided by Mason and Dixon's Line, differed on the question of negro slavery, and that the South held the view that any State had the right to secede from the Union if it chose. The entrance into office of President Abraham Lincoln, March 4th, 1861, an opponent of slavery, brought matters to an issue, and on April 13th the Confederate capture of the Federal Fort Sumter at Charleston, in South Carolina, led to a state of war. The Confederates, or Southerners, numbered about six millions of whites, and included the following States: South and North Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, Arkansas, and East Virginia. On the opposing side the Federals, or Northerners, numbered not fewer than twenty millions of whites, and included the following States: All the Northern and North-eastern States, *e.g.*, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, West Virginia; and in the west, California and Oregon.

On the borderland lay the three doubtful States: Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland.

#### GEOGRAPHY OF THE THEATRE OF WAR.

Doyle, in his *America*, says: "The territory of the South might be looked on as a vast fortress, guarded by the Potomac, the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Atlantic. It possessed many elements of strength, and one marked weakness, *i.e.*, the South could not boast of any vessels, and thus could easily be blockaded by Lincoln, though by doing so the Federal President almost admitted that he was dealing not with rebels, but with a separate nation." Here should be read Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*, volume i. pages 106-14, where the theatre of war is described.

The most important portion of the theatre of war was Virginia; this State comprised West Virginia, which was attached to the Union cause, and Virginia, which espoused the side of secession. Virginia was divided into the Valley of the Shenandoah (described in Chapter IV.), and the plain lying east of the Blue Ridge. The roads in this plain were very bad, and forests were not rare, *e.g.*, the forest of the wilderness near Chancellorsville; rivers, too, were formidable obstacles, *e.g.*, the Rappahannock, etc. For all these reasons the railways were of supreme importance, more especially to the numerous armies of the North.

Chief railways were :—

- I. Baltimore and Ohio through Harper's Ferry.
- II. Orange and Alexandria from Washington to Gordonsville, where it branched to the west, and to the east to Richmond.
- III. Manassas Gap Railway.
- IV. Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway.

#### THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

It is to be noted that the Confederates possessed a salient or convex frontier, whilst the Federals possessed a re-entrant or concave one; this is so whether you look at the line of the Rivers Potomac and James (after the destruction of the Southern vessel, the *Merrimac*, May 11th, 1862), or at the line of the Atlantic seaboard and of the Gulf of Mexico. As Richmond, the base of the Southerners, was inside this projection, they could not be forced to form front to a flank, and could always fall back concentrically; the disadvantages arising from a base situated farther back (*i.e.*, in this case to the west of the Mississippi River) than the salient frontier (provided that it is impossible to take the offensive) are well illustrated by the French position in 1870 and by the British position in Natal in 1899—in those two cases it would have been well for the defender to have retired from the salient.

The command of the sea gave considerable advantage to the Union armies, and indeed gave them

always the usual benefit of an extensive base, *i.e.*, it was almost impossible completely to intercept them ; on the other hand, during 1861 and 1862 at least, the initiative was, generally speaking, with the Confederates, who were also much helped by the fact that the population was favourable to them, and that thus they could shift their bases. The Confederate campaign was conducted on single, combined, and interior lines ; that of their opponents on double, independent, and exterior lines, and in this case the former succeeded, as in 1796 in Germany, when the Archduke Charles acted on combined lines against the French Generals, Jourdan and Moreau.

### CHAPTER III.

ON April 29th, 1861, Colonel Jackson took command of 4,500 men at Harper's Ferry, covering Winchester, the real key of the important Shenandoah Valley; he was opposed by General Patterson with 14,000 Federals on the northern bank, whilst in West Virginia the Confederate Militia were overpowered by the Federals under General G. B. McClellan. Towards the end of May, General Joseph E. Johnston succeeded to the command at Harper's Ferry, his numbers being raised to 10,000, and on Patterson crossing the Potomac to Martinsburg the Southern general in July retired on Winchester, his small body of cavalry being led by the celebrated J. E. B. Stuart, and Jackson commanding the brigade afterwards famous as the Stonewall Brigade. It was during this advance of Patterson that Jackson and Stuart checked him in the rearguard action at Falling Waters, midway between Martinsburg and Williamsport—for a detailed account, see Henderson, vol. i. pp. 128–30. At this time General Beauregard held Manassas Junction with 20,000 Confederates, threatened in front by the Federal General McDowell's 35,000; Johnston, therefore, knowing the value of interior lines, held Patterson by able demonstrations, and moving without Patterson's knowledge *viâ*

Ashby's Gap, entrained on the Manassas Gap railroad, joining Beauregard just in time for the Battle of First Bull Run or First Manassas, July 21st (see Plan No. 1).

Beauregard was posted south of the Bull Run, and the Federal general, placing a reserve at Centreville and a containing force opposite Beauregard's right, sent a turning force over Sudley Springs against his left, which would have been rolled up but for a charge by Stuart and but for Jackson's vigorous resistance on the Henry Hill (hence his title of Stonewall). The finishing stroke was given by Kirby Smith, who, detraining at Manassas Junction 1,900 men of Johnston's Shenandoah Army, came up on Jackson's left; the Federals fled on Washington, all except the regulars in rout, Johnston leisurely following to Centreville. Here should be read Henderson's discussion of the failure of Johnston to press on to Washington, and his remarks on the tactics of the battle (see vol. i. pp. 153-63). It may be added that if the turning force had moved with its external flank thrown back it would have been in less danger, and that Kirby Smith's tactical employment of the railway was as marked as it was unusual, though Elandslaagte in 1899 affords another instance.

For the rest of 1861, Johnston occupied Centreville, and in West Virginia McClellan practically cleared the Great Kanawha Valley of the Confederate forces, whilst Patterson recrossed to the north bank of the Potomac.

## CHAPTER IV.

ON November 4th, 1861, Jackson, with the rank of Major-General, was appointed to the command of the Shenandoah Valley, in which position he fully realised the importance to the South of controlling the Baltimore and Ohio Railway as well as the Valley of the Monongahela River up to the great lakes, by which means Washington would be severed from the west. Of the Valley itself, Allan, in his *Jackson's Valley Campaign*, gives the following description:—"It is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by other ridges of the Alleghanies or Appalachians. The width varies from twelve to twenty-four miles. Near Front Royal the Shenandoah divides into two forks, between which run the Massanutton Mountains; on the western side of these mountains lies the Valley. On the eastern side, *i.e.*, between the Blue Ridge and the Massanuttons, lies the Luray Valley. Through the Valley runs the North Fork until it joins the South Fork at Front Royal; the South Fork runs through the Luray Valley. This Fork is made up of the North, Middle, and South Rivers, which unite near Port Republic.

“The great Valley turnpike passes through Staunton, Newmarket, Winchester, and on to the Potomac River, whilst an inferior road traverses the Luray Valley. These two roads are connected by a road leading from Newmarket right across the Massanuttons.” Though most of the roads were not good, yet the Valley generally was favourable for troops to manœuvre. The most important strategic points were Winchester and Staunton; as to the celebrated Harper’s Ferry, it was tactically untenable, but it connected the Confederate States with Maryland, it commanded the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and was regarded by both sides as a sort of Thermopylæ. It should be noted that the railways in the Valley, viz., the Baltimore and Ohio with branch Harper’s Ferry–Winchester, the Manassas Gap rail up to Mount Jackson, and the Virginia Central through Staunton, did not materially affect the operations, except as lines of supply. The most important bridges were over the South Fork, viz., Front Royal, White House, Columbia, Conrad’s Store, and over the North River at Port Republic. To the Federals the Valley, as it led them away from Richmond, was less important than to the Confederates, who from it drew large supplies and who possessed in it a covered line of operation against Washington. Late in the war Sheridan, realising this, laid it waste, thereby rendering it useless to the Southern forces.

At the end of 1861 General McClellan, lately appointed to command the Union forces, was in

Washington, whilst Johnston, with the Confederate Army, lay at Centreville, and Jackson occupied Winchester with his Stonewall Brigade, some militia, and Colonel Turner Ashby's irregular horsemen, the last named patrolling the Potomac River. Jackson had to consider Banks's (who had succeeded Patterson) 18,000 Federals on the north bank, Kelly's 5,000 at Romney, and a large hostile force under Rosecrans on the Great Kanawha River, whence it might move on the important town of Staunton—this town was protected by winter, by a difficult country, and by troops of Loring and E. Johnson; his first exploit was during December to destroy a dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, west of Williamsport. As on Christmas Day some militia under General Loring raised the Winchester troops to 11,000, and as Banks seemed inclined to advance, Jackson on New Year's Day, 1862, promptly took the offensive against that general, moving in bitter weather on Bath and Hancock, where he took many stores and did much damage. He then turned on Romney, which the enemy evacuated with the loss of their magazines, January 14th. The unruly character of Loring's command prevented anything more; he consequently left Loring at Romney and marched the rest of his men to Winchester. Here should be read Henderson's appreciation of the results of this expedition (vol. i. pp. 195-8).

During this month of January he was instructed by the Confederate Secretary of War to recall Loring,

that officer then being detached from Jackson's command; the latter then sent in his resignation, which, however, was finally withdrawn. This was a gross case of civilian interference. In the following month of February McClellan's Army of the Potomac, 200,000 strong, near Washington, faced Johnston's 32,000 at Centreville, whilst Jackson, with about 4,000 (the Army of the Valley) at Winchester, had to meet Banks on the north bank of the Potomac River, Shields, who had reoccupied Romney, and perhaps Frémont on the Great Kanawha River.

## CHAPTER V.

AT the end of February Banks, with the divisions of Williams and Shields, 20,000 strong, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and Johnston a few days afterwards fell back from Centreville southwards along the Orange and Alexandria Railway; Jackson, however, clung to Winchester, feeling sure that by so doing he would alarm the President for his communications with the West. As Banks moved forward and occupied Winchester, Jackson retired through Strasburg to Mount Jackson, Shields with one of Banks's divisions, 7,000 strong, following to the former place.

In Washington President Lincoln unwillingly gave his assent to McClellan's plan of transporting his great army down the Potomac River to Fort Monroe, and marching thence on Richmond. The assent was conditional on Washington being rendered secure. Personally Lincoln preferred a direct advance along the Orange and Alexandria Railway as against McClellan's plan, which was "to strike at the enemy in the west and the east (at Nashville in Tennessee and at Richmond) and to assail points on the coast and on the Mississippi, *e.g.*, New Orleans" (Webb, *The*

*Peninsula*). As a fact, McClellan would have preferred to land at Urbana on the Rappahannock and thence to move on the Confederate capital, but Johnston's unexpected retirement from Centreville rendered this inadvisable, and he consequently fell back on the Monroe plan. For the protection of the capital, itself an entrenched camp, he assigned 55,000 men, including the Valley troops. To render Washington more secure Banks retired Shields on Winchester, and despatched his other division (under Williams) eastwards for Manassas Junction; Ashby incorrectly reported Shields as being very weak, and consequently Jackson, marching thirty-six miles in two days, brought on the Battle of Kernstown, March 23rd (see Plan No. 2) in which he numbered 3,400 infantry and 290 cavalry against Shields' 7,000 (Kellogg gives 11,000). He would have waited till the next day had not his position been visible to the enemy, who held a strong position on both sides of the turnpike; his plan of battle was to hold them on the turnpike with half Ashby's mounted men, detach the other half to cover his left, and turn Shields' right by moving along the high ridge with his main body. In spite of the Federal guns on Pritchard's Hill, the Confederates gained the ridge, taking post behind a wall just as a strong body of Federals fell on them from the north; a fierce contest ensued. The Federals, leaving only a small force to contain Ashby on the turnpike, moved more men to the ridge and broke

the Confederate line. Jackson's men, covered by their cavalry on the left, fell back sullenly along the road southwards.

Jackson, defeated tactically, had succeeded strategically, for Kernstown had the following effects:—Williams was ordered back on Winchester; Blenker's division, detached from McClellan, was to move across the Valley to join Frémont in West Virginia; McDowell's army corps of 40,000, also detached from McClellan, was halted at Manassas Junction—an error, for the best protection of Washington was to render McClellan irresistible. Worse still were the President's five separate commands which he then constituted, viz., McClellan in the Yorktown Peninsula, McDowell south of Washington, Banks in the Valley, Frémont in West Virginia, and the Governor of Fort Monroe. McClellan had intended McDowell to move along the north bank of the York River and turn Yorktown: this was now impossible. Here should be read Henderson's tactical comments, vol. i. pp. 250–7. It may be added that the real danger was that the Federals might have held Jackson's left and moved in force along the turnpike.

## CHAPTER VI.

**B**ANKS having arrived, leisurely pursued up the Valley, where Jackson took up a position at Rude's Hill, just south of Mount Jackson, effectually checking the Federal advance and attaining his main object, which was to detain as many of the enemy as possible from helping McClellan. At this period, General Ed. Johnson (Confederate), with 2,800 men near Staunton, was preparing for Milroy, who was approaching with 6,000 men from Frémont's West Virginian Army.

In the middle of April, McClellan (who had landed at Fort Monroe, April 2nd) was operating with his 100,000 men against the Confederate Commander-in-Chief (J. E. Johnston) in the Yorktown Peninsula, whilst in the Valley Banks, with the divisions of Shields and Williams, 20,000 strong, advanced to Harrisonburg, Jackson, with a force now raised to 6,000, of whom one-third were cavalry, rapidly retiring to Swift Run Gap in Elk Run Valley. He thus connected with Ewell's 8,000 men whom J. E. Johnston, during his retirement on Richmond, had left at Stanardsville; and he also menaced Banks's flank. On April 21st the Confederate

President, Davis, named General Lee as Commander-in-Chief, and that officer, in view of the fact that McDowell moved his army corps from Manassas on Fredericksburg with the obvious intention of co-operating with McClellan, placed Ewell and Ed. Johnson, April 29th, under Jackson's command, and the two Southern generals then discussed three possible lines of action which would relieve the situation, viz. :—(1) Leave Ewell in Swift Run Gap to hold Banks, whilst Jackson with Ed. Johnson attacked Milroy; (2) Jackson and Ewell to operate against Banks's rear by the Luray-Newmarket road; (3) Jackson and Ewell to operate against Banks's rear by moving east of the Blue Ridge and then through the Manassas Gap. The first course was preferred, and Ewell having been brought up to Swift Run Gap, Jackson marched his own force up river to Port Republic, then through Brown's Gap to Mechum's Station, and on to Staunton: this difficult route was selected with the view of taking Milroy by surprise. Another and perhaps unintended effect of the movement on Mechum's Station was that the President, in alarm for the capital, halted McDowell at Fredericksburg, where he was contained by 12,000 Confederates under General Anderson, and transferred Shields' Division from Banks to that officer.

Jackson, moving west from Staunton, joined Ed. Johnson, and on May 8th they struck Frémont's advanced troops under Milroy and Schenck in the Battle of McDowell Village (see Plan No. 3). That

village is approached by the road from Staunton running in a defile between Sitlington's Hill on the south and Hull's Hill on the north and crossing the Bull Pasture River by a bridge raked by four Federal guns. On Hull's Hill were some Federal rifles with two guns, but the distance was too great for them; on rising ground west of the bridge were some infantry and a battery; troops lay on the river-bank and round McDowell. Sitlington's Hill was a fine position for his guns, but Jackson would not bring them up because—(1) he wanted to conceal his numbers; (2) it was difficult to drag them up; (3) in case of defeat they would be lost; (4) he meant to send during the night a turning force with guns north-east round Hull's Hill, cut Milroy's retreat to Franklin, and crush him between his own and the turning force. In fact, he merely meant to contain the enemy on the 8th, but Milroy wisely took the offensive, crossing his men by the bridge in order to seize Sitlington's Hill. Jackson, however, occupied the crest in a pronounced curve with the convexity towards the Federals, and on this hill desperate fighting followed, the steepness of the height giving the usual advantage to the attack and the usual disadvantage to the defence. The battle lasted from 4.30 to 8.30 p.m., when the Federals retired. Two of their guns over the river and one on Hull's Hill had fired all the time, but with no effect. The numbers on either side were about 6,000, and the attacker lost fewer men. There

was no immediate pursuit, because cavalry could not act in that terrain; and Milroy and Schenck rapidly fell back on Franklin, covered by the smoke of the forests which they fired, as was done in Portugal in 1811, and by Tantia Topi in the Mutiny, and by Botha in 1900; the Confederate general followed without much effect. Meantime, in the Yorktown Peninsula Johnston had retired before McClellan, whilst the Rivers York and James passed under Federal control, the Southern vessel *Merrimac* having been destroyed on May 11th.

Jackson then countermarched and made for Harrisonburg, whence Banks had fallen back on Strasburg, Jackson taking care to render impassable all roads by which Frémont could reach the southern part of the valley, and thus isolating Banks. The fact was that the President had lost faith in Banks, and so Shields' division was (May 12th) marched off *viâ* Front Royal to join McDowell at Fredericksburg, and Banks himself with his remaining division under Williams was ordered to fall back on Strasburg; it would have been wiser to fall back to Winchester and hold Strasburg and Front Royal with detachments, for thus Banks would have escaped the influence of the parallel obstacle, the Massanuttons.

## CHAPTER VII.

IN the middle of May the Federals were full of hope. New Orleans had fallen, the battle of Shiloh had given them the control of the Upper Mississippi River, McClellan was nearing Richmond, the Federal gunboats on the James River had to be checked by a boom constructed at Drewry's Bluff, McDowell plus Shields was preparing to move from Fredericksburg on Richmond, for the President had regained courage when Jackson had marched westwards; the question was, Would Jackson's counterstroke at Banks save the situation?

That general, joined by half Ewell from Swift Run Gap, passed through Harrisonburg on to Newmarket, whilst the other half of Ewell moved on Luray; total numbers about 16,000 or 17,000. Jackson, having despatched Ashby's cavalry down the turnpike to act as a screen in front of Banks, then turned east over the Massanuttons and joined Ewell at Luray, whence the whole army marched down the Luray road towards Front Royal, where was Colonel Kenly with a detachment from Banks of 1,000 strong. The latter with about 8,000 men lay entrenched at Strasburg, expecting an attack

from the south. On May 23rd took place the Combat of Front Royal (see Plan No. 4). Jackson's foot fell on Kenly's front, whilst Colonel Flournoy, with 250 horse, turned his right, and as Kenly fled north through Cedarville along the Winchester road, Flournoy broke both cavalry and infantry, capturing 600 of the latter with two guns. Kenly was annihilated. Meantime Ashby (who from in front of Strasburg had rejoined Jackson by difficult paths over the Massanuttons) had moved more to the left and cut the railway half-way between Strasburg and Front Royal.

Banks at Strasburg had four courses open to him : (1) Stop at Strasburg and wait for Frémont (whom Blenker had joined, May 11th) from Franklin ; (2) break through Jackson at Front Royal ; (3) retire on Winchester ; (4) cross the Little North Mountain to the River Potomac. He chose the third and probably wisest course, and moved, on the 24th of May, along the Winchester road, losing on the way large supplies. Jackson himself with Ashby pursued by the turnpike, whilst Ewell took the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; but the chase was not so effective as it should have been, because Ashby's men dispersed in order to pillage.

Next day, May 25th, saw the Battle of Winchester (see Plan No. 4). The Federal position was well chosen, their right on the turnpike and west of it, their left on the Front Royal road ; "the line of defence ran along a broken ridge, lined in many

places with stout stone walls, and protected in front by the winding reaches of Abraham's Creek" (Henderson, vol. i. p. 338). The numbers engaged were about 6,500 Northerners against 16,000 Southerners. Early in the morning the Stonewall Brigade attacked Banks's right in a severe contest, for the enemy were ably led by General Gordon: Ewell also moved up to strike, whilst Jackson carried out a turning movement against Gordon's right. In this quarter a charge of Federal cavalry cost them dear; and then the turning force, the Stonewall men and the reserve swept the Federals through the streets of Winchester along the road to Williamsport on the River Potomac. They escaped with less loss than might be expected, because Ashby had not yet been able to get his men in from their pillaging, and because Ewell's cavalry leader (Steuart) refused to pursue until Jackson's order to do so came to him through Ewell. That night and next day Banks crossed the Potomac; his utter rout had great strategic results: It alarmed President Lincoln and McDowell was again withdrawn (May 24th) from helping McClellan and ordered to send Shields' Division to the Valley to co-operate with Frémont in intercepting Jackson—the former with 10,000, *viâ* Front Royal, the latter with 15,000, *viâ* Wardensville. Jackson's counterstroke had saved Richmond. He then moved on Harper's Ferry, where was Saxton with 7,000 Federals. He now learnt of the concentric movements of Frémont and Shields to inter-

cept him at Strasburg. In fact, his 16,000 men were threatened not only by Frémont and Shields with their 25,000, but also by Banks's 7,000, Saxton's 7,000, and by the rest of McDowell, *i.e.*, 20,000 (not reckoning Shields or McCall, the latter's division being about to join McClellan by water), who was moving along Manassas Gap railway in rear of Shields. The Southern general, therefore, to escape the blow, rapidly countermarched through Winchester and Strasburg, whilst Frémont and Shields slowly approached the latter place—slowly because each was ignorant of the other's movements. Their indecision was fatal, and Jackson avoided the blow without the loss of a waggon. The Federal failure illustrates not only the evil of divided command, but also the selection of a point of interception too near the enemy's army, the same error as the French Emperor committed in 1814 when he struck against Prince Schwartzberg's rear at Plancy. The retreat up the turnpike was viewed by Shields and Frémont as they came into connection at Strasburg.

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE two Federal generals then pursued, Frémont by the turnpike and Shields by the Luray road, effectually separated by the parallel obstacles of the Massanuttons and the South Fork, for Jackson took care to burn the bridges of White House, Columbia, and Conrad's Store, and to secure the only remaining bridge of Port Republic with a party of cavalry. On the main road the retreat was covered by Ashby fiercely contesting with Frémont's horsemen, but on the 6th of June that intrepid sabreur met his death in an action near Harrisonburg: it was a heavy loss for the South.

Jackson's force numbered about 13,000, of whom part under Ewell occupied Cross Keys and part under the general himself held Port Republic, *i.e.*, his trains in Port Republic and the troops on the heights west of the South Fork, with cavalry watching either Federal general and with a signal station on the southern end of the Massanuttons; whilst Frémont at Harrisonburg did not locate the enemy till the evening of June 7th, and Shields on the Luray road with his brigades dangerously strung out was hurrying up, expecting to crush the Confederate

leader between himself and his coadjutor. Jackson on interior lines planned to defeat them in detail, and the terrain suited his purpose: the North and South Rivers forming the South Fork join at Port Republic; over the North River was the Port Republic bridge, but over the South River were only two difficult fords; and north of Port Republic on the west bank bluffs commanded the eastern bank. The plan was to hold Frémont on the west and to crush Shields on the east, then recross and deal with Frémont; this plan, however, was thrown out by Frémont's advance against Ewell at Cross Keys on June 8th (Battle of Cross Keys, see Plan No. 5). Ewell had about 6,000, Frémont about 12,000, with far more guns and cavalry. Meantime a serious incident had occurred at Port Republic: Shields' advanced troops had moved unseen through the forest (Jackson's signallers on the mountain had been recalled and his cavalry scouts failed) and fording the South River, entered Port Republic and nearly captured their redoubted adversary. His trains were in danger, but having galloped across the bridge, he brought up troops and cleared the town, driving Shields' men over the South River to Lewiston.

At Cross Keys Frémont did not act vigorously. He moved his left against Ewell's right in the thickets: the Confederate brigadier allowed them to approach within sixty paces before he fired. The Federals retired, and as they did not seem inclined

to attack again, the brigadier outflanked their left and drove it back on their guns. The defeat of his left caused Frémont to withdraw his right and centre. The approach of night forbade any idea of pursuit of the repulsed army.

Jackson's "audacious" (Allan) plan for next day, June 9th, was to hold Frémont on the west with part of his force, rout Shields' advance guard with his main body, then recross and defeat Frémont; he therefore that night constructed a bridge of waggons across the South River at Port Republic.

June 9th saw the Battle of Port Republic (see Plan No. 6). In this battle the Confederates numbered at first 1,200, but as the day wore on they had 6,000 in the field; whilst Shields' advance guard, 3,000 to 4,000 strong, held a strong position—their right on the South Fork, centre at Lewiston or Lewis House, their left across the Luray road and in the woods; several guns strengthened their centre and left. The Federal commander, Tyler, was vigorous, and Jackson's first attack with 1,200 men against Tyler's right was severely repulsed. The reinforcements that arrived across the waggon bridge Jackson detached to his right through the woods in order to turn Tyler's left and threaten his guns. Meantime Ewell was with difficulty crossing the awkward waggon bridge, and Jackson's original force of 1,200—*i.e.*, the Stonewall Brigade, under Winder, on the left between the Luray road and the South Fork—was hardly pressed by the energetic Tyler, and finally

broken and forced back. Part of Ewell coming up vainly attacked the left of the attacking Federals; the day seemed lost when Jackson's right through the woods fell on Tyler's left, carried his guns, and endangered his retreat, though not without desperate fighting. Tyler at once recalled his victorious right. A general advance drove him in retreat north along the Luray road.

Jackson had soon seen that he could not hope to beat Frémont as well as Tyler, and during the contest with the latter he retired the force in front of Frémont over the Port Republic Bridge, which was then burnt. The Federal general slowly occupied the heights west of the South Fork, but not till the battle was over. It was to avoid the fire of his batteries that Jackson took the forest path to Brown's Gap, which he reached at midnight.

At Port Republic the Confederate general attacked too soon, and with insufficient numbers; strategically, however, this battle and the preceding one of Cross Keys had great results. McDowell, who had again, on Jackson retiring up the Valley, been ordered to move towards McClellan, was for the fourth time held back; nor did McClellan himself fail to feel the effect of Jackson's success. His great army, based on White House, lay on either side of the River Chickahominy waiting for McDowell—an unfavourable position, and yet hardly to be avoided if co-operation with McDowell was to be secured. It was in this position that on May 31st and June 1st

he was heavily attacked by Johnston in the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks; in the course of these indecisive actions Johnston was wounded, and Lee became not only Commander-in-Chief, but also General-in-Chief in the field. Thus Jackson, by causing McDowell to be retained, compelled McClellan to occupy an unfavourable position.

Lee and Jackson then planned for the latter to march to Richmond and strike McClellan on his right, which, as White House was his base, was his strategic flank; whilst Lee himself contained the enemy's left on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy River. With this end in view, it was needful to keep off McDowell and to induce Frémont to believe that Jackson was pursuing in person; reinforcements, therefore, were ostentatiously despatched from Richmond westwards; Jackson's own cavalry followed Frémont far down the valley, and in all ways he tried to create the impression that he desired. Meantime for five days he rested his infantry at Mount Meridian, and then, starting on June 17th, rapidly marched for Richmond, *viâ* Gordonsville, reaching Ashland Station June 25th. So ignorant were the Northern generals of the move, that McDowell was now for the fifth and last time withdrawn from McClellan and placed with Frémont and Banks under General Pope, whose orders were to act against Stonewall Jackson in the Gordonsville district; but on June 26th McClellan learnt that his ubiquitous foe was on his right flank.

## CHAPTER IX.

### REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

HERE should be carefully read Henderson, vol. i. pp. 403-45, and vol. ii. pp. 391-6.

Allan, in his *Jackson's Valley Campaign*, says:—"The operations of General T. J. Jackson in the valley during 1862 constitute one of the most brilliant episodes of the great Civil War. The theatre on which they took place afforded a quick and easy approach to the Federal capital. The mountains and rivers of the valley gave to an active and skilful commander many opportunities of neutralising great disparity of force. This campaign had a most important bearing on all the military operations in Virginia, for he checked forces four or five times as numerous as his own, and thus paralysed McClellan. It is an admirable example of an aggressive-defensive campaign."

S. C. Kellogg, in his *Shenandoah Valley*, remarks of the Valley Campaign that "the student must be impressed with the strategical eminence of Stonewall Jackson, as compared with the lack of capacity on the part of his opponents. On the Federal side the authorities at Washington were still groping for

suitable commanders for their thousands of ardent but inexperienced soldiers. For a past-master in the art of war like Jackson to handle an army, how inferior soever, against Patterson, Banks, Frémont, or Pope, was not difficult." The same author calls especial attention to the Southern general's rapid and successful escape at the end of May from the midst of 60,000 converging foes (see pp. 68-70).

Allan, in *Jackson's Valley Campaign*, thus reviews the operations of the three months preceding the Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic:—

"Jackson, with 4,600 men, fell back from Winchester before Banks's 30,000 (20,000 practically), but appearing unexpectedly at Kernstown, hurls his little army against part of Banks's army. He is mistaken as to the number of the enemy, and suffers a severe repulse; but he causes the recall of all Banks's force and the detachment of McDowell from McClellan. Falling back before his pursuers, he retires to Elk Run Valley (Swift Run Gap), where he leaves Ewell to contain Banks, while he himself joins Ed. Johnson near Staunton. He fights Milroy at McDowell, and drives him back on General Frémont. Jackson then counter-marches, and with Ewell unexpectedly appears at Front Royal, crushes a Federal detachment there, and two days after defeats Banks at Winchester, driving him over the Potomac. McDowell is again withdrawn from McClellan, and the President gathers 60,000 men against Jackson's 16,000; but by rapidity

he eludes his pursuers, and, retiring up the Valley, takes up a position near Port Republic, where he defeats Frémont at Cross Keys, and Shields at Port Republic."

In thirty-five days preceding June 9th Jackson marched 245 miles, and won four battles. It may be of interest to state that Stuart marched sixty miles in twenty-six hours during his raid on Catlett's Station, and 110 miles in two days during his Pamunkey Expedition.

## CHAPTER X.

**D**URING June, McClellan, based on White House, with more than 100,000 men, lay on the River Chickahominy facing Richmond. He was waiting for McDowell. In his front stood Lee with 60,000, including J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry, which carried out the Pamunkey Expedition—that is, a raid right round the Federal Army. On June 12th, the cavalry leader with 1,200 men and horse artillery moved from Richmond *viâ* Ashland, Hanover Court House, Tunstall's Station, cutting telegraphs, etc.; then over the River Chickahominy and along the James River road to the city. McClellan's left was posted south of the river, his right north of it; the Southern general therefore crossing his left over the Chickahominy, joined hands with Jackson, and brought on the series of actions known as the Seven Days' Battles, from June 25th to July 1st, 1862. They struck the enemy's right at Mechanicsville on June 26th, and at Gaines' Mill on June 27th; the blow would have been fatal had not McClellan already arranged to transfer his base from White House, on the York River, to the River James. In this case we

see the enormous advantage of sea-power, as also when Wellington in 1813 transferred his base from Portugal to the northern ports of Spain. The reasons that induced this change of base by McClellan were—Stuart's raid, the state of the White House roads, and the appearance of Jackson.

During these actions the left of the Union Army, south of the Chickahominy, was held by demonstrations of Lee's far inferior right—66,000 against 28,000. The position of both armies illustrates the truth of the strategists' dictum that when an army is astride a river its real peril is that it may be struck on its own side. In 1870 Bazaine might have illustrated this maxim if on August 17th he had moved southwards along the east bank of the Moselle instead of waiting to fight at Gravelotte, for on that bank only one German army corps was in position to oppose him. The Boer leader, too, might conceivably have held Warren at Spion Kop, on the other side of the Tugela, whilst dealing a heavy blow with his left at Buller's troops on our side.

Then followed McClellan's able retirement across the White Oak Swamp to the River James, and in pursuing him Lee's columns failed to co-operate. It is said that Jackson on the left was slow, and certainly his men must have been very exhausted; it has been urged that he was ignorant of the district, and that he had to bridge the Chickahominy; but the plain fact is that that great soldier on this occasion did not come up to his reputation. In any case,

however, it is certain that Stuart's cavalry should not have gone off to White House. After severe fighting in the Swamp the Northerners reached Malvern Hill, on the James, and here Lee committed the grave error of assailing the formidable position on that hill, July 1st, with terrible loss to himself. It should, however, be remarked that Allan, in his *Army of Northern Virginia*, contends that Lee's action was sound, because the destruction of the great Union Army was worth any risk. McClellan's next move was to retire to his new base at Harrison's Landing on the James, bringing to a close active operations in the Yorktown Peninsula.

## CHAPTER XI.

THE next problem that faced the Confederate Government was how to deal with General Pope's army; and in order to prevent him from occupying the important junction of Gordonsville, Jackson was at once despatched to that place, and in spite of a slow march of his divisions, on August 8th—caused by his extreme reticence to his lieutenants—he inflicted a defeat on the boastful Pope's leading army corps under Banks. In this Battle of Cedar Mount, or Cedar Run, or Slaughter Mount, fought on August 9th, a charge of 174 Federal cavalry cost them 103, and did no good. After this brilliant feat of daring, Jackson, afraid of Pope's gathering numbers, fell back to Gordonsville, the enemy following to the line of the Rapidan.

It was quite within the bounds of possibility that McClellan should, from Harrison's Landing, have again seriously menaced the Southern capital; but on August 3rd it became clear that he was moving down the Peninsula to Fort Monroe, and on August 14th his main body marched thither under orders to embark for Acquia Creek and Alexandria. Lee therefore, with Longstreet, having left 25,000 men at

Richmond, hastened to join Stonewall Jackson. The junction effected, they planned the splendid manœuvre of turning Pope's left and cutting him from Washington; but accidents interfered, and the Northern general, alarmed, wisely took post behind the River Rappahannock. Lee followed, and at once despatched Stuart with 1,500 troopers on his celebrated raid round Pope's right into Catlett's Station, where he captured the Federal despatches.

Though General Lee numbered only 55,000 as against the 80,000 to which Pope had been raised by reinforcements from McClellan's Army of the Potomac, he decided on the risky plan of dividing his forces. In accordance with this decision, whilst Longstreet held Pope on the Rappahannock, Jackson and Stuart, on August 25th, started on the famous flank march *viâ* Amissville, Orleans, Salem; then through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, striking Pope's line of communications, the Orange and Alexandria railway, at Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction, where vast supplies were captured. The Federal general, learning of this movement in his rear, marched on Gainesville and Manassas Junction; whilst Lee, with Longstreet's force, moved by the same route as Jackson had traversed, and the point was whether Pope would seal up Thoroughfare Gap and deal with Jackson before Longstreet could arrive. The commander of the Union troops, however, foolishly swung all his men round on the Junction, expecting to crush

Jackson there; but not finding him there, Pope ordered a general movement on Centreville: as a fact, the daring Southerner had evacuated the Junction and taken post north of Groveton, on the unfinished railway from Sudley Springs to Gainesville. From this position he disclosed himself to the enemy on August 28th by attacking his left in what is called the Battle of Gainesville; he took this course in order to stop what he conceived was a retreat, for he knew it was Lee's aim to bring Pope to decisive action before all McClellan's troops could arrive. At this moment Longstreet was filing through the Thoroughfare Gap, but the Federal leader was still convinced that he could crush Jackson before the rest of the Confederates could come up. Accordingly, on the next day, August 29th, he in great force fell on Stonewall's 20,000 in the Battle of Groveton, during which action Longstreet, with 30,000 men, arrived on his colleague's right. Lee at once desired Longstreet to assail Pope's left: the order was not executed, which, according to Henderson, was a grave error; but Allan, in his *Army of Northern Virginia*, considers it was not advisable, under the circumstances, to deliver such an attack.

Next day, August 30th, saw the Battle of Second Manassas or Second Bull Run (see Plan No. 7), between 50,000 Confederates and 65,000 to 70,000 Federals, Jackson still holding the unfinished railway, and Longstreet gradually forming up on his right and south of the Centreville Turnpike, Pope lying

opposite and west of Bull Run. The latter general still clung to the belief that Longstreet was not fully up, and that Jackson was retreating; he therefore ordered a general assault on Jackson's position, which the Federals found strongly held. They were repulsed, and at that moment Lee let loose Longstreet south of the Turnpike on Pope's left, whilst Jackson also pushed forward. The enemy was forced back on the Stone Bridge, Sykes's regulars firmly holding the Henry House Hill and practically saving the Union Army. On the extreme right Stuart's cavalry charged down the Federal horse "in the most brilliant cavalry combat of the war" (Henderson). As night drew on, the defeated Northerners withdrew across Bull Run on Centreville, where they were joined by 20,000 more troops from McClellan's Army.

Jackson then made another flank march round Pope's right *viâ* Chantilly, which compelled that general to retire on the works at Alexandria. He was immediately superseded by the abler McClellan; and this was the close of the campaign of the Second Manassas or Second Bull Run, which had lasted from August 13th to September 2nd. Here should be read Henderson's excellent comments on this campaign, vol. ii. of *Stonewall Jackson*, pp. 185-97.

## CHAPTER XII.

TO complete his victory, Lee saw he must strike home, though his men were sadly in want of boots, and though he had only about 60,000, in spite of 18,000 reinforcements newly arrived from Richmond. Accordingly, on September 6th, the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac at White's Ford into Maryland and occupied Frederick, whereupon McClellan slowly approached from Washington through Rockville; whilst a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry threatened Lee's communications up the Valley. To remove this obstacle, therefore, whilst Longstreet fell back over the South Mountain, Jackson with A. P. Hill was detached *viâ* Williamsport against Harper's Ferry; he marched rapidly, and on September 15th the Federal garrison with large stores surrendered.

Meantime, McClellan, who by a lucky accident captured Lee's orders, had with unusual rapidity forced the passes of the South Mountain, and followed Lee in his retreat to the Antietam at Sharpsburg. Here he was joined by Jackson, his numbers being 35,000 to 45,000 against McClellan's 80,000 to

90,000. Stonewall Jackson held the left of the Confederate line, north of the town; Longstreet the right, south of the town.

On September 16th part of McClellan's right crossed the Antietam, and on September 17th took place the sanguinary Battle of Sharpsburg or the Antietam (see Plan No. 8). Early in the morning the enemy's right fell on Jackson in a desperate conflict, both sides losing heavily, and the Southern general displaying conspicuous tactical skill; the Federals also assailed Lee's centre, moving across the Bloody Lane, or Sunken Road. Later on, McClellan's left, crossing the Antietam by a bridge, south-east of Sharpsburg, put the Confederates in great peril, but the sudden onset of A. P. Hill (hurrying up from Harper's Ferry) on the hostile column saved the situation.

Next day, as McClellan was being reinforced, Lee, crossing the Potomac at Boteler's Ford, made for Winchester, and thus the battle was a strategic victory for the North, though a tactical success for the South. The cardinal error of the Federal commander had been his delay—he should have attacked on the 15th, and in any case on the 16th.

Jackson was now promoted to be Lieutenant-General, with command of the second corps, and both combatants set to work reorganising, except that J. E. B. Stuart made from October 9th to October 13th his famous raid into Pennsylvania, *viâ* Chambersburg; right round McClellan's Army. With

1,800 troopers he crossed at Williamsport and entering Chambersburg at night seized horses, cut telegraphs, etc., and then *viâ* Frederick over the River Monocacy reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, which he destroyed; hearing the enemy's cavalry were on the alert, he made for the woods and re-crossed near the mouth of the Monocacy. Late in this month the Union forces, 125,000 strong, crossed to the south bank of the Potomac, east of the Blue Ridge, moving on Warrenton, whereupon Lee, who now numbered 70,000, despatched Longstreet to Culpeper Court House on the Orange and Alexandria Railway, Jackson remaining in the Valley.

McClellan, the greatest commander the Army of the Potomac ever had, was unwisely superseded by General Burnside, who decided to strike at Richmond along the short line of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway. He therefore rapidly marched down the left bank of the Rappahannock to a point opposite Fredericksburg, his base being at Acquia Creek. Lee's reply was to move Longstreet to Fredericksburg, and to call up Jackson from the Valley to the same place, where he took post on the right of Longstreet and south of the town. The Confederate position, though immensely strong for defence, especially on the left, afforded no chance for a counterstroke, and on that account Jackson objected to it.

On December 11th pontoons were laid by Burnside's great army of 110,000 to 120,000 men, with the help of his array of batteries on the left bank;

and next day the Federals crossed, but Lee had had time to concentrate his troops (about 78,000), Jackson on the right, Longstreet on the left. On December 13th was fought the savage Battle of Fredericksburg (see Plan No. 9), in which Burnside's left, under Franklin, made a desperate but unsuccessful attack on Jackson; whilst his right, under Sumner, heroically and fruitlessly hurled itself against Longstreet at Marye's Hill. Stonewall was in favour of at once delivering a vigorous counterstroke, and even proposed a night attack: Lee overruled him. Henderson adversely comments on the latter's failure to attack his defeated enemy, but Allan, in his *Army of Northern Virginia*, considers Lee was prudent in view of the numerous Federal artillery. During a terrific storm (December 15th) Burnside passed to the north bank, crossing 100,000 men in fourteen hours—at Wagram Napoleon crossed 180,000 in one night. Thus the Federal general did what is rare in war, namely, after defeat to cross safely a river immediately in the rear; this same feat was performed by Buller after Spion Kop. On December 25th Stuart began his Christmas Day raid, cutting in between Burnside's army and Washington, and during it he lost many horses. Here should be read Henderson's chapter xxi., on the "Army of Northern Virginia," in vol. ii. of his *Stonewall Jackson*, pp. 338-78.

## CHAPTER XIII.

IN January, 1863, Burnside, in the so-called "Mud Campaign," tried to turn Lee's left, but later on in the same month was replaced by "Fighting Joe" Hooker in the supreme command of the Army of the Potomac, which still lay on the Rappahannock opposite Lee's position on the southern bank. As the year advanced, the Southern prospects did not grow brighter; Hooker's army numbered 130,000, and the Northerners controlled nearly all the Mississippi, and even in Virginia they held Winchester, Fort Monroe, and Suffolk (west of Norfolk); whilst at sea the Confederacy was held tight by Lincoln's blockade. The presence of the Federals at Suffolk so alarmed President Davis for the safety of Richmond, that he ordered Lee to detach Longstreet with 20,000 men to that district. Thus weakened, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief had to meet Hooker's enormous numbers.

That general's plan was to move on three lines, namely, his 10,000 cavalry, under Stoneman, far on the right, *viâ* the Orange and Alexandria Railway, to cut Lee's communications with Richmond; his left, under Sedgwick, to cross the Rappahannock below

Fredericksburg ; his right to cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan on to Chancellorsville, under his personal orders. It may be noted that this double passage was unwise. Lee stood south-west of Fredericksburg with 60,000 men. Hooker began to move on April 27th, completely turning his enemy's formidable position ; Lee therefore contained Sedgwick with 10,000 troops, and massed the rest of his force against Hooker himself. These movements led to the stubborn Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1st to May 5th (see Plan No. 10), in the forest of the Wilderness of Spotsylvania. During May 2nd Lee, with 10,000 only, remained in front (on the east) of Hooker's strong position at Chancellorsville ; whilst Jackson and Stuart, with about 30,000 men, moved to the left in order to turn Hooker's right flank. They passed through the thick forest on to the Turnpike, and at 6 p.m. Jackson, moving east, smote the extreme right of the enemy and routed it ; Lee, on hearing his guns, at once advanced to the assault. Hooker was in deadly peril ; his line of retreat to the United States Ford was in danger. Jackson's men poured along the road to Chancellorsville, getting disordered among the trees and in the darkness, and it was then that the general was hit by three musket shots from the 18th North Carolina Regiment (his own troops). General A. P. Hill was also severely wounded, and the command fell on J. E. B. Stuart, who did not realise that Jackson's plan had been to cut Hooker's line of retreat at White House.

The Federals then delivered a somewhat vigorous counter-attack, and by May 3rd their position was much improved. Stuart and Lee made a concentric effort against Hooker, who on his side ordered Sedgwick to press actively the force in his front and take Lee in the rear. The success of Sedgwick in carrying Marye's Hill and forcing back the Confederate containing force caused Lee, on May 4th, to move in person against him, with the result that the Federal general recrossed at Banks's Ford, Hooker sending him no assistance. On May 5th and 6th Hooker, covered by a heavy storm, passed over his bridges to the north bank. The two armies retired to their old positions, Hooker having failed mainly because he had sent away his powerful body of horsemen; but if he had continued the struggle he should have proved victorious, with the help of Stoneman threatening Lee's communications.

Jackson was brought to Guineas Station, where he died on May 10th. His fall had saved the Federals from ruin, and was, in addition to want of supplies and a widespread belief that President Lincoln would at last concede separation, a principal reason for Lee not pursuing his defeated enemy.

Here should be read Henderson's eloquent appreciation of Stonewall Jackson as a soldier and as a man (see chapter xxv. in vol. ii. pp. 476-98). Particular attention should be paid to the parallel there drawn between Wellington and the Confederate general.

## THE BATTLES.

STRATEGY is the art of bringing the enemy to battle ; it is the science of war, it is the study of communications, and is concerned with the theatre of war. Tactics is concerned with the operations on the battlefield, and is especially the art of concentrating superior numbers at decisive points. Note that at Kernstown Jackson was tactically defeated and strategically successful ; at Sharpsburg Lee was tactically successful and strategically defeated. For Jackson's skill in assembling superior numbers (except at Cross Keys), see Henderson, vol. i. pp. 423-4, note.

First Bull Run or First Manassas : 28,000 Confederates, 35,000 Federals. Tactical points : tactical employment of the railway ; great danger of a turning force is that it may be struck on its external flank ; necessity of vigorous pursuit ; folly of piecemeal attacks ; necessity of tactical training ; counter-attack by Jackson ; cavalry charge by Stuart.

Kernstown : 3,400 Confederates, 7,000 to 9,000 Federals. Tactical points : Jackson's excellent tactics in moving in strength along the ridge ; could a

desperate counter-stroke by the Stonewall Brigade have saved the day? real danger of Jackson.

McDowell: 6,000 Confederates, 6,000 Federals. Tactical points: wisdom of taking the offensive; effect of the steepness of the height; the attacker lost fewer men; Jackson did not pursue.

Front Royal: 16,000 Confederates, 1,000 Federals. Tactical points: surprise; great results of cavalry action; Kenly had no cavalry at first (two companies joined during the combat)—note the effect of their absence.

Winchester: 16,000 Confederates, 6,500 Federals. Tactical points: good defensive position; a costly cavalry charge; failure of pursuit.

Cross Keys: 6,000 Confederates, 12,000 Federals. Tactical points: evils of divided command; folly of not using one's full strength; fire-discipline of Confederates; counter-stroke of Confederates.

Port Republic: 6,000 Confederates, 3,500 Federals. Tactical points: excellent flank attack; danger of premature attack with insufficient numbers.

Malvern Hill: 70,000 Confederates, 80,000 Federals. Tactical points: folly of piecemeal attacks; great effect of artillery.

Cedar Mount: 21,000 Confederates, 9,000 Federals. Tactical points: a costly cavalry charge; two hours' artillery duel.

Gainesville: Tactical point: Jackson surprised the Federals.

Groveton: Tactical point: it is a fine defensive action.

Second Bull Run or Second Manassas: 50,000 Confederates, 65,000 to 70,000 Federals. Tactical points: splendid tactics of Lee; fine cavalry combat; conduct of the regulars; Lee marched divided and fought concentrated.

Harper's Ferry: Note the great effect of artillery.

Sharpsburg, or the Antietam: 45,000 Confederates, 90,000 Federals. Tactical points: fine tactics of Jackson; McClellan's delay; Federals attacked piecemeal.

Fredericksburg: 70,000 Confederates, 110,000 Federals. Tactical points: Lee made no counter-attack; folly of frontal attack on Marye's Hill; excellent Federal passage of the river after defeat.

Chancellorsville: 60,000 Confederates, 130,000 Federals. Tactical points: Jackson and Stuart make a great flank movement; Hooker's double passage of the river; absence of Federal cavalry; the attack by Jackson is like Kirby Smith's attack at First Bull Run.

## NOTES.

1. Henderson, vol. ii. p. 499, gives an interesting list of killed and wounded in a large number of battles.

2. The following distances are useful:—

Richmond to Fredericksburg, 60 miles.

Staunton to Harrisonburg, 25 miles.

Harrisonburg to Strasburg, 47 miles.

Strasburg to Winchester, 18 miles.

Winchester to Harper's Ferry, 28 miles.

The Shenandoah Valley measures 120 miles in length.

3. The five withdrawals of McDowell from McClellan should be noted:—

(1) April 3rd, in consequence of Kernstown.

(2) May 3rd, on Jackson moving to Mechum's Station.

(3) May 24th, in consequence of Front Royal.

(4) June 8th to 9th, in consequence of Cross Keys and Port Republic.

(5) June 26th, when McDowell was placed under Pope.

4. Note the effect of parallel obstacles: the Massanuttons screened from Banks at Strasburg Jackson's offensive movement down the Luray road on Front Royal; the same obstacle hampered Banks in his advance up the Valley; the same obstacle taught Frémont and Shields how perilous it is for allied armies to move simultaneously on the opposite sides of a parallel obstacle.

5. Henderson considers the relative qualities of regulars and of volunteers in the Introduction, pp. x.-xiii., and in the text, pp. 48-50 of vol. i., and pp. 160-70 of same vol. He remarks on civilian interference in vol. i. pp. 13-16, 206-10, 215; and insists on the immense importance of sound strategy in vol. i. pp. 20-2, 74-6—"a Napoleon must be something more than a Ney."

## LIST OF QUESTIONS.

1. Narrate the causes of the great American Civil War.
2. Give a general description of the theatre of war generally, and more especially of Virginia.
3. Consider the strategic situation arising from the formation of the frontiers of the combatants.
4. Comment on and illustrate from these campaigns: Civilian interference; qualities of regulars as contrasted with those of volunteers; the effect of parallel mountains.
5. Sketch the events leading up to the Battle of First Bull Run or First Manassas, July 21st, 1861.
6. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of First Bull Run or First Manassas, July 21st, 1861. What remarks occur to you as applicable to this battle?
7. Comment on: Organisation; armament; commissariat; *moral* of the two armies; and especially on the cavalry.
8. Show the strategic importance of West Virginia; and give a detailed description of the Shenandoah Valley, and show its strategic importance to either side.
9. Describe Jackson's operations in the north of the Valley, November 4th to end of January, 1862 (capturing Romney, January 14th).
10. Describe the events in the Valley leading to the Battle of Kernstown, March 23rd, 1862.

11. State the plans of campaign urged during March, 1862, by President Lincoln, and by General McClellan.

12. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Kernstown, March 23rd, 1862. Give some tactical comments on it, and state its strategic results.

13. April 19th, 1862, Jackson at Swift Run Gap. State the positions of the contending forces, and state the three courses open to that general.

14. Describe the movements of Jackson from Swift Run Gap to join Ed. Johnson near Staunton.

15. Describe, with rough sketch, the Battle of McDowell, May 8th, 1862, and give some tactical comments on it.

16. Show the general strategic situation in the middle of May, 1862. Describe the march of Jackson and Ewell on Front Royal with the action at that place, May 23rd, 1862.

17. Banks at Strasburg, May 23rd and 24th, 1862. What courses had he open to him?

18. Describe, with rough sketch, the Battle of Winchester, May 25th, 1862.

19. Show the strategic results of the Battles of Front Royal and Winchester.

20. Describe the attempt of Frémont and Shields to intercept Jackson at Strasburg, and account for its failure.

21. Describe the retreat of Jackson up the Valley, and the pursuit by Shields and Frémont.

22. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Cross Keys, June 8th, 1862.

23. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Port Republic, June 9th, 1862. Add any tactical comments.

24. Show the strategic effects of Cross Keys and Port Republic.

25. Describe Jackson's march from Mount Meridian (June 17th) to the River Chickahominy.

26. Write a general review of the Valley Campaign, and of its influence on the progress of the war generally; note Jackson's use of cavalry, his marching powers, and his frequent separation in the presence of the enemy.

27. Name some of Stuart's famous cavalry raids, and write a note on such raids.

28. What led to the Seven Days' Battles, and what was the general result of those actions? (June 25th to July 1st, 1862.)

29. Lee and Pope faced each other on the Rappahannock during August, 1862. Describe the movements of both armies leading to the Battle of Second Bull Run or Second Manassas, August 30th, 1862.

30. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Second Bull Run or Second Manassas, August 30th, 1862.

31. Comment on Lee's separation of his troops, when in presence of superior numbers, in August, 1862.

32. Sketch the events leading to the Battle of Sharpsburg or the Antietam, September 17th, 1862.

33. Describe, with rough plan, the Battle of Sharpsburg or the Antietam, September 17th, 1862.

34. Briefly narrate the operations of General Burnside against Lee, including a rough account of the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13th, 1862. Comment on Burnside's escape after his defeat.

35. What remarks does Henderson make on the United States view of the "thinking bayonet," and of the "machine-made soldier"?

36. Henderson says, the ultimate objective is the enemy's main army. Show how this applies in the case of the Valley Campaign.

37. Sketch events immediately preceding the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1st to 5th, 1863, and give a rough plan of that battle.

38. Briefly describe the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1st to 5th, 1863.

39. Estimate the effect on this battle of the fall of Jackson.

40. Draw a comparison between Jackson and Wellington.

41. State and explain the several withdrawals of McDowell from McClellan.

## APPENDIX

### **"Secrecy and Surprise."**

Napoleon, Hannibal, and Wellington excelled in secret surprises, and Jackson was no mean imitator: witness his moves against Milroy, against Kenly, and against McClellan in June, 1862, and against Pope in August. But he carried his reticence too far; this injured him before Cedar Mount and injured his cause materially in the Battle of Chancellorsville.

### **"Superiority of the Regulars in Battle."**

This appeared in the Mexican campaign, at the two battles of Bull Run, and at Gaines' Mill.

### **"Initiative, value of."**

Jackson at siege of Mexico City; in the Romney Expedition; at Cedar Mount; Milroy at McDowell; Frémont at Cross Keys.

### **"Uses of Cavalry."**

The uses of cavalry—the strategic arm before battle—are: Scouting, screening, pursuing, charging, and perhaps raiding. The War of Secession revived the first two uses of this arm, forgotten since the days of Napoleon, and Jackson's cavalry, under Ashby, did excellent scouting and screening, and so did Stuart throughout the whole period. Ashby screened Jackson's move towards Front Royal, and Stuart's scouting informed Lee of Burnside's movements before Fredericksburg. In pursuit Jackson was always vigorous, as at Bath, and indeed always where it was possible. On the disputed point of cavalry charges in battle, the facts of this campaign can be quoted on either

side—Stuart's charges at the First Bull Run and at the Second Bull Run (this was against cavalry) were successful, but the Federal charges at Winchester, at Cedar Mount, and at Gaines' Mill were costly failures. The most remarkable feat of the mounted arm was the success of Colonel Flournoy at Front Royal.

Whether a cavalry raid is or is not advisable is a moot question: Jackson apparently objected to them, Lee acquiesced in them. In the War of Secession they were extensively employed, *e.g.*, by Stuart and by Stoneman. Stuart's raids were the Pamunkey, the Catlett's Station, the Pennsylvania, and the Christmas Day raid, 1862; Stoneman raided during Chancellorsville. Such raids are certainly more applicable to America than to Europe, and in any case the objections to them are weighty, *e.g.*, waste of horseflesh, damage inflicted can soon be repaired, the main army may regret the absence of its horsemen (as Hooker did at Chancellorsville), the raiding cavalry runs the risk of being completely wiped out. On the other hand, the raid inflicts damage, destroys the enemy's *moral*, raises one's own *moral*, and at times gains valuable information, as Stuart did at Catlett's. On the whole the balance of opinion seems to be against such use of cavalry.

#### **"Importance of Studying the Opponents' Character."**

This was a constant practice of Jackson, and the conduct of the various officers in Mexico frequently gave their opponents in the Civil War a key as to what to expect of them in the greater struggle. McClellan's ability and caution were correctly appraised by Lee, who was surprised when that general acted with unusual rapidity during the South Mountain actions, a rapidity due to his capture of Lee's orders. Jackson justly appreciated the lengths to which he could go when opposed by Banks, nor would Lee have dared his risky separations if, instead of Pope, it had been Sherman or Grant in front of him.

### **“Volunteers and Regulars.”**

The Boer War has caused many to think that the armed farmer is a match for the trained regular, but Lord Wolseley holds that one trained army corps would have, at least in 1861, settled the question, and on two occasions we see the United States regulars alone preserving cohesion in defeat (in the two battles of Bull Run). On the march volunteers may equal regulars, but it is in military house-keeping and in action, and indeed in offensive operations generally, that the regular is seen to excel the armed patriot. Callwell, in his *Small Wars*, states that in only two modern instances have guerillas proved more than a match for regular troops, namely, the Cuban insurgents beat the Spaniards, and the Abyssinians at Adowa defeated the Italians.

### **“The Confederates acted on Single, Combined, and Interior Lines; the Federals on Double, Independent, and Exterior Lines.”**

This is apparent during the whole campaign, and can be clearly seen in July, 1861, from the relative positions of Patterson, McDowell, and the Federals in West Virginia, and of Johnston, Beauregard, and the Confederates in West Virginia. At Cross Keys, and Port Republic too, Jackson was obviously on interior lines, and the two Federal armies obviously on exterior lines. Throughout the whole of the operations the Southerners acted from Richmond, and fell back on it concentrically, whereas the enemy assailed that city from widely divergent points, such as, from Fort Monroe, Fredericksburg, the Valley, and the Great Kanawha Valley.

### **“Strategic Positions.”**

In the Valley, Winchester and Staunton were strategic positions; so also was the Newmarket-Luray road, as well as Swift Run Gap—the last because its front was covered by the Shenandoah, its flanks by the mountains; there

were roads in rear connecting with General Ewell; in case Banks went to Staunton, he would expose his flank to Jackson; in case he attacked Jackson and were beaten, he would find himself in a hostile country.

**“Main Features of Jackson’s Tactics.”**

Flanking movements, as at Kernstown and at Port Republic; reserving of fire and use of the bayonet, as at Cross Keys and at First Bull Run; surprise, as at Front Royal; vigorous pursuit, as at Bath and after Front Royal; counter-stroke; superiority of numbers on the field; sending in of supports at the right moment; Sharpsburg, in September, 1862, displays his tactics in all their excellence.

**“The Counter-stroke is the Soul of the Defence.”**

The truth of this was exemplified by Jackson on several occasions, notably in January, 1862, when the moment Banks seemed inclined to advance, the Confederate leader, though inferior in numbers, at once, in the Romney Expedition, took the offensive; tactically, he trusted much to the counter-stroke, *e.g.*, at Kernstown and at First Bull Run; and even at Fredericksburg he urged the same course. That Lee held the same opinion is evident from his September invasion of Maryland—the purely defensive attitude cannot succeed, unless under exceptional circumstances.

**List of Generals in Order of Time.**

FEDERALS.

In West Virginia: McClellan, Kelly and Rosecrans, Shields and Frémont.

In the Valley: Patterson, Banks, Saxton, Frémont, Shields.

In East Virginia: McDowell, McClellan, McDowell, Governor Wool of Fort Monroe, Pope, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker.

CONFEDERATES.

In West Virginia: Garnett, Lee, Loring, and E. Johnson.

In the Valley: Jackson, J. E. Johnston, General Jackson.

In East Virginia: Beauregard, J. E. Johnston, Lee.

EXAMINATION FOR PROMOTION:  
CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENANTS.

FIRST PAPER, SET NOVEMBER, 1904.

**Strategy and Military History.**

TIME—THREE HOURS.

*Maximum Marks, 250.*

1. Explain fully the importance and value to the Confederates of the possession of the tract of country known as the Shenandoah Valley.—30 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

In chapter iv. will be found a full answer to this question.

2. Show how the possession of sea-power was utilised by the Northerners during the whole period embraced in *Stonewall Jackson*.—30 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

The command of the sea, always in the hands of Lincoln, gave the Federals the usual advantage of an extensive base, *i.e.*, it secured them, in spite of the skill of their opponents, against the possibility of capture, and throughout the whole war no Federal army was ever so cut off that it had to surrender; Pope, for instance, was always able to retire on some base, though Jackson manœuvred so ably against him. Command of the sea, too, enables a general to change his base, as McClellan did during the period of the Seven Days' Battles; it confers the power of transferring troops, as we see when the Army of the Potomac was transferred from Fort Monroe to Acquia Creek and to Alexandria, and as General Scott transported his 13,000 men to Vera Cruz in 1847 in the Mexican War; and indeed no country has carried out this work on such a large scale as the United States, excepting only Great Britain. The great defect of this sea-transport is the evil effect it has on the horses.

The command of the sea also hides one's plans, and it was

Johnston's fear of a secret Federal move by the Potomac that induced him so suddenly to evacuate Centreville in March. The same power renders the communications safe, as we see McClellan's were to Fort Monroe, and the converse is illustrated by the fact that the Confederates' lack of vessels always rendered it almost impossible for them to obtain supplies from Europe, except by the precarious plan of running the blockade, which English and other neutrals constantly attempted.

3. Taking any one of the under-named periods—

- (a) From, but not including, Port Republic to the end of the Seven Days,
- (b) From, but not including, Cedar's Run to the close of the Second Manassas,
- (c) From, but not including, Fredericksburg to the death of Jackson,

give the strategical and tactical lessons you find in the operations. It is desirable that the answer should be so given as to enable the examiner to recognise the incidents that you consider furnish the lessons.—50 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE (c).

Stuart, in his Christmas Day raid, cut in between Burnside and Washington, but in doing so paid the penalty of losing many horses. Burnside, in his January effort to turn Lee's left, was checked by what Napoleon called one of the elements that disturb war—mud. President Davis, by insisting on the despatch of Longstreet with 20,000 men from Lee's army, in order to protect Richmond from the Federals at Suffolk, committed a great error. He weakened his main army, and indirectly was the cause of the negative effect of the Chancellorsville victory. Hooker's double passage of the Rappahannock River is seen to be unwise. The flank movement of Jackson and Stuart was a brilliant effort, and carried out with exceeding decision and striking Hooker on his exposed right flank, much as Kirby Smith struck McDowell's exposed flank at the First Bull Run. Jackson's excessive reticence in not informing Stuart

of his plan of severing the enemy's line at White House had disastrous results. The absence of Hooker's great body of horsemen was felt by the Federals throughout the long battle. Lee failed to pursue, and though there were several reasons for his failure, and though vigorous pursuit is never easy, yet we must account it an error on the part of that great commander.

N.B.—With each answer to the following questions, one, and only one, illustration is to be given, and it must not be taken from the period covered by the special campaign.

4. Show the ill effects of the absence of correct information in war.—30 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

The immense value of correct information and the evil effects of its absence are illustrated by the whole history of war, and in this campaign nothing is more obvious than the disastrous effect produced by the errors into which McClellan was led by his mistaken ideas as to the numbers of the enemy. Throughout the Yorktown operations he habitually doubled the strength of Johnston's army. This was one of the main reasons for his slowness and apparent timidity. Lincoln, indeed, made some sarcastic remarks on this tendency of his generals to exaggerate the enemy's numbers.

5. Show the value of cavalry in war.—30 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

For full answer see the section "Uses of Cavalry," on p. 66.

6. Show the use of detaining forces in strategy, and also in tactics.—40 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

A containing or detaining force—much the same as a rearguard—is one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of a commander, and it can delay, especially in a rugged terrain, the advance of an immensely superior body for a very considerable period. Its great rules are that it

should not commit itself to a general action; that it should retire the moment it is outnumbered; that it should not attempt to act so far distant from its main body that it will be reduced to a skeleton in the course of its operations, for losses of necessity are heavy in the case of such detaining operations, and that nevertheless it must be pushed far enough out to keep the divided forces of the enemy from uniting, because, if they should unite, the presumably superior numbers of the double-line forces would ensure them the victory. These rules hold good practically both for tactics and for strategy. A good case of a strategic detaining force is Magruder's 11,000 men in the Yorktown Peninsula, who so long held back McClellan's great army, and gave time for the arrival of Johnston. In tactics detaining operations are illustrated by Lee's employment of 10,000 men to hold Hooker's left, under Sedgwick, during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

7. Show the influence and effect of rivers on military operations.—40 marks.

N.B.—Map to be returned with the answers.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

I will first deal with rivers as direct obstacles. They are less formidable than they were as obstacles owing to the existence of modern bridges and the large number of pontoons carried by modern armies; but to cross a defended river at a known point is one of the costliest operations of war. The assailant, therefore, has recourse to stratagem, and even then he should possess a superiority in guns—all this illustrated by Burnside's passage at Fredericksburg. If the defender be concentrated, the assailant should employ a turning force, which should have been Burnside's course at Fredericksburg instead of a direct attack; he should have turned Lee's left, as Hooker attempted in the following year. The peril of such a turning force is that it may be struck on its outer flank, as occurred at First Bull Run and at Chancellorsville. This outer flank should,

therefore, be thrown back. But the especial danger of an army that sends such a turning force across a river is, that its own main body on its own side of the stream protecting its line may be struck during the operation and its line severed. What would have been the fate of McDowell if at the moment of Kirby Smith's onset Beauregard had let loose his right across Bull Run full on Centreville? We know, too, that McClellan, astride the Chickahominy, when struck on his own side at Gaines' Mill, was saved only by his command of the sea and his consequent power of transferring his base.

Rivers can also act as screens, and are of importance as having great cities on their banks; but as lines of communication and as lines of invasion their place has, at least in civilised countries, been usurped by railways.

Rivers parallel to an army's march present peculiar problems; when moving along them it is necessary to hold or destroy the passages, as Jackson did when retiring before Frémont and Shields; and it is a matter of great moment whether the defender can or cannot pass to either bank at pleasure, as is obvious in the case of Jackson at Port Republic, where the bridge gave him that immense advantage.

The most remarkable passage of a great river was that of Napoleon over the Danube with 180,000 men by six bridges in one night, just before the battle of Wagram. Whether an army should stand to fight with its back to a river depends upon whether the distance between it and the stream is or is not sufficient to allow of its retreat being organised before reaching the passage; it is clear, however, that Burnside's escape after Fredericksburg is an exception, and that he owed his safety to an opportune storm.

N.B.—Candidates can always illustrate their answers by rough diagrams. The above answers are written as if in the examination-room, and without reference to any book.

EXAMINATION FOR PROMOTION:  
CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENANTS.

SECOND PAPER, SET NOVEMBER, 1904.

**Strategy and Military History—Special Campaign.**

TIME—THREE HOURS.

*Maximum Marks*, 250.

1. What were the reasons for the abandonment of Winchester by Jackson on March 11th, 1862? What approximately was the strength of Jackson's force and of that opposed to him? What were the limits of the Confederate retreat and the Federal advance?—40 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

The reasons that induced Jackson to abandon Winchester, though he realised the strategic value of that place, were the facts that Banks was moving against him with far superior numbers, and that Johnston's retirement southwards from Centreville in the first week of March had left him isolated; and in addition there was the desire to draw as many Federals as possible up the Valley, so that McClellan's main army might be thereby weakened. In spite of these reasons he had, as a fact, determined to make a night attack on Banks at Winchester in order to retain that vital point; but a mistake of his Staff had moved his troops to Kernstown, and a Council of War (his first and last Council of War) objected to a night attack, and consequently he abandoned the idea and retired southwards.

Jackson's force was roughly 3,600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 27 guns; Banks's strength was practically 20,000, in two divisions, under Shields and Williams.

Jackson retired as far as Mount Jackson; Banks's leading troops occupied Strasburg.

2. What was the large scheme of McClellan that involved the withdrawal of Federal troops from the Valley in March? What in detail was the situation on the Federal side when Jackson on the 21st resolved to push northwards?—40 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

McClellan had devised a large scheme; he meant to strike at the enemy in the west at Nashville, in Tennessee, and in the east at Richmond, and to assail points on the coast and on the Mississippi, *e.g.*, New Orleans. His own march on Richmond he would have preferred to start from Urbana, on the River Rappahannock, had not Johnston's sudden retirement on Gordonsville rendered such a course inadvisable. This drove him to choose the route from Fort Monroe up the Yorktown Peninsula. Now the President disliked this plan, and agreed to it only on condition that Washington should be rendered absolutely secure. It was to fulfil this condition that Federal troops left the Valley in March, 1862, for Manassas Junction.

On March 21st McClellan's own troops were embarking or waiting to embark at Alexandria; there was a garrison in Washington; Governor Wool held Fort Monroe; Frémont was in West Virginia; as to Banks's troops, Shields was retiring from Strasburg on Winchester, and Williams moving across the Blue Ridge, *via* Snicker's Cap, for Manassas Junction.

3. What were the errors that combined to produce the repulse of the Confederates at Kernstown?—40 marks.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

Ashby's incorrect information caused Jackson with about 3,400 men to attack at least 7,000 Federals; a rapid march of thirty-six miles in two days had fatigued the Confederates; and in Jackson's opinion Garnett, in command of the Stonewall Brigade, acted wrongly in retiring his men, for the general considered that a strong counter-stroke could still have won the day, even as the French Emperor succeeded in doing at Marengo, 1800.

4. In the early days of April the Federal Government desired that Jackson should be driven from the Valley. What were the considerations that presented themselves to Banks as difficulties and dangers in the advance?—30 marks.

## ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

Banks was much hampered by difficulties about supply, for his magazines at Winchester were supplied from Washington by rail through Harper's Ferry, and that rail was not in good order; as to the Manassas Gap rail, its bridges were broken.

In addition he, like every other inferior leader, was incapable of dealing with a parallel obstacle, *i.e.*, the Massanuttons, because to advance on both sides of such an obstacle involves separation with all the dangers of separation, whilst to advance entirely on one side always allows of the possibility of the enemy stealing a march on you by moving on the other side. His wisest course would have been rapidly to seize the Newmarket-Luray road.

5. Describe briefly and discuss fully the operations on both sides, either—

(a) From April 30th to May 17th, between Elk Run and Mount Solon; or,

(b) The operations at Cross Keys and Port Republic.

50 marks.

## ANSWER TO THE ABOVE (b).

The two Federal generals, Frémont and Shields, pursued Jackson up the Valley, the former by the Turnpike, the latter by the Luray road, and on June 7th Frémont, at Harrisonburg, had ascertained the enemy's position, whilst Shields, with his force dangerously strung out, was pressing up the Luray road. Meantime, Jackson had thus posted his men—Ewell with 6,000 was at Cross Keys in face of Frémont, Jackson himself with 7,000 had his trains, hospital, etc., in Port Republic, and his troops on the heights north of the town and west of the South Fork. Next day, the

8th, took place the Battle of Cross Keys, in which Frémont, with 12,000, was repulsed by Ewell's 6,000, and during which the leading troops of Shields made a dash across the fords into Port Republic, and nearly captured the Confederate leader. On June 9th Jackson left some of Ewell's force to contain Frémont, and marching the rest of his men across the Port Republic bridge and the Waggon bridge, which latter he had constructed over the South River, fought the desperate engagement of Port Republic with Tyler, who commanded Shields' vanguard of about 3,500; finally, the Confederates were victorious, but Jackson had to call up the containing force from in front of Frémont and burn the Port Republic bridge. Tyler fell back northwards on Shields, and Frémont slowly occupied the bluffs west of the South Fork, whence he impotently shelled the victorious enemy.

On these operations the following strategic remarks suggest themselves: the evils of divided command are apparent, for Shields and Frémont did not know each other's movements, and hence arose indecision; they acted on double and exterior lines, and as they had far superior numbers—a total of 25,000 against 13,000—they might, if acting with skill and decision, have crushed Jackson between them, as Napoleon was crushed by Wellington and Blucher at Waterloo. But they had not the ability, and had to deal not only with a superior antagonist, but also to act in a terrain that admirably lent itself to interior-line operations. The river was an obstacle separating their forces, and its only passage at Port Republic was in Jackson's hands. One should also note the failure of the Confederate cavalry to report the sudden advance of Shields' leading troops on Port Republic on June 8th.

Tactically Frémont displayed great weakness at Cross Keys, considering his superior numbers, especially in guns and horsemen, whilst Ewell showed admirable judgment not only in the manner in which he reserved fire till the

enemy arrived within sixty paces, and in which he delivered a counter-stroke on the Federal left, but also in his judicious refusal to pursue, for night was coming on, and neither would pursuit have suited Jackson's general plan. On the same day Jackson saved himself at Port Republic by his vigorous promptness; it may be remarked that both Napoleon and Wellington ran a similar risk of capture. At the Battle of Port Republic Tyler occupied a well-chosen position, and fought with stubborn skill, as he had previously at Kernstown, and his defeat was due to Jackson's able turning movement and to the desperate courage of the Louisianians, who executed that movement. The victor's tactics, nevertheless, were faulty—he assailed the enemy too soon, and with insufficient numbers. In fact he grasped at too much; his idea was to crush Shields in the morning and Frémont in the afternoon, and this was the reason of his hurried attack, with its consequent heavy loss. His pursuit was, as usual, vigorous.

6. Describe briefly and discuss fully and impartially the retreat of Jackson from Harper's Ferry after the overthrow of Banks at the end of May, 1862.—50 marks.

N.B.—Map to be returned with the answers.

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE.

Jackson having driven Banks in rout over the Potomac, found himself at the end of May threatened by large numbers of the enemy, namely, in his front Banks with 7,000, Saxton at Harper's Ferry with 7,000, and converging on his rear Frémont with 15,000 *via* Wardensville, Shields with 10,000 *via* Front Royal, and behind him McDowell with 20,000 more—a total of 60,000 against his 16,000. His scouts informed him of the danger, and Shields drove a Confederate detachment out of Front Royal; but the general acted at once: he called on his troops for an effort, and by rapid marching they passed through Strasburg in time, and escaped the blow.

There can be no question of Jackson's decision and rapidity in thus eluding his foes; but, also, there can be no doubt that, if Frémont and Shields had displayed one half the energy and marching power after they came within striking distance that they had displayed in their first movements, it would have gone hard with the Confederate chief.

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